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Balancing National Uncertainty andForeign Orientation: Identity Buildingand the Role of Political Parties in Post-Orange UkraineInna Melnykovska a b c , Rainer Schweickert a b c & TetianaKostiuchenko a b ca Freie Universität Berlin & Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kielb Kiel Institute for the World Economyc National University of Kyiv–Mohyla Academy

Available online: 28 Jul 2011

To cite this article: Inna Melnykovska, Rainer Schweickert & Tetiana Kostiuchenko (2011):Balancing National Uncertainty and Foreign Orientation: Identity Building and the Role of PoliticalParties in Post-Orange Ukraine, Europe-Asia Studies, 63:6, 1055-1072

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Balancing National Uncertainty and Foreign

Orientation: Identity Building and the Role

of Political Parties in Post-Orange Ukraine

INNA MELNYKOVSKA, RAINER SCHWEICKERT &TETIANA KOSTIUCHENKO

BUILDING NATIONAL IDENTITIES WAS AT THE centre of post-communist transforma-

tion but the search for the appropriate mix of ethnic and civic components of

a national identity, along with the redefinition of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Others’, has

been complicated by primordialism and post-colonialism (Cirtautas & Schimmelfennig

2010). While primordialism has been reflected in the plurality of regional and local

identities and led to uncertainty about self-sufficiency of own national identities, a

consequence of post-colonialism has been an ‘inferiority complex’, involving a

willingness to attach national identities to post-imperial or modern supra-national

identities.1 However, a comprehensive analysis, integrating both features, is still

needed. In addition, the literature concerning identity building concentrates on the

elite, civil society and the population as internal drivers and the EU and Russia as

external drivers. Thereby, it mostly neglects political parties as drivers of identity

building, although they play a central role in post-communist countries.

We argue that a focus on the role of political parties allows for a more

comprehensive view of the interconnections between the main features of post-

communist identity building. Parties can formulate positions on national identity and

foreign orientation and influence the preferences of the population on identity issues.

In turn, through voting for a particular party during elections, the population can

express its preferences on identity issues. Hence political parties can be assumed to

play a central role in post-communist identity building.

The authors would like to thank the participants of the workshop ‘Elites and the Formation of

Identities in Post Soviet Space: Global and Domestic Influences’ (held at Emmanuel College,

Cambridge University on 11 June 2010) and the two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an

earlier draft of this essay. The authors are indebted to Klaus Segbers and the Institute for East

European Studies at the Freie Universitat Berlin for financial support. The authors would also like to

thank David Lane for his detailed and very inspiring critique on revised versions. Of course, the usual

disclaimer applies.1These features are discussed in scholarly literature. See, for example, Brubaker (1996), Chernetsky

(2003), Kuzio (2002), Schopflin (1996), Smith (1998) and Tolz (1998).

EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES

Vol. 63, No. 6, August 2011, 1055–1072

ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/11/061055-18 ª 2011 University of Glasgow

DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2011.585754

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Our essay seeks to demonstrate the interaction between the identity values of

political parties and of the population, which become visible through the analysis of

parties’ programmes and election results. We review the literature in support of our

argument and show the relevance of political parties in identity building for Ukraine.

We also provide empirical evidence based on an evaluation of party programmes

during two consecutive elections for the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, in

2006 and 2007. We develop indicators that measure uncertainty about national

identity and orientation towards supra-national identities as articulated in party

programmes. Relating these indicators to election results reveals the preferences of the

population about national identity based on identity values manifested by the political

parties. We conclude that, for the case of Ukraine, there is a strong link between

uncertainty about national identity and orientation towards supra-national identities

both in party programmes and as revealed by election results. This supports our view

about the importance of political parties in identity building in a still largely

undetermined setting in young post-communist democracies.

Post-communist identity building—the role of political parties

National identity building has been one of the central processes of the post-communist

transformation. National identities were expected to provide the foundations for the

statehood of post-communist states and to promote their ability to persist as

independent states (D’Anieri 2002).2 Thus, the post-communist states had to rediscover

the national ‘Self’ and to re-define the ‘Others’ through restressing the similarities of the

in-group and its differences with those outside the political community (Kuzio 2001).

However, building post-communist national identities was complicated by the fact that

most post-communist states (in particular post-Soviet republics) had little experience of

nationhood before they became members of the ‘communist camp’. Identities were

therefore pre-national and below the level that is usually considered as ‘necessary’ for

constructing a nation as an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991). Furthermore, these

states possessed a plurality of ethnic, local and regional identities and ‘tend to be

bundles of competing traditions gathered accidentally into concocted political frame-

works rather than organically evolving civilizations’ (Geertz 1993, p. 240).

In addition, the post-communist states (in particular post-Soviet republics) have been

regarded as post-colonial and therefore having inherited an ‘inferiority complex’ that

revealed uncertainty about the self-sufficiency of their own national identities

(Chernetsky 2003; Kuzio 1998b, 2002; Riabchuk 2002). Although the post-Soviet

republics demonstrated different degrees and forms of the ‘inferiority complex’ (in

Ukraine, this complex was called ‘little Russianism’ (Kuzio 1998a, p. 155)), they were

similar in their willingness to attach their national identities to imperial or post-imperial

supra-national identities, provided by ‘elder brother’ Russia, and mainly Slavic or

Eurasian in nature.3 The willingness to attach themselves to the European supra-national

2Different levels of national identity development have also been seen as explaining the degree of

success in democratisation and market reforms (D’Anieri 2002; Shulman 2005).3In the Soviet identity projects, Russia was presented as an ‘elder brother’ and became the main kin-

state for the post-Soviet republics.

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identity was intensified by regional integration processes such as the enlargements of the

EU and NATO and the neighbourhood policies of both the EU and NATO (Franke

et al. 2010; Gawrich et al. 2010; Melnykovska & Schweickert 2008, 2009).

Hence, due to its primordial and post-colonial features, post-communist identity

building, especially in post-Soviet countries, suffers from two challenges. First, the main

challenge of post-communist identity building was to define what components of national

identity—ethnic or civic—did or would unite most members of a particular post-Soviet

nation and what components had to be given priority (Shulman 2002a; Wolczuk 2000).4

Primordial local and regional ethnic identities had to be chosen to shape the concept of

the nation and to forge integrated state identities without sufficient experience in

democratic statehood and with a weak civic identity (Kuzio 1996; Tolz 1998).

Second, the majority of the population in the post-communist countries link their

national identities to a supra-national one—mainly European, which is a civic rather

than an ethnic identity (Neumann 2001).5 For those countries that do not feel Asian

(Ukraine, Belarus and most of Russia), the Eastern Slavic identity, which is based on

the persistent myth of a common origin, joint descent and a continuity of the fate of

the community, was another option as a supra-national identity (Wilson 2004). As a

further complication, these attachments are not neutral but are closely connected with

policies to promote democracy or stabilise autocracy.

Moreover, the willingness to attach to supra-national identities is promoted by

external drivers. It is widely recognised that the EU exercises normative,

transformative and predominantly civic power (Manners 2006; Schimmelfennig &

Sedelmeier 2005). However, as an influential kin-state, Russia is another key external

driver in post-communist identity building (Aslund & Kuchins 2009). Russia has been

exporting Eurasian or Eastern Slavic identities, especially in the former republics of

the Soviet Union, the ‘Near Abroad’ (Kagan 2008). Russia also influences the

construction of civic identities by strengthening autocrats’ coercive state capacity and

destabilising democratising states in the region (Ambrosio 2009; Tolstrup 2009). In the

case of post-Soviet countries, the EU and Russia therefore pull countries towards

opposite foreign orientations, thereby increasing uncertainty about national identities.

As for internal drivers, discourse between the political elite and presidential policies

has been recognised as shaping mass attitudes towards national identity and as being

the main sources of ethnic and civic nationalism (D’Anieri & Kuzio 2002;

Melnykovska & Schweickert 2008; Shulman 2002b; Wolczuk 2000). The role of the

population and civil society in post-communist identity building has only recently

been recognised in the course of the ‘coloured revolutions’ (McFaul 2005).

The diffusion of the coloured revolutions in post-communist countries allows for

the potential of the population to be more actively involved.

4Some scholars have prioritised ethnic components as, for them, the new states in Eastern Europe were

‘nationalising states’ or ‘nationalising regimes’ (Brubaker 1996; Schopflin 1996; Smith 1998). An opposing

school warned against building an ethnic identity in the multi-ethnic post-communist states (Geertz 1993;

Ignatieff 1993). The representatives of this school gave the priority to building civic identity, which is based

on inclusiveness and corresponds to values and behaviour supportive of democratic society and which

therefore would promote the democratisation of post-communist countries (Shulman 2002a).5According to Habermas (1992), European identity is based on the values of peace, democracy,

respect for human and minority rights, social justice and welfare.

IDENTITY BUILDING IN POST-ORANGE UKRAINE 1057

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In this context, it is rather surprising that, despite the ability of parties to shape

the national discourse on identity issues and the increased power of legislatures in the

post-communist countries (Kailitz 2007), especially in Central Eastern Europe, the

role of political parties in building national identities has gained little attention. There

are many ways in which political parties are involved in building national identities.

First, political parties are a critical element in translating existing identities into

politics (McAllister & White 2007), as they represent public opinions in politics

(Duverger 1954). Second, with the aim of attracting electoral voices, parties

instrumentalise and politicise dominant cleavages by choosing values of identity in

their electoral programmes (Sartori 1976). Third, political parties can construct

national identities because they shape public discourse, educate and socialise people

into political processes and contribute to national identity policies (Weber 1966). As a

result, parties can influence the perception of national uncertainty and either

strengthen or weaken a sense of national identity. Thus, building a national identity

is a by-product of competition between parties over electoral voices and seats in

national parliaments and public office (von Beyme 1984).

The literature on political parties in post-communist states has paid little systematic

attention to the effects of parties on national and regional identities.6 Research on

political parties has mainly concentrated on their roles in areas such as cleavage

structures (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2009), democratisation

(Lewis 2001), party identification (Miller & Klobucar 2000) and the effects of party

competition on public support (Ray 2003; Steenbergen & Scott 2004). The European

Union’s impact on national party systems has been the subject of just a few studies

(Enyedi & Lewis 2006; Poguntke et al. 2007; Vachudova 2008). These studies have

confirmed that post-communist parties formulated their position on accession to the

EU according to voters’ attitudes towards integration with the EU or under the

influence of the EU’s actors.

However, there are some research results that are highly relevant in our context.

Recent data show that voters have begun identifying themselves with parties. A

majority of post-Soviet voters identify with one party or another and share the

attitudes and views of the political system and policies with party leaders (Miller &

Klobucar 2000). This also means that the role of parties and the interaction of party

programmes with popular preferences have increased in post-communist countries.

Furthermore, research on ethnic cleavages demonstrates that ethnic nationalism,

politically mobilised by parties, can work for, rather than against, democratic

consolidation. Ethnic nationalism and democracy can go together provided that ethnic

preferences are focused on ending foreign rule rather than fighting with other

neighbouring ethnic groups (Beissinger 2008). Thus, whether the instrumentalisation

of ethnic cleavages would aid or hinder the building of national identity depends on

the way these cleavages are articulated by political parties.

Elections have recently also become more frequent and fair in post-communist

countries (Bunce & Wolchik 2006; Kalandadze & Orenstein 2009; Ambrosio 2007). In

6This can be explained by the fact that a majority of voters in post-communist countries were

regarded as demobilised—meaning that voters distrusted parties, and did not identify with a party,

which led to extremely volatile electoral support for political parties (Rose 1995).

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turn, the political elite, whose power increasingly depends on the popular vote, has

become more driven by popular attitudes. Together with research on the role of political

parties, this implies that political parties should be central in analysing national identity

building. Elections clearly provide a possibility for parties to shape the public discourse,

influence public opinion on identity issues, and, thereby, help the population to reveal

preferences about national identity.

The case of Ukraine—mapping identity clusters, identity building

and the role of political parties

A few researchers have already mapped identity clusters on the development of

national identity, and explained its weakness and its regional variations in Ukraine

(Wilson 2000; Wolczuk 2000; Kuzio 2001; Barrington & Faranda 2009; Rjabtschuk

2009). However, no specific attention has been given to the role of political parties in

identity building or to the role of party programmes and elections in revealing the

preferences of the population about a national Ukrainian identity. As visualised in

Table 1, the challenges of post-communist identity building can be connected with the

pronounced positions of parties with respect to national identities and foreign-policy

orientation. Mapping the nexus between aspects of Ukraine’s national identity

(Table 1) allows us to discuss identity building in terms of ethnic and civic identities,

the potential role of a European identity and the role of the political parties for

matching the identity preferences of elites and the population.

Clusters of ethnic and civic identity

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was no convergence towards a

homogenous Ukrainian ethnicity (Wilson 2002), and the heterogeneity of views about

TABLE 1THE NEXUS BETWEEN NATIONAL AND SUPRA-NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND

POLITICAL PARTIES IN UKRAINE

Notes: BYT, Block Yulia Tymoshenko; OU, the Bloc ‘Our Ukraine’; PR, the Party of Regions; CPU, theCommunist Party of Ukraine; PBL, the People’s Bloc of Lytvyn; SPU, the Socialist Party of Ukraine.

The borders between identities are blurred as shown by the dotted lines.

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what marks Ukrainian identity posed a considerable challenge in identity building in

independent Ukraine (Barrington & Herron 2004). Apart from the ethnic identities of

minority groups,7 there are three Ukrainian ethnic identities that compete for the

status of being a Ukrainian national identity (Table 1). Each of these ethnic identities

is embedded in a broader set of beliefs and historical memories, as well as religious,

linguistic and policy preferences, forming what are labelled ‘national identity

complexes’ in particular regions of Ukraine (Shulman 2004).8

First, ethnic Ukrainian identity prevails in the western regions and stresses the

values of individualism, freedom, democracy and tolerance. The dominance of these

values is devoted to the historic heritage of the more liberal Austro-Hungarian Empire

and to the later incorporation of these regions into the Soviet Union. Most

representatives of this identity feel more comfortable speaking the Ukrainian language

and articulate a strong sense of national pride (Nikolayenko 2008). They are also

interested in day-to-day political affairs and are continuously active, both during

and between elections. Ethnic Ukrainians are also strongly supportive of democratic

and market reforms (Shulman 2005).

Second, Eastern Slavic identity is common in the south-eastern regions and

highlights the values of collectivism and patrimonialism, along with a preference for

the Russian language. Eastern Slavic Ukrainians are largely inactive between elections,

are less supportive of democratic and market reforms and are the main base of support

for oligarchs and centrist parties (Kuzio 2005).

Third, Soviet Ukrainian identity is the mixed identity dominant in the central

regions.9 In terms of ethnic components, Soviet Ukrainian identity is a hybrid (Pirie

1996) and reflects less clear ethnic components due to the melting of multiple

ethnicities settled in central regions (Rjabtschuk 2009) and due to the erosion of

linguistic and ethnic boundaries between Russophones and Ukrainophones (Wolczuk

2000). Soviet Ukrainian identity has its roots in Homo sovieticus, with a low valuation

of culture and religion and with a specific mix of Ukrainian and Russian language—

surzhyk. Soviet Ukrainians often regret the breakdown of the Soviet Union but also

support Ukraine’s independence (Wilson 2002). Their historical memories are limited

to Soviet times, but their historical consciousness represents the overlap of the

mythology of the Soviet propaganda about the Ukrainian Soviet nation and the ethnic

legends about Ukraine’s attempts to achieve independence in previous centuries

(Hrytsenko 1998). This group of mixed identity is regarded as the key to any potential

majority in Ukrainian society.

Despite a number of attempts to build an inclusive national identity, Ukraine is very

far from being a homogenous ethnic entity (Barrington & Faranda 2009; Kulyk 2009;

Lane 2008). Since Ukraine’s independence these identities have overlapped and fused,

leaving the vast areas between them often holding characteristics of both, although to

7The most influential is the identity of the Russian minority group, which is concentrated in five

south-eastern regions—Donetsk Oblast’, Luhansk Oblast’, Kharkiv Oblast’, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast’

and Zaporizhzhya Oblast’—and in Crimea.8Despite certain overlaps, the borders between these identities do not match with the religious,

linguistic or regional borders.9Further sub-groups are distinguished within this identity group.

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varying degrees. Thus, these three identities have interacted, leaving many citizens of

Ukraine holding double, very fluid and ambivalent ethnic identities.

Furthermore and as a consequence of the Soviet identity-building projects, regarding

oneself asUkrainian does notmean having a preference for aUkrainian national identity.

Following Soviet traditions, people define themselves as Ukrainians due to their place of

residence or due to paternal inheritance (Simonsen 1999;Wolczuk 2000). Thus, it was not

a real national (ethnic or civic) but a ‘passport’ identity (Wilson 2002). Hence, despite a

substantial number of citizens who regard themselves as Ukrainians, the number of

people with Ukrainian ethnic national identity is small (Riabchuk 2000; Wilson 1997,

2000). Civic national identity is strong only in the western regions of Ukraine where there

is a dominance of Ukrainian ethnic identity. In the other regions, a civic national identity

had to be built ‘from scratch’, as it could not rest on any stable historical or cultural core

to develop powerful transcendent ideas of liberty, prosperity or welfare, a common social

contract of reciprocal rights and obligations or constitutional patriotism (Wilson 2002).

The Orange Revolution of 2004 marked a new stage in the development of

Ukraine’s civil society and ended the previous political era of the hybrid Soviet-type

system (Stepanenko 2006). However, whether the Orange Revolution brought any

change with regard to Ukrainian identity is a highly disputable issue. Some observers

believe Yushchenko’s active mass support was drawn by representatives of the ‘ethnic

Ukrainian’ rather than the ‘eastern Slavic’ identity (Lane 2008; Rodgers 2006). David

Lane (2008) remained sceptical because the events of the Orange Revolution, in his

view, did not initiate and, consequently, did not integrate mechanisms creating

solidarity—the formation of a ‘civic Ukraine’—but led to greater division between

East and West Ukraine. Furthermore, Peter Rodgers (2006) argued that the Orange

Revolution rather intensified than decreased divisions and Ukraine has become even

more polarised. In contrast however, another group of scholars argues that the Orange

Revolution gave birth to a political nation in Ukraine (Rjabtschuk 2009).10 Andrew

Wilson (2004, p. 210), for example, refers to ‘Viktor Yushchenko’s value-based

campaign, which helped consolidate a new version of the ‘‘national idea’’’.

Overall, there seems to be a consensus that any impact of the Orange Revolution

implied a shift in national identity towards civic nationalism, which includes a positive

attitude towards democracy and market reforms (Shulman 2005). However, this shift has

been threatened by some groups within the Ukrainian political elite who emphasise ethnic

differences in the population in order to gain votes in the enduring political crisis after the

Orange Revolution. Because this led some parts of the population to reject everything

that is connected with the definition of ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘national’, the result was rather a

deeper divide than convergence and, to some extent, a crisis of national identity.

European identity as a uniting force?

As is shown in Table 1, civic weakness and the ethnic divide are matched to some

extent by the willingness to attach to opposing supra-national identities and opposing

10According to surveys of public opinion, the number of Ukrainian patriots has increased from 60%

in 2003 to 75% in 2006; around 60% of the citizenry was ready to fight for their country in armed

conflicts (Yakymenko & Lytvynenko 2006).

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foreign orientations, with only a part of the ethnic Ukrainians having a strong civic

identity favouring self-sufficiency and neutrality. Due to the post-colonial legacy, the

majority of Ukrainians attach national identity to supra-national identities. At the

same time, there is widespread disagreement concerning cultural similarities with

potential supra-national identities with which to attach, so called ‘Ours’ in contrast to

‘Others’ (Shulman 2004). In the Ukrainian case, the main candidates respectively for

‘Ours’ and the ‘Other’ are Europe (primarily the EU) and Russia.

Ethnic Ukrainians stress large cultural differences between Ukrainians and Russians

and thus Russia serves for them as the primary ‘Other’. A small part of ethnic

Ukrainians see their identity as self-sufficient and therefore support Ukraine’s

neutrality and self-reliance. The majority of ethnic Ukrainians argue that Ukrainian

culture is part and parcel of European culture. They thus support Ukraine’s

integration into the EU and NATO and are in favour of an attachment of their

national identity to the supra-national European identity. For them, the linear

progression of the primordial community into a nation state was frustrated by

Russia’s imperial aspirations, as this separated Ukraine from its European roots

(Wolczuk 2000). Similarly, modern Ukrainian nationalism stresses the close relation-

ship between Ukraine and Europe, which is regarded as even more central than the

relationship with Russia (Rjabtschuk 2009). Furthermore, modern Ukrainian

nationalism regards being attached to Europe and building a European identity as a

way to strengthen the Ukrainian national identity. Being Ukrainian and being

European are set as equal to each other (Table 1).

The proponents of Eastern Slavic identity, on the contrary, stress the very similar

historical and cultural development of the three Eastern Slavic peoples of Russia,

Ukraine and Belarus. They see Ukraine as a part of the Eurasian economic and

cultural space and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). They believe

Ukraine’s future lies in closer cooperation with Russia and are proponents of

attachment to the East Slavic supra-national identity.

A European civic supra-national identity may potentially provide a way to unite a

majority of Ukrainian citizens, regardless of their ethnic identity. By embracing

‘Europe’, Ukraine has a chance to both merge internal divisions and replace the

previous supra-national community, the ‘Soviet people’ (Wolczuk 2000). However, the

literature on Neighbourhood Europeanisation, for example Gawrich et al. (2010) and

Franke et al. (2010), has shown that the rather weak incentives under the ENP regime

have not enabled the impetus for such a merger.

Potential security threats, the presence of a large Russian minority and

dependencies on gas supply imply at the same time that neglecting Russia as an

important player is not possible. Hence, in a way, uncertainty about national identity

stems from the need for external support and security threats. As a consequence, the

majority of Ukrainians are uncertain about national identity and believe that

Ukraine has no reliable external guarantees of its independence, sovereignty or

territorial integrity. In addition, the perception of threat differs with respect to the

source of the external threat, whether Russia or NATO (Razumkov Centre 2010).

Hence, neither the West (the EU or NATO) nor Russia provides an easy solution,

and foreign orientation in a country like Ukraine depends to a large extent on

external factors.

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The role of political parties after the Orange Revolution

Although the President of Ukraine continued to play an important role in identity

building after the Orange Revolution,11 political parties have gained influence in the

parliamentary–presidential system of Ukraine (D’Anieri 2005).12 Party programmes

became a central part of pre-election campaigns and were widely distributed by the

free media in Ukraine. The issue of national identities was one of the most discussed

issues in the election campaigns of 2006 and 2007 (Herron 2008; Hesli 2006). Hence,

the Orange Revolution has strengthened the position of political parties in Ukrainian

politics and their ability to build a single Ukrainian national identity and to promote

European choice. Besides representation of the people’s interests and preferences in

the parliament, party members have been able to polarise voters, instrumentalise

existing cleavages of ethnic identities, and spread national uncertainty and stress the

necessity of a particular foreign orientation (Dafflon 2008).

As shown in Table 1, there is a substantial degree of clustering concerning national

identity building and the two opposing ‘orange’ and ‘blue–white’ political camps, and

especially the major parties, which have positioned themselves at the borders between

these clusters. Three parties can be clearly allocated to either ‘orange’ or ‘blue–white’

forces. The Party of Regions (PR, Partiya Regioniv), led by former prime minister and

2004 presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych, represents the blue-and-white force,

which was most closely associated with Kuchma’s regime. The base of this party

includes the eastern regions of Ukraine. Two partners in the Orange Revolution—the

Bloc ‘Our Ukraine’ (OU, Blok ‘Nasha Ukrayina’) and the Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko

(BYT, Blok Yuliyi Tymoshenko) constitute the orange camp and their supporters are

largely from western and central regions.

None of these three parties won a majority of the vote, however, and even the voices

of the two orange forces together were not enough to form a governmental coalition.

This fact increased the importance of middle-range parties. These were the Communist

Party of Ukraine (CPU, Komunistuchna Partiya Ukrayiny), the People’s Bloc of

Lytvyn (PBL, Narodnyy Blok Lytvyna) and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU,

Sotsialistychna Partiya Ukrayiny). Although these middle-range parties were too small

to be treated as independent players, they possess a significant number of seats for

11Immediately after independence, policies concerning national identity building were dominated by

the presidency. Under the auspice of the presidencies of Leonid Kravchuk (1991–1994) and Leonid

Kuchma (1994–2004) the multiple projects of identity building were launched. Despite the fact that

ethnic diversity was instrumentalised in the election campaigns, the priority in state policies was given

to building civic components (Szporluk 2000; Arel & Ruble 2006).12As part of the compromise to rerun the controversial second round of the 2004 presidential

election, some of the anti-Kuchma coalition joined with the ‘party of power’ to pass a constitutional

reform (cancelled after the election of Viktor Yanukovych as president in 2010) that substantially

reduced the powers of the president and correspondingly augmented the powers of the prime minister

and parliament. Furthermore, the electoral rules were changed from a mixed to a proportional voting

system in which all 450 members of parliament are elected from party lists. The proportional election

system added to the value of representative mandates and to the importance of the political parties in

Ukrainian politics. Furthermore, the fact that Ukraine’s population became increasingly disappointed

in the presidency of Yushchenko shifted the focus from the presidency to political parties (and their

programmes) as alternative sources of political will.

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building situational majorities. Thus, these parties have increasingly gained

importance among Ukrainian voters, who, in addition, became ‘tired’ of the fighting

between the three key parties. While the CPU is a ‘natural’ ally of the PR, the latter

two parties have taken positions depending on the situation and promised incentives.

Hence, clustering concerning national identity was incomplete. The positions of

parties remained flexible and borders between clusters were not sharply defined. This

situation allowed the negotiation of short-term agreements, but coalitions remained

highly unstable with national identity building being a prominent topic in the election

debates. The position of parties has remained flexible and election outcomes highly

uncertain with national identity building a highly relevant topic in the election debates.

In the next section, we show how parties used the room for manoeuvre, offering

specific positions with respect to the main features of identity building, concerning

uncertainty about a national identity and foreign orientation.

Revealed preferences—party programmes and election results

In order to analyse shifts in party programmes and the reactions of voters, we

constructed two indicators in order to measure the two features of post-communist

identity building: National Uncertainty and Foreign Orientation.

For National Uncertainty—based on Anthony Smith (1991), Benedict Anderson

(1991) and Ernest Gellner (1983)—we defined several groups of characteristics

essential for a functioning nation state (for example, territorial integrity, economic

welfare and national security). We assumed that National Uncertainty could be either

expressed as supra-national European Identity or in terms of National Inferiority.

Consequently, we constructed sub-indicators by analysing the party programmes for

the number of appearances of the following rhetorical devices.

First, the sub-indicator on European Identity was constructed as the number of cases

where the terms ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘European’ were used simultaneously or where

Ukraine was regarded as a European state. In addition, we counted instances where

party programmes mentioned ‘European standards’ as a blueprint for the develop-

ment of the Ukrainian state.

Second, concerning the sub-indicator National Inferiority, we assumed that this

feature of uncertainty is represented by cases where party programmes mentioned the

differences between Ukraine’s regions; that Ukraine needs external support for its

development; that Ukraine needs to pay attention to external threats; and that

Ukraine’s government should grant official status to the Russian language.

We do not add together the figures for the two sub-indicators because National

Uncertainty has a different quality when measured by either European Identity or

National Inferiority. In the case of European Identity, the rhetoric may be based on

rational considerations of building a national identity in accordance with the EU role

model and would not necessarily imply inferiority. A general European or world-

market orientation may alternatively be interpreted as economic rationality rather

than uncertainty. Clearly, from an economic perspective, variants of capitalism may

be implemented depending on country-specific circumstances. Nevertheless, an

outward orientation is without an alternative for economic development. In the case

of National Inferiority, plain evidence of inferiority would not be expected in party

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programmes. In this sense, party programmes may be treated as a piece of diplomacy,

at least to some extent, implying that detecting one of the four sub-indicators actually

indicates inferiority. We think labelling the overall indicator National Uncertainty

strikes a balance between these somewhat extreme interpretations.13

Next we look at Foreign Orientation. With regard to the post-colonial feature of

post-communist identity building, the first indicator measures the link between

Ukrainian national and a particular supra-national identity that was articulated

through the foreign orientation of Ukraine proclaimed in the party programmes.

Political parties want Ukraine to be politically and economically aligned with Russia

(Russian Orientation) or Europe (European Orientation). For example, a Russian

orientation was evident in the case of the programme that advocated entering the

Single Economic Space (SES), joining Russia and forming a new Union of

Independent States (consisting of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, as well

as other post-Soviet states). A European orientation was found to exist in the

documents of the parties or blocs declaring their desire to have Ukraine join the EU,

NATO or the WTO. In contrast to National Uncertainty, the sub-indicators are

comparable and allow for two aggregations. Total Foreign Orientation, the sum of

Russian Orientation and European Orientation in party programmes, reveals a

preference for any foreign orientation. In contrast, Net-Russian Orientation treats

European Orientation as a negative value of Russian Orientation and reveals the overall

preference in favour of an orientation towards Russia.

We would expect that uncertainty about national identity should basically go along

with a strong foreign orientation, either European or Russian. If party programmes

are consistent, uncertainty stemming from a supra-national European identity should

rather support a European orientation. This is in contrast to uncertainty that stems

rather from national inferiority because it could justify both types of external

orientation or a balanced multilateralism.

In our evaluation, we concentrated on the main parties for which we could observe

results for both elections: the Party of Regions (PR), the Block Yulia Tymoshenko

(BYT), the Bloc ‘Our Ukraine’ (OU), the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), the

Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) and the People’s Bloc of Lytvyn (PBL). As

shown in Table 2, the party positions can be clearly distinguished, with major shifts in

party programmes taking place between the 2006 and 2007 elections. Comparing the

party programmes offers some confirmation that the parties reacted to the outcome of

the 2006 election. In 2006, we observe that most of the parties were clustered around a

rather neutral position with respect to their foreign orientation, with the OU as the

only outlier playing an important role in the new parliament.

Most parties reacted to the outcome of the 2006 elections within one year and the

alternative trajectories became clearer. The BYT became more pro-European, while

the OU moderated the European orientation and expressed a higher degree of national

13Previous research used other definitions for the phenomenon we call National Uncertainty. These

were the definitions of ‘localisms’ (Wilson 2002, p. 42), ‘self-sufficiency in nationhood’ (Kostiuchenko

2009, p. 1), ‘sense of belonging to one distinct community’ (Tolz 1998, p. 993) and ‘inferiority complex’

(Rjabtschuk 2009, p. 143). These definitions have been driven by the focus of analysis of these studies

and do not contradict ours.

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TABLE

2IN

DIC

ATORSOFN

ATIO

NALU

NCERTAIN

TY

ANDORIE

NTATIO

NANDELECTIO

NRESULTS,2006

AND2007

PR

BYT

OU

SPU

CPU

PBL

Population*

2006

2007

2006

2007

2006

2007

2006

2007

2006

2007

2006

2007

2006

2007

NationalUncertainty

EuropeanIdentity

00

11

12

21

00

11

0.6

0.7

NationalInferiority

43

22

33

10

43

21

3.0

2.5

ForeignOrientation

European

10

0.5

33

11

00

01

01.2

1.2

Russian

21

00

00

0.5

03

21

01.0

0.5

TotalForeign

31

0.5

33

11.5

03

22

02.2

1.7

Russian-European

11

70.5

73

73

71

70.5

03

20

070.2

70.7

ElectionResults

32.1

34.4

22.3

30.7

14.0

14.2

5.7

2.9

3.7

5.4

2.4

4.0

Notes:*values

oftheindicators

asexpressed

inpartyprogrammes

weightedbynationalelectionoutcomes.BYT,Block

YuliaTymoshenko;OU,theBloc‘O

urUkraine’;PR,

thePartyofRegions;CPU,theCommunistPartyofUkraine;

PBL,thePeople’sBlocofLytvyn;SPU,theSocialist

PartyofUkraine.

Source:

owncalculations,basedonelectionresultspresentedbytheCentralElectionCommissionofUkraine;

available

at:http://w

ww.cvk.gov.ua/,accessed18April2011.

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uncertainty in its party programme. The People’s Bloc of Lytvyn (PBL) appeared as

one of the most confident parties regarding the self-sufficiency of Ukrainian national

identity, and the strategy of its leader, Volodymyr Lytvyn, of being neutral in his

foreign orientation, might explain why the PBL won more votes (the party received

2.4% in 2006 and 4% in 2007) than the SPU (with 5.7% in 2006 and 2.9% in 2007).

Regarding the PR, it won nearly the same percentage of votes in the 2007 re-elections

(32.1% in 2006, 34.4% in 2007), but its strategy towards national self-sufficiency seems

to have moved one point closer to zero, which suggests the near absence of national

uncertainty. Thus, it could be argued that, because two parties with a fairly low level

of uncertainty (the PR and the BYT) gained the majority of votes both in 2006 and

2007, Ukrainians were more confident about national identity. Especially the BYT

gained votes (22.3% in 2006 and 30.7% in 2007) by offering a clear European

orientation in order to alleviate political and economic instability in Ukraine.

We have so far only looked at party programmes and have shown that the changes

made before the second of the two elections seem to be affected by the analysis of the

previous election results. This implies that the indicators Foreign Orientation and

National Uncertainty—analysed above—were actually relevant for the election

outcome. However, the indicators shown in Table 2 also reveal some inconsistencies

in party programmes or remain rather inconclusive with respect to the link between

national uncertainty and foreign orientation. For example, the BYT switched to a

clear European orientation without any move in uncertainty indicators and the OU

put more emphasis on a European identity while not offering a clear European

orientation.

Weighting the indicators with the election results allows an examination of the

preferences revealed by the population. It is evident that European Orientation was

stronger than Russian Orientation in both elections. This difference became even larger

in the second election due to a weakening Russian Orientation. This result is matched

by an overall reduction in National Uncertainty, the effect of a stronger European

Identity and a weakening National Inferiority. Hence, these empirical results confirm

our hypothesis. Less National Uncertainty was to be the cost of a Foreign

Orientation—towards Russia in the first place. Somewhat surprising or inconsistent

preferences manifested by political parties seem to be balanced out by the voting

results.

Further evidence on the link between National Uncertainty and Foreign Orientation

is offered by examining the correlation of changes between 2006 and 2007 based on

regional election results (Figure 1). There is a rather stable pattern of change

underlying the shift in preferences. Voters that preferred less Foreign Orientation in

2007 did not change their position with respect to European Identity but with respect

to National Inferiority. Consistent with our hypothesis, less National Uncertainty

implied less Foreign Orientation, that is an increase in self-sufficiency. This result again

supports the conclusion that European Identity and National Inferiority are two

components of National Uncertainty that show quite different correlations with

Foreign Orientation.

The results also demonstrate that revealed preferences may be unstable to a

significant extent in a post-communist country with a young democracy. During 2006–

2007, a time when Russian foreign policy remained rather passive, this implied a shift

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towards either self-sufficiency in the east and south or towards European integration

in the west and centre. It is reasonable to assume that changes in the external

environment have a strong impact on revealed preferences on national identity.

Summary and conclusions

Our results reveal the potential role political parties can play in identity building in

post-communist countries and the actual role they played in the case of Ukraine. We

focused on two features of post-communist identity building: national uncertainty (the

lack of confidence about self-sufficiency of national identities) and foreign orientation

(the willingness to attach national identities to post-imperial or modern supra-national

identities).

Based on the presence of tactics and rhetorical devices in party programmes, we

constructed indicators which allowed for a quantification of positions on identity

building offered by the major political parties in Ukraine in the parliamentary

elections of 2006 and 2007. We defined National Uncertainty as determined either by

the presence of an alternative supra-national European Identity or by the presence of

National Inferiority. In the case of Ukraine, this inferiority may be expressed by

emphasising regional difference, the need for external help, the perception of external

threats and the language question. In terms of Foreign Orientation, Ukraine is

attracted by either Europe or Russia (European Orientation/Russian Orientation).

Weighting indicator values with election results allows us to detect the reaction of

voters to shifts in the balance between the major identity values in party programmes,

and the revealed preferences of the population.

Overall, our analysis of identity building in Ukraine showed the following: political

parties changed positions on identity issues in the 2007 parliamentary election as a

Source: authors’ own calculations, based on election results presented by the Central ElectionCommission of Ukraine, available at: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/, accessed 18 April 2011.

FIGURE 1. CORRELATION BETWEEN ORIENTATION AND UNCERTAINTY, 2006/2007

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reaction to the 2006 election, when their programmes were clustered around a neutral

position; the Foreign Orientation of the population decreased due to a strong decrease

in the orientation towards Russia; lower Foreign Orientation was related to lower

levels of National Uncertainty; European Orientation seems to be less dependent on

National Uncertainty; and National Inferiority seems to support Russian Orientation.

Considering that this is a first attempt to quantify the role of political parties for

identity building in post-communist countries, policy conclusions should be drawn with

some care. However, the robustness of the relationship between European Orientation

and European Identity as well as between Russian Orientation on National Inferiority

lends some support to the argument that the external environment matters for national

identity building. During 2006–2007, when Russian foreign policy stayed rather neutral,

a stronger offer for integration into Europe, which was missed badly, as we argued

earlier (Gawrich et al. 2010; Franke et al. 2010), could have stabilised a European

identity in Ukraine. Because Russian foreign policy became more active afterwards, this

window of opportunity seems to have closed—the former Orange coalition lost votes to

the PR—and regional elections in 2010 brought the rise of the right-wing extremist

party Svoboda in the western regions. Hence, future research will have to focus on the

impact of a changing external environment on national identity building.

Freie Universitat Berlin & Christian-Albrechts-Universitat zu Kiel

Kiel Institute for the World Economy

National University of Kyiv–Mohyla Academy

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