Should USAF Officers Be Technically Competent or Just Good

Leaders?

DRAFT

Larry Chandler

Walden University

ABSTRACT

A quantitative, non-experimental research design was utilized with a survey methodology to investigate munitions and missile maintenance officers’ perceptions regarding the importance of general leadership skills and functional competence to successfulorganizational performance. The 2010 survey population was 312 U.S. Air Force officers, a sample n = 120 officers and 92 participants was followed by the 2013 survey with a population of340 and 155 participants. The data analyses from these two surveystudies were consistent and revealed three key findings: (1) officers perceived both general leadership skills and functional competence to be important to successful organizational performance; (2) officers perceived functional competence to be slightly more important than general leadership skills to successful organizational performance; and (3) there were no differences between the perceptions of senior officers and

company-grade officers regarding the importance of these two leadership constructs.

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Introduction

The United States Air Force executes complex, high-risk operations worldwide, and failure could result in catastrophic consequences (Manpower & Personnel, 2010). On two occasions in 2007 and 2008, the Air Force suffered major nuclear weapons-related incidents. These incidents were so significant that the secretary of the Air Force and the chief of staff were forced to resign (Schlesinger, 2008). In the first incident, referred to here as the “Minot-Barksdale” incident, six cruise missiles with nuclear warheads were inadvertently loaded on a B-52 bomber and flown from Minot Air Force Base (AFB) in North Dakota to Barksdale AFB in Louisiana and were left unattended there for 36 hours (Raaberg, 2007; Welch, 2008). In the second incident, referred to here as the “Taiwan” incident, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) fuses were mistakenly shipped to the government of Taiwan; the fuses had been incorrectly packaged andlabeled as helicopter batteries (Donald, 2008). These two episodes were investigated by distinguished senior executives andgeneral-flag officers. The investigators concluded that a seriouserosion of nuclear expertise was a major cause of both incidents (Peyer, 2008; Schlesinger, 2008; Welch, 2008).

The erosion of nuclear expertise may have occurred because Air Force leadership development and officer assignment policies emphasize general leadership skills (GLS) over functional competence (FC) (Nowak, 1995; Trebon, 2011). Indeed, the criteriaused to select officers to lead nuclear weapons logistics and maintenance organizations do not include functional competence (i.e., knowledge of and experience in the functional mission). Thus, officers may lack the expertise to manage munitions and nuclear weapons organizations (Donald, 2008; Headquarters Air Force, 2008). During the secretary of defense-directed investigation of the Taiwan incident, Admiral Kirkland Donald (2008) found that more than “…half of the senior commanders, colonel and above, did not have the requisite nuclear weapons experience to lead the organizations they commanded” (p. 47). In

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1991, the Air Force eliminated the munitions officer career field. This senior-level personnel management decision played a role in the erosion of nuclear weapons expertise by merging the maintenance officer career fields; officers’ knowledge and skillswere expected to be broader, shallower and less specialist focused on any single mission (i.e., nuclear weapons maintenance and logistics). Although this may be only one potential cause of the Air Force nuclear weapons-related incidents, it may be the most important cause and was not examined during any of the studies or investigations.

We argue here that Air Force officer personnel policy, which is based on the belief that any officer with general leadership skills can successfully lead a nuclear weapons organization, is flawed. This issue was not discussed in any detail during any of the post-incident investigations but is examined in this study. The purpose of this study was to elucidate the munitions officers’ perspectives on the importance of the constructs, generalist leadership skills (GLS) and functional competence (FC)(i.e., technical competence), in achieving successful organizational performance. The 2010 survey study was a quantitative descriptive, quasi-experimental research design witha research survey methodology and was the most appropriate methodto gather and analyze the data from a random sample of 120 munitions officers and the most effective method to elucidate theofficers’ perceptions and represent those perceptions in numerical form for analysis The second phase of the study was based on an official U.S. Air Force administered survey using thesame survey instrument from the 2010 survey with a few additionalquestions added. The 2010 survey sample of 120 was drawn from apopulation of 312 munitions and missile maintenance officers while the 2013 survey sampled the entire population of 340 munitions and missile maintenance officers; of the 340 officers invited, 155 participated in the study (Avolio et al., 2009; Creswell, 2009; Friedrich, Byrne, & Mumford, 2009; Headquarters U.S. Air Force, 2013).

The two constructs are defined as follows:

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Functional competence. Functional competence refers to the core knowledge and skills officers need to fulfill their job responsibilities as indicated by official position descriptions (e.g., U.S. Air Force, 2006a; U.S. Air Force, 2007a; U.S. Air Force, 2008a; U.S. Air Force, 2009a).

Generalist leadership skills. Leadership skills encompass motivational skills, ability to influence others to achieve organizational goals, public speaking, interpersonal skills, teambuilding, organizational knowledge and planning, scheduling, finance, and budget expertise. Leadership skills are not dependent on any specific core functional discipline such as logistics, maintenance, or supply (Northhouse, 2009; U.S. Air Force, 2006b).

The core question is whether the officers selected to lead or manage munitions or nuclear weapons organizations should be functionally competent or whether general leadership skills are asufficient qualification for leading and managing complex technical organizations operating in high-risk environments. In addition, the perceptions of senior and company-grade officers onthe importance of generalist leadership skills (GLS) and functional competence (FC) were compared to determine whether these two groups held similar or dissimilar perspectives. When the senior (i.e., the leader) and company-grade (i.e., the follower) officers have different perceptions regarding the qualifications for effective officer leadership (e.g., should officers be technically competent in the work they lead and manage?), fragmented officer leadership may increase the risk of major organizational failure, as was the case in the two Air Force nuclear weapons-related incidents (Donald, 2008; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).

To enhance readability and reduce the use of acronyms and uniquely military alpha-numerical codes, the term munitions officer is used to represent this officer career field, which has changednames and Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) numerical identifiers many times during the past 20 years. The term munitions officer

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covers the following: 21M AFSC officers, munitions and missile maintenance officers, and munitions officers

Literature Review

The literature review is organized around the two constructs (leadership skills and functional competence), an analysis of AirForce officer leadership development, and the differences betweenorganizational performance and individual officer career success.There was little research on general leadership skills or functional competence per se; most of the existing literature concerned how leaders emerge, the various leadership styles, and the concept of leadership success as defined as individual leadercareer success rather than organizational success. There were no studies examining the perceived importance of a military (or specifically Air Force) officer’s functional competence compared with his or her general leadership skills as a factor in successful organizational performance. Kotter (1982), Gabarro (1987, 2007) and Avery, Tonidandel, Griffith, and Quinones (2003)provided a relevant theoretical framework based on their studies of general and functional managers in industrial and professionalsports contexts, respectively, but both studies failed to define the influence of functional competence on leader effectiveness asdefined by successful organizational performance. Summaries of these studies and their relevance to our study are presented.

Air Force Leadership Development

At the tactical level, the Air Force leadership doctrine includesa description of personal leadership, technical skills, problem solving, and performance counseling for airmen under an officer’sleadership (AFDD 1-1, 2006). According to Air Force doctrine, officers should understand the technical and tactical competencesof the airmen under their leadership, but the description in Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1 does not require the officers to be technically and tactically competent themselves (AFDD 1-1, 2006).

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At the operational level, officers are required to be technicallycompetent at “synchronizing systems and organizations, sophisticated problem solving, and interpersonal skills” (AFDD 1-1, 2006, pp. 8–12). This description does not seem technical; rather, it is more managerial. Although Air Force doctrine includes the phrase technically competent at the individual, operational, and strategic levels, the descriptions of technical competence do not appear to be technical and are vague and unaligned with the other military services’ definitions of technical competence (Horey & Fallensen, 2003).

At the institutional and strategic levels, senior officers lead large, diverse organizations (AFDD 1-1, 2006). For example, AFDD 1-1 (2006) describes institutional leadership skills as “technical competence in force structure and integration; on unified, joint, multinational, and interagency operations; on resource allocation; and on management of complex systems” (pp. 8–12). The vague language in Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1 (2006) does describe senior officer strategic and institutional responsibilities, but the term technical competence does not seem appropriate, nor is it consistent with the construct identified as technical competence for company grade and field grade officers.

Organizational Performance vs. Careerism

Current Air Force personnel policy is focused on leadership performance based on individual officer career success; a more effective measure would be organizational performance (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005).. The two constructs under study (i.e., general leadership skills and functional competence) are relevant to bothorganizational performance and careerism; the question is which of the two is currently incentivized. Successful officer careers are not the same as successful organizational performance (Air Force Instruction 36-2501, 2006; Wayland, 2002). Entirely different metrics are used to measure the success of individual

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officers’ careers and organizational performance. In the military, as in corporate organizations, careerism is a danger toorganizational performance. For example, Hauser (1984) found thatif leadership career development programs changed individuals to fit the organization instead of developing leaders who were willing to challenge and change the organization, careerism was likely to occur. This effect is exacerbated by a centralized evaluation and promotion system (Bendall, 2009; Evans, 1998).

Because the Air Force’s centralized promotion authority is not familiar with individual officers, it relies on the whole-person concept as presented in the officers’ personnel records (Air Force Instruction 36-2611, 2006; Drucker, 2002). This centralizedpromotion system rewards short assignments that seem to indicate broader experience and fosters the rapid promotion of generalist officers who fit the institutional Air Force model (AFDD 1-1, 2006; Drucker, 2002; Evans, 1998; Gluntz, 1984.; Hauser, 1984; Wayland, 2002). Air Force pilots who are promoted to the general officer rank are sometimes selected to lead organizations other than flying units (Scott et al., 2007). Some of these organizations conduct highly technical operations, and these general officers have little or none of the required domain knowledge (i.e., experience and expertise) (Scott et al., 2007). If this model is applied only to general officers, few problems occur because there are usually sufficient numbers of functional professionals in an organization for the general to rely on for functional expertise. However, if this model is applied throughout the organization (i.e., to company-grade and field-grade officers), there will eventually be no functional experts on which to rely. The question is whether officer jobs exist because the Air Force depends on these individuals to lead their organizations to accomplish their missions, or whether officer jobs exist as developmental positions that provides officers career opportunities and allow them to acquire the correct personnel record entries for future promotions (i.e., “ticket-punching”) (Evans, 1998). The balance between organizational mission accomplishment and individual career development may have

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shifted too far toward careerism at the expense of mission capability.

Research Methodology

All of the Minot-Barksdale and Taiwan post-incident investigations identified the shortcomings of leadership (e.g., alack of nuclear weapons maintenance and logistics management and technical expertise) as major causes of organizational failure. The research questions were derived from the confluence of eventsand personal experiences and were influenced by discussions of the post-incident investigation teams regarding whether an officer in charge of nuclear weapons maintenance and logistics organizations should be technically or functionally competent or whether it was sufficient for such an officer in charge to “just be a good leader” (i.e., to be a generalist) (Bennett, personal communication, January 16, 2008). The most direct method of seeking the answer to these questions was to ask the officers charged with managing these munitions and nuclear weapons organizations for their opinions via a survey.

Survey Instrument

The 2010 research survey included the following three sections: (a) demographic data, duty titles, and education data; (b) assignments and experience; and (c) attitudes and beliefs about organizational performance. In the first section of the survey, demographic information was collected regarding the rank, duty titles, and education level of each participant. The second section addressed the participants’ assignments and experience and included nine categories of assignment and functional experience items. The participants were asked how many months andyears of experience they had in each applicable job category, as well as the number of times they had been in a leadership role during major command inspections. The third section, which

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addressed attitudes and beliefs about organizational leader behaviors, was composed of 16 Likert-type scaled items that were designed to measure the participants’ perceptions of the importance of GLS and FC. All of this same data was requested in the 2013 survey and several additional questions were added. However for study purposes the questions asked in the 2010 surveywere also asked in the 2013 survey and thus facilitates a comparative analyses.

Table 1 presents the leadership skills construct survey that was used to validate the Army leadership competencies criterion. The study by Horey, Harvey, Curtin, Keller-Glaze, and Morath (2007) used a 7-point Likert-type scale and 87 survey items to validate the Army’s eight leadership competencies, asking subordinates to rate their leaders as below, at, or above expectations for each of the competencies. With permission, the author adopted the Horey et al. (2007) study’s five highest (item-total correlation)component leader behavior survey items as part of the general leadership skills (GLS) construct. Three leader behavior items from other current research (Gabarro, 2007; Kaiser, Hogan & Craig, 2008) were included to create the modified survey GLS construct composed of the eight survey items indicated in Table 1. The items were validated using a pilot study and a thorough review by a subject-matter expert panel (Creswell, 2009).

Table 1. Construct, Literature Source, Measurement Scale, and Survey Items 1 Through 16

ConstructLiterature

source Survey items

Leadershipskills

Horey et al. (2007)

1. Motivating others to succeed (1)

Horey et al. (2007)

2. Modeling sound valuesand behaviors (4)

Horey et al. (2007)

3. Encouraging fairness and inclusiveness (7)

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ConstructLiterature

source Survey itemsHorey et al. (2007)

4. Communicating effectively with others; ensuring shared understanding (10)

Horey et al. (2007)

Researcher developed Gabarro (2007)Kaiser et al. (2008)

Researcher developed Gabarro (2007)Kaiser et al (2008)

Researcher developed Gabarro (2007)Kaiser et al. (2008)

5. Building team unity and loyalty skills and processes (6)

6. Working to be a good generalist logistics officer (11)

7. Having leadership skills is important for officers serving on headquarters staffs (13)

8. Being a charismatic MMS/MUNS squadron commander (15)

Functionalcompetence

Researcher developed Kaiseret al. (2008)

9. Demonstrating a thorough knowledge ofthe jobs of subordinate officers

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ConstructLiterature

source Survey items(2)

Researcher developed, Scottet al. (2007)

10. Having a relevant experience base for recognizing when current problems are similar to past problems (8)

Researcher developed Scott et al. (2007)

11. Being sufficientlyknowledgeable to appreciate second- and third-order consequences of decisions (5)

Functionalcompetence

Researcher developed (U.S. Air Force, 1985,p. 5).

12. Demonstrating a thorough knowledge ofhis/her own job (3)

Researcher developed (Scott, et al. 2007)

Researcher developed (U.S. Air Force, 1985,p. 5).

Researcher developed Kaiser, et al. (2008)Gabarro (1987).

13. Being able to articulate what subordinate organizations must dofor the entire organization to succeed (9)

14. Working to master the munitions and missile maintenance officer job (12)

15. Having deep career field knowledge and experience serving on

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ConstructLiterature

source Survey items

Researcher developed Kaiser, et al. (2008)Gabarro (1987)

headquarters staffs (Writing policy & allocating resources)(14)

16. Having the ability as an MMS/MUNS squadron commander toarticulate how each section's work contributes to accomplishing the “whole” mission. (16)

Note: The measurement scale for all survey item questions is a 7-point Likert-type scale. The number in parentheses at the end of each survey item in the survey items column [i.e., (1)…(16)] denotes the number or order of the survey items as they appear onthe research survey. MMS = Munitions Maintenance Squadron and MUNS = Munitions Squadrons.

The survey was administered electronically via a web-based service. The data were collected, downloaded and analyzed. The demographic data are presented in the tables below and in the appendix. This demographic information may appear excessive, but it is critical to understanding the complexity of managing such asmall but critically important career field in which organizational failures can have catastrophic results.

Participant Demographics

A random sample of 120 munitions and missile maintenance officerswas selected from a population of 312 officers (Williams, personal communication, August 4, 2009) and invited to

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participate in the research based on an electronic survey (Chandler, 2011). The respondents were 92 Air Force officers who were stationed at locations worldwide. The following tables show some of the demographic characteristics of the sample and the population of munitions officers studied.

The participants’ current duties included management at various organizational levels, such as the section, flight, squadron, group, and wing levels as indicated in Table 3. The officers’ breadth and depth of experience in specific functional areas are indicated in the appendix (See Appendix).

Table 3. Participants’ Current Duty Positions

Duty position n (%)

Section/Branch, Officer in ChargeFlight commanderOperations officerSquadron commanderMajor command Staff officerMajor command IG inspectorAir Staff Division chiefMaintenance group

commanderWing commander/directorOther

Missing Data

8 (8.7%)17 (18.5%)13 (14.1%)9 (9.8%) 11 (12.0%)1 (1.1%)1 (1.1%)3 (3.3%)

1 (1.1%) 15

(16.3%)

13 (14.1%)

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Total 92 (100.0%)Note. IG = Inspector General. Other = Headquarters Air Force plans, doctrine, strategy and integration, programs and budget (engine room), basic nuclear munitions officer course instructor,munitions prepositioning ships management, Nuclear Surety Inspection inspector, depot-level munitions operations (Air ForceAir Logistics Centers, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Defense Logistics Agency or U.S. Army), chemical munitions technical escort, and explosive ordnance disposal.

The data in Table 4 indicate that the sample of officers surveyedis large and representative of the population of Air Force munitions officers.

Table 4. Comparison of Participants’ and Population Rank Distributions

RanksDistribution –

Samplen (%)

RanksDistribution -Population

n (%)

Second Lieutenant

First Lieutenant

CaptainMajorLieutenant

ColonelColonelBrigadier

GeneralRetired/other

9(9.8%) 9(9.8%) 28

(30.4%) 18

(19.6%) 13

(14.1%) 6

(6.5%) 1 (1.1%)

Second Lieutenant

First Lieutenant

CaptainMajorLieutenant

ColonelColonel

Brigadier General Total

25 (8%)28 (8.9%)104 (33.3%)95 (30.4%)30 (9.7%)28 (9%)2 (.7%)312

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RanksDistribution –

Samplen (%)

RanksDistribution -Population

n (%)

Missing dataTotal

4 (4.3%) 4 (4.5%)

92 (100%)

Population (100%)

Note 1. Officer personnel information from Headquarters Air ForcePersonnel Center database, Randolph AFB, TX. (2009)

Note 2. Company grade officers comprised 50.2% of the population and 50% of the sample surveyed, whereas field grade officers comprised 49.8% of the population and 45.6% percent of the sample surveyed. The surveyed sample is representative of the population.

Results and Findings

Results

The descriptive statistics for the variables of interest, generalleadership skills (GLS) and functional competence (FC), were determined. The initial SPSS analysis of the sample data distribution revealed a significant negative skew for both variables: GLS skew = -2.85; FC, skew = -3.67. Because the data are skewed, the use of planned parametric statistics is not appropriate; hence, non-parametric analyses were used to test thehypotheses. There were random missing data for some of the officers, which led to varying totals for different analyses. Thedetails are presented for each hypothesis.

Hypothesis H1: Officers will perceive that leadership skills are important for successful organizational performance. A single-sample sign (binominal) test was used to evaluate the officers’ perceptions. The results indicated that the officers perceived general leadership skills

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(M = 5.68, SD = 0.90) as important to successful organizational performance. Two officers selected ratings at or below a neutral score of 4.0, whereas 82 officers selected ratings greater than 4.0, p < .001.

Hypothesis H2: Officers will perceive that functional competence is important for successful organizational performance. A single-sample sign (binomial) test was used to evaluate officers’ perceptions. The results indicated that officers perceived functional competence (M = 5.96, SD = 0.90) important to successful organizational performance. Again, two officers selected ratings at or below a neutral score of 4.0, whereas 86 officers selected ratings greater than 4.0, p < .001.

[New Hypothesis???] A Wilcoxon signed-rank test was also conducted to evaluate whether officers perceived GLS or FC to be more important to successful organizational performance. The results indicated that the officers perceived functional competence to be more important than general leadership skills, z= -4.20, p < .001. [Separate analysis that deserves its own hypothesis…or just state that this is exploratory.]

Hypothesis H3: Senior officers (i.e., majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels) perceive generalist leadership skills are the most important factor for successful organizational performance. [REWORD]There will be no difference between senior officers (i.e., majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels) and company-grade officers (i.e., lieutenants and captains) in terms of their perceptions of the importance of general leadership skills to successful organizational performance. A Mann-Whitney U analysis revealed no differences between the perceptions of senior officers (M rank = 35.45) and those company-grade officers (M rank = 43.26) regarding the importance of general leadership skills to successful organizational performance, U = 586.00, z = -1.53, p = .13.

Hypothesis H4: Company-grade officers (i.e., lieutenants and captains) perceive functional competence the single most important factor for successful organizational performance. [REWORD]There will be no difference between senior

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officers (i.e., majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels) and company-grade officers (i.e., lieutenants and captains) regardingtheir perceptions of the importance of functional competence to successful organizational performance. A Mann-Whitney U analysis revealed no differences between the perceptions of senior officers (M rank = 43.50) and those of company-grade officers (Mrank = 39.00) regarding the importance of functional competence to successful organizational performance, U = 720.00, z = -0.86, p = .39 Ditto regarding new Hypotheses wording]

There were three primary findings based on the perception of officers leading and managing munitions organizations. First, general leadership skills are important for officers who are in charge of organizations. Second, functional competence is important and can even be considered to be slightly more important than general leadership skills. Both characteristics are important because neither GLS nor FC alone is sufficient for an officer to effectively lead a complex technical organization operating in a high-risk environment. Third, there was no difference between the perceptions of senior officers and company-grade officers regarding the importance of GLS and FC. The officers who participated in this study believed that they should be functionally competent in the work of the organizationsthey lead and manage (e.g., nuclear weapons maintenance and logistics organizations).

Evaluation of Findings

These findings are relevant for leaders in complex technical organizations in high-risk environments (e.g., nuclear weapons, munitions, and missile maintenance organizations). As a group, the munitions officers indicated that the officer-in-charge of any organization should be functionally competent in the work of that organization. These findings are consistent with those of Avery et al. (2003); Drucker (2002); and Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) regarding the importance of leaders’ previous, relevant functional experience to their ability to effectively lead their organizations. The findings of this study also add another

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organizational context to the literature supporting high-reliability organization (HRO) theory. The importance of individual officer expertise is especially significant in this regard. For officers in a leadership position, “just being a goodleader” is insufficient; followers expect their leaders to be competent in the work of the organization and to contribute to organizational performance (Kouzes & Posner, 2007). Although theyare incremental, these findings fill a gap in the literature and move the generalist-specialist argument toward a better understanding of the relationship between specialist (i.e., expert) domain knowledge and a leader’s credibility in the eyes of his or her organization’s personnel. These findings may improve senior logistics leaders’ understanding of officer development and assignment policy.

After the data were analyzed, it emerged that the officers rated FC as slightly more important than GLS to the success of organizational performance. Additionally, the demographic data suggested that officers commanding munitions squadrons (MUNS) that are responsible for nuclear weapons maintenance and logistics rarely stay in a single leadership-management position for more than two years. In contrast, Gabarro (1987) found that even with relevant functional experience, new managers required at least three years to achieve mastery in their new management positions, which then enabled them to positively influence the performance of their organization.

Participant Comments - Optional Qualitative Open-ended Question

Of the 120 officers who were invited to take part in the survey, 92 completed the survey. Of these 92 officers, 47 responded to the optional open-ended question. This significant response rate indicates the widely felt need to provide feedback regarding the policies in question. Of the 47 officers who responded to the open-ended question, 8 participants indicated that an officer only needed to be “a good leader” and did not need to be functionally competent (i.e., they endorsed the GLS development model). In contrast, 39 participants indicated that GLS alone

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(without FC) was insufficient for an officer to help a technical and complex organization operating in a high-risk environment to achieve successful performance. The following comment is representative of the 39 responses indicating that an officer should be both a good leader and functionally competent:

My maintenance knowledge base is a mile wide but only an inch deep. Although my general experience with leading/supervising maintainers has been gradually built up over time, my technical/weapon system experience has not carried over well from one assignment to the next. After a decade, I find myself just wanting one assignment in which Ican apply knowledge I learned at a previous assignment instead of being the new guy who hasn’t gotten his feet wet.I also find that this makes me less effective as a maintenance officer. Now that I am a major in my first [weapon system] job, I find that the expectations are that Iperform as a Field Grade Officer in a [weapon system] position commensurate with my rank—but my [weapon system] experience/knowledge is roughly equivalent to that of a 1st Lieutenant. My squadron commander has remarked to me on numerous occasions that, despite my performance, my experience set does not benefit the unit. (Survey Question 24, Response 49)

The response above indicates that the officer was concerned that his previous experience was not relevant to his current job. The comments also indicate that the speaker’s squadron commander had directly told him that his experience did not positively influence the unit’s performance. The value of previous and relevant munitions and missile maintenance management experience seems clear to both the officer and his commander.

Eight respondents (out of 47) expressed an opposing view: that the officer in charge only needs to be a “good leader” and need

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not be functionally (i.e., technically) competent. The following comments are representative of this belief:

I believe we are in danger of stove-piping young officers tothe point of making them non-competitive [for promotion] forthe future. As someone who has spent time in aircraft maintenance, acquisition and munitions at the wing, center and major command and Air/JT [Headquarters Air Force staff and the Joint Services Staff] level, I feel breadth is very important. In my younger officers, however, I see a push to increase depth and little opportunity for breadth. This willmake them great Ops O [operations officers], possibly Sq/CCs[squadron commanders], but little beyond that. I believe strongly that we must rely on the technical expertise of ourSNCO [senior noncommissioned officer] corps and continue to diversify our officers. (Survey Question 24, Response 47)

The response cited above argues for generalist leadership development for logistics officers (Devault, 1995; Nowak, 1995). The primary concern in the second response was the promotion of individual officers, whereas the first response focused on an officer’s contribution to organizational performance. This divergence in officer perspectives (i.e., a focus on officer careers versus organizational performance) could be catastrophic;what might the impact be if the focus on individual officer careers were allowed to take precedence over organizational performance in the long term?

Major General Raaberg (2007), a senior investigator in the Air Combat Command commander-directed investigation of the Minot-Barksdale incident, described the munitions squadron’s schedulingoperation as an ineffective, “loose knit confederation of shop chiefs” (p. 15). General Raaberg also described the munitions squadron chain of command as “focused upwards. They predominantlyleft the daily activities in the hands of the chiefs and enlisted” (p. 36). Previous scholars have warned the military services of the dangers of a generalist officer leadership

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development model. In fact, Hauser (1984) suggested that careerism was inherent to that model. Nevertheless, the Air Forcebegan moving toward the generalist model for the maintenance and logistics officer career fields as early as 1986 (Zettler, 1986),even though some senior officers strongly opposed the policy (Curtis, 1987). Several participants in our study suggested that the omission of functional (i.e., technical) competence as a criterion for officer-leaders is intentional and is designed to rationalize assigning officers to command squadrons (e.g., munitions and missile maintenance, even fighter squadrons) even though they lack the functional competence that subordinates expect of their commanders (Evans, 1998). The unofficial policy is perceived as more focused on which assignment is best for an individual officer’s career than on which officer is best qualified for the specific job and the organization’s mission.

During the Taiwan incident, Admiral Donald (2008) declared the lack of senior officer qualifications is a systemic problem; he noted that more than half of the senior Air Force leaders (i.e., colonels and above) involved in the nuclear mission did not have the requisite nuclear weapons experience to lead the organizations they commanded (e.g., munitions and missile maintenance organizations). Since 1995, officers have been encouraged to pursue generalist logistics management positions outside of their core career fields (Nowak, 1995). According to the officers who participated in this research, this career broadening policy has resulted in the systematic erosion of functional competence (e.g., expertise in logistics management within nuclear weapons organizations) in the munitions and missile maintenance officer career fields. Without functional competence, officers and commanders are less capable of recognizing and addressing substandard performance. Thus, they are also less capable of preventing major organizational failures. The munitions squadron was responsible for five of the six major mistakes that caused the Minot-Barksdale nuclear weapons-related incident. The squadron commander had only one year of experience managing nuclear weapons operations; he was a lieutenant in a nuclear-capable wing in 1994, 13 years before

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assuming command of the munitions squadron (Biography, 5th Bomb Wing, 5th Munitions Squadron commander, 2007). However, the squadron commander’s lack of nuclear experience and technical background was not identified or examined in any of the Air Force’s post-incident studies or investigations.

Discussion

The principles, relationships, and generalizations drawn from oursurvey questions are supported by the additional qualitative datafrom the optional open-ended survey question and are consistent with the literature. Gabarro (1987, 2007), Kaiser, Hogan & Craig,(2008), Kotter (1982), and Drucker (2002) have established that it takes considerable time and relevant experience to develop technically competent leaders. Leaders lacking technical competence fail more often than leaders who are technically competent (Gabarro, 2007). Drucker found, “there is no such thingas a good man. Good for what is the question. What is the man good for” (p. 72). Drucker continued to comment on the whole-man concept (which the Air Force officer promotion system is based on) “The whole man” concept hides a profound contempt for man’s specific gift: his ability to put all his resources behind one activity, one field of endeavor” (p. 72). Although we expected tofind senior officers more supportive of the generalist leadershipskills requirement, the data did not support our proposition. Even though the whole-man (i.e., while-person) concept requires further study, one alternative explanation is consistent with Kotter (1982). Kotter found that senior general managers all claimed to be generalists who could manage any organization, but when he studied the details, he found they were all highly specialized within their business, industry, and even within their company, and thus their knowledge and skills were not necessarily portable. Because the senior officers in this study perceived technical competence just as important a leadership characteristic as did the junior or company grade officers, we had to examine potential explanations for this exception to our hypothesis. One possibility, which requires further study, is that because the senior officers were so lacking in practical

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experience, from a functional or technical perspective, they wereno different from company-grade officers and so shared their perspective on the value of technical competence.

NOTE: Add to discussion section. We believe that the terms nuclear experience, nuclear expertise, functional competence and technical competence are used in these reports and throughout theliterature as if they are interchangeable, but there is no supporting evidence that these terms represent the same construct.

NOTE: Add to discussion section. Harrell, Thie, Shirmer, and Brancato (2004) developed the concept of competency-building and competency-using assignments during one of several studies commissioned by the Air Force Senior Leader Management Office. Insubsequent RAND research, Scott, Drezner, Rue, and Reyes (2007) explored the competencies that general officers used to compensate for a lack of knowledge and experience in the organizations that they had been selected to command. Scott et al. (2007) interviewed 27 Air Force general officers. Some were serving in jobs for which they were well-qualified, whereas others were in jobs for which they had little or no background orexperience. Some general officers were serving in assignments as deputies or vice commanders. These jobs were competency developing because the officers were working in understudy roles to learn the roles of their immediate superiors without being responsible for organizational outcomes. In other assignments, the general officers acted as directors or commanders. In these jobs, they used the knowledge and skills that they had acquired in previous competency-developing assignments and were responsible for organizational outcomes (Scott et al., 2007). Harrell et al. (2004) recommended that general officers’ competency-using assignments be twice the duration of their competency-developing assignments in order for the Air Force to take advantage of the time invested in developing these officers’ competencies. However, this concept has not been applied to Air Force company- and field-grade officers.

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NOTE: Add to discussion section. Additionally, some officers were assigned to headquarters staffs and other diverse, career-broadening assignments outside their primary munitions officer career field. Most munitions officer positions require the officer to manage organizations with munitions and missile maintenance missions. However, some staff and inspector general positions also require munitions officers to be subject matter experts. The extensive experience and expertise of munitions officers provide the credibility required to develop and implement Air Force doctrine, policy, and procedures or to inspect unit execution and compliance. The experiences described by the surveyed officers encompassed a wide variety of roles in munitions management. The officers had the most management experience in conventional munitions storage, with 71 officers reporting an average of 3.35 (SD = 2.77) years of experience. Thenext most common area of work experience was nuclear weapons maintenance and storage, with 52 officers reporting 2.85 (SD = 2.37) years of experience. There were 44 officers with 2.89 (SD =2.18) years of experience in armament systems or weapons loading.The high standard deviations relative to the means (e.g., the coefficient of variation) indicate that few officers had any experience and that very few officers had many years of experience (Snedecor & Cochran, 1989).

NOTE: Add to discussion section. The final demographic survey item asked the participants to state the number of nuclear suretyinspections they had been responsible for as the officer-in-charge or commander in managing their organization’s performance outcomes. The results indicated the officers were responsible formanaging organizations (e.g., results or outcomes) during an average of 3.63 (SD = 3.94) inspections. Significantly, only 10 of the 92 officers (n = 68) had any experience managing an organization (e.g., a section, branch, squadron, group or division) during an inspection, and the large number of inspections (10 to 15) experienced by these few officers skewed the data. Even though these data were only descriptive and were not used to test the hypotheses, they provide us with a more informed context in which to view the significant erosion of

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munitions officers’ functional competence (e.g., nuclear expertise), the core issue examined in this study.

Implications

The findings of this research have three implications. First, based on the findings, it seems that leaders (e.g., officers-in-charge and commanders) should be technically competent in the work of the organizations that they lead. According to the surveyed officers, a functionally competent leader is more likelyto develop an effective vision and strategy and to have a better understanding of important technical information that is routinely up-channeled by his or her subordinates. Officers’ comments suggest that functionally competent leaders have greatercredibility with their followers because they possess common technical and professional bonds (e.g., in terms of language, jargon, and organizational culture). The implication is thereforethat functional competence should be restored as a leader selection criterion for complex technical organizations in high-risk environments.

Second, although the investigators who examined the two nuclear weapons-related incidents in 2007-2008 identified the overall erosion of nuclear expertise, the investigators failed to identify the relevant career fields involved, distinguish betweenenlisted and officer career fields, or describe the relative effects on organizational performance that were generated by placing fewer expert officers and enlisted members in specific career fields. The Air Force develops and manages officer and enlisted members’ career fields, but the specific officer career fields involved in the incidents were not identified or examined.Although the munitions and missile maintenance officer career field was a significant factor in the nuclear weapons-related incidents, it was not identified as such, nor was the selection, promotion, and assignment policy for the examined career field.

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Third, the surveyed munitions and missile maintenance officers donot believe the current organizational proposition (i.e., Air Force personnel policy) that officers do not need to know the details of their organization’s work. The officers’ responses to the optional open-ended survey question indicated that they believe senior Air Force logistics leaders have overemphasized career-broadening assignments and undervalued functional competence (e.g., nuclear weapons maintenance and logistics management expertise). The officers stated that they themselves were less effective as officers-in-charge because they lacked thefunctional competence needed to perform their roles in accordancewith the organization’s mission. For example, a typical response to the open-ended question was, “I am always the new guy just getting my feet wet.--- My previous experience never seems relevant from one assignment to the next.” The implication here is that officers feel less effective when they lack functional competence, and their commanders concur. Air Force assignment policy should be revised based on this knowledge.

Practical Implications

Because the officers rated functional competence as slightly moreimportant than general leadership skills, the current Air Force leader selection, development, and assignment policies, which do not consider functional competence as an important criterion, contradict the beliefs of the officers managing the nuclear weapons organizations. If senior logistics officers, especially group commanders, continue to encourage company-grade officers to“get out from behind the fence and get to the flightline to get promoted” (survey response) and if all company-grade officers begin to heed that advice, there will soon be no munitions officers “behind the fence” managing the maintenance, storage, and logistics of nuclear weapons. That situation seems to have

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existed at the time of the nuclear weapons-related incidents as evidenced by Admiral Donald’s (2008) finding of the lack of officer technical expertise as a “systemic problem” (p. 47) that had diminished the safety, security, and reliability of the Air Force’s nuclear weapons. According to the post-incident studies and investigations, all company-grade munitions officers were being rotated in and out of the weapons storage area jobs to minimize their time “behind the fence” at Minot Air Force Base in2007 (Donald, p. 47). The Air Force should revise officer leadership development, selection, and assignment policy to include technical competence as a critical criterion for all officers in technical, complex career fields.

Limitations

The present study was limited to a single officer career field (i.e., that of munitions officers) because of resource constraints, but this single career field played a critical role in the Air Force’s two nuclear weapons-related incidents in 2007 (U.S. Air Force, 2008a;U.S. Air Force, 2008b; U.S. Air Force, 2008c). The remaining officer career fields include 1,800 aircraft maintenance officers as well as 2,500 logistics readiness officers and the associated noncommissioned officers and civilian personnel (Air Force Association, 2010). The resultsof this munitions officer research may not be generalizable to this broader population.

There may have been some response bias in this study, as officerswho felt strongly about this topic might have been more likely torespond to the survey. Officers who were less interested in or thought that they benefited from the current leader selection criteria may have been less likely to participate. However, this response bias was mitigated partially by the random selection of the participants and partially by the acceptable survey response rate of 76%; 92 of 120 officers completed the study (Friedrich etal., 2009).

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Conclusions

First, the participants in this study believe that it is important for munitions officers to be both functionally competent (i.e., technically competent) and good leaders. The participants indicated that being a good leader but not being technically competent is insufficient for an officer to lead a nuclear weapons maintenance or logistics organization successfully. Second, officer assignments should be based on assigning the best qualified officer (e.g., addressing organizational needs first) rather than on what is deemed best for individual officers’ careers. The Air Force would be wise to adopt a competency-developing and competency-using assignment policy for all officers, similar to the assignment policy recommended for general and flag officers by RAND, and to begin the roll-out of this policy with munitions officers. Third, the Air Force should implement high-reliability organizational principles and best practices in its nuclear weapons organizations, keeping in mind that these principles and practices have long been successfully employed in the U.S. Navy’snuclear power and weapons organizations and in organizations in other complex industries (e.g., the nuclear power industry, the chemical and explosives manufacturing industries, and forest firefighting services) for more than 25 years (Roberts, 2003).

Additionally, the participants in this study indicated that officers should be deeply knowledgeable about their organization’s mission and it’s supporting processes and procedures, and this suggestion may be generalizable to other technical career fields. Officers, NCOs, and airmen expect their leaders to know their organization’s mission details well enough to recognize effective and ineffective performance and to lead byexample. These findings may be relevant to business management ingeneral and thus warrant further study.

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Appendix A

Comparison of Company-Grade (n = 46) and Senior Officer (n = 42) Munitions and Missile Maintenance Management Functional Experience

Company-grade

officers

Years Seniorofficers

Years

Previous functional experience

n (%) M (SD) n (%) M (SD)

Conventional munitionsmaintenance and storage

33(71.7)

2.77(1.77)

36(85.7)

5.11(3.11)

Armament systems/weapons loading

10(21.7)

1.74(3.09)

32(76.2)

3.13(1.76)

Conventional munitionsaccountable systems officer (MASO)

18(39.1)

1.19(0.62)

11(26.2)

1.34(0.76)

Nuclear weapons maintenance and storage

20(43.5)

1.98(1.10)

30(71.4)

3.31(2.75)

USAFE w/nuclear weapons maintenance and storage (WS3) system

7 (15.2) 2.14(0.96)

26(61.9)

3.28(1.45)

Nuclear weapons MASO 15(32.6)

1.47(0.76)

18(42.9)

1.56(1.07)

300

Company-grade

officers

Years Seniorofficers

Years

Missile ICBM maintenance

14(30.4)

3.18(1.93)

12(28.6)

5.53(5.43)

Cruise missile (ACM/ALCM) maintenance

5 (10.9) 1.62(0.61)

18(42.9)

1.94(0.91)

Aircraft maintenance officer in fighterunit

4 (8.7) 1.29(0.63)

15(35.7)

2.72(1.83)

Aircraft maintenance officer in bomber unit

5 (10.9) 1.80(1.32)

20(47.6)

2.26(1.73)

Nuclear weapons or explosives safety officer (unit and/or headquarters levels)

6 (13.0) 1.36(0.70)

27(64.3)

4.14(4.00)

Munitions and missile maintenance staff officer, JS/air staff, or MAJCOM staff

2 (4.3) 2.93(1.04)

6 (14.3) 1.19(0.62)

Total number (n) of officers

46 46

Note. MASO = munitions accountable systems officer. USAFE = U. S. Air Forces Europe. ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. ACM/ALCM = Advanced Cruise Missile/Air Launched Cruise Missile. JS = Joint Staff; MAJCOM = Major Command. These percentages reflect the percentage of officers endorsing each category within

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each class of officer. The categories are not mutually exclusive;hence, officers may have selected multiple categories, and thus, percentages may exceed 100%.

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