AnInformalTransitSystemHidinginPlainSight:Brooklyn’sDollarVansandTransportationPlanningandPolicyinNewYorkCity

EricL.Goldwyn

SubmittedinpartialfulfillmentoftheRequirementsforthedegreeof

DoctorofPhilosophyundertheExecutiveCommittee

oftheGraduateSchoolofArtsandSciences

COLUMBIAUNIVERSITY2017

©2017EricL.Goldwyn

AllRightsReserved

Abstract

AnInformalTransitSystemHidinginPlainSight:Brooklyn’sDollarVansandTransportationPlanningandPolicyinNewYorkCity

EricLouisGoldwyn

New York’s transit system serves millions of riders each day; the local

newspaperscomplainaboutthelackoffundingforinfrastructureprojects;andthe

City Council regularly hosts hearings about Bus Rapid Transit, bike-share, road

safety,e-hailtaxis,andgondolas.TransportationissuesmattertoNewYorkers,but

these debates, at the policy level, often focus on technology, budgets, and

regulations rather than the needs and experiences of passengers. This focus on

“technical” matters allows planners and politicians to confine transportation

debatestotherealmofexpertsratherthanengagethebroaderpublicinthem.

The failuretoaddresstheneedsofpassengers inBrooklynandQueenshas

ledtothedevelopmentofdollarvans.Dollarvansarehybridbus-taxis,alsoknown

as jitneys, thatprovidevital transportation links tomore than120,000 ridersper

day andoperatebeyond the control of the formal transit systemgovernedby the

Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA). While this ridership pales in

comparisontothedailyridershiponthesubwayorbus,itdoesrivalbusridership

incities likeDallasandMilwaukeeanddwarfsthe50,000peakridershipachieved

by Citi Bike, New York’s celebrated bike-share system. More important, the

durabilityofthevansrevealsthefailuresoftheexistingformalsystemtoserveall

NewYorkers.

Iarguethatthisfailureisimportantforthreereasons.First,thevansrespond

to a geographically specific problem: adequate access to inadequate service. The

vans thrive in busy transit corridors where MTA-owned buses come too

infrequently, are overcrowded, or are regularly stuck in traffic. On these busy

routes,thevansprovideamorereliablerideandalternativefortransit-dependent

populations looking tobypass the falteringbus system. Second, regulations fail to

reflectdailypractice.Thisgapbetweenpracticeandpolicyleavesvanoperatorsand

passengersinanawkwardlimbothatcriminalizesanindustryandjeopardizesthe

mobilityofentireneighborhoods.Third,sincethevansoperateoutsideoftheformal

system, traditional metrics, such as ridership, travel time, vehicle revenue miles,

etc.,arenotcollectedandcomparedagainstthemetricsofothermodesoperatedby

theMTA.Aslongasthevansremainanunknownquantity, it is impossibleforthe

CityandStatetoservetransit-dependentpopulationsinBrooklynandQueens.

In this dissertation, I use a mixed-methods research design to probe the

worldofthevansandarguethatcontinuedregulatoryuncertainty,longthefriendof

the vans, has the potential to upend them as development pressures and capital

investmentinCentralBrooklynintensifies.

i

TableofContents

ListofFigures............................................................................................................................iiIntroduction:DollarVans,Jitneys,andInformality.....................................................1ChapterTwo:AHistoryofNewYorkCity’sDollarVans..........................................34ChapterThree:HearMeHonk..........................................................................................69ChapterFour:AnInformalTransitSystemHidinginPlainSight.......................106ChapterFive:TheAnatomyofaNewDollarVanRoute.........................................131ChapterSix:PolicyRecommendationsandFutureResearch..............................153Appendix1:Survey............................................................................................................165Appendix2:LetterTemplateforVanOperators.....................................................167WorksCited..........................................................................................................................168

ii

ListofFigures

Figure1 AccesstoJobs 19Figure2 PirateVanvs.CommuterVan 37Figure3 CommuterVanPassengerBillofRights 63Figure4 CommuterVanDecalPilot 65Figure5 Informationalpalmcard 66Figure6 B32BusRouteMap 77Figure7 AnnualBusRidership 79Figure8 TotalVehicleSeizures 87Figure9 Vanseizures 88Figure10 AppendixtotheTLCBudget 92Figure11 NewYorkCityCarOwnershipRates 112Figure12 WhatisYourHourlyWage? 116Figure13 WhyVanRidersChooseVansOverBuses 121Figure14 CommuterVanTravelTimes 125Figure15 B41BusTravelTimes 126Figure16 FlatbushAvenuevanroutemap 128Figure17 CaribbeanPopulationAlongFlatbushAvenue2000 138Figure18 CaribbeanPopulation2008-2012 139Figure19 PopulationChangeinFiveCensusTracts 140Figure20 WestIndianPopulationchangeinFiveCensusTracts 141Figure21 CensusTractPercentageWestIndian 142Figure22 CaribbeanPopulationAlongNewRoute2000 143Figure23 CaribbeanpopulationAlongNewRoute2008-2012 144Figure24 WestIndianPopulationChangeinFiveCensusTracts 145Figure25 LookingsoutheastonBerrimanStreet2012 148Figure26 LookingsoutheastonBerrimanStreet2014 149Figure27 TheFlatbushandEastNewYorkroutes 151Figure28 Newer,largervansonFlatbushAvenue 153

iii

Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not be possible without the help and guidance of

friends, family, colleagues, and the people I havemet along theway.Without the

generosity of the people I interviewed from the Taxi and Limousine Commission,

DepartmentofTransportation,DepartmentofCityPlanning,NewYorkCityCouncil,

Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and all of the people associated with the

vans,therewouldbenothingbutsomemisguidedthoughtsbasedonconjectureand

afewarticlesIreadwhileridingthesubway.

ThankyouAaronReiss,AviFlamholz,CuthbertOnikute,AnnalisaLiberman,

and Jonathan Izen for all of your help with mapmaking, collecting surveys, and

computer programing. Ali Rasoulinejad always came through with historical City

Council documents and transcripts when I needed them. These invaluable

contributionsallowedmetoimprovemyargumentsandvisualizemydataclearly.

MycolleaguesatColumbiaprovidedsupport,encouragement,andcompleted

dissertations that I have looked to for formatting guidance. My cohort—Dory

Thrasher, John West, and Banke Oyeyinka—provided friendship and room for

intellectualexploration.JigarBhattandLaurenFischeralwaysaskedquestionsand

encouragedmeasIdevelopedmyideas.LauraLietograciouslyreadachapterand

sentme comments all theway fromNapoli. JonathanEnglishprovided thoughtful

feedback on a number of chapters and our conversations,meals, andwalks have

alwaysbeenproductiveandfun.

Anumberoffriendshavetakenaninterestinmyworkandhavevolunteered

toreadachapterorlistentomeexplainmythinking.NickKleinwasoneofthefirst

iv

peopletoreadmyearliestattemptsatthedissertation.DaniellaGitlinsatwithme

andhelpedmewithmywriting. Shealso inspiredChapterThree’s title, “Hearme

Honk.”AnnSmithpushedmetoreturntoschoolandpursuemydoctorate.Liliana

Greenfield-Sanders took on the unenviable task of editing two chapters. David

Parker’stwenty-yearfriendshiphasmademethepersonIam.Hisintellect,critical

mind,andwitremindmethatIhavealongwaytogo.

My committee—Paige West, Robert Beauregard, Elliott Sclar, and Steven

Gregory—engagedwithmy ideas andwriting andprovided theoccasional kick in

the pants or kind word when I needed it. Each of them helped me understand

abstruse concepts or introduced me to entirely new worlds, for which I will be

forevergrateful.

Myadvisor,DavidKing,alwaysallowedmetogooffandpursuetheideasand

methods that interested me. He always made me justify my decisions and think

aboutexistingliteraturesandmethods,buthesupportedmychoicesandreminded

metoassertmyselfasascholar.

Myfamilyismyrock.Marc,Ellen,Caroline,Alex,Joyce,Norman,Rouben,and

CharlottehavemonitoredmyprogressandtakenmyhinttochangethetopicwhenI

nolongerwantedtodiscussmywork.Mymomanddadhavealwaysbelievedinme

andnurturedmyideas.Icannotimaginedoingthiswithouttheirloveandsupport.

Mymom’sexcellentexampleofhowtobeanacademichasstayedwithmeduring

my time at Columbia. As a child, I watched her write and re-write, prepare her

classes, and negotiate life at the university all while being my mom. My dad’s

boundless curiosity and enthusiasm are two qualities I have tried to bring tomy

v

research. Both parents have been patient listeners, sage advisors, and irrational

conspirators.

1

Introduction:DollarVans,Informality,andJitneys

ThePresentistheFuture

Being uninformed is rarely a virtue. Being uninformedwhile regulating an

industryisneveravirtue.Inthisdissertation,IarguethattheCityandStateofNew

York’s current regulatory approach to dollar vans fails to match the practice of

dollar vans in portions of Brooklyn and Queens. This dissonance creates an

opportunityfortheCityandStatetore-organizethesesectionsofthecitytoserve

their needs, be it to attract a wealthier residential tax base or curate a more

“orderly”city,ratherthantheneedsofexistingresidents.Itisthistensionbetween

lawsandpracticethatmakesthevansinformaldespiteoperatinginNewYork,the

wealthiestcityinthewealthiestcountryintheworld,undertheauspicesoftheTaxi

andLimousineCommission(TLC).

While the vans are informal and poorly understood by the City, every few

yearstheCitytriestoincorporatethemintotheformaltransitnetwork.In2010,for

instance,thevansbecameatopicofinterestinlocaltransportationdebatesbecause

the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) announced widespread service

reductions in the outer boroughs and the TLC responded with a plan to deploy

dollarvans—re-brandedas“groupridevehicles”—onfiveformerMTAbusroutes.

The Group Ride Vehicle Pilot Project failed to achieve the TLC’s goal of

providing affordable transit service to New Yorkers who had recently lost bus

service.While following the pilot, I started attending theNewYork City Council’s

Committee on Transportation’s monthly meetings to get a better sense of the

2

transportation issues that merited its attention. By 2013, I had begun to attend

every regularly scheduledmeeting and continued to do so until the end of 2015.

During this period, I monitored local transportation proposals and listened to

expertsextol thevirtuesof streetcars, aUticaAvenue subway, congestionpricing,

bike share, car share, e-hail taxis, ferries, Bus Rapid Transit, lower fares on

commuter rails, and gondolas. It appeared that everything short of teleportation

would be considered before anyone thought to take advantage of an existing

resourcewithaprovenrecordofmovingpeople,thevans.

ThenonOctober22,2015somethingexcitinghappened.TheCommitteeon

Transportation held a hearing to debate three bills related to licensed commuter

vans.Itwasneverclearthisdaywouldcome,butpositivesignshadbeenvisiblefor

a fewyears. City CouncilMember I.DaneekMiller, a former bus driver and labor

leader, had made a point of criticizing the vans whenever possible. Meanwhile,

HectorRickettshadspentthelastfewyearsorganizinghisfellowvanoperatorsand

workingwithMatthewDaus, a former chair and commissioner of the TLC, and a

groupofattorneysto lobbytheCityCounciltore-examinetheexistingregulations

governingthevans.

I had alreadywritten a largeportion ofmydissertationby the timeof the

hearing, but I observed it in person. As I argue and document throughout the

dissertation, the regulators and elected officials charged with developing

transportationpolicyarepoorly informedaboutthevanstheyoversee. Thisbasic

level of confusion is clearly captured in a brief back-and-forth between Council

Member Ydanis Rodriguez, chair of the Committee on Transportation, andMeera

3

Joshi, the chair and chief executive officer of the TLC, during the October 22nd

hearingaboutthenumberoflicensedcommutervansinNewYork.1

Following Commissioner Joshi’s prepared testimony on the proposed bills,

Council Member Rodriguez asked her to clarify her comments on the number of

vansoperatinginthecity:“yousaidinthefirstpageofyourtestimonythatthereare

currently49authorizedcommutervans,butthatwehaveatotalof585commuter

vans operating in the city” (City Council 2015, p. 29)? In asking howmany vans

thereare,Rodriguezrevealshowlittleheknowsaboutthedollarvanindustry.2In

addition,aswewilllatersee,hisresponseshowsthathehasmixedupthemeaning

of“authorizations”andlicensedvans.

In an attempt not to draw attention to the Council Member’s confusion,

CommissionerJoshioutlinesthemetricsheragencycollects:

Yes, todaywe have 49 authorizations, and I can compare that with2010whenwehad50.Sothenumbersfluctuatedbetween,50,48,47.We’re now at 49. The number of vehicles attached to thoseauthorizations, and as I mentioned in my testimony, eachauthorization has an individual cap for the number of vehicles it’sallowedtohave.Overallwehave585vehiclesinservice,butthetotalcapofeveryauthorizationcombined is675.Soatnopointcouldwegoabovethenumber675.(CityCouncil2015,pp.29-30)

Here,Joshilaysoutthethreedifferentclassificationsthatheragencycounts:there

are49 authorizations, 585vans in service, and a capof 675 total vans that could

everbeinservicebasedonexistingregulations.

1It is the chair of a City Council committeewho decideswhich bills a committeewill debate andwhether therewillbevoteontheproposed legislation.Thus, it is incredibly important tohavethechair of the Committee on Transportation show an interest in the vans, if there is ever to belegislativemovement.2Inchaptertwo,Idefinecommutervan,dollarvan,andothertermsthatappearinthedissertationandarerelevanttotheindustry.

4

Rodriguez, however, still does not grasp the difference between

authorizationsandvehiclesinservice.Hepressesforwardwhenheasks,“Yeah,but

doesthismeanthat49[vans]hadapermit,and…536areoperatingwithoutbeing

licensed”(CityCouncil2015,p.30)?Rodriguezbelievesthereare49licensedvans

and 536 unlicensed vans. Rather than understanding the difference between

authorizations and licensed vans, hemerely subtracts the 49 authorizations from

the585vans,tocalculatethe536unlicensedvansnumber.

Joshi,onceagain,seekstoclarifyhertestimony.Sheexplains,“No…whenwe

say authorities, that’s akin to abase. So there’s—it’s almost like there’s49bases

and there’s 585 vehicles attached to those 49 bases. It’s a separate license” (City

Council2015,p.30).Finally,bylikeningacommutervanauthorizationtoafor-hire

vehicle base, Joshi finds the right words to translate van jargon into a language

Rodriguez understands. As the chair of the Committee on Transportation and a

former livery cab driver, Rodriguez knows that livery cabs are dispatched from a

base.ByJoshi’slogicthen,individualcommutervansmusthaveanauthorizationto

operate legally in New York. While these differences are clear to her, it is not

obviouswhyanyoneelsewould intuitivelygraspthesedifferenceswithoutcareful

explanation.

Finally,Rodriguez is satisfiedwith Joshi’sanswerabout licensedcommuter

vans. Now, he turns his attention to the unlicensed vans: “Okay. Sowhat is your

estimateonhowmanyareoperatingwithoutalicense”(CityCouncil2015,p.30)?

Until this moment in the hearing, Joshi has spoken from a position of

knowledge;however,unlicensedvansarebeyondherareaofexpertise:

5

It’s a difficult question. What I can give you is figures on what weseize,and—and there [sic]are just theportionof illegaloperators. Iactually in all honesty think that if you speak to the commuter vanoperators that areworking everyday and competingwith the illegaloperators, you will get a truer sense of what the volume of illegaloperatorsare[sic].Butit’ssafetosaythatitisprobably—Idon’tthinkequal, but not far off from equal. But I really would defer to theoperatorswhoexperiencedthiseveryday.(CityCouncil2015,pp.30-31)

Awkwardtranscriptionerrorsaside,itisevidentthatJoshiisunsureofthenumber

ofunlicensedvansoperatinginNewYorkandthatshebelievesactivevandrivers,

theverygroupsheregulatesandcouldeasilyconsultwith,arebetterinformedthan

sheis.

This brief series of questions and answers between the chair of the City

Council’sCommitteeonTransportationandtheleaderoftheTLC,theentitycharged

with regulating the vans, reveals just how uninformed the City’s transportation

leaders are about very simple descriptive data points about the vans. This is

especiallytroublingbecauseTLCChair JoshiknowsthattheanswertotheCouncil

Member’squestion isreadilyavailable,butrequiressomeonetopose it tothevan

driverssheregulates.Onthisspecificday, it justsohappened,thatscoresofthem

weresittingdirectlybehindherreadytosubmittheirtestimonyonthebillsinfront

of the committee. At no point during the two-and-a-half-hour hearing did she or

CouncilMemberRodriguezturntothevandriversandaskthemthisquestion.

vvv

In the rest of this chapter, I provide an overarching framework for the

dissertation:Ireviewkeyliteratures,provideanoverviewforthedissertationand

layoutmymethods.

6

LiteratureReview

This research engages two bodies of scholarship: urban informality and

transportation. By examining both literatures side-by-side, I am able to bring the

informality literature to bear on the transportation literature and vice-versa. By

bringing in the perspective of the informality literature, I extend the scope of the

transportation literature and ask questions about equity, social justice, and

regulationwhiletheorizingaboutthefutureofthevanswithframeworksdeveloped

in the informality literature. Examples of informality exist in the transportation

literature,thejitney,whichIhighlightbelow,bridgestheseliteraturesandprovides

relevantcontextonhowinformaltransportserviceshavebeenregulatedinthepast.

EvenNewYorkisInformal

TheCity’sinabilitytomaintainbasicdescriptivedatapointsaboutthevans,

ashighlightedearlier,speakstolargergapsinknowledgeaboutwheretheyoperate,

howfrequentlytheyrun,andhowmanypassengerstheyserve.Thisknowledgegap

is exacerbated by regulations that fail to reflect daily practice and the uneven

enforcement of the laws. For example, passengers flag down vans traveling along

Flatbush Avenue from the curb.While this practice is ubiquitous, the law clearly

statesthatitisillegaltohailanyvehiclefromthecurbotherthanayelloworgreen

taxi.Bylaw,allvanridesmustbepre-arranged,butinpracticeallvanridesignore

thisregulation,aregulationthatoutlawstheprimarymodeofinteractionbetween

vandriversandpassengers.

7

It is this tension between laws and practice thatmakes the vans informal.

Roy(2005)definesurbaninformalityas“astateofexceptionfromtheformalorder

of urbanization” (p. 147). Being exceptional, flouting existing laws, comes with

benefits and drawbacks. In the short-term, barriers to entry are limited and

providerscanadapttotheneedsofconsumersquickly.Therearevanstravelingup

and down Flatbush Avenue that do not have the appropriate insurance and are

operatedbyimproperlylicenseddrivers,buttherearealsovansprospectinginnew

neighborhoods to satisfy the travel needs of New Yorkers. These markers of

informality make it cheaper to operate a van, which in turn allows those with

limited resources and few job prospects to earn a living.3Over the long-term,

however,beingexceptionalisperiloustothoseoperatingundertheinformalrules.

Sustainedinformalityleadstodisinvestmentinsocialservicesanddevalorizationof

the land,which in turn provides the impetus for policy interventions that trigger

displacement, such asurban renewal, large-scale “Hausmannization”projects, and

thegentrificationofblightedneighborhoods(Roy2005,p.151).

Whiletheinformalityliteraturefocusesoncitiesindevelopingcountriesand

issueslikesquatting,itspeakstothethemesrelevanttothevans:legaluncertainty,

vulnerability to the application of the law, and state retrenchment (Roy and Al

Sayyad2003). Italsoprovidesawaytotheorizethe futureof thevans.As longas

dailypractice and the lawsdiverge, increased enforcementof existing regulations

willrunthevansofftheroad.Roy’s(2009)workonsquattersinIndiaunderscores

the tenuous relationship between informal actors and the state when laws and

3ItiscommonforlicensedvandriversonFlatbushAvenuetopay$1,000amonthforinsurance.

8

practiceareopposed.Aslongasthelawisunenforced,sheexplains,thestateretains

the ability to criminalize informal actors and remove them from the land. This

tensionleavesinformalactorsinafragileliminalspace.

Though the literature on informality grewout of experiences in the “Third

World,”scholarshaverecentlystudiedinformalityinAmericancities(Bromleyand

Gerry 1979; Rakowski 1994; Mukhija and Loukaitou-Sideris 2014). Much of this

work focuses on similar themes, such as housing, reclaiming space, globalization,

neoliberalism,andbasicsurvival(Mitchell2003;Venkatesh2006;Ehrenfeuchtand

Loukaitou-Sideris 2014; Crawford 2014). The experiences of street vendors, as

spelledoutinthisbroaderliterature,capturethelegallyuncertainexperiencesfaced

byvans(Duneier1999;Browneetal.2011;Devlin2011;Dunn2013;Kettles2014).

ConfusingLawsCreateSpaceforHarassment

Streetvendors, likedollarvandrivers, faceharassmentfromthepoliceand

store owners, have a weak grasp of the laws governing their profession, operate

withorwithoutalicense,andtheirbusinessesaremarginalizedbecausetheylook

different.InNewYork,advocacygroupsliketheStreetVendorProjecthelpeducate

vendorsabout their rights, lobby localgovernmenton theirbehalf, fight tickets in

court,andcreateacommunityofpoliticallyengagedvendors(StreetVendorProject

2003).Therearenoequivalentversionsof theStreetVendorProject in thedollar

van industry, though there have been recent efforts to organize and lobby

governmentofficials.

Streetvendorswithafirmgraspofthelawavoideasyticketsbystickingto

9

thestreetstheyareallowedtoworkonandrespectingthevariousregulationsthat

determinewhere they can locate on a specific block. According to the New York

Administrative code, the rules governing where a vendor can set-up are

unambiguous:

Novendingpushcartshallbelocatedagainstdisplaywindowsoffixedlocation businesses, nor shall they be within twenty feet of anyentrancewaytoanybuilding,store,theatre,moviehouse,sportsarenaor other place of public assembly, orwithin twenty feet from exits,includingserviceexits,tobuildingsthatareexclusivelyresidentialatthestreetlevel.(NewYorkAdministrativeCode§17-315(b))

ThislawspellsouttherestrictionsonwherevendorscansetuptheircartsonaNew

York street. Kettles (2014) refers to this as a “crystal” law, a law that limits the

discretion of a police officer (p. 228). While many of the laws governing street

vendorsarecrystallaws,theyarenotenforcedevenly,andvendors,policeofficers,

andstoreownersoftendonotknowthedetailsofeverylaw.

Confusionaboutlawscreatesspaceforharassment.Devlin(2011)illustrates

the precarious nature of legal street vending when he describes a contentious

encounterbetweenthemanagerofaMcDonald’sandastreetvendornamedFarha:

“As it became evident to Farha that afternoon, her own spatial legitimacy and

businesssecurityhadlittletodowithformallaws.Alegalvendinglocationinfront

ofanantagonisticstoreownerwasuntenablethankstofearanduncertaintybornof

complex and difficult to understand regulations” (p. 54). While Devlin has given

cover to theactors in thisexamplebydescribing the lawsas “complex,” themore

accuratedescriptionisthatFarhawasunsureofthelaws.Afterall,theMcDonald’s

manager either lied orwas uncertain about the law himself when he said it was

illegal forhertosell foodneararestaurant.Ratherthanfiguringoutthedetailsof

10

the law or continuing to deal with the harassment from the storeowner, Farha

decidedtomovetoalessburdensomelocation.

Harassment is not always confined to competitive disagreements. Street

vendors,licensedandunlicensed,areoftenhassledbecauseoftheirappearance.In

Duneier’s (1999) ethnography of sidewalk vendors in New York, he interviewed

Andrew Manshel, a lawyer working for the 34th Street and Grand Central

Partnership, two of the most prominent Business Improvement Districts in the

country. During the interview, Manshel explained that his group opposed street

vendorsbecausetheydefiedtheimagehisgroupwantedtopromote:

“It’smostlyabouthow they lookasmuchaswhat they’redoing. It’snotjustthatthey’resellingthingsinpublicspace,buttheydon’tlooklike they’vemadea capital investment inwhat theyaredoing.Theyarenotsellinghigh-qualitygoods.Whentheyaresellinghigh-qualitygoods,thereisanimplicationthatthegoodsarestolen.It’snotclearthat they are part of the social fabric. The problem—besides that itlooksdisorderedbecauseofthelackofcapitalinvestmentandthelackof social control imposed upon it—is that there is an element ofunfairnesswithpeoplewhoarerentingstoresandaresellingsimilarmerchandise and are paying taxes and minimum wage and rent.”(p.234)

This extended excerpt reveals two interlocking ideas. First, street vendors do not

conform to the normative values espoused by the Grand Central and 34th Street

Partnership.Since they lookdingyandarenotbrick-and-mortarstores, theymust

be trading in low-value goods or stolen goods. Nowhere in this response does

Manshel mention that street vending is legal and thus protected under the law

regardlessofthevalueofthegoodsbeingsold.Second,becausestreetvendorslook

different thanManshel’s idealretailer, it isokay toapply the lawselectively.After

all, these vendors have not made a capital investment or paid rent to the

11

landownerswhopayduestoManshel’sorganizations.

This tension between normative values and legal uncertaintymakes street

vendors,especiallythosewholookdifferentordonothaveafirmgraspofthelaw,

ripeforharassmentanddisplacement(Dunn2013).Justasdollarvansoperatewith

impunityalongFlatbushAvenuewhenthepoliceallowthemtodoso,streetvendors

relyoninformalsanctionratherthantheletterofthelawtoensuretheirplaceon

the street. Thus, the law appears to have little to dowith the day-to-day lives of

street vendors and dollar van drivers. As Devlin notes, street vendors seek out

spaceswhere they canoperatewithout fearof harassment regardlessof the legal

implications: “thespatialarrangementofvendingoncertainblockshas lesstodo

withwhatformallawdesignatesandmoretodowiththewillingnessofindividual

storeownersandpropertyorganizations…tointimidate,threaten,orharassvendors

andthewillpowerofindividualvendorstocontestorevadethesetactics”(p.57).

DustingofftheJitney

Dollarvansareaninformaltransportationservice.Attheircore,thevansare

shared-ridevehiclesthatoffertheflexibilityofataxiforthepriceofthesubwayor

thebus.NewYork’svansareanexampleofamodethathasexistedsincethedawn

oftheautomobile,thejitney.Today’svansholdmorepassengersthanthejitneysof

theearly1900s,buttheincreasedflexibilityovermonopoly-runtransitservicesata

competitivecostremainsunitesthesemodes100yearslater.

The jitneys of the 1910s, similarly, were shared-ride vehicles that took

peoplewheretheyneededtogoforaflatfee.Notalljitneyswerealike.AstheNew

12

YorkTimes(1915) pointed out, in some cities jitneys “maintain regular routes, in

others they cruise, and in still others they follow the street car lines” (n.p.). This

variabilitymakesitdifficulttodevelopadefinitivedescriptionofthejitneys,butlike

today’s dollar vans, they represent a flexible transportation option that combined

theaffordabilityoftransitwiththeconvenienceofataxi.

In the early twentieth century, Americans in cities across the country

embraced the jitneys’ flexibility and low prices, but they thrived in response to

transitriders’displeasurewithstreetcarmonopoliesand largersocial issues,such

ashighunemployment,racism,andtheavailabilityofcheapusedcars.Noteveryone

celebratedtheemergenceofjitneys.Incityaftercity,localpoliticians,influencedby

streetcarinterestsandconcernsaboutwhetherthejitneyscouldsatisfytheneedsof

atransit-captivepublic,introducedregulationsthatreducedthejitneys’presenceto

ahandfulofcitiestargetingspecificgroupsandneighborhoods.

There isnorecordofanopeningceremony to inaugurate the launchof the

first jitney.ThemayorofLosAngelesorPhoenixorNewYorkwasnotonhandto

cutany ribbons, takeaphoto,or commemorate theeventbysmashingabottleof

champagneonthehoodofausedFordModelT.AccordingtoDoolittle(1915),the

jitneysoriginatedinthesouthernandwesterncitiesofNorthAmericain1914.He

attributes their development to the novelty of riding in a car, high levels of

unemployment, advertisements in local newspapers, and the availability of

inexpensive secondhand cars. Suzuki’s (1985) work on “vernacular” taxis shows

thatjitneysthrivedinChattanoogaafteraboycottagainstthecity’strolleybyblack

residents. Instead of allowing Jim Crow laws to define their travel, a black

13

entrepreneur organized “his six Cadillacs and Packards into the first black jitney

operationinthecity”(p.338).Extendingtheargumentsofpreviousauthors,Bottles

(1987)andMcShane(1994)foundovercrowdingandgeneraldispleasurewiththe

streetcars tobe critical to the rise of the jitneys.Hodges (2006) concurswith the

analysisofDoolittle,Suzuki,Bottles,andMcShane,butoffersaslightwrinkletothe

jitney origin story. He asserts that the first jitneys developed during a 1913

streetcarstrikeinPhoenix.WhetherthejitneysoriginatedinLosAngeles,Phoenix,

or elsewhere matters little.4What does matter is that the jitneys took hold in

Americancitiesbecauseofhighratesofunemployment,dissatisfactionwithexisting

transitoptions,racialdiscrimination,andtheavailabilityofaffordableusedcars.

The jitneys strained the existing regulatory framework of transportation

services inAmerican cities.As longas jitneyoperatorsmaintainedagapbetween

themselvesandregulations,theycouldmakealiving(Doolittle1915).Regulations,

however,eventuallycaughtuptothejitneys.InLosAngeles,forinstance,“TheCity

Councilhadessentiallylegislatedthejitneysoffthestreetsbecauseitdidnotbelieve

thatthisformoftransportationcouldreplacethecity-andcountywiderailsystem.

Tohaveallowedcontinuedjitneycompetitionwouldhavethreatenedtheviabilityof

the city’s urban transportation system” (Bottles 1987, p. 69). In cities across the

country, the legislation directed at jitneys sought to protect streetcar companies’

monopolyovertransitbymakingitmoreexpensiveforjitneystooperate.Themost

commonlocalordinancesrequiredjitneyoperatorstoestablishfranchises;charged

licensing fees; restricted the hours of operation; forced jitneys to adhere to fixed4Therearereferencestojitneysoperatingpriorto1913inbooksandarticles,butthereferenceisalwaysgeneralandwithoutconcreteevidence(Bianco1999andStout2011).

14

routes and schedules; mandated jitneys to serve long routes, which proved

uneconomical;proscribedjitneysfromoperatingalongroutesservedbystreetcars;

developedsafetystandards, suchasspeed limitsanddriver fitness;and increased

insurance requirements (Eckert and Hilton 1972, pp. 308-320). The outcome of

theseregulationswasdramaticandswift,“Between1915and1918thenumberof

jitneys operatingnationally declined from62,000 to6,000” (Goldwyn2014). This

swift crackdown on jitneys speaks to the precarious position informal operators

occupy.

While the data shows that regulations basically eradicated the jitneys by

1920,theyre-emergedinthe1970s.Citieswithlargeimmigrantandblacktransit-

dependentpopulations, suchasBaltimore,Boston,Chicago,NewYork,Miami,and

Omaha, supported illegal jitneys that adapted to changing development patterns

better than public transit authorities (Teal and Nemer 1986; Davis 1990; Suzuki

1995;Cervero1997;Richmond2001).Cervero(1997)highlightsthejitneys’ability

to help transit-dependent populations to spatial barriers created by growing

automobile ownership rates and suburbanization when he writes, “While public

transit authorities have gotten into the business of running reverse-commute

services…. For inner city residents who cannot afford to own a car, shared-ride

jitneysandvans thatprovide low-priced, curb-to-curbserviceareamong thenext

bestthing”(p.10).

Evenasjitneysprovedeffectiveforsomecommunities,municipalregulations

continued to outlaw the jitneys. This time around, however, enforcement and

regulationsseemeduninterestedinrunningthejitneysofftheroad.Withoutaclear

15

enemy or vested interest to lobby local officials—by this time the federal

government had financed the public takeover of transit through the Urban Mass

TransitActof1964—thissecondgenerationof jitneysdevelopedonthe fringesof

established transit markets (Richmond 2001). Suzuki (1995) speculates on the

hesitancetoupholdthelawsprohibiting“vernacular”taxis,anothertermforjitneys,

in Boston when he writes, “There have been some attempts to crack down on

vernacularsinBoston,butwithlittlesuccesstodate.Perhapsacontributingreason

for relaxed enforcement is that vernaculars often are willing to travel to

neighborhoods thatmedallioncabdrivers consider tobe toodangerous” (p.130).

Suzuki’sfindingisanimportantonebecauseitspatializesthejitneysandpointsto

the uneven application of the law. Jitneys are not ubiquitous. They cluster in the

areaswhere they are needed and operatewhere they do not draw the ire of the

state.

OutlineoftheDissertation

I describe theworldof thedollarvansacross threeaxes. First, I place the

vanscirca2016intotheirappropriatecontext.ThismeansthatIwillexploretheir

history,detailingrelevant legislativeandregulatoryactions,andanswerquestions

such as: why did the vans originate in West Indian neighborhoods in the outer

boroughsandhowdidthevanscometoberegulatedbytheTLC?Inchaptertwo,I

define my terms using archival methods to piece together this story so that the

16

readergainsinsightintotherelationshipbetweenthevansandtheirchiefregulator,

theTLC.

Second,Idescribewhyplanners,especiallythosechargedwithregulatingthe

vans,knowsolittleaboutthem.InChapterThree,Ipresentmyinterviewswiththe

plannerswho shape transportation planning and policy in New York. It is in this

chapter that I connect the vans with issues of social justice, gentrification, and

informality.

Third, I compare thevans to conventionalmodesof transit, specifically the

bus. In chapter four, I situate the vans within the broader transit literature. By

surveying van passengers, scraping BusTime data, and timing van rides, I

demonstrate that the vans operate like any other conventional mode of transit.

Whilethevansmaylookdifferentfromthebusandsubway,theyprovidethesame

function:reliableconnectionstopeopleonthemove.

ChapterfivedevelopedwhileIwasdoingmyresearch.Oneofthebenefitsof

ethnographicresearchisthatitallowsnewinformationtoshapeitasthelandscape

inevitably shifts. In this chapter, I detail one van operator’s desire to start a new

route. I comparehisanecdotalobservationsaboutchangesalongFlatbushAvenue

withempiricaldatacollectedbytheCensusandMTA.

Inchaptersix,theconcludingchapter,Ireturntomy6researchquestions,outline6

policyrecommendations,andidentifyfutureareasofresearch.Mydissertationboth

describeshowdollarvansfitintothelargerdebateaboutinformalityandargues

thatdollarvans—likestreetvendorsandsquatters—signifyneighborhood-level

disinvestmentandcontributetothedevalorizationofland.Thestate’swithdrawal

17

ofbasicservicesfrompoorandpoliticallydisenfranchisedneighborhoodslaysthe

groundworkfortheprocessofgentrificationtotakerootanddisplaceexisting

communitiesandtheirculture.“AnInformalTransitSystemHidinginPlainSight”is

notmeanttobethefinalwordonFlatbushAvenuedollarvans,butrathersheds

lightonanalltoooftenoverlookedareaoftransportationplanningandpolicythat

requiresimmediateattention.

ResearchQuestionsandMethodology

In the following four chapters I use a mixed methods research design to

answer6primaryresearchquestions:1)Howdidexistingvanregulationscometo

bedivorcedfromdailypractice;2)Howdoplannersandpolicymakersthinkabout

thevans;3)Howdoplannersandpolicymakersconstructtransportationpolicy;4)

Whydo van passengers choose the vans over the bus; 5)What are the operating

characteristics of the vans and how do they compare to the bus; 6) How are

demographics changing along the Flatbush Avenue corridor and a proposed East

NewYorkcorridor?

EthnographicMethodsandTransportationResearch

WhileNewYorkandtransithavebeensynonymousforacentury,accessto

speedy,reliabletransitisunevenacrossthefiveboroughs(Sparberg,2015;Raskin

2013). When the City of New York (2007) published PlaNYC 2030, its long-term

18

sustainabilityplan,itdescribedgoodaccesstotransitasbeingwithinahalf-mileofa

bus or subway station. By this measure, which is generally accepted within the

discipline, the neighborhoods adjacent to Flatbush Avenue, the site of this

dissertation,haverobustaccesstothebus.However,busaccessandsubwayaccess

areunequal(Guerraetal.2012).

Theconsequencesofploddingbus serviceandspatial separationaregreat,

especiallywhen other areas of a city are served by swift, dependable transit that

easesaccessto jobs,services,andeverythingelseacityhastooffer(Handy1994;

Handy2002;Ross2000;Blumenberg andManville 2004; Julnes andHalter2000;

Kawabata 2003). Using the Regional Plan Association’s (2014) Access to jobs

interactive tool, one can quickly visualize how uneven job access is based on

proximitytotransitmode.5WhenmeasuringjobaccessfromMidtownManhattan,a

30-minutetransitrideprovidesaccesstonearlythreemillionjobs.Allofthataccess

is theby-product, inpart, of adensenetworkofoverlapping subways, buses, and

commuter rail lines. When one uses the same tool to map access to jobs from

Flatlands, Brooklyn, an area served by the vans, that number drops to roughly

75,000 jobs, or 97 percent fewer jobs [Figure 1]. Here, Flatlanders only have

immediate access to the bus, which explains the tight clustering of jobs when

comparedtothespreadofjobsaccessiblefromMidtownManhattan.Asaresultof

beingprimarilydependentonthebus—Flatlanderscanconnect to thesubwayvia

the bus, but that addsmore time to their commute—the promise ofNewYork is

beyondthereachoftransitdependentpopulationsinFlatlands,Brooklyn.

5ThevanswerenotincludedintheAccesstojobsinteractivetool.

19

Figure1:TheRegionalPlanAssociation’sAccesstojobsinteractivejob-accesstool(RPAn.d.).

20

The vans respond to a geographically specific problem: adequate access to

inadequate transit service. To better understand why the City and its residents

tolerateunequalaccesstotransit,Iexaminedtransportationplanningmethodsand

policy formation inNewYorkusing ethnographicmethods to gain greater insight

intohowthevansareregulatedandunderstoodbypolicymakers(Creswell2007,p.

94). Over the course of 50 community meetings and semi-structured interviews

with policymakers, elected officials, regulators, private sector transportation

planners, van drivers and operators, transportation advocates, community

organizers, and an extensive review of documents from the City of New York, I

discovered that transportation planning in New York is often ad hoc rather than

systematicandthatpoliticalanddevelopmentpressuresoftenguidedecisionsabout

whatisstudied.

This planning process has allowed the vans to toil in obscuritywhile new

regulationshavebeenaddedinresponsetospecificcrises,namelysafetyconcerns

or the reduction of bus service, rather than any consistent planning approach to

understandthetravelneedsofthecommunitiesservedbythevansortherealities

of how the vans operate. Ostrom (1990) argues thatwhen the state regulates an

industrywithoutknowledgeorthemeanstoenforceitsregulations,theuncertainty

createdbythoseregulationsincentivizesselfishbehaviorthatunderminesthelong-

termviabilityoftheresource.Sheusestheexampleofforestnationalizationtomake

herpoint:

In some of these countries, national agencies issued elaborateregulationsconcerningtheuseofforests,butwereunabletoemploysufficient numbers of foresters to enforce those regulations. Theforesters who were employed were paid such low salaries that

21

acceptingbribesbecameacommonmeansofsupplementingincome.The consequence was that nationalization created open-accessresources where limited-access common-property resources hadpreviouslyexisted.(emphasisintheoriginal)(p.23)

For Ostrom’s purposes, a set of de facto regulations existed prior to states’

intervention.Whilethedefactoregulationswereflawed,theyalsosafeguardedthe

longevity of the resourceby limiting access and curbingbehavior that threatened

thelong-termviabilityoftheresource.Oncethestateoverturnedthosecenturyold

rules,however, the forestsbecameopen-access resources thatanyonecouldmine

withoutthecheckofeithertheolddefactoregulationsorthenewstate-sanctioned

onesduetotheprevalenceofbribery.Withnoenforceablechecksandnocertainty,

individuals, she argues, are encouraged to log as much of the forest as possible

because there is no guarantee that the forest will be a viable resource into the

future.Inthecaseofthevans,wherethestate’sregulationsareappliedsporadically,

weseeasimilaropen-accessproblemasdescribedabove:driversfightforaccessto

thecurb,wherethepassengersare,whichinturnleadstorecklessdriving,needless

congestion,violentconfrontations,andanoverproductionofvans.

Whiletheseexternalitiesareacute,theyoccurinareasofthecitybeyondthe

focusofmunicipalinvestmentorinterest—fornow—whichmakestheseareaseasy

to ignore, dismiss as intractable, or police erratically (Rios2014;Roy2009). This

bifurcation of the city, areas of investment, planning, and interest versus

everywhereelse,representsaparadigmshift inhowmunicipalserviceshavebeen

distributedhistorically.

Asthegoalofmunicipalserviceprovisioninmanycitiesacrosstheglobehas

transitioned fromubiquitous coverage to serving areasof the city that can turn a

22

profit,orbecustomized tomatchresident’swillingness topay,newsystemshave

emerged, such as informal water delivery and unsanctioned transport services

(Suzuki1985;Uzzell1987;GrahamandMarvin2001;McDonald2008;Cerveroand

Golub 2007;Acey 2010; Bhatt 2014;Oviedo-Hernandez andDávila 2016).During

this same period of fracture or “splintering,” to borrow a term fromGraham and

Marvin (2001), the planning literature has shifted its focus from externalities

created by polluting land-uses to an emphasis on inequality rooted in social

disadvantage.Thesetypesof“invisible”networks,whichservethesamefunctionas

formalandstatesanctionednetworks,representattemptsbydisadvantagedgroups

to overcomeneglect at the state level and achieve regular access to vital services

(Taylor1998,p.148;Scott1998).

The growing number of examples of unplanned transport systems—

unplanned, as in not planned by the state—speaks to both the inability of the

engineering and economics paradigms, dominant in transportation planning, to

account for the rich variety of systems that have emerged in the face of centrally

plannedtransitsystemsandanexclusionarymodeofgovernancethatfavorsareas

of cities that attract capital investment (Walder 1985; Golub 2003; Garrison and

Levinson2006;CerveroandGolub2007).Thesenetworks,or“darktwins”asScott

(1998)would say, and the spaceswhere they thrive embody Soja’s (1989) socio-

spatial dialectic. Soja argues that social relations affect the organization and

productionof spaceand that spatial arrangementsandproduction reflect existing

socialrelations:“Thestructureoforganizedspace isnotaseparatestructurewith

its own autonomous laws of construction and transformation, nor is it simply an

23

expressionoftheclassstructureemergingfromsocial(andthusaspatial?)relations

ofproduction,relationswhicharesimultaneouslysocialandspatial”(p.78).Thus,

thesenetworksareanoutgrowthoftheplacestheyoperatein.

These attempts to overcome disadvantage are valuable pieces of feedback

that planners can learn from as they think about housing, food systems, and

transport (Uzzell 1990; Ferreira andGolub 2004). To improve transport network

design and serve those most transit-dependent populations, it is critical to

understandhowpeoplegetaroundandhowexistingtransitsystemsfailorsucceed

toservethem(Rogalsky2010;Perrotta2015).

By focusing on the vans, I was able to study transportation planning and

policy inNewYork throughan “atypical case.”Rather than tackling the sprawling

MTA, the owner and operator of New York City’s buses, subways, and commuter

rail,thecommutervansprovidedanopportunitytofocusspecificallyontheissueof

adequate access to inadequate servicewhile also studyinghow theMTAplans its

servicesandhowtransportationactorsacrossthecitycoordinate.Flyvbjerg(2006,

p.229)arguesthatatypicalcases

revealmoreinformationbecausetheyactivatemoreactorsandmorebasicmechanisms in thesituationstudied. Inaddition, frombothanunderstanding-orientedandanaction-orientedperspective,itisoftenmore important toclarify thedeepercausesbehindagivenproblemand itsconsequences than todescribe thesymptomsof theproblemandhowfrequentlytheyoccur.

Byrepeatedlyaskingdifferentinterviewsubjectsaboutthevans,theywereforced

tospeaktohowtheythoughtaboutthevansandincorporatedthemintotheirlong-

term planning exercises rather than describe transportation planning and policy

abstractly. Thisorganizedour interviewsaround thevans,but still allowedus to

24

talkaboutthesubwayandbusinatargetedmannerwhilefocusingonhowthevans

factorintobroadertransportationpolicydecision-making.

Tobetterunderstandthevariation,richness,andgapsinthetransportation

planning and policy terrain in New York, I use ethnographic methods to bring

multiple viewpoints into contact with one another. Through my interviews and

regularattendanceat localmeetings, I strive toaddanewvoice to transportation

policy debates—the voice of the commuter van industry—provide a fuller

understanding of people’s needs, and show how uninformed policy fails entire

neighborhoods.

Transportationplanningmethodspurporttoprovideacomprehensiveview

of the world. This flattening, through the use of central tendencies, marginalizes

differenceandpaintsafalsepictureofthecity.Haraway(1991)arguesthatunified

knowledge that is easily filtered through a black box is amyth, and that instead,

knowledgeisinherentlyparticular,unique,partial,andsituated:

There is no unmediated photograph or passive camera obscura inscientific accounts of bodies and machines; there are only highlyspecific visual possibilities, eachwith awonderfully detailed, active,partial way of organizing worlds. All these pictures of the worldshould not be allegories of infinite mobility and interchangeability,butofelaboratespecificityanddifferenceandthelovingcarepeoplemighttaketolearnhowtoseefaithfullyfromanother’spointofview.(p.190)

Unabletocreateagod’seyeviewoftheworld,itisincumbentupontransportation

planners to connect multiple perspectives to develop a more informed

understandingoftheneedsandgapsinexistingtransportationnetworks.

25

ReconstructingtheRegulatoryHistoryoftheVans

Dollarvansdeveloped in the1970sas theCity’s fiscalcrisis threatenedthe

provisionofpublicservices,representinga“splintering”oftransitoptionsfordaily

riders (Blumenthal1975). Insteadofwaiting for theCityandState todelivervital

transportation services, local entrepreneurs seized the opportunity and offered

faster andmore reliable van services.6I reconstruct the regulatory history,which

starts inearnest inthe1980s, inordertoanswermyfirstresearchquestion:How

didexistingvanregulationscometobedivorcedfromdailypractice?Toanswerthis

question, Iused twomethods: archival researchandsemi-structured interviews. I

carefully mined the TLC’s archive of monthly meeting minutes, TLC policies,

relevantnewspaperarticles,thefewCitysanctionedstudiesofthevans,CityCouncil

testimony,andtwocourtcases.Inordertoroundouttheregulatoryhistory,Ialso

conductedthreeinterviewswithcurrentandformerTLCemployeesandaformer-

City Council member to clarify the official record provided by the examined

documents.

IexaminedtheTLC’sarchiveofmonthlymeetingstoseewhattheTLC’sstaff

and commissioners knew about the vans during key regulatory moments in the

vans’history.Todothis,IreviewedeverymonthlyTLChearingbetween1990and

1999.TheTLCfirsttookupregulatoryoversightoverthevansintheearly1990s.I

also reviewed transcripts from the 2000s because the TLC initiated van-related

policiesduringthisperiod.Thetranscriptsfromthe1990sarenotavailableonthe

TLCwebsite.Fortunately,aTLCemployeewasgenerousenough tomakeadigital6Evenbeforethevans,“gypsy”cabsservedareasofthecitythatyellowcabsrefusedtoserve(Bigart1968).

26

copyofeachmeetingforme.IusedtwomethodstoensureIfoundeverymentionof

the vans. First, I read every single transcript of each meeting and coded each

instance the vans appeared in the transcripts. This comprehensive approach

allowedme to catchevery reference to thevans that reliedon context toaddress

them.Inaddition,itprovidedmewithinvaluableinsightintowhatoccurredduring

these meetings. In these meetings, the TLC commissioners reviewed policy and

disciplinary actions against drivers who had violated the Commission’s rules.

Second,Idouble-checkedmyreadingbyusingadocumentsearchforeachmeeting

that included the terms “vans,” “dollar,” “local law115,” “local law83,” “Ricketts,”

and “commuter” to guarantee I found each mention in the transcripts. Over the

courseof96meetings,aperiodthatsawthevanscomeunder theruleof theTLC

anda lawsuit thatredefined theCommission’sauthority, thevanscameupbriefly

10 times. In three of these instances, the commissioners discussed extending

existing yellow taxi and livery policies to the vans, such as cell phone usage

restrictions and the severity of penalties and suspensions (Taxi and Limousine

Commission1999a;TaxisandLimousineCommission1999b).

AsIreconstructedmorerecentregulatoryevents,namelytwopoliciesfrom

2010and2014,ItargetedmysearchoftheTLCarchive.Insteadofreadinganentire

decade’sworthofmeetingminutes,Ifocusedonmeetingsfromtheyearthepolicies

wereannounced.Thisapproachprovedeffectivefortworeasons.First,I learneda

great deal about the context surrounding the two policies that interested me.

Second,duringthisreading,IcameacrossanotherTLC-vanregulatoryexamplethat

provedusefultomyresearch.

27

In1993,theCityCouncil’sCommissiononTransportationheldahearingon

the vans. The purpose of themeetingwas to debate proposed local legislation to

regulate the vans. Through a contact at the City Council, I acquired an electronic

copy of all of thewritten testimony and transcripts from the hearing.7I read and

coded this 226-page document in its entirety. In addition to this reading, I also

trackeddowntwoDepartmentofTransportationreportsthatfocusedonthevans.

Since these reports are standalone documents, I read them, took notes, and

investigatedrelevantreferences.

The last archival source I consulted during my research was that of

newspapers and journals. I used databases through the Columbia University

Library’swebsite,Google,andlocalnewspapers,includingtheNewYorkTimes,Daily

News, New York Post, and neighborhood newspapers in Brooklyn and Queens. I

searched for the terms “van,” “dollarvan,“ “commutervan,” “local law115,” “local

law83,”groupridevehicle,”and“TaxiandLimousineCommission.”Anytimethese

searchesreturnedresults, Iwould lookat thedateand titleof thearticle tomake

sure it was relevant. Often times, my searches turned up articles in Dutch. I

discardedthese.Forrelevantarticles,Ireadandcodedthemaccordingly.

UnderstandingHowPlannersPlanandHowtheVansFactorintoPlans

Transportation research tends to emphasize quantitative methods that

project ridership, describe operating characteristics, or compare costs versus

benefits(Dickey1983;Seely1987;Black1995;Lewis1997;Gómez-Ibáñez,Tye,and

7SomerefertothisasaBillJacket.

28

Winston1999;GarrisonandLevinson2005).Whilesomeoftheseconcernsappear

in thisresearch,myresearchquestionsweremoreprocessoriented.Specifically, I

asked: How do planners and policymakers think about the vans; and how do

planners and policymakers construct transportation policy? I relied on semi-

structuredinterviewsandfieldnotestoanswertheseresearchquestions.

Thegoalofthispartoftheresearchwastoexaminetransportationplanning

andpolicymakingupclose.InFlyvbjerg’s(1998)Rationality&Power,hearguedthat

onlybybringingthereaderintotheworldofhiscasethroughtherichdescriptionof

eventsinAalborg,Denmarkcouldthereaderadequatelyjudgeandunderstandthe

socialandpoliticalcontextthatinformshiscase.Ratherthanatomizingastrandof

thepolicyprocess,Flyvbjergadvocatesforaholisticview:

Inthisbook,IwilltakethereaderthroughthestreetsandalleywaysofAalborg.Wewillexplorethecityfirsthandinsteadofreadingmapsof it; we will investigate the actual practices of politics,administration, and planning before their rules; andwewill not besatisfiedbylearningonlyaboutthosepartsofthepracticesthattakeplace in public…. For readers who stick with the minutiae of theAalborg story from beginning to end, the payback will be anawarenessofissuesofdemocracy,rationality,andpowerthatcannotbeobtainedfrom“maps,”thatis,summaries,concepts,ortheoreticalformulae.Achievingsuchawarenessiscentraltodevelopingjudgmentand expertise in political and administrative affairs and in carryingoutresearchintosuchaffairs.(p.7)

LikeFlyvbjerg,Iexplorehowpolicyismadeandwhatpolicymakersdoonaday-to-

daybasisthroughinterviewsandfieldnotesfromhearingsandmeetings.

By interviewing current and former elected officials, planners at the New

YorkCityDepartmentofCityPlanning’s (DCP)TransportationDivision,MTA,TLC,

theNewYorkCityDepartmentofTransportation(DOT),andintheprivatesector,I

29

gainedinsight intohowplannersplan.Throughoutthisdissertation,Iusea liberal

definitionoftheterms“planner”and“planning.”Iborrowthisbroaddefinitionfrom

Friedmann(1987):

Modern planning practice is a social and political process in whichmany actors, representing many different interests, participate in arefined division of labor. Among these actors, the more importantones are lawyers, agronomists, economists, water engineers, cityplanners, socialworkers, statisticians, systemsanalysts,professionalsoldiers, civilian defense analysts, political scientists, socialpsychologists, public administrators, geographers, foresters,architects, environmentalists, community organizers, anddemographers.(p.25)

Bycastingawidenetandengagingasmanyactorsaspossible,Ilearnedmuchmore

about the vans and the practice of planning inNewYork than I otherwisewould

havebyfocusingonasingleagencyoronesectoroftheindustry.

I requested interviewswith planners at theMTA, TLC, DCP, andDOTwho

had a connection to the vans or transit planning. I also reached out to elected

officialswhohadmadepubliccommentsaboutthevansorservedontheCouncil’s

Committee on Transportation. I interviewed private sector planners who have

workedwith theCityandhaveoverseen theirownprojects.Finally, I interviewed

communitymembers and transit advocateswhohadpublicly discussed the social

justice implications of transit. While setting up these interviews, a number of

plannersagreedtobeinterviewed,but insistedthatInotrecordtheinterviewsor

reveal their identities. In order to accommodate this request, I decided to take

handwritten notes during all of my interviews, compose summary notes after

concludingallofmyinterviews,andusefemalepronounsexclusivelywhenwriting

30

uptheinterviews.8Inadvanceofeachinterview,Iwroteoutquestionsandthemes

that I wanted to highlight. Once I asked my questions and received adequate

answers,Iposedadditionalquestionsbasedonthecontentoftheinterviews.Ialso

followed upmy interviewswith subsequent interviews, emails, or phone calls to

clarifyanylingeringquestions.

Inadditiontointerviewingmultipleactorsaboutthevans,Iwantedtolearn

about the different techniques and skills they used to study the vans and other

modes of transportation. During my interviews with planners, I asked about the

datatheycollect,theplanningprocesstheyconduct,theknowledgetheyvalue,and

the obstacles they face. As Forester (1989) wrote, “[P]lanning analysts do much

morethan‘processfeedback’...theyformulateproblems,analystspreemptdecision-

makers; they define and select the feedback aswell as process it. Theywatch for

newopportunities.They faceuncertainties thatareanythingbutwelldefinedand

that cannot be routinely monitored” (p.15). Planning is a dynamic process that

responds to social and political pressures; thus, it follows the action rather than

unfoldinginaneutraltechnocraticvacuum.

Ialsousedmy interviewsto followuponevents IobservedatCityCouncil

meetingsorreadaboutinmyarchivalresearch.InBrash’s(2011)studyofeconomic

developmentinNewYork,heconductedinterviewswithlocalofficials“todrawout

the understandings various actors held…and to obtain information concerning

eventsandprocessesoccurringoutofpublicview”(p.21).Interviewsenabledmeto

8InChapterFive,IusemasculinepronounstodescribethemalevanoperatorsIfollowed.SinceallofthelicensedvanoperatorsonFlatbushAvenueidentifyasmen,Idecidedtoswitchthepronouns.

31

focusmyquestionsonprecisely the subjects thatwere important tomeand seek

clarificationwherenecessary.

Whilemy ethnographic research allowedme to dig deeper into the policy

formation process, it also revealed how money and influence shaped municipal

action, agendas, and outcomes. During the TLC’s monthly meetings, meetings I

eitherattendedorwatchedonline,itwascommontoseeandhearfromyellowtaxi,

livery,andparatransitindustryleaders.TheseleaderslobbiedtheCommissionand

advocated on behalf of their clients. The samewas true of themonthlymeetings

convenedbytheNewYorkCityCouncil’sCommitteeonTransportation,allofwhich

Iattendedbetween2014and2015.Notably,dollarvaninterestswereabsentfrom

allofthesemeetingsexcepttheOctober22ndmeetingmentionedearlier.

Theseabsencesrevealedaprofoundlackofcommunicationandcoordination

betweendollarvan interests and localofficials.Without stronger linkages to local

government, it isno surprise that the laws regulating thevans fail to reflectdaily

practiceinBrooklynandQueensandthatlocalofficialshavetroubleunderstanding

thedifferencebetweenalicensedcommutervanandanauthorization.InGregory’s

(1998)workonpolitical activismand theblack experience inCorona,Queens, he

detailed a fight between the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and

residentsinManhattanandQueenswhoobjectedtotheconstructionofanelevated

traintoLaGuardiaairport.EventhoughthePortAuthorityfailedtobuildthetrain

totheairport,avictoryfortheresidents,heobservedthat

[t]hegreater class-basedpolitical capital at thedisposalof residentsof theEastSide [ofManhattan]provided themwith thecapacitynotonly to formulate their interestsmore effectively but to bring thoseinterests to bear in public with greater authority than their

32

counterparts in Corona and East Elmhurst. Simply put, Manhattanresidentshadmoremoney,time,andpoliticalclout.(p.226)

Asymmetricalpower,class,andracerelationsleadtodifferentoutcomes.Inthecase

above, the Queens coalition’s general objection to the train aligned with the

Manhattan coalition’s agenda. Both groups were served, but only because the

Manhattan coalition managed to frame their critiques in a language the Port

Authority understood, technical jargon and political pressure. The same power,

class,andraceasymmetriesexistwiththevans.Forthelasttwenty-threeyears,van

operators have complained about the local laws governing them but have not

figuredoutawaytomarshaltheirresourceseffectivelytochangethem.

TheSurveyandOperatingCharacteristics

The primary reason for the vans’ existence is that they provide superior

service, in the estimationof their riders, than the existing transit options, namely

thebus.Todemonstratethisempiricallyandanswermyfourthresearchquestion:

Whydovanpassengerschoosethevansoverthebus?Iadministeredover20016-

question surveys in the summer of 2013. The survey asked van passengers their

thoughts about the vans and the bus directly. It also asked for demographic,

employment, and income data (Appendix 1). Since all of the surveys were taken

inside of moving vans, I also used direct systematic observation to record trip

duration,popularstops,andpassengerturnoverduringrides.Thisadditionaldata

set allowed me to answer my fifth research question: What are the operating

characteristics of the vans andhowdo they compare to thebus?To compare the

vans’performanceversustheB41bus,I“scraped”aweeksworthofdatafromMTA

BusTimeandreconstructedtheB41’sroutetodeterminetheaveragetraveltimeof

33

every B41 bus along Flatbush Avenue.9Since BusTime does not store its data, at

least not for public use, Iwrote a program that downloaded everyB41’s position

every30-seconds for aweek.Using thebusesunique identifiers, Iwasable to re-

traceeachbustripalongFlatbushAvenueandcalculatetraveltimes.

MappingChange

Duringthecourseofmyresearch,newinformationbecameavailable.Oneof

thevanoperatorsImetwhilesurveyingpassengersandattendingmeetingsasked

memythoughtsonthepotentialofanewvanroute. Inordertotakehisquestion

seriouslyandanswermyfinalresearchquestions,howaredemographicschanging

along the Flatbush Avenue corridor and a proposed East New York corridor, I

comparedtheoperator’sanecdotalobservationsagainstCensusandMTAridership

data. In answering this question, my role as researcher shifted from observer to

participant.Theoperatorchangedmyresearchagenda.This isoneof thebenefits

andpotentialrisksofethnographicresearch. ImappedthesechangesusingGIS to

seeiftheoperator’sintuitionwascorrect:areWestIndiansmovingawayfromthe

FlatbushAvenuecorridorandtowardstheproposedEastNewYorkcorridor?

9MTABusTimeisareal-timebustrackingsystemthatallowsuserstofollowbusmovements.

34

ChapterTwo:AHistoryofNewYorkCity’sDollarVans

WhyDollarVans?

In 2014, I conducted extensive interviews with policymakers, planners,

transit advocates, and others responsible for New York City’s transportation

planningandpolicy.IwasfortunatetoscheduleaninterviewwithaNewYorkCity

councilmemberwho sits on the Council’s Committee onTransportation. Shewas

the perfect fit because of her deep interest in transportation policy and avowed

criticismofdollarvans.Beforeconcludingourinterview,sheposedafewquestions

of her own,most of whichwere rhetorical: “What do you thinkwould happen if

these vans were operating in Manhattan? If they were running up and down

BroadwayorFifthAvenuejumpinginandoutoftraffic?Doyouthinkanyonewould

stand for that?Whyare thesevansacceptable inBrooklynandQueens,butnot in

Manhattan”(PersonalInterview2014a)?

Underlyingthislineofquestioningwasanunstatedbutclearcommentabout

equity. The council member wanted to know, “Why do black and brown

communities,with the longest commutes, have to put upwith anything less than

high quality MTA bus service” (Personal Interview 2014a)? The intractability of

unequalserviceforequalNewYorkersmotivatesthisdissertationandmyinterest

inNewYork’sdollar vansmore thananything.While the councilmember is right

that the vans that thrive on Flatbush Avenue would be unable to flourish in

Manhattan’sCentralBusinessDistrict,thestoryisnotassimpleaspoorservicefor

35

black and brown people and higher quality service for white people. Dollar vans

representadifferenttypeoftransportationservicefrombuses,subways,ortaxis.

Throughout this dissertation, I explain why transportation researchers,

planners,andpolicymakerswouldbenefitfromanunderstandingoftheambiguous

terrainoccupiedbydollarvansinordertobettersensewhatpassengerswantand

how demographic shifts can be managed. Vans, as opposed to fixed rail

infrastructure, or the seemingly immutable routes of buses, can and should be

recognizedasaviableoptionforimprovingaccessintheouterboroughs.Iusethis

chapter todefine the termsused inmydissertationand toclarifywhat Imeanby

“dollarvan.”Idrawadistinctionbetweenlicensed“commutervans”andunlicensed

“pirates.” Next, I will provide a comprehensive overview of the development of

thesevansinNewYorkCity.

Dollar vansdeveloped as theCity’s fiscal crisis threatened theprovisionof

public services, representing a “splintering” of transit options for daily riders.

InsteadofwaitingfortheCityandStatetodelivervitaltransportationservices,local

entrepreneurs seized the opportunity and began to offer faster andmore reliable

van services. I reconstruct the regulatory history of the vans through a careful

examinationofhistoricaldocuments:theTLC’sarchiveofmonthlymeetingminutes,

relevantnewspaperarticles,thefewCitysanctionedstudiesofthevans,CityCouncil

testimony,andtwocourtcases. Finally,ashighlighted inChapterThree, I relyon

threeinterviewswithaformerCityCouncilmemberandacurrentandformerTLC

employeeandchair toprovideclarificationon theofficialhistoryprovidedby the

examineddocuments.

36

Today,trunkandfeederlinedollarvansservemorethan100,000passengers

perdayinQueens,Brooklyn,Manhattan,andtheBronx(KingandGoldwyn2014a,

p.188; Reiss 2014).10While the vans’ ridership is impressive,when compared to

busridershipinothercitieslikeDallasorMilwaukee,thevans’ridershiprepresents

atinyfractionofoveralltransitridershipinNewYork(DARTn.d.;MCTSn.d.;MTA

n.d.;Rausen2015).

Despitethisimpressiveridershipfigure,TLChasnevershownmuchinterest

inthevans.Thetwomostrecentpoliciesthat theTLChasenactedontheirbehalf

aretheCommuterVanDecalPilotprogram,designedtobroadentheappealofthe

vansandmakethemmorelegibletotheridingpublic,andGroupRideVehiclePilot

Project. InthefewinstanceswheretheTLChaschosentotargetthevansdirectly,

these policies have hampered van operators without improving the passenger

experience. In addition to being poorly informed, these programs have proven

unresponsivetotheneedsofthecommutervanoperators,drivers,andpassengers.

Tobe fair to theTLC, it is important tonote that it isa smallagencywith limited

resourcesandiscurrentlyresponsiblefortheoversightofnearly100,000vehicles

coveringtheentirecity.InChapterThree,Iwillgiveamorethoroughaccountingof

theTLC’sstaturerelativetootherCityagencies.

10Forthepurposesofthisdissertation,Ifocuson“feederline”vansthatconnecttovanpassengerstothesubwaysystemratherthan“trunkline”vansthatprovidetheentiretrip.

37

WhatAreDollarVans?

Dollarvansareeasiertoidentifythandefine.Thisisbecause“dollarvan”is

anumbrellatermusedtodescribeany14-passengervehiclethatoperatesasafor-

hire transit service or common carrier. 11 Simply put, dollar vans—whether

operatingwithout a license (knownas pirates) or licensed and recognizedby the

City of New York (commuter vans)—are large, easily flagged-down vehicles that

traveloverasemi-fixedroutewithoutaformalschedule[Figure2].

Figure2:ThetopimageshowsapirateonFlatbushAvenue. Notethelackofmarkingsidentifyingthevehicle’soperatingauthorityandowner.BelowisanimageofaTLClicensedcommutervan;notethemarkingsabovethebackwheel(PhotoCredit:EricGoldwyn).

11Common carrier, a legal term used to refer to for-hire transit operators, was defined by theDepartmentofCityPlanning (1986)as, “apersonororganization thatprovides, for compensation,transportationservices[available]tothegeneralpubliconanindividualfarebasis”(p.53).

38

Prior to the introduction of the vans, jitneys provided a similar service in

American cities that lacked adequate transit service. The jitneys first emerged in

Americancitiesattheturnofthetwentiethcentury(KingandGoldwyn2014b).As

themarketforsecond-handcarsdevelopedandeconomicconditionsdeclined,some

out-of-work car owners turned to providing rides in their personal vehicles for a

nickelastheylookedfornewjobs(Hodges2006).

Thisnewmodecompeteddirectlywithstreetcars,astheytravelledalongthe

same routes. However, the jitneys quickly won over the affection of passengers

becausetheycoulddeviatefromtherouteifneedbe.Unlikeatrackedstreetcar,the

jitney had free reign of the roadways and served parts of the city that were

developinganduntracked(Hodges2006,p.254).Thisseeminglyminordifference,

in addition to overall dissatisfaction with streetcar performance, gave jitneys a

unique advantage over their track-bound competition (Bottles 1987; McShane

1994).EckertandHilton(1972)capturetheshape-shiftingnatureof jitneyswhen

theydescribe jitneyserviceasamixtureof “buses, taxicabs,anddeliveryvehicles.

Thebasicoperationofthejitneyswasasbusesinoroutofcentralbusinessdistricts.

Typically, they picked up passengers at streetcar stops where, obviously, people

demandingpublictransportationcongregated,andcarriedthemalongthecarlines”

(pp.295-296).So, jitneysaremainlybuses thatprovide flexible serviceandshare

characteristicswithtaxicabs.

The jitneys’ trademark hybridity, which combined the cheap fare of a

streetcar with the taxi’s point-to-point flexibility, carved out its niche in urban

transportation markets across America. As the jitneys grew in popularity and

39

challengedstreetcarcompaniesforpassengers,municipalitiesrespondedswiftlyon

behalf of streetcar interests to eliminate competition. This widespread move to

maintain the streetcar’s primacy was not a trivial consideration at a time when

fewer than fivepercentofAmericansownedanautomobileand thedissolutionof

streetcarswouldhaveimmobilizedAmericancities,whichhaddevelopedaspatial

structure that access tomotorized travel (Census 1999, pp. 868& 885; Schaeffer

and Sclar 1980). In all fairness tomunicipalities that acted on behalf of streetcar

interests, jitneys were habitually fickle: drivers abandoned their routes without

warningwhentheyfoundnewjobsortheircarsneededrepairs. Thisuncertainty

left passengers vulnerable to service outages and price-gouging by opportunistic

jitneydrivers(Hodges2006,p.255).CityandStategovernmentscametotheaidof

thestreetcarcompaniesbyforcingjitneyoperatorstoestablishfranchises,abstain

fromroutesservedbystreetcars,paylicensingfees,andpurchaseinsurancepolices.

HiltonandEckert(1972)arguethat theseaddedregulationsdramaticallyreduced

thenumberofjitneysoperatingintheUnitedStatesfromapeakof62,000to5,879

by1918(p.322).

Despite this regulatory pushback, which nearly eradicated the jitneys a

century ago, their most basic and desirable attributes remained in the public

consciousness. Low fares, frequent service, and flexible routinghave given rise to

the multi-billion dollar app-based transportation industry, with companies like

Uber, Bridj, Sidecar, Didi Chuxing, Chariot, Lyft, Via, and many others (King and

Goldwyn2014b;Goldwyn2014).AfterthepassageoftheUrbanMassTransitActin

1964, fixedroutetransitoperators,while initiallysupportedbymunicipalitiesand

40

eventually subject to a series of public takeovers, could not compete with

automobiles as the country embarked upon amassive road-building odyssey that

contributed to thedecentralizationof citiesand laid the foundation for theriseof

low-density suburbs that struggled to supportmass transit (Jackson 1987; Lewis

1999;Gutfreund2005;Jones2008;Baum-Snow2007).

TheNewYorkStory

AStrikeAndMuchMore

The rise of the dollar vans is typically attributed to the 11-day 1980

Transport Workers Union (TWU) and Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) strike

(Sadik-Khan1993;Giulianiv.CounciloftheCityofNewYork,1999;Dausetal.2016).

While labor disputes brought regular transit service to a halt within the city,

entrepreneurs intheouterboroughssteppedintothebreachandprovideddollar-

van service to keep New Yorkersmoving. These services proved so popular that

overtimetheyestablishedaregularcustomerbaseandcompetedwiththeMTAfor

more riders after the labor dispute was resolved (Department of City Planning

1986;DepartmentofCityPlanning1998).Buttheopportunityofferedbythestrike

and seized by van operators underscored the much larger issue of mounting

dissatisfaction with MTA service and the consequences of government

retrenchment. Grava et al. (1987) concluded that it was the combination of the

strikeanddecliningtransitservicethatallowedthevanstothrive,whichfollowsa

similarnarrativetothejitneysalmostseventyyearsearlier:

The establishment and growth of the van operations have beentriggered by deficiencies in the regular transit service and riders’

41

concerns about personal safety and demand for better accessibility.The transit strike of 1980 gave a significant boost to the privateoperations,which did not fademuch after the strikewas settled (p.62).

Hood (2004,p. 254) captures thedepthof the subway’sdecline in the1970sand

1980swhenhewrites,“Nineofeverytensubwaytrainshadrunonscheduleduring

the 1930s and 1940s, but by 1983 on-time performance fell to 70 percent. The

averagedistanceasubwaycartraveledbetweenbreakdownsdroppedfrom34,294

miles in 1964 to 9,000 miles in 1984.” In addition to these very real service

problems, Hood connects the unraveling of New York’s transit system with the

broader “urban crisis” debates that captured a generation of historians,

policymakers, and commentators: “Rising crime and graffiti made the system a

nationalsymbolofurbanviolenceanddisorder….Byanymeasurethesubwayshad

hitbottom”(p.254).

Whiletransitserviceworsenedoverthecourseofthe1970s,NewYorkCity’s

populationandtaxbasealsofaltered.Between1970and1980,thecity’spopulation

declined by 800,000 residents, which forced the City’s leaders tomake decisions

about how to allocate declining resources (United States Census Bureau 1998;

Greenberg2008).InadetailedNewYorkTimes,MartinGottlieb(1985)reflectedon

the city ten-years after the dramatic fiscal crisis that “set inmotion fundamental

changes in the fabric and psychology of the nation’s largest city, changes that

continuetoshapeNewYork’sgovernmentinwaysthatfewhavefullyunderstood.”

Inorder tokeep thecity fromfiling forbankruptcy, theCityandState “altered its

approach to the role of government, capping off and frequently trimming

42

dramatically theactivistsocial-welfare thrust thathadheldsway for40yearsand

that, in its breadth, separated the city from virtually every other in the country”

(Gottlieb,1985). Thismeant,cuttingbacksocialservices,chargingtuitionatonce-

free universities, dismissing 19,000 civil servants in one evening, and raising the

fare on buses and subways by nearly 300 percent. In an environmentwhere the

governmentwasunableandunwillingfromafinancialandideologicalpointofview

toprovideessentialservices,NewYorkerslookedelsewhereforthem(Tabb1982).

Thepotentcombinationofdecliningserviceandan11-daytransitworkers’

strike opened the door fot the vans’ to assume a permanent place inNew York’s

transport universe. The vans continued to thrive because theMTAwas unable to

improveitsservicestomatchtheconvenienceofthevans.DuringtheCityCouncil

CommitteeonTransportation’shearingonLocalLaw115 in1993,vanpassengers

testifiedthatthevansprovidedamorecomfortable,reliable,andspeedierridethan

thebus.VernaKarr,amotheroftwoandanursingassistantworkinginManhattan

and commuting from Queens, described her morning routine riding the bus as

follows:

Onmywaytoworkeachmorning,ImustfirststoptodropmychildoffattheEducationCenter.WhenmydaughterfirststartedtoattendtheEducationCenter,IusedMassTransit.Thismeantwaitingaslongasfifteenminutesforanalreadycrowdedbus–usuallymydaughterandIwouldhavetostand–andthenatwentyminuteridetothechildcarecenter.AfterbringingmychildtotheEducationCenterandtoherclassroom, Iwould thenhave towait forasecondbus to takemetothesubwaystation.Again,thewaitcouldbeaslongasfifteenminutes.Almostalwaysthissecondbuswouldbefilledtocapacity,andIwouldhave to stand during the twenty to twenty-five minute ride to thesubwaystation.Thiswayofdroppingmychildofnotonlytooklotsoftimebutalsocostmeanextrafareforthesecondbuseachmorning.(p.1)

43

Karr’s testimonyhighlights theonerousnatureof her commute: shewaits for the

bustwice,paystwofares,standsonthebusforupwardsoffortyminutes,dropsoff

herdaughteratchildcare,andthenproceedstothesubway.

After a year of this routine, Karr decided to try the vans: “Now,whenmy

daughterandIridethevansinthemorning,thevandriversactuallywaitformeto

walkmydaughter into theEducationCenterand toherclassroom, then I reboard

thevantocontinueonmywaytothesubway.This isa total fare, thesumof($1)

one dollar” (p. 1). After transitioning to the vans, Karr reduced the steps of her

commutefromtwofares,twodelays,andtwounpleasantbusridestoonefareand

oneride.WhenKarrcomparedthevanstothebus,shefoundthatthevanssaveher

“asmuchasonehourandahalfintraveltimeperday,andseveraldollarsaweekin

travel expenses” (p.2). Ultimately, the vansmatched Karr’s needs better than the

bus,especiallysincethevanswaitedforherwhileshedroppedherdaughteroffat

childcare,whichenabledhertoavoidtheaddeddelayofwaitingforanadditional

vanorpayingasecondfare.

Whilelongheadwaysandcrowdingmadeforanunpleasantbuscommutein

Karr’scase,NewYorkCity’sbusnetworkhadnotkeptpacewithshifting land-use

patternsanddemographic changes. Sincepublic transitpredates theMTA,and its

earlieriterations,themajorityoftoday’srouteswereplannedbeforetheMTAcame

intoexistencein1966.A1986DCPcommutervanstudyexplainsthat“manyofthe

bus routes being operated in the City today…have been in existence for decades

without any significant modifications or changes, notwithstanding major

demographic shifts over the same time period. As a result, many of today’s bus

44

routes are not as effective as theymight be” (pp. 58-59). Whenwe combine the

transit strike with this lack of responsiveness to changing land-use patterns and

demographics, it becomes clear that the vans’ value not only comes from their

improved comfort and speed, but also from their deeper understanding and

adaptationtohowandwherespecificcommunitiestravel.Inthesamestudyquoted

above, the authors examined a feeder line van line operating in the Bronx and

serving a nearby subway station: “van operators, aware of local residents’ travel

patterns andpreferences, have takenadvantageof the absenceofdirect local bus

serviceinthiscorridor”(p.111).Inadditiontoaguaranteedseat,fasterride,more

convenient pick-ups and drop-offs, vans have also kept pace with changing

developmentpatterns.

RegulationsorLackThereof

AsNewYork’s “urbancrisis”approached itsnadir in the1970sand1980s,

thevannetworkexpanded. TheCityandState jockeyedjoylesslyoverwhowould

regulateit.TheCity’sBureauofFranchiseandtheBoardofEstimatehaddominion

overintra-citybuses,butdidnothaveauthorityfromtheStatetoregulateintra-city

vehiclesthatheldfewerthan20passengersandwerenottaxis.Thus, it fell tothe

State to regulate the vans, vans that typically carried up to 14 passengers. This

seeminglymundanedistinctionbetweenbusandvanbecameamajorstickingpoint

astheStatestruggledtoregulatethevansadequately.EdwardCanty(1982),Head

45

of the State Department of Transportation’s (State DOT) Regulation Division,

describedtheconsiderabletroubletheStatehadregulatingthevanswhenhewrote:

Theonceclearcutdistinctionbetween‘busline’runningafixedroutebetween stated termini (andunder the jurisdictionof theNewYorkCityBoardofEstimate)and‘contractcarrier’(underDOTjurisdiction)hasbecomeagrayareainrecentyears.Thishasbeenmainlyduetochangesintechnologywiththeadventofvansandsmallersizedbusesfor passenger transportation; the changes in the delivery oftransportation systems under such programs as prearrangedreservations, share-a-ride, vanpooling and dial-a-ride; and theincreased demand for for-hire transportation brought on by trafficcongestion, fuel costs and dissatisfaction with the existing masstransportationfacilities.(pp.6-7)

Despitehavingexistedinoneformoranothersinceatleastthemid-1970s,thein-

betweensizeofthevansandbus-likeoperationsconfoundedthosewhostudiedand

regulated themandstrained themeaningofexistingregulations,apatternwesee

time and again in the history of the vans. Because the vans hold fewer than 20

passengers, they do not qualify as buses and are thus beyond the City’s

jurisdiction—atleastin1982.Asaresultofthisuncertaintysurroundingthenature

ofthevanstheStateDOToptedto“takealiberalapproachingrantingpermits

tomeet thedemand formass transportation serviceswithinNewYorkCity”

(emphasis inoriginal)(p.7). Inadditiontothis liberalapproachtopermitting,the

State DOT did little to ensure compliancewith its regulations. In short, the State

DOTmadethevanslegalbutwithoutameaningfulwaytoenforceregulationssuch

astheprohibitionagainststreet-hailsoroperatingalongroutesservedbytheMTA,

thevanscontinuedtooperateastheyalwayshadandignoredtheregulations.This

dissonancebetweenregulationsandrealityisanongoingthemethatloomslargein

debatessurroundingthevans.

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Inarevealing letter totheeditorof theNewYorkTimes,HenryPeyrebrune

(1985), an Assistant Commissioner for Public Transportation at the State DOT,

chided the City for not taking the lead on van regulations. Peyerbrune, perhaps

sensitivetoacriticaleditorial thatappearedinthenewspaperearlier,arguedthat

the“regulationofcitytrafficbelongsinmostpartwiththecity.”Despitethisobvious

connectionbetween local traffic and local regulation,he criticized theCity fornot

assuming“itslogicalregulationoverthevans”(Peyrebrune1985).

As theregulatoryback-and-forthbetween theCityandStatecontinued, the

vannetworkcontinued togrowandchallenge theMTAandprivatebusoperators

for passengers. Over the next few years, the labor unions representing transit

workersaggressivelylobbiedelectedofficialsatthelocalandstateleveltorespond

to the vans and stop them from poaching their passengers. In an interview I

conductedwithaformerNewYorkCityCouncilMemberwhosatontheCommittee

of Transportation in the 1990s and eventually oversaw the development of the

City’sfirstlocallawtoregulatethevans,thatmembertoldmethatthelaborunions

“lobbied individual CouncilMembers over the vans because theywere concerned

about jobs” (Personal Interview 2014b). In addition to the unions’ interest in

protecting jobs, the former-Council Member also mentioned that concerns about

disorder and crime factored into the lobbying efforts and her thinking about the

vans:“Therewasalsopressurefromlocalresidentsintheseareas.Theycomplained

aboutunsafedrivingandcrime.Youhavetorememberthatduringthistimethere

wereoftenfightsbetweenthevandriversandbusdriversandconfrontationswith

thepolice”(PersonalInterview2014b).

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Bytheearly1990s,thevanshadbecometoolargeofanissuefortheCityto

ignoreandtoolargeofaresponsibilityfortheStatetohandleonitsown(Personal

Interview2014b).AccordingtotestimonyfromJanetteSadik-Khan(1993),thethen

director of theMayor’sOffice ofTransportation, public safety concernsmotivated

theCity’sdesiretoregulatethevans.Shedescribedanumberofheadlinegrabbing

incidents, most notably from 1991, to underscore the urgency of this matter:

“Unlicensedanduninsuredvanshavecausednumerousaccidentsandcontinue to

present serious safety hazards for pedestrians, motorists, and van passengers”

(Sadik-Khan1993,p.10).

With the City eager to take control of the vans, the State passed new

legislation to transfer regulatory authority to the City in 1992. Within this

legislation,theStateincludedanumberofchapteramendmentsthatrestrictedthe

CityCouncil’sautonomyindraftingitsownlocallaw.Thus,thetransferwasnotas

simpleas theStateempowering theCity to regulate thevans inwhatever fashion

the City deemed appropriate. The transferwasmore of a directive to the City to

regulate the vans but to do so in a manner that adheres to State-mandated

guidelines. In a report drafted for the Committee on Transportation by Anthony

Baronci (1993),who served as Counsel to the Committee, he outlined the State’s

demandsinbulletform:

Thelegislationpermitsthecitytodraftalocallawthatdoesthefollowing:- Designates a City agency that will assume responsibility for van

regulation(e.g.,theTaxiandLimousineCommission).- Establishes criteria and regulations governing the issuance of van

operatingauthority.- Prohibits theoperationof a van serviceor other common carrier of

passengersthatdoesnothaveproperoperatingauthorityordoesnotcomplywiththeStatesafetyregulations.

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- Requiresallvanoperators,includingthoseissuedNYSDOToperators,operatingauthoritytotheagencyresponsibleforvanregulation.Thelaw directs the City to allow NYSDOT authorized van services tocontinue operation pending the review of their applications by theCity.

- Allows the imposition of an annual fee by the City for operatingauthority. Revenue from the licensing fee can be used to fund vanenforcementfunctions.(p.2)

In addition to these prosaic requirements stipulating an orderly

administrationofpermitsandregulation,theStatealsoadoptedlegaldefinitionsfor

a “commuter van” and “commuter van service” to clarifywhat a commuter van is

andhowitcouldoperate.Itishere,inthedefiningoftheseterms,thatoneseesthe

resultofthelaborunions’lobbyingefforts.

Intheorythesedefinitionsshouldhavemovedthevansoutofthe“grayarea”

theyoccupied,but instead thedefinitions ignored therealitiesofhowtheexisting

vansoperated,whichcreatedanewsetoftensions.Asof1992,thelegaldefinition

ofacommutervanwas“amotorvehiclecarryingpassengersforhireinthecityduly

licensedasacommutervanbythecommissionandnotpermittedtoacceptstreet

hailsfromperspective[sic]passengersinthestreet”(p.3).Thisdefinitiondoeslittle

to describe how a van operates, and instead seeks to curb a specific activity, the

street hail. The commuter van service definition is evenmore restrictive and less

reflective of reality on New York’s streets. Baronci (1993) explains the definition

andalsoprovidesabitofcontextforthepurposeofthedefinitions:

[A] commuter van is permitted to provide service on a prearrangeddaily basis only, over non-specified or irregular routes, between azone in a residential neighborhood and a location which shall be awork-related central location, a mass transit location or masstransportationfacility,ashoppingcenterorairport….Subdivision(b)prohibits a commuter van from soliciting, picking up or discharging

49

passengers at bus stops along routes traveled by a bus owned oroperatedbytheNewYorkCityTransitAuthorityoracompanyhavinga franchise fromtheCity.Subdivision (b)alsoprohibitsa commutervanfromdischargingpassengerswithinthirtyfeetofadesignatedbusstop orwithin thirty feet of an entrance to a subway station. Theseprovisions are intended to prevent vans the opportunity to pick uppassengerswhoarewaitingforabus.(p.5)

As Baronci notes at the bottom of this excerpt from his memo to City Council

Members sitting on the Committee of Transportation, these new definitionswere

designedtoprotectbusridershiponCity-ownedandCity-franchisedservices.This

defensive posture cast the vans as a menace; it defined them in opposition to

existing transit services and neglected to acknowledge the numerous benefits

deliveredbythevans.

Thisnarrowunderstandingofthevansfailedtoaccountforthetheirpositive

attributes. In the conclusion of the 1986 DCP commuter van study, the authors

argued that “[t]he van services currently operating are improving themobility of

and/orthequalityoftransportformanypeoplewholiveand/orworkintheCity—

especially residentsof lower-density areas in Staten Islandand theouterparts of

Queens,BrooklynandtheBronx”(p.239).Inadditiontojudgingthevansasanet

positive,theyalsorecognizedthelimitationsoftheexistingtransitoptions:

In a few cases…the commuter vans have attracted patrons thatexistingpublictransitwouldhavebeenhardpressedtoaccommodatewithout significantly increased service levels—something thatmighthavebeenimpossibleforavarietyofreasons(budgetaryconstraints,lack of equipment, inadequate garaging and maintenance facilities,etc.). In more cases, however, the vans have captured riders thatexisting public transportation did not serve effectively but who didusetransitbeforethevansbegantooperate.ThisisparticularlytrueofvansthatprovidefeederservicetorapidtransitstationsandothertransportationfacilitiesinQueens,Brooklyn,andtheBronx.(p.240)

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AstheStatedecidedonthesenewdefinitionsandsetthetermsofthedebate

the City Council took up, it had an opportunity to recognize the vans’ positive

contributions anddevelop a regulatory framework to supportNewYorkers living

beyondthereachofeffectivepublictransportation.BrooklynCityCouncilMember

Una Clarke (1992), in a letter to Governor Mario Cuomo, acknowledged the

shortcomingsofthevans,butencouragedtheGovernortorejectanylegislationthat

would unduly narrow the purview of the vans and prevent the City Council from

shaping appropriate legislation. She believed that “[r]egulation, not restriction, of

the industry would benefit everyone. Requiring the proper licensing, registration

and insurance coverage will assure standards in the industry and encourage

passengersafety”(p.1). Instead,shearguedthattheState’s legislationwouldruin

the industry anddrive vanoperators “out of businesswith itsnumerouspunitive

measures.Thisbillstiflesgrowthinourcommunitybylimitingtheopportunitiesfor

these immigrants to learn and enter themarketplace” (p. 2). Despite the Council

Member’sobjections,GovernorCuomoratifiedthewilloftheStateLegislatureand

transferredregulatoryoversightofthevanstotheCityofNewYork.

CityCouncilinAction

EvenbeforetheGovernorhadsignedthebillempoweringtheCitytoregulate

the vans in December 1992, the City Council’s Committee on Transportation had

alreadybegundraftinganddebatingtwobills, Intro519and Intro115, toregulate

thevans.Thecontentsofthetwobillsweremoreorlessthesame—afterallmuchof

51

the details of the eventual bill had been handed down by the State. The agency

responsible for regulatoryoversight of the vanswas themaindifferencebetween

thebills: Intro519granted regulatory authority to theTLC and Intro115granted

authoritytotheDOT.

AstheCommitteeonTransportationheardpublictestimonyontheproposed

billsinJune1993,itbecameclearthatexistingvanoperators,passengers,andthose

sympathetic to the vans saw the legislation as an attempt to eradicate the vans

ratherthancreateaviableregulatoryframework.Thelanguagethatwaseventually

included in Local Law 115 (1993) defined a commuter van as a vehicle carrying

fewer than 20 passengers “and not permitted to accept hails from prospective

passengers”(NewYorkCity,N.Y.,LocalLawNo.1151993,p.2).Itwentontodefine

commutervanserviceasa“transportationservicethroughtheuseofoneormore

commutervansonaprearrangedregulardailybasis,overnon-specifiedorirregular

routes” (NewYorkCity,N.Y., Local LawNo. 115 1993, p. 2). This language is very

similartowhattheStatehadoutlined,andthebillalsoincludeddetailedapplication,

insurance,licensing,andvehicleseizureinstructions.

The West Indian van community from Brooklyn and Queens came out to

support their interestsandrallyagainst theproposedbills.Thosewho testified in

favor of the vans invoked four main arguments to discredit the legislation and

defend the vans. Van loyalists argued against the narrowness of the language

contained within the bill, loss of economic opportunities created by the vans for

recentWestIndianimmigrants, importanceofcompetitionforpassengers,andthe

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machinations deployed by entrenched interests who wanted to protect their

fiefdoms.

Thelanguageusedtodescribethevansandtheservicetheyofferedwasthe

largest hurdle to overcome for the van community. Legal definitions stripped the

vans of the right to operate conventional routes, provide service in areas with

existing transit service, or accept street hails. Because the vans mimic relatively

conventional feeder line service to subways, many operated predictable routes

betweena subwaystationandamain street.GeorgeCarlPezold (1993), a lawyer

representingagroupofvanoperatorsinQueens,providedadetailedpoint-by-point

rebuttal totheproposed legislation. Indoingthis,healsoclearlydefinedhowthe

vans, at least the vans operated by his clients worked. The idea that vans could

effectively serve passengers without treading on existing transit routes was

untenable: “The second part of this proposed section, expressly prohibiting the

solicitation,pickupordischargeofpassengers‘alongaroutewhichistraveledupon

byabusownedoroperatedbytheNewYorkcitytransitauthorityorabusowned

byaprivatebuscompanythatisoperatedpursuantofanauthorizingresolutionof

thecouncil’isunworkableandfatal.”(pp.10-11).ArthurCummings(1993),oneof

thefoundersofBrooklynVanLines,tookupthespiritofthisdebateandadvancedit

bypointingoutthatexistingbusroutesinBrooklyncoveredtheentireboroughand

thusleftnoacceptableareasforhimtooperate:“InBrooklyn,whereBrooklynVan

Linesoperates,itisimpossibletotravelanydirectionwithoutenteringabusroute.

Themainstreetswherepeople live,shop, taketheirchildrentoschool,areallbus

routes”(p.3).

53

Whilevanoperatorsandthoseloyaltothemwereprotectingtheirturf,they

alsodefendeddollarvanservicesonthegroundsthatdrivingavanofferedagood

entry-leveljobtorecentimmigrantsandthoseunabletofindworkduringdifficult

economic times. Derrick Warmington (1993), a resident of Riverdale, Queens

defendedthevansonthegroundsofimprovedtransitservice,butalsoinvokedan

economic self-sufficiency argument, which was made more pressing by a lack of

jobs:

Many of these operators were formerly engaged in other forms ofemployment, from management in the corporate world to peopleearning minimum wage. They lost their jobs, the very means ofproviding for their families due to a faltering economy. Rather thanbecomeeconomicrefugees,theyhavedecidedtotakechargeoftheirlives; they have decided to become self-reliant. They are nowindependent business people actively participating in the AmericanDream.(p.3)

Roger Joseph (1993), a twenty-two year old van operator from Guyana, told his

story of starting off as a gypsy cab driver to help pay his tuition at Long Island

Universitytoeventuallyfoundinghisownbusiness,BGBuscompany.Drivingwas

nothisfirstchoiceforemploymentbutaftersearchingfora jobunsuccessfully,he

“decidedtoprovidecarservice.Isawtherewasaneedforsuchservice.IsawthatI

could provide it. I started by renting a car and providing service in East

Flatbush…Today,Iownthreevans”(p.2).

Even local officialswere sympathetic to the vans and understood that this

legislation, if enacted, would severely limit opportunities for van operators and

choiceforpassengers.RobertHarris(1993),theDeputyComptrollerforPolicyand

ManagementintheOfficeoftheNewYorkCityComptroller,criticizedtheproposed

54

legislation for not going far enough to create a coherent surface transportation

policy that provided a framework for regulation, but also enhanced service for

passengers. Harris attacked the proposed legislation as being arbitrary and

inconsistentwhenhetestified:

New York City needs a private surface transportation policy whichincludes tough enforcement against van operators who endangerpublicsafetyandaregulatoryframeworkthatallowsandencouragesvanstocompetefairlyagainstotherprivatetransportationproviders.Whilesomemayargue thatachievingbothof theseobjectives is toodifficult, the cost of failing to address this issue is simply too high.Without enforcement, public safety is at risk. Without faircompetition,transitprovidershavelittleincentivetoprovidethebestpossible service at themost affordable price. (emphasis in original)(pp.3-4)

Undergirding these concerns about the proposed legislation was the

influence of the transit workers’ labor unions, the MTA, and the private bus

operatorsinshapingthedebateinAlbanyandCityHall. Whilethebillwassoldas

an opportunity to bring the vans into the regulatory framework of the City and

improvetransportationoptions,itwascleartothosecitedabove,thattheCouncil’s

intentwastoregulatethevansoutofbusinessorconfinetheiroperationstoavery

smallsegmentofthetransportationmarket.NolaSoutherland(1993),theChairof

theQueensCitizensOrganization,madeherconcernsknownwhenshetestifiedthat

herorganization intended to “support the legislationunderdiscussion today,”but

afterreviewingit,shedecidedtoopposeitbecause“itmustbeunderstoodthatfirst

andforemostthisisanMTAandprivatebussponsoredbill.Thisbillisdesignedto

protect themonopoly that the MTA and private buses enjoy” (p. 1). Despite this

rebukeofthebill’sintentions,Southerlandwentontoarguethatthevansbenefited

55

the communities they operated in but still needed to be regulated, “They have

caused serious accidents, disregarded traffic laws, many are unlicensed and

uninsuredandtherebycreateahazardoussituationinsomecases….Theymustget

theiracttogether…”(p.1).

LivingwithLocalLaw115

AfterLocalLaw115passedthroughtheCityCouncilbyavoteofforty-twoto

fourandwassigned into lawonDecember31st1993, theTLCassumed itsroleas

regulatorofthevans.WhiletheCommissionwasgrantedtheauthoritytoapprove

commutervanpermits, theCityCouncil routinelyoverturned thosedecisions.The

Council further meddled into the vans’ business and bypassed the TLC when it

passedLocalLaw83 in1997.LocalLaw83placedaone-yearmoratoriumonnew

commutervanpermits(Giulianiv.CounciloftheCityofNewYork1999).12Notonly

did the law define commuter vans in opposition to how they operated, it

underminedtheagencytaskedwithoversightandjeopardizedthegoodstandingof

approvedcommutervanservices.

Inamarriageofunhappycommutervan interests, theTLC,MayorRudolph

Giuliani,andthecommutervanoperatorschallengedLocalLaw115andLocalLaw

83 in two lawsuits,Giulianiv.Councilof theCityofNewYork, 1999 andRickettsv.

City of New York,1999. The Commission used its “bully pulpit” to encourage the

12Frominterviewsandnewsreports,itappearsthatanumberofCityCouncilMemberswereactingon behalf of the Transport Workers Union, the union representing MTA employees (PersonalInterview2014b).

56

public to speak out against the Council’s actions, which undermined the

Commission’sauthoritytoregulatethevanswhilethecommutervanoperatorsand

theMayorpursuedlegalactionstostrikedownLocalLaw115andLocalLaw83.13

While the vans have never amounted to a top priority of the TLC, the

CommissionopposedLocalLaw115fromtheoutset.DuringaTLCmonthlymeeting

in1994,justaftertheadoptionofthelaw,CommissionerSandraJeffersonGranum

commented thatChairFideldelValle should “usehis goodoffices toactupon the

legislaturetomakechangesinthislaw.”Shewentontoimploreaffectedcommuter

vanpassengersto“speakwiththeelectedofficialssothatwecanchangethislaw,”

and “developaproper regulatory system for this industrywhich shouldanddoes

exist”(TaxiandLimousineCommission1994,p.11).WhileCommissionerGranum

spoke fervently about the vans, the vans did not appear more frequently in

subsequentmeetings.

With little written testimony in the TLC archive about Local Law 115, I

conducted an extensive interview, with follow-up phone calls, with one of the

commissionersfromthiscriticalperiodinthehistoryofthevans.Inadditiontothe

commissioner’s role as a regulator, she also happened to live along the Flatbush

Avenue corridorand saw thevanseveryday in the1980s,1990s, andeven today.

Thus,sheunderstoodrightawaythattheexistinglawcontradicteddailypracticeon

Flatbush Avenue. When I asked her about the convoluted nature of the law, she

explained that political considerations, specificallywith the labor unions,made it

impossible to create a sensible policy: “If those idiotic compromises, like the pre-13Inthetwoyearsittooktoadjudicatebothcases,LocalLaw83hadalreadyelapsedsothecourtdidnotrenderajudgmentonthatspecificpieceoflegislation.

57

arrangement stuff and operating along bus routes, hadn’t been included, it never

wouldhavepassedthe[City]Council”(Personal Interview2014c).WhenIpushed

backandaskedhertospeakdirectlyaboutthespecterofthelaborunionsoverthe

negotiations, she told me “the TWU saw the vans as an MTA plot to get rid of

organizedlabor”(PersonalInterview2014c).Similartothecriticsofthelegislation

in1993,theformercommissionertoldmethepolicywasdesignedtomakeitillegal

for the vans to operate as they had always operated and protect transitworkers’

jobsfromcompetitionfromthevans.

Gaining theTLC’ssympathywasuseful to thevans,butultimately thevans

livedanddiedwiththelaw.Withoutlawsthatreflecttherealityonthestreets,van

driverswerevulnerable to ticketsandvehicleseizuresby theTLCandNYPD.The

court’s interpretationofLocalLaw115wasmixed.On theonehand, it sidedwith

theMayorwhen it found that theCityCouncil couldnot invalidate commutervan

permitsapprovedbytheTLC.InJudgeLouisB.York’sGiulianiv.CounciloftheCityof

NewYork(1999)decision,heconcludedthatbasedontheenablinglegislationfrom

the State, the Mayor’s Office was entitled to the right of “final determination on

grantingorrejectingacommutervanapplication”(n.p.).Thus,oncetheTLCmadea

determinationregardingacommutervanapplication,itwouldbefinalandbeyond

thereachoftheCityCouncil.

In theRickettsv.CityofNewYork (1999) decision, Judge York proved less

sympathetic to van operator Hector Ricketts’ grievances against Local Law 115.

Judge York found that the City’s police powers protected the City’s decision to

regulate where the commuter vans operated and how they picked up and

58

dischargedpassengers.Here, theJudgeupheldLocalLaw115’sprohibitionagainst

operating along existing bus routes and the requirement that passengers only be

pickeduponapre-arrangedbasis.DespiteJudgeYork’sdecision,whichessentially

upheldthemostsignificantpiecesofLocalLaw115,heseemedtocommiseratewith

thevanoperatorsonapersonallevel,asevidencedbythisshortasidemid-decision:

“WhileImaybelievethereisabetterwaytoaccomplish[theCity’s]endsIcannot

determinebeyondareasonabledoubtthatthereisnorationalrelationshipbetween

thislawandtheCity'spolicepowertoregulatetrafficinthegeneralpublicinterest”

(n.p.). JudgeYork,whilemovedbycommonsense,foundthattheCitywaswithinits

righttoinvokeitspolicepowerstoregulatetrafficonitsstreetsinwhatevermanner

it deemedappropriate and,unfortunately for thevans, theywould continue tobe

barred fromoperatingalongstreets servedby theMTA. Despite this legaldefeat,

thevanscontinuedoperatingalongbusroutesandacceptingstreethails.

MovingpastLocalLaw115

When Mayor Giuliani left office in 2001, it appeared that the vans would

recede even further into the background while yellow taxi fare increases,

environmental concerns, credit card payment systems, and advertising screens

dominated the foreground (Taxi and Limousine Commission 2004; Taxi and

LimousineCommission2005;TaxiandLimousineCommission2007).Onoccasion

thevansresurfacedinthepress,butusuallyduringtimesofcrisisorafterrun-ins

withthelaw(Money2006).

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TheTLCdidspendmoreenergythinkingaboutthevansafter2010,buteven

in the three cases presented below, the Commission’s efforts were poorly

formulatedandoftentoonarrowinscopetoaddresstheconcernsoftheindustry.

As was made clear during the debates over Intro 519 and Intro 115 in the mid-

1990s,thecommutervaninterestswantedthelegalrighttopickupstreethailsand

operate along bus routes. In addition to these issues of legal language, the van

operatorshaveconsistentlycomplainedaboutthepirateswhocompetewiththem

for passengers but remain uninsured and unsanctioned by the TLC. The

Commission’sfocusonthevanscoincidedwiththeappointmentofDavidYasskyas

the new chairman, wide-ranging MTA service cuts, gentrification in Central

BrooklynandHarlem,andgreaterlobbyingeffortsonbehalfofthevanindustry.

In thesummerof2010, thevanswerecalledupontosupplementMTAbus

service after the MTA announced large-scale service reductions and re-routings.

TheGroupRideVehiclePilotProjectwasaproactiveattemptbytheTLC—thefirst

ofitskind—topromotecommutervanserviceinareasofthecitynegativelyaffected

byMTAservicecuts(KingandGoldwyn2014a). EmilyGallo(TaxiandLimousine

Commission 2010a), the TLC’s Policy Director, presented the pilot project to the

TLC’s Commissioners for a vote at the agency’s monthly meeting in July. She

explained that with the loss of bus service in Brooklyn and Queens, passengers

would be forced to “use alternatives that could add transfers and increase their

travel time,” and that “[t]his pilot will help us determine how TLC-regulated

industriescanbestfillgapsinthemasstransitnetworktoimprovemobility”(p.78).

DavidYassky, theTLCChairman,acknowledged that the idea for theprojectcame

60

aboutonlyamonthortwoearlierandthattheagencyhadbeenencourageddirectly

byMayorMichaelBloombergtocomeupwithcreativewaystoalleviatetheburden

causedbytheMTA’scuts(p.90).

UnfortunatelyfortheTLCandthevanindustry,theGroupRideVehiclePilot

Project failedbefore it everhad a chance to build consistent ridership. From the

outset,thepilotwashamperedbylargeobstacles,suchasatwo-monthgapbetween

the cessationofMTAbus service and thebeginningof group ride service, a court

battle with the TWU that almost upended the entire pilot, a lackluster effort to

promote the pilot in these new neighborhoods, and a general sense of confusion

(King and Goldwyn 2014a). At the Commission’s Octobermeeting, Commissioner

Yassky(TaxiandLimousineCommission2010b)deliveredthefollowingassessment

ofthepilot’sdisappointingfirstmonth:

Westartedwith five [serviceareas], on threeof them there is someamount of traffic, not enough to be self-sustaining at this point butenoughfortheoperatorstohaveadesiretohanginthereandseeiftheywillsucceed.Ontwoofthem,therehasbeenverylittleridership,not enough for them to justify the operators who want to hang inthere.Evenonthethree,wehavehadspottyservice,againyouhaveakindofchicken/egg[situation].Itiscleartome,thatfortheoperatorsto succeed there, they are going tohave toprovide a consistencyofservicesuchthatridersfeelthattheycanrelyuponit.Andtheyreallyhavenotbeendoingthatyet.(pp.6-7)

Within the firstmonth of the pilot’s launch, two of the operators had abandoned

service and the other three struggled to cultivate a sustainable customer base.

Unsurprisingly, thepilot failedtogarnerevenamentionat theCommission’snext

meeting inNovember. While theTLC lamentedthepilot’sdemise,astaffmember

involved with the project told me, “we tried, and now it’s on to the next thing”

61

(PersonalInterview2014d).Basedonthetenorofourinterview,Iinterpretedthis

tomeanthatnooneattheTLClostsleepoveritspoorlyconceivedpilotprojectthat

essentiallywasted the timeandeffort of the few sincereoperatorswhodiligently

pliedtheseserviceareasforthree-monthsatthecostofprovidingserviceinmuch

moreprofitableareasofthecity.

Since 2010, the abortive Group Ride Vehicle Pilot was the splashiest TLC

policy directed towards the van industry, but it was not the only one. The

Commission’s two other initiatives geared toward the vans were much less

ambitiousthantheGroupRideVehicleProject:thefirstwastocodifyaCommuter

VanPassengerBillofRightstoinformpassengersoftheirrightsandthesecondwas

tooutfitcommutervanswithdistinctivedecalsontheirexteriortodistinguishthem

fromunlicensedpiratessothatpassengerscouldquicklyidentifywhichvanscarried

TLCpermits.

TheexampleoftheCommuterVanPassengerBillofRights[Figure3]reveals

the TLC’s adhoc approach to regulating the vans. Instead of developing targeted

polices that respond to theneedsof thevanoperatorsorpassengers, theTLC re-

purposed an existing initiative and applied it to the vans as an afterthought.

AccordingtotheTLC’smeetingminutesfromMarch2010,thecommutervanswere

among the very last group of vehicles under the TLC’s authority to receive a

passenger bill of rights. TLC staff member David Klahr (Taxi and Limousine

Commission 2010c) mentioned in a brief aside while presenting to the

Commissioners on the pending language that “[t]here has already been a Taxicab

Bill of Rights inmedallion cabs since at least the 1990s” (p. 46). Klahr does not

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explainwhyittooktwentyyearstocomeupwithaBillofRightsforcommutervan

passengers.

DespitetheCommission’slackofenthusiasmforthevans,theTLCdidmake

earnest, ifsomewhatperfunctory,effortstocultivateacloserrelationshipwiththe

vancommunity.DuringtheCommission’sJuly2010meeting,CommissionerYassky

(Taxi and Limousine Commission 2010a) recognized the longstanding lack of

communication between the van operators and the Commission, but expressed a

willingnesstoworkmorecloselywiththemontheBillofRightslanguage.“Thisisa

groupofpeoplethatoftendoesnotengageinwith[sic]whatwedohere,butthey

were interested enough in the idea that we're making the rules more

comprehensible to come in andgive their two centsworth,” he said (p. 59). Even

though Commissioner Yassky sounded hopeful about cultivating a closer

relationshipwiththecommutervaninterests,theguaranteesgrantedtocommuter

van passengers are often puzzling and inappropriate. For instance, right number

sevenguaranteesthatallpassengershavetherightto“[r]eceiveafarequotefrom

the dispatcher and pay that amount for [their] ride,” (Taxi and Limousine

Commissionn.d.,n.p.).Thisright,however,reflectslittleunderstandingofhowthe

vans operate. Since all passengers receive the same flat fare and vans are not

dispatched, it isunclearhowthisrightbenefitspassengers.Whileeveryonewould

agreethatoutliningtherightsofthepassengersisagoodidea,ithasneverbeenan

issue that van operators, passengers, or drivers have mentioned to me in my

interviews or surveys. As with many TLC regulations that govern the vans, the

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CommuterVanBillofRightsisahand-me-downfromtheyellowtaxisandfor-hire

vehiclesratherthanapieceofpolicydesignedtoaddressthevans.

Figure3:CommuterVanPassengerBillofRights(TaxiandLimoussineCommissionn.d.).

This era of renewed engagement with the commuter vans reached a

crescendo in 2014. During the August Commission meeting, Assistant General

Council Jessica Taylor (Taxi and Limousine Commission 2014) delivered a

presentationthatTLCChairMeeraJoshidescribedasanewpilottohelppassengers

“easily identify[commutervans]forthesafe legaltransportationtheyprovide”(p.

11).

Thelogicforimplementingthisprogram,however, ismurky. Taylormakes

two disparate claims in support of the pilot. First, she argues, “There are a few

challengesuniquetocommutervans.Byandlarge,commutervanshavesmalland

loyal customer bases, butmost of the public really doesn’t knowmuch about the

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industry or how itworks” (p. 13).Here, Taylormakes the case that the branding

initiativeismeanttoappealtothegeneralpublicwhodonotusethevans.Laterin

herpresentationshepositsasecondrationalefortheprogram:

[T]hebiggest challenge to the industry comes from illegal vanswhopass themselves off as being legitimate. These illegal vans prey onpassengerconfusionbecausemanypassengerscan’ttellthedifferencebetweenlegalandillegalvans,andeventhosepassengerswhocantellthe deference [sic] don’t appreciate or know the dangers associatedwithridinginillegalvans.(pp.13-14)

AtthebeginningofTaylor’spresentation,shedescribedthepilotasawayto

help thepublic identify thevansbypastingadistinctive “NYCCommuter” logoon

theexteriorof licensedvans. In the longerexcerpt, she takesadifferent tackand

arguesthatthebrandingwillhelpexistingpassengersdistinguishbetweenlicensed

and unlicensed vans,whichwill in turn encourage passengers to opt for licensed

commutervans,thoughitseemsclearfromherownwordsthattheexisting“loyal

customerbases”areunconcernedby thisallegedconfusion [Figure4]. While this

pilotwaspositionedasasolutiontocrackingdownonillegalvans,itrevealedhow

disconnectedtheTLCwasfromcommutervanpassengers’needs.

Nothing about this pilot program takes active measures towards reducing

thenumberofunlicensedvansontheroad.Thisisnottodiscountthepilotentirely,

but it fails to address the issue of unlicensed pirates directly. As one former TLC

Chair toldme, “the onlyway to get the unlicensed vans off the road is to set up

policeroadblocksandseizevehicles.Thisissomethingwedidinthe90sanditwas

very successful” (Personal Interview 2014c). As the former Chair noted, the only

waytogetunlicensedvansoftheroadistophysicallyremovethem.

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Figure4:ThedecalusedintheCommuterVanDecalPilot(PhotoCredit:EricGoldwyn).

Inadditiontothedubiousnatureofthepilot,theoutreachconductedbythe

TLCrevealsanunfortunatelackofawarenessofwhoreliesoncommutervans.To

promote the new pilot and educate passengers on how to distinguish between

licensed commuter vans and unlicensed pirates, the TLC printed palm cards in

EnglishandSpanish to informpassengersof theprogram. Since thevansoperate

exclusivelyinWestIndianandChineseneighborhoods,thoughtobesureSpanish-

speaking riders exist, itwas strange not to see palm cards inMandarin or Creole

[Figure5].

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Figure5:palmcardsinEnglishandSpanish(TaxiandLimousineCommission2010).

The TLC is a flawed regulator that operates from a significant knowledge

deficit when it comes to commuter vans. Despite seemingly good intentions, the

Commission’s recent policies have exacted either a negative or neutral impact on

the vans. It was in light of this consistent maltreatment that the West Indian

commuter van operators in Brooklyn and Queens banded together to retain the

servicesofa lawfirmtoadvanceitsagendaandlobbytheCityCouncildirectly. In

thisunprecedentedshowofunityamongvanoperators,theymadeitclearthatthey

wanted to see the City Council strike down the language in Local Law 115 that

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prohibitsvansfromoperatingastheyalwayshave,andthattheoperatorsalsowant

the State DOT to resume its role as chief regulator of the vans (Commuter Van

Summit2014).

Conclusion

Byreviewingtheoriginsof thevans, fromadaptingtodemandintheouter

boroughsinthe1970storecentattemptstodeveloppoliciesdirectedatthevans,I

defined my terms, pointed to the shortcomings and decline of the bus network,

connectedtheriseofthevanswithbroaderattemptstocurbpublicspending,traced

thechangingshapeofregulations,exploreddebatesabouthowtoregulatethevans,

probed theTLC’soversightof thevans,and identified thegapbetweenpolicyand

dailypractice.Thevansaretheoutgrowthofaspatiallyspecificproblemthatwas

exacerbated by a fiscal crisis and continued neglect by the City. Rather than

addressingtheissueofapoorlycalibratedbussystemandchangingdemographics,

the City and State enacted regulations designed to stymie the vans. Despite the

prohibitionsenshrinedinLocalLaw115,thelawhasbeenappliedunevenly,which

hasinturnallowedthevanstothriveandproliferateinWestIndianneighborhoods

inBrooklynandQueens.Inthefollowingchapter,Iwillpresentthefindingsofmy

interviewswithplanners andpolicymakerson transportationplanningandpolicy

formation in New York City. These interviews reveal the day-to-day activities of

planners and show how little institutional knowledge there is of the vans. I also

68

drawconnectionsbetweenthevansandsocial justice issuesrelatedto informality

andgentrification.

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ChapterThree:HearMeHonk

PullingBacktheCurtain

Thisdissertationsetouttoinvestigatetheconstructionoftheregulatoryand

planning processes governing dollar vans, an informal transit network, which

allowedthemtoflourishinsomeNewYorkneighborhoodswhileothershaveaccess

to robust public transit. In this chapter, I describe and analyze interviews I

conductedwithMTAandDCPplannerstolearnhowtransportationplanningworks

and how transportation policy is developed in New York. Since neither of these

agenciesworksdirectlywith thevans,ourdiscussionscenteredon transportation

planningmethodsandprocess,andonlyoccasionallyreferencedthevans. Insights

gained here, helped me understand how planners and policymakers construct

transportationpolicyandwhytheregulationsgoverningthevanscontravenedaily

practice.

Second,IintroducemyinterviewswithplannersfromtheTLCandDOT.Itis

in this section that I hear directly from those who regulate the vans. The TLC

planners tell me that the vans are barely a known quantity and that while the

Commission promises to pay closer attention to the vans going forward, a look

throughrecentbudgetfilingssuggeststheopposite.Ialsospokewiththeplanners

attheDOTwhooverseethevans,andtheywereequallyblaséaboutthevansand

seem unconcerned that an entire class of transportation services hovers in an

awkwardandconfusingregulatorypurgatorywithnoresolutioninsight.

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Third, I interview actors beyond local government and focus on the van

industryitself.AtthefirstCommuterVanSummit,ameetingthatsawcommutervan

interests, regulators,policeofficers,electedofficials, andotherscome together for

the first time inanyone’smemory,we finally seehowall of thesedifferent actors

interactwheninthesameroom.Withmyfocusnowshiftedfromplannerstonon-

government actors, I recount an interviewwith an executive at amedia company

thatsellsadvertisingtargetedtoWestIndianpassengers.Inthisinterview,Ilearned

thevanindustryhastriedtoengagewiththeCity,specificallytheTLC,buthasbeen

continually rebuffed. Finally, I interviewed the head of a local grass-roots

organization engaged in raising awareness about police repression, gentrification,

andequityinFlatbush,Brooklyn.Inthisinterview,astrongconnectionbetweenthe

vansandsocialjusticeismade.Throughtheseinterviews,Itheorizethataslongas

thevansoccupyanundefinedandinformalspace—especiallywhenthatspaceisin

opposition to the law—passengers, operators, and drivers are vulnerable to

displacementasdemographicanddevelopmentpressuresmount.

BeyondaMethodologicalBias

Because other cities with large immigrant populations, such as Miami,

Hudson County, New Jersey, and parts of California, have robust van networks, I

believedthatshortcomingsintransportationplanningmethodsemployedbytransit

agencies and departments of transportation played an important role in these

groups’ decisions to develop their own transportation solutions (Federal Transit

71

Administration1992;ValenzuelaJr.etal.2005;HudsonCountyDivisionofPlanning

2007). Since transportation planning methods emphasize central tendencies and

elevatetheautomobileoveralternativemodesoftransportationitseemedplausible

thatplannersfailedtocaptureportionsofthetravelingpublicwhentheycarriedout

theirdatacollectionandanalysis(Black1990;Johnston2004;Schiefelbusch2010).

The problem in New York, however, had little to do with methodological

biases.Overthecourseofmyinterviews,itbecameclearthatalackoforganization,

interest, competing demands, and coordination stymied any actual planning or

systematic thinking about the vans. Before overhauling transportation planning

methodstobettercapturevariationintraveldemand,itismoreimportanttomake

sure the City and commuter van operators, drivers, and passengers communicate

withoneanothermoreeffectivelysothateachsidedescribesitsneedsanddevelops

linkagesthatenableproductiveplanning(Beauregard2015,p.146).

ThefirstcluethatIwasbeatingdownthewrongpathcameinmyveryfirst

interview. In a large conference room at theMTA’s offices in LowerManhattan, I

spokewithanumberofsubwayandbusplannerswhohadbeengraciousenoughto

explaintheirresponsibilitiestomeandanswermyquestions.Afteraninformative

presentation about theMTA’s planning efforts, I looked down at the script I had

prepared,whereIhadunderlinedmultipletimestomakesurethey“reallydescribe

modelsanddecision-makingcriteria,”andaskedtheroom,“HowdoestheMTAplan

newroutes”(myemphasis)(PersonalInterview2014d)?Afteramomentofsilence,

a senior bus planner looked to her left and right before answering, “It’s not as

academicasyouthink”(PersonalInterview2014d).Sheandhercolleagueswalked

72

methroughsomebasicbenchmarksthattheMTAtriestouphold:whereisservice

lackingandhowcantheMTAensurethatallNewYorkersarewithina10-minute

walkof transitservice.14While theseareadmirablegoals, theyprovide littleroom

for planners to do much of anything in corridors that have adequate access to

service.

Insteadof“forcing”theinterviewtoconformtomypreconceivedideasabout

transportationplanningmethods,Iaskedtheplannerstodescribetheirday-to-day

responsibilitiesandactivitiesandhowtheyselectednewbusroutes.SincetheMTA

hasalargeportfolioofassets,employeescoveralotofterrainandareexpectedto

balance multiple interests and demands. In addition to making the buses and

subwaysrun,theMTAisrequiredtorespondtopubliccommentsandrequestsfrom

publicofficials.

Time is precious, and according to the group of planners I spoke with,

responding tocomments, requests, andcomplaintsconsumesa significantportion

of their time.Oneplannerwent so far as to say that her jobwas constrained “by

limited time and political considerations” (Personal Interview 2014d). What this

plannermeantwasthateverydecisionshemakes,fromthesignificanttothebanal,

takes placewithin a fishbowl. As soon as anything is decided there is immediate

push back that must be addressed by the MTA. Responding to feedback and

criticism requires as much care and consideration as service expansion or

reduction. One example that the group volunteered that was particularly

14Asmentionedearlier,inordertopreservetheanonymityofthepeoplewhoagreedtospeakme,Ihaveusedsolelyfemalepronounstorefertoallofmyinterviewees.

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illuminatingoccurredin2000andplayeditselfout inthepressoverthecourseof

severalmonths.

Asthegroupdescribedthestory, theyclaimedthatwhatbeganasasimple

service improvement toeliminate “mergeconflicts”between thenumbers2and5

trainsintheBronxquicklydeterioratedintoapoliticalskirmishbetweentheMTA

andtheNewYorkStateLegislature(PersonalInterview2104d).AssoonastheMTA

announced the proposed service change a member of the New York State

LegislaturecontactedtheMTAandurgedittoabandontheplan.This intrusionby

theStateLegislatorforcedplannersattheMTAtogobackandre-studytheissue—

whatre-studyingactuallymeansisstilluncleartome—andengageinafutileback-

and-forthwithanelectedofficialwhohadno interest inoperatingefficienciesbut

instead—itwasalleged—wantedtomaintainexpresssubwayservicenearhishouse

(PersonalInterview2014d).

Intriguedby thisstory, I reviewedoldnewspaperarticles topiece together

thestoryandcorroboratedetailsbroughtupintheinterview.InMay2000,theMTA

announceditwantedtoeliminate5trainexpressservicebetween180thstreetand

149thstreetintheBronxduringtheweekdaymorningandeveningrushhours.The

problemwiththeexistingservice,fromtheMTA’spointofview,wasthatitrequires

the5 train to crossover the2 train’s tracks toaccess theexpress tracksandskip

stops intheBronx.Thesecrossoversdelayboththe2and5trainsandreducethe

absolutenumberoftrainstheMTAcanrunoneithersetoftracks:“thechangewill

helppreventdelaysallalongtheNo.5line.KeepingtheDyreAvenuetrainonalocal

track, they say, will prevent bottlenecks involving the No. 2 train, which also

74

switches to express tracks at 180th Street” (Critchell 2000). In short the fix was

designed to improve service along both routes by eliminating a conflict between

rivaltrainsfightingforscarcetrackspace.

After the MTA’s announcement, Assemblyman Jeffrey Klein, now a State

Senator, got to work mobilizing his constituents and colleagues in the State

Legislature to pressure the MTA to abandon the service change. He collected

signatures opposing the planned service change, lobbied the MTA directly, and

enlistedtheassistanceofhisfellowlegislators,includingAssemblySpeakerSheldon

Silver,StateSenatorEricSchneidermanandAssemblymanScottStringer,tooppose

thechange(Kennedy2000a;Kennedy2000b).Klein’sinterventionpaidimmediate

dividends.Within twodaysofhandingovermore than2,000 signaturesopposing

thechangetotheMTA,itannouncedaone-monthdelaytotheproposedchangesoit

couldre-studytheproject(Critchell2000).

While the opposition had powerful allies in the State Legislature and a

motivated public, the MTA had the benefit of sound logic, expertise, and the

presumedautonomytoact.AsBeauregard(2015)explains,“Plannersremainunder

the influence of modernism’s promise that knowledge can overcome ignorance,

resolveopposingviewpoints,andmotivatethosewithpowertoactforthecommon

good” (p. 219). In September 2000, the MTA nevertheless announced it would

abandonitsplanstoeliminatethemergeconflictsbetweenthe2and5trainsinthe

Bronx(Kennedy2000b).Withinthespanofaseason,theMTAannouncedaservice

change to improve service, met with intense opposition from local politicians,

receivedmore than2,000signatures fromdisgruntledBronx residents, re-studied

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the issue, and abandoned it. As a postscript to this story, the MTA eventually

upgraded some parallel track that eliminated the conflict in the southbound

direction, but the conflict still persists in the northbounddirection 14 years later

(PersonalInterview2014d).

It is not a surprise that politics and power often shape transportation

decisions (Caro 1974; Hall 1980; Wachs 1990; Flybjerg 2000; Dyble 2007; Swift

2012;White2012).Theinitialsitingofsubwaystationsacenturyagooftenfollowed

politicalinterestsratherthantechnicalconsiderationsandrecentdisputesoverbike

lanes and rail connections to local airports remind us how quickly political

coalitionscoalescearoundtheseinfrastructureinterventions(Gregory1999;Hood

2004;Grynbaum2011). In theexamplerecountedby theMTAplanners,however,

theMTA attempted to initiate a relatively small, technical improvement,which in

turn triggered a maelstrom of opposition, scrutiny, and additional work.

AssemblymanKlein alleged thathehad “yet to findanyoneoutsideof theTransit

Authority who thought this would have been a good idea,” and that the MTA’s

reasoningfortheservicechange,toeliminateabottleneck,“justdidnotringtrue”

(Kennedy2000b).

TheabilityofthelegislatorstochallengeandunderminetheMTAspeaksto

thepowerofthelegislatorstofindarationalitytosuittheirneedsandoutmaneuver

theMTA. As Flyvbjerg (1998) writes, “Power does not seek knowledge…. Rather,

power defines what counts as knowledge and rationality, and ultimately…what

counts as reality” (emphasis in the original) (p. 27). Thus, what seemed

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uncontroversial and technically sound to the MTA was quickly assailed and

rebrandedasunreasonablebythelegislators.

In the face of these kinds of threats to theMTA’s autonomy, the planners

explainedthattheypreferredtopursuenon-polarizingprojects.Thus,whenoneof

theMTAplannerstoldmethattherewasa“strongimpulsetolookatsomethingthat

ispoliticallymotivated,”Iwascurioustolearnmoreabouthowthesenon-technical

forces shaped their daily duties. At this point in our interview, however, we had

alreadybeentogetherforoverthreehoursandourconversationhadtouchedonso

many interesting subjects that it made sense to digest the information I had

gatheredandscheduleafollowupmeetingsowecoulddigdeeperintotheissueof

routeselectionandpolitics.

As Iwrote upmy summary notes for the day in the comfort of theMTA’s

lobby—this was in addition to the notes I had taken during the meeting—I was

drawnby theplanners’ continual reference to the limitationsplacedon their jobs

rather thantheirability toact.Theplannersdescribedhowpoliticsstymiedthem,

aginginfrastructurenarrowedtheirmissionbyreducingavailableoptions,andthe

rigidityoffederalpolicyandgrantsforcedthemtoconformtoguidelinesthatmay

or may not have any bearing on the needs of the MTA. These limitations, the

plannersimplied,shapedtheirday-to-dayactivitiesandledmetoconcludethat,in

somerespects,MTAplannerstargetpoliticallyfeasibleprojectsratherthanprojects

thatcreatethelargesttransportationbenefits.

Inoursecondmeeting,asmallergroupofplannerswalkedmethroughtheir

processalloveragainandingreaterdetail.Thistimewefocusedonanewbusroute

77

inWilliamsburg,Brooklyn,theB32,tohighlightwhytheydevelopedthisnewroute

[Figure 6]. They explained that a number of prompts, from articles in the

newspaperstoarecentrezoning,persuadedthemtorolloutnewbusservicealong

Kent Avenue connecting the Williamsburg waterfront with Greenpoint and Long

Island City (Personal Interview 2014e; Metropolitan Transportation Authority

2014).Oneoftheplannerstoldme,“Momentumforanewservicebuilds.Requests

come in from people in the community, real estate developers, and politicians”

(Personal Interview2014e).While thisapproach is sensible, especiallyas theCity

re-zonesareasofthecitythatlackadequatetransitaccess,itmeansthatareasofthe

citythatarenotthesiteofheavyinvestment,suchastheFlatbushcorridor,missout

onsimpleserviceupgrades.

Figure 6: Routemapof theB32bus,which spansLong IslandCity,Greenpoint, andWilliamsburg(MetropolitanTransportationAuthority2014).

78

As I moved the discussion towards methods and the decision-making

process,theplannersremindedmethatalotoftheirfocusisinneighborhoodsthat

arebeingremadethroughlarge-scaleresidentialdevelopmentandre-zonings,such

as the industrial waterfront in Brooklyn and Queens, and that the economic

slowdownin2008madeitverydifficulttopredicthowridershipwouldchangeover

time.Togglingbetweenscales,thecityorregionandspecificneighborhoods,posesa

realchallengetothebusplanners:“NYMTC(NewYorkMetropolitanTransportation

Council) has good travel data at the macro-level, but it’s not so good at the

neighborhoodscale,” theytoldme(Personal Interview2014e).Withoutgoodlocal

travel data, it becomes impossible for the planners to project ridership into the

future with any confidence along specific routes, especially when economic

conditionsremainunclear:“Wedon’tknowwhichneighborhoodsaregoingtocome

back” (Personal Interview 2014e). What they did stress, as we talked about

fluctuations in bus ridership [Figure 7], was that reliability, the ability of a

passenger to know with certainty how quickly the bus would take him or her

between point-a and point-b, was the key to building andmaintaining ridership.

Thesmallertheuncertainty,theeasieritistogetpeopleonthebus:“Wehopethat

with tools like BusTime and Select Bus Service, wewill be able to providemore

reliableserviceandincreasebusridership”(PersonalInterview2014e).15

15BusTime allows anyone to see where all the MTA’s buses are via the Internet or smartphoneapplication. SelectBusService is theMTA’s latest attempt to improve travel timesonhighvolumeroutesbyeliminatingon-boardpayments.

79

Figure7:AnnualBusRidershipviatheMetropolitanTransportationAuthority.

IfNoOneSpeaks,IsNoOneHeard?

While theMTA is the largest transit provider in the city, it is not the sole

entitychargedwithstudyingthecity’stransportationneeds.Inordertolearnmore

about thisprocess, Iconductedahandfulof interviews,with followupemailsand

phone calls, with planners at the Department of City Planning’s Transportation

Division. TheTransportationDivisionworkswith theDOT,who Iwill speakwith

later in this chapter, and the MTA to provide guidance and support on

transportationstudies.Here, Iconducted interviewswiththreepeopleatdifferent

stagesintheircareers.Atmyfirstmeeting,Ispokewithayoungplannerworkingon

two neighborhood-planning projects in Brooklyn and Queens. The young planner

clearlyoutlinedtheprocessshefollowed:1)establishexistingconditions;2)meet

withmembers of the community to discuss existing conditions, present the tools

620000000

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700000000

720000000

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760000000

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Ride

rship

Year

AnnualBusRidership

80

availabletothem,andtakefeedbackontheirneeds;3)schedulefollowupmeetings

tomakesureeveryone’svoiceisheardandthattheplannershaveacleargraspof

the issues facing the neighborhood; 4) draft a working document that takes

everything learned into account and circulate it internally; 5) coordinate across

agencies to make sure everyone is onboard; 6) publish the study (Personal

Interview2014f).

The young planner believed that this exhaustive process had a number of

meritsbutalsoposedsignificantchallengestodevelopingaplan.Thebiggestissue

she identified was planners’ inability to capture the full range of voices in a

neighborhood.“Eventhoughwedoextensiveoutreach,”shesaid,“wedomissentire

groups of people because they don’t participate” (Personal Interview 2014f). She

illustratedthisshortcomingwhenshedescribedaprojectshewasworkingonina

rapidlychangingneighborhoodinQueens.Asmoreresidentsmovedintothearea,

new residents clamored formore bike lanes and slow zones tomake the streets

more appealing to pedestrians and bicyclists. Representatives from the existing

businesses,however,namelythe factoriesandwarehousescommoninportionsof

this industrialneighborhood, failedtoshowuptothesemeetingsandthushadno

directvoice in theprocess.Withoutavoice in theprocess,CityPlanningdrafteda

study that marginalized industrial interests and painted a partial picture of the

neighborhood’sneeds.

Omitting entire groups from theplanningprocess is not a newproblem in

planning (Jacobs 1961; Mohl 2004; Buzbee 2014). In another interview with a

senior planner from the Transportation Division, she, too, spoke of this enduring

81

problem:“Thepeoplewhodon’tparticipatearethehardestpartoftheprocess.As

we thinkaboutbike lanes, for instance,wehaveno insight frombikemessengers

andhowtheymovethroughthecity.Unfortunately,youcan’tknowwhatyoudon’t

know.Butwerecognizethegapsandtrytoplugtheminasbestwecan”(Personal

Interview2014g).

When a known group is absent from the process, planners can take the

meetingsdirectlytothosegroups.AstheDepartment’splannerspreparedastudyof

RedHook, Brooklyn, for instance, they noticed that residents from the RedHook

Houses, the largest public housing development in Brooklyn, never attended the

publicoutreachmeetings(DepartmentofCityPlanning2014).Ratherthanignoring

thisabsenceandmovingonwiththestudy,theseniorplannertoldme,“Whenthe

RedHookHousesdidn’tshowupforourmeetings,wejustwenttotheirmeetings

andlistenedtotheirissues”(PersonalInterview2014g).16

WhiletheRedHookHousesisanobviousandfixedneighborhoodinstitution

inRedHook,othergroupsaremoredifficult to identify,and it isnotalwaysclear

that the City has the energy or resources to find every niche community. This

exampleconnecteddirectlywithacomment frommyinterviewwiththeMTAbus

planners who discussed how difficult it was for them to assess local bus needs

becauseofthelackofinformationattheneighborhoodscale:“Howmuchoutreach

can we do? We try to get officials, churches, and everyone” (Personal Interview

2014e).Theinabilitytoincludeeveryoneinastudyisnotafatalflaw.Theproblems

arisewhen studies are presented as comprehensive and definitivewhen they are16Sandercock and Forsyth (1992) also point out that even when people show up to planningmeetings,thereisnoguaranteethateveryonewillparticipate(p.51).

82

clearly partial and suggestive.When factors fail to find theirway into a study or

model,thereisnowaytorepresentthem(Black1990).

Sophisticated, time-intensive “predict andprovide”modelsare thebedrock

oftransportationstudies.Black(1990)acknowledgesthatduringhistimeworking

on the Chicago Area Transportation Study, a ground-breaking large scale

transportationplanningandengineeringstudythatproducedathree-volumereport

released in 1959, 1960, and 1962, researchers failed to identify future concerns,

suchascongestionandpollution,which in turnwere impossible tooperationalize

and include in their models. The models they created were premised on flawed

assumptionsandhadnowaytoconceiveofaworldconcernedaboutpollutionand

congestion.Theimpossibilityofcollectingeverypieceofdata,orrepresentingitina

model,meansthatimportantfactorsgetomitted,andgroupsandfactorsarealways

marginalized,forgotten,ordisenfranchised.Igo(2007)contendsthatwhiletherise

ofquantitativeanalysisinthesocialsciencesandinpopularculture,mainlythrough

polling,helpedcreateamorefixedpictureofthenation,thisrenderingcameatthe

costofpromotingapartialvision:

Proclamations about ‘Americans’ could not be made withoutsuppressing thevoicesandexperiencesofsome,andheresurveyorsmoreoftenperpetuatedthanchallengedtheassumptionsoftheirday.Their presumptions about who constituted the public meant thatsome Americans—African Americans, immigrants, and poor people,among others—were systematically excluded from their statistics,andthatthenationsurveyedwasalwaysapartialone.

83

RegulationWithoutACause

While transportation planningmethods, as practiced in New York City did

notprovide theexplanatoryvalence I anticipatedas Ipursuedmyquestionabout

how do planners and policymakers construct transportation policy, I turned my

attention to the regulators, politicians, and actors connected with the industry.

Specifically,IspokewithcurrentandformeremployeesattheTLCandtheDOT,van

drivers and operators, and communitymembers interested in the vans. Because

interviews are susceptible to gaps in knowledge, poor recall, or confusion, I

combined them with ongoing archival and ethnographic research that examined

meetingminutes,legislation,TLCbudgetdocumentsandannualreports,newspaper

articles, community meetings, and City Council meetings to contextualize the

universe of the vans and transportationpolicy and verify claimsmadeduringmy

interviews.

MixedMessages

After combing through three decadesworth of the TLC’smeetingminutes,

looking for insight into how the vans were perceived and handled by the

Commission, and turning up very little, I turned to interviews with current and

formerTLCemployeesandcommissionerstogainanotherperspectiveonthevans.

Asmentioned earlier, I interviewed a former commissioner from the1990s, but I

also spoke with current employees working in the policy department, the press

office,andlegaldepartment.Throughtheseinterviews,itisclearthattheTLCwants

84

to learnmore about the vans, but that it knows little about the industry; namely,

howthevansoperate,orhowtogetafirmergraspontheexistingconditions.

Duringmy interviewwith the former commissioner, she still remembered

theTLC’sroleinregulatingthevansvividlybutalsoreliedoncommonstereotypes

ofthevanstodescribehowtheyoperatedandwhousedthem.Shealsoadmittedto

havingneverbeeninsideavan,despitelivingadjacenttotheFlatbushCorridorfor

more than 30 years. After discussing the TLC in the 1990s and getting some

background information on the former commissioner, I asked her why the vans

weresopopularonFlatbushAvenue:“Asservicedeclinedonthebusesandpeople

grew desperate,” she explained “the vans sort of just popped up.When there are

over a thousand people waiting at the Junction (where Flatbush Avenue and

NostrandAvenueintersect)forbusesthatweren’tthereorwereovercrowded,you

understandwhythevansaresopopular”(PersonalInterview2014c).Shefollowed

heranswerwithashortexplanatoryaside,“youknowit’sreally,reallyhardtosay

no[tothevans]whenyou’refreezingorsoakingwet”(PersonalInterview2014c).

While the formercommissionerconfirmedmuch Ihad learned throughmy

survey work, archival research, and interviews, it was important to hear that

someone at theTLCunderstood thepassenger’s perspective.Despite empathizing

withstrandedpassengers,sheexplainedthattheTLCalreadyhadaclearlydefined

rolebeforethearrivalofthevansin1993,regulatingtaxis,andthatthevanswere

anunexpectedaddition:“theTLCdidn’twanttodealwith[thevans].Ourshtickis

taxis,thankyouverymuch”(PersonalInterview2014c).

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Even though the TLC was uninterested in regulating the vans, the former

commissionerassuredmethattheCommission’sexperienceissuingpermitstofor-

hire vehicles, inspecting taxis, and regulating private operatorsmade it the best-

suitedagencytooverseethevans.Thevans,liketaxisandfor-hirevehicles,arefully

privatized.They receivenodirect subsidy for their operationsor capital costs.As

such,theCitytoesacarefullinewiththeseoperatorsratherthanexertingtoogreat

aninfluenceoverthem.ThisisimportantbecausetheCityandState,intheshapeof

the MTA, hold buses and subways to a very high operational standard and

determineexactlywhereserviceisprovided.Withthevans,theCitymandatesthat

vehicles are inspected three times a year, but it does not require vans to be

wheelchair accessible, provide service on specific streets, or maintain a schedule

(TLCn.d.,p.6).

Besides the distinction between the public and private provision of

transportationservices,wealsodiscussedregulationsandenforcement.Oneofthe

chief complaints against the vans, as raised by elected officials, local newspapers,

andsomecommunitymembers,istheperceptionoflawlessness.Overthecourseof

attendingpublicmeetingsandinterviews,anumberofvanoperatorsfromQueens

referredtoFlatbushAvenue,andthevansinBrooklyngenerally,asthe“WildWest”

andtheirdriversas“cowboys.”Whilethevansandlawlessnessaresynonymousto

some,theformercommissionermadethepointthatregulatingthevansshouldbe

easy,andthatwhenshewasattheTLCshethoughttheCommissiondidagoodjob

enforcingthelawandcurbingtheillegalpirates:“Franklyvanenforcementiseasier

than livery, taxi, or gypsy [cab] enforcement: the vans are like a whale in a

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swimming pool, they’re hard to miss and they aren’t spread all over the city”

(Personal Interview2014c).Since thevansstick towell-definedcorridorsandare

distinctive, rather than personal anonymous cars, it is relatively easy to set up

checkpointsandseizeunlicensedvans.17

As we discussed enforcement, I asked her to explain how the TLC could

better regulate the industry today. Her suggestion was simple: the TLC needs to

seizevansifitwantstostampoutthepirates.WhenIsuggestedthattheTLCneeded

moreresourcesforenforcement,sheinterruptedmeandsaid,“It’snotafunctionof

money;it’safunctionofhavingastrategyandtakingvansoffthestreet”(Personal

Interview2014c).Expandinguponthisideaofhavingavan“strategy,”Iaskedifthe

agencyhadastrategynow,shetoldmethewilltoseizevanshaddisappearedsince

hertimeattheagency,thoughrecentstatisticssuggestthatisnotentirelytrue.The

former commissioner speculated that the vanshadbeen ignored, inpart, because

Cityofficialsdidnotwanttoappearracistandthushadallowedthevanstohoverin

aliminalspacebetweenlegalityandillegality.Whileherpointhasmerit,onecould

argue, as the City Council Member quoted in an earlier chapter did, that it was

racisminthefirstplacethatledtotheinitialdeclinesinbusservicethattriggered

theonsetofthevans.

Intriguedbythe formercommissioner’scommentsaboutvehicleseizures, I

wanted to see just how many vehicles the TLC seized every year. The former

commissioner toldme thatwhen sheworkedat theTLC in the1990s, theagency

17In September, a federal judge ruled that it was unconstitutional for TLC enforcement agents toseize vehicles they suspect are operating as unlicensed taxis or vans without first obtaining awarrant.Thisdecisionhaseliminatedvehicleseizuresasaviableenforcementmethodforthetimebeing(Penhirin2015;Joshi2015).

87

seized about 1,000 total vehicles per month.When I examined the TLC’s Annual

Reportsdatingbackto2010,IfoundthattheTLCseizedfarfewervehicles[Figure

8],butthatsince2012,coincidingwiththeintroductionoftheStreetHailLiveryor

BoroTaxiprogram,aprogramdesignedtocreate18,000newstreethailliverycars,

sold off in three tranches of 6,000, that can be both dispatched or hailed in the

boroughsandinManhattannorthof96thstreetontheEastSideand110thstreeton

theWest Side, therehadbeena renewedeffort to stampout illegalpoachingand

gypsycabstojustifythepriceofthenewmedallions.18

Figure8:TotalVehicleSeizuresviatheTaxiandLimousineCommission(TLC).

WhenIlookedspecificallyatvanseizures,thetrendwasverysimilartothe

totalvehicleseizurestatistics:2010and2011hadveryfewvanseizuresrelativeto

thenumberseizedin2012,2013,and2014[Figure9].

18Basedontherecentcourtcase,itisassumedthatthe2015numberswillbelowerthanthe2014numbers.

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Seizures

Year

TotalVehicleSeizures

88

Figure9:TotalVanSeizuresviatheTaxiandLimousineCommission(TLC).

In a separate interview with a seasoned TLC veteran who possesses an

encyclopedicknowledgeoftheagency,itbecameclearthattheCommissionknows

littleaboutthevansandhasnoimmediateplanstorectifythisshortcomingdespite

announcing new policies concerning the vans, namely the decal program and the

abortive Group Ride Vehicle Pilot Project discussed earlier. Our interview began

withafewquestionsaboutthehistoryoftheCommissionanditsroleregulatingthe

vans.

SincetheadoptionofLocalLaw115,thevanshavebeenadministeredinan

ad hoc fashion and no single person at the TLC has ever developed a deep

understandingorinterestinthem.AccordingtotheTLCveteran,“Thereisn’talotof

institutionalmemoryofthevans”(PersonalInterview2014h).Whileshelamented

thisfact,shejustifiedthelackofinstitutionalmemoryandknowledgebyasserting

that theTLC “is a regulatingand licensingbody” (Personal Interview2014h).The

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Seizures

Year

VanSeizures

89

TLC, for the most part, does not carry out studies or serve as a storehouse of

knowledge. After all it was the DCP Transportation Division that carried out the

commutervanstudyin1998despitetheTLC’sroleasregulator.19TheTLCissues

permitsandinspectsvehicles,whathappensafterthat,accordingtothelogicofthe

veteran TLC employee, is beyond the Commission’s ken—though it does have a

small enforcement division of 186 agents (Goldwyn 2015). When I asked the

veteranTLCemployeeifthisdissonancebetweenknowledgeandregulationseemed

problematic to her, she replied in a resigned tone, “The TLC is here for better or

worse” (Personal Interview 2014h).When I shiftedmy questions to issues about

unlicensed vans, lapsed insurance, vans operating out of their service areas, and

otherconcernsmentionedbydriversandoperators,sheresponded,“Yes,thoseare

problems, but we don’t oversee the minute-to-minute operations of these

businesses”(PersonalInterview2014h).

WhiletheTLCveteranacceptsthelimitationsoftheCommissionasanactive

regulatory body when it comes to the vans, the truth is more complicated than

blitheneglect.TheTLCisasmallagencywithabout700full-timeemployeesandan

equally small budget—it is projected to reach $80 million in 2015 (City Council

2015a).TobetterunderstandjusthowsmalltheTLC’sbudgetis,theNewYorkCity

DepartmentofTransportation’scameinatjustunder$1billionforfiscalyear2015

andtheNewYorkPoliceDepartment’swasjustover$5billionforfiscalyear2015

(CityCouncil2015bandCityCouncil2015c).DespitetheTLC’smuchsmallerstature

vis-à-visotherCityagencies,ithasanenormousresponsibilityingeographicterms:19WhenIinitiallytriedtogetacopyofthestudyformyownreview,nooneattheTLCwasabletolocateadigitalorphysicalcopy.Intheend,Igaveacopyofthe1998studytotheTLC.

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theoversightofnearly150,000driversand100,000vehiclesthatspaneverysquare

inchofthecity’sthreehundredsquaremiles.

In the face of limited capabilities and bandwidth, however, the TLC has

selectively takenon tasksbeyond inspecting and licensingvehicles.Asmentioned

earlier,theTLC’sdecisiontoinitiatetheGroupRideVehiclePilotProjectwasoutof

character for the agency, but over the last five years, the agencyhas grownmore

active. Part of this is thedoingof the agency, namely the launchof theBoroTaxi

program, and part of this is the changing transportation landscape in New York,

suchastheriseofe-hailtaxisandshiftingdemographicsacrossthecity.Belowisa

chartshowingjusthowrapidlythefor-hirevehiclemarkethasgrowninNewYork,

which in turn requires the TLC and the City to expend more resources on

inspections, ticketing, data processing, studies, hearings, etc. Between 2010 and

2014, thenumberof for-hirevehiclesgrewby20,513vehiclesor54percent, and

thenumberoflicenseddriversincreasedby21,762or40percent.

Oneoutgrowthofthisrapidchangehasbeenintensescrutiny.Inthesummer

of2015,theMayorandCityCouncilannouncedaproposedcaponfor-hirevehicle

permitswhiletheCitystudiedtheimpactthisgrowthhashadontraffic

(FlegenheimerandFitzsimmons2015).Thecapwaseventuallyabandoned,inpart,

becauseUberspentanestimated$3millioncourtingpublicopinionandpolitical

influence(VanZuylen-Wood2015).

While the growth of the for-hire vehicle sector had little to dowith active

decisionsmadebytheTLC, theagencydid takeaproactivestepwhen it launched

theBoroTaxiprogram in2013.Withoutdelving toodeeply into thedetailsof the

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program,thecorepointisthatwhentheCommissionbegansellingnewStreetHail

Liverymedallions, it also budgeted for the hiring of 140 new employees directly

responsible for the implementationof theprogram(NewYorkCityCouncil2013).

TheTLC’sbudgetgrewrapidlybetween2012and2015,nearlya150percentrateof

change, because the agency accounted for the new jobs needed to ensure the

smoothdeploymentandadoptionofthisprogram.

Acloser lookat theproposed2016budget revealsanumberofnewneeds

affectingmultipleareasof theagency,butthereareno line itemsdedicatedtothe

vans, even after it announced that its decal pilotwould become permanent (New

York City Taxi and Limousine Commission 2015). The agency wisely allocated

$279,000 for thecitywide traffic safety initiative,VisionZero;$294,000 foradata

analysisteamtoprocesstheterabytesofdatacreatedbythe76mobileapplication

enabled for-hire vehicle providers like Uber; and $1,231,000 million for the La

GuardiaAirport Squad to increase enforcement against illegal pickups (NewYork

CityCityCouncil2015). Whilealloftheseexpendituresaredefensible,thereisno

indication that the new budget will allocate one dollar towards improving the

passenger, operator, or driver’s experience for commuter vans. If budgets reflect

prioritiesandvalues,asthedeBlasioadministrationhassaid,thevansarenowhere

to be found in the budget documents, or the appendix detailing new needs,

submittedtotheCityCouncil(CityofNewYork2014)[Figure10].

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Figure10:TaxiandLimousineCommission’s2015budgetdocument(NewYorkCityCouncil2015).

Whilethegapbetweenfundingtaxiinitiativesandvanprojectshaswidened

with successive TLC budgets, the Commission has implemented two minor van

policies. In an interview with a TLC employee charged with implementing the

CommuterVanDecalPilot, I askedherwhat the agency’s goalswere for the vans

andhowthisspecificpolicywouldhelpachievethem.Sheassuredmethatthe“vans

have become a top priority since the newCommissioner took over,” and that the

primarygoalsforthevanswereto“lendthemlegitimacyandbuilduptheindustry

goingforward”(Personal Interview2014i).Theseresponsesreflect thesamelevel

of uncritical hopefulness conveyed in TLCmeeting minutes discussed in Chapter

Two. Again, there is little explanation as to why this specific policywill help the

industry going forward, and as budget documents show, this optimism is simply

assumedratherthanpartofaconcreteandpaid-forplan.

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In an effort tomove passed these boilerplate responses, I asked her about

settingupmorecheckpointstocrackdownonpiratesanddoingmoreoutreachto

learnabouttheneedsofpassengers,drivers,andoperators.Sheexplainedthatfor

thevans,“enforcementhastostartsmall,andthatthedecalprogramisastepinthat

direction”(PersonalInterview2014i).Whilethisresponserevealednothingofnote,

it was a more politically sensitive version of comments made by previous TLC

employeeswhoprovidedbluntertakesontheagency’slackofinterestinthevans.

WhenIaskedwhyenforcementhadtostartoffsmall,thenarrativerevertedtothe

TLC’slackofcapacityratherthananoveralllackofinterest.InfairnesstotheTLC,

coordinationbetweentheCityandthevanshasneverbeenverysmooth,withboth

parties bearing some fault so perhaps this small program is the start of a deeper

engagement.Perhapsthe2017budgetwillrevealagreateremphasisonthevans.

Before speculating on the 2017 budget, I want to return to 2015 and the

decalprogram.Afterrunningaone-yearpilotproject,theTLCdecidedtomakethe

decalprogrampermanent;thus,alllicensedcommutervansnowhavetodisplaythe

official commuter van decal—in addition to other markers that were already

mandated. In the documents posted on the TLC’s website outlining the rules

regardingthenewdecals,theCommissionalsospecifiedtheobjectivesofthepilot:

1) Make TLC-licensed Commuter Vans easily identifiable topassengers so they can tell the difference between legal,licensedCommuterVansandthoseoperatingillegally;

2) AttractnewcustomerstolicensedCommuterVans;and,3) MakeiteasierforTLCandNYPDenforcementtoidentifyillegal

vans, which will potentially make the enforcement officers’dutiessafer.(TaxiandLimousineCommission2015)

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The intent of these three goals is clear; it is still unclear how the decal program

helpsachievethem,orhowthesegoalsweregenerated.Laterinthedocument,the

authors describe the results of the yearlong pilot project. While many operators

participated in the program—87 percent—the commission provides no data,

numericorotherwise, that shows thedecalprogram led to increased ridership in

licensedvans, attractednew customerswhohadnotpreviouslyused the vans, or

helped with enforcement—in fact as we saw in Figure 9, van seizures declined

between2013and2014.This lackof evidence leaves thedistinct impression that

littleeffortwasputintotheanalysisofthisprogram,especiallywhencomparedto

theeffortandresourcesspentontheBoroTaxiprogram.

INeedaVanGuy

TheTLCholdsregulatoryresponsibilityover thevans,but theDOTplaysa

key role in reviewing commuter van applications and renewals, and governs the

streetsofNewYorkCity.AttheDOTIspokewithagroupofplannerswhooversee

thevans,inadditiontootherresponsibilities.Inspeakingwiththesethreepeople,it

becameclearthatnoonehasreallyconsideredthevansaspartofthecity’sbroader

transportation network,which trackswith everything else I have heard from the

TLC and observed at dozens of City Council meetings, where everything from

paratransit to for-hire vehicles to parking regulations to ferries have had a

hearing.20While everyone recognizes the utility of the vans and even the more

salacious fact that “every commuter van operates illegally,” no one seems too

20ThevansdidfinallyhaveahearingonOctober22nd,2015.

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concerned about this disconnect between existing policies and practice (Personal

Interview2014j).

Despite this conclusion about the legality of the vans, the City has no

immediate interest in studying the industry more closely or figuring out how to

integrateit intothelargertransportationnetwork.21Oneoftheseniorplannerson

this team revealed that no one at the DOT, TLC, or City Planning is interested in

“planning for thevansor findinga logicalplace for them in thesystem”(Personal

Interview,2014j).Asaresultof this lackof interest,noone intheCityhasaclear

idea if there are too many or too few vans plying the streets, and if they are

needlessly contributing to congestion and collisions, or doing an adequate job

servingpeople’sneeds.

Theoverall lackof interest inthevansstems, inpart, fromthefactthatthe

van industry is diffuse and has struggled to organize itself, make its concerns

known,andfollowupwiththeappropriatedecision-makerstoensurethatthevan

industry’s concerns are also the concerns of elected officials and regulators. In

ChapterTwo,IcitedsomecommentsfromformerCommissionerDavidYasskythat

acknowledged the communication difficulties between the van industry and the

City. This issue of communication remerged in my interview with the DOT’s

planners: “When Ihaveaproblemwith the taxis, I knowwho to contact. When I

haveaproblemwiththebus, Iknowwhotocontact.WhenIhaveaproblemwith

theliveries,Iknowwhotocontact.WhenIhaveaproblemwiththevans…Ihaveno

21Thiscouldchange.Thereisapieceoflegislationthathasnotbeenvotedonthatwouldputaoneyearmoratoriumonnewcommutervanpermitsandcompel theTLCtostudythevans.Thisbill isstillwiththeCommitteeonTransportation

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ideawhat I’m supposed to do” (Personal Interview, 2014j). This quotepoints not

onlytoalackoforganizationonthesideoftheCity,butalsotoalackoforganization

on the side of the van industry. The yellow taxis and for-hire vehicles have

representatives who attend every TLC meeting, advocate on behalf of their

constituents,lobbylocalandstateofficials,andspeaktothepresswhenissuesover

safetyor legislationarise—thecurrentdebateovere-hail taxis isagreatcaseand

pointofthisorganizationaldifferentiation.

This basic level of organization allows groups to unify around a cause and

showelectedofficialsthatthereisaconstituencywhoseneedsmustbeaddressed.

Without this level of organization, the commuter van industry remains a diffuse,

inscrutableindustrythatiseasilyignoredwhenmorepressingissuesemerge.This

isashame.More important, it isamissedopportunity tounderstandtheneedsof

120,000dailyriderswhorelyon licensedandunlicensedvans.Withoutavoice in

thepolicyprocess,riders,drivers,andoperators’needsaresubsumedbytheneeds

oftaxiriders,MTApatrons,andconcernsoverroadsafety.

GettingOrganizedandBreakingtheFourthWall

Speakingwith local officials provided an enormous amount of background

informationonlocaltransportationplanningandpolicyformation,thestatureofthe

vansintheireyes,andasnapshotofthecurrenttransportationpolicylandscapein

NewYork.Thevansoccupylittlerealestateinthisworld.Togetabetterhandleon

theissuesfacingthevanoperators,drivers,thebroadercommunity,andtobringin

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anotherperspectivetohelproundoutthisworld,Ihadtofindotherforumstogeta

clearer sense of the issues facing drivers, operators, and those dependent on the

industry.(Imakethisdistinctionbetweendriversandoperatorsbecauseoperators

own commuter van bases, which allow drivers and vans to associate with them.

Sometimesanoperatorownsallofthevansassociatedwiththebase.Thismeanshe

orshewilldriveonevanandrentouttheother licensedvanstodrivers. It isalso

common fordriverswhoown their van topaya fee to join anexistingbase.This

distinctionmeansthatdriversandoperatorshavedifferentsetsofconcerns.Drivers

worryaboutrecoupingthecostsofrentingavanwhileoperatorsworryaboutthe

longevity of their base. While one would assume that these priorities should

overlap,thenatureoftheregulationsandtheuncertaintyofenforcementmakethe

rulesoftheroadunclearand,thus,encourageselfishbehavior.)

Inordertobringgreaterclaritytotheregulatoryregimegoverningthevans,

anissueasoldasthevansthemselves,HectorRickettsorganizedandconvenedthe

first Commuter Van Summit in Jamaica, Queens in May 2014. The goal of the

summit,asdescribedbyRicketts,“wastocomefacetofacewithourregulatorsand

neighbors” (Ethnographic Field Notes 2014). The meeting did exactly that. In

addition to the operators and drivers from Brooklyn and Queens—just bringing

these two groups together is a feat in and of itself—the meeting also featured

members of the New York Police Department, DOT, and TLC; local business

interests; City Council Members’ representatives; lawyers working with van

operators;insuranceagents;andlocalcommunitymembers.

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The scheduled portion of the summit gave all of the invited guests an

opportunitytointroducethemselves,speakabouttheirrelationshipwiththevans,

andraisegeneralconcerns.Itwasduringthisperiodthatvandriversandoperators

questioned the assorted guests, especially the TLC, and made larger declarative

statements,like“theTLCneedstofindoutwhatthedriverswant,”or“withoutthe

driversthisindustrycannotmove,”andfinally,“whatIwanttheTLCandDOTtodo

isenforcethelaw”(EthnographicFieldNotes2014).Thisportionofthesummitwas

really a one-way lecture about the shortcomings of the TLC, namely the lack of

enforcementthathasallowedthepiratestooperatewithnearimpunityinBrooklyn

andQueens,ratherthanasubstantivediscussionbetweenmultipleparties.

Whilethescheduledportionofthesummitalloweddriversandoperatorsto

airtheirgrievances,itwasduringlunchthatpeoplemixedandspoketooneanother

rather than at one another. Itwas here that the gapbetween the regulations and

day-to-day practice became obvious. While listening to a group of operators

permitted to serve Flatbush Avenue—a group with over 100 years of collective

experience—discuss their specific issues, it became clear that noneof themknew

howtheCitydecidedwheretositecommutervanloadingzonesorhowtogetthe

Citytomoveexistingonestomoreuseful locations. “DowetalktotheTLCabout

[loading zones]? Maybe Dorothy [from the DOT] would know,” asked one of the

operators(EthnographicFieldNotes2014)?Afterafewmoremomentsofconfused

conversation,Isuggestedtheywritea letter identifyingspecificareastheywanted

to convert to loading zones and send it to whomever they decided was the

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appropriatecontactattheCity.“Withoutanofficialrequest,suchasaletter,noone

attheCitywillevertakethisseriously,”Isaid(EthnographicFieldNotes2014).

Aswediscussedthisidea,itbecameclearthatnoneofthemwantedtotake

ontheresponsibilityofwritingaletteroridentifyingtherightpersontocontact.It

washerethatIinterjectedagainandvolunteeredtowritetheletterontheirbehalf

(Appendix 2), with their consultation and final approval, outlining the operators’

desire to have new commuter van loading zones installed along Flatbush Avenue

andfindtherightpersonwithintheCity’smachinerytopetitionontheirbehalf.

Uptothispoint inmyresearch, Ihadcarefullyobservedallof thedifferent

actorsintheindustry.Ihadaneasyrapportwithanumberofdriversandoperators,

but I hadnever volunteeredmy services, andno onehad ever called uponme to

serveaspecificinterest.Ingeneral,Ithinkthedriversandoperatorswereuncertain

whatroleIplayed,butsinceIkeptappearingintheirvansandatmeetingsorother

events,theyweregraciousenoughtocontinuespeakingwithme.Whilethisshiftin

my role is important, the more relevant finding is how poorly the City and van

interestscommunicate.

This issue of communication emerged during my interviews with City

officials and, not surprisingly, persisted during my interviews with varying van

interests. While the summit made clear just how disconnected everyone was, an

interviewwithanexecutivefromamediacompanythatsellsadvertisingonandin

vansonlyreaffirmedthistroublingfact.

Duringourinterview,theexecutivementionedthatin2013,shewaspartof

groupthatapproachedtheTLCaboutsettingupa“braintrust” tohelpcoordinate

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betweentheCityandthevans.Theideabehindthebraintrust,asdescribedbythis

mediaexecutive,wastocreateaformalarrangementbywhichthegroupcouldpitch

theTLCondifferentideasitbelievedwouldbetterservetheCityandtheindustry,

andtheTLCcouldalsocometothetrustandtestoutitsideas.Inshort,“Wewanted

to facilitate discussion and get things moving” (Personal Interview 2014k), she

explained.

According to the executive, the TLC was not receptive to this idea and

questionedthegroup’smotivations.While theTLChaseveryright toquestionthe

motivationsof an industrygroup, it isunfortunate that theTLChasnotmade the

efforttocreatethesetypesoflinkageswithoneoftheindustriesitregulates.After

all, since the TLC operates from such an information deficit, the best place to get

good information is from the industry itself. In this specific example, it is

particularly ironicbecausethepurportedbraintrustpitchedtheTLConarooftop

light,similartothelightsontopofyellowandgreentaxicabs,todistinguishlicensed

commuter vans from unlicensed pirates (Personal Interview 2014k). While the

particulars of the rooftop light vary from the Commuter Van Decal Pilot that

launchedin2014,whichgrewoutofasuggestionfromthe101stPolicePrecinctin

Far Rockaway, it is troubling that the TLC eagerly adopted one strategy for

distinguishing the vans while rejecting the exact same idea, which came directly

fromagroupwithinthevanindustry.

MoreproblematicthanthelackofcommunicationbetweentheTLCandthe

vanindustryisthelackofclarityonexistingregulations,somethingalludedtoinmy

interviews with the DOT planners and which has been reported in the media

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(Margonelli2011;Goldwyn2015).Evenbasicissues,likewhichlicensesvandrivers

needisnotclearlyunderstoodbyallofdriversandvanoperators.“IftheTLC’srules

were enforced, at least as I understand them, no vans would be allowed on the

roads.Noonehasalloftherightstuff,andit’snotclearanyoneknowswhatallof

therightstuffis,”shesaid(PersonalInterview2014k).Thisistrue,ofcourse.Many

vansdonothavetheright insuranceandmanydriversdonotholdalloftheright

licenses.While the TLC’s requirements are clearly spelled out on itswebsite, the

irregular rhythm of enforcement makes strict adherence to the rules costly and

unnecessary(TaxiandLimousineCommissionn.d.,pp.5-18).

This pervasive uncertainty stretches beyond the van industry and affects

entire neighborhoods and groups of people. In an interviewwith the leader of a

grass-rootsorganization inBrooklyn,shearguedthat theuncertaintysurrounding

thevans,namelythedistinctionbetweenlicensedandunlicensedvans,servesasa

justification for “the police harassment in our communities” (Personal Interview

2014l). Since vans operate illegally in specific neighborhoods, the police have the

right to set up checkpoints, pull over vans, and use whatever tactics it deems

necessarytoupholdorder.

Her work with the vans, which includes documenting tickets van drivers

receive and connecting drivers with legal counsel, grew out of earlier work to

combatpolicebrutality.“Aslongasthereisuncertainty,”shesaid,“this‘traffic’issue

isn’tseenforwhatitreallyis:acivilrightsabuse”(PersonalInterview2014l).While

her focus on civil rights rather than transportation planning separates her from

other interview subjects, her points are valid and add a new dimension to the

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debate. The struggle for equal rights and access to everyday necessities, which

transportation services enable, takes place at multiple scales and depriving

neighborhoods of service, whether licensed or unlicensed, “is demoralizing”

(Personal Interview 2014l). This harassment exacerbates an already tenuous

situation,namely theproblemofadequateaccess to inadequateservice: “Wecan’t

relyonthebusafterdark.Manyofourneighborhoodsaresuburbanandweneed

transportationjusttoengage….Whydoesgettinghomeattheendofthedayhaveto

besuchastrain”(PersonalInterview2014l)?

It is when we think of the vans as a social justice issue that we begin to

understand why new regulations that reflect daily practice are needed and how

informalityjeopardizeseveryoneconnectedtothevans.Whileregulationsdoexist,

the van industry is best described as informal. I use informal not to draw a

distinction between licensed and unlicensed but, instead, to highlight the veil of

uncertainty that shrouds the entire industry. Roy (2009) defines informality as

“inscribed in the ever-shifting relationship between what is legal and illegal,

legitimate and illegitimate, authorized andunauthorized.This relationship is both

arbitraryandfickleandyetisthesiteofconsiderablestatepowerandviolence”(p.

80).Itistheficklenessofinformality—onedayavandriverpicksupapassengerat

a bus stopwithout drawing the ire of the police, but a day later she has her van

impounded and livelihood snatched from her grips for providing the exact same

service—thatleavesvandrivers,streetvendors,landsquatters,andallotherswho

hover inthe liminalspaceof informalityvulnerabletothewhimsof thestate.Roy

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(2009) argues that the state uses the uncertainty that defines informality as a

weapontoenactitsplans:

It is this territorialized flexibility that allows the state to ‘future-proof’, to make existing land available for new uses, to devalorizecurrent uses and users and to make way for a gentrified future; inshorttoplan.Itisnaïvetodesignatesuchprocessesasextra-legal,fortheydonotexistoutsidethelaw.Ratheraspracticesofthestatetheyareelementsofanensembleofsovereignpowerandthemanagementofterritory.Thisinformalityfromabove,ratherthaninformalityasasubalternrevolutionfrombelow.(p.84)

Inthepassageabove,RoyusestheexampleoflandtenureinIndiatohighlightthe

ability of the state to co-opt informality and use it against thosewho have found

succorinitsfuzziness.JustasdevelopmentpressuresinCalcuttaenabledthestate

to upend those de facto land rights ten years later, what will happen in Central

Brooklynwhencapital investmentand re-zoningsarrive?Whatwillhappenwhen

the landscape needs to be re-ordered to facilitate capital accumulation (Smith

1996)?

In New York, the same issues Roy describes are evident in neighborhoods

undergoingdemographicchange.InFreeman(2006),herecountsinterviewswhere

informality,thegapbetweenlawsanddailypractice, ingentrifyingneighborhoods

inBrooklynandManhattanisusedbynewcomersasaweapontoestablishavision

of the city that conforms to their vision of the neighborhood rather than the

practicesoftheexitingcommunity:

In Terry’s story, old (presumably harmless) rituals are beingdisrupted by the gentrywho are trying to “take over.” By using thepolice to enforcewhat they deem to be the new regime, the gentryinspireresentment.Whatisevenmoregallingisthatcertainactivities,suchasdrinking inpublic,areproscribedunless theyconformtohegentry’s idea of what is acceptable. Drinking outside is drinking

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outside.Aslongassomeoneisnotdisorderly,whatdifferencedoesitmakewhether someone is standing on a corner or sitting behind arestaurant cordon? This type of differential treatment is notsurprisingly laidatthedoorstepofgentrificationandisresented.(p.107)

Likeloiteringordrinkinginpublic,thevansoperateillegallyandarevulnerableto

the whims of the police and newcomers who view the vans as ramshackle and

disorderly(TheBrooklynPaper2014,Riesz2014).Thus,demographicshiftsrather

than any changes in the law could functionally criminalize the van industry. The

TLC’sStreetHailLiveryprogram,aprogramdesignedtoeliminategypsycabsisan

excellentindicatorofhowquicklythestatecanmoveonaninformaltransportation

industryandrecastitinitsownimage.

Conclusion

This chapter began with the assumption that predict-and-provide

transportation planning methods marginalize the van community; however, it is

clear that the gap betweendaily practice andpolicy is the outgrowth of a lack of

intereston thesideof theCityandpoorcommunication:neither thevan industry

nor the City engages with one another effectively. The other responsibilities of

planners at the DCP, DOT,MTA, and TLC, from cratering taximedallion prices to

fixing leaky ceilings at the new Hudson Yards subway station, exacerbate these

communicationbreakdowns(Allanetal.2016).Aslongasthevanindustryremains

absentfromlocalhearingsanddisconnectedfromtheplanningandpolicyprocess,

theirconcernsandinterestswillnotberepresented.

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Inadditionto thesevaluable insights intohowtheplanningprocessworks,

this chapter also demonstrated that the vans’ informality is a social justice issue.

Since the laws governing the vans are applied arbitrarily, the van industry has

developed its own practices in opposition to the existing laws but often go

unpunished.Whenpoliceofficersenforcethelaw,whichistheirduty,theythreaten

the mobility of a community and criminalize citizens going about their regular

routines.By viewing the vans through the lens of informality and recognizing the

threatofgentrification,thischapterdrewconnectionstootherurbanactorswhoare

regularlyassociatedwithgentrification,suchassquattersinIndia,streetvendorsin

NewYork,andAfrican-AmericanresidentsinFortGreene.

Inchapterfour,Iwillpresentsurveydatadescribinghowpassengersusethe

vans,why theyprefer them toMTAbus service, and their thoughts on the divide

betweenlicensedanunlicensedvans.

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ChapterFour:AnInformalTransitSystemHidinginPlainSight

SplinteringTransportationNetworks

In 2010, the MTA announced large-scale service reductions in New York

(MTA2010).SoonaftertheMTA’sannouncement,theTLCrespondedwithitsGroup

RideVehiclePilotProject(TaxiandLimousineCommission2010d).ThePilotpaved

thewayforTLC-regulatedcommutervans,dubbedGroupRideVehicles,tooperate

legallyinfiveserviceareaswheretheMTAhadeliminatedbusservice.Thepurpose

ofthepilotaccordingtoTLCChairDavidYassky(TaxiandLimousineCommission

2010d)wastoprovide“anewformofservicethatwebelievewillbeofgreatbenefit

topeopleaffectedbytheMTA’sservicereductions”(p.1).

The vans are amode of transportation that serves niche communities and

operatealmostentirelybeyondtheCity’sscrutinyforavarietyofreasonsthatwere

identified in the previous chapters. While there are licensing and insurance

requirements, a number of vans do not adhere to those requirements, and even

amongtheonesthatarelicensedandinsured,theCityknowslittleabouthowthey

operate,whousesthem,wheretheytravel,andhowmanyofthemareontheroad

in a givenday.Drawn to this lackof knowledge,ProfessorDavidKingand Iwere

enlistedtomonitorthePilotonbehalfoftheTLC.

Asnotedearlierand inotherwork, thePilotwasdramaticallyunsuccessful

(KingandGoldwyn2014a).TheTLC’sinabilitytopilotasuccessfulprojectwiththe

vans demonstrated how poorly it understood the industry and suggested that

without a serious data collection effort, drafting policy geared towards the vans

would be futile. In short, this dissertation is an attempt to make “social science

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matter” by responding to a demonstrable policy failure that shows no sign of

improving(Flyvbjerg2001;Flyvbjergetal.2012).

I spend the bulk of this chapter interpreting the results of my survey of

commuter van passengers on Flatbush Avenue. First, I dive into the survey and

report descriptive statistics that render a clearer image of how commuter vans

operatealongFlatbushAvenueandshowthatthevans,likethebusandthesubway,

are simply anothermode of transit rather than something exotic and beyond the

comprehension planners. After manually surveying over two hundred commuter

van passengers betweenApril 2013 and September 2013, I,with the help of two

colleagues,collectedthefirstdatasetthatattemptstounderstandanunrepresented

andunstudiedportionofNewYork’s transportationuniverse.22Using thisdataset,

onecanmakeclaimsaboutwhypassengersoptforthevansoverthebus,whether

or not these trips are part of a longermulti-modal trip, and who are the people

travelingdownFlatbushAvenueinthehundredsofnon-descript14-seatpassenger

vans. The answers to these topline questions are relatively straightforward and

easily anticipated: people select the vans because of their speed and reliability,

manydoconnecttothesubwayviathevans,andpassengerstendtobefemaleand

originallyfromBrooklyn,Jamaica,Haiti,orTrinidadandTobago.Second,Icompare

theperformanceofthevansagainsttheperformanceoftheB41busandshowthe

extentoftheFlatbushAvenuevans’reachinthecityandregion.

22Becauseof transcription issues, anumberof surveyshad tobe excluded from the final analysis,which totaledonehundredandninety-eight respondents. Iwould like to thankAnnalisaLibermanandCuthbertOnikutefortheirhelpcollectingthesurveys.

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Who,Why,Where

While the literature on the vans is sparse, one thing is clear among all

authors: thevansarepredominatelyusedbyWest Indian immigrantsorBrooklyn

bornresidentswithtiestotheCaribbean(DepartmentofCityPlanning1986;Grava

etal.1987;DepartmentofCityPlanning1998;Richmond2001;Best2016).Whileit

is undeniable that themajorityof van ridershail from theCaribbeanorBrooklyn

thatisonlythetipoftheicebergratherthanthelogicalpointofconclusionforany

inquiry into the vans. To better understand the universe of the vans, Iwanted to

knowwhere riders live, if they own cars, why they select the vans over the bus,

where theywork,and informationabout theirwages.Thesurveyaskedquestions

related to eachof these topics andprovides invaluable insight intowho rides the

vans,why they ride thevans, andwhere theyaregoing in thevans (Appendix1).

After reviewing the survey,whatbecameeminently clear is that thevansare just

another form of a transit—after all 167 of 198 passengers, or 84 percent, use

conventional transit for all,most, or some trips. It just so happens that the vans

operateataremovefromthestateratherthanunderitsdirectcontrol.

WhoRidestheVans?

Thesurveywasdesignedtogetaclearerideaofwhoridesthevansandhow

vanusersaresimilartotransitusers,asdefinedbytheexistingliteratureontransit.

To this end, the survey contains questions about gender, nativity, car ownership,

currentresidency,andemployment. Byprobingtheseareas, it iscleartoseehow

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experiences in thevansresembleexperiencesonthebus,subway,or lightrail. In

additiontotheobviouspointsofoverlap,suchaspassengerseagertoaccesswork,

shopping, and entertainment, the vans have other points in common with

conventionaltransit,suchasattractingahigherproportionofimmigrantpassengers

thanreflectedinthegeneralpopulation,lowerautomobileownershiprates,andan

over-representation of female passengers (American Public Transportation

Association2007;Glaeseretal.2008;ChatmanandKlein2009;Chatman2014).In

short, commuter van passengers have opted for the vans over existing transit

options because they are not receiving the level of service they demand from

conventionaltransit.

Gender

Beforeunpackingthenativitydata,Iwantedtoseeifthevansattractedmore

womenthanmen.Iwasinterestedinthisquestionfortworeasons.First,datafrom

the American Public Transportation Association (2007) shows that women are

morelikelytousetransitthanmen.Thus,ifthevansaresimilartoothermodesof

transit, perhaps this relationship also holds. While I am taking a surface level

approach to this question, the existing literature suggests that the positive

correlationbetweenwomenandtransitridership isnotaquirkyaberrationinthe

data, but the product societal practices across the globe that confine women to

transitdependency(Loukaitou-SiderisandFink2009).

Second,andsomewhatcounter-intuitivelybasedonthefirstfinding,women

aremorewaryoftransitfacilitiesthanmen.Loukaitou-Sideris(2014)confirmsthis

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fearwhenshewrites,“Oneofthebiggesthurdlestowomen’smobilityremainsthe

anxiety over possible victimization in public spaces, buses, and trains (p.244).

While Loukaitou-Sideris is speaking generally about women and transit, popular

accountsof thevans inBrooklynandQueensoftenhighlighttheriskswomenface

when they ride the vans (Taub 2014; Smith 2015; Matua 2015). Despite these

harrowingaccountsinthemedia,thevans,muchliketransitingeneral,carrymore

femaleridersthanmales. Accordingtothesurveydata,124of198passengers,or

63percent,identifiedasfemale.

Nativity

As noted above, everyone who has written about the vans has always

highlightedthatthepassengerstendtobeimmigrantsfromtheWestIndies,islands

like Jamaica,Haiti, Trinidad andTobago, andGuyana. While the survey confirms

this, the survey also reveals that passengers come from Central America, Africa,

Europe,SouthAsia,EastAsia,andotherAmericancities.Thisisanimportantfinding

because it supports the idea that people ride the vans to solve a specific

transportationproblem,inadequateaccesstoadequateservice,ratherthanthevans

beingpartofaculturalidiomuniquetoWestIndianpopulations.

Sinceforeign-bornpassengersmakeupthemajorityofriders,wecanalso

takeacloserlookathowthevanscomparetotraditionaltransitwhenitcomesto

thetravelbehaviorofforeign-bornpassengers.AccordingtoChatmanandKlein

(2009),transitismorepopularamongforeign-bornthanamongnative-born

Americans.Specifically,theyfoundthat“[c]hangesinforeign-bornmode-choiceare

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mostdramaticduringthefirst5yearsintheUnitedStates.Immigrantswhohave

beenintheUnitedStateslessthan1yeararepredictablyleastreliantonautos;just

onethirddrivetoworkinasingle-occupancyvehicle.Butmorethanhalfofthose

whohavebeeninthecountryforjust5yearsdrivealonetowork”(p.315).In

short,immigrantswhohavebeeninthecountryforfouryearsorless,aremore

likelytorelyontransitorcarpoolthandrivealonetowork.Inthesurveydata,I

found108of193respondents,or56percent,wereforeignborn.

Whileallofthesepassengersaretransitusers,therewerequestionsrelated

tocarownershipandworkcommutingtripsthathelpustestChatmanandKlein’s

finding. Since the survey focuses specifically on Brooklyn, it is important to

contextualizethisratherthanrelyonnationalleveldata.AccordingtotheNewYork

City Economic Development Corporation (EDC) (2012) 44 percent of Brooklyn

householdsownacar.AcloserlookatthemapproducedbytheEDC,showsthatthe

farther down Flatbush Avenue one travels, in neighborhoods like Flatbush,

Flatlands,andSheepsheadBay(theneighborhoodnamesarenotoverlyprecise in

thismap),orrightintotheheartofdollarvanterritory,themorelikelyoneistofind

ahouseholdwithanautomobile[Figure11].

In the surveydata, therewerea total59of198passengers,or30percent,

whoalsoowneda car.This cohereswithChatmanandKlein’s (2009) finding:we

wouldexpectthatvanpassengersownfewercarsthanatypicalBrooklynresident

because the majority of passengers are foreign-born. To dig deeper into the

differences between foreign-born and native-born passengers, I stratified the

datasetandisolatedforeign-bornrespondents.Whenselectingforplaceofbirthand

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Figure11:NewYorkCityCarOwnershipRates(NewYorkCityEconomicDevelopmentCorporation2012).

car ownership, I found that 35 of 108 foreign-born respondents, or 32 percent,

owned automobiles. This slight uptick in automobile ownership rates, while

surprising, can be explained by drilling deeper into the data and controlling for

yearsofresidency.Aswesawabove,thelongerforeign-bornresidentsremaininthe

country, the more likely they are to adopt similar travel habits to native-born

residents, which means the more likely they are to drive or own a car. Thus, in

stratifying thedata again, I found that35 foreign-born respondents answered the

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car ownership question, but only 33 provided information on how long they had

beeninthecountry.Ofthose33,onlysixhadbeeninBrooklynforfouryearsorless,

andthus,82percentofforeign-bornvanpassengerswhoownedacarhadbeenin

the country for fiveyearsormore.While this finding supports the literature, it is

importanttonotethatthesurveydoesnotaskwhenriderspurchasedtheircarsso

itispossiblethatsomerespondentshaveownedtheircarsincemovingtoBrooklyn.

SinceChatmanandKlein(2009)reportedfindingsaboutcommutingtrips,I

addeda third variable into the analysis to get abetterunderstandingof how this

population,car-owningandforeign-born,traveltowork.Outof32respondents,19

reportedowningacarbutdidnotuseittocommutetoworkinthepreviousmonth,

seven reported owning a car and sometimes used it to commute to work in the

previousmonth,andsixreportedowningacaranduseditexclusivelytocommute

toworkinthepreviousmonth.

In the final analysis of nativity, car ownership, and commuting habits over

the previous month, only six of 32 foreign-born-car-owners, or 19 percent, used

their car exclusively to commute to work. The remaining 26 respondents, or 81

percent,reliedonthevans,subway,bus,taxis,bicycle,walking,andcarpooltogetto

work.SinceIadministeredthemajorityofthesurveys,Ihadtheabilitytoaskfollow

up questions tomany respondents.When I asked passengerswhy they chose the

vansor transit insteadof theirprivate carwhencommuting towork, I receiveda

numberofresponsesrangingfrom“parkinginDowntownBrooklynistoomuchofa

hassle,”to“mywifeusesthecartogotoherjob”(EthnographicFieldNotes2013).

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NewYorkResidency

After fixingwhereriderswereborn, theirgender,andwhetherornot they

ownedacaranduseditforworktrips,IwantedtoknowwheretheylivedinNew

York.Again,therearenogreatsurpriseshere.RidersalongtheFlatbushroutetend

toliveinFlatbush,forthesakeofrepresentingthisgraphicallyIcombinedFlatbush

andEastFlatbushresponsesintoonecategory.Nearlyhalfofallrespondents,98of

195,reportedthattheylivedinFlatbush.Whatismosttellingaboutthisdataishow

homogenous ridership is by geography, another trait that the vans share with

conventionaltransit(Tayloret.al.2009).Only22of195passengers,or11percent,

liveinneighborhoodsthatarenotadjacenttoFlatbushAvenue,suchastheBronxor

RedHook.

Throughout this dissertation, I make the claim that van passengers have

adequateaccesstoinadequatetransitserviceandthatthevansfillthatvoidrather

thanprovideaccessinareasthataretransitdeprived.Thisthesisisapparentwhen

we look at where people travel, something I take a closer look at later in this

chapter,andwherepeoplelive.Wheretransitconnectionsfailtomeetthedemands

ofusersandthereishighdemandfortransit,thevansmakeforalikelysolutionto

thisproblembyimprovingaccessateitherthepointoforiginordestination.Before

diagnosingtherootofthisfailure,wecanseethattheareaimmediatelysurrounding

Flatbush Avenue, and especially in areas without direct subway access, the vans

prosper.

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Wages

Job and income datawere the final pieces of demographic data I collected

frompassengers. Later, Iwill address the geographic component of this question,

wheredopassengerswork,butfornowIwillsticktotheaspatialquestions:“what

is your occupation?” and “what is your typical hourly wage?” The goal of these

questionswastogetabettersenseofwhatvanpassengersdoforalivingandtheir

wages. The first finding is that, 164 of 197 passengers, or 83 percent, reported

havinga job. Fromhere, the survey revealed that thehealth sectorwas themost

popular area of employment for passengers. 34 of 156passengerswho identified

theirjob,or22percent,workedinjobsrangingfromhomehealthcareattendantsto

registerednursestophlebotomists.Theservicesectorprovidedthesecondlargest

shareofjobswith31of156,or20percent,reportingthattheyworkedasbaristas,

beauticians, and baby-sitters. Retail and sales followed closely behind the service

sectorandwas responsible for26of156 jobs,or13percent.Themost intriguing

finding in this data was the rich mix of people who relied on the vans, such as

teachers, electricians, custodians, cashiers, ushers, attorneys,waitresses, a “visual

associate,”andevenanMTAbusdriverandstationagent.

Theincomedatarevealsanumberofimportanttrends,aswellaslimitations

inthedata.Forstarters,theincomedataisskewedtowardsthehighestendofthe

ranges.Of146validobservations,48riders,or33percent,reportedawageof$19

or more per hour. While $19 or more was the most common wage earned, the

secondmost frequentresponse,with33of146passengersor23percent,wasthe

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$10.01 to $13 per hour range. The other three categories drew roughly equal

responseswith20, 22, and23 riders each [Figure12]. While this incomedata is

illuminating,itisimportanttomentionthatthemostcommonanswertothehourly

wage question was NA. While unemployment accounts for 33 NAs, another 19

passengersoptednot toprovide informationabout theirhourlywage; thus, 52of

198passengers,or26percentfailedtoregisteranywageinformation.Regardlessof

thislimitation,itappearsthatthevansrepresentagoodcross-sectionoftheincome

spectruminBrooklyn.

Figure12:Whatisyourhourlywage(Goldwyn2013)?

Even though the income data is reported as a categorical variable, ranges

rather than exact dollar amounts, I attempted to calculate an average wage to

compareagainstdata from theBureauofLaborStatistics so I couldplace thevan

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$7.25-$10 $10.01-$13 $13.01-$16 $16.01-$19 $19+ NA

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Whatisyourhourlywage?

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passengers’wage data in the larger context of Brooklynwages. Since the income

variables are categorical andnot continuous, getting an averagewage takes some

artistry.Byusingaweightedaveragefromthedataset,Iwasabletoapproximatean

averagehourlywageof$15.Tocalculatethisaveragewage,Itookthemidpointof

eachcategory, for instance$8.625 is themidpointof the first category,$7.25-$10,

and multiplied that by the number of respondents in each category to take an

average of all 146 respondents.23When I compared this against data from the

Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d) for 2013, I found that the average working van

passengermade less than theaverageworkingBrooklynite’s $19perhour.Again,

becausethewagedata isskeweddownward, this finding issuggestiveratherthan

definitive.

WhatIfoundmoreinterestingthanthewagedataofvanpassengersversus

average Brooklynites was the distribution of wages within each sector. Since

healthcare encompasses a broad spectrum of jobs, from nurses’ assistants to

operating room technicians, it is apparent that the vans serve the best andworst

paidwithinthehealthprofessioninalmostequalintervals.Inthedataweseethat

10of34respondents,or29percent,earnedbetween$10.01and$13anhour,while

nineof34,or26percent,earned$19+perhour.Thisdistributionofhighandlow

wages ismorepronounced in thehealth sectordata than in the general data and

indicates thatwhilehealth related jobsaregrowing in the region, vanpassengers

23Sincethefinalwagecategoryis$19+,Iused$19ratherthanthemidpointof$19andinfinity.Thisdecision skews the data downward. Had I decided to make a range of $19-$25, for instance, themidpointrangewouldbe$22,andtheaveragehourlywagewouldbecome$16ratherthan$15.Sincethisdata ismeanttobe introductoryandnot thedefinitiveword, Iwouldrecommendthatanyoneinterestedincollectingdetailedincomedatafromvanpassengersgooutandconductanewsurvey.

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tendtobehomehealthcareaidesandnurses’assistantsratherthanthebetterpaid

doctorsandsurgeons.

Thedemographicdataprovidesanewlens intovanpassengers. Insteadof

seeing a monolithic block of West Indian passengers, we can now make more

precise claimsaboutpassengers.Most important, thedata from the survey shows

thatvanpassengers, like conventional transitpassengers inNewYork, arepeople

with jobswhorelyon thevans toget themaround thecity, especially in thearea

near where they live. Additionally, like transit passengers generally, the van

passengers are less likely to own a car and more likely to be foreign-born and

female. As the MTA struggles to understand why bus ridership continues to

fluctuate,itstargetmustbepassengerslikethese,thosewhoarealreadymostlikely

tousetransit,thananidealizedtransitpassengerwhodoesnotexist.

WhyRidetheVans?

Withaclearer ideaaboutthenativityandresidencyofvanpassengers, it is

timetodigdeeperintowhyriderschoosethevansandwhetherornottheyalsouse

theMTAbusesandsubways.What isabundantlyclear is thatmostvanridersare

alsoregularMTAusers.Asnotedearlier,167of198passengers,or84percent,use

theMTAforall,most,orsometrips.Whilethisstatedpreference isoneavenueof

approachtoidentifyinghowmanypassengersalsouseMTAbusandsubway,Ialso

askedpassengersiftheyhadaMetroCard.Thisquestionwasdesignedasarevealed

preferenceindicator,afterallwhywouldonehaveaMetroCardiftheydidnotuse

MTA services, to help triangulate around this issue of whether or not van

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passengers also use MTA services. According to the survey, 150 of 197 van

passengers,or76percent,haveaMetroCard.Whereverthetruthlies,itseemsclear

thatcommutervanpassengersarealsoavidMTAusers.

Afterestablishingthisfact,whichisalsosupportedbyearlierstudiesofthe

vans,IwantedtofigureoutwhypassengersoptedforthevansovertheMTAalong

FlatbushAvenue,anareathatiswellservedbythebus—theB41busisthefourth

mostpopularbusinBrooklynwithovertenmillionannualridesin2013(MTAn.d).

Thebestway todo thiswas to target theMTA’smost committed riderswho still

selected thevansover thebus. Since theMTAoffers anunlimitedMetroCard that

entitlesholderstoswipeontoMTAbusesandsubwaysadinfinitum foraspecified

periodof time, either aweekormonth, Iwanted to seewhat this sub-population

hadtosayabouttheMTA.Ofthe150vanpassengerswhohadaMetroCard,62,or

41percentof thissmallersub-population,hadpurchasedanunlimitedMetroCard.

Thismeansthateverytimethese62vanpassengersridethevans,theywillinglypay

anadditionaltwodollars fortheprivilegeofriding inavanratherthanusea free

swipeontheirMetroCardtousethebus.Sincethemarginalcostofeachadditional

MTArideis$0and$2forthevan,thissub-populationshouldbetheleastlikelyto

defect fromtheMTA,which in turnmakes themtheperfectgroup to targetabout

thedifferencesbetweenthevansandtheMTA.

Since thissub-population,unlimitedMetroCardholders,representsagroup

with little obvious economic incentive to use the vans, I wanted to see how

frequentlytheyrodethevans,oriftheywerecasualuserswhoreliedonthevansin

apinch.Whiletheadditionalcostofridingthesubwayorbusisalways$0forthese

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passengers, it was surprising to find that the vast majority of them, 56 of 62

unlimitedMetroCardholders, or 90percent, reported that theyused the vans for

eitherall,most,orsomeoftheirtrips.Only6of62unlimitedMetroCardholders,or

10percent,reportedusingthevansalmostneverornever.

Given the popularity of the vans with unlimited MetroCard holders, I

expandedmyanalysistoseewhyvanpassengerspreferredthevansoverthebus.

Thefourmostcommonanswerstothequestion“Whydoyouchoosethevansover

theMTA”were: speed, convenience, cost, and timewaiting at stop. This question

includedotheroptions,suchasweatherandfriendlinessofpassengersanddrivers,

and also included space for passengers to tell me if there were any additional

reasonsIhadomitted.Time-after-time,however,passengersreturnedtotheissue

ofspeed.Aswecanseein[Figure13]anoverwhelming80percentofpassengers,

160of195,identifiedspeed,whichisalsoaproxyforreliabilityofservice,asbeing

thekeyreasonwhytheychosethevansovertheMTA’sservicesalongtheFlatbush

corridor. Thisfindingaffirmstheexistingliteratureonthedeterminantsoftransit

ridership and reliability (Ben-Akiva and Morikawa 2002; Carrion and Levinson

2012).

Even though the bulk of respondents identified speed as the main reason

they chose the vans over other options, more than 50 percent of passengers

identified the convenience of the vans as an advantage over the MTA. Speed,

convenience, and time waiting at stop work together to capture the different

components of time that factor into a transit trip. When these factors are

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unpredictable, passengers grow aggravated and seek alternatives that minimize

uncertainty(Paulley2006;Litman2008;Watkinsetal.2011).Tayloretal.(2009)

Figure13:Whyvanriderschoosevansoverbuses(Goldwyn2013)?

gosofarastoconcludethatvehiclerevenuehoursofservice,anotherwayofsaying

frequencyofservice,“explains95%ofthevariationintransitpatronage”(p.9).In

short,themoretransitserviceprovided,thegreaterpatronagewillbe.Whileitmay

beuneconomicalfortheMTAtorunhigh-frequencyservicethatmatchesthevans’

constantpresenceonFlatbushAvenue,thebulkofthevans’allureisthattheyrun

continuously, which obviates the need for passengers to memorize schedules or

waste time standing at a bus stop. During a three-month period of observation

duringthewinterof2011and2012,Icountedonevanperminuteduringthepeak

morningperiod,7A.M. to9A.M., along theFlatbush corridor (EthnographicField

Notes2012).

020406080100120140160180

Speed Convenience Cost TimeWaiOngatStop

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Reason

WhyVanRidersChooseVansOverBuses

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Whileanumberofriderscitedcost,47percent,asareasonforchoosingthe

vans over theMTA’s service, Iwas surprised that itwasnot themost compelling

reasonfortakingthevans.Duringthetimeof thissurvey, thecostofanMTAfare

was$2.50while thecostofavanridewas$2; thus, thebuswas25percentmore

expensive than the vans. Redman et al. (2013) conducted a review of the public

transit literatureandfoundthat theexistingresearchfoundpriceandspeedtobe

two the leading indicators of passenger satisfactionwith transit service (p. 120).

Whilepriceisaconsiderationforsomevanpassengers,themajorityofridersrate

speed ahead of price. This finding helps explain why those with unlimited

MetroCardscontinuetousethevanswhentheyhavetheoptionofafreebusride.

When I compared the answers of unlimitedMetroCard holders against the

general MetroCard holder population, the answers remained largely the same.

Again the fourmost commonreasons cited for taking thevansover thebuswere

speed, convenience, cost, and timewaiting at stop. Insteadof cost being the third

mostpopularreason, itslippedtofourth.Thistime,48of62unlimitedMetroCard

holders,or77percent,saidthatthespeeddifferentialbetweenthebusandthevans

accountedfortheirdecisiontopayanadditional$2forthevansratherthantakea

freerideonapokybus.

Since cost appeared to be less important to the unlimited MetroCard

population, here only 20 of 62 passengers, or 32 percent picked cost as a

determining factor when choosing between the vans and bus, I decided to ask

passengers,independentofthesurvey,aboutwhytheywillinglypaidtheadditional

$2 for the vanswhen they had a free bus ride at their disposal. One passenger I

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spokewithseemedtohaveneverthoughtaboutthisissueandtoldme,“Wellmaybe

I’mnotgoodwithmymoney,butthebusisjusttooslowsometimes”(Ethnographic

FieldNotes2013).Thislineofreasoningspeakstothenotionofadequateaccessto

inadequate service. Yes, a free option exists, but when compared to a low-cost

substitute, such as the vans, the gains in speed and reliability outweigh the

additional$2.

MeasuringPerformanceandSpatializingtheVans

Sojusthowdramaticisthespeeddifferencebetweenthevansandthebus?

To figure thisout, I compared theaverage travel timeof59van trips that I timed

versus BusTime data from theMTA for the B41. Since the BusTime data is from

April 2014 and my trips occurred in the Summer of 2013, I am not comparing

exactlyalikethings,but,presumablyvanridersin2014andeventodaywouldstill

point to the differences in travel time as a reason to take the vans over the bus

(Goldwyn2015).

Of the59 trips I tookwhile conducting the surveyportionof the research,

only 34, or just a shade over 50 percent, actuallymade it from terminal point to

terminal point. Sometimes, a van driver would turn around halfway through the

route,afterallof thepassengershadexited,andheadbacktowherehehadcome

from in search of more passengers. After all, van drivers seek to minimize

deadheading,orridingwithoutpayingpassengers.Drivers,sincetheyarenotbound

to any specific operating rules like MTA bus drivers, attempt to solve the

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deadheadingproblemthroughdifferenttechniques.Somecontinuetotheterminal

point,suchasKing’sPlaza,andwaitforridersthere,thiscertainlyseemedtobethe

operating logic of the more senior drivers, and others frantically turned around

thinkingmorepassengerswerebackinthedirectiontheycamefrom.

Overthecourseof59rides,Iencounteredanumberofanomaloustrips.On

one occasion, I was in a van that refused to travel to either terminal point after

passengershadalighted;instead,thedriverfocusedhisattentionontheportionof

the route between Prospect Park and King’s Highway (Ethnographic Field Notes

2013).Onotheroccasions,driverswouldaskpassengerstoexit thevanandenter

anothervan,atnoextracost,ataspecifiedstop.Duringonetrip,thevanIwasriding

inwasstoppedbythepoliceanddetainedfor15minutesorsoafterthedriversat

through a cycle of lights, a traffic violation, at the corner of Smith and Livingston

Street.Despite thesehiccups,passengersalwaysmanaged tomake it to their final

destination,thoughtherewaslittlecertaintythateveryridewouldbeaspredictable

asthepreviousone.

Afterexcludingnon-terminaltoterminaltripsfromthedataset,Ifoundthat

theaverage travel timeof34 tripswas43minuteswithastandarddeviationof5

minutes [Figure14]. The rangeof these travel timeswasbetween31minutes—a

trulydeathdefyingexperience—and53minutes.Allofthesetripsfellwithinthe2

P.M.and7P.Mafternoonandearlyeveningrush.Asthedatareveals,thetripsare

relativelyclustered,whichmeanspassengershaveafairlygoodideahowlongtheir

tripwilltakeuponenteringthevan.

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Figure14:Commutervantraveltimes(Goldwyn2013).

WhenIlookedatthetraveltimedatafortheB41,Ifoundthatthebuswas,on

average,50percentslowerwithastandarddeviationthatwastwiceaslargeasthe

vans’standarddeviation.Theseresultsaffirmedwhatvanpassengerstoldmeinthe

survey:thevansarefasterandmorereliablethanthebus.Sincethebusrunsboth

regularstopand limitedstopservice, Iorganizedmydata into fourgroups:King’s

Plaza bound limited stop (n = 23), King’s Plaza regular stop (n = 29), Livingston

Streetbound limitedstop (n=53), andLivingstonStreetboundregular stop (n=

46).24King’sPlazaboundlimitedstopservicetookanaverageof65minuteswitha

24In scrapingaweek’sworthofBusTimedata from theMTA, I had to exclude someobservations.Because thedata isdownloadedevery30seconds rather thanwhen thebus starts its route, sometripsdidnotregisterthepointoforiginIwantedtousefortheanalysis.Thesetripsthatregisterafterleaving Livingston Street, for instance,were excluded from the results. Another set of trips that Iexcludedfromthedatasetwerethosethatdefiedlogic.Forinstance,Irecordedatripwithadurationof 3,026minutes and 53 seconds. According to the notations, this trip started onMarch 31st and

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standarddeviationof12minutes.King’sPlazaregularstopservicetookanaverage

of 66 minutes with a standard deviation of 11 minutes. Livingston Street bound

limitedstopservice tookanaverageof58minuteswitha standarddeviationof8

minutes.LivingstonStreetboundregularstopservicetookanaverageof62minutes

withastandarddeviationof11minutes.WhenIexaminedtherangeoftriptimes,I

foundaLivingstonStreetboundregular stopB41make the trip inanefficient34

minutesand15seconds.Sincethistripoccurredat1:37AM,itislikelythatthebus

traveled its route without any major slowdowns from congestion or heavy

passengerloads.ThelongesttripIrecordedwasaKing’sPlazaboundlimitedstop

B41tripthatcameinat1hour42minutesand27seconds.Thistrip,unsurprisingly,

beganitsjourney5:32PMonaMonday[Figure15].

Figure15:B41BusTravelTimes(MTABusTime2014).

endedonApril2nd.Whileriding thebusmay feel likeaneternity, it seemedmore likely that therewasadatatransmissionerror.

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What immediately stood out in the data was that the limited stop buses

performedsimilarlytotheregularstopservice.Thisfindinghaslargerimplications

forbusplanning inNewYork than itdoes for thisdissertation,but it seemsclear

that skipping stops is not the best way to speed up bus travel along Flatbush

Avenue.IftheMTAwantstoimprovebustravelonthisroute,itwillhavetofigure

outhowtomitigatethedelaycausedbycongestionandpassengerpayment.

The variation in travel time, as evidenced by the range and standard

deviationof theB41, gives thevansa legupon thebusas it competes for riders.

While the guaranteed seat, occasional DVD broadcast, ormusical accompaniment

were identifiedasbenefits, theoverwhelmingmajorityof riders selected thevans

overthebusbecauseofthevans’shortertraveltimes.

WhereAretheVansGoing?

Since the Flatbush Avenue vans serve a narrow spine in the city’s

transportation network, I wanted to see where van passengers travel. There are

cleardestinationsalongtheFlatbushroutesuchasthethreeshoppingcentersalong

FlatbushAvenue:King’sPlaza,AtlanticTerminalMallattheAtlanticAvenuesubway

stop, and the Junction at the Flatbush Avenue stop [Figure 16]. Outside of these

obviouspointsofinterest,Iaskedpassengersaboutthelocationoftheirjobstogeta

better sense ofwhere their trips ended or originated. After all, travel demand is

linked to the destinations it connects riders with. While work trips no longer

dominate travel habits, as they once did, Small (1992) reminds us that travel “is

normally undertakennot for its own consumption value, but rather to facilitate a

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complexandspatiallyvariedsetofactivitiessuchaswork,recreation,shopping,and

home life” (p. 5). This point of view is more or less uncontroversial in the

transportation planning, engineering, and economics literature. Even Mokhtarian

and Salomon (2001), who contest the absolute nature of the derived demand

concept,noteveryoneviewstravelasacosttobeminimized,agreethat“mosttravel

isderivative”(p.715).Themaincaveattheyidentifyisundirectedtravel,ortravel

independentofaspecificdestinationoroutcome,likejoyriding.WhileIwouldnot

discountthepossibilityofundirectedtravelinatransitsetting,undirectedtravel,as

definedbyactivitieslikejoyriding,isanathematotransitbecausetransittripsleave

noroomforpassengerstodirectthespeed,routeselection,orotheraspectsofthe

trip.

Figure16:FlatbushAvenuevanroutemap(Reiss2013).

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Understandingwherepeoplework,highlightshowimportantthevansareto

everydaylifebecauseitshowshowthevansintegratepassengersandcommunities

into the broader transit network. In addition to connecting with four shopping

centers, the vans alsoprovide access to commuter rail to Jamaica,Queens via the

LongIslandRailRoadandmultipletrainsinthesubwaynetwork,includingthe2,3,

4,5,A,B,C,D,G,N,Q,R,andtheFranklinAvenueShuttle.Becausethevansprovide

access to a richmix of trains, the large dispersion ofwork locations reported by

passengerswasexpected.

Basedonthesurvey,passengersusedthevanstoconnecttojoblocationsin

Manhattan,Flatbush,DowntownBrooklyn,andtothegeographicallyimprecise“all

over.” WhilethemajorityofridersworkinBrooklyn,117of173,or68percentof

respodnents, thevansallowworkerstoconnectwith jobs inall fiveboroughsand

outonLongIsland.

Byplacingthevansinabroadergeographiccontext,onequicklyseesthatthe

vanstranscendFlatbushAvenue,andevenBrooklyn,byenablingaccesstoanentire

cityandregion. In theaftermathofHurricaineSandy, I tookaridedownFlatbush

Avenue, before I began surveying passengers, andmet a passenger from Elmont,

LongIslandwhohadaflighttocatchinPhiladelphia.Planeshadbeengroundedat

JFK, La Guardia, and Newark, and access to transit was severly limited. This

passenger saw the vans as his only hope of getting to a curbside intercity bus in

Manhattan’s Chinatown, which would take him to Philadelphia. While the vans

provide faster trips up and down Flatbush Avenue, as detailed above, they also

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provideanaddedlayerofcertaintywhenconventionalsystemsfailandpeopleneed

totravel.

Conclusion

The process of surveying van passengers and recording operating

chracteristics of the vans allowedme to demonstrate that the vans are a form of

transitratherthansomethingotherandbeyondthecomprehensionofplanners in

New York. Van passengers share much in common with transit passengers: on

average they tend to be female, foreign born, transit dependent, live and travel

within close proximity of the van network, and value reliability of service. The

existenceofthevansspeakstobroaderproblemsinNewYork’sbusnetwork:slow

andunpredictableservice.Asthesurveyandtraveltimedatashow,vanpassengers

choosethevansoverthebusinordertoreachtheirdestinationsmorequickly.This

is a valuable finding for bus planners at theMTAwhoworry about declining bus

ridershipontheB41,andhowtheycanre-invgorate thesystemgoing forward. In

thefollowingchapter,Iwilltakeadeeperlookatthechangingdemographicsalong

theFlatbushAvenue route and explore the changingdemographics of a proposed

routetoEastNewYork.

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ChapterFive:TheAnatomyofNewDollarVanRoute

ShiftingDemographics;ShiftingService

One of the van operators I have followed since the outset of this research

pulledmeasideonedayandaskedifwecouldmeetonaFridaymorningtodiscuss

ourletter-writingeffortsandanotherpersonalmatter.Alwayseagertospendtime

inthevanwithanoperator,Iimmediatelyagreedwithoutthinkingtoodeeplyabout

thepersonalmatterhementioned.

When we eventually met, the operator asked me my thoughts about

developinganewroute.Hewantedtobeginanewserviceconnectingthesouthern

portionofFlatbushAvenue,anareawithinhisservicearea,withEastNewYork,an

areabeyondhisservicearea.WhenImentionedthatthisnewroutepushedpasthis

serviceareaboundary,hedeflectedandtoldme,“ThoseguysfromQueenscomeon

Flatbushallthetime.I’mstayinginBrooklyn.Thisismyborough.I’mnotcrossing

intoanotherborough”(PersonalInterview2014m).

Whilehehad a logical justification forhis decision todevelop anew route

beyondthecurrenteasternboundaryofhisroute,healsounderstoodthathewas

technicallyviolating the rules: “This iswhy Ineedyourhelp.While I’m tryingout

thisnewroute,IalsowanttostartgettingletterstogetherfortheDOTtoaskforthis

newarea.IwanttobereadywiththepaperworkincaseIneedtosendsomething”

(Personal Interview2014m).Hisuncertain tone,whichwaspunctuatedby the “in

caseIneedtosendsomething,”servedasyetanotherreminderthatthecommuter

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vans are officially sanctioned but, for all intents and purposes, are an informal

serviceintheeyesoftheCity.

Aswediscussedhisnewroute,heaskedmetodrafta letterdescribinghis

newserviceareaso thathecouldsubmitanofficialpackage to theDOTata later

date. To start, the operator planned tomove a small number of vans to the new

routewhilemaintaininghispresenceonFlatbushAvenue:“Atfirst,maybeI’llhave

fivevansonthe[EastNewYork]route.Ihaveafewolderdriverswhoarewillingto

try it out for a while” (Personal Interview 2014m). Instead of abandoning his

Flatbushoperationsaltogether,hewantstotestthenewroutefirstandmakesureit

isviable.

AswedrovefromLivingstonandSmithStreetuptoFlatbushAvenueinhis

van,hebegantoexplainwhyhewantedtopioneerthisnewroute.“Haveyouseen

thenewmallout there? It’sbig” (Personal Interview2014m),he said referring to

thecolossalGatewayCenter,a640,000square foot shoppingcomplexsittingona

former landfill in East New York (Christian 2000). I was unfamiliar with the

GatewayCenter,butaswecontinuedtalkinghetoldmehewantedtoconnect the

Gateway Center, which had recently completed an expansion, with “the Junction,

whichisrightinthemiddleofmyroute”(PersonalInterview2014m).

TheJunctionisoneofthekeynodesalongtheFlatbushAvenueroute.Atthe

Junction passengers have access to shopping, Brooklyn College, and the subway.

Instead of designing a new route out of thin air, this operator wanted to take

advantage off an already busy hub of activity and extend the route east towards

another shopping center, the Gateway Center. Gateway occupies 50-acres on the

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former230-acreFountainAvenue landfill that is the site of rapid re-development

(Farrell, 2002; Christian, 2003;RealEstateWeekly, 2007). To access it, oneneeds

eitheracarorthebus.Theclosestsubwayisoveramileaway,theNewLotsAvenue

stop.WhiletheGatewayCenterisremote,onecouldsaythesamethingaboutKing’s

Plaza,thecurrentterminalpointoftheFlatbushAvenuevans.King’sPlaza,too,isa

largeshoppingcomplexservedonlybythebusthatiswellbeyondthereachofthe

subway.

This operator, however, saw potential to expand his business and hedge

against changing demographics he fears will eventually erode his customer base

along Flatbush Avenue. Unlike the MTA who manages a regional network of

transportationservices,thisoperator’snarrowerpurviewallowshimtocultivatea

moreintimateunderstandingofthepeopleandareaheserves,whichenableshimto

confidentlytestnewservices.

Itisthesedifferencesofscaleandscopeandtheinformalnatureofthevans

thatpermithim to ignore theboundariesof service area andpractice “generative

planning,” a term coined byUzzell (1987). Uzzell argues that generative planning

differs from more traditional “regulative planning” by substituting technical

knowledgeandplanningexercises thatpurport topredict futureoutcomeswitha

modeofplanning that reliesona “thoroughunderstandingofhowasociocultural

systemoperates,carefullychosenminimal intervention inthesystem, incremental

feedback on the consequences of actions, and adjustments based on information

received”(p.7).

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The generative planning paradigm allows one to capitalize on one’s deep

knowledge of a specific area and/or group gained through experience to test an

idea,suchasapilotprojectalonganewroute,inordertoassesstheidea’sviability.

Inthegenerativemodeofplanning,oneleverageslocalknowledge,orlokavidyaor

metis, to informdecision-making(LindbloomandCohen1979;Scott1998;Basole,

2014).Localknowledgeiscontextualandnoteasilygeneralizableorscalable,which

makes it difficult to operationalize and unwieldy to incorporate in large scale

planningprojects(Uzzell1990).Itisthedisregardoflocalknowledge,however,that

createstheneedforquasi-formalandinformalsolutionslikedollarvans.

Inthecaseofouroperator,hedrawsuponhisstoreoflocalknowledge,built

up over the twenty plus years he has spent interacting with passengers and

observing changes along Flatbush Avenue, to test an idea and see if there is an

opportunitytoexpandhisbusinesswhilealsorespondingtoaneedtheMTAhasnot

yetdetectedoraddressed.“Idon’tthinkthesenewpeoplemovingintoFlatbushare

goingtorideinmyvan.I’mjustfollowingthepeople.IspeaktothemeverydayandI

seehowcrowdedthatbusis,”hetoldme.

Neighborhood change, specifically the loss ofWest Indians along Flatbush

Avenue spurred this operator into action. Gentrification is often discussed in the

realmofhousingcostsandresidentialdisplacement,butneighborhoodchangeand

displacementalsoaffectlocalbusinesses(NewmanandWyly2006;Freeman2006;

Voltolini2014).Thisdriver,asadailystudentofFlatbushAvenueandaBrooklyn

resident, came to the conclusion that demographic change is bad for business.

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Higherincomesmaybegoodforlandlordsbutnotfornichetransportationservices

thatcatertoWestIndiancommunities.

In this chapter, I reconcile the driver’s anecdotal observations, or local

knowledge,withempiricaldata.Iarguethattheoperator’slocalknowledgeallows

himtoadapttoshiftingneighborhooddynamicsandplaneffectively.Idemonstrate

thisbymatchinghisclaimsagainstdatafromtheMTA,2000Census,2010Census,

and 5-year averages from the American Community Survey (ACS). Through the

exploration of this data, historical images, and planning documents from the

DepartmentofCityPlanning,it isclearthatneighborhoodchangeisafootandthat

theoperator’s localknowledgenotonlyhelpshimadjusthisbusiness,butalsohis

insights can be detected in the larger empirical data sets that planners and

policymakersrelyontomakedecisions.

BusRoutesbytheNumbers

Assoonastheoperatorstartedtodescribehisplantodevelopanewroute,I

began to think about how to evaluate his claims. I, too, spent a lot of time on

FlatbushAvenueandsawalotofthechangeshementioned,butwasthatenoughto

justifyanewservice?Themorewespokeabouthisideas,however,itbecameclear

that I could do some transportation, demographic, and land-use analysis of his

existing-andproposed-routetoseeiftheempiricaldatamatchedthestoryhetold

me.

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In addition tomy concerns abouthaphazarddecision-making, theFlatbush

routewastheundisputedcrownjewelinthedollarvannetwork.FlatbushAvenue’s

primacy had gone unchallenged for 30 or more years so why mess with a good

thing?Therewasnoquestion that FlatbushAvenue could support some vans, but

coulditsupportthe100licensedcommutervanswithauthorizationfromtheTaxi

and Limousine Commission, the 500 or so unlicensed pirates, and the licensed

commuter vans from Queens and other sections of Brooklyn who operated on

FlatbushAvenueregularly(EthnographicFieldnotes2014)?

Toinvestigatethisquestion,Istartedbylookingathowridershipalongthe

B41,thebusthattheFlatbushdollarvansshadow,hadchanged.Between2009and

2014, the B41 lost roughly 20 percent of its annual riders, which amounted to

2,500,000 fewer riders. Explaining this sharp decrease in ridership is interesting,

but lessrelevanttothe issueofwhetherornotthevanoperatorshoulddevelopa

newroute.ThesolepurposeofexaminingtheB41datawastogetasenseofhow

ridershiphaschangedonFlatbushAvenue.Sincethevansandbuspickupatsimilar

locationsonFlatbushAvenue, thebusridershipdatasheds lightonhowridership

maybechanginginthevans.However, theoperatorsIhavespokenwithhavenot

consistently complained that ridership along Flatbush Avenue was significantly

down.

TheB41 data only tells a small part of the neighborhood change story. To

gainbetterinsightintothevanoperator’shypothesisaboutshiftingtravelpatterns,

IhadtotakeadeeperlookattheannualridershipdatafortheB103,theMTAbus

that roughly follows thenew route the operatorwants to pioneer. Between2009

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and 2014, the B103 had a very different experience than the B41. Instead of

sheddingpassengers,itwastakingonnewpassengersrapidly.Ridershipsoaredby

250percent,whichamountedtoanabsolutegrowthofmorethan2,500,000,which

isslightlymorethanthenumberofpassengerswhoabandonedtheB41.Impressive

as these numbers appear, it is all themore strikingwhen one considers that bus

ridershipacrossNewYorkhasdeclinedsteadilyoverthesameperiod(Metropolitan

TransportationAuthority2015).

While the ridership data along the two routes confirmed the operator’s

observationaboutcrowdedbusesontheB103’sroute,Ialsohadtomakesurethat

thedemographicchange, the influxof “newpeople,”healluded towasalso taking

placealongthetworoutes.

WestIndiansontheMove

Despitetheoperator’sgeneralproclamationsaboutneighborhoodchange,all

ofhisclaimswereverifiable.Toverifythem,IcreatedmultiplesetsofGISmapsthat

examined overall population change at the Census Tract level between 2000 and

2010 along the existing Flatbush route and the proposed route out to Gateway

Center.25Beforematchingdatatoeachroute,Icreatedaquarter-milebufferaround

each route rather than simply looking at data at the blunter Community District

level.

25IamextremelygratefultoJonathanIzenforhishelpmakingthesemaps.

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Based on my survey work, experience with the vans, and the operator’s

comments about following his passengers, primarily West Indians, it was most

important toseehowtheCaribbeanpopulationchangedbetween2000and2010.

InFigure17,wesee justhowtightlyclusteredanddenselypackedtheyare inthe

areasurroundingFlatbushAvenuein2000.

Figure17showstheFlatbushAvenueroute,subwaystopsthat fallalong it,

andtheintensityofWestIndianpopulationsbyCensusTractin2000.Itisclearthat

West Indians, as of 2000, lived in largest numbers in the area south and east of

Prospect Park. The area with the greatest concentration of West Indians falls

betweentheProspectParkandtheFlatbushAvenuesubwaystops,whichliesright

inthemiddleoftheFlatbushAvenueroute.

Insteadoflookingonlyatonetimeperiod,Imadeasecondmap[Figure18]

ofthesamegeography,butexchangedthe2000Censusdatafor2008-2012ACS5-

YearAverages.ThismapshowsacleardiffusionofWestIndiansalongtheFlatbush

route.While the southern trend is apparent to the naked eye, Iwanted to better

understand West Indian population change in the area that had been a tightly

clusterednucleusofWestIndianstotheeastofProspectPark.

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Figure17:DistributionoftheCaribbeanpopulationalongtheFlatbushroute(2000Census).

7th

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Figure18:DistributionofCaribbeanpopulationalongtheFlatbushroute(2008-2012ACS).

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BytakingacloserlookatfivecensustractsalongProspectPark,webeginto

seewhatmicro-levelpopulationchangelookslike[Figure19].InthesefiveTractsit

isevidentthat thetotalpopulationdeclinedslightlybetween2000and2010.This

finding is counter-intuitive based on popular accounts of the frenzied real estate

market in Brooklyn, but this trend accords with DCP’s findings about population

changeincentralBrooklyn:“WhileBrooklyncontainsmanyinterestingpatternsof

change…thecentralpartof theborough…sawpopulation lossesbetween4and10

percent”(DepartmentofCityPlanning,2012p.19).

Figure19:PopulationChangeinfiveCensusTracts(2000Census&2010Census).

Despite an overall downward population trend, it is critical to understand

howtheWestIndianpopulationchangedbetween2000and2010tobetterassess

the operator’s intuition about changing demographics along the Flatbush Avenue

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corridor.Inordertoevaluatetheseclaims,Ihadtocomplementthe2000and2010

Census data with 2008-2012 ACS 5-Year Averages so I could see how the West

Indianpopulationfaredbetweenthetwoperiods.26

When I compared the 2000 Census against the 2010 Census—for total

population data—and the 2008-2012 ACS 5-Year Averages—for West Indian

population data—it was clear that the West Indian population along Flatbush

Avenuedecreasedatarategreaterthanoverallpopulationdecline.InFigure20,we

can see that the West Indian population declined across all five Census Tracts

illustratedinFigure19.InFigure21weseethatthepercentageofWestIndiansin

these Tracts also declined, on average, between 2000 and 2010. Thus, the West

Indian population dropped at a greater rate than the overall population decline

between2000and2010.

26The2010Censusdoesnothavedemographicinformationbrokendowntothelevelofcountryoforigin.Togetthatdata,andmatchitagainstthe2000Census,IhadtousetheACS.TheCensusandACSdiffer in that theCensusprovides an absolute countwhile theACS samples thepopulation inordertoprovideanestimate.

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Figure20:WestIndianpopulationchangeinfiveCensusTracts(2000Census&2008-2012ACS).

Basedonthesedatapoints,demographicchangeisdefinitelyafootalongthe

Flatbush route. In short, the operatorwas correct: The Caribbean population, the

bulkofhiscustomers,haddeclinedalongFlatbushAvenuebetween2000and2010.

NowthatIhavereconciledtheanecdotalandempiricaldataonFlatbushAvenue,I

have to investigate population changes along the proposed route to the Gateway

Center.

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Figure21:CensusTractpercentagechangeofWestIndianpopulation(2000Census&2008-2012ACS).

SimilartothedataanalysisoftheFlatbushAvenueroute,Imadeanumberof

maps exploring West Indian population change along the Gateway Center route.

Figures22and23showthenewroute,whichconnectstotheFlatbushrouteatits

western terminus, theFlatbushAvenuesubwaystop,andthen followsarelatively

straightline,asfarasBrooklyn’sstreetgridallows,outtoGateway.

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Figure22:CaribbeanPopulationalongEastNewYorkroute(2000Census).

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WhiletherewasasizeableWestIndianpopulationalongthisroutein2000,

therewereonlyahandfulofCensusTractswithmore than1,000West Indians in

them.Inorderforthisnewroutetoprosper,IexpectedtoseeanincreaseofWest

Indiansbetween2000and2010alongthisroute.Figure23confirmsthis:themap

addeddarkerorangeCensusTracts adjacent toFlatbushAvenue, in themiddleof

theroutealongFlatlandsAvenueandouttowardsGatewayCenterbetweenthetwo

timeperiods.Togainadeeperinsight intothemagnitudeofCaribbeanpopulation

changealongthisspeculativeroute,IselectedfivecontiguousCensusTracts,allwith

WestIndianpopulationsgreaterthan1,000intheyear2000.Thepatternmatches

my expectations, increasedWest Indian clustering along the route. Census Tracts

950and954experiencedslightdeclinesinWestIndianpopulation,achangeof171

and217respectively,butthefiveTracts,intotal,grewby1,027WestIndians,or13

percentbetweenthetwoperiods[Figure24].

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Figure23:CaribbeanPopulationalongEastNewYorkroute(2008-2012ACS).

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As with the changes in bus ridership, the operator correctly identified

population change along the two routes. In general, the West Indian population

declinedalongtheFlatbushrouteandincreasedalongtheproposedGatewayCenter

route. Of greater consequence, areas of concentration were diluted along the

Flatbush routewhile theywere fortified along theGateway route. These patterns

speak to larger historical and economic trends that factor into transportation

planninganalysis.

Figure24:WestIndianpopulationchangeinfiveCensusTracts(2000Census&2008-2012ACS).

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AMallGrowsinBrooklyn

Populationchange,however, isonlyanother component inour storyabout

shiftingdemographicsandthedevelopmentofanewroute.Theoperatorspokeofa

crowdedbus,WestIndiancommutervanpassengerswhoweremovingawayfrom

theFlatbushroute,andland-usechangesthatincludedalargeshoppingcenterand

newresidentialdevelopmentinEastNewYork.Contextualizingthechangingland-

use component by focusing on the Gateway Center and adjacent residential

developmentprovidesthefinalpieceofthisstory.

EastNewYorkistheparadigmaticexampleofurbanpathologyanddeclinein

Brooklyn.GregDonaldson’s (1994) fine-grained lookatpolicing inurbanAmerica

settledonthispatchofBrooklynbecause“itissodangerousthebarshavebeenshut

down for years, there are no movie theaters, and some newly renovated city-

subsidized apartments on New Lots Avenue go unclaimed because of fear” (p.1).

WhileDonaldsonwroteinthe1990s,HaroldConnolly(1977)citesa1968Housing

andDevelopmentAdministrationreportthatfoundareasofEastNewYork“suggest

death”(p.140).

In spite of these unflattering portraits of EastNewYork, it is still a site of

interest for residents looking to land somewhere in an increasingly expensive

Brooklyn,zoningchanges,andcapitalinvestment(Sheftell2008;DepartmentofCity

Planning 2014; Rice 2015). After analyzing the 2010 Census data, City Planning

(2012) concluded that East New York was an area of the borough experiencing

rapidgrowthanddevelopment:

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EastNewYorkwas the second fastest growingneighborhood in theborough,gaining8,700personsoverthelastdecade,withmostofthechange due to natural increase. The black population increased byover10percent,throughbothnetmigrationandnaturalincrease;itislikelythatblacksfromotherpartsoftheBrooklynmovedtoEastNewYork.Abigincreaseinhousingunitsoverthelastdecadeaddedtotheattraction of this neighborhood as a destination for those leavingotherpartsofBrooklyn.(p.21)

The ascendanceof theGatewayCenter serves as ametaphor for the large-

scalechangeunderway inEastNewYork.RelatedCompanies,amultinationalreal

estatedeveloperthatbuilttheTimeWarnerCenterinColumbusCircleandisoneof

theprimarydevelopersofHudsonYardsonManhattan’sfarwestside,openedthe

mallin2002andpumped$192millionintotheproject(Siwolop,2001).Inaddition

tobuildingtheshoppingcomplex,Relatedalsospentliberallyonfacilitiesupgrades,

such as an exit from theBelt Parkway and green space. In 2003, the City opened

SpringCreekPark,whichitbraggedhad“[t]heveryfirstfielddedicatedsolelytothe

sport of cricket…the 17-acre parkwas built by Related Retail Corporation” (New

YorkCityParksDepartment2003).NottobeoutdonebyRelated’smunificence,the

City’sDepartmentofEnvironmentalProtection launcheda$200millionproject to

remediatethelargerareaaroundJamaicaBay,whichincludestheoldFountainand

PennsylvaniaAvenuelandfills(Chang2009).

All of this investment and interest in East New York has made it a

destination. It is thismagnetic quality that the van operator identified and spoke

aboutaswedroveinhisvan.Whiletheflowsofcapitalareimpressive,Iwasmost

takenbywhatIsaw.

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AswedrovealongFlatlandsAvenueandcircledtheGatewayCenter, itwas

clear that he had identified a densely populated corridor anchored by a bustling,

expanding shopping complex. More important, however, was the pace of new

residential development and the lack of train or adequate bus access to Flatbush

Avenue.Inthespaceofadecade,thisformerdumpinggroundhadtakenonanew

identity.

Using Google Maps’ historical street view function, one can see just how

muchdevelopmenthasoccurred[Figure25]. SinceGoogleMaps’historicalstreet

viewfunctiononlygoesbackto2012inthissectionofEastNewYork,wecansee

justhowrapidthepaceofdevelopmenthasbeen.Infigure25,theGooglecaris

Figure25:LookingsoutheastonBerrimanStreetin2012(Google2012).

drivingsoutheastonBerrimanStreet towardsSchroedersAvenue. In thedistance,

wecanmakeoutthewhiteframeofthenextbatchofattachedtownhousesthatwill

look exactly like the rowofhouseson the right sideof the image,which faces an

152

undeveloped lot. Whenwe return toBerrimanStreet twoyears later,we see the

pace of development has been swift [Figure 26]. Not only has the white shell in

Figure 25 transformed into a row of East-New-York-expectation-defying-pre-

fabricatedhomes,butalsotheentirestripacrossthewayhasbeendevelopedinthe

same fashion. By 2016, this area of East New York, now dubbed Spring Creek

Nehemiah, will boast 1,525 new homes, three new schools, and two state parks

(Sheftell,2012).

Figure26:ThesameviewasFigure35in2014(Google2014)

This is not theEastNewYorkof the1990s.This is a neighborhood that is

rapidly changing: fromdemographics to land-use to capital investment, EastNew

York is thesiteof intenseactivity.Tokeeppacewithandpromote thesechanges,

the City has invested in new schools, parks, and streets, but what about

transportationservices?

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The MTA has responded to changes in East New York, as best it can, by

extending bus service to Gateway Center, but the van operatorwe have followed

throughout this chapter still seesa ripeopportunity topluck,asevidencedby the

passengersontheB103whoareunabletofindaseatandareforcedtostandinthe

aislewith theirhandspressedagainst the ceiling tobrace themselves against any

herky-jerkymovements(MetropolitanTransportationAuthority2007).Justlikethe

vanoperator’sserviceonFlatbushAvenue,whichpromisesaseatandafasterride

than theB41,he canprovide the same service toBrooklynites travellingbetween

FlatbushAvenueandGatewayCenter.

LinkingKnowledgewithAction

Afteranalyzingtheoperator’sobservations,itisclearthathisassessmentof

changingneighborhooddemographicsandtravelpatternsareaccurateandthathe

identified a potentially profitable business opportunity and service need by

developing a route from the Junction toGatewayCenter [Figure27].While dollar

vansandcommutervanoperatorsexistonthefringeofthetransportationplanning

andpolicyuniverseinNewYork,inpartbecausetheyworryoveratinysliverofthe

larger transportation network, they plan in the same sense that professional

plannersplan:theyanalyzepopulationchange,identifyactivitycenters,andobserve

existingtransportservices.FreidmannandHudson(1974)definedplanning“asan

activity centrally concerned with the linkage between knowledge and organized

action” (emphasis inoriginal) (p.2).While thevanoperatordrawshisknowledge

154

from different data sources than bus planners at the MTA, he actively links

knowledgewithactionwhenplanninganewroute.

155

Figure27:TheFlatbushandEastNewYorkroutesmapped(Goldwyn2014).

X3

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Prospect Park South

Prospect Lefferts Gardens

0 0.5 1 1.5 20.25Miles

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King's Plaza

EXISTING ROUTESBROOKLYN BUS NETWORK

156

Conclusion

Thischapterwasagift. WhenIbeganmyresearch,Ihadnoexpectationof

consulting with a van operator about the wisdom of developing a new route. I

included this chapter because it demonstrates how one operatormakes sense of

changesalonghisexistingrouteandopportunitiesforexpansion.Thisperspective

allowedmetocontrasthismethodofplanningversusplanningcarriedoutby the

CityandState.Uzzell (1990)explains thedifferencebetween formalplannersand

planners like the van operator when he writes, “[P]eople engaged in informal

activitiestendtofashionplansfromtheworldastheyfindit,incontrastwithformal

planners,who tend to reifymodelsof theworlds they invent” (p. 114).While the

van operator did “fashion plans” for theworld he inhabits, itwas encouraging to

discover that his observations could be assessed and validated by the same

empiricaldataMTA,DOT,andTLCplannersaccessregularly.

Inmyconversationswiththevanoperator,heneverreferencedthebroader

surfacetransportationnetworkinNewYorkCityorBrooklyn.Hedid,however,have

very, very astute observations about Flatbush Avenue and changes in East New

York.Thebusplanners Ispokewithat theMTAspokeaboutBrooklynasawhole

rather than singling out specific routes or thinking about changes on a route-by-

route basis, unlesswediscussed a specific intervention like SelectBus Service on

BedfordandNostrandAvenues. Inaddition, theypointedouthowdifficult it is for

themtothinkaboutneighborhoodleveldynamics,somethingthevanoperatorhas

157

noproblemdoing.Eachplanner’ssenseofscaleandmethodofunderstandingwhat

isgoingoninthegeographytheyareinterestedinisdramaticallydifferent.

The different goals and knowledge of each group of planners begs the

question,“HowcantheCityandStatebenefitfromthefine-grainedplanningbeing

carried out by van operators?” The stepwise nature of formal planning makes it

impossible for institutions like the MTA, TLC, or DOT to respond to changing

neighborhooddynamicsasquicklyornimblyasthevanoperators.Thus,itbehooves

the local residents and the City and State to coordinate more closely with van

operatorsandallowthemtopracticetheir“generative”planning.

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ChapterSix:PolicyRecommendations&FutureResearch

BiggerisBetter

While my research is over, I still spend a lot of time on Flatbush Avenue

watchingthevans,listeningtotheirdistinctivehorns,andclimbingintothemwhen

Ineed to takea ride to the Junction. I stillattend theCityCouncil’sCommitteeon

Transportation’shearingstokeepupwiththelatesttransportationpolicyissuesin

thecity. I still speakon thephonewithdifferentpeople in thevan industryabout

fledglingroutes,potentialpolicychanges,andnewdevelopments.Thecurrenttrend

amongvanoperatorsistoputbiggervehiclesontheroad.Insteadofthereliable14-

passenger vans, some operators are opting for larger minibuses with capacities

greaterthan20passengers[Figure28].

Figure28:Newer,largervansonFlatbushAvenue(Goldwyn2016).

159

This change is significant. The TLC regulates commuter vans, which are

legallydefinedasvehicleswithacapacityoffewerthan20passengers.Anyvehicle

withacapacitygreaterthan20isconsideredtobeabusandisthusregulatedbythe

StateDOTandnottheTLC.Operatorsoftheselargervehicles,perhapsunwittingly,

have moved their vehicles beyond the reach of the TLC. This seemingly banal

distinction,forthetimebeing,hastheCityscrambling.TheTLCdoesnotbelieveit

has the authority to police buses, the State DOT does not appear to have an

enforcementteamcampedoutonFlatbushAvenue,andvanoperatorsarethinking

about scrapping their old vehicles for newer, bigger minibuses, which has

implicationsfortheeconomicsoftheindustry(PersonalInterview2016).

As this latest wrinkle in the vans’ rumpled story gets ironed out, I have

compiledalistofrecommendationsfrommytimestudyingthevans.AsIdeveloped

thislist,Ireturnedtothe6researchquestionsthatmotivatedmyresearch.Manyof

these ideas are the product of conversations I had with planners, van operators,

passengers,andcolleagues.

ReturningtotheResearchQuestions

Atthebeginningofthedissertation,Iidentified6researchquestionsthatthis

researchsetouttoanswer:1)Howdidexistingvanregulationscometobedivorced

fromdailypractice;2)Howdoplannersandpolicymakersthinkaboutthevans;3)

Howdoplannersandpolicymakersconstructtransportationpolicy;4)Whydovan

160

passengerschoosethevansoverthebus;5)Whataretheoperatingcharacteristics

ofthevansandhowdotheycomparetothebus;6)Howaredemographicschanging

alongtheFlatbushAvenuecorridorandaproposedEastNewYorkcorridor?

Eachsubstantivechapteransweredatleastoneofthesequestions.Inchapter

two, Iusedarchivalresearchand interviewstoshowthatexistingvanregulations

contradict daily practice because the regulations were intentionally developed to

hinderthevans’growthandprotectbusridership.

Inchapter three, I interviewedplanners,policymakers,andelectedofficials

andattendedCityCouncilhearingsandothermeetingstodeterminethatplanners

andpolicymakersdonotthinkaboutthevansbecausethelinesofcommunication

arenon-existent.AstheDOT’splannersaid,“WhenIhaveaproblemwiththetaxis,I

knowwhotocontact.WhenIhaveaproblemwiththebus,Iknowwhotocontact.

When I have a problemwith the liveries, I knowwho to contact.When I have a

problem with the vans…I have no idea what I’m supposed to do” (Personal

Interview, 2014j). This inability to resolve basic knowledge gaps makes it

impossiblefortheCitytoconstructpolicythatadequatelyservesthevanindustry.

As long as policy and daily practice remain at odds, the van industry and the

passengers who rely on it are vulnerable to displacement. Blame runs in both

directions: neither the City nor the van industry has done a good enough job

developingthiscriticalrelationship.

Inchapter four, I turnedtosurveys touncover thatvanpassengerssee the

vansasfasterandmorereliablethanthebus.Thisperceivedadvantagewasverified

bycomparingtimedvanridesversusaweek’sworthofB41BusTimedata.

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In chapter five, I investigated the claimsof vanoperatorwhoworried that

demographic change along Flatbush Avenue created an opportunity to develop a

newserviceconnectingthe JunctionandtheGatewayPlazaMall.BasedonCensus

data andMTA ridership statistics, it is clear that the van operator’s instincts are

correctandthatWestIndianpopulationispositivelycorrelatedwithbusridership

ontheB103andtheB41.AstheWestIndianpopulationincreasesalongtheB103

route,ridershipisincreasedbyanincredible250percentbetween2009and2014.

Recommendations

Throughout thisdissertation, Ihavehighlightedhowinformalitypermeates

all levels of the van industry. This ongoing legal uncertainty speaks to a glaring

weakness in New York’s transportation policy: there is no unified surface

transportationpolicy.TheNewYorkCityDOTregulatesmanyoftheCity’sstreets,

MTAplansthebuses,TLCissuespermitsforliverycabs,StateDOTcertifiesprivate

buses, New York Metropolitan Transportation Council allocates money from the

federalgovernment forprojects to reducecongestionand improveairquality, the

City Council’s Committee on Transportation holds hearings on all of these topics,

and every fewyears theMayor issues anencyclical that re-energizes interest in a

transportationagenda.

Alloftheseactorscontributetothesurfacetransportationnetworkbutfew

activelycoordinatewithoneanother.ExampleslikeSelectBusServiceandeventhe

permittingof commuter vans shows that it is possible to fosterdialoguebetween

162

agencieswhenthewillexists.27Withoutaclearideaofhowsurfacetransportation

in New York should operate, it is difficult to know if the TLC should issuemore

permits forUberandLyft, if theStateDOTshouldwithholdbus licenses,or if the

Department of City Planning should reduce parking requirements as it rezones

neighborhoodsacrossthecity.

My first recommendation is that the City Council’s Committee on

Transportation spearhead the effort to develop coherent surface transportation

policy. The Committee would assess topics like service frequency, tailpipe

emissions,andcongestion.Italreadyholdsmonthlymeetingsfocusedondisparate

transportationissues,fromtheTLC’sannualbudgettoparkingplacards.TheChair

oftheCommitteesetstheagendaofeachmeeting,andheorshecoulddedicateone

ortwomeetingsayeartodevelopingsurfacetransportationpolicyandcoordinating

the actions of existing agencies. In addition, the Committee has a staff of policy

analystsand lawyerswhoworkon these issuesyearround.CouncilMembersand

theirstaffcouldalsocontributetimeandresourcestothiswork.Thefindingsofthe

Councilwouldnotbebinding,buttheywouldsteerdebateandprovidelogictothe

Committee’s actions. This is a small step towards transparency and developing a

usefulbaseofknowledgetoguidelegislativedecisions.

Other cities, like London and Paris, already coordinate much of their

transportation policy through a single entity that has the authority to set transit

fares,adjustparkingviolations,licensetaxis,andbuildbuslanes.Thismeansthatif

ridership on a bus line rises past a certain threshold, the operator can decide to27SelectBusServiceisajointeffortbytheDOTandtheMTA.TheprocessofacquiringacommutervanpermitrequiresapprovalsfromboththeTLCandtheDOT.

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buildabuslaneandincreaseservicefrequency.InNewYork,however,theMTAhas

noauthority tobuildabus lanetoaccommodatehighpassenger loadsandreduce

thedelaycausedbytraffic.

Mysecondrecommendationstemsfrommyexperienceresearchingthelaws

that govern thevansand talking toplanners, vanoperators, and legislators about

them.Rarelydidanyoneseemtoknowtheexactletterofthelaw.Thevanoperators

were themost knowledgeable, but even they held a few erroneous beliefs about

whatislegal.Assuch,theCityneedstore-regulatethevansifitwantsthevansto

continueoperatingonitsstreets.Thisongoingcontradictionbetweenlawanddaily

practice is unacceptable. It not only criminalizes drivers but also leaves entire

neighborhoodsvulnerabletoinsurgency.Thelawisclear,streethailsandoperating

alongbusroutesisillegal.IftheCityofNewYorkwantstotameFlatbushAvenue,it

couldeasilydosoinamatterofhours.TheNYPDcouldsetuppolicecheckpointsup

and down Flatbush Avenue and arrest any vans suspected of operating illegally.

BasedontheexperienceofsquattersinCalcutta,streetvendorsnearPennStation,

andgypsycabdriversinWashingtonHeights,thispossibilityisnotasremoteasit

sounds. Clear laws that are regularly enforced will bring certainty to the daily

operations of the vans. This clarity will allow operators to plan their businesses

accordingtothoseregulationsandmoveforwardknowingthattheyareoperating

legally.While I contend that the street hail and prohibition against operating on

164

routeswithMTAserviceshouldbeeliminated, it ismoreimportanttocreateclear

enforceablelawsthateveryonecanadheretoandunderstand.28

A good way to start re-thinking these laws leads me to my third

recommendation.Beforeanynewlawsarewrittenorevendebated,theTLCandthe

vanindustryneedtoforgeacloserrelationship.Thismeansthatvanoperatorsneed

tostartattendingtheTLC’smonthlymeetingsandtheTLCneedstobeopentoideas

likesittingdownwithavan industry “brain trust”onaregularbasis,an idea that

surfaced in chapter three. The van operators should mimic the organizations of

other transportation advocacy and industry groups like the Livery Roundtable,

Black Car Assistance Corporation, Greater New York Taxi Association,

Transportation Alternatives, Streets PAC, Riders Alliance, and the New York Taxi

WorkersAlliance.Withgreaterorganizationonthepartofthevanindustrycomes

greaterresponsivenessfromtheTLC,CityCouncil,andtheMayor.

The TLC knows very little about the vans’ daily operations. It currently

collects terabytes of trip data on the yellow and green taxi industries and is

improving its livery cabdata collection efforts, too. Noneof thesedata collection

effortshavebeenextendedtothevans.Withoutsomebaselinedataaboutwhorides

thevans,wherethevansaregoing,andhowmanypassengersthereare,however,

the TLC has no idea if it has issued too many or too few permits, if it should

aggressively recruitmore operators, or how large the dollar van phenomenon is.

28ThisbeliefisbasedontheideathattheMTAwillnotimprovefrequenciesonroutesservedbythevans. The vans, in my view, are a “second-best” solution to the problem of adequate access toinadequateservice.

165

TheTLCneedstomonitortheindustries itregulatesandmaintainup-to-datedata

onridership,safety,andactivelicenseddrivers.

My fourth recommendation trickles up to the State ofNewYork. Since the

passage of Local Law 115 in 1993, definitions established at the State level have

shaped local regulations. Without the State’s willingness to amend definitions it

imposedontheCity,theTLCwillneverhaveanyauthorityoverthelargervehicles

operating on Flatbush Avenue or the flexibility to adapt existing definitions to

reflect daily practice. In short, the State and the City need to work together to

improvethelawsthatregulatethevans.

The rise of smartphone applications has overturned the taxi industry and

redefinedtheroleoftheTLC.RecommendationfiveseekstoextendexistingTLCe-

hailpilotprogramstothevans.Thesmartphone,inmanyways,representsalegal

rayoflightforthevans.Vanshailedviaasmartphoneapplicationwouldnolonger

beinviolationofstreethailrestrictions.Inaddition,sincethesevansarenowbeing

e-hailed, it may override prohibitions against operating on routes served by the

MTA.Becausevandriverswillberespondingtoane-hail,onecouldarguethatthe

van drivers are honoring the law and operating over non-specified routes rather

thanservicingafixedFlatbushAvenueroute.

Myfinalrecommendation,recommendationsix,movesbeyondtherealmof

the vans and, instead, thinks about surface transportation on Flatbush Avenue.

Duringoneofmyinterviewswithanelectedofficial,sheaskedmehowIwoulddeal

withthevans.Iexplainedthatitwasmypositionthatthevansrepresenta“second-

best”solutiontothetransportationproblemsinCentralBrooklyn.Thebestsolution,

166

inmyopinion,ishigh-qualityMTAbusserviceonFlatbushAvenue.Theonlywayto

achieve that, however, is to eliminate the delays caused by traffic and lengthy

boarding queues that slow down service as each passenger dips his or her

MetroCardintothebus,readerbeforeboarding.29

AtrueBusRapidTransit(BRT)rolloutonFlatbushAvenuewouldsolvethe

problems of unreliable bus service by eliminating the vagaries of traffic and

reducingpassenger load times.30Bysolving these twoproblemswithadedicated

bus lane and pre-boarding payment, the need for the vans would disappear. As

chapter three demonstrated, riders opt for the vans because they are faster and

morereliablethanthebus.AtrueBRTonFlatbushAvenuewouldbeevenfasterand

morereliablethanthevans.Inaddition,itwouldworkwiththeexistingMetroCard

andbefreetopassengersconnectingfromthesubways.Whiletherearelegitimate

concerns to deploying BRT on Flatbush Avenue, namelywhatwill happen to van

driversandthetighterroadgeometriesonthesouthernportionofFlatbush,those

issues canbe debated andnegotiated. Inmany cities, fromBogota to CapeTown,

BRTsystemshaveabsorbedprivatesectordriversandworkedwiththemtoprovide

thenewservices.

These6recommendationsaredesignedtoclarifythelaw,developnewlines

of communication between the van industry and the City, promote coordination

among transportation agencies, embrace new technologies, and improve surface

29Thisisnotanewsuggestion.Asnotedinchaptertwo,the1986DepartmentofCityPlanningstudytargetedthesesameissues.30TheMTA’scurrentSelectBusService,whichexistsonUticaAvenue,anotherdollarvancorridor,does nothing to reduce the delay from traffic. SBS routes, while a good first step, have not seenridershipincreases.

167

transportationinNewYork.Evenwiththesesixrecommendations,however,there

isstillmoreresearchtobedone.

FutureResearch

ThisresearchhasimplicationsfortransportationplanningandpolicyinNew

York, but it also provides insights into the practice of informality, the process of

gentrification, and what some refer to as planetary urbanization. In Andy

Merrifield’s (2014) book, The New Urban Question, he describes planetary

urbanization as “a process that produces skyscrapers aswell as unpaved streets,

highwaysaswellasbackroads,by-watersandmarginalzonesthatfeelthewrathof

theworldmarket—both itsabsenceand itspresence” (p.5).Myworkaffirms the

stark divides identified by Merrifield, but also provides a more substantial

understandingofhowthesecontrastsarebuiltandsustainedbyexaminingthevans

indetail.

To find the material form of these theories, I would expand my existing

research and bring in cases that allow me to toggle between the neighborhood,

citywide, and global scales to showhow they are linked together. The theories of

gentrification, informality, andplanetaryurbanizationmanifest themselves clearly

when examining the precarious position of dollar vans traveling along Flatbush

Avenue in Brooklyn, the dwindling number of gypsy cab drivers in Upper

Manhattan, the newly minted green taxi drivers operating citywide, and the

168

triumphant e-hail drivers who have disrupted the taxi industry on a global scale.

Thethreadconnectingthesecasesistheunevenapplicationofthelaw.

When rules are codified but applied unevenly, it blurs their meaning and

threatenstheirrelevance.Whendailypracticecontradictsthelaw,asinthecaseof

dollarvanandgypsycabdriverswhoacceptstreethails,thelawlosesitsauthority.

Atfirst,thisinformalitywasaboontovanandgypsycabdriverswhooperatedwith

near impunity,butasIhavearguedinthisdissertation,this“salutaryneglect” isa

stallingtacticthatallowsthestatetowithholdinvestmentuntildemographicchange

demands improved infrastructure and services. This is an example of how the

devalorization process described by Smith (1996) is coordinated between public

andprivateactors.Thedecayofservicesinaneighborhoodisnotanaturalevent;it

istheoutcomeofcoordinatedactivitiesbypublicandprivateactors.Smith,borrows

this framework from Bradford and Rubinowitz (1979), who argue that

devalorizationis“theresultofidentifiableprivateandpublicinvestmentdecisions,

madeby identifiablepublicactorsandmembersof therealestate investmentand

developmentindustry”(p.79).Forourpurposes,theNewYorkCityfiscalcrisis in

the mid-1970s triggered a number of austerity measures that starved outer-

boroughneighborhoodsoftransitservice(Tabb1982).

The case of e-hail taxis, however, offers an interesting counter to these

theories.Thesecompanieshavefoundsustenance inthesamemunicipal fuzziness

asthevansandgypsycabs,andsuccessfullyfoughtregulatorswhileexpandingtheir

businesses in the face ofmounting scrutiny. E-hail taxi companies differ from the

informal operators in two important ways: first, e-hail taxi companies have used

169

theirbillionsofdollarsinventurecapitaltocombatlawsuits,lobbygovernment,and

promote their services. Second, theyhave appealeddirectly to active riderswhen

regulatorshavetriedtocurbtheiroperations.Bymarshalingthepoliticalpowerof

venture capital and users, e-hail taxi companies have rejiggered the regulatory

paradigmandpartneredwith governments to redefine regulations rather thanbe

sweptawaylikeotherinformalactorsbeforethem.

Transportationplanningandpolicyprovidealensintothebroaderworkings

of cities. This is an area of study that is under-developed but ripe for analysis.

Through thisdissertationand future research, the idiomof informalityprovidesa

powerful framework to understand gentrification and the way inner-city

neighborhoodsarebeingre-developedtoday.

170

Appendix1:Survey

DATE:

TIME:

DIRECTION:King’sPlazaORAtlantic

SurveyQuestionnaire

1. Over18?2. Areyoumale___female___3. Inwhatcityandcountrywereyouborn?4. Inwhichneighborhooddoyoulive?5. Howlonghaveyoulivedinyourcurrentneighborhood?6. Doyouownacar?

a. Ifyes,wheredoyouparkathome?i. Streetii. Paidlotnotaffiliatedwithyourhomeiii. Parkingspaceathome

1. Doyoupayforthespacedirectly?7. Doyouownabicycle?8. Doyouusedollarvans…

a. Foralltrips?b. Formosttrips?c. Forsometrips?d. Almostnever?e. Never?

9. Howfrequentlydoyouridethebusorsubway…a. Foralltrips?b. Formosttrips?c. Forsometrips?d. Almostnever?e. Never?

10. DoyouhaveaMetrocard?a. Ifyes,doyouhaveanunlimitedcard?

11. Inthelastmonthdidyoutraveltoworkby…a. Dollarvanb. Subwayc. Busd. Bicyclee. Walkingf. Taxig. Drive

171

h. Carpoolwithfriendsi. Carpoolwithfamily

12. Inthelastmonthwhenyoutraveledtoseefriends,familyorshoppingdidyouuse…

a. Dollarvanb. Subwayc. Busd. Bicyclee. Walkingf. Taxig. Driveh. Carpoolwithfriendsi. Carpoolwithfamily

13. WhichofthefollowinginfluenceyourchoicebetweendollarvansandMTA

transit…a. Cost(fare)b. Speedoftripc. Convenienceofstopsd. Transferstootherbuses,subwaysorvanse. Friendlinessofridersanddriversf. Timewaitingatstopg. Weather

14. WhenchoosingbetweenadollarvanorMTAtransit,howdoyoudecide

whichtotake?

15. DoyoucareifadollarvanisofficiallylicensedbytheTLC?

Yes No

16. Areyouemployed? Yes Noa. Where(neighborhood)?b. Whatisyouroccupation?c. Howmanydaysperweekdoyouwork?d. Doyouhavemorethanonejob?

i. Ifso,doyouworkmorethanonejobinasingleday?ii. Howdoyoutravelbetweenjoblocations?

e. Pleaseindicateyourtypicalhourlywage:i. $7.25-$10.00perhourii. $10.01-$13.00perhouriii. $13.01-$16.00perhouriv. $16.01-$19.00perhourv. Morethan$19.00perhour

172

Appendix2:LetterTemplateforVanOperators

DearCommissionerxxxxxx,

We,theundersignedLicensedCommuterVanoperatorsofBrooklyn,wouldliketorequestthatyourofficeconsiderchangestotheexistingcommutervanstopsalongtheFlatbushAvenueandUticaAvenuecorridors.Wewouldliketoencourageyourofficetomovetheexistingstopstofiveareasthatareeasilyaccessibletoourpassengersandvans.Thereasonwhywe’reaskingforthesechangesistwo-fold:first,assmall-businessowners,wecarefullycatertoourpassengers’needs,andinturn,areforcedtopickupanddropoffatthemostconvenientandsafestlocationswithinourservicearea.Sinceourpassengerswork,shop,andconnecttoothermodesoftransportationalongFlatbushandUticaAvenues,we’recompelledtopickupanddropoffalongthesecorridors.Second,astrafficruleshavechanged,specificallytheflowoftrafficduetoredesigns,someofourdesignatedlocationshavebecomeinaccessible.Forinstance,itisnolongerpossibletoaccessSchermerhornStreetconveniently,wherewehaveafewdesignatedlocations,fromFlatbushAvenuewhenheadingtoDowntownBrooklyn.ThischangeinthetrafficruleshasseverelyreducedtheutilityofSchermerhornStreetasalocationforourbusinesses.Sincecommutervansoperateonsemi-fixedroutes,wearen’tbeholdentospecificstops,likeabus,butpassengersdocollectatkeypointswithinourservicearea.Inordertoensurethatourpassengersareabletoboardourvanssafelywithoutdisruptingtraffic,wewouldliketoseethecreationoffiveloadingzones.InlightofMayorBilldeBlasio’srecentVisionZeroinitiative,wefeelthatthisisacriticalcontributionwecanmaketoimprovingsafetybymakingourstreetsmoreorderly.We’veidentifiedfourzonesalongtheFlatbushAvenuecorridor:SmithStreetbetweenLivingstonandSchermerhornStreets,FlatbushAvenuebetweenAtlanticAvenueandPacificStreet,FlatbushAvenueandAvenueH(onFlatbushitself),andfinallyoutbyKing’sPlazaonFlatbushAvenuebetweenAvenueUandE53rdStreet.OntheUticaAvenuecorridor,wewouldliketoseealoadingzoneatEasternParkwayandUticaAvenue.Ifyouhaveanyquestions,pleasefeelfreetocontactus.WeareunitedinourdesiretoimprovecommutervanserviceinBrooklynandbelievethatwithyourhelp,wecanbesuccessfulinourendeavors.Thankyou,xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

173

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