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CANBERRA PAPERS ONSTRATEGY & DEFENCE NO. 145

Published in Australia at the Australian National University,2002.@ Individual authors.This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purPoses of privatesfudy, research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act, no partmay be reproduced by any process without written Permission. Inquiries shouldbe made to the publisher.

National Library of AustraliaCataloguins-in-Publications entry

Masters of tenor: Indonesia's militarv & violence in East Timor in 1999.

rsBN07315 5419l.

l. Violence - Indonesia - Timor Timur. 2. Atrocities -Indonesia - Timor Timur. 3. Indonesia - Militia. I.McDonald, Hamish, 1948- . IL Ball, Desmond,1947- . lll.Australian National University. Strategic and Defence Studies

Centre. (Series : Canberra papers on strategy and defence ; 145).

363.3209s986

Series editor, Kitty EggerkingCover design by Emily BrissendenPrinted by Panther Publishing and PrintingPublished and dishibuted by:

Strategic and Defence Studies CentreAustralian National UniversityACT 0200 AustraliaTel:51 (0)2 6125992IFax:61 (0)252480,816Email: sdsc@anu.edu.au

Mlsrrns or Tnnnon:INnoNEsla's Mn-rreny & Vror.Erucr

w Easr Tnaon w 1999

Hamish McDonaldDesmondBallJames Dunn

GerryvanKlinkenDavid Bourchier

DouglasKammenRichard Tanter

PublishedbyStrategic and Defence Studies Centre

Australian National UniversityCanberra

20a2

Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence are a series of mono-graph publications that arise out of the work of the Strategic andDefence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. Previ-ous Canberra Papers have covered topics such as the relationship ofthe superpowers, arms control at both the superpower and South-east Asian regional level, regional strategic relationships and majoraspects of Australian defence policy. For a list of Canberra Papers,please refer to the last pages of this volume.

Unless otherwise stated, publications of the Centre are presentedwithout endorsement as contributions to the public record and de-bate. Authors are responsible for their own analysis and conclusions.

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre

Publications Program: Editorial Board

Professor Paul DibbProfessor Desmond Ball

Professor David HomerMr Alan DupontDr Coral Bell

Professor Anthony MilnerProfessor Virginia HookerProfessor Ross Babbage

Ms Kitty Eggerking

CONTENTS

Contributors

1. IntroductionHamish McDonald

2. Masters of Terror: Indonesia's FindingsHamish McDonald

3. Full Report of the Investigative Commission into HumanRights Violations in East Timor

vll

1

15KPP-HAM

4. Crimes Against Humanity in East Timor,January to October 1999: Their Nature and Causes 60lames Dunn

5. The Key Suspects: An Introduction gg

Gerry aan Klinken, Daaid Bourchier €t Douglas Kammen

5. The Key Suspects 113Gerry oan Klinken I Daaid Bourchier

7. Practical Justice in Doe a. Lumintang: The Successful Useof Civil Remedies against 'an Enemy of All Mankind, 224Richard Tanter

8. Silent Witness: Awtralian Intelligence and East Timor 239Desmond BaII

Notes 262

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Publications 317

CONTRIBUTORS

Desmond Ball is a professor in the Strategic and Defence StudiesCentre at the Australian National University, Canberra. professorBall is the author or editor of over 40 books or monographs ondefence and security in the Asia-Pacific region. professor Ball is aFellow of the Academy of Social Sciences of Australia (FASSA), amember of the Council of the Intemational Institute for Strategic Stud-ies (llSS), and co-chair of the Steering Comrnittee of the Council forSecurity Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).

David Bourchier lectures in Asian Studies and Indonesian at theUniversity of Western Australia. He has written on aspects of Indo-nesian politics, law, labour and the military. He co-edited Dunocracyin lndonesin: 1.950s and 1990s (Monash University, 1984) and lndone-sian Politics: A Reader (Routledge, 2002).

James Dunn served as Defence analyst, diplomat and foreign affairsadviser to the Federal Parliament for more than 30 years. He wasAustralian Consul in Timor in the early 1960s; was the expert on afact-finding mission sent there in 1974; led an ACFOA aid mission tothe territory in late 1975 when Indonesia's military intervention be-gan; was a UN Observer for both the 1999 plebiscite and the 2001elections. He has had a long involvement in intemational humanrights, including as foundation President of the Human Rights Coun-cil of Australia, and co-president of the Second World Congress onHuman Rights (Dakar). In October 2000 he was commissioned by theUN to write a report on the events of '1,999. He is author of Tinnr: APeople Betrayed (ABC Books, Sydney 1996), and co-author of severalother works.

Douglas Kammen received his PhD in political science from CornellUniversity in 7987. He has taught at the University of Canterbury inChristchurch, New Zealand, and in 2000-2001 was a FulbrightSenior Scholar in Makassar, Indonesia.

Gerry van Klinken edits hside lndonesia, a quarterly magazine pub-lished in Melbourne, Australia. He has taught and researched at

universities in Indonesia (nine years) and Malaysia (three years), as

well as at Australia's Griffith University, Sydney University, and theAustralian National University. Gerry has recently written about thepost-New Order transition in Indonesia, including papers on chang-ing visions of history, on religion and crisis, and on the communalconflicts in Maluku and Central Kalimantan. After a first career inphysics, his 1996 PhD dissertation was on late colonial Indonesianhistory.

Hamish McDonald is the Intemational Editor of the Sydney MorningHerald.

Richard Tanter is Professor of International Relations in the fthoolof Environment and Society at Kyoto Seika University. He has writ-ten on Indonesian and fapanese politics, and on a range of issuesconnected to militarisation and intelligence, as well as on environ-mental politics and social theory. He recently co-edited and contrib-uted to Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, lndonesin and the WorldCommunity, (Rowman & Littlefield, and Pluto Press, 2001).

1

Introduction

- The terror campaign by pro-Indonesian armed groups before, during andafter East Timor's independence referendum in 1999 wal a bhtant challenge tothe 'world community'in general, and to the authority of the united Nations inparticular.

It was also a challenge to analysts and investigators seeking to pursue theissue of culpability.

Many of the acts of murder, political intimidation, destruction and massdeportation took place before the eyes of the world: the media, UN officials,diplomats, observers from govemments and NGos. By now, some of the worstincidents have been well documented, and some suspects identified.

Yet the ultimate responsibility remains hidden, as it was clearly intended tobe from the beginning. Behind the local braggarts and bullies installed as os-tensible leaders of the pro-integration militias was a shadow organisation ofIndonesian covert operatives.

Their chain of command operated in parallel to those of the regular army,police and civil authorities - but clearly had precedence. The result was ahigh degree of impunity. The higher levels of this shadow organisation remainbehind the smokescreen, the ultimate instigators not clearly identified.

More than two years after the event, the impetus to penetrate this smokeseems to be dissipating, through a combination of procrastination and proce-dural confusion on the part of the Indonesian government, a desire for i""or,-ciliation by the leadership of a fragile East Timor and a creeping return todiplomatic expediency by influential third governments.

The systematic violation of human rights was investigated by the Interna-tional Commission of Inquiry on East Timor, a panel of five eminent jurists,over september-December 1999, following a resolution by the UN Commissionon Human Rights in Geneva on 27 september 1999.Its report, presented at theuN on 31 January 2000, found the widespread militia violations would nothave been possible without the active involvement of the Indonesian army, andthe knowledge and approval of its senior commanders.

However, further action was deferred by general agreement to allow Indo-nesia the chance to undertake prosecutions, as promised, within its domesticjurisdiction. At the same time as the UNCHR report, a special investigationteam of Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission (Komnas-HAM)had completed its parallel inquiry, conducted partly in cooperation withthe UNCHR panel, and presented its report to the Indonesian Attorney-General's Office.

2 Masters of Teror

Nearly two years later, the possibility remains that Indonesia will try ascore of individuals for five or six of the best-documented massacres and mur-ders in 1999 - though after some preparatory activity by the newly-installedgovemrnent of President Megawati Sukarnoputri in August 2001, the Prom-ised ad hoc tribunal had not yet been constituted by late November.

If trials proceed, the precedents for exemplary punishment are not good.Separate prosecutions of militia personnel in regular courts - against two men

for involvement in the mob murder of three foreign UN officials in the WestTimor border town of Atambua on 31 August 7999, and against the notoriousEurico Guterres for illegal arrns possession - resulted in disproportionatelylight jail sentences in the first case, and a token period of house detention in thecase of Guterres.

Even assuming that the proposed prosecutions are conducted in a comPe-

tent and whole-hearted fashion, resulting in convictions and aPProPriate pun-ishments, this will be far from satisfactory.

It would let blame lie with a number of individuals, who were clearly in-volved in the execution of the terror campaign, but not its conception and plan-ning. The top instigators would remain in impunity. Nor would it address the

institutional responsibility, especially of the Indonesian military forces (Tentara

Nasional Indonesia, TNI) and National Police, whose subsequent activities inAceh and Papua hardly suggest the East Timor experience was chastening.

Moreover, broken down into a number of individual incidents, as horrificand large-scale as some were, the prosecutions proposed so far by Indonesiado not add up to the full dimensions of the systematic crime against humanityperpetrated in East Timor.

This crime was more than a series of massacres and murders, in whichperhaps 2,000 people died, and of incidents of torture, rape and assault. Itinvolved the forced deportation and flight of three quarters of East Timor's800,000 people by September 1999, and the organised destruction of the territo-

ry's infrastructure and housing stock. It involved an attack on the territory'sreligious institutions. It was a frontal attack on democracy and freedom, anattempt to dismantle an emerging nation.

But for an unusual level of agreement among the Security Council's Perma-nent Five and the Asia-Pacific countries, the readiness of Australia and othernations to intervene, the vulnerability of Indonesia itself, and ultimately a com-mitrnent to decency by Indonesia's then President B.f.Habibie, it nearly suc-ceeded. The masters of terror would have seen off the world community andplunged East Timor into many more years of darkness and brutality.

To let this recede into the past without a concerted attempt to attribute atleast the blame where it is due would itself be a crime of omission.

lntroiluctian

This book intends to assemble what has come so far into the public domainabout the terror campaign of 1998-99, as well as background matlrial on impli-cated persons, and thereby provide a platform for further specific investigationby scholars and human rights bodies.

Although greeted with considerable suspicion as a potential whitewash bya semi-official body, the report by Indonesia's commission of Investigationinto Human Rights Violations in East Timor (known as the KTTp-HAM) pre-sented to then Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman at the end of January i000is a serious and valuable addition to our knowledge, based on persistent andeven courageous inquiry within the lirnits of its resources, terms of referenceand time-frame (reproduced as Chapter 3 in this volume). As well as the chill-ing detail of atrocities, particularly the 5 september 1999 massacre of clergyand refugees in the suai church compound, the report convincingly rebuts tf,!notion put by many Indonesian leaders that the militias .ept"settt"d a sponta-neous upsurge among the East Timorese. It provides the first coherent insightinto the motives of the terror campaign, which shifted over three distinct phaiesof 1999. From the initial objective following president Habibie's January 27announcement of deterring the holding of a referendum, the focus of terrorshifted after the May 5 Agreement to one of intimidation to produce a pro-Indonesia vote by fear, and finally, after the brave furn-out and overwhelmingvote for independence became known, to one of discrediting the result by ipurported voluntary exodus to nearby Indonesian regions. The KTTp-HAMreport also provides some tantalising glimpses into the shadow chain of com-mand, suggesting that a study of informal links between serving and pastmembers of the TM's special Forces Command, or Kopassus, would be a pro-ductive line of inquiry.

The KTTP-HAM's findings and sununary were announced early in Febru-ary 2000, precipitating a crisis in the then govemment of president Abdurahmanand the reluctant resignation of General wiranto as co-ordinating securityminister as a result of his accusation for moral responsibility for the East Timoiterror while defence minister and rNI commander in 1999. However the fulltext was not widely available - indeed it was tightly held in the Attorney-General's office - until translated and published almost in full on the sydneyMorning Herald's website (www.smh.com.au) in March 2001. This translationwas made, it might be noted, by sydney-based Chinese and Indonesian lan-guage specialist Richard johnson, who as Third secretarv in the AustralianEmbassy in Jakarta in 1975 was sent to Kupang, west Timor, in the first ofmany inquiries into the killing of five Australian-based newsmen at Baliboduring lndonesia's covert invasion of East Timor that year. Along with the tex!we include the Herald's account and analysis of the KTTP-AAM's report,published under the headline 'Masters of rerror', which we have taken astitle of this book.

Masters of Terror

Around the same time, the extensive report commissioned from the veteran

East Timor analyst James Dunn by the Serious Crimes Unit of the UN Transi-

tional Administration in East Timor came into the public domain on the same

website (and appears in this volume as Chapter 4). A former diplomaf linguistand intelligence analyst, Dunn's association with East Timor goes back to thePortuguese era with his posting to Dili as Australia's consul in the early 1960s'

From his position as researcher in the Australian Parliamentary Library, and

membership of fact-finding missions, he followed the transition from Portu-

guese rule to Indonesian annexation from 1974 onwatds, chronicled in hisbook Easf Timor A Nation Betrayed. ln 1999, Dunn returned to East Tirnor andpersonally observed the referendum campaign and the immediate aftermathbefore joining the forced evacuation of all but a few foreign observers. In late2000 and early 2001, Dunn spent several months in East Timor compiling thisnew reporf which, as much as with its depth of fact, is enhanced by Dunn's

deep knowledge of both East Timorese and Indonesians and symPathy withboth peoples.

From these two documents, as well as from the mass of contemporary mediacoverage rn7999, the role of several senior TM officers emerges as deservingcloser scrutiny, along with the possible play of unofficial loyalties forged byunit membership, TNI cliques and factions, and field experience in East Timor.

In their sections of this book, David Bourchier, Gerry van Klinken and Richard

Tanter have profiled the implicated TNI personnel, drawing on extensive data

bases which indeed throw up strong suggestions about the identity of the 'mas-ters of terror' and their chain of command. (See Chapters 5 and 5.)

Soon after the launch of the Australian-led International Force in East Timor(lnterfet) in late September 1999, the Australian media carried a succession ofleaked intelligence documents which fed into a recriminatory debate about the

level of knowledge and forewaming Canberra might have had about the terrorcampaign. The suicide of an Australian intelligence liaison officer in Washing-ton emerged as a tragic outcome of an intemal bureaucratic struggle to controlthe flow of information relating to this question. Desmond Ball's article 'SilentWitness' (Chapter 8 here) assembled this leaked intelligence material and otherevidence to point to evidence that might be available from secret sources/ Par-ticularly monitoring of Indonesian military communications and mobile tel-ephone traffic, if the political will is there to override security concems.

Ironically, the pursuit of the instigators of East Timor's mass terror mayfinally lapse as a result of the declared 'war on terror' declared by the UnitedStates and its allies after the attacks in New York and Washington'

Interest in following up the investigations - either through an ad hoc in-ternational tribunal on the Balkans or Rwanda model, or an enhancedIndonesian prosecution - was already flagging before the 11 Septemberattacks. The horrified governments which had backed the eventual UN-

lntroduction

approved intervention in East Timor may now be reluctant to put furtherpressure on a large 'moderate'Muslim nation whose efforts are now sought inthe crackdown on the al-Qaeda extremists.

This would be a pity, not only for the reasons given above, but for the reasonthat the same or like-minded TNI have not hesitated to foster violent Islamicgroups to help their political strategies or to employ the kind of state terror thatopens populations to the influence of radical movements.

If 'moral jeopardy'is to be rammed home to profligate regimes and businesselites through enforced reform and liquidations, how much more important isit for a tainted military to be forced to look at its own record and cut away itsmorally bankrupt elements?

Hamish McDonald

November 2001.

2

Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Findingsl

HamishMcDonnld

On the morning of Saturday, 4 September, 1999, it was announced that East

Timor's people had voted to separate from Indonesia' From that point on, FirstLieutenant Sugito of the Indonesian Army seemed to have no doubts about hisduties as local military commander of the town of Suai. Nor did his colleaguesin Suai's military, police and civilian government.

At 10am, the United Nations revealed the 78.5 per cent vote for independ-ence. Just four hours later, armed police and militias of the pro-IndonesianLaksaur group attacked the hamlet of Debos, shooting wildly and burninghouses.

One high school student was shot dead and his body taken away in a policetruck. Villagers fled into the grounds of Nossa Senhora de Fatima Church inthe centre of Suai, joining hundreds of others camped there. The following day,the Laksaur were joined by members of another militia group called Mahidi,and they began threatening the refugees inside the church compound.

That Sunday night, Lieutenant Sugito (his only name) took part as soldiers

and Laksaur militia roved around Suai, setting fire to all its buildings.

At 2.30 on the afternoon of Monday, 6 September, arrny and police, togetherwith the two militia groups, directly attacked the civilians inside the churchgrounds. The attack was supervised on the spot by Sugito, and by retired armycolonel Herman Sedyono, the administrative head (bupati) of the Covalina re-

gion, which includes Suai. Both were wearing jungle-green uniforms and car-

rying rifles. Witnesses heard Sugito and Sedyono say that all priests, men andwomen would be killed.

A Laksaur militiaman called Igidio Manek shot one of Suai's Catholic priests,Father Hilario Madeira, and trod on his body. Another Laksaur militiaman,named Americo, stabbed and slashed Father Francisco Soares, while unidenti-fied militiamen killed Father Tarcisius Dewanto.

As the killing went on, regular policemen, members of the police mobilebrigade and army soldiers stood outside the fence of the church compound,shooting refugees trying to flee.

After the shooting, a number of survivors, including many women andchildren, were taken away by truck to the military district headquarters. AtSpm, three army trucks came to carry at least 50 bodies from the compound to

the west of Suai.

The next moming, Sugito was seen directing three soldiers and a Laksaurteam who were burying corpses on the seashore at Weluli, across the border in

Indonesia's Findings

west Timor. An exhumation of the graves more than two months later foundthe remains of 27 men, women and children as young as five. Among themwere the bodies of the three priests.

The massacre at suai while the Indonesian commission says the total deathtoll was 'at least 50', other estimates say more than 200 was probably the worstsingle incident of mass murder during the horrific month that followed theresult of East Timor's UN supervised ballot.

Until the Australian-led intervention force Interfet established its conholover East Timor in october that year, about 500,000 of the 800,000 populationwere forced to flee their homes either to the hills of the interior, where hungerand disease waited, or across the border in a mass deportation drawn up incontingency plans by Indonesian authorities.

suai was not exceptional. As a hitherto secret report compiled by a specialcommission for Indonesian Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman makes clear,it followed a pattern of violence set by militias who were organised, armed andclosely directed by Indonesian military, police and civil authorities from thebeginning of 1999.

'The planning and discussion about the formation of armed civilian groups... took place in East Timor, in Bali [where the Indonesian regional militarycommand then covering East Timor has its headquarters] and in Jakarta, andas well involved officers with authority in the chain of command, both at re-gional and central level.'

This involvement is acknowledged in statements by officers as high as formerArmed Forces Commander General Wiranto to the Commission to InvestigateViolations of Human Rights, or KPP-HAM as it is known by its Indonesianinitials, which completed its inquiries at the end of January last year.

Moreover, the systematic support for the militias by the military and police,and the approving comments sent to Jakarta by regional army commanderMajor-General Adam Damiri about two of their most vicious attacks, make itinconceivable that the militia strategy was the unauthorised initiative of offi-cials on the ground.

The KPP-HAM report traces the origins of the militia groups to the parti-sans formed by the Indonesian Army when it invaded East Timor in 1975,some of which became quasi-military units with ranks and pay scales match-ing those of regular soldiers. After the then president B.f. Habibie announcedon 27 lanuary, 1999 that East Timor could choose between two options au-tonomy within Indonesia or independence the report said 'these old militiagroups were revived and supported in order to achieve victory for autonomy'.

In addition, Damiri reported to the then security co-ordinating minister inHabibie's Cabinet about a military-style force of young people called Gada

Masters of Terror

Paksi (Young Guard Upholding Integration) which was 'recruited, trainedand funded'by the Indonesian Army, specifically Kopassus (the Special Forces).

Eurico Guterres and several other militia leaders were prominent in GadaPaksi, whose members were later recruited into the 'Integration Fighting Force'

headed by former partisan and Bobonaro region head Joao Tavares.

The former provincial governor, Abilio Soares, and various regional heads

told the lndonesian investigators how these militias and other military auxilia-ries were formed into pro-integration groups directed by local administrators,police chiefs and army commanders.

Guterres was in charge of 2,657 pro-integration supporters in the capitalDili, including 1,521. members of his Aitarak militia.

The commission said Wiranto acknowledged the militias in his contin-gency plan drawn up in August 1999, in which he lists about 1,100 peoplewith 546 weapons, and a further 11,950 members of "resistance organisations'such as Aitarak, Laksaur, and so on.

Earlier, in a confidential letter on 15 fune, Wiranto said that 'one of thedevelopment efforts with regard to the pro-integration SrouPs that also needs

to gain support from all relevant departments/agencies is to watch that theyremain united and do not split, and that they continue to stress efforts fordialogue and discussion, and avoid physical activities aimed at intimidationwhich will simply be very counterproductive in the struggle for various aspira-tions'. Wiranto goes on to commend the coalition of two pro-integration politi-cal fronts into 'one fighting forum'.

The commission comments that this 'development'was definitely directedtowards a win for the autonomy choice. The same kind of thing was indicatedby Wiranto in his testimony to the commission, that'in a moral sense therewere indeed efforts to make autonomy win so that East Timor would still be one

with Indonesia ... This can be very much seen in the security apparatus andgovernment apparatus in the region.'

The same drive for an autonomy vote involved army and civil elements inbacking pro-autonomy groups in the staging of mass roll-calls and oath-takingceremonies at Balibo, Viqueque and Zumalai between February and April atwhich military and civilian officials were present.

The biggest rally involved militia from all over East Timor in the grounds ofthe govemor's office on 17 April. Immediately afterwards, the massed militia,led by Aitarak, attacked the house of independence leader Manuel Carrascalao,killi.g his son and 11 other people.

This and an earlier attack won approval in a secret report by Damiri to the Co-ordinating S€cudty Minister, Lieutenant4eneral Feisal Tanjung, on 11fuly , \999.

Inilonesin's Findings

The 6 April attack on refugees in the Liquica church by Besi Merah putihand other militias, with police and army units standing by, left at least 30 dead,some of whom were dumped secretly in a nearby lake. Damiri said this had'resulted in the anti-integration youth being unable to act'.

Likewise, after the 17 April attack on the Carrascalao house, Damiri saidthe 'situation among society all over East Timor was to love the Red and white[the colours of the Indonesian flag]. East Timorese society only then becameaware that the integration group clearly had many supporters.,

The report gives an outline of operational links between the militias and theIndonesian army. According to sworn testimony by former pro-Indonesianpartisan Thomas Goncalves, who went overseas early in 1999 rather than ac-cede to pressure to lead militias, the operational commander was Major-Gen-eral Zacky Anwar Makarim, a career special Forces officer and East Timorveteran who had a shadowy liaison role in Dili throughout this period.

Some of the militias were billeted at local military bases. The militias oftenused military vehicles for their patrols, if they were not pakolling together withmilitary personnel. After capturing and torturing suspected supporters of theindependence council, the CNRT, the militias would hand them over to mili-tary posts. The special Forces group/ known variously as sGI, Tribuana orNanggala which was seconded to the East Timor Command as well as regulararmy units and the two locally raised battalions'often helped the CNRT indetecting and capturing CNRT people'.

Goncalves is quoted as saying that he received 300 rifles directly from Lieu-tenant-Colonel Yayat sudrajat, the SGI commander. In the Lautem region, 40semi-automatic sKS rifles were kept in the army base for use by the Alfa militia,who had their room in the barracks and came and went as they pleased withthe weapons. The military at suai supplied the Laksaur with weapons,and Eurico Guterres told the commission his Aitarak militia had M-15semi-automatics.

'According to him the weapons had been left with the police but on the eveof the announcement of the ballot resul! they took them out from the storageplace,' the commission said. 'Eurico's testimony was strengthened by a state-ment by Major-General zacky Anwar Makarim to the KPP-HAM mentioningthe fact that weapons from the militia were stored in various military barracksand that they could be taken back when needed.'

In the north-west coastal region of Maubara in particular, the three militiagroups called Besi Merah Putih, Mahidi and Red Dragon always operated withIndonesian army groups. Most of the Besi Merah Putih barracks were at localmilitary bases, and the village arrny representatives under the military's territo-rial command structure, known as babinsa, were the organisers of this militia.

10 Mosters of Tenor

'Acts carried out carried out by the Barisan Merah Putih and the militarysupporting them generally followed the pattern of capture, abductiory tortureand murder,' the commission says. 'While on a daily basis they threatened,robbed, terrorised and intimidated the population so that it would ioin theBMP and choose autonomy.'

The commission goes on to observe the impunity enjoyed by the militias.'Proof of the support from military and civil authorities is that militia membersthat had openly carried out murder, torture, abduction and capture were nevercaught by the security apparatus,' it reports. 'Even if they were arrested, beforevery long, according to the East Timor Regional Police Chief, Brigadier-GeneralTimbul Silaen, the detention would be suspended. This kind of thing contin-ued from January up to 7 September.'

The commission found that the military were also involved in the militiaviolence aimed at forcing the population to flee. The bupati of Suai, HermanSedyono, and the local army commander, Lieutenant Sugito, had told the com-mission they had prepared transport to shift the population several days be-fore the poll results were announced.

The violence in East Timor right from Habibie's 27 January announcementto the ballot result was not the result of civil war, the Indonesian investigatorsconcluded, but the 'result of a systematic course of violent action carried out bythe militia with the support of and, it must be strongly suspected, organised bythe armed forces and police apparatus'.

The commission then notes drily: 'Indonesian army, police and civil offi-cials when asked for clarification at the National Human Rights Commissiongenerally denied their linkage with the militia.' In separate sections of the re-port, the commission complains about the destruction of evidence such as thehiding of bodies, and the obstructive role played by legal advisers engaged bysuspect officers.

But what happened was far more than 'gross violations of human rights',the commission says. 'First, the facts were established of definite policies is-sued both by those in charge of security in East Timor and the local governmentwhich made possible the continuation of the criminal acts,' it says. 'Secondly,in the time frame investigated by the KPP-HAM, a criminal act on a wide,massive, intensive and collective scale can be seen.' But while it found 'crimesagainst humanity' had been established under both Indonesian law and inter-national conventions, the commission said that the offences could not be called"war crimes', and did not amount to attempted genocide.

In delving into the purpose of the crimes, the commission sees three distinctphases in which the military role changed subtly. Before the 5 May agreementin New York setting the terms of the referendum, the violence had been moreblatant, aimed at giving the impression of civil war conditions emerging in

Indonesia's Findings

East Timor and thereby encouraging a deferral of the vote. After the agreement,the military and police had to step back to give 'an image of neutrility, andviolence was escalated by militias.

The final phase involved the large-scale deportations after the ballot, inwhich about 250,000 people were taken to west Timor and other nearlv Indo-nesian territories.

'The enforced evacuation was carried out under various kinds of modusoperandi which affirm the existence of a systematic plan,' it notes. 'Documentsobtained provided indications that the enforced evacuations were plannedlong before in anticipation of defeat in the ballot. All of this was supp-rted bythe statements given by refugees in [Kupang and Atambua].,

The intention was to convince world opinion that the results of the ballotwere in doubt, and that the East Timorese preferred the security of being in theneighbouring Indonesian province. 'At this stage, the objective to keep ih" tu.-ritory and deny the East Timor people's choice was carried out thrbugh thepractice of violence and a high stage of preparedness for pacification throughthe avenue of forced evacuation,' the report says.

'The violence that continued indicated the unbroken connection betweenelements of the Indonesian Army, Indonesian police and the militias in carry-ing out conditioning, choice of actions, fixing of times and targets from theevacuation project.' The last stage has been in guarding the refugees in westTimor, and enforcing terror through murder, disappearances, mistreatmentand sexual violence.

Who then is responsible?

According to the Indonesian Commission, there were three classes of perpe-trators: those militia, military and police personnel directly on the scenej thosewho controlled operations; and those who were responsible for national secu-rity policy, 'including but not limited to the high military officials who wereactively and passively involved in the crimes'.

The report lists 32 people who should be investigated as suspects for crimesagainst humanity. These included the two major-generals, Zacky AnwarMakarim and Adam Damiri, and 15 other military personnel, such as Lieuten-ant Sugito, identified in various atrocities; several civilian officials includingformer governor Abilio soares, and 10 militia members including Eurico Guterreiand Joao Tavares.

The Indonesian investigators concluded that the whole range of violationswas'fully known to and realised by the Armed Forces Comminder, Generalwiranto, as being the one responsible for national security' and the 'wholerun' of civilian and military officials working East Timor at that time.

11

t2 Masters of Terror

'All of the crimes against humanity, direct or indirect, took place because ofthe failure of the Armed Forces Commander to guarantee the security of theimplementation of the announcement of the two options by the govemment'the KPP-HAM said.

'The police strucfure which at that time was under the command of theDefence Minister [a position also held by Wiranto] weakened the capacity ofthe police apparatus in canying out the task of security based upon the NewYork agreement. For this, General Wiranto as armed forces commander was theone who must bear responsibility.'

Laying the blame

East Timor, lanunry-SEtember 1999

Crime: Through the organisation, training, arrning, financing and directionof armed militia groups, the commission of 'a criminal act on a wide, massive,intensive and collective scale' involving mass killings, torture and maltreat-ment, disappearances, sexual violence and enforced population movement.

Suspects: Major4enerals Adam Damiri and Zacky Anwar Makarim; Briga-dier-Generals Tono Suratman and Timbul Silaen; Colonel Nur Muis. Ultimateresponsibility through failure to carry out the Govemment's pledge of securityfor the ballot Armed Forces Commander and Defence Minister General Wiranto.

Suai,5 September L999

Crime: Laksaur and Mahidi militia massacre of at least 50 people includingthree priests sheltering inside church compound. Local army and civil officialsdirect operation. Soldiers and police shoot refugees trying to run away. Bodiestaken away by army and buried secretly.

Suspects: regional administrator Colonel Herman Sedyono, LieutenantSugito, Laksaur members Olivio Moruk, Martinus, Manek.

Liquica,6 Apfl 1999

Crime: Besi Merah Putih militia, police in civilian clothes and soldiers at-tack church compound where people are sheltering from militia attacks. Oneshot and tear gas grenade open attack, completed with knives. At least 30

killed. Police Mobile Brigade platoon stands by. Soldiers take away bodies inarmy trucks for secret disposal.

Suspects: Liquica regional administrator Leoneto Martins, army sergeantsYacobus, Tome Maria Goncalves. Besi Merah Putih leader Manuel de Sousa.

Cailnco, Bobonaro, 1.2-13 Apfl 1.999

Crime: Halilintar militia and local rnilitary abduct and torture six people,including primary schoolteachers suspected of being independence supporters.

lndonesia's Findings

After several abductors are killed later that day in a Falintil ambush, the six areexecuted the next day in front of moumers.

suspects: Bobonaro military district commander Lieutenant-ColonelBurhanuddin Siagian, and Halilintar militia chief Joao Tavares.

Dili,17 Apfl 1999

_ _ Crime: After rally in front of the provincial governor's office, militia destroy

offices of Dili's only newspaper, attack home of independence figure ManuelCarrascalao where more than 140 people are sheltering. Carrascalao's l7-year-old son Manuelito among about 15 killed.

Suspect Aitarak militia leader Eurico Guterres.

Maliana, 8 September 1999

crime: Militia from Dadurus Merah Putih and other groups attack dozensof refugees sheltering in the town's police headquarters. A^y and police Mo-bile Brigade troops do nothing. At least 70 killed by bullet and knife. Bodiestaken away in trucks later that night.

Suspects: Lieutenant-Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian and |oao Tavares.

Los Palos,25 September 1999

Crime: A Tim Alfa rnilitia group formed and trained by Indonesian specialForces ambush a vehicle taking a church delegation to Baucau. Nine killed,including two nuns and Indonesian journalist Agus Mulyawan.

Suspects: Alfa leader Joni Marquez, members foao da Costa, Manuel daCosta, Amilio da Costa.

Investigators dug deep

The report on human rights violations in East Timor during the last monthsof Jakarta's rule has been sitting like a pent-up volcano in the office safe of theAttomey-General, Marzuki Darusman, for the past 15 months.

- It caused a major eruption when it first looked like being aired in Februarylast year. Even a limited whiff of its contents was enough to blow the then Co-ordinating Minister for Defence and security, General wiranto, out of office.

Keeping the full report under lock and key may have been part of the pro-tracted bargaining over nearly two weeks that resulted in wiranto acceptingPresident Abdurrahman Wahid's call for his resignation.

Knowledge of its damning conclusion, sheeting home ultimate responsibil-ity to wiranto, will play into the current political crisis in fakarta, in which'status quo' military elements including the former defence chief are trying toreplace Wahid with Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri.

13

't4 Masters of Tenor

The rnembers of the special investigation comrnission include some of Indo-nesia's finest human rights lawyers, who spent years in heroic but often futilechallenges by the privately funded Legal Aid Institute to former presidentSoeharto's authoritarian New Order.

With Albert Hasibuan as head, the commission included lawyers AsmaraNabahan, Koesparmono Irsan (a retired police general), Todong Mulya Lubis,H.S. Dillon, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, Munir, and Zoemrotin.

Given 27 research, documentation and secretarial staff, the commissionvisited East and West Timor as well as interviewing witnesses in Indonesiancities. If anyone thought the inquiry would be token, that view was shakenwhen the commission found and exhumed bodies of the Suai massacre thathad been buried secretly in West Timor.

Revelation of its full scope will put immediate pressure on Wahid's Gov-ernment to widen the jurisdiction of the special tribunal it has just foreshad-owed, to include crimes committed before the 30 August 1999, ballot as well as

afterwards.

But the report also contains a broader challenge by Indonesia's civil societyto militarism. As well as prosecutions for the 1999 violence, it calls for investi-gation of Timor crimes going back to 1975, and the complete withdrawal of theIndonesian Armed Forces from their 'territorial' involvement in domestic ad-ministration.

3

Full Report of the Investigative Commission into Human RightsViolations in East Timor (Kpp-HAM)l

l.Introduction

Foreword

This report is produced in fulfilment of the mandate assigned by the Indo-nesian National Human Rights Comrnission (Komnas HAM) on 22 september1999 based on consideration of the deteriorating human rights situation inEast Timor following the announcement of the ballot result. The mandate wasgiven to KPP-HAM in the context of reports of increasingly serious and wide-spread acts of violence and gross human rights abuse in East Timor. The man-date is in accord with clause 89 article 3 of Law No.39 on Basic Human Rightsas well as on the provisions in clause 10 article 1 and clause 11 of GovemmentRegulation (Perpu) No.1 of 1999 regarding a Human Rights Court.

In this report KPP-HAM concludes that various gross violations of humanrights occurred in East Timor between January and october 1999. Therefore allthose who committed or were responsible for the commission of acts of violenceand gross human rights violations in East Timor must be held individuallyresponsible for those occurrences. In order to convince both the national andintemational communi$r and for the sake of justice, Kpp-HAM supports effortsto bring those primarily responsible as well as the perpetrators of violence andgross hurnan rights violations to justice in accordance with the prevailing law.

KPP-HAM through the National Commission on Human Rights (KomnasHAM) requests the Attorney General (Kejaksaan Agung) to investigate andthence to prosecute in a Human Rights Court those suspected of responsibilityfor the gross violations of human rights in East Timor, which occurred after theannouncement of a ballot option in January 1999 and up until the results ofthat ballot were accepted by Indonesia's supreme legislative body (MpR) inOctober 1999.

Background

For about 400 years East Timor was a Portuguese colony. East Timor has along history of resisting colonialism. The appearance of Indonesia in East Timorby mobilising massive military force on 7 December 1975 gave rise to a newpolitical problem. The official integration of East Timor with the Republic ofIndonesia the following year did not thoroughly resolve the desire for self-determination for which the people of East Timor had fought for so long. on thecontrary the integration that was implemented with the support of repressivemeans was a policy that ran counter to the fundamental rights of the people ofEast Timor to determine their own future.

76 Masters of Tenm

The historical experience of East Timor under integration shows two majortrends: first, an accelerated physical development in every areai second, con-tinued human rights abuses such as violations of the right to liberty, the right tomovement and residence, the right to life, as well as violations of the right topersonal integrity including violence towards women. This pattem of abusecan be traced to its root, which is the effort to suppress the right to self-determination.

The presence of an armed Indonesian force in East Timor invited strongcriticism in the United Nations Security Council, which asked for the immedi-ate withdrawal of Indonesia's armed forces from the territory of East Timor.Meanwhile the integration of East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia wasnever recognised by most of the international community. This rejection by theinternational community of the legality of Indonesia's sovereignty over East

Timor was the reason why the East Timor problem always remained on vari-ous United Nations agendas.

The fall of the Suharto govemment and the beginning of the subsequent eraof reformation gave birth to an openness and to the hope that human rightswould now be respected and a democratic life would take shape. The reforma-tion era presented the opportunity to review the govemment policy of the past

which had betrayed human rights, including the problem of East Timor'

In the spirit of reformation, on 27 January 1999, the Habibie govemmentannounced a new policy to resolve the East Timor issue. Briefly, the policyconsisted of a proposed resolution through two options. The first option was togrant special autonomy to the people of East Timor. If the people of East Timorchose this optiory East Timor would remain a part of the territory of the Indone-sian Republic. The second option was to reject special autonomy, leading East

Timor no longer to be a part of the territory or a province of the Republic ofIndonesia.

In further developments, the offer of a resolution through a choice betweentwo options to reject or accept autonomy was laid down in an agreement be-tween the govemments of Indonesia and Portugal under the auspices of the

LN Secretary General on 5 May 7999 in New York. In the agreement the Gov-ernment of Indonesia was responsible for peace and security in East Timor, toensure that the ballot would be conducted fairly and safely, free from intimida-tion, violence or intervention from various sides.

As a result of the 5 May agreemenf the people of East Timor conducted aballot on 30 August 1999. The result was that 78.5 percent of the participants(334,580 voted) rejected the special autonomy offered by the Indonesian gov-ernment, which meant that East Timor would leave the Republic of Indonesia'Meanwhile about 21 percent (94388 voters) chose special autonomy, whereas1.8 percent of votes (7,985 voters) were declared invalid.

The KPP-HAM Report

Soon after the result of the ballot was announced on 4 september 1999, adsof violence broke out and spread, fire destroyed everything,lhe.e was looting,and a massive evacuation of the population.

Mandate

In response to this situation, the National Commission on Human Rights(Komnas HAM) on 8 september 1999 issued a statement about the huiranrights situation in East Timor after the ballot. The first point in this statementread:

that developments in East Timor at that time tumed to anarchy and terroristacts carried out widely both by individuals as well as groups witnessed directlyand permitted by elements of the security forces.

Reports indicating human rights abuse led the whole of human society,national as well as international, to become very concerned about the huminrights sifuation in East Timor. They were also very concemed about the sifua-tion of refugees in East Nusa Tenggara [ie. West Timor].

The uN Human Rights Commission in Geneva on 23-27 september 1999conducted a special session about the situation in East Timor. This was onlvthe fourth special session since the commission was formed 50 years ago. Thisdemonstrated the depth of concern among commission *e-Le.s about thescale and intensity of human rights violations in East Timor after the ballot.The decision to hold a special session was reached after consultation betweenmembers of the commission upon the request of Porfugal on 9 september 7999.voting among the members resulted in 28 agreeing to hold a special sessiory 15against, and 2 abstaining. Indonesia objected to the procedure, which it feltwas inconsistent with the ECOSOC charter.

This special session issued Resolution 7999/S-4/'1,, in which the UN Hu-man Rights Commission called on the Indonesian Govemment to:

' Guarantee in cooperation with Komnas-HAM that those responsible forviolent acts or systematic violation of human rights be brought to trial;

' Guarantee that human rights and international humanitarian law befully respected for everyone under the jurisdiction or control of the Indo-nesian Governmenf

' cuarantee the voluntary refurn home of all refugees and displaced peo-ple including those forcibly removed to places of refuge in East NusaTenggara (NTT) province;

' Guarantee the immediate access for humanitarian agencies to all displacedpeople, whether in East Timor and in NTI and other Lrdonesian territories,and to promise the security and free movement of inbmational officials;

' Cooperate fully with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights viaa special office in Jakarta.

17

18 Mnsters of Tenor

In additioru the resolution asked the UN Secretary4eneral to form an inter-national investigation mission including experts from Asia to work with the

Komnas-HAM and a Special Rapporteur to compile a systematic record ofviolations in East Timor since the announcement of the two options on 27

January 1999. This commission was then to report to the UN Secretary General

who would present it for further action to the Security Council, to the General

Assembly, and to the Human Rights Commission's 56th session'

In response, the Indonesian permanent representative in Geneva notifiedthe Human Rights Commission on 23 September that the previous evening theIndonesian Government had formed the Investigative Commission into Hu-man Rights Violations in East Timor (Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran HakAsasi Manusia di Timor Timur, abbreviated to KPP-HAM). The special session

then welcomed the establishment on 22 September 1999 of KPP-HAM by the

lndonesian Human Rights Comrnission, and expressed the hope that it wouldachieve concrete results in close cooperation with intemational bodies.

On 23 September 1999 the Indonesian National Human Rights Commis-sion published chairperson's decision no.770/TUA/LX/99 concerning the es-

tablishment of an investigative commission. The letter was later update by deci-

sion no. 797 /TUA/X/W on 22 October 1999. The decision was based on consid-

eration of the deteriorating human rights situation in East Timor after the ballot,and recalled Law no.39 of 199 on Human Rights and Govemment Regulationno.1 of 1999 on a Human Rights Court, as well as the decision of the plenarysession of the National Human Rights Commission on 23 September 1999'

Scope

The KPP-HAM's terms of references were:. to assemble information and search for evidence in relation to violations

of human rights that occurred in East Timor from January 1999 until the

MPR issued its decree [in October 1999], which recognised the ballotresult, with special attention to gross violations of human rights such as

genocide, massacre, torture, enforced displacement, crimes againstwoman and children, and scorched earth politics.

' to investigate the level of involvement by the apparatus of state and/ orother bodies, national and intemational, in these crimes;

. to formulate the results as basis for prosecutions in the Human RightsCowt.

The commission began work on 23 September 7999.Its original deadline ofend Decembet 1999 was extended until 31 fanuary 2000 by means of KomnasHAM decision no. 857 /TUA/XII/99 dated 29 December 7999. The extensionbecame necessary because of unforeseen developments and because of thenumber of cross-examinations of TNI members and civilians'

The KPP-HAM Report 19

Authority

The KPP-HAM was authorised under Law no. g9/ 7999 about Human$ght", clause 89 article 3, and by Governrnent Regulation no.1/ 1999 about aFluman Rights Court, clauses 10 and 11, to:

' undertake investigations and interrogations based on the suspicion ofhuman rights violations in East Timor;

. seek information from victims;

' summon and interrogate witnesses and those suspected of involvementin violations;

. assemble evidence;

' inspect-such places as required, including buildings, with the agree-ment of the head of the Human Rights Court;

' inspect and request any necessary documents from official and otheragencies, with the agreement of the head of the Courf

o to give protection to witnesses and victims of human rights abuse;

' to prepare and analyse facts that are discovered for the purpose of pros-ecution and publication.

Purpose ofreport

In accordance with the scope of its task, the report of its findings as well asthe data and results and evaluations it collected about human righls violationsare handed over to the National Commission on Human Rights.'That commis-sion (Komnas HAM) then hands them over the Attomey General for furtherinvestigation and then to be processed at the Human nifnts Court.

Organisation

The membership of the KPP-HAM consisted of Komnas-HAM membersand leaders in the field of human rights. The nine members were:

Marzuki Darusman, SH (chairperson)Dr Todong Mulya Lubis, SH, LLM (deputy chairperson)Asmara Nababan, SH (secretary)Dr Albert Flasibuan, SH (member)

Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, SH (member)

Dr Zoemrotin K.S. (member)Dr Ir. H.S.Dillon (member)

MajGen (Pol, retired) Dr Koesparmono Irsan, SH, MM, MBA (member)Munir, SH (member)

Following the appointment of Marzuki Darusman as Attomey-General, thechair of the KPP-HAM was transferred to Dr. Albert Hasibuan on 30 october7999, by means of Komnas HAM decision no. 804/ A/TUA/XI/99 dated 1November 1999.

20 Masters of Tenor

To expedite its work, the KPP-HAM was assisted by a research assistant

support team whose task was to provide technical help for field investigationas well as data processing, as follows:

. Assistant Team (12 people)

Dr. P. M. Laksono (coordinator)

Helmy Fauzi

Sasanti Arnisani

MajGen (Pol, retired) S. A. Supardi

Robertus RobertAmiruddinElfansuriLefidus Malau

Aida Milasari

S. Lery Mboeik

Leonard SimandjuntakYos Dasi Djawa

' Information and Documentation Team (8 people)

Harry Wibowo (coordinator)

Bambang T. D. (database Progranuning and information processing)

Muhammad Ahnaf (database programming)Farida Sondakh (data processing)

Liza Hadiz (data processing)

Ari S. (data processing)

Tyas Ponco (transcript checking)

Eka Sapta Rakhmani (librarian). Secretariat (7 people)

Sriyana (head)

Hanggoro Hadinoto (treasurer)

Leila M.L. Carceres

Suryo WidodoMugiyonoPonimanKustoyo

KPP-HAM was also assisted by the following resource Persons:

Dr. Budi Sampuma, SH, Spf.

Antonius Sujata, SH

Fikri Djufri

The KPP-HAM Report

- T\" rgyu"th point in the Komnas HAM chairman's decision [establishingthe KPP-HAMI no. 770/TUA/rx/99 stated that Kpp-HAM should cooperatEwith the protocol agreed by the Commission of Inquiry into East Timor (CIET)established by the UN secretary General. In point nine Kpp-HAM undertook toestablish procedures and mechanisms in accordance with the prevailing lawand international standards.

Besides the general principles of investigation in the area of gross viola-tions of human rights such as occurred in East Timor, this investigation alsofollowed the basic principles and instruments of international law as com-piled in the rules of procedure and evidence in the case of crimes against hu-manity, genocide, and the possibility of gross violations of human rights estab-lished in international humanitarian law (the 1949 Geneva conventon).

The KPP-HAM invited an expert in information and documentation namedManuel Guzman from the High Commissariat for Human Rights in Geneva totrain the Assistants Team for two weeks to equip them to work in accordancewith the standard code of practice.

Actiaities

In order to fulfil the high standards of neuhality, accuracy and flexibility setdown in the intemationally accepted code of ptactice, the icpp-rreM did notrestrict its investigations only to one group but directed its investigations at allthose involved in human rights violation in East Timor. Furtherrnore, bearingin mind the need for accuracy as well as the scale of human rights abuse in EastTimor, the KPP-HAM focused on five 'special' cases: those of the oili Diocese,Bishop Belo's House, Liquica, Maliana and suai. However, the principle offlexibility meant that this focus did not preclude other issues or othu. cases ofhuman rights abuse.

The process was begun by collecting mass media accounts - both print andelectronic - about human rights abuse, as well as reports from varioul organi-sations and cornplaints from individuals. This inforrnation was then seleltedand coded using the HURIDOC program (Human Rights Information andDocumentation system, Intemational), based on events. This information wasthen analysed and elaborated by means of further evidence, testimonies, exhuma-tion of mass graves and interviews and interrogations at the Komnas HAM office.

The commission carried out nine field missions, including three to EastTimor and one to exhume graves at Alas Village, Kobalima srrt-dist ict, BeluRegency, in East Nusa Tenggara [west Timor] on 25 November 1999. For theexhumation KPP-HAM worked together with the forensic medicine section atthe University of Indonesia medical faculty, with the cipto MangunkusumoHospital, with the East Nusa Tenggara Attorney Generil's Depaitment, theEast Nusa Tenggara Police and the Belu police. on every visit Kpp-HAM col-lected new evidence and conducted interviews, being sure the witnesses were

27

Masters of Terror

protected, for example by sending them back to East Timor [ie. out of the militia-dominated West Timorl. KPP-HAM interviewed 123 individuals ['witnesses']in Dili, Suai, Liquica, Maliana, Maubara, Kupang, Atambua and fakarta. The

transcripb of these interviews were Processed in |akarta.

In keeping with Resoluttonl9f9/S-4l1 of the UN Human Rights Commis-sion, the International Investigative Commission (CIET) was asked to worktogether with KPP-HAM to investigate human rights abuse in East Timor. KPP-HAM had several meetings with CIET. The first took place in Darwin on 24

November 199, the next two in lakarta on 6 and 8 December 1999. Informationwas exchanged but no agreement was reached for a protocol over evidence'

A KPP-HAM field secretariat was set up in Kupang (West Timor), withthree assistants. The secretariat:

' Did secretarial work and made preparatory communication with localdecision makers.

. Facilitated communication among fakarta, Kupang and areas where refu-gees were concentrated in East Nusa Tenggara.

' Prepared witnesses, including a witness protection Program involvingwhere possible their evacuation back to East Timor with their families.About 70 witnesses and their families were thus evacuated back to Suai,

Dili, Los Palos, Viqueque and Baucau.

. Prepared supporting facilities, including the exhumation at South AlasVillage and the subsequent return of remains to East Timor. This in-volved extensive coordination with the police, attorney general, religiousbodies, and locals living around the exhumation site'

' Wrote brief situation reports, or recolrunendations for further work.

' Developed contacts with the local community

' Helped trace secondary documentation including clippings and otherreports.

The KPP-HAM during its investigations, encountered various obstacles,especially:

. the time limit of three months, extended by one month, was still tooshort, given the presence of militias spreading fear among witnesses,

and given limited access to East Timor since it was no longer an Indone-sian territory;

. the antipathy towards lndonesian personnel and instifutions among East

Timor's populatiory and disbelief in the impartiality of the KPP-HAM;. although the UN administration in East Timor (UNTAET) provided co-

operation and facilities to the KPP-HAM, it was not able to gain access toevidence in the hands of UNTAET and the international interventionforce, InterfeU

The KPP-HAM Report

' although the KPP-HAM met three times with the uN commission ofinquiry CIET, the UN commission was unwilling to draft protocols toallow each side to use evidence possessed by the two bodies;

' the slowness of the government in allocating and disbursing the Kpp-HAM's operational funds comprised a serious obstacle to ttre carryingout of its duties.

2. Links between the civil and military government apparatuses and thearmed civilian groups

There were significant changes in East Timor after the Indonesian Govem-ment's two-option scenario was introduced. The chain of violence before theoptions reflected the repression by the Indonesian govemment apparafus ofthe aspirations of the people of East Timor, but everything that happened afterthe announcement of the options took place in line with the requirement forvictory of the autonomy option.

Legally, and especially after the New York Agreement in May 1999, thespecial nafure of the East Timor case made intemational bodies pay more openattention to human rights violations and the duty of the Indonesian govern-ment to watch over security and order.

- sociologically, East Timor post-options combines several variables: politi-

cal and security policies, the development of armed groups or militias *ith theincrease in violence, and reactions from pro-independence segments of society.All of these variables were present in one time frame: they began from theannouncement of the options and continued until after the ballot.

violence has been a daily experience for the people of East Timor, and itheightened after the Indonesian military entered the territory in197s. one formof violence was arming of civilian groups, including wanra (popular resist-ance). some of them were later organised into the TNI through aprogram ofmilitarisation or milsas as soldiers, whereby they had rank and weie plid justas regular soldiers. Milsas - which senior military officials in Jakarta bften re-ferred to as regional sons of the TNI - functioned only in East Timor to assistTNI East Timor operations. Partisans from elite circles were made administra-tive officials. Examples were Joao Tavares Bupati Bobonaro who was the leaderof the Halilintar militia and Emundo da silva Bupati Lautem who led the Alfaat Los Palos. Apart from this there are also found the team names saka,/sera atBaucau and Makikit at Viqueque.2

The violence committed by these pararnilitary groups working together withIl8y]ar TNI troops led to widespread human rights concerns. For eiample theHalilintar militia and rNI produced a violent incident at Alas, Manufihi, inOctober 1998, where arrests, torture, killing, kidnapping and burning and de-struction led many to flee to the Alas church.3 The emergence of so-called 'pro-integration militias' were formed after international pressure grew over

23

24 Masters of Tenor

human rights violations committed by TNI, and because demands for a refer-endum grew increasingly strong.a

Besides this, militia units were supported, which according to UdayanaMilitary Region Commander Major-General Adam R. Damiri in his report tothe Coordinating Minister for f Political and Security were 'Pro-integrationgroups driven by young people to establish patriotic organisations's Accord-ing to various reports, these young people were members of Gada Paksi (YoungGuard Establishing Integration), which was recruited, trained and funded bythe TNI, especially Kopassus, ln 1994-7995. Eurico Gueterres, the leader of theAitarak militia, and the leaders of the BMP militia in Liquica had been leadersin the Gada Paksi.5 These militia groups were later recruited into the Integra-tion Fighting Force with its Commander foao Tavares and deputy EuricoGueterres and head of staff Herminio da Costa da Silva.

These pro-integration militia Broups, according to a statement by the Re-

gents lbupati, also translated as district headsl and Governor of East Timor toKPP-HAM were called Pam-Swakarsa [Volunteer Security Forces], and wereformed in each village under the direction of the village chiefs with the purposeof achieving autonomy. In a Statement by the Regent of Dili, which was issuedin May '1,999,7 Eurico Gueterres, Commandant of Aitarak, was mentioned as

Coordinator of the Organisation Field of Pam-Swakarsa Dili, which numbered2,551 people. Some 1,521 people among them were members of the Aitarakmilitia. In this Aitarak 78 people were members of KAMRA. In the PamswakarsaDli there were also regular members of the Indonesian armed forces (Abri), 25

non-commissioned officers (babinsa) and 25 policemen (binpolda). The Gover-nor and the East Timor military commander (Danrem) were advisors, guidancewas given by the Dili govemment council (Muspida). It was chaired by the DiliMayor, who had the Dili military chief of staff (Kasdim) and the Dili deputypolice chief (Wakapolres) as his deputies. East Timor military commanderBrig-Gen Tono Suratman told KPP-HAM that the militias were the responsibil-ity of the provincial goverrunent, that they were coordinated (pembinaan) bythe provincial police (Polda), while the provincial military (Korem) gave suP-port.

Further in the same document all the expenses of the militia were bome bythe Provincial Government Budgef , taken out of the routine regional develop-ment allocation as well as the Social Safety Net.

The existence of pro-integration militia was also recognised by TNI GeneralWiranto in his Plan to Combat Contingency:

The armed force is about 1,L00 people with 545 weapons of various kindg includ-ing homemade weapons; they are joined in pro-integration organisations. Themass of militant supporters is 11,950 people joined in resistance organisationslike Besi Merah Putih, Aitarak, Mahidi, Laksaur Merah Putih, Guntur Kailak,Halilintar Junior, Pancasila Team, Mahadomi, Ablai and Red Dragon.e

The KPP-HAM Report

According to a statement by Eurico Guterres to the Investigative commis-sion, all the military organisations are joined into the Force of Integration Fight-ers with its political wing the Front of the People of East Timor (BRTT) andlheForum for Peace, Democracy and Justice (FPDK). Regarding these two pro-inte-gration political wings - BRTT and FPDK - TM General Wiranto in his letter to thecoordinating Minister for Politics and security on 15 |une 1999 wrote:

one of the development efforts with regard to the pro-integration groups thatalso needs to gain support from all of the Releaant Department/Agencieris to watchthat they remain united and do not split, continue to stress efforts for dialogueand discussion and avoid physical activities aimed at intimidation that willsimply be very counter-productive in the struggle for respective aspirations.In this connection, two Pro-Lrtegration factions joined in the FpDK and theBRTT have been successfully united in one fighting forum, the Joint pro-Au-tonomy of East Timor (FBPorr) with collective leadership from those rwofactions.ro

- Th" implication is definitely a victory for the autonomy option. The samekind of thing was said by TNI General wiranto in his statement to the lnvesti-gative Commission, which said that

...in a moral sense there are indeed efforts to make Autonomy win so that EastTimor will still be one with Indonesia and at the same time strengthen the pre-existing Determination of the MPR. Apart from that, if autonomy wo.r, therisk is slighter. This can very much be seen in the security and govemmentapparafus in the region.

The effort to make autonomy win which involved rNI elements and civilofficials-pushed pro-autonomy civil groups to mobilise the masses in 13 regen-cies. subsequently the militias held large rallies and blood-oath loyalty ier-emonies simultaneously in various places, for example at Balibo on 19 Febru-ary, and later a similar public meeting was held on 10 April 1999 at viquequeand continued at Zumalai, Covalima on 11 April 1999. Tirere was a large pio-integration public meeting in the grounds of the govemor's office in piti on rzapnl 1999 Every military alert meeting was attended by thousands of peoplefrom various militia and regions. some present were reported to be canyingfirearms and sharp weapons. The public meeting at Dili was attended by mifltia units from all 13 regencies. In each public meeting of armed milit6, East

JiTg. military and civil officials were present. After thebili meeting, the massesled by Aitarak attacked and bumed the house of Manuel Carrasialao in Diliand killed 12 people, among them the son of Manuel Carrascalao.

The Military Area Commander, TNI Major General Adam Damiri, in hisreport to the Coordinating Minister for Politics and security, stated that theattack on the Liquica Church that caused loss of life on the an-ti-integration side

lad styrnied the anti-integration youth. Meanwhile on the incideniTNl MajorGeneral Adam Damiri stated that after the attack the social reactio.r *ur pui.i-otism towards lndonesia. It was only then that East Timor society became awarethat the integration group clearly had many supporters.rl

Masters of Tenor

Mass mobilisation was directed at breaking the domination of the Conselho

Nationalida de Resistencia da Timorense (CNRT) group and at the same timesupporting the domination of the pro-integration Broup in society. In this mass

support to bolster integratiory the military apparatus was involved at various

levels. The mass mobilisation at the same time was a reaction by the civil and

military officials in East Timor to the rise of pro-referendum political supportpowered by CNRT previously, especially from October to December 1998.12

On the ties between the pro-integration militia and the military, the state-

ment of TNI General Wiranto reads: 'at present there are only the forces ofpopular resistance that are assisting in each District Military Command' Theyhave long assisted the District Military Command; they were organised. They

were given official incentives from the govemment, and were also armed, thoughwith old weapons and not with modern weapons.'13

The ties between high-ranking TNI officers and the militia were revealed byThomas Goncalves, former Regent of Ermera. In a statement written under oath

he stated that he had directly heard of support from high-ranking TNI officersand had obtained confirmation that'the one who was directly responsible inmilitia field operations was General Zacky Anwar'.ra

The majority of the core leadership and personnel of the militia were mem-

bers of Kamra, wanra [two kinds of civil guard], milsas, Gada Paksi and hnnsip

{another kind of civil guardl and members of the District Military Command'

From long before they had been trained by the military to use weapons invarious TM operations. And in fact some of the barracks of these militia were atMakodim or Koramil. Further, to conduct their patrols the militia often usedmilitary facilities such as vehicles, or they patrolled together.rs After capturingand torturing people they suspected as CNRT supporters, they would givethem over to Kodim or Koramil, and, according to the statements of wibresses,

members of the Komando/Nanggala/sGl/Tribuana and/or members of the

TNI and Kodim or Koramil together with members of Battalion 745 and/ or 7Moften helped the militia detect and capture CNRT people. The SGI in the officialKorem structure was the Satgas Tribuana, which originated from Kopasus,

which in turn was seconded to the East Timor command (Korem).15

The militia's connection with the military can also be seen from the weaP-

ons used. Besides the homemade weapons and the weapons said to be left byPortugal, it is apparent that the general types of weaPon they used were theSKS, M15, Mauser, G-3, grenades and pistols. According to a statement byThomas Gonzalves (former regent of Ermera), he received 300 long-barrelledweapons directly from the hands of the commandant of Satgas Tribuana, Lieu-tenant Colonel Yayat Sudrajat. Intelligence staff of the district command atLautem Serda Gabriel de Jesus several days before the pre-ballot registration

his (Kodim) headquarters had received a drop of '10 SKS weaPons from Korem.

The weapons were later put away and used by the Alfa militia. At Makodim,

The KPP-HAM Report

the Alfa Team also had their own rooms and members of the Alfa militia oftencame and went carrying st(S type weapons. supporting the militia with weap-ons from the Kodim of suai was also mentioned by the local head of the sociilwelfare department(Kakanwil Depsos suai), Jorge Manuel de Jesus, who wasactive in the BRTT. The weapons that were given to Laksaur by Dandim suaiAgus Tarman were a Mauser and a pistol. Joni Marques revealed to the lnves-tigative Commission that the Team Alfa mlitia, which he led, also used SKStype weapons. While Eurico Gueterres revealed to the Investigative Committeethat he and his force did possess M16 weapons. According to him the weaponshad been left with the police but on the eve of the announcement of the reiultsof the ballot they took them back from where they were stored. The testimony ofEurico is strengthened by a statement by TNI Major Generur zacky AnwarMakarim to the Investigative commission mentioning the fact that weaponsfrom the militia were stored in various military barricks and they could betaken back when needed.

The connection of the militia with the military can be seen from operationsand patrols that they carried out together. BMR Mahiti and the Red Diagon forexample at the Regency of Maubara, Liquica, in various measures were ilwaystogether with several rNI elements. The TNI elements that were involved withBMP were BTT 134 [sic -143], and the Koramil posts in various subdistricts.Most prominent was the Koramil 03/Maubara apparatus. In fact most of theBMP barracks were at the Makorimils. Apart from that also involved in theBMP were members of Kodim 1638/Liquica. The BMp movers in the villageswere the non-commissioned officers (babinsa). Acts carried out by the BMp andthe military supporting them generally followed the pattern of capture, abduc-tion, torture and murder. while on a daily basis they threatened, robbed, terror-ised and intimidated the population so that it might join with BMp and chooseautonomy. usually they would capture residents that they suspected as sup-porters of the CNRT and detain them at the Makoramils, among which wisMakoramil O3/Maubara. The most extraordinary BMp act was the slaughter ofresrdents in the complex of the Liquica Church on 5 and 6 April 1999. Accordingto the statement of witnesses who survived the slaughter in the Churctr, the BMpmilitia before attacking first met in the moming at the Kodim Barracks field thatwas across the road from the Church. The other militias fell into the same mobili-sation pattems as the BMP. so also the pattems of action they carried out and thevictims they aimed at were the same, that is the supporters of the CNRT. Thismeans that from the evidence in the field it was found that the presence of themilitia groups was directly supported by the military apparatui and the localregional Sovernment. Proof of the support from military and civil authorities isthat militia members openly carrying out murder, torfure, abduction and cap-ture were newer caught by the security apparatus. Even if they were caught,before very long, according to the Head of the Regional police East Timor,Police Colonel rimbul silaen, the detention of those who were caught waspostponed. This kind of thing continued from January up to 7 september 1999.

27

Masters of Tenor

The Investigative Commission also received a statement noting that some

time before the results of the ballot were announced, at Maliana, Dili, Los Palos,

Liquica, Suai, Oekusi (Ambeno) acts of destruction and torching by the militiatook place, with the assistance of the TNI and the Indonesian Police. Especiallyin Dili, witresses state that some security cadres on 4 September, just before theannouncement of the results of the ballof carried out indiscriminate shootingas well as burning.

Apart from that, the Indonesian military, the militia and the bureaucraticapparatus were also involved together in the process of violence towards thecivil population of East Timor. The case of the slaughter at Suai Church andLiquica proved that the military apparatus together with the militia were in-volved acts of violence that forced the population to leave their homes' The jointinvolvement of the militia and TNI personnel was exposed even more clearly in

a report by East Timor police intelligence chief (Kaditserse Polda Timor Timur)Major (Pol) Carlo B Tewu after investigating the Liquica Church attack']7 The

report said: '... The witness saw the attack was launched by the Besi MerahPutih group together with several Kodim members whom he knew named Isak,Tome and Jacob who were wearing civilian clothes.' At Suai in fact the RegentHerman [Sediono]and the Danrmil of Suai, Lt Sugito, in their statement to the

Commission/ revealed that they had prepared means of transportation for the

removal of the population, several days before the results of the ballot wereannounced.

On the basis of the chain of events above, it is evident that first there isfound a strong connection and linkage between the TNI, Indonesian Policeand the civil bureau$acy; second, the violence that occurred in East Timorbeginning from just after the announcement that a ballot would be held upto the post-ballot announcement was not caused by a civil war but was the

result of a systematic course of violent action carried out by the Militiawith the support of and, it may be strongly assumed, organised by the TNIand Indonesian Police apparatuses.

TNI, Indonesian Police and civil officials when asked for statements atthe National Commission for Human Rights in general denied their link-age with the militia.

The KPP-HAM

Firearms Leader(s)

Report 29

No. Militia Area Size

Alfa Team Lautem 300 Armed joni Marques

Saka,/ Sera Baucau 970 250 Kopassus Sgtloanico da Costa

59-75 Fighters

Junior/ MakikitViqueque 200 200 Martinho Femandes &

tafaek Saburai

Ablai Manufahi 400 70 Nazario Corterel [sic {ortereal]AHI Alieu

Mahidi Ainaro 2,000 500 Cancio de CarvalhoLaksaur Covalima 500 200 Olivio Mendoca MorukAitarak DiIi 7,521 120 Eurico Guterres

Sakunar Ambeno

10 BMP Liquica 4,000 armed Manuel de Sousa

11 Halilintar Bobonaro armed |oao Tavares1,2 Iati Merah Putih Lospalos armed

13 Darah Integrasi Ermera armed

(from wrious sources)

3. The pattern of violation of basic human rights: crimes against humanityGross violations of human rights are fundamentally the responsibility of

the state, as is made clear in various international instruments such as-theIntemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention againstTorture and other cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment. But justice alsodemands that these gross violations carry an individual responsibility.rs

certain policies issued by those in charge of security in East Timor as wellas by local government officials made it possible for these crimes to occur.Carrying out state policy can never be an excuse for given discriminative pro-tection only to one person 9l one group within society.le Therefore widespread,massive/ intensive and collective2o attacks against civilians not only indicatean inability of the security apparatus to protect the populatiory but represent acorrscious and planned attempt to permit attacks, murder and scoiching totake place.

on the basis of the principles of humanitarian law, the crimes that occurredbetween the time the ballot was announced and the moment that East Timorwas formally handed over to the UN are so systematic, planned, collective,massive and widespread as to constitute gross violations of the Geneva Con-vention,2l as well as of national law22. Crimes against humanity demand anaccounting by the state or an accounting by individuals, and the official statusof an individual provides no special immunity.ts

30 Masters of Terror

The facts, documents, information and testimonies collected by the KPP-HAM demonstrate that all the actions taken by the military apparatus and thevarious armed Broups against the civilian population in the time frame of fanu-ary to October 1999 can be classified as cruel, inhuman and degrading acts,

including the following gross violations: the right to life (01), the right to per-sonal integrity (02), the right to liberty (03), the right to movement and to resi-dence (05), and the right to own/ retain property (13).

Frequenry of human rights violations (Jan-Dec 1999)

Mass killings

There have been found a fair number of statements and proofs for variousacts of violence and murder efforts towards a number of people (for politicaland other discriminatory reasons), although not all the victims died. In gen-eral, killings took place in a cruel and brutal manner and were extra-judicial innature. In several cases the killings took place in the residences of the civilpopulation, places of worship (churches), and refugee encampments in mili-tary and police headquarters. Killings in the military headquarters took placeat the Lautem military district (Kodim) headquarters on 11 September 1999.

The victims had been arrested by the Alfa Team militia and then detained atKodim from 7 September 1999. The four victims, youths named Olandino,Norberto, Joan Branco and Alvonso da Costa, were suspected of pro-independ-ence sentiments. These mass killings took away the right to life.

Leading up to the announcement of options at the beginning of 1999 up tothe end of September 1999 there were recorded at least 394 acts that took awaythe right to life of civilian members of the East Timor population in 142 cases

Month 01 02 03 05 13

lan'99Feb'99

Mar'99

Apr'99

lvlay'99

lun'99Jul'99Aug'99

Sep'99

Oct'99

Dec'99

t75

90

2

28

42f,

3

11

1

19

5

7

3

13

24

2

1

24

2

6

2

1

1.4

2

4

41.

1

1

1

4

29

1

1

otal 394 90 42 17 85

The KPP-HAM Reporl

that included the regency of Dili (59 cases); Aileu (3); Ainaro (3); Ambeno (4);Baucau (3); Belu (2); Bobonaro (24); Covalima (8); Ermera (3); Lautem (14);Manufahi (1); Viqueque (1); and 1 case at Kupang (East Nusatenggara).

T orture and maltreatment

In nearly every case of violence carried out by the militia, there are manyreports and proofs about the torture and maltreatment towards the civilianpopulation who had different political convictions. Before the ballot process,the maltreatment was carried out by militia towards civilians, who refused tojoin with or become members of the militia. one example of a case was themaltreatment of Lnginus in the village of Ritabou on 14 April 1999. soldiersand the Halilintar Militia captured a resident of the village of Ritabou, Subdis-trict of Maliana, named Longinus,38 years old. The victim was captured at hishome and brought to the village of Batugade, subdistrict of Balibo, in a ToyotaKijang. At Batugade the victim was mistreated until he died. The remains of thevictim were not given to the family but were buried by the rnilitia.

During the process of the ballo! maltreatment was carried out towards civil-ians who participated in the enrolment for the ballot. After the announcement ofthe ballot, maltreahnent became part of the acts of terror and threat of murder thattook place in every attack and on every occasion of destruction of physical infra-strucfure, including various cases of ambush of columns of refugees.

Enfo r c e d di s app e ar anc e s

Involuntary/enforced disappearances happened after the announcementthat a ballot would be held, offering two options 127 January 19991. Civilianswho were critical and had divergent political convictions were intimidated,threatened and made to disappear. This enforced disappearance was carriedout by militia groups, which were thought to obtain assistance from the secu-rity apparafus through the means of abduction or capfure later to be summarilyexecuted. As an example on 12 April 1999 Koramil Kailako dan HalilintarMilitia abducted six residents of Kailako, Bobonaro. The six people were ab-ducted and brought to Koramil Kailako. There they were detained, interro-gated, and tortured. The next day they were killed in the house of ManuelGama. Apart from this case it is not known whether other enforced disappear-ances ended with murder.

In the lnvestigative Commission records for April and september 1999 thereare at least five cases of enforced disappearance - that is, three at Dili, one atBobonaro, and one at Liquica. Altogether 17 people disappeared, three of whomwere 'abducted' while they were sheltering at the Liquica subdistrict police sta-tion (Polsek) after an attack by the BMP militia at the village of Dato, Liquica. Thefate of these people has not been confirmed to now, except for one memter of theNational Commission of women who is known to be safe. Meanwhile, at least sixcases of abduction were carried out by the militia before the time of the ballot.

31

32 Mastqs of Tenor

Violmce based on gandefa

Cases of violence towards women identified by the Investigative Commis-sion included torture and public sexual humiliation by the militia and the TNI,forcing under age females to serve the sexual needs of the militia, enforcedprostitution and rape. The rape of East Timor women was characterised bythese situations: (a) one pelpetrator with one woman; (b) more than one perpe-trator with one woman; (c) more than one perpetrator with a number of womenat one location; and (d) use of one fixed location where the act of rape wascarried out several times.

Enforced moaement of the population

Although evidence has been found of evacuations that were carried outvoluntarily, statements and proofs obtained by the Commission indicate thatthere were two patterns of enforced movement of the civilian population.

a) Prior to the ballot

Soon after the formation of the militia in |anuary 1999, the intensity of vio-lence increased. At the beginning of that year alone there were movements ofthe population in the thousands, flooding the city of Suai (6,000 people) andDili (1,000 people). The militia attacked residences and burned homes andgardens. The residents fled and sought protection in the nearest subdistrictcapital, as happened in April at the Suai Church, the Liquica Church, and thehouse of Manuel Carascalao.

b) After the announcement of the ballot results

The militia attacked villages, and forced the population to leave their resi-dences. At the same time, on various roads vehicles readied by the securityapparatus were waiting and were used to take residents to the territory of East

Nusatenggara [ie, West Timor].

Especially after the announcement of the results of the ballot, there was a

wave of mass evacuation from the territory of East Timor. KPP HAM found atleast six cases of large-scale evacuation at Dili, Baucau and Lautem. Around250,000 were forced to flee to East Nusa Tenggara territory.

This enforced evacuation was preceded by cruel and fierce intimidation,threats and terror by the militia together with the security apparatus so that thecivil population lost the courage to choose to stay. It is necessary also to notethat the enforced evacuation was in the beginning carried out by pro-inde-pendence civilians who felt that their life was threatened by intimidation andterror by the militia and the security apparatus. But the number of civiliansfleeing purely because of fear of the threat of the militias who were buming East

Timor to the ground was very large. This evacuation was carried out into theforests, the hills and most of all into East Nusa Tenggara territory.

The KPP-HAM Report

The enforced evacuation was carried out under various kinds of modusoperandi that affirm the existence of a systematic plan. Documents obtainedprovided indications that the enforced evacuations were planned long beforein anticipation of defeat in the ballot. All of this was strengthened by state-ments provided by refugees in East Nusa Tenggara territory (Atambua andKupang).

Scorched earth and destruction

Field study carried out in East Timor provided clear proof that there hadbeen damage, destruction and burning on a large, planned and systematicscale in various cities (Dili, suai, Liquica etc). Scorched earth was implementedin relation to civilian housing, shops, stalls, hostels and office buildings. State-ments provided generally affirmed that the scorched earth was implementedby the militia and elements of the security forces, or at least elements of thesecurity apparatus from TNI and police elements did not carry out acts ofprevention towards the scorched earth that took place.

In this scorched earth practice there also happened various acts of looting,stealing and robbery of goods. The violation that occurred was violation of theright to property. It is estimated that around 70per cent of the civilian buildings(shops and residences) were smashed or burnt after the announcement of theballot, including thousands of vehicles. This scorched earth by the militia andthe TNI is said to be only a manifestation of the dissatisfaction of the militiaand the pro-integration population towards the result of the ballot because offraud by Unamet.

General Pattern of Violent Operations

Elements of crimes against humanity mentioned above indicate a system-atic work process in the form of acts of violence that was born from a process ofjustification and planning along the following lines: violence recorded to havehappened in the time period from27 January-S May 7999,58 events; from 6May-31 August 1999 there was a decline to 34 events; and in the period 1

september to 9 october there were 106 events. This decline in spread accordswith a change in the number of types of violation that show an increasinglyhigh tendency in March, going down in May and going up again in Augustand peaking in September.

After the option announcement in January 1999, an effort was mounted toestablish a pro/contra impression and civil war among the civilian popula-tion. This was carried out by pushing and forming civilian groups mobilised inthe name of pro-integration and security.

33

v Masters of Tenor

Formation of militins

The formation of Militias in the drive to mobilise supporters of integrationpassed through the group work format under the direct coordination of theTNI. This included the plan to legalise rnilitia units through Pamswakarsa andKamra. ln this sense the core strength of militia units, whether through Wanraor through several partisan groups that had been formed long before, wereproxy forces for the TNI. Pamswakarsa was developed in the framework ofjustification for the violent operations by the militia that were armed, facili-tated, by giving them arms, training, funds, vehicles, and control by the TNIapparatus. lncluded in this was protecting and condoning acts of violence thatwere carried out by the militia units.

The planning and discussion of the formation of armed civilian groups asnoted above were located in East Timor, in Bali, and in fakarta, and involvedofficers with authority in commando chains, at both the military region andcentre level.

Tenor and intimidntion

The mobilisation of militia forces to support pro-integration forces was de-veloped through politics of terror with various forms of violence towards mem-bers of society who had different political views. This pattern can be seen fromthe existence of acts of violence by the military, police, civil bureaucracy andmilitia apparatuses, in the form of murder, efforts at enforced evacuatiory peo-ple being disappeared, etc. The aim was to increase the number of pro-integra-tion supporters and membership of the militias.

Policies of the TNI leadership

Acts to mobilise military force went along with the existence of variouspolicies of the TNI leadership and the Coordinating Minister for Politics andSecurity, who indicated that they had strong interests in the creation of condi-tions in the run-up to negotiations in New York. Among them were the forma-tion of a Tribuana task force, P4OKTT Task Force, and so on. The tendency forviolence to increase or decrease paralleled the emergence of new political andsecurity policies at various times. Through January up to May, the chain ofviolence caused changes in determination of when the ballot would be carriedout. Violence aimed at causing the ballot to fail peaked in April 1999, and thecases of violence at Liquica and Maliana which claimed so numy victims amongcivilians strengthened that tendency.

The ciail war scuurio

a) After the autonomy option

There were found various steps directed towards strengthening a pro con-tra picture and even a civil war in society over the autonomy option. This

The KPP-HAM Report

pattern changed with the existence of agreement in New York that provided forsufficient security conditions, and the involvement of international organisa-tions towards a ballot.

The violence that involved rNI members or units in fact drastically de-creased in May 1999, rn accord with the existence of an agreement in New Yorkon 5 May 1999. The result of this agreement in New York placed Indonesiaunder international supervision with the duty to implement security and watchover Peace. The decrease in violence was also connected with security policies tomake the implementation of the 1999 General Election in East Timor a success.

However, at this stage, there was an escalation of violence by militia ele-ments as a Pro Integration force. However this did not mean direct contactbetween the TNI elements and the militia violence did not continue. TNI ele-ments and Indonesian Police were playing a role to build an impression ofneutrality and effort to make the ballot successful. For this the P3TT units wereformed to facilitate connection with international institutions.

Steps to build an image of neutrality were demonstrated by TNI and Indo-nesian Police through efforts at good offices as mediators in the conflict be-tween the Militia and the Pro-Independence, as in the Peace Agreement of 21Aril 1999 at Dili, and 18 June 1999 in fakarta. This agreement was followed ina lively fashion by the process of cantonment and peace propaganda. How-ever, the mass mobilisations inevitably follow the need to ensure victorv in theballot.

The policy of |akarta was to prepare a framework in the event of the au-tonomy option being defeated, taking the form of a plan for withdrawal andevacuation. Those evacuation plans were not merely part of the efforts to pro-vide security for the ballot but they were designed to persuade people that thesupporters of pro-integration outnumbered supporters of independence.Among the given reasons prepared long beforehand were the stories of a psy-chological burden [ie that soldiers had been psychologically conditioned tosupport integration], popular anger against fraud by Unamet, and [alleged]violence by pro-independence elements.

b) After the ballot announcement

After the announcement of the results of the ballot, violence escalated dras-tically over almost all of the territory of East Timor. The violence was in the formof murder, abduction, rape, destructiory looting of goods and residences, bum-ing and destruction of military installations, offices and residences of the peo-ple, and ended in efforts at enforced evacuation.

The TNI, Indonesian Police and militia apparatuses became the core forcesof the violent operations that went on systematically, expanding in a plannedmanner, as in the policy frameworks that have been set out above.

35

% Masters of Tenor

The pattern of work was directed towards reassuring International Societythat the results of the ballot should be doubted and the society of East Timorpreferred to be secure in East Nusa Tenggara territory. At this stage the need tomaintain the territory, and deny the choice of the people of East Timor, wascarried out through the practice of violence and a high stage of preparednessfor securing routes of forced evacuation.

The continuing violence indicated the unbroken connection between ele-ments of the TM, Indonesian Police and the Militia in carrying out condition-ing, choice of actions, fixing of times, and targets for the evacuation project.

The last stage of the violence operation was the continued operation of thethree components of violence above in guarding concentration of the refugeesin East Nusa Tenggara territory. The configuration of the scattering of therefugees indicated the control connection over societ5r by the Militia and TNIElements to the end of October 1999, except in certain places, such as Tuapukan

[near Kupang], which was still under control. The acts of murder, PeoPle beingdisappeared, maltreatment, violence with a gender aspect were patterns ofterror to watch over the attitudes of the people so that they would remain in theterritory [of West Timor].

4. Cases of note (January-October 1999)

From the results of research and investigation, various facts have been un-earthed that indicate the incidence of a chain of events of violence against thecivil society of East Timor. Cases of violation of basic human rights that tookplace are wide as pictured in the preceding chapter. This chapter sets out inparticular several cases of note w hich are of the character of gross violations ofbasic human rights which took place after the publishing of the two options upto the separation of East Timor from the territory of Indonesia.

Tlrc slaughter at Liquica church

On Easter Day,4 April 1999, according to statements of witnessesE to theInvestigative Commission, there occurred a fire and the wrecking of houses ofpro-independence figures by the militia group Besi Merah Putih (BMP) atMaubara. After carrying out the attack, some 25 BMP militia people escaped toKoramil Maubara. The people, who were dissatisfied and angry at the attack,surrounded the Koramil barracks, armed with bows and machetes, but thedisturbance was able to be held off by Pastor Rafael together with the Subdis-trict Head, the village head and Danramil.26

On 5 April 1999 the BMP militia together with police and Koramil memberscarried out arrests and attacks against people who were considered Pro-inde-pendence at Maubara. In this incident two citizens died as a result of beingslashed with sharp weapons by militia. Around 0800 hours the news was

The KPP-HAM Report

heard that the BMP militia, the police and members of Koramil would movefrom Maubara to Liquica. Hearing this, the group from Liquica went towardsthe border to face up to the BMP militia and the Koramil members. At the borderthere was a confrontation between the people and the BMP militia. The policeand members of Koramil who were on the left and right of the road did not by toprerrent this but instead fired at the people, causing the death of 2 and wounding 7.

Around 13.30 hours throughout the city of Liquica there was heard thesound of firing from the security apparatus for about one hour. Hearing this thepeople rushed out of their houses and sought refuge in the church complex.Around past 1400 hours the BMP militia on the border began to enter the city ofLiquica. BMP militia and soldiers were seen entering the Liquica district mili-tary command complex. From there around 15.00 to 16.00 they began to burnthe houses of pro-independence figures. According to the testimony of wit-nesses, there were about 2000 citizens of Liquica who were forced to shelter inthe church complex, among them a number of pro-independence figures.

On 6 April 1999, about 05.00 militia equipped with sharp weapons andfirearms were outside the fence of the Liquica church complex. About 08.00militia began to surround the church complex, and then a mobile brigade withtwo officers came, who were Lieutenant Damianus Dapa and LieutenantFranciscus Asisi Ali Baba. The two officers asked Pastor Rafael whetherCregorio and facinto da Costa Conceicao were among those who had takenrefuge in the church. The Pastor answered that there was only Jacinto da CostaConceicao, head of a village in Liquica. The two officers asked the pastor tosurrender the village head to BMP. The pastor refused to surrender the villagehead to the BMP. The officers went back to carry out coordination with theircommandant.

Between 08.00-09.00, 5 Mobile Brigade members led by First LieutenantJohanis Rea from the District Police asked the pastor to surrrender the firearmsthat according to the police had been brought by Jacinto da Costa Conceicao tothe church complex. The pastor denied that Jacinto da Costa Conceicao hadbrought firearms. Jacinto da Costa Conceicao was able to meet with First Lieu-tenant Johanis Rea but refused to be taken out of the church.

Finally Pastor Rafael asked for security protection from First Lieutenantfohnais Rea and it was agreed to locate about one platoon of police around thechurch complex. Outside the fence BMP was still threatening to attack thechurch complex, while awaiting the arrival of assistance from Halilintar andAitarak. The police apparatus was seen chatting with militia as if nothing wasgoing to happen.

Around 10.10 the Aitarak leader Eurico Gutteres arrived in a Kijang, drivenby a member of Kopassus [Special Forces Command]. According to the pastor,Eurico hied to solve the problem but failed because the Regent of Liquica Leonito

38 Masters of Terror

Martins and the commandant of the BMP militia Manuel de Sousa were notprepared to have a dialogue with the pastor.

At 12.00 the militia and the District Military Command apparatus enteredthe complex and carried out an attack against the civilians who were shelter-ing in the house of Pastor Rafael. The attack was begun with one shot andteargas. According to witnesses, the militia and the soldiers who were wearingcivilian clothes mounted a slaughter using sharp weapons and firearms. Vil-lage Head Jacinto da Costa Conceicao, Aghusthino, Victor and Leovirgildowho were on top of the building and hiding in Pastor Rafael's bathroom werekilled by militia, rnititary cadres and Mobile Brigade members who were wear-ing civilian clothes. In the incident Pastor Rafael and his colleague PastorDaslan were saved by District Military Command memebrs and taken directlyto District Military Command headquarters. At the District Military Commandheadquarters, Pastor Rafael saw Liquica Regent Leonito Martins, Comman-dant of District Military Command Asep Kuswana, Police Commandant Salopas

[sic - LCol (Pol) Adios Salova, Liquica district police chiefl, the Chairman ofthe Regional People's Legislative Assembly, the Deputy Commandant of EastTimor based in Dili [Col (Inf) Mudjiono], and several officials of East Timororigin.

On retum from the District Military Command, the pastor did not find anycorpses in the church complex; only splashes of blood remained in the rooms,and everything in the house was smashed. According to testimonyz, the corpseswere loaded on a Hino truck belonging to TNI and buried somewhere. It isestimated that at least 30 people were killed in this incident. Some of the corpsesof the victims were thrown into the sea around the Subdistrict of Maubarausing seven trucks and four minivans.

According to a statement by fulio da Sousa2s on 6 April 1999 he himselftogether with Barloe, Antonio and 4 other denizens of the village of Labukoe,Maubara, were ordered by the Commandant of the Koramil of Maubara Carlosdos Amaral and the Subdistrict Head of Maubara fose Afat to bury five corpsesof victims of the slaughter at Liquica Church. The corpses were brought bySecond Sergeant |acob, Second Sergeant Tome, members of Liquica DistrictMilitary Command. Burial was carried out at night by the electric light from thehouse of Albina, a member of the Koramil of Maubara.

Fransisco da Silva2e, a member of BMP, on 5 April 1999 at 17.30 received acommand from a member of the Rajawali force to bring a military truck totransport 15 corpses from inside the Liquica cornplex. These corpses were laterbrought to the Masin Lake near Maubara about 15 km from Liquica. After thecorpses were unloaded from the truck, the witness was ordered to retum toKoramil headquarters at Maubara.

East Timor police chief Timbul Silaen told KPP-HAM in a statement thatpolice had arrested the civilian perpetrator[s], but he [they? number not clear in

The KPP-HAM Report

Indonesianl had been released again. Meanwhile the TNI took no action at allagainst its members that had been involved.3o

Murder of citizms of Kailako, Bobonaro

on 12 April 1999 the Kailako Military Rayon Command and the Halilintarmilitia abducted six residents of Kailako, Bobonaro who were suspected ofbeing sympathisers of the pro-independence group. The six were abductedand taken to Kailako Military Rayon Command. There they were detained,interrogated and tortured. The next day they were killed in the house of ManuelSoares Gama, a member of society in Kailako, Bobonaro Regency. The names ofthe six victims were: Antonio Soares, |oao Evangelita Vidal, Joao Mafus, JoesPaulelo, Manuel Maulelo and Paulino Banumali. The Investigative commis-sion identified units of TNI elements suspected of being directly involved in thearbitrary detentions that later became a case of unlawful killing. So also was itwith units from armed civilian groups that accompanied TNI elements.

The ambush of Manuel Gama's group

The Investigative Commission received a report of another act of violencethat happened on the same day, 12 April 1999.ln the incident there was anambush of the group of Manuel Soares Gama in the journey from Maliana toKailako by an armed group suspected of being members of Falintil. In thisambush three people died including Manuel soares Gama, and two other vic-tims were members of TNI. Meanwhile four other people were wounded. Thevictims of the act of violence were: Angelino Bere Asa, Head Private TNI;Aristides, I Ketut Subrata, Luis Antonio, 1st Corporals TNI; Manuel; ManuelSoares Gama; and Miquel (aged 23).

(Sumnnry) execution of members of cioil population at Bobornro

On 13 Apnl 1999, at around 0600 hours, there was an execution of severalcivilian residents of Bobonaro, namely, Antonio soares (38), teacher at the statePrimary School, Kailaco; Joao Evangelita Vidal (35), teacher at the State pri-mary School, Dahudu; Jose Paulel; Manuel Maulelo (38), teacher at the StatePrimary School, Maumela; Paulina Batumali (9);Joao Matus (32), farmer. Allthe victims had been previously abducted on 12 April 1999 from their respec-tive homes by members of the Halilintar paramilitary and members of BobonaroMilitary District Command, because they were suspected of helping FALINTILand being supporters of the CNRT. The victims were first taken to the MilitaryRayon Command and interrogated and torfured. Later, the victims were takento the house of Manuel soares Gama and executed in front of the moumers ofthe late Manuel soares Gama. The corpses of the victims were thrown into theMarobo River, L0 km east of Kailako. After the execution was carried out, TNILieutenant Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian, Commandant of the Military Dis-

39

Masters of Tenor

trict of Bobonaro said to mourners - civilians and local government officials - atthe site that anyone who opposed the Army or the govemment of Indonesiawould meet the same fate. According to witnesses' statements, it should beassumed that the Commandant of the Military District of Bobonaro, TNI Lieu-tenant Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian and foao da Silva Tavares (Commanderof the Fighters of the Forces of Integration) directed the execution.

The Investigative Commission noted the linkage between this incident andother incidents, namely the incident of the abduction of six citizens of Kailako,Bobonaro and the incident of the ambush of the group of Manuel Soares Gamaat Kailako.

The attackon thehouse of Manuel Carrascalao

On 17 April 1999 at 1000 hours, a crowd of about 5000 pro-integrationpeople from 13 regencies in East Timor held a public meeting in front of theOffice of the Governor of East Timor in connection with the strengthening of thePro-Indonesian Militia of Aitarak Command under the leadership of EuricoGuterres. The integration or militia forces that were present were among othersMahidi, Aitarak, Halilintar, Lafaek, AHI, Alfa, Besi Merah Putih and DadurusMerah Putih. They were equipped with weapons like clubs, traditional weap-ons, machetes and bows. Acting as master of ceremonies was Joao Tavares andin his speech he said that he was ready to sacrifice himself body and soul forintegration. The public meeting continued with a mass procession around Dili.

After the public parade, some of those from the mass procession went to theoffice of the Voice of East Timor, the only newspaper published in East Timor,situated not far from the Dili Diocese. They wrecked the building and officeequipment such as computers, television sets and so on. The attack is thoughtto have been connected with the accusation that the news in the Volce of East

Timor daily newspaper favoured only the pro-independence group, especiallyin the reports of the case of the Attack on the Liquica Churctu April 1999.

Coming to late afternoon, there was an attack on the house of ManuelCarrascalao by militia consisting of Besi Merah Putih and Aitarak. This housewas also the secretariat of the Movement for Reconciliation and Unification ofthe People of East Timor (GRPRTT). Manuel Carrascalao was the chairman ofthis organisation. Victims of the attack were refugees from Liquica, Alas andTuriscai who at the time were seeking shelter in the house of Manuel Carrascalaoand Manuelita Carrascalao, son of Manuel Carrascalao. The refugees whowere in the house of Manuel Carrascalao were estimated to number 143, andthe number of victims killed as many as L5 people, namely Agustinho Ximenes,Alberto dos Santos, Alfredo de lesus, Alfredo Sanches, Carmelinda Guterres,Cesar, Christina, Januario, |oao, Joo Junio Caerio Alves, Manuel Ario IntamanuViegas Carrascalao, Marcelina Carrascalao, Marito alias Micky and Pen. Afterthe attack, about 50 refugees, who had survived, were transported by police to

The KPP-HAM Report

East Timor Police headquarters, including the family of Manuel Carrascalaoand the family of CNRT figure Leandro Isaac.

Riots in DiIi

In connection with preparations for the ballot, both the autonomy factionand the pro-independence faction were given time to mount campaigns. on 25August, suddenly the turn came for the pro-independence group under theumbrella of the GNRT to carry out a campaign in Dili. Using at least 400 trucksand buses, about 16,000 people participated in the campaign, which proceededwithout incident.

on 25 August L999, the pro-autonomy faction carried out the final cam-paign. But this campaign changed to become a riot where a group of Aitarakmilitia joined in to surround Dili and force the local people to join in an pro-autonomy parade. This caused anger on the part of the pro-independence group.The result of the riot was that several victims fell. Among others there were twomembers of the Aitarak militia, Abdullah and Abai saleh, who died at theComora Market from stab wounds, Acacia who was killed at pantai Kelapa,virgilio Faria Rodrigues da Costa and Ameta who died after being shof atKuluhun, Bemardino (Bedino) Agusto Guterres and several unknown others.when the disturbance broke out, the Police/Mobile Brigade was present at thescene but was not able to control the sifuation.

The case of the summary killing by the Mobile Brigade of a student from theUniversity of Satya Wacana, Salatiga, named Bernardino (Bedino)AgustoGuterres at the village of Bemori, Dili, on 26 August 1999 was witnessedby anumber of domestic and international journalists, and the incident receivedwide coverage, including sequential photographs of the shooting in Life Maga-zine of December 1999. The Head of the East Timor Police at that time, ColonelTimbul silaen, in his statement to the Investigative Comrnission on 12 ]anuary2000, admitted the incident, but no legal action was taken against the perpetra-tor or the Mobile Brigade squad involved in the incident. The reason that wasgiven was lack of material evidence.

Attack on the Dili diocese

After the announcement of the results of the ballot on 4 september 1999, themilitia carried out a mass action in Dili. In the action the pro-integration militiacarried out a search for pro-independence people in Dili Harbour. This meas-ure caused disorder that was marked by the outbreak of series of shots. Accord-ing to several witnesses, in the middle of the day the militia carried out criminalacts, damaging and burning several buildings. The targeted buildings wereresidences, shops, kiosks, rice storage facilities, and public facilities like mar-kets and schools. The situation in the city of Dili became uncertain and thefrightened populace sheltered or fled to places that were felt to be fairly safe,

41.

a Masters of Terror

such as the Hosana Protestan church, the Dili [Catholic] Diocese, the EastTimor Police Headquarters and the house of Bishop Belo.

The situation on 5 September 1999 worsened, marked by bursts of gunfirewhich were increasingly frequent and widespread, together with burning andlooting. While the disorder was happening, apaft from the citizens who wereon the streets in flight, there were also security cadres consisting of members ofthe police and TNI members on watch. Apart from that, citizens wibressed agroup of militia in black clothing with the red and white emblem. At 1430hours, the citizens who were sheltering at the Ecclesiastical Chambers (CamraEclesestica - Dili Diocese) were startled by an attack and act of burning at thatlocation. In this incident according to a statement by Bishop Belo there were as

many as 25 people who fell victim.3i

Attack on the house of Bishop Belo

On 6 September 7999 at about 0700 hours intimidation occurred by themilitia to refugees sheltering in the house of Bishop Belo, estimated at 5000people. According to a statement by Bishop Belo, from 30 August 1999 therefugees had sought refuge at his residence. The refugees were alarmed to see

the militia threatening to kill them. Bishop Belo had asked for assistance withtransport from East Timor Police Chief and the Commandant of the [Dili] Mili-tary District to evacuate the people to Baucau but the request was disregarded'On 6 September, a TNI officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel entered theresidence of Bishop Belo and asked him to come out to be evacuated to the EastTimor Police Headquarters.

After Bishop Belo left his residence, the militia group, some of whom were inAitarak uniform carried out an attack against the refugees sheltering in thehouse. The refugees were forced to obey the commands of the militia to comeout of the yard of Bishop Belo's housing complex, and this was accompaniedby acts of violence. According to wihresses at around 0900 the militia carriedout burning of the Bishop's house. This militia attack was accomPanied byshots, which, according to Bishop Belo, claimed two victims. The total numberof victims is not known.

In connection with the statement of witnesses concerning the involvementof the Aitarak militia in this athack action, the Investigative Commission has

asked the commandant of Aitarak, Eurico Guterres, to provide an explanation.According to Eurico Guterres, he knew about the incident but when the attackhappened he was not in Dili because he was taking refugees to Atambua.When he arrived back in Dili, the disturbance was already over.

Burning of thehouses of the population at Maliann

In the investigation in East Timor, the lnvestigative Commission receivedtestimony and case reports about the buming of people's houses and buildings

The KPP-HAM Report

at Maliana on 4 September 7999. Based on the direct observation of the Investi-gative Commission on the site, the level of destruction of the ciW of Malianareached 80per cent. This incident was tied to the security situationin the city ofMaliana where since 30 August 1999 the city of Maliana could not be haveisedby people because it was guarded closely by pro-integration militia, TNI ele-ments, and Indonesian Police. several local staff of UNAMET and pro-inde-pendence activists were killed on the spot or abducted in a cleansing operationby the Dadarus Merah Putih militia (DMP) and Halilintar assisted by the localDistrict Military Command. Hundreds of houses were burnt on 4 september,while escaping residents were shot by militia and rNI members. several eye-witnesses also saw residents attacked with machetes on the street. After that inthe district of Bobonaro, especially Memo and Batugade, roadblocks were setup by the militia to check refugees going to NTT territory. statements by severalwitnesses indicated the incidence of cases of enforced disappearance of refu-gees who had been stopped at these posts.

Attnck on the church complex, Suai

According to the testimony of Domingas do Santa Muzinho32, on 4 Septem-ber 1999 at about 1400 hours, the village of Debos at suai was attacked by theLaksaur militia and police apparatus. In the attack houses of the Debos popu-lation were shot at and bumed. Several perpetrators were known by witnesses,among them Alipio Mau and olivio. The shooting was carried out wildly andcaused the death of a senior high school sfudent, whose corpse was put into aKijang official vehicle of the Police contingent, Lorosae. As a result of the at-tack, the people took refuge at the Nossa Senhora de Fatima Churcll whichwas also often called the Suai church or the Ave Maria church by the Iay popu-lation, under the watch of the militia, who were firing shots.

Based on the statement of Jorge Manuel de Jesus33, on 4 September 1999 atabout 1400 hours, the buming of the population's houses and buildings be-longing to the government in the city of Suai took place at night on 5 september1999. The buming was carried out by Laksaur militia and members of the TNITerritorial Battalion. Beginning from 6 september 1999, the population wasforced to leave their houses, and then the contents of the houses were lootedand bumt. According to the statements of witnesses, Commandant of the Mili-tary Rayon Sugito joined in the looting and burning.

on Sunday,5 september the Laksaur and Mahidi militia began to threatenthe citizens who had fled to the suai church complex. on 5 september at about1430 there was an attack on the citizens who had fled to the suai Churchcomplex by the Laksuar Merah Putih and Mahidi militia, the TNI aparatus andthe Police. According to the testimony Fares da Costa,a the attack was directlyled by Kovalima Regent Herman sediono and Lieutenant sugito of the MilitaryRayon Command who at the time was wearing the jungle green uniformand holding long-barrelled weapons. Witnesses heard Regent Herman and

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4 Masters of Tenor

Military Rayon Commandant say that all the Pastors, men and women whohad these'strange attitudes' would be killed.

According to witnesses, at the time there were about 100 refugees in the oldchurch with many more outside. The wihresses saw Father Hilrio beingshot inthe chest once and his colpse trodden on by Igidio Manek, a member of the[.aksaur militia. Passtor Francisco was stabbed to death and slashed by Americowho was also a member of the Laksaur militia. Another witness, Domingas dosSantos, testified that Pastor Dewanto was killed in the old church. The sametestimony was given by fuliana Cardoso3s, who saw Pastor Dewanto killed. Atthe time of the attack the Police, the Loro Sae Mobile Brigade Contingent andsoldiers were outside the fence shooting refugees who wanted to flee out of thechurch complex.

After the shooting, the refugees who were not killed, particularly womenand children, were transported by kuck to the Military District Command. It isestimated that at least 50 people were victims in the incident. The pelpetratorsalso stole money, TVs and refrigerators from the church complex. At about1700 hours, three TNI Hino trucks came to transport the corpses to the west ofthe city of Suai.

In the Investigative Commission visit to the location of the incident on 19

November and 13 December 1999, signs of the burning of the slaughtered vic-tims were found around the church complex; the remains of human bones andskulls and clothes of the refugees, which had been burnt black, were found.Besides that, almost all of the buildings belonging to residents and to the gov-ernment in the diskict of Suai had been bumt down to the ground.

According to the evidence of Sergeant Kanakadjas and Second LieutenantSudarminto3T to the Commission, on 7 September 1999 about 0900 hours Cen-tral lndonesian Time, they saw burial activity at the seashore at Weluli, SouthAlas Village, Subdistrict Kobalima, Belu Regency. The burial of the corpseswas directed by First Lieutenant Sugito, together with three TNI members anda Laksaur militia team.

The corpses were taken by First Lieutenant Sugito from Suai about 0830hours past the Police post at Metamauk in the jurisdictional area of the Wemasapolice sub-district, using one yellow truck DH 8323 M and one red Kijang DF9025 AA together with a minivan without number plates, marked 'EVER DADE'.

Results of an exhumation of mass grave of victims of the slaughter at SuaiChurch carried out by the lnvestigative Commission on 25 November at a loca-tion with coordinates 09.46814 degrees South and 125.08109 degrees East.From the three graves that were dug up the remains of 27 persons were found.From the results of an autopsy3s carried out by the Forensic Team of the Facultyof Medicine, University of Indonesia, 15 males and 8 females could be identi-fied, with 1 probable male and one probable female. The age of the victims

The KPP-HAM Report

ranged from 5 years to adults aged over 40. Three among them were pastorTarsisius, SJ; Pastor Hilario Madeira; and Pastor Francisco Soares.

According to the statement of the Head of Polsek Kanakadja, TNI First Lieu-tenant Sugito told him that the corpses were the victims of the killings at Suaiwhich took place on 5 September 1999. First Lieutenant Sugito requested polsekHead Kanakadja to keep the incident secret.

The Investigative Commission investigation of First Lieutenant sugito, whichwas held on 23 December 1999 and 17 |anuary 2000, could not proceed prop-erly because those involved were not able to give logical answers to the ques-tions that were put.

The killings at the Maliann police station

In the investigation of the violation of fundamental human rights that tookplace at Maliana, Regency of Bononaro, the Investigative Commission, tookpreliminary statements about and preliminary evidence of the incidence ofmass killings of refugees sheltering at the Bobonaro Police station complex atthe city of Maliana. According to the statement of witnesses on 8 September1999 a mass killing of refugees sheltering at the Police Headquarters occurred.According to the eyewitness evidence at the scene of the incident, the masskilling took place at night. when carrying out a visit to the location, the Inves-tigative Commission found a large number of cartridge shells scattered in sev-eral rooms within the complex.

According to statements of several witnesses, after the end of the ballot, pro-autonomy leaders encouraged the people not to run away and become refugeesbecause nothing would happen. It was said that a peace agreement had beenreached among BRT, FPDK and CNRT. Despite this, many had fled to the hills.

On 2 September 1999 at 1700 hours there were shots throughout Maliana,and members of the TNI Territorial Battalion who were on duty at their postswent down to the District Military Command to join with the Dadarus MerahPutih group to cany out an operation against pro-independence people. From3 to 5 September it seems from evidence that militia were freely coming andgoing at the Police Station. on 6 september the Coordinating Post at the PoliceStation asked the people who were sheltering in the garage and in police ac-commodation to vacate these areas, because they were to be used by members ofthe Police, who would be stationed there. In the end, the people were forced tomove to the cenhal area of the Police station complex. From a statement, beforethis, on 5 September 1.999, around 0800 hours the Commandant of the MilitaryDistrict Burhanuddin Siagian, Commander PPI Joao Tavares, the Chairman ofBappeda II Francisco soares came to observe the Coordinating Postat the policeStation.

On 8 September 7999, the Maliana Police Station complex occupied by refu-gees was surrounded by militias divided into four separate groups. The first

45

M Masters of Tenor

group entered from the direction of the PLN [electricity company] office, thesecond from the direction of the BRI office, the third from the direction of theSubdistrict office and the fourth closed off the main road in front of the PoliceStation. Behind the militia members of the TNI and the Mobile Brigade werevisible. After surrounding the complex the militia groups attacked the refugees

inside.

Among the victims of the mass killi^g were the head of the village of RitabouDominggos Pereira, Manuel Barros, Acting Chairman of the District Repre-sentative Council, and fulio Barros, the Subdistrict Head of Maliana. The per-petrators of the mass killings were members of the Dadurus Merah Putih mili-tia. Apart from these three people, witnesses also saw a number of victimswhom they could not identify. Most of the victims were killed by blows from acleaver. According to witnesses, neither the local police nor the Loro Sae PoliceContingent took any action to stop the violence by the militia. At about 2300hours the electricity was switched off and the corpses were taken away in a

pick-up truck and disposed of in an unknown place.

The murder of Sander Thoures

A joumalist from the Netherlands name Sander Thoenes was killed on 21

September 1999.3e His remains were found by local people at Becora suburb,East Dili on 22 September \99.It is thought that Sander Thoenes left the HotelTourisme, Dili between 1630 and 1745 hours Central Indonesian Time on a

motor cycle driven by Florinda da Conceicao Araujo towards Becora, Dili. It isthought that the two had gone 300 metres when they were blocked by un-known people riding three motor cycles, a truck and a car. They wore TNIuniform and were armed with automatic weapons. They fired at Sander Thoenesand Florinda da Conceicao Araujo and made the motorcycle roll over. Araujomanaged to save himself, although he was shot. Sander Thoenes was killed onthe spot; when his remains were found they had been moved from whereFlorinda da Conceicao Araujo had seen his corpse. It is thought that the deathof Sander Thoenes occurred between 1550and1745 hours on 21 September1999. lt is known that 745 Battalion was in the region at that time.

The Investigative Commission interviewed the Commandant of 745 Battal-iory Lieutenant Colonel |acob Qoko Sarosa to obtain a further explanation aboutBattalion's involvement in the incident. He explained that Battalion 7t15 had infact passed the location during a joumey from Pos Palos to Kupang. But he deniedthat Battalion 745had been involved in the killi^g of Sander Thoenes, because histroops had passed the location before the incident had taken place. Examinationby forensic pathologist Dr Michael Anthony Zillman at the Royal Darwin Hospi-tal on 24 September 1999 showed that the causes of death of Sander Thoeneswere gunshot wounds. Lieutenant Colonel |acob Djoko Sarosa in his statementstated that the cause of death was wounds inflicted by a sharp weaPon.

The KPP-HAM Report

Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Djoko Sarosa did admit, however, that there hadbeen a robbery, of cameras belonging to two foreign joumalists named Joe Swainand Charles Hires on 21 September 1.999 by members of T4S Battalion. Hefurther said that the robbery had been motivated by suspicion of foreigners anddissatisfaction with the fraudulent actions of UNAMET. Later he admitted thathe had been detained for a week over the incident and two lower rankingofficers had been detained for two weeks over it.

In this connection, Major General Kiki syahnakri explained to the Investi-gative Commission that the robbery had been triggered by TNI members'dis-satisfaction at being photographed by the two joumalists. The robbery hadbeen preceded by intercepting two taxis occupied by the two foreign joumaliststogether with an interpreter named Ancaleto da Silva and a driver. They took,among other things, a camera and 50 rolls of film, a bag, a video camera and apassport. They then fired at the wheels of the taxi to prevent the journalistscontinuing their journey. The two joumalists were left at the place of the inci-dent, which was about two kilometres from the centre of the city of Dili.

The murder of the church group at Los Palos

Based on statements that were able to be collected, it is known that on 25September 1999 an attack took place on a church group that was joumeying toBaucau, by the Tim Alfa militia group consisting of foni Marques, foao daCosta, Manuel da Costa, and Amilio da Costa.

In its investigation visit to East Timor, the Investigative Commission metwith the suspects who were suspected of carrying out executions outside theprocess of law, in the Interfet detention centre in Dili, and obtained a directstatement from Joni Marques. The Investigative Committee also obtained state-ments that the militia group Tim Alfa had been formed and trained by a Kopassusunit. Based on the testimony of a perpetrator to the Investigative Commission,the involvement of a member of a Kopassus unit who had ordered the killingwas stated.

There were nine victims of the mass killings: Agus Mulyawan, Indonesianjournalisf Celeste de Carvalho, Head Sister; Erminia Cazzaniga, nun; ErminiaRudy Barreto; Fernando dos Santos; Jacinto F. Xavier; a youth of 13; Titi SandoraLopez;Valerioda Conceicao.

Gender Violence0 -Sexual

utslaaement

Case 1

From statements by witnesses and citizens around the office of the village ofWemasa, at the end of September 1999 a number of mothers and children wereset down from a car that stopped next to the village complex of Wemasa-Raihenek, Kobalima Subdistrict, Regency of Belu, East Nusatenggara. Accord-ing to witness statements, they were separated from other refugees because

47

Masters of Teror

they were thought to be pro-independence sympathisers. Numbers were notknown, nor was anything known about the husbands. They were placed in a

tarpaulin tent near the Wemasa village office. The position and situation werevery open, and people outside could see the situation inside the tent.

Every night between 2000 and 2100 hours a group of Laksaur militia wouldcome to these tents and rape the mothers. A witness told of a case of sexual

enslavement of a mother who was still breastfeeding her child and was forcedto serve members of the Laksaur militia.This testimony was strengthened byother witnesses who still maintained family relationships with the victims.Another witness reported the shooting of a female refugee who refused to havea sexual relationship with members of the Laksaur rnilitia. The victim was shotin the back with a home-made weapon by a Laksaur militiaman.

Early information conceming the locking up of 30 women in a refugee cen-

tre was followed up by contacting a witness at Wemasa. From the informationobtained, the women had scattered to the area of Raihenek (Kobalima Subdis-trict, Belu Regency, East Nusatenggara) so that it was difficult to locate them.From witness statements, the women experienced sexual violence at the handsof the militia.

Case 2

From the statement of a witness - whose two friends had become victims ofdetention and prostitution (A and M) brought from East Timor and forced tolive with Commandant Mahidi Company Commandant, J, in EastNusatenggara. They came from the same district, Ainaro. The two women wereforced to come by Hatubiliko (an East Timor army group formed by the TNI),when they were bathing. Their home was ransacked and they were taken toAitekalarang-Ankais, Malaka Subdistrict, on 15 September 1999. They soldvegetables all day long outside f's house and looked after family interests. Atnight they had to serve the friends of the Mahidi Company Commanderwhocame to visit and drink at his house, and this included serving them sexually.Their movements were constantly observed by Company Commander I and hismen. To the witness, A and M said that they were ashamed to retum to EastTimor because many people knew that they had been kept women of CompanyCommander j and his friends.

Case 3

On 5 June 1999, there was an arbitrary arrest of 23 women by the BMPmilitia at the post near Gugleur, Maubara Subdistrict, Liquica Regency. Thevictims were forced to cook and wash for the BMP and become victims of sexualviolence.

Cases of violence towards women, especially rape, were also reported in thereport of the UN Special Thematic Reporter of 8 December 7999.

The KPp-HAM Report 49

5. Description of victims and perpetrators

From the results of the investigation, the Commission found that the vio-lence from |anuary to october 1999 was a result of the actions and decisions ofthe civil and military apparatus at various levels, as well as by militia groups.It also found that the results of the violent acts were loss of life and propeityand the destruction of the social and cultural conditions of East Timor. A de-scription of the victims and perpetrators in the chain of violence is set outbelow.

Desciption of aictims

Regarding victims, the Lnvestigative Commission found several key dimensions.

. The victims who were especially chosen as targets for acts of violence bythe militia and the military and civil apparatus were students, univer-sity students, and CNRT activists. This report is also strengthened byseveral reports of summary execution of Bernadino Guterres before doz-ens of witnesses; the killings carried out by members of the Aitarak miti-tia deliberately in front of East Timor students in Dili harbour; the attackon the CNRT office and the murder of CNRT activist Ferisimo King ofLos Palos at Los Palos; the attack, destruction and killing at the refugeecamps carried out by the militia against CNRT activists and East Timoruniversity sfudents, including journalists.

. Apart from the individuals who were targeted, many victims were civil-ians who had no political affiliations at all. Among them were childrenand church people, journalists and humanitarian workers. The Investi-gative Commission found that at the slaughter at the Suai Church atleast 26 people were killed, consisting of a number of adults, two chil-dren and three pastors fell into this category. Apart from this, hundredsof thousands of civilians, to avoid killing and violence/ were forced toleave their homeland, becoming refugees living in camps under the guardof the militia.

. A number of reports were specially obtained on acts of sexual violencecarried out by both the militia and the apparatus against a number ofwomen. One report said that rape had occurred against women in aKodim by militia members with the knowledge of the local police andmilitary apparatus, while they were held over awaiting evacuation. Thesame report also noted the efforts at enforced concubinage carried out bya leader of the Laksaur Militia with a refugee.

r Apart from human victims, the cruelty caused the total destruction ofnearly all the local social and cultural structure, with the destruction ofthe whole physical infrastructure and damage, looting and destructionof the possessions of the civilian population. This cruelty has been car-ried over into the territory of East Nusatenggara and was directed againstthe refugees and their possessions.

50 Mnsters of Tmor

D esciption of p erp etrat or s

The account of events shows that the violence in qualitative and quantita-tive terms covers a wide landscape; and it was carried out in a directed way,involving systematic mobilised actions that were based on a great antipathytowards the civilians of East Timor who rejected the special autonorny option.This means that such sudden wide damage can only have been achievedthrough well-planned and organised field activities.

The pattem of enforced movement of the population out of East Timor wascaused by two special factors, evacuation before the announcement of the re-sults of the ballot, (a) carried out by the refugees themselves to avoid quarrel-ling and the possibility of violence; (b) forced evacuation after the announce-ment. Statements have been received about the activities of the security appara-tus and the militia groups that entered houses to examine and force out theresidents, with threats, the firing of shots and even direct fatal shooting.

The pattern of evacuation was first to bring the population to offices orbarracks of the local military and police, with oversight by the military, militiaand police apparatus. This oversight was experienced by the East Timor refu-gees even after they were in refugee camps. A number of Regents/Heads ofDistrict Level II East Timor - among others TNI Colonel Herman Sudiono (Re-

gent of Covalima) - stated to the Investigative Committee that among them somehad prepared for the possibility of evacuation of the population before 4 S"P-tember 1999, and even before that date, Regent Guielherm [ie, Guillherme] DosSantos (Regent of Maliana) stated that he knew about the violence in variousdistricts of East Timor after the ballot announcement.

Several facts show the clarity and openness of the origins of this directedviolence, like the violence that took place in the attack on the UN Mission onEast Timor (UNAMET) offices, the murder of UNAMET staff, the burning of theDili Diocese, the attack on Bishop Belo's residence, the slaughter at Suai ChurchLiquica which all point to involvement of the armed militia and the Indonesianapparatus. The leader of the Aitarak militia Eurico Gutterres told the Commis-sion that the blockade of the streets of DiIi was to identify and seek out Pro-independence leaders and activists, showing clearly the direction of all theviolence. The clear nature of the violence was to some degree strengthened byTNI General Wiranto who said that the violence took place as a reaction todissatisfaction over the failure of the referendum. Thus what happened in thefield was justified by TM General Wiranto's statement.

The perpetrators intimidated and terrorised the refugees in EastNusatenggara. Suweillance, control and a measure of violence that happened tothe East Timor population during evacuatiory such as murder, torture and sexualviolence, showed the links between the perpebators of violence against the refu-gees in the camps, as the same people who had done this before the evacuations.The militia and the security apparatus were conunon to both situations.

The KPP-HAM Report

From what it did to the bodies of the victims, the violence was cruel andmassive, with the use of blunt and sharp weapons and firearms. To classify thevictims, although many were ordinary civilians, statements showed that youngintelligentsia and CNRT activists were special targets. The perpetrators madepriorities in categorising the victims.

The violence generally showed support from the military civil apparatusinvolving financial aid taken from the official regional budget, facilities of com-mand headquarters and coordination, and infrastrucfure of various levels. Thepattern of violence showed that the military apparatus and the local bureauc-racy controlled the perpetrators in the field.

The violence cannot be separated from the role of a number of high rNIofficials from TNI Headquarters who carried out a series of activities in thefield, beginning from acting as liaison officials, till assuming shadow com-mand in intelligence operations. They did nothing to stop the destructiory eventhough the violence in East Timor was known by high level rNI, and contin-gency plans had long been prepared. worse, there was no appropriate responsefrom the TNI even though reports and requests for assistance had been directlyrequested (for example the request of Bishop Belo to General wiranto on 5september in Dili). High TNI officials did not take firm action to stop the acts ofthe militia and the civil and military apparatus in the field. Answers from TMhigh officials said 'the troops are working under a psychological burden'aland 'the perpetrators of violence are those who are disappointed with the re-sults of the ballot'42 show sufficient knowledge on the part of rNI high officialsabout the possibility of violence and the close links between the militia and theIndonesian military.

And so the responsibility for the chain of violence in the field during theperiod in question falls on the shoulders of three main agents: first, the perpe-trators of direct violence in the field, the militia and the TNI and police appara-tus in the field; second, the agents who carried out operation conkol activities,including the bureaucratic apparatus, especially the Regents, the Governorand the military leaders and local police; third, those who held responsibilityfor security policy including the high military officials who actively and pas-sively were involved in or knew about the chain of violence.

Apart from these findings, the Investigative Commission also received re-ports noting that there were acts of violence carried out by groups rejecting thespecial autonomy option, among them a report collated by the commission forPeace and stability (KPS) and from several statements put forward by civil andmilitary officials.a3

JI

52 Mastus of Tmor

6. Conclusions and recommendations

KPP HAM in formulating this report and the conclusions that will be con-veyed to Komnas HAM [the National Commission for Human Rights] hasconsidered carefully all the findings in the field, statements from witnesses,victims and perpehators together with other parties, rePorts and official andunofficial documents and various other information. KPP HAM considered allthe reports and the materials from UNTAET and INTERFET based on theirown investigation.

As the result of various tirne limitations, conditions and preconditions andthe efforts of certain parties to eliminate pieces of evidence, KPP HAM has onlybeen able to describe part of the human rights violations that happened.

KPP HAM has been successful in collecting facts and proofs that providestrong indications that serious violations of human rights have been commit-ted in a planned and systematic manner and on a large and wide scale in theform of mass murder, torture and maltreatment, forced disappearance, vio-lence towards women and children (including rape and sexual slavery), forcedevacuations, scorched earth policies and destruction of property, all of whichconstitute crimes against humanity.

KPP HAM also found strong evidence about ridding and destroying evi-dence, which is a criminal act.

From all the facts and evidence, KPP HAM did not find evidence of thecrime of genocide.

The facts and evidence also indicate that the civil and military aPParatusincluding the police cooperated with the militia creating a situation and condi-tions that supported the occurrence of crimes against humanity, which werecarried out by the civil, rnilitary, police and militia group apparatuses.

The militia forces with different names in various locations directly or indi-rectly were built up on the basis of the formation of popular resistance grouPs(Wanra), popular security groups (Kamra) and Volunteer Security Forces(Pamswakarsa) which directly or indirectly were armed, trained, supportedand funded by the civil, military and police apparatuses.

The type of acb and dre patbm of crimes agairst humanity wele as follows:

Mnssmurder

Mass murder with many victims among the civilian population was car-ried out systematically and cruelly several places. The mass murder generallytook place at places of shelter such as churches, police stations and militarybases. These acts were carried out using sharp weapons and firearms by mili-tary groups and/or with the support of the military apparatus or allowed tohappen by the military and police apparatuses.

The KPP-HAM Report 53

T orture and mal treatment

Torfure and maltreatment was carried out on a large, wide and systematicscale against the pro-independence civil population. The torture and maltreat-ment happened at several specific moments - that is, before the killing wascarried out and after the arbitrary arrests for the purpose of extracting informa-tion from the victims. In several cases, the torture and the maltreatment also hap-pened spontaneously at the time of attack on the houses of the victims. At the timeof evacuation, torfure and maltreatment were often carried out against victimsidentified as university students, high school students and CNRT members.

Enfo r c e d di s app e a r an c e

Enforced disappearance took place along the lines of the following pattern.First in connection with the recruitment of members of the militia. A number ofcivilians disappearing was the result of their refusing to be made militia mem-bers. second, the enforced disappearance was an act of making supporters ofindependence submit. Third, the enforced disappearance towards a number ofvictims from among university sfudents and supporters of independence wasalso reported to have happened as a continuation of military activity in placesof evacuation.

Sexual slaaery and rape

Sexual slavery and rape happened in houses, in military barracks and placesof evacuation both before and after the ballot.

Scorched earth policy

scorched earth tactics were carried out before and after the results of theballot were announced against houses of the population and various govern-ment offices and other buildings. Before the ballot, scorched earth tactics werecarried out especially against houses of the population suspected of being pro-independence. This action increased in intensity and spread after the results ofthe ballot were announced until it comprised wrecking of buildings and otherproperty in nearly all the territory of East Timor.

Enforced moaemmt and eaacuation

Terror and intimidation before the ballot caused the evacuation of the popu-lation to places considered safe such as churches and the hills. After the an-nouncement of results enforced movement and evacuation on a large scale,with logistical and transport support from the civil, military and police appa-rafuses, following a pattem prepared previously. This enforced movement wasa further target of various forms of violence and scorched earth at variousplaces. The enforced movement and evacuation and the hindering of refugees

Masters of Tenor

retuming to their place of abode were carried out through terror and intimida-tion. Up to now some refugees have still not been able to return.

Damage and elimination of eoidence

The elimination of evidence by those carrying out crimes against humanitywas carried out deliberately and in a planned fashion by, for example, destruc-tion of documents, mass burials, and the removal of remains to hidden loca-tions. The locations of mass burial are still being found.

The whole chain of crime against humanity was the responsibility of threegroups of perpetrators, namely:

t Perpetrators who were directly on the scene; that is, the militia and themilitary and police apparatuses.

. Those who carried out control of operations, including but not limited tothe civil bureaucratic apparatus especially the Regent, the Govemor andthe military leadership and the local police.

. Those who held responsibility for national security policy, includingbut not limited to the high military officials who were actively and pas-sively involved in the crimes.

Based on the crimes that have occurred and the portrait of the victims thathas been drawn as well as the cross-correlation of the existence evidence andtestimony, the names - not an exhaustive list - of those suspected of involve-ment is as follows:

a. Individuals suspected of directly committing crimes against humanity,that is, militia members and leaders, members of TNI and the Indone-sian Police, and civilian bureaucrats in East Timor, as listed in Appen-dix 5 [not included here], 'List of Suspects of (directly committed) CrimesAgainst Humanity'.

b. Individuals suspected of committing crimes against humanity becauseof their position and their acts at the level of control and coordination offield operations, as follows:

' MajGen Adam DAMIRI, Udayana Military Region Commander(Pangdam Udaya)

As commander [of a large area of eastem Indonesia that included East

Timor] he is suspected of supporting militia activities, of failing to con-trol and discipline the involvement of TNI members in the militias.

o Col (Pol) Timbul SILAEN, East Timor Police Chief (Kapolda TimorTimur)

As provincial police chief he held command in the field (kodal - komandolapangan) until 5 September 1999 and was therefore responsible fororder and security in accordance with the New York agreement of May

The KPP-HAM Report

7999. He took no effective preventative action to stop the series of humanrights abuses.

Col (InO M Noer MUIS, East Timor military comrnander (Danrem lW WD)As provincial military commander he took insufficient action to stop histroops participating in and with the militias who were committing vari-ous kinds of human rights abuses.

Col (Inf) F X Tono SURATMAN, East Timor military commander(Danrem l54l WD)As provincial military commander he permitted and took no actionagainst units under his control who were participating in militia activi-ties. He even joined in giving briefings to militias.

LtCol (Inf) Yayat SUDRAJAD, Tribuana Task Force Commander (DanSatgas Tribuana)Participated in providing weapons and direct support to the militias.

LtCol (Inf) SUDRAIAT, Lautem district military commander (DandimLautem)As dishict military commander he participated in providing weaponsand making his headquarters available to the Tim Alfa militia.

Maj (InO Yakraman YAGUS, Commander of Battalion Z44J DiliFailed to stop and discipline members of Battalion ZM who terrorisedand intimidated the population.

LtCol (InO Jacob Joko SAROSA, Commander of Battalion 74Sl SYBLos Palos

Suspected of responsibility for the murder of Dutch joumalist SanderThoenes, and members of his battalion were involved with militias.

Capt (InO TATANG, Commander of Company B, Battalion 7441DiliKnew there were four corpses in the battalion headquarters.

Abilio SOARES, Governor of East Timor

Participated in the formation, provision of facilities, and support of mi-litia units in every regency.

Dominggos SOARES, Regent (Bupati) of DiliInvolved in establishing and financing militias under the guise ofPamswakarsa.

Guelherme dos SANTOS, Regent (Bupati) of Bobonaro

Joined in providing facilities to militias.

Col (Infl Herman SEDYONO, Regent (Bupati) of CovalimaInvolved in the attack on the Suai Church on 5 September 1999, providedlogistics and hansportation for the forcible evacuation after the ballot

55

Masters of Teror

' LtCol (Inf) Asep KUSWANDI, Liquica military district commander(Dandim Liquica)

Involved in the chain of violence in Liquica in April 1999.

' LtCol (InO Ahmad MASAGUS, Covalima military district commander(Dandim Covalima)

Was in front of the Suai Church at the time of the attack on the church on

5 September 1999, supplied weapons to the Laksaur militia.

' Edmundo Conceicao de SILVA, Regent (Bupati) of Lautem

Active in leading meetings and patrols of the Tirn Alfa militia.. Suprapto TARMAN, Regent (Bupati) of Aileu

Participated in providing funds taken from the provincial budget and

from the Social Safety Net (Jaringan Pengaman Sosial, JPS) to Pay for the

activities of Pamswakarsa.

. LtCol (Cav) Burhanuddin SIAGIAN, Bobonaro military district com-mander (Dandim Bobonaro)Suspected of direct involvement in the murder of civilians in Bobonaroin April 1999.

c. After examining the involvement of perpetrators at the field level, the

activities of those responsible at the local level, as well as seeing variouscross-links between official policy at the central and the local level based onthe attached documents [not reproduced here], it is difficult to deny the in-volvement and responsibility of senior TNI office holders at the central level.

Upon this basis, the following individuals should be formally investigated:

' Gen WIRANTO, fomrer Defence Minister and Commander of theArmed Forces (Menhankam/ Panglima TNI)

Suspected of having foreknowledge that a situation would occur tend-ing towards violence and indeed of knowing that human rights abusehad occurred or was then occurring, but took no effective action or effortin the field; had knowledge of and justified the close relationship thatexisted between the militias and the TNI, Police and civilian bureauc-racy and their acts.

' LtGen Johny LUMINTANG, Deputy Army Chief of Staff (Wakasad)

Issued an order to use force (GUNKUAT, penggunaan kekuatan) in thename of the Army Chief of Staff while preparing preventive and repres-

sive/ coercive action as well as evacuation plans/plans to move peopleback in the event of the second option [independence] being chosen, on5 May 1999. The Chief of Staff does not have the authority to issue anorder such as was given in that letter. The order in the letter implies thatthere was a policy to apply repressive action if the first option was

The KPP-HAM Report

rejected. The order issued by LtGen TNI Johny Lumintang was the basisthat gave birth to an evacuation policy actually put into practice in EastTimor after the ballot.

. MajGen Zacky Anwar MAKARIM, member of the p4-OKTT task forceand security advisor to the P3TT task force

Conducted intelligence and operational activities beyond the terms ofhis job description of security advisor to P3TT.

o MaiGen (retired) H R GARNADI, deput5r chairperson of the task forcesP4OKTT and P3TTInvolved in supporting a policy of repression and scorched earth. Hissuggestions about the steps that need to be taken in the event of the firstoption being rejected were expressed in a document that became knownas the Garnadi document.

The Investigative Commission can confirm that from the whole process ofinvestigation including the collection of facts and documents together withstatements of witnesses and other parties, the whole range of violations offundamental human rights carried out in a wide and organised manner thathappened in the period before and after the ballot in East Timor was fullyknown and realised by the ABRI/TM Commander General whanto as being thlone responsible for national security, and the whole run of civil and militaryofficials in connection with their responsibilities in working and operating inEast Timor at that time. The breadth and lack of control of the human-rightsviolation in due course required the announcement of military utne.g".rcy, brrtthe situation could still not be controlled and INTERFET was invited becausethe TNI was institutionally incapable of controlling the situation.

All the crimes against humanity in East Timor, direct or indirect, took placebecause of the failure of the TNI Commander to guarantee the security of theimplementation of the announcement of two options by the govemment. Thepolice structure at that time under the command of the Minister for Defencecontributed to the weakening of the ability of the police apparatus in carryingout the task of security based on the New York agreement. For this, GeneralWiranto as Commander of the TNI must bear the responsibility.

As a special note, the Investigative Commission feels that without lesseningthe rights of those investigated to receive proper legal aid, the fact that all thoseinvestigated except the military obtained legal aid from what called itself theAdvocates' Human Rights Team for TNI officers ignored the possibility ofconflict of interest between one side and another. The possibility of finding aconflict of interest was very great between TNI officers, Police officers, the formerCoordinating Minister for Politics and security and the former Minister of For-eign Affairs. This fact, directly or indirectly, could hinder the work of investiga-tion in collecting facts to establish material truth and form an obstacle to theaffirmation of law and justice.

5/

Masters of Terror

Recommendations

Based on the conclusions above, the Investigative Commission puts for-ward recommendations as follows:

' To ask the Supreme Public Prosecutor to carry out an investigation ofperpetrators thought to be involved in serious human rights abuses butnot limited to the names mentioned in the above conclusion.

' To request the Government arrange protocols to gain access to all newfacts and evidence about the violations of human rights in East Timor todate that are still being uncovered by UNTAET and other internationalbodies.

t To request the Indonesian Parliament (DPR) and the govemrnent form aCourt of Fundamental Human Rights with the authority to try cases ofhuman rights violations as defined in national and international hu-man rights and humanitarian law. Such a Court should have the Powerto try violations which took place previously, including those that hap-pened in East Timor throughout this time.

. To request the Government quickly ratify the international instrumentsof human rights that are important for the affirmation human rights inIndonesia including, but not limited to the Covenant on Civil and Politi-cal Rights and the First Optional Protocol.

' To request the Govemrnent give a guarantee of security to all witnessesand victims.

. To request the Govemment work for the rehabilitation and just comPen-sation of victims and their families.

' To request the Government declare firmly that every case of violencebased on gender is a violation of human rights. Apart from that thegovernment has the duty to prePare various forms of assistance (psychi-

atric, psychological) and other compensation to the victims.

' To call upon the National Committee for Basic Human Rights - for thesake of truth and justice and the interests of history - to carry out thor-ough investigation into all human rights violations in East Timor since

1975. The result of this investigation must be produced as an officialdocument of human rights.

' To urge the Govemment to carry out a repositioning, a redefinition anda reactualisation of the TNI so that it becomes an institution for defencein a democratic nation which upholds human rights. For this the addi-tional functions of the TNI must be erased, especially the territorial func-tion that up to now has become a hindrance and nuisance for the imple-mentation of good police and civil government functions.

. To demand that the Government guarantee the affirmation of the lawand securitv and social order. In this connection there must be full

The KPP-HAM Report 59

separation between the institutions of the Indonesian Police and theTNI. Apart from this there should be a strengthening of the institution ofthe police through the professionalisation and demilitarisation of thepolice.

To urge Parliament and the Governrnent to arrange institutions andactivities of state intelligence by law guarantee that the intelligence func-tions of the nation are carried out fully for the interests of social securityand the nation alone so that they cannot be instruments for the violationof human rights.

To demand that the Government and the High Court in the legal processover crimes against humanity - whoever the perpetrators, including TNImembers - carry it out freely and independently without interferencefrom anybody.

To request the Government facilitate and remove all hindrances andpressures that hinder refugees wanting to refum to their place of origin.In this connection UNTRAET is requested to give a guarantee of law andsecurity as soon as they refum to the territory of East Timor.

Dr Albert Hasibuan, SH, ChairpersonDr Todung Mulya Lubis, SH, LLM, Deputy Chairperson

Asmara Nababan, SH, Secretary

Dr Ir. H.S. Dillon, MemberDr Koesparmono Irsan, SH, MM, MBA, Member

Dr Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, SH, Member

Dr Zoemrotin KS, Member

Munir, SH, Member

lakarta, 31 lanuary 2000

4

Crimes against Humanity in East Timor,Ianuary to October 1999:

Their Nature and Causes

lamcsDunn

Introduction

The actions violating human rights and international humanitarian law in EastTimor were directed against a decision of the United Nations Security Council,acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, and were contrary to agreements

reached by Indonesia with the United Nations to carry out that Security Coun-

cil decision. Under Article 25 of the Charter, Member States agree to accept and

carry out the decisions of the Security Council. The organised opposition inEast Timor to the Security decision requires specific international attention andresponse. The United Nations, as an organisation, has a vested interest inparticipating in the entire process of investigation, establishing responsibilityand punishing those responsible and in promoting reconciliation. Effectivelydealing with this issue will be important for ensuring that future SecurityCouncil decisions are respected.

-Para147,ICI Report

In October last year I was invited by Mr Mohamed Othmaru the ProsecutorGeneral to accept a commission to prepare a general report on the events be-hind the crimes against humanity committed in East Tirnor in 1999, and theirbackground, to assist the Court in its deliberation of the crimes against human-ity cases that would be coming before it. I also saw this request as an opportu-nity to compile a report for a wider readership, in particular for those in theUnited Nations system with an interest, even a passing one, in the world body'srole in guiding the new nation from the ashes and chaos of October 1999 to full,eventual independence. I have attempted to present this report in a form suit-able to the court, but it must remain essentially the presentation of an experi-enced observer of the recent history of East Timor, without the legal precisionand definitive substantiation that marks the discipline of prosecuting lawyersin their handling of individual cases. I hope this report will serve as a modestaid both to the Court and to others with an interest in the tragic events thattranspired in East Timor in 1999. The thrust of the report, therefore, is to ex-

plain and analyse, rather that to present the case for the prosecution. As itturned out, with extremely limited assistance this modest effort has in fact beena marathon task, and no doubt some aspects of what is a rather complex pat-tern of events will not have been adequately treated.

The Dunn Report 61

The aim and scope of the report

This report is essentially a general examination of what I believe to be themain elements behind the tragic and disastrous events which swept over EastTimor in 1999. Its aim is to improve the understanding of United Nations offi-cials charged with responsibility for the investigation and eventual prosecu-tion of crimes against humanity which, it is alleged, were perpetrated againstthe people of East Timor by the armed forces of Indonesia and the militia be-tween 1 fanuary and 25 october 1999. rn preparing this report I have taken intoaccount the findings and conclusions of the report of the International Com-mission of Inquiry established in November 1999 by cHR Resolution 7999/g4/1. of 27 september 1999, and endorsed by ECosoC decision 1999 /293 of lsNovember 1999.1 | have also taken careful account of the commendable effortsby Indonesia's KPP HAM to investigate these crimes against humanity, to iden-tify those responsible for them, and to bring them to justice.2 This report is frankand detailed, and its conclusions reflect the commitment, the impartiality andthe concem of its authors.

The ICI reporf referred to, recommended that its conclusions be considereda 'starting point in the process of bringing those responsible to justice,. Itexpressed 'the view that ultimately the Indonesian Army was responsible forthe intimidation, terror, killings, and other acts of violence experienced by thepeople of East Timor before and after the popular consultation'.3 In this reportI have set out to, among other things, assist further progress in that directiory byshowing that there is evidence available - much of which I have been unable topresent in detail in the limited time available and with the extremely limitedresources available - to justify the institution of proceedings against certainsenior officers of the Indonesian National Army (the TNI), as well as leadersand members of the milifia, in relation to the counts of crimes against humanitythat were highlighted in the ICI report. Already, it is noted, the Govemment ofIndonesia has announced its intention to bring some, but not all, of the personsmentioned in this reporf before a Tribunal in fakarta, an undertaking that hasyet to be fulfilled.

Because those who planned and facilitated militia operations, includingmost militia group leaders, are now in Indonesia, the institution of these pro-ceedings and, where appropriate, prosecutiory involves complex internationalnegotiations if this fundamentally important exercise in upholding interna-tional humanitarian law and human rights is to succeed. while the prosecu-tion of members of militia units who are held in East Timor is an encouragingbeginning, the fact that those who organised, trained and directed their opera-tions are still inaccessible to UNTAET's law-enforcement agencies will presenta moral dilemma until the problem of access is resolved.

In dealing with individual cases of militia killings here in Dili, where theaccused is charged with murder, it is important to take account of the wider

Masters of Terror

context - what we call crimes against humanity. These crimes were plannedand are systematic in character. The victim was only one of rt?rfr and the aimwas to intimidate, terrorise, eliminate or punish a target group of persons. Inmost of these cases responsibility for the crime must, at least be shared betweenthe killer and those who planned or made possible the operation in which thecrime was comrnitted. Acknowledging the command responsibility is centralto the pursuit of justice in relation to war crimes, or what we call crimes againsthumanity. In the case of the events that occurred in L999 it follows that theultimate responsibility rests with those who planned, organised, trained andequipped the militia. It is also apparent that the brutal TNI culture, which led toserious human rights violations from December 1975 onwards, left its irnprinton the various incidents rn 1999. My own research into events of that time hasrevealed a consistent pattem of brutality, in the TNI's response to opposition tothe integration of East Timor into Indonesia. In the wider perspective, it isworth recalling the recommendation contained the report of Mr Bacre WalyNdiaye, Special Rapporteur, on his mission to East Timor in |uly 1994. tn rela-tion to the Santa Cruz killings, he stated that these 'killings should not beconsidered as a thing of the past. They must not be forgottery and there is stilltime to correct the shortcomings, noted at all levels, in the way in which viola-tions of the right to life have been dealt with by the Indonesian authorities inEast Timor: it is not too late to conduct proper investigations, to identify andbring to justice the pelpetrators, to determine the fate and whereabouts of themissing persons, to grant compensation to the victims or their relatives, and toprevent the occurrence of further killings.'a

The further pursuit of justice in this matter is dependent on political coop-eration from the Government of Indonesia. While the early resPonses from theGovernment of President Wahid have been encouraging, the political climatein Indonesia may have changed to the extent that the further pursuit of these

matters could well turn out to be a lengthy process, with their ultimate resolu-tion being dependent on the support and political will of the internationalcommunity. The record so far is bleak. As Professor Harold Crouch, a leadinginternational authority on lndonesian politics, states in a recent report (in rela-tion to legal action in Indonesia in general) that 'Although the investigations(so far) have uncovered much evidence of killing and other crimes/ they havenot produced more than a handful of prosecutions. And even when convic-tions have been obtained, the sentences have often been extraordinarily light,and suspected "masterminds" behind the offences have not been charged.'sHowever, the major crimes against humanity that were committed in East Timorrn 1999, in fact those committed since the beginning of the lndonesian occuPa-

tion of Timor Loro'sae, cannot be left to drift into historical obscurity. ln termsof their magnitude and the brutality attending them, these incidents are ex-tremely serious crimes, by *y measure, and should therefore be addressed bythe international community, at the very least in the event that, for whatever

The Dunn Report

political reasons, the authorities of Indonesia are unable, or even disinclined,to confront them. The option of the setting up of an intemational tribunal willneed to be considered, in order to deal with those responsible for the crimesagainst humanity in East Timor during a period when the welfare of the peopleof this country was formally considered by the United Nations not to be ihelegitimate property of the Indonesian authorities. The challenge before theintemational community has been succinctly recorded by Harold Crouch:

The intemational community will lose its credibility if it ceases to insist ontrials of gross human rights offenders where Indonesia has undertaken itsmost visible obligation, namely with respect to events in East Timor n 1999.But more than credibility is involved. At bottom the international community'scontinued involvement with the accountabilifr issue is grounded in a beliefthat its own interests are deeply involved in Indonesia's efforts to establish astable and secure democratic society since Indonesia is one of the world's mostpopulous and significant countries.6

Between 1 January and 25 October 1999 widespread extra judicial, sum-mary or arbitrary executions - including both mass murder and individualkillings, as well as torfure and violence against women - were carried out againstthe people of East Timor. These crimes against humanity were planned, weresystematically carried out and were perpetrated on a wide scale. They weredirected against particular groups; in particular, leaders of the independencemovement and East Timorese who were perceived to be their supporters, butthese actions often degenerated into indiscriminate killings. In some cases bru-tal attacks were also directed against Church officials on the grounds, that theChurch was perceived as supporting the option of independence. Apart fromkillings, these attacks on the person led to widespread injuries, to sexual as-saults against women and to abductions.

Activities by the militia and the TNI, in September 1999,1ed to the wide-spread massive displacement and deportation of peoples. The evidence, basedon a wide sampling of interviews and on the observations of other observers,indicates that most East Timorese transported to West Timor were in fact forcedto go against their will. They were given orders or explicit directions, oftenaccompanied by threats of violence. Also it was the well-founded fear of vio-lence from TNl/militia forces that caused tens of thousands of East Timorese toflee from their homes to mountain areas, where they were to endure food short-ages, lack of medical treatment, and other difficulties until international reliefarrived, and the security of their home environments was ensured by the pres-ence of Interfet forces. In total more than 500,000 Timorese, or more than d0 percent of the entire population, were displaced by the violence or threats of vio-Ience in september 1999. Moreover, the entire adrninistrative and social orderof the province was destroyed so that in November 1999, when UNTAET wasfirst established, the returning East Timorese were assembling in devastatedtowns and villages totally devoid of the basic infrastructure of a community.

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64 Masters of Terror

Some relevant historical notes

The island of Timor came under Portuguese influence in the first half of the15th century, when the Portuguese established a colony in the Solor Islands,east of Flores. The Portuguese presence in Oecussi was established in the 17thcentury, but it was not until 1769 that the serious colonisation of what is nowEast Timor was begun, when the Porfuguese colonial administration was movedto Dili. The present division of the island was agreed to in general terms in themid-19th century, but was not confirmed until the Sentenca Arbitral agreementof 1913. Portuguese colonial rule continued unchallenged until an interven-tion by Allied forces in late 1941 led to an occupation by fapan until the lattersurrendered in August 1945. Portugal was then able to resume its colonial rule.

Soon after Indonesia gained its independence in 1949, the Sukamo goverrl-ment lodged a claim to the adjacent territory of Dutch West New Guinea, whichit eventually formally acquired in 1979, but at no stage did the Government ofIndonesia lay a claim to Portuguese East Timor. Following the Lisbon Coup inApril1974, the people of East Timor, along with the peoples of other Portu-guese colonies, were extended by the new Porfuguese goverrunent the right todetermine their own future, and choose independence if they so wished. Earlyn 1975 the two major parties, UDT and Fretilin, formed a coalition for inde-pendence, a ra*rer flimsy arrangement which failed to survive in the face of anIndonesian intelligence strategy designed to bring about its collapse. Thanksin part to these efforts the Portuguese colonial administration's a decolonisationprogram was hampered by a widening gulf between the two major parties.

The next move by Indonesian intelligence was to provoke a brief civil con-flict between the Fretilin and UDT parties. However, in October 1975, a monthafter the Fretilin victory over its rival, Indonesian forces entered the province ina covert military operation, which was designed ultimately to bring about theintegration of the colony. This invasion was, in the event, strongly resisted bythe forces of Fretilin, at the time the de facto administration of the territory,which was seeking the return of the Portuguese (who had retired to Atauro),and the resumption of the decolonisation program. The major invasion of EastTimor then took place on 7 December 1975.

In a strongly worded UN General Assembly Resolution Indonesia was calledon to withdraw its troops from the territory and to allow for a genuine act ofself-determination. The General Assembly also referred the matter to the Secu-rity Council, which repeated the demand that Indonesian withdraw its troops.The Government of Indonesia did not comply with these demands and, largelybecause of an extremely low level of interest on the part of the major players inthe international community, the Security Council Resolution appeared towither on the vine. In luly 1976, in disregard of the concerns of the UnitedNations, President Suharto proclaimed East Timor the 27th province of theRepublic. This action was not, however, recognised by the United Nations, the

The Dunn Report

stafus of East Timor remaining on its agenda as an unresolved issue until thedramatic events oI 7999. UNGA Resolution 30/37 of 1982 set the stage for aprocess of negotiation between the representatives of Portugal and Indo-nesia, a process that proceeded only fitfully until after the santa Cruz mas-sacre of 1991.

In the meantime, the people of East Timor suffered tragically as Indonesiaresorted to severe military measures in order to suppress persistent oppositionto the illegal integration of the territory. As a background to the events of 1999,it is important that the pattern of violations against the people of East Timorshould be taken into account. From the very beginning of the military interven-tion, there were persistent reports of gross human rights violations. In the weekfollowing the invasion of Dili hundreds of citizens of the capital, almost all ofthem non-combatants, were summarily executed. These killings, some of whichtook the form of mass executions, included women and at least one foreigner,Roger East, a journalist from Australia. Mass executions at Liquica, Maubara,Aileu and near Bobonaro were reported in the months following the invasion.According to reports received in Australia from Church sources, as many as50,000 Timorese may have died in the year following the invasion, and asmany as 200,000 in the subsequent four years, many of course from disease andstarvation. summary executions continued in the 80s and 90s, the worst knowncases being the Creras massacres, where more than 1,000 East Timorese werekilled by rampaging TNI troops, and the Santa Cruz massacre, which report-edly claimed the lives of more than 200 Timorese. There were also persistentreports of torfure and sexual assault, which were given frequent attention inthe annual reportsT of Amnesty Intemational and, later, Human Rights Watch.However, until the santa Cruz incident the response from the internationalcommunity was negligible, with the major powers declining to support the fewcalls for an international investigation.

It is important that this pattem of behaviour on the part of the Indonesianmilitary be taken into account when judging the events of 1999. The relevanceof the historical background was noted in the KPP HAM report, which recom-mended that 'a comprehensive investigation be carried out into all crimes againsthumanity committed in East Timor since 1975'.8 TNI attitudes during thisperiod clearlye reflected a persistent disregard for basic human rights, espe-cially when dealing with those suspected of being opposed to integration. Themilitary's persistent brutal treatment of the East Timorese, including the masskillings, was evidently ignored or tolerated by the Government of Indonesia, astance no doubt encouraged by the extremely low level of interest in the plightof the people of this remote and, at that time, little-known territory. There was,however, considerable international reaction to the Santa Cruz killings, butsummary executions on a smaller scale, torfure and other abuse in fact contin-ued. As recently as 1995 six East Timorese were executed in the Liquica area,although in this case a TNI officer was charged with the offence. From the

6 Masters of Tenor

outcome of these trials it was evident that the Suharto Govemment had notaddressed what had become a culture of oppression and brutality in East Timor.

In January of that year President Habibie agreed to allow the people of East

Timor to decide between the option of autonomy and independence. Arrange-ments for the plebiscite were agreed to on 5 May, with UNAMET undertakingthe task of setting up the plebiscite.lo The vote was taken on 30 August and on4 September the results were .mnounced. 78.5 per cent of a voting turnout ofmore than 98 per cent, came out against the autonomy proposal.

Militia violence against supporters of independence began early in 1999,

and in earnest in April when Operasi Sapu jagad (Operation Clean Sweep)11

was launched. However, the main thrust of the violence occurred between 4September, when the results of the plebiscite were announced in Dili, and the

end of September, when the INTERFET force was able to restore security to the

central and eastem sectors of East Timor. This operation of massive destruc-tion, ransacking and deportation was also devised by the TNI when it wasrealised that the plebiscite was likely to go against integration. Accordingly, in|uly the TNI began developing Operasi Wiradharma, the evacuation of East

Timor, an operation which apparently also used the code-name, Guntur. Theplan, which was devised at least two months before it was launched, wascommanded by TNI Kopassus officers, with Major Generals Zakky AnwarMakarim and Adam Damiri playmg key command roles. According to informedsorrces in |akarta, it was planned to deport most of East Timor's population toWest Timor, from where they would later be dispersed to other parts of thearchipelago. The planners seemed to believe that the violence would persuadethe MP& the Indonesian Parliament, to reject the outcome of the ballot. Theoperation began in the immediate aftermath of the announcing of the results ofthe plebiscite, and was focused on the deportation of a large part of the popula-tion of East Timor, the destruction of most houses and buildings, and on a

campaign of terror against the staff of UNAMET, foreign journalists and otherforeigners present in East Timor at that time.

The role of the Indonesian military, the formation of the militia and thecampaign of terror

The use of the term 'militia'may be of recent origin in East Timor, but the

training and use of Timorese in para-military units goes back to the time ofbrdonesia's military intervention in East Timor n 1975. In that year the oldestof the militia units, Halilintar, was established following a covert military train-ing program conducted in West Timor by a special TNI military force, com-manded by then Colonel Dading Kalbuardi. 12 This operation was code-namedOperasi Komoilo, and its aim was to procure the integration of Portuguese Timor,which was then in the process of decolonisation. Halilintar troops, then led byTomas Goncalves and Joao Tavares, accompanied the TNI military force in a

The Dunn Reoort

support capacity/ in Operasi Flamboyan (Operation Poinciana tree), a covertmilitary action against Fretilin forces in West Timor in mid-October 1975 in theaftermath of the latter's victory over UDT. It was an operation planned by thethen commanders of RPKAD (the Army Paratroop Regiment) and members ofOPSUS (special operations), an elite combination which was the pre-cursor ofKopassus, ABRI's Special Forces command. The way East Timorese were usedin this operation marked the beginning of a TNI policy of using willing Timoresein operations conceived and planned by military commanders, in which theformer provided a political front designed to mask the leading role of the Indo-nesian military.

ln1975, some months after the invasion of Dili, most of the Halilintar troopswere re-deployed to form the basis of Battalion 74413, a regular territorial unit,which was later to be joined by Battalion 745. These units were largely made upof Timorese soldiers, but were staffed by Indonesian officers. Halilintar itselfwas disbanded in 7982, and, was not reformed until 1998. In the late 70sTimorese were again used in paramilitary roles in the Hansip, or civil defenceunits, which in fact also existed in other parts of Indonesia. The development ofthese bodies took place against the background of a harsh, and at times brutal,campaign against the population of East Timor by the occupying military forces.While considerable international attention has been devoted to the killing offive newsmen from Australia at Balibo in October 1975, this incident was onlythe first of a serious of atrocities alleged to have been committed by Indonesianmilitary units over the ensuing 16 years. Summary executions on a mass scalebegan in the days following the invasion of Dili on 7 December, when hun-dreds of East Timorese were killed, many of them in several mass executions.Similar atrocities were reported elsewhere in Timor in the next three years,during a period when there were no intemational observers in the territory to bearwitness to these incidents of summary execution and indiscriminate killing.

Thus mass killings were reported (mostly by Church sources) to have oc-curred at several locations, mostly in the interior of the island. One of the mostserious of these tragic incidents, which was said to have claimed the lives ofmore than 1,200 East Timorese, was reported to have occurred near Bobonaroin 1976.14 Later, in 1983, according to a Timorese official who investigated theincident, more than 1000 Timorese were killed in the Ossu area by rampagingIndonesian troops. The massacre was in revenge for the earlier killing of 16 TNItroops by Falintil guerrillas, which itself was a response to the brutal rape of aTimorese woman by TNI troops. The fact that these tragic events led to noaction by the Indonesian authorities to discipline the units concerned, or pres-sured from the intemational community, appears to have created a convictionamong the military commanders concerned that they enjoyed an immunityfrom legal action or international scrutiny. The TNI's culture of oppressionand brutality, which has already been referred to, had been formally estab-lished. Until 1999 the only major incident to attract significant international

67

58 Masters of Teror

attention was the massacre of more than 200 Timorese by Indonesian troops,following a peaceftrl demonstration at Santa Cruz cemetery in November 1991,.

In the face of international pressures some legal action was taken against a

small number of troops. However, it is noteworthy that they were accused notof murder but of having disobeyed orders. Their sentences were light, andstood in stark contrast to the heavy prison sentences handed down to severalTimorese demonstrators by an Indonesian court. While this incident causedinternational concern and some action by the United Nations, the responsewas hardly enough to end what had become, during the Suharto regime, stand-ard practice in the way the Indonesian military treated dissidents, whether inEast Timor or elsewhere in the Republic.

It is against this background that the setting up of the militia and the way itresorted to brutal tactics need to be considered. The origins of Timorese para-military units have already been examined. The militia as it existed in\999,and as an extension of the para-military force Halilintar, go back to the 80s

when East Timorese para-military units were again formed, specifically to in-volve the local population in operations not only against Falintil, the armedresistance, but against the growing phenomenon of passive resistance. Thebest known of these early units was Team Alpha (Tim Alfa) which, with TeamSaka (Tim Saka), was formed in 1986 in the eastem sector of East Timor by aKopassus officer, Captain Luhud Pandjaitan, reportedly acting on orders fromhis commander, then Colonel Prabowo. Team Alpha's members were trainedand paid, and their operations against pro-independence elements organised,by Indonesian military officers. Another significant move was the setting up ofthe Gada Paksi (Gadu Penegak Integrasi, Guards to Uphold Integration) rn 7994,also reportedly by Prabowo. The Gada Paksi was conceived as a way of mobi-lising young pro-integration activists.

The formation of the militia was evidently yet another initiative of Kopassus,the TNI's Special Forces Command. This special military group became aselect army within Indonesia's military force structure, at the time called ABRI(Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia). Its members were specially cho-sen, received special training and equipment, enjoyed privileges and were gen-erally regarded as an elite corps, with, in the time of President Suharto, the elitemission of protecting the integrity of the Indonesian state. While elements ofKopassus (Groups 1 and 2) made up a special combat force, other parts of theforce have been engaged in operations of a covert kind. Hence, Group 3 wassaid to have dealt with terrorism, while Groups 4 and 5 have in the past beenengaged in intelligence operations against opposition groups, their actionsincluded kidnapping and 'disappearances'. The financing of the covert opera-tions of this internal security force had reportedly been facilitated in part thoughthe extensive business operations of Kopassus.ls

Kopassus has had a long involvement in East Timor, its founding com-manders having played key roles in the illegal military intervention against the

The Dunn Report

Fretilin Administration in october 1975. Throughout the 24 years of Indone-sian rule in East Timor, Kopassus officers have played a key role not onlyagainst the Falintil armed resistance, but also in the wider community againstthe growing ranks of rimorese pro-independence activists. Events in the monthsfollowing the downfall of President suharto became a matter of some concernto TNI officers in East Timor, where Kopassus members occupied key posts.Moves by President Habibie to dismantle the so-called orde Baru, and liberal-ise Indonesian politics, served to stimulate demands in East Timor for the rightto self-determination the people of the territory had not yet been able to exercise.

Based on the material I have been able to examine it is clear that the settingup of the militia, in the form it assumed rn1999, was the outcome, not of pro-integrationist Timorese demands, but of an initiative by a group of senior TNIofficers, all of whom appear to have been members of Kopassus. These officerswere motivated by a determination to head off the risk of losing East Timor as aconsequence of mounting domestic pressures on President Habibie, includingpressures for democratic reform, international urgings and increased UnitedNations efforts. statements by the President himself, in the months followinghis appointment, foreshadowed a significant change of policy on the part ofthe new government of Indonesia. on 9 June 1998 President Habibie told aReuters correspondent that he was considering 'special stafus' and wider au-tonomy to East Timor. Less than a week later 1500 East Timorese sfudentsdemonstrated in Dili, where they called for a referendum and for the release ofXanana Gusmao. On 18 June Foreign Minister Ali Alatas presented new pro-posals to Portugal regarding East Timor. These events led to more public pro-tests, with violent responses from Indonesian troops, who killed several stu-dent demonstrators.

The plan to develop the militia in all districts of the province of East Timormay have enjoyed the support of leading Timorese opposed to change - amongthem, Govemor Abilio Soares, Francisco Lopes da Cruz and foao Tavares - butit was initially a military response, a plan devised by Generals Syamsuddinand Zakky Anwar Makarim, between July and September 1998.16 According tothe testimony of fulio Femandes, the official launch of the militia occurred on10 or 12 August 1998 at a meeting attended by Major General Damiri andColonel Tono Suratnam, as well as foao Tavares, Eurico Guterres, and Canciode Carvalho. Damiri and suratman told those present that they must organiseto protect integration.

At the time it was apparent that support for ultimate independence hadgrown rapidly in East Timor in the previous months. The formation of themilitia was apparently perceived as a way of creating what in fact was anillusion - that the people of East Timor did not want independence, and wereprepared to use coercion and even force in order to ensure that the provinceremained as a constifuent part of the Indonesian Republic. Their views were ofcourse shared by Timorese opposed to independence, such as the Governor,

70 Masters of Tenor

Abilio Soares, and other Timorese supporters of integration, from whose ranksleaders of the militia groups were chosen. On the other hand, as militia vio-lence began to develop, some members became disillusioned and withdrew,while it became increasingly difficult to recruit new members. In the monthsleading up to the September violence, in some areas Militia leaders resorted toforms of conscription of new members, with violence being used on occasion

against those who resisted.lT The organisational structure of the militia wasvirtually integrated into the TNI structure in East Timor.rs Militia units wereformed in each of the 13 Kabupaten (districts), with the commanders beingchosen or confirmed by the TNI command. These were as follows:

Militia Place Leader

1. TimAIfa Lautem foni Marques

Serka Kopassus Joanico da Costale

Martinho Fernandes

Nazario Corterel

Horacio

Cancio de Carvalho

Olivio Mendonca Moruk

Eurico Guterres

Simao Lopes

Manuel de Sousa

Joao de Tavares

Natalino Monteiro

Edmundo de Conceicao Silva

Lafaek Saburai

5. AHI Aileu

14.Darah Merah Ermeralntegrasi

The above list is by no means an exhaustive one. In the Bobonaro/Malianaarea, for example, there were at least six groups, with Halilintar forming theheadquarters. While the plan to form these units was conceived and commencedin 1998, most were not operational until April 1999. These units varied in size,the most prominent being Halilintar and Aitarak. Halilintar's commander,foao Tavares, a former Bupati of Bobonaro district, was appointed Panglima, oroverall commander of militia chiefs in East Timor, an appointment said to havebeen made by TNI officers. Tavares had had a long association with para-military bodies, having been a founding member of the Halilintar force, whichaccompanied Colonel Dading Kalbuardi's RPKAD force on the TNI's first majormilitary assault against East Timor in October 1975.n

2.

J.

Saka/Sera Baucau

Pedjuang 59-75Makikit Viqueque

Ablai Manufahi

5. Mahidi

7. Laksaur

8. Aitarak

12.Dadurus

13. jati MerahPutih

Ainaro

Covalima

Dli

Bobonaro

Lospalos

9. Sakunar Oecussi

10. BMP Liquica(Besi Merah Putih)

11. Halilintar Bobonaro/Maliana

The Dunn Report

Aitarak came under the command of the flambouyant East Timorese, EuricoGutteres. A much younger man, Eurico's earlier links had been with Fretilin.His parents had been killed by Indonesian troops, while he himself, as a teen-ater, had worked as a courier for Falintil before being captured by a Kopassusunit, which aPPears to have been responsible for the redirection of his loyalties.

The crimes against humanity

The crimes against humanity committed in East Timor in 1999 are wide-ranging in their detail. They are outlined in greater detail elsewhere in thisreport. They are listed below, in rather general terms. As for the victims, whilethe main targets were pro-independence activists, and other known support-ers of the independence movement, most of the people of the East Timoresenation virfually became victims of at least one of these crimes - e.g., deportationor deprivation of shelter. In September 1999 the priests, brothers and nunsbecame targets, not only because pro-independence supporters sought sancfu-ary in the churches, but because the Church was seen by at least some of theTNI commanders and militia leaders as being opposed to the autonomy op-tion. These attitudes were manifestly present during the brutal killings at Suaiand in Lautem, and the assault on Bishop Belo's residence in Dili.

While it could not be said that these killings were of a genocidal character,there was a degree of wanton discrimination against families of the key targets,including women and children. East Timorese who had worked for UNAMETwere also singled out and in some cases were brutally executed. Indonesiannationals supporting the Timorese right to choose independence, if they so wished,were also at risk and a number of them were lucky to escape with their lives.

The major crimes and the killing fields

In summary the following violations represented a massive onslaught onthe human rights and well-being of the people of East Timor.

. The wanton killing of hundreds of East Timorese: The true figure for thetotal loss of life is not yet known, and may never be known. However, onthe basis of the information available, and on discussions with Churchofficials, Timorese human rights activists, Civpol and Interfet officers,and on my own observations in the period around the plebiscite it maywell be greatly in excess of 1,000 persons. I gained the strong impressionthat not enough is known about killings outside the major atrocities,especially during the period between the announcement of the results ofthe plebiscite and the end of September. It is important to note that thesekillings were systematic, and were directed against the opponents ofcontinued integration with Indonesia. When the violent acts occurredthe situation was invariably one-sided, with the victims being unarmed,and unprotected by local law-enforcement authorities. The killings wereoften brutally carried out, with the bodies sometimes being mutilated.

7',|

72 Masters of Tenor

' Hundreds of cases of injury to the person: In the period between earlyApril and the end of September 1999, many Timorese were injured inmilitia attacks, especially in the Covalima, Bobonaro, Ermera, Liquicaand Dili areas.

' Many cases of torture, intimidation, rape and abduction: Many victimswere beaten, some being left with serious injuries. There were also manyassaults against women and children. According to a FOKUPERS re-port there were 182 cases of gender-based human rights violations.2lThese include rape, kidnapping and, in some instances, slavery.

r Forced deportation: It is generally accepted that more than 250,000 EastTimorese were transported to Indonesia, most to West Timor. In almostall instances, according to my own inquiries, the Timorese were ordered,not requested or persuaded, to leave their homes. There are persistentreports from refugee camps in West Timor that the use of force has con-tinued to be used to prevent those refugees who desire to retum to theirvillages from doing so.

' The forced flight from their homes: More than 200,000 East Timoresewere compelled, through what should be considered well-founded fears,to flee to the mountains. They were soon to be facing starvation in theconditions of the time. It should be noted that the flight to the mountain-ous interior occurred during the dry season when there was very littlefood to be found in the natural environment, especially in the hinterlandof Dili.

r The wilful destruction, damaging and ransacking of the houses or shel-ter: This massive scorched earth campaign caused the destruction of thebasic shelter of more than 80 per cent of East Timor's population. In theurban areas at least ransacking and pillaging denied tens of thousandsof East Timorese of their worldly possessions. There was no subsequentattempt by the Indonesian authorities to organise the return of thesegoods.

o The wilful destruction, ransacking or damaging of schools, health cen-tres, etc: The right to education and health are today widely consideredfundamental rights. The destruction of these facilities has in effect se-

verely set back these services in East Timor, especially in the field ofeducation.

The major killings and their characteristics

Mass killings or executions have an understandably special quality of hor-ror about them, and for that reason the main focus in East Timor has tended tobe on the horrific killings in Suai, Liquica, Maliana and other places. It needs tobe stressed, however, that numerous killings on a smaller scale - often involv-ing individuals - occurred elsewhere in the territory, and have attracted much

The Dunn Report

less attention, including, I suspec! from UN investigators. These lesser-knownkillings and cases of assault on the person were part of the wave of brutalitiescarried out by the militia and the TNI. It reached most parts of East Timor,although there were great variations in intensity. Among the worst areas wereCovalima and suai and the Bobonaro/Maliana district. There were many indi-vidual killings, but they should be considered as part of the crimes againsthumanity, in that they were directed against individuals as members of a par-ticular group, within the context of the wider aim of eliminating, neutralising,or punishing the opposition to integration. The main wave of violence occurredin september, when many pro-independence supporters were singled out forsummary execution while the systematically executed pembumihangusan, orscorched earth operation, was in progress.

In some instances, especially in the interior of the territory, these killingsmay have escaped investigation. Even in Dili, though my inquiries have hardlybeen exhaustive, I have not been able to establish just how many Timorese werekilled in the rampage between 4 September and the arrival of Interfet. Myinvestigations have produced a wide range of estimates - from 3Z to whatseems to be an improbable figure of 500, in the period under review. In Liquicaa figure of more than 200 was mentioned repeatedly by local residents. Thelarge-scale killings, however, deserve special attention for a number of reasons.They required a degree of organisation, and in most cases there was a visible, ifnot commanding, TNI participation, together with, at best, a total failure of thePolri to intervene to protect the citizens under attack, who were almost invari-ably unarmed. Throughout most of 1999 the armed resistance forces, theFALINTIL, were inactive, in response to specific orders from the Commander,and were in most cases unable to help protect their supporters. with some18,000 TNI troops, and perhaps 20,000 militia in East Timor the FALINTILforce of less than 2,000 was massively outnumbered. Any attempt to intervenerisked a massive reprisal against the civilian population. This was demon-strated at Cailaco, in the Maliana district on 12 April, when a FALINTIL-linkedforce killed Manuel soares Gama and two TNI personnel, fwho had earliermurdered six Timorese in Gama's house. The very next day a force led byLieutenant Colonel siagian and foao Tavares reportedly kidnapped, torturedand then executed six residents of Cailaco.

Killings in the Dili area

The killing of Manuelito, the young son of Manuel Carrascalao, and at least11 displaced Timorese from Liquica, Alas and Turiscai, took place on 17 April1999 at the Carrascalao residence in Dili, which was also used as the secre-tariat of the Movement for the Reconciliation and Unity of the people of EastTimor, of which Manuel Carrascalao was Chairman. Manuelito,s compan-ions and many refugees had sought refuge in the house from violence in theirhome towns. The house was attacked by Aitarak and Besi Merah putih militia

73

Mnsters of Tenor

following a rally that day by more than 5,000 militia, outside the Governor'soffice, a meeting that was presided over by Colonel Tono Suratnam, the Koremcommander. The attack was a particularly brutal one, on a house where therewere some 143 persons seeking refuge. It took the life of Manuelito, the coura-geous teenage son of Manuel, who attempted to persuade the militia to stoptheir assault and spare the lives of the refugees inside the house.

Some killings were reported in the following months, but the presence ofUNAMET headquarters and a sizeable intemational community seems to havedeterred the militia from further massacres, that is until the destructive assaultof September. As the Aitarak militia grew in size and aggressiveness, violencebegan to increase, especially in August. On 5 September, the day following therelease of the results of the plebiscite 25 people were reported to have beenkilled by Aitarak members at the Camara Ecclesiastica Diocese in Dili. On thefollowing day some of the refugees in Bishop Belo's house are reported to havebeen murdered, though the figures have not yet been confirmed. Some EastTimorese university sfudents who had just retumed from Java, were also re-ported to have been killed. Others, including a German priest and a civilian,were killed in the period prior to the arrival of the lnterfet forces, but the fullcasualties during this chaotic period are apparently still not known. The claimthat bodies were taken out to sea in barges and disposed of has not been proverybut it cannot yet be dismissed. I was in Dili at the time, and was informed by aTimorese that this form of disposal was taking place, and myself witnessedtwo barges going far out into the waters between Dili and Atauro. They spentless than an hour in that location before returning to Dili. Based on my ownobservations, as well as reports from Timorese, the assault on Dili, which be-gan on 4 September, less than two hours after the announcement of the plebisciteresults, was led by TNI personnel, most of whom were dressed in Aitarak shirb.At the Bishop's house an unnamed TNI Lieutenant Colonel escorted the Bishopaway from the scene before the house was bumed and several refugees killed.

The Oecussi killings

While there were reports of murders and intimidation in the Oecussi en-clave before August 1999, the main killings occurred between 8-10 September.The killers included members of 745 Battalion of the TNI and a substantialnumber of militia. On Wednesday 8 September a force, including about 200

troops attacked the villages of Tumin, Kiobiselo, Nonkikan and Nibin, andkilled about 14 men. The next day at Imbate about 70 young men, who weresaid to have been selected on the basis of their educational ability, were sepa-rated from the rest of the people gathered there. They were bound in pairs andwere marched to Passabe. At 1 am on 10 September, following a pre-arrangedsignal a mass slaughter of these young men was carried out, the victims beingshot or hacked to death. According to the investigators, the main instigators ofthe massacre included the Police Chief of Passabe, Gabriel Colo and Laurentino

The Dunn Reoort

Soares, aka Moko, but it is also recorded that the massacre was controlled bv asmall number of men who were both TNI soldiers and members of the mili-tia.The total number of victims is estimated at more than 70, but these killingscould not be investigated until after the arrival of Interfet forces on 2 October. Inthe words of the investigator, 'there is no positive data available at this time topositively identify how many murders had occurred in the enclave between L

January and 25 October 1.999'. However the killings referred to above were saidto be carried out'predominantly by the Sakunar Militia group, supported bythe TNI'.

Suai/Covalima

The Covalima district, or kabupaten, in which Suai is located, was one ofthe worst centres of violence by the militia/TNl in 1999. several independencesupporters were killed in January, most of them by the Mahidi, and in at leastone case in an operation with infantry and Kopassus troops. The main atrocityoccurred at the Ave Maria Church when at least 200 of displaced East Timoresewho were seeking refuge there were slaughtered in an attack by Mahidin andLaksaur militia, supported by TNI and Brimob (Mobile Brigade) personnel.The attack was a particularly brutal one, which also took the lives of priestswho had tried to negotiate with the attacking forces. There is strong evidencethat the attack was actually directed by two TNI officers - Infantry ColonelHerman Sediono (who was also Bupati) and TNI Lieutenant Sugito, who laterdirected the disposal of the bodies in mass graves. Following this attack, sev-eral women survivors were reportedly taken to Covalima Kodim Headquartersand sexually assaulted.

Maliana

The massacre at Maliana police station was the most serious incident inthis area, but it was merely the culmination of a wave of violence that began inFebruary 1,999. ln that month Militia groups launched attacks in Maliana,Atabai, and Cailaco. The Bobonaro/Maliana area militia groups22 were nu-merous, and were under the command of Joao Tavares, the militia Panglima,and their operations were inextricably linked with TNI operations, under thecommand of Lieutenant-Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian. On 12 April sixTimorese were kidnapped and then murdered by Halilintar troops. This wasfollowed by a Falintil revenge attack, in which a Halilintar leader and two TNIsoldiers were killed. On 13 April a force led by Siagian and Tavares allegedlykidnapped, torfured and then executed six Timorese from Cailaco village, re-portedly randomly selected, in revenge for the Falintil killing. From mid-Au-gust onwards the militia increased their activities. During this period severalmurders were committed and houses burnt. On the last day of the electioncampaign militia attacked Memo, killing three persons and destroying 20houses. On 2 September two UNAMET local staff were shot dead by a TNI

/3

75 Masters of Terror

sergeant. At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian is re-ported as having told LINAMET local staff that they would be killed after theConsultation.23 The Halilintar and Dadurus Merah Putih militias, backed bythe TNI began a campaign of destruction in Maliana on 4 September, duringwhich several local citizens were killed.

The main rrnssacre occurred at the Maliana police station on 8 Septemberwhen Dadurus Militia Putih Militia, backed by TNI troops, attacked a largegroup of Timorese who were seeking refuge in the police station. According toInterfet investigators, more than 70 persons were killed, many of them in abrutal matter. According to one of these investigators, the TNI were positionedaround militia killers, who had reportedly been given drugs, and shot Timoreseatternpting to escape from the scene.2a A characteristic of all these operationswas the involvement of the TM at all levels.

Lautem/Lospalos

The eastern districts of East Timor did not suffer the same level of violence,and several villages, among them Uatolari and Viqueque, virtually escapingdestruction by the militia. lndividual acts of violence or killing did begin early,however. On 17 March 1999 Mariano Soares, a prominent citizen of Trilokavillage disappeared and is believed to have been killed. A week later anotherTimorese was killed by TNI troops in the Baucau district. On 17 April membersof Team Alpha killed Virgilio de Sousa, a prominent independence supporterin his home in Bauro Village in Los Palos. In August, on the eve of the plebisciteLos Palos village chief Verissimo Quintas was brutally killed by local militia,following an attack on his house.

The worst period for the Los Palos/Baucau occurred well after the plebi-scite. On 12 September four Timorese were killed, reportedly by TNI troops, atthe Lospalos Military sub-district command, and on the same day five personswere said to have been killed at Baucau by Battalion 745 troops. The worstrnassacre in the area occurred on 25 September, five days after INTERFET troopslanded at Dili. Team Alpa members killed and mutilated nine people, includ-ing nuns and deacons and an Indonesian journalist, on the road between LosPalos and Baucau. The bodies were placed in their vehicle, which was thenpushed into the Luro River. Team Alpha operated under the control of Kopassusofficers, and the local TNI commander. According to the KPP HAM report a

member of Kopassus was implicated in the ordering of this killing.

Liquica

The Liquica/Maubara district was one of the first areas to experience mili-tia violence. As early as 30 January, Mahidi militia were reported to have killeda civilian in the Liquica district. It was also in Maubara that the Church came

under an earlv threat. BMP militia members surrounded the Carmelite Convent

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there on 16 March and threatened to kill any who tried to leave. on 5 April thesame militia group, assisted by TNI troops and Mobile Brigade personnel, as-saulted a pro-independence group in Maubara, killing two of them. They thenwent to Liquica, where they proceeded to bum the houses of known pro-inde-pendence supporters. They then surrounded the Liquica Church, where morethan 1,000 people were assembled. After some attempt at negotiatiory the com-pound was attacked and more than 50 killed,E with the bodies being disposedof with TNI help. Occurring as it did while the 5 May Agreement was beingnegotiated, the incident aroused a strong intemational reaction. However, Gen-eral Wiranto told journalists in Jakarta that both pro-integration and pro-independence groups had become 'emotional'. Interviews of Liquica resi-dents, and a study of records held by Civpol and SCIU indicate the TNIand Mobile Brigade personnel played a leading role in the attack, and thedisposal of the bodies.

Other areas where militia killings took place were the Manatuto, Aileu,Ermera, Ainaro and Manufahi dishicts.

Responsibility for the crimes against humanity

The campaign of violence and terror which was conducted in East Timorfrom April to October 1999, is usually described as 'militia violence,. Whilemilitia members played a key role in these operations, the term needs somequalification. There is strong evidence that questions the widespread assump-tion that the first line of responsibility rests with the militia leaders. A numberof these leaders clearly bear a responsibility for leading, or participating iryattacks on groups and individuals, for the intimidation of local populations,and for their participation in the mass deportation of peoples in september,and the wholesale destruction and ransacking that accompanied it. A numberof militia members have already been arrested and are awaiting trial in Dili.However, as has already been pointed out, most of the offending leaders, suchas Eurico Guterres, Manuel de Sousa and Joao Tavares, are now in Indonesia,and the further pursuit of investigations against them is critically dependenton cooperation from the Government of Indonesia. Despite encouraging re-sponses from President Wahid and Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman, theattainment of an appropriate level of cooperation is not yet assured.

The militia leaders, therefore, may be the most conspicuous subjects forprosecution, but they are not really the most important subjects for investiga-tion in relation to these serious human rights violations. In his report onUNAMET, its chief executive, Ian Martin, later wrote:

Observers had little doubt that the Indonesian armed forces (the TNI) wereresponsible for forming and arming the pro-integration militia groups, and fordirecting their activities. while this was officially denied to internationalcritics there was no concealment of the degree of official approval of their

Masters of Tenor

existence: military, police and civilian officials attended inaugural and otherfunctions throughout the territory. The culmination was a parade ceremony infront of the Governor's office in Dili on 17 April, in the presence of seniorofficials, at which Joao Tavares of Halintar and Eurico Guterres of Aitarakspoke as Commander and Deputy Commander respectively of the militias'umbrella organisation.

Their operations were the intended result of operations planned, in the firstinstance, by certain senior officers of the Indonesian National Army, the TNI,with the collusiory at least, of the civil govemment. It also needs to be taken intoaccount that the Indonesian province was dominated by the military. Therewere more than 17,000 troops in the province, and TNI officers had a com-manding presence in key areas of government and in the districts. Here it isalso worth noting that at the time of their departure n 1975 the Portuguese

garrison amounted to a mere 200 soldiers, most of them non-combatants. The

corunanders also had extensive property interests. Timor also received close

attention from Kopassus, the special forces command, which had played a

leading role in the TNI's covert intervention n 7975. Its structure and role willbe considered elsewhere in this report. Who, then, were the commanders be-hind the scenes? They include senior officers of ABRI Headquarters, the offic-ers in command of the East Timor Korem 164 command, and the Nusatenggararegional, or Kodam/Udayana command, of which the East Timor territorialcommand forms a constituent part, and several commanders at the districtlevel, in particular the Dili area, and the kabupatens of Liquica, Bobonaro, andCovalima. In the fust instance the militia were trained by, and equipped by theTM, and there is evidence based on the investigation of militia members thatorders were given to attack and kill their targets who were invariably unarmed'There are, I believe, sufficient grounds to consider the prosecution, in particu-lar, of Major General Syafrei Syamsuddin, Major General Zakky AnwarMakarim, Major General Damiri, Udayana commander Brigadier General TonoSuratnam and Lieutenant Colonel Yayat Sudradjat. These officers were theleading actors in what was in effect a conspiracy to implement a campaign ofviolence against the unarmed supporters of the independence option; the de-portation of a large part of East Timor's population; and the wanton, indis-criminate destruction of their houses, and other buildings essential to the wellbeing of village and town communities. These names are a select list only. Interms of responsibility, to this list should be added the names of other officers,militia unit commanders and members of the militia and the TM. In most cases

the militia may have been identified as the killers and agents of the reign ofterror, but their actions flowed from the command involvement of TNI officers,sometimes from direct orders, or from the provision of military training, weaP-ons, money and - according to militia members- drugs.

To elaborate on this last point it needs to be stressed that the emergence ofthe militia in East Timor was not a spontaneous public response, reflecting the

The Dunn Report

legitimate concems of those Timorese who favoured remaining with Indone-sia. The formation of this para-military organisation was planned by a groupof TNI officers as a cover for their own strategic objective oi preventing the tosiof the Province to the Republic of Indonesia. In practice it meant preventing thefulfilment of the efforts by the United Nations and members of the internationalcommunity to secure for East Timor a genuine act of self-determination, whichhad long been urged by the United Nations General Assembry, and was ex-plicit in the May 1999 Agreement concluded in New york between Indonesia,Portugal and the United Nations. while a minority of East Timorese evidentlypreferred the autonomy proposal over a shift to independence, probably only asmall proportion of this number favoured resorting to violence in supporf oftheir cause. Even those who became members of the militia mav not have re-sorted to the use of violence to advance their cause, had they r,oi b"".r incited,encouraged, trained and equipped to do so by officers of the TNI. As militiaoperations intensified rn 1999, many Timorese, some of them under age, wereconscripted as recruits, while those who tried to withdraw from the organisa-tion were sometimes hunted down and punished.

An example of the comprehensive TNI control over militia operations hasbeen described in an article by Peter Bartu, who served as a political officer inthe Maliana, one of the strongest militia areas, and one of clear strategic impor-tance because of its proximity to west Timor. Bartu's excellent r"poit " high-lights the extent of TNI control over the militia groups in that particular district,as well as the involvement of the civil administration. He concludes:

The TNI were heavily involved in all aspects of militia activity in Bobonarodishict aimed an ensuring a pro-autonomy vote in the popular Consultation.At the higher levels the sub-district militia leaders were coordinated and di-rected by the Dandim and his intelligence chief from the Kodim and from theBupati's office. At the sub-district level the militia was either directly com-manded by TNI personnel or directly supported by Koramil staff. At the villagelevel the militia worked hand in hand with military posts and Babinsas.2z

These conclusions are in general terms consistent with the findings set outin the report by Indonesia's KPP HAM, which has been brought to my atten-tion. Its conclusions are similar to those I have reached in the process of thisinvestigation. For example, in Paragraph 3 of its press release the Kpp HAMreport states:

KPP HAM has succeeded in assembling facts and evidence which indicatestrongly that serious violations of human rights were carried out in a plannedmanner/ systematically on a large and widespread scale, in the form of massmurder, torture and oppression, forced disappearances, violence againstwomen and children (including rape and enslavement), deportation, scorchedearth destruction and damage to property, all of which constitute crimes againsthumanity.2s

79

Masters of Terror

It concluded, moreover, that:

These facts and evidence also indicate that the civil and military establishment,

including the police, acted in cooperation with the militia, in creating situationsand conditions which supported the carrying out of crimes against humanity,

which were carried out by civil, militarp police and militia agencies.D

The commanders

Annex A to this report contains a list of officers whose roles would haveplaced them in positions of responsibility in relation to the crimes againsthumanity that occurred in East Timor in 1999. In some cases their responsibil-ity may have been peripheral. Others have a much greater complicity. At the

top of the list must stand the generals who planned the formation of the militia,providing ib units with arms, money, targets, and with drugs to be taken bymembers to 'make them brave'when on oPerations. These include Major Gen-eral Zakky Anwar Makarim, Major General Syafrei Syamsuddin and the re-gional operational commanders, Major General Adam Damiri, Colonel (nowBrigadier General) Tono Suratnam and Lieutenant Colonel Yayat Sudrajat,who passed on orders and advice to militia commanders. Others, the KPP

HAM report found, failed to meet their responsibilities according to Indone-

sian law. AU TNI conuunders of districts in which major violations occurred

cannot escape a measure of responsibility, especially where TNI troops led orassisted the militia. No military commander can shirk responsibility for thebehaviour of men under his command, whatever the circumstances, particu-larly when they bearing arms that were issued to them. Most of the troops ofBattalions 7M and 745 were of course East Timorese, and many of them be-

came active in the militia groups. In judging their activities, however, theyshould be considered first as members of the TNI, especially when they woreuniforms and carried weapons. The responsibility of soldier's conduct, whenin combat dress, must remain ultimately with the officers in command of hisunit. Therefore, if a Timorese soldier in combat dress joined in militia operations

he should, I suggest, be considered a member of the Indonesian National Army.

It would be an injustice to condemn all TNI officers in the Udayana/EastTimor command for the crimes against the people of East Timor in the periodcovered by this report. We know that at least some were troubled by the TNI'sinvolvement in the militia violence. On the other hand, most of those in com-mand positions in the areas in which these crimes occurred must have knownthat serious abuses were being perpetrated, and that there was a measure ofTNI involvement. The massacres that took place in Dili and Liquica in April1999 - not to speak of the many incidents of individual killings, almost all ofthem by militia units, offered ample waming to military commanders that themilitia they had created were unconcerned about basic human rights. Whilethere were reassuring statements by senior officers in Dili there is little evi-dence of any serious effort to implement their assurances. The reality behind

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the scenes suggests that at least some military commanders were exhorting themilitia to kill. According to Tomas Goncalves, colonel Tono Suratnam himselfexplicitly stated that all CNRT (members), priests, nuns and pro-independenceleaders should be regarded targets for 'elimination'. A similar statement wasreportedly made by Govemor Abilio soares on 25 March. According to othertestimonies, in August at least some senior commanders exhorted the militia tokill and to use violence against officials of the Church. lndeed, in the case of thesuai massacre Colonel sediono was reported to have been giving orders to themilitia, who at that time were killing people in the Ave Maria church, includingpriests. Sediono, who was Bupati of Covalima at that time, may have beenoccupying a civil administration post, but the fact that for his role in the massa-cre he reportedly donned a TNI uniform and brandished a weapon indicateshe was performing a military function. some officers, usually at i lower level -such as Lieutenant sugito of Covalima and Lieutenant sayful of Lospalos -participated actively in leadership roles in militia operations. In most militiaoperations it may well have been that TNI commanders were not present, butas their troops were involved they could not have been unaware of *hut *utgoing on. Thus we have three categories of commanders: those involved di-re-9tly in the militia operations in a command sense (nearly all of them Kopassusofficers); those who were indirectly involved; and those who kept a discreetdistance from all aspects of these operations, but who would almost certainlyhave been involved the mass deportations of September 1999.

The extent to which Indonesia's Armed Forces High Command was in-volved in this operation is still not clear, but it is difficult to believe that GeneralWiranto, for example, could have been unaware of Operasi Guntur, not leastbecause of

-the magnitude of an operation which succeeded in transporting

some 250,000 East Timorese to Indonesian Timor over a period of less than ifortnight, 11d in destroying or seriously damaging more than 70 per cent ofhomes and buildings in East Timor. This operation required considerable or-ganisational skill and the mobilisation of transport and other military resources.It seems inconceivable that these resources could have been musteied withoutthe prior knowledge and approval of the head of Indonesia's armed forces.

In this connection the authors of the KPP HAM report noted that they:...had been able to ascertain from the entire process of investigation, includingthe gathering of facts and documents with the testimony of witnesses andother parties (pihak-pihak lainnya)[that] all of the human rights violations,which were widespread and organised, which occurred both before and afterthe plebiscite in East Timor, were well known to and understood by the ABRIPanglima/TM General wiranto as the person responsible for natjonal secu-rity, along with all levels of civil and military officials, in the context of theirresponsibilities and operations in East Timor at that time. il

The report goes on:

The entire crimes against humanity in East Timor occurred, directly or indi-rectly, because of the failure of the TNI Panglima to guarantee the security of

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82 Masters of Tenu

those carrying out of the two options announced by the Government. Thepolice structure, at that time under the Ministry of Defence, weakenedthe capacity of the police to implement the security precautions based onthe New York agreement. For this, TNI General Wiranto, as TM Panglima,is a party who must be held responsible.3l

In his monograph, Professor Des Ball wrote that, in connection with the TNIplan for 'violent retribution', Australian intelligence agencies had

. ..identified the senior Indonesian military officers involved, and reported thatthe chain (of command) reached up to General Wiranto, the Commander inChief of the TM, and that implementation of the plan was the responsibility ofthe TM's SGI (Satuan Tugas Intelijen, or Combined Intelligence Task Force),

directed by Kopassus.32

In this paper I have unashamedly focused on the TM commanders, withoutwhose intervention the militia violence would never taken place, except per-haps on a quite minor scale. The TNI commanders not only nurtured the militiainto existence; they also stiffened the resolve of individual groups, and in atleast some cases encouraged their brutality. This is not intended, however, toplay down the individual guilt of the militia leaders. No doubt as committedsupporters of integration they willingly, if not enthusiastically, accepted theirleadership roles. On the other hand, their involvement is easier to identify, andthe prosecution case easier assembled, although in some cases, such as those ofJoao Tavares and Eurico Guterres, the Militia offenders are, at this juncture, as

inaccessible as are the TNI commanders. Then there are civil administrationofficials, whose involvement is well known. The KPP HAM report lists AbilioSoares, the Governor of East Timor, Domingos Soares, the Bupati of Dili, as wellas the bupatis of Covalima, Liquica, Bobonaro, Lospalos as among those impli-cated in the crimes against humanity.s Many civil officials at lower levels, ofsimilar political disposition, became members of the militia, in some cases afterconsiderable pressure from their superiors, militia leaders, or the TNI. lA/hilemost of these officials were not themselves involved in the killing or othercrimes, at least some, such as Abilio Soares, used their considerable authorityto encourage activities that resulted in crimes. In the circumstances they mustat least be considered accomplices.

[r Annex A [see p.84] I have assembled a list of TM officers, based on informa-tion collected in East Timor and on data assembled by Dr David Bourchier, anacademic specialist on the Indonesia military at the University of Westem Aus-tualia.Y While there is a prima facie case, I believe, for some of those on this list tobe charged with crimes against humanity, other names are included because ofthe command positions they held in areas where serious incidents occurred. Thelist includes some background details, which are desigred to help with the iden-tification of the persons concerned. A number of officers on this list were alsolisted in the KPP HAM report This information may serye as useful reference forinvestigators and prosecutors. [Arurex B, a chronology of events, appears at p.91.]

The Dunn Report 83

Recommendations

1. Efforts should be stepped up to establish the guilt of those ultimatelyresponsible, or with shared responsibility, for the crimes committed in1999, and to commence action to have them brought to justice. particularattention needs to be given to investigating the roles played by TNI com-manders, with a view to laying charges against those responsible for theevents of 1999. To meet these challenges, which carry sensitive politicaland diplomatic implications, structural changes should be made to thesections presently dealing with these matters, namely the office of theGeneral Prosecutor and the Serious Crimes Investigation Unit.

2. The hials of those East Timorese militia at present in detention in Dilishould be expedited. In judging their cases careful consideration needsto be given to the impact of the militia/TNl command structure on theiractions, and to the factor of shared guilt.

3. In the event that no progress is made in Indonesia towards bringing tojustice those responsible for the crimes comrnitted in East Timor in 1999,immediate steps should be taken to negotiate the setting up of and inter-national hibunal for this purpose.

4. The question of reparations, or some form of compensation, in relation tothe massive destruction of shelter and buildings functioning for the well-being of the people, as well as the extensive and organised theft of prop-erty, should be placed prominently on the agenda, in relation to negotia-tions with the Govemment of Indonesia.

5. A solution to the position of East Timorese refugees in west Timor is amatter of considerable importance, since those detained against theirwill remain victims of a serious crime. Therefore, the efforts of UNTAET'sTransitional Administrator and UNHCR to resolve this issue deservestronger support from the intemational community.

6. while this report focuses on events tn 1999 , in the course of my enquiriespersistent allegations of very serious crimes against humanity, involv-ing mass murder, since East Timor was invaded in 1925 have beenbrought to my attention. I join with the Kpp HAM report (recommenda-non 27) in calling for a thorough investigation of what transpired and ofwho was responsible. The most serious crimes, such as the creras andSanta Cruz massacres, are crimes of such magnitude that they must beconsidered of concern to the international community as a whole.

Action in relation to these matters is important both to the fulfilment ofUNTAET's mandate in East Timor, and to the development of an appropriatelyharmonious relationship between the new nation and Indonesia.

u Masters of Terror

Annex AsSenior Indonesian Military Officers who should be Investigated in

Relation to CrimesAgainst Humanity in East Timor

l.Major General Zakky Anwar MakarimBackground: Bom, 1948, Jakarta71 - Class 2, Akmil/Akabri, Magelang

75 - Commander RPKAD (paracommando) company

75-ffi - ln operations against OPM in Irian Jaya, especially in intelligence role

8389 - Operations in E Timor as Kopassus officer9194- Assistant for Intelligence, KodarrtJakafta Raya (under Hendroproyono and Wiranto)

9+95 - Deputy Chief of Intelligence Unit, BIA95-96 - Head, Directorate A (Intemal Politics), BIA

9G97 - Assistant 1/Security, to the Army Chief of Staff (ASPAM KASAD)

97-99 - Head, Armed Forces Intelligence Board (BIA)

99 - Chief Liaison Officer between ABRI and the UNAMET mission

99 - at TM HQ, fakarta, as Head, Centre for the Coordination of the Upholding of theLaw and SecurityComments: One of the stars of his generation, receiving six medals for his performancein Timor in 80s. Alleged to have coerced East Timorese to demonstrate outside DutchEmbassy in Jakarta in 1995. kading intelligence officer, close to Prabowo. In 1998

mentioned (with Simbolon) as the TM's most experienced in covert operations and as

'two of the most intimately involved in East Timor.... US haining unknown but hasmade number of visits to the US. Widely reported to have been responsible for militiaterror against independence supporters and UN workers, which led to his removalfrom post, following pressure from outside powers, including the US.

Assessment: This officer played a key planning and organisation role in relation tomilitia operations in 1999.

2. Major General Adam Damiri (Infantry)

Backgrounil: Bom, 1949

1972 - one of five top Akabri graduates of his year

70s and 80s: Held various positions in Udayana Comrnand

95-95: Commander, Korem 052,/Tarumanegara, Garut; said to have been involved inattack on PDI HQ in July 1996

97-98: Chief of Staff, Jakarta Garrison, under Sjafrie

98: Commander, First Infantry Division, Kostrad, under Prabowo

98: Appointed to the MPR as a regional representative

98/99: Commander, Kodam IXlUdayanaComments: had no US training, reported to be trusty ally of Prabowo, especially inlatter's rivalry with Wiranto, is on list in KPP report recorrunending investigationsinto Timor atrocities

Assessment: This officer played a key operation command role in relation to events inEast Timor in 1999.

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3. Major General Sjafrie Syamsuddin

Backgrounil: Born, 1,952, Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi73 - Commander of the Cadet-corps at Akabri; Took part as a 'volunteer, in operasiFlamboyan, under Yunus Yosfiah, and in operasi seioja in East Timor in 192574 - Class 5, Military Academy (Akmil)75-77 - Battalion Commander, Group I Kopassandha (forerunner of Kopassus)77-80 - commander, secgnd Company, Group I, special Forces. Reported to haveparticipated in'Operasi Nanggala X'78-? - Commander, Executive Unit, Presidential Escort80-81 - Intelligence Officer, Group I, Kopassus

92-!5 - DgnltJr Commander, Battle Detachment 13, Group I, speciar Forces, involvedin Operasi Chandra XV in Timor in 1984

85 - Infantry Officer's Advanced Course, Fort Benning USA85-99 . DepuV Commander, First Battalion, Group I Kopassus. part of ,Maleo Team,,with Agum Gumelar, in 87

91-93 - Deputy Assistant for Operations, Kopassus93 - Brief training course at Swanboume SAS base, perth, Australia93-95 - Commander, Group A, Presidential Security Guard96-97 - Chief of Staff, Kodam Jaya (Greater Jakarta)97-98 - Commander, Kodam Jaya99 - Member of the MPR, ABRI faction. AIso Expert staff, Defence and security Af-fairs, Commander of ABRI Staff99 - Assigned to East Timor (under Zacky Anwar) at time of the plebiscite9-2000 - Expert Staff, Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security (under General Whanto)Comme.nts: Leading-Kopas_sus officer. Fought in operasi Bravo alongside prabowo inEast Timor. As head of SGI in East Timor in iSSt islaid to have had in involvement inthe Santa Cruz massacre. Rep_orted to have designed counter intelligence operationsin East Timo-r during his tour. Is reported by intelligence analysts to hive prepared theplans for TNI and militia operations, there playing a key role in efforts toprevent lossof East Timor. According.to an ANU strategii afiairs analyst, syamsuddin preparedthe plans for TNI and militia operations in Elst Timor at A1IRI Fieadquarteri. FG wassent to East Timor shortly before the plebiscite where, according to another report, hehelped conduct the militia campaign. one of those recommenled by Kpp HAM in-quiry for investigationAssessment: Further investigations should show that this officer is implicated as was9.ne 9f lhe key military officers responsible for the development of the TNI strategythat led to serious crimes against humanity in East Timor.-

4. Major General Kiki Syahnakri

Background: Born, 1.947, Krawang, West Java (Sundanese)

71: Class 2, Akabri, Magelang73-75- Commander, sub-district military command in Atapupu, West Timor76-78- Comrnander of Operations, Kodim 1605, Atambua, West Timor

86 Masters of Tanr

82-? - Deputy commander, Battalion 7M/Satya Yuda Bakti, East Timor

80s - Commander 502 Battalion, Malang, East Java

93 - Deputy commander, Korem 164/ rNira Dharma, Dili9+95 - Commander, Korem 154/rl{u.a Dharma (East Timor)

97-99 - Assistant for Operations, Army Chief of Staff (ASOPS KSAD), as Brig-Gen.Promoted Maj-Gen in 98

99 - Martial Law Administrator for East TimorComments: Very experienced Timor hand. Took part in London talks in April 1999 re-

future of E Timor.-Removed from his post in Timor in 1995 on recorrunendation ofHonour Council investigating the murder of six Timorese at Liquica. Accused of linkswith scorched earth policy and of links with Aitarak rnilitia.Assessment: Some involvement through his position in operational command struc-

ture, though perhaps peripheral.

5. Major General Amirul Isnaeni

Background: Born, c1952

74 - Class 6, Akabri92 -Head, Jaring Merah II Task Force, Aceh

96 - Kopassus officer in charge of intelligence team which tracked down OPM rebels

holding hostages in lrian |aya9A99 - Commander, Army Intelligence Centre

99- - Deputy Martial Law Commander, East TimorComments: Has been listed as a Prabowo associate. Reported to have accompaniedZacky Anwar and Kiki Syahnakri to E Timor on secret mission in April 1999 involvingIiaison work with the militia leaders. Served under Syahnakri in September 1999.

Assessment: On the basis of evidence examined this officer may have had a peripheralinvolvement.

5. Major General Tyasno Sudarto (Sudarso, Sudarno)

Backgrounil: Bom, L948, Magelang, Central fava70 - Class 1, Akabri95-96 - Head, Directorate C, BIA

96-98 - Assistant for Planning to Army Chief of Staff

99- -Head,BIAComments: Served as intelligence officer under General Murdani in late 80s. Flew to ETimor with Zacky Anwar and rcki Syahnakri on 20 April 1999, reportedly to organisemilitias. BIA said to have had the task of securing a favourable result to the plebiscite.

Assessment: Some evidence of involvement, but extent unclear.

7. Brigadier General Tono Suratnam

Ba*ground: Bom, c1952

73 - Class 6, Akabri, Magelang

The Dunn Report 87

?-96 - Commander, Sector A (Eastern East Timor)96-98? - Commander, Group III, Kopassus Training Unit (pusdik pasus), Batujajar,Bandung

98-99 - Commander, Korem 164/Wiradharma (Dili), with rank of colonel98 - Appointed to the MPR as a regional representative99- - Commander, Group 3, (Training) Kopassus (pusdik passus), Batujajar, Bandung99 - Deputy Head, Armed Forces Information Centre (Wakapuspen)Comments: suratnam was a leading star of his generation, who has held importantseveral.command posts in East Timor, including sensitive Kopassus postsjwhichwould have involved him closely in operations against pro-indipendence activists.Alleged to have been responsible for the brutal rape of the wife of i leading Timoreseearly in 1999. Four months before the plebiscite hL is reported to have sai{that if thevote went againstrndonesia 'Everything is going to be destroyed. East Timor will notexist as now. It'll be much worse than 23 years ago.' Militia witnesses allege that heissued orders to kill. Has been accused of sexual assault.

Assessment: on the basis of existing evidence surahram played a key operational rolein relation to militia/TNI operations in East Timor.

8. Brigadier General Mahidin SimbolonBackground: Born, 1951. Samosir Island, North Sumatra72 - Class 3, Akabri, Magelang

93-95 - Assistant for Intelligence, Kopassus

95-97 - Commander, Korem 154, Dili97-98 - Chief of Staff, Second Infanhy Division, Kostrad, Malang9&99 chief of staff, Kodam x/ udayana, the regional command which included East TimorComments: worked directly under Prabowo when latter was Kopassus Deputy Com-mander, and considered one of brightest officers. served six times in Eist-Timor,sometimes with Prabowo. Was involved in military operation which led to capture ofXanana Gusmao, which led to his promotion to colonel. In August 1998 ref&red to,with Zakky Anwar, as'TNI's most experienced officers in covert operations" and twoof the officers most involved in East Timor. Is reported to have hid close links withmilitia commanders, especially Cancio Carvalho.Assessment: Though his role in relation to rnilitia violence and the forced deportationsis not clear, on the basis of the evidence considered for this report he ihould beinvestigated.

9. Brigadier General Gleny KairupanBackground: Bom, c1949

72 - Class 3, Akabri-95 - Deputy commander, Korem 1,U/Dili99 - Assigned to East Timor in mid 1999 to assist Generals Anwar Makarim andSyamsuddin organise militia operations

Comment: His role should be investigated.

Masters of Tenor

10. Brigadier General Timbul Silaen (KAPOII)

Background'.I have little information about the background of this Polri commander.He *as Chief of Polri in East Timor in 1999 and is alleged to have actively supportedthe militia operations.

Assessment: Silaen was questioned during the KPP HAM inquiry and is listed amongthme officers implicated in the events under study. He should therefore be investigated.

ll.Colonel lrwan Kusnadi

Background:No early career details

9$- Commander of a Central Java infantry battalion ( 432 or 433)

99 - Commander,3d Airbome Infantry Brigade, Kostrad, and at the same time Com-mander of East Timor's Eastem Sector

Commmt; This officer is said to have been under investiSation, probably in relation to

the deportations.

Assessment: Further inquiries should be carried out.

12. ColonelNurMuisBackground: Born, Aceh, 1953

73- Class Z Akabri

78-90 - experience including some haining in Aushalia and role in UN peacekeepinginMiddleEast97 - Commander,l7i Infantry Brigade, Kostrad, Cijanfung

98-99 - Commander, Korem O71/rNljayakusuma (Central Java)

99 - Commander, Army Combat Training Centre, Baturaja, South Sumatra for shortperiod before being appointed to take command of Korem 164 in Dili. Assumedcommand only two weeks before the August plebiscite, then conducted his com-

mand's evacuation to West Timor2000 - Believed to hold senior fava Command

Comments: In relation to TNI security operations this officer has been described as amoderate, but was a key command figure at the time of the plebiscite. He has beenaccused of active support for the militias.

Assessment:This officer was a key command figure and should be investigated. In theKPP HAM report he is listed as one of the officers implicated in the events of the time.

13. Colonel Herman Sediono

Commenh There is little information on this officer's military career. In 1999 he wasBupati of Covalima, a civil post sometimes assumed by TNI officers. However, thereis ihong evidence that Col. Sediono played a leading role at the Suai Ave MariaChurch massacre. There he was seen in TNI uniform and carrying an automatic rifle.He was also reportedly giving orders to the attacking militia and troops, where a KPPHAM witness alleged he gave orders to kill priests and others.

Assessment: As he donned a combat uniform and carried a weaPon, Herman Sedionoshould be treated as a military commander, and his role close investigated.

The Dunn Report 89

14. Lieutenant Colonel Sudrajat ASBackgrounil: 98-99 Comrnander Kodim 1629 (Lautem, Lospalos)Comments: Commander of the district in which Team Alpha was active, and has beenaccused of having supplied weapons to the militia.Assessmett: According to the KPP HAM list he is one of the officers implicated in theevents of 1999, and his role should therefore be investigated.

15. Lieutenant Colonel Yayak SudrajatBackground: Birth and professional background details not known.?-99 -Head, Group IV (intelligence/secret warfare), Kopassuq Cijantung99 - Head of SGI - Satgas Intel Kopassus, also referred to as Satgas lntel TribuanaKopassus, in Korem 154

2000 - Battalion Commander, Group V (counter-terrorism) Kopassus2000 - Intelligence Assistant to Commanding General of Kopassus (Asintel Danjen K),replacing Soenarko

Comments: As head of SGI, Lt. Col Sudrajad personally directed the operations of themilitia on behalf of Darniri and Suratnam. Sdveral militia members have reported hispresence at meetings,

-at which tactics were discussed and funds and arms provided.

His role fits in with the shadowy operations of Group fV of Kopassus, *hich hasengaged in covert operations against opposition groups. Called before KPP HAMinvestigation team. one of those recommended by inquiry for further investigation.Assessment: On the basis of the evidence considered this officer is deeply implicated inthe TNl/militia command strucfure, and in directing at least some militia operations.

15. Lieutenant Colonel Wioyotomo NugrohoBackground:

-?-99 - Assistant fgr tntelligence (Asintel), Kopassus. Head, IntelligenceTask Force for East Timor (SGI)

99 - Post dealing with personnel in KopassusComments: Alleged to have been involved in setting up militia in 1998 and, in 1999, as'a Kopassus intelligence_chief'perlonally directed their operations, reporting directlyto Colonel Suratnam andl\4aj-Gen Damiri. Reportedly played leading role in KopassusGroup IV operations in Timor.Assessment: This officer exercised a key responsibility in the TNl/militia commandstrucfure and his role be much worse than 23 years ago.' Militia witnesses allege thathe issued orders to kill. Is accused of sexual altack oi Timorese woman.

17. Lieutenant Colonel RudiantoBackground: Unit/function: sector commander, prorninent in Covalima operationsLieutenant Colonel Sudjrajat Unit/function: Kopassus officer?, District Commander,Lospalos

Role: Commander, during militia/TM killing operations in LautemAssessment: His role should be the subject of further inquiries.

18. Lieutenant Colonel fefr5r Sanakri3sBackground: Few details available. Described as Commander of Westem Sector.Accused of command responsibility, according to letter from'people of Ainaro'.Assessment: His role should be investigated.

90 Masters of Terror

19. Lieutenant Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian

Background:81 - Class 12, Akabri95-? - Commander, 7h Cavalry Battalion, Greater jakarta

9U99 - Commander, Kodim 1535 (Bobonaro, East Timor)Comments: Commander of Maliana district during militia violence in April 1999. Re-ported responsible for brutal reprisal attack, involve death of five citizens chosen atrandom. Worked closely with Halilintar militia, described as'sponsor'. He is namedfor investigation in the KPP HAM report. In the Yayasan Hak Report, his name isamong those listed as very'sadistic'.Assessment: This officer should be investigated with a view to prosecution.

20. Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad NurBackgrounil:82 - Classl3, Akabri9V99 - Commander, Kodim 1537, Ermera

Comment: He was commander during the mobilization of militia and other paramili-tary groups, and at the time of the plebiscite reportedly (by Unamet officer) told Polrichief not to intervene in militia operations.

Assessment: Should be investigated.

21. Major Yagus Yakraman

Background:85 - Class 15, Akmil97 - Commander, Kodim 1635, Covalima (Suai)

99 - Commander, Battalion 7M/Satya Yudha Bakti

Comments; Reported to be a sponsor of Laksaur militia. Was called before the KPPHAM inquiry, and was listed in report as among those irnplicated in violence.

Assessment: His role should be investigated.

22. Lieutenant Colonel Endar Priyanto

Backgrourul:81 - Class 12, Akabri?-97 - Chief of Staff, Operations, Korem 154, Dili97-99 - Commander, Kodim Dili district, Korem 154

Comments: Dili area commander at the time of militia mobilisation early in 1999. How-ever, said to be on list for investigation by UN Human Rights Commission, re atroci-ties in 1999; other comments about him, however, were positive.

23. Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Masagus

Background: Early career details unknown99- Commander, Kodim 1635, Suai district, CovalimaComments:This officer was commander of the Suai district, at the time of the Ave MariaChurch massacre.

Assessment: Although his role unclear, in view of involvement of the Kodim militaryin the massacre, he should be investigated.

The Dunn Report 9l

1998

2lMay:

9 June:

Annex B

Select Chtonology

President Suharto of Indonesia is forced from power, and replaced byhis vice-president, Dr B J Habibie.

President Habibie states (to Reuters) that he will consider offering special status to East Timor.

15 June: An estimated 15,000 students demonstrate in Dili, calling for referen-dum, and release of Xanana Gusmao.

18 fune: Foreign Minister offers new proposals to Portugal.

27 June: Clash beh'veen proindependence and pruintegrationist supporbrs in Dli.5 August New round of UN-sponsored talks between Indonesia and porfugal.

12 August Maj Gen Damiri and Col Tono Suratnam meet with ]oao Tavares, EuricoGuterres and Cancio de Carvalho, and tell them they must organise'toprotect integration'.

21 August: Xanana rejects autonomy proposal.

10 september: Bishops Belo and Nascimento hold two days of talks at Dare on issuesof independence and autonomy.

5 October: Govemor Abilio Soares demands that all govemment employees, whooppose integration, resign immediately.

11 October: Rally of 30,000 in Dili calls for Govemor's resignation.12 October: Thousands protest in Baucau against TNI.1 November: TNI troops carry out a series of raids on villages in Manufahi district.4 November: Several hundred Kopassus troops reportedly arrive in Kupang for de-

ployment in East Timor.20 November:UN Secretary General expresses concern over violence in E Timor.

Lisbon suspends talks.

27 December: TNI troops, with Gada Paksi, arrest and allegedly torture four civilians,and destrov several homes in Maubara district.

'.9993 January: Mahidi Militia kill and injure independence supporters in Ainaro.2L5January: Mahidi, with TNI involvement, kill 4 in Zumalai.27 January: It is announced in Jakarta that Habibie will ask the MPR to approve

independence if a special vote for autonomy is rejected.

7 February: Portuguese and Indonesian foreign ministers meet in New York todraft plan for East Timor.

8 February: Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos Horta declare that East Timor should be-come independent, after a period of Autonomy.

15 February: BMP group and local TNI attack Guiso village in Maubara district andarrest several Dersons.

Masters of Tenor

15 February: According to South China Post report, Lt Col Yayat Sudradjat, head ofKopassus lntelligence unit (SGI) convenes a meeting of militia leadersand calls for killing of pro-independence leaders and their families.

17 February: Joao Tavares reportedly tells meeting of sub-district and Village headsin Bobonaro that thev will be sacked if they fail to mobilise their citizensto attend pro-gouemment rally in Balibo.

19 February: Tavares tells Balibo rally that there will be war if people reject theautonomy proposal.

22 February: General Wiranto states in |akarta that TNI will continue to deploy thernilitia to help Polri maintain security.

24 February: Two Timorese shot dead in Dili, apparently not by rnilitia, but by TNItroops in civilian clothes.

25 February: Portuguese Prime Minister calls for UN presence in East Timor.Australian Foreign Minister meets with Habibie in Jakarta.

4 March: A classified Australian Defence lntelligence Organisation report con-cludes that TNI 'are clearly protecting, and some instances operatingwith, militants'. It notes that TNI 'could apprehend or easily controlpro-Indonesian militants, but has chosen not to'.

8 March: More than 1,000 Timorese from Guiso village are reported to have fled

11 March:into mountains after militia attacks.

In New York it is announced that Jakarta and Lisbon have agreed togive Timorese a vote on their future.

Gusmao and Tavares agree to cooperate for a cease-fire.

15 March: BMP militia surround the Carmelite convent in Maubara, accuse thenuns of supporting independence movement and threaten to kill them.

26 March: According to one of those present, at a meeting with militia leaders,Govemor Abilio Soares orders that priests and nuns should be killed.

5 April: At Liquica as many as 50 Timorese located in the church compound aremurdered by BMP militia, with TNI involvement. Gusmao calls onFalintil forces to defend themselves. General Wiranto tells media thatthe massacre was the result of conflict between'rival groups'.

L2 April: At Cailaco in Bobonaro area, six villagers are kidnapped and then mur-dered by Halilintar and TNI troops in house of Manuel Soares Gama. AFalintil group retaliates, killing Gama and 2 TNI troops.

13 April In revenge attack a force of TM and militia, led by Lt Col. BurhanuddinSiagian and Joao Tavares reportedly kidnap, torture and then kill sixCailaco villagers.

15 April: Belarmino de Cruz, a brother of Lopez, is reportedly killed at Laclubar.

LTApril: Massacre at home of Manuel Carrascalao. Manuelito, Manuel's son,and at least 11 others are killed by Aitarak and BMP members, follow-ing a militia rally, addressed by Colonel Tono Suratnam.

Team Alpha militia murder Virgilio de Sousa, an independence sup-porter, at his home in Bauro, Lospalos.

20April: |ose Ramos Horta calls for intemational sanctions against Indonesia.General Wiranto visits Dili, and claims securiff sifuation is under control.

2l April:

23 April:

24 Apri:

25 April:

27 April:

28April:

30 April:1 May:

3 May:

4 May:

5 May:

TMay:

9 May:

18 May:

23May24May:

The Dunn Report

Evaristo Lopes believed dead after being arrested by Kopassus andTeam Alpha militia in Los Palo.

Falintil and militia leaders sign peac€ agreern€nt at Bishop's residence in Dili,whidr errvisages setting up of a Joint Commission on Peace and Stability.Catholic Church reports that between 42 and, 100 persons killed bymilitia units in Suai.

According to Australian Defence Intelligence Organisation report Gen-eral Wiranto had chosen to ignore the violent behaviour of TM andmilitia forces in Timor.After two days of talks Portuguese and Indonesian officials reach broadagreement on autonomy package and referendum, but security ar-rangements are yet to be resolved.Commission on Peace and Stability for East Timor created with repre-sentatives from pro-integration, pro-independence, local govemment/military, police, Church and KOMNASHAM.

ftTeet'ry with Aushalian Prime Minister Howard DrHabibie promises tohold a selfdetenninatiur ballot under UN supenrision on August 8.

Suratman prornises that pro-integration militias would be disarmed incorning weeks.

Report that bodies of 11 pro-integrationists found in Bauhati.Sakunar militia, led by Simao Lopes, established in Oecussi.

Megawati Soekamopuhi announces that East Timor referendum willbe cancelled if her party (PDI-P) wins forthcoming election.Kopassus troops and militia members reportedly kill Domingos SoaresAparicio near Viqueque.

Mateus Soares Monis, of Sagadate, Baucau, is arrested and killed byKopassus troops.

Agreement between lndonesia. Portugal. and the UN on a referendumfor East Timor is signed in New York. It provides for internationalexperts to help set up and supervise the ballot, and for unarmed policeto observe the process. Responsibility for security, however, rests withABRI forces.

The UN Security Council passes Resolution 135, in support of 5 MayAgreement, and moves quickly to commence its implementation.Maj Gen Damiri tells media that disarmament of militia and pro-inde-pendence forces was'proceeding smoothly'and that security sifuationwas now under control.More than 30 Timorese reported killed by militia in Atara.President Habibie promises to release Xanana after ballot.The SYSG urges the Security Council to send a team of military advisersto East Timor, as Indonesian authorities were not maintaining securitythere. After 3-day visit, Special Envoy Soragjee tells Habibie that ailEast Timorese must be disarmed.Timbul Silaen, Kapolri, tells media that his police were neutral and 'haddone as best as possible to prevent violence'.

94 Masterc of Terror

27 May:

28May:

L June:4 June:5 |une:

5 June:

7 June:8 fune:

11 fune:

15 June:

23 June:

25 June:

29 June:

The Security Council expresses its deep concem at the continuing vio-lence in East Timor.The Peace and justice Commission reports that militia were compilinglists of pro-independence leaders, with the assistance of intelligenceagencies, so that they could be targeted if the consultation result wereto go against the autonomy proposal.

Megawati makes brief visit to East Timor.The 70-member UNAMET mission comrnences its work in East Timor.Lamberto da Costa and another person reported killed after arrest byjoint TM/BMP members. 11 others reported killed.

BMP militia force 23 women into domestic and sexual slavery in Maubara,Liquica [KPP HAM Report].

Indonesian parliamentary elections held.

The UN begins its consultation campaign.

Eduardo Pereira,50, is killed at Liquica, reportedly by 4 BMP memberswho accused him of supporting Falintil.

The Security Council passes Resolution 1246. formally establishingT]NAMET.

The Australian Foreigrr Minisbry announces that it has information that theTNI has actively encouraged and supported the pruintegration militia.

UNAMET staff unexpectedly wibress BMP militia destroying Leotelavillage, and beating locals, with TNI watching.

The UN, citing unsatisfactory security conditions, postpones referen-dum to August 22. General Wiranto records his disagreement with thepostponement.Bishop Belo attends peace talks in Jakarta. Jose Ramos Horta and Xananaallowed to attend.

Seven UN officials injured in Maliana in attackby pro-autonomy mob.The UN Security Council President subsequently expresses his graveconcem at attack. SYSG report states that security situation in EastTimor not yet conducive to holding of ballot.

A UN driver is shot during militia attack on UNAMET staff and aidworkers in Liquica and Maliana.Indonesia sends extra 1,200 police to East Timor, in response to intema-tional concem at security problems.

UNAMET staff in Maliana witness 50-80 militia being given militarytraining, reportedly organised by local TNI nco.

Falintil proclaims cease-fire.

A delegation of ministers, including General Wiranto, meets with IanMartin and Francesc Vendrell.Wiranto declares that there was no cause to deploy UN troops in EastTimor, which would in any case violate the May 5 Agreement.

Voter registration begins, with one militiaman killed during a clash.

Voter registration ends, with 438,000 registered.

4 July:

7 luly:

8 July:

10 July:12 July:

14 July:

16 fuly:4 August:

The Dunn Report

Delegation of Indonesian ministers, led by Alatas, meet with UN offi-cials in Dili.Pro-independence and pro-integration leaders sign code of conductagreement, as a conunitment to referendum. General Wiranto declaresthat surrendering of weapons is prerequisite to peaceful implementa-tion of the ballot.Two Timorese killed in Viqueque, and two others wounded in attackby 59 /75 Junior Militia on a poll information centre. SySG calls formore Indonesian police to be deployed in Timor, and for more interna-tional police monitors.Wiranto issues assurance that military will ensure security during post-ballot period, and will accept outcome of the ballot.Colonel Suratnam is replaced by Colonel Noer Muis.Three Timorese reportedly killed in Maliana by militia.Noer Muis wams of bloodshed before and after the announcement ofthe results of the ballot. Admitted to mounting tensions in Suai.Noer Muis says that security forces would face a big problem if pro-independence won, and it would incite reaction of their opponents. But'possibility of war and violence would be very small if pio-integrationfaction won'.Eurico Guterres tells rally of 15,000 in Dili that East Timor will becomea sea of fire if independence is declared. After the rally two Timoresear9 ki]t9-d by Aitarak militia in a brawl, witnessed by lndonesian policewho failed to intervene.The UN Security Council passes Resolution 1262, extending UNAMET,smandate.

ln Los Palos village chief Verissimo Quintas is killed by militia, whoaccused him of supporting CNRT.Militia force joumalists and UN staff out of Maliana where two localsare then killed.Kapolri Silaen declares that his forces are adequate for security.Alatas rejects need for peacekeeping force in East Timor.CNRT offices in Dili, Ambeno and Los Palos are destroyed by militia.A senior UN field officer reports that TNI troops have stockpiled 400M-16 rifles in Maliana, and that local commander (Lt Col Siagian) isplanning to carry attacks with militia on those who vote for independ-ence.

The consultation ballot is held in East Tirnor. with more than 977o ofregistered voters participating.Polling station at Gleno attacked by more than 50 militia.Militia attacks in Dili, Gleno, Ermera, Aileu, Ambeno and Maliana leave11 killed, including 3 UN local staff.United Front for East Timor Autonomy accuses UNAMET of bias anddescribes consultation as'garbage'.Alatas praises the referendum.

95

7 August:

8 August:

11 August:

12 August:

13 August:15 August:22 August:

25 August:

26 August:

27 August:

28 August:

29 August:

30 August:

31 August:

Masters of Tenor

1 September: Thousands of Indonesians and pro'integrationist Timorese start flee'ing to West Timor.

2 September: UN Special Envoy ]amsheed Marker endorses Indonesian manage-ment of security in East Timor. Portuguese, however, ask SecurityCouncil to prepare contingency plans for peacekeeping force.

3 September: UNAMET staff in Maliana evacuate to Dili after militia attacks.

General Wiranto announces that in order 'to face unexpected circum-stances' two battalions of troops had been dispatched to East Timor. Hesaid that'he had just heard that the situation in Timor had returned tonormal'.

4 September: The results of the plebiscite are officially announced at the MahkotaHotel, with 78.5% voting against autonomy option.

Within an hour of the announcement militia, many in TNI uniform butwith Aitarak cloaks, pour into Dili, and destruction of the city begins.An early target is the Mahkota Hotel.

In Maliana Halilintar and Dadurus Merah Putih militias, in tandem withTNI troops, begin a campaign of destruction, and kill several localsincluding two UNAMET staff.

5 September: A violent operation is launched throughout East Timor, apParently- launched by the TNI with code-names Wiradharma and Guntur.25 refugees in the Camara Ecclesiastica killed by Aitarak militia.

US Civpol offer wounded in militia attack near Liquica.

5 September: Ki[ings and destruction at Bishop Belo's house. Refugees forcibly evicted,several believed murdered.Refugees also forcibly removed from ICR compound.

Suai massacre at Ave Maria Church. More than 200 Persons seekingrefuge are brutally killed by Mahidin and Laksaur militia, with TNI andBrimog support. Colonel Sediono and Lieutenant Sugito played lead-ing roles in the attack and the disposal of bodies. Several woman whosurvived the attack were later taken to local military (Kodim) head-quarters and raped.

President Habibie imposes martial law in East Timor, and places MajGen Kiki Syahnakri in charge.

7 September: Many East Timorese university students, retuming to Dili from Java,are reported to have been killed, and some of the women raped.

Bishop Belo is evacuated from Dili to Darwin.Xanana is released from house arrest and taken to British Embassy injakarta.

8 September: Maliana Police Station massacre. More than 50 persons are killed byDadurus Merah Putih militia at Maliana Police StatiorL with TMbacking.L3 Timorese killed at Tumin and Kiobiselo in Oecussi in militia attack,with TNI involvement.Killings reported in other parts of East Timor.

Military and militia activities in Dili reflect close cooperation, by underTNI command.

The Dunn Report

Indonesian Commission on Fluman Rights condemns the violence,noting complicity of securitlz forces.

Massive operation to force East Timorese to go to West Timor on com-mandeered or military vehicles gets under way, accompanied by mas-sive systematic destruction.

9 September: As many as 14 persons killed near Batugade by militia and TNI ncos.

UN decides to evacuate all its staff to Darwin.US suspends military ties to Indonesia.Indonesian MPR accepts results of ballot.

10 September:Massacre at Passabe, Oecussi, by Sakunar militia, assisted by hoopsfrom745 Battalion.

Reverend Ximenes is killed on road from Dli to Baucau.

UN Secretary General calls on Indonesia immediately to accept peace-keeping force.

US President Clinton sav that'it is now clear that the Indonesian mili-tary is aiding and abetting the militia violence. This is unacceptable.'

11 September:A German priest, Albert Garim, and a Timorese are killed at Dare,allegedly by Kopassus troops.

UN Security Council delegation, with General Wiranto, visits Dili.12 September:Killings reported at Ainaro, Los Palos and Baucau by militia and TM.

hrdonesian Govemment formally agrees to peacekeeping force intenrerrtion.

13 September:Indonesia allows intemational food and airdrops in East Timor.14 September:Two Timorese killed at Raifun village.

UNAMET staff and 1,400 Timorese evacuated from Dili to Darwin.The EU bans arms sales to Indonesia.

15 September:UN Security Council Resolution 1,254 approves Interfet deployment.16 September:Maj Gen Syahnakri denies TNI support for militias.17 September:TNl withdraw from East Timor begins, and UN aerial fmd drop conunenc€s.

19 September:Interfet comrnander, Maj Gen Peter Cosgrove, meets with Maj GenSyahnakri in Dili.

20 September:Seven Timorese killed by Sakunar militia in Ambeno, Oecussi.

Interfet corunences deployment in Dili, without incident.21 September:As Battalion 745 withdraws to West Timor, its soldiers reportedly kill

Timorese and destroy houses . Financial Times joumalist Sanders Thoenesis murdered by 745 troops in the Becora area.

The Indonesian human rights agency, KOMNASHAM, sets up a com-mission to investigate violations in East Timor.

23 September:Militia groups start flooding into West Timor, and TNI troops beginbuming their barracks and other buildings.

24 September:UNHCR reaches an agreement to aid refugees in West Timor.25 September :Massacre in Lautem area when Team Alpha militia ambush vehicle

carrying nuns, brothers and an Indonesian journalist. Nine persons arekilled and their bodies mutilated.

97

98 Masters of Tetror

27 September:The UNCHR calls for an intemational commission to investigate viola-tions in East Timor.

29 September:Militia reportedly kill two persons in Maliana.3 October: Interfet troops push towards the westem part of East Timor.5 October: Bishop Belo retums to East Timor.

8 October: East Timorese refugees start refurning from West Timor.

9 October: One militiaman is killed and two wounded when engaged by Interfettroops near border.

13 October: UN officials report that about 4O0,000 East Timorese are missing.20 October: Indonesia's MPR passes a decree, annulling the formal incorporation of

East Tirnor, which took place in fuly 1976.

25 ftober: The UN Security Council, in Resolution 1272,creates UNTAET.

25 ftober: East Timor is taken over by the UN, and Sergio Vieira de Mello isappointed as transitional administrator.

c

The Key Suspects: An Inhoduction

Gerry oan Klinken, Daaid Bourchier I Douglas Kammen

The history of the Indonesian military occupation of East Timor (1975-99) isa history of crimes against humanity. Its final year culrninated in September inan orgy of burning, killing, and the expulsion of much of the population. Sev-eral serious efforts have been made to identify the culprits for these 1999 crimes(while the crimes of earlier years still await investigation). The present studybuilds on those efforts and extends them substantially, identifying over onehundred suspects who we believe ought to be investigated for crimes againsthumanity. We hope that it will hasten the prosecutions that an outraged worldcommunity has been demanding.

After explaining how we went about selecting the individuals listed in thedatabase, we discuss the sources we used, and then draw some conclusionsabout how it might all have happened.

An expanded list

We began our work on the key suspects by noting all the individuals namedon three 'lists of stafus'. Two of these were Indonesian, one was a United Na-tions report. They were:

. The 34 recommended for prosecution in the February 1999 report of theIndonesian inquiry into 1999 atrocities in East Timor (KPP HAM, KomisiPenyelidik Pelanggaraan Hak Asasi Manusia di Timor Timur, or Com-mission to Investigate Human Rights Abuses in East Timor);1

r The 26 announced (at various times between September 2000 and April2001) as suspects by the Indonesian Attomey General's Department, infollow-up to the KPP HAM repor!2

r The 24 mentioned as worthy of further investigation in the April 2001report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity, famesDunn.3

These three lists overlapped to some extent, and contained one or two errors.Together they listed 54 suspects.

Both the KPP HAM and the Attomey-General's lists focused on responsi-bility for specific, high profile incidents. They included militia leaders, localgovernment officials such as district administrators, district military and po-lice chiefs and some more senior military figures. The UN Special Rapporteur'slist was restricted to the military, and added some non-territorial officers (thatis, those outside the regular garrison or territorial command structure).This last list also generally went higher up the chain of command than theother two had done.

i00 Masters of Terror

The two Indonesian lists seemed never to be quite fixed. Those who haddrafted them obviously worked under intense pressure. General Wiranto'sname, for example, was removed from the KPP HAM list in the nine days thatelapsed between the publication of its executive surrrrnary and the final fullreport (which was not made public). In Wiranto's stead, the name of retiredMajGen Garnadi, which had not appeared in the summary, popped up in thefinal version. We have included both Wiranto and Gamadi.

The Attorney-General's list, meanwhile, only shrank as time went on. De-partmental officials declared repeatedly that this or that individual had beendropped because they, or witnesses who might testify against them, 'could notbe found'. Our list contains all these names.

However, this still left out many other names that had been mentioned invarious human rights reports as needing investigation.

First, we were aware that some militia members had been indicted for crimesagainst humanity in an East Timor now under UN administration. Leavingout of account several rank-and-file members, these included three militia lead-ers who had appeared on no list thus far. We realise this list - the fourth 'list ofstatus' - remains incomplete.

Second, we knew of various other lists, lacking official status but that wenevertheless regarded as helpful.a The names on them fell in all four categoriesalready touched by previous lists - militia leaders, civilian government offi-cials, police and military officers. The latter included both territorial and non-territorial officers and ranged from local commands to TNI Headquarters inJakarta.

We did not add all of those we found in this way to our own growing list.Some were rank-and-file soldiers and militia members. Some others were as-sistants to senior comrnanders in the Udayana military command in Bali andto non-territorial commanders in East Timor - people about whom we knewlittle. All these we mentioned only under the entries of their superiors. Foursuch rank-and-file men from the KPP HAM list we also did not list separately.However, even after those deductions, we had discovered an additional 62new identities. We now had a total of 1L9 names, all of them apparently in needof investigation.

Sources

Next, we set out to discover what was already known about these individu-als. We did not have the resources to collect new evidence, nor, with a very fewexceptions (identified in the foohrotes), did we have access to any informationnot already on the public record. The public sources included Indonesian andinternational news publications, reports from East Timorese, Indonesian andintemational human rights organisations available on the intemet, and anony-mous (but usually reliable) intemet news services such as SiaR and MateBEAN.

The Key Suspects: An Introduction

The Indonesian language human rights and news service reports are by farthe most detailed. They were composed under circumstances of extreme dan-ger for those who gathered information in remote places. Indonesian and EastTimorese human rights workers and joumalists were constantly threatenedwith death, and some did die. we need to remember not only the murderedEuropean journalist Sander Thoenes (see the item on Jacob sarosa in this col-lection), but also the East Timorese human rights campaigners Aniceto Guterres(see Guilherme dos Santos), Alfredo da Silva (see Col Suprapto Tarman) andLourence vicente Martins (see Lt Sutrisno), who all experienced death threats.The Indonesian journalist Agus Mulyawan was murdered by a militia led byJoni Marquez. only now is Mulyawan being recognised as a hero of independ-ent journalism.s

Ever present danger was merely one of the lirnitations on the public recordleft behind by 7999. Another was ignorance of military structures. Most jour-nalists had little idea how multifarious the Indonesian command structure is.They knew about the regular garrison commands (also known as'territorial'or'organic') - layered hierarchically all the way from Jakarta to the smallest vil-lage. This structure is found all over Indonesia. They often didn't know abouta parallel chain (or chains?) of combat command used in counter-insurgencyoperations. such structures, established by and taking orders from Jakarta, arefound only in combat areas like East Timor, Aceh and Irian faya. foumalistsoften failed to understand the secret role played there by the various specialForces (Kopassus) and shategic Reserve (Kostrad) troops in East Timor. yetthese were key institutions of violence.

The picture we present here is determined as much by these limitations ofaccess as by what actually happened on the ground. It outlines sharply theformal, visible bureaucratic structure of governor, district head, territorial mili-tary commander and police chief, while leaving blurred the parallel reality ofmilitia chiefs and their relationships with cloak-and-dagger intelligence op-eratives. Amid the many statements issued by the former, we have only a veryfew confessions of defecting militia leaders to help us understand the latter.

This disjuncture between the densely reported territorial military structure,and the highly under-reported combat structure (often occupied by officers ofhigher rank), skews our picfure of the abuses committed in East Timor in a waythat must be satisfying for those who bear the greatest responsibility.

Many important sources of information remain hidden. The next stage mustnow be to gain access to them. The full report of the KPP HAM must be released.we already have one superb paper based on secret Indonesian military recordsleft behind in East Timor, and there may be more there.6 Interviews with Indo-nesian and particularly East Timorese eyewitnesses will furn up a great deal,as will court documents for the trials now being held in East Timor.

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Probably of most interest, however, will be the intercepts of Indonesianofficial communications held in the databases of international intelligence agen-cies such as the Australian Defence Signals Directorate. An inquiry or courtchallenge may be necessary to force these vitally important records into thepublic domain. Until Indonesia experiences a democratic overturn such as thatin East Germany, when the records of the Stasi secret police were opened to thepublic (albeit selectively), intercepts made in democratic countries provide thebest hope of bringing the East Timor episode to an honourable close.

Ranking the suspects

After trawling the public record on the extra individuals who had not pre-viously appeared on a list of stafus, we found that some had been frequentlydiscussed and clearly had a case to answer. These we assigned the code Prior-lty 1 (25 individuals). Others were structurally in a position of responsibilitybut were rarely mentioned in the reports. These we called Priority 2 (another40). We believe that all those on the four lists of status, as well as those we havegiven the codes Priorities 1 and 2, should be investigated for crimes againsthumanity.

This by no means constitutes an exhaustive list. The data we have is oftensketchy. Other names appear on no list but are mentioned in scattered reports.We have not had time to ferret them out. More are sure to emerge in the future.

Whi-le we have treated all the available data critically, we are aware that inalmost every case these are allegations that require further investigation. Somecould turn out to be exaggerated, wrong, or even more appalling than wasinitially alleged. Indeed the purpose of this monograph is not to present a

definitive statement for the prosecution, but to stimulate such further work.

Nevertheless, the data in these pages represents the most complete set ofprofiles available so far of the key suspects in the destruction of East Timor.Moreover, the web of relations between these individuals allows us for the firsttime to see in detail the institutional networks through which they did theirtawdry work. This web is visible with particular clarity on the fully cross-Iinked internet version of this data set, which we hope to make available soon(http / / www.yayasanhak. minihub. org).

Preliminary findings

Clearly most of the intimidation and killing before the ballot on 30 August1999 was done by the East Timorese militias. With most independent observersgone, we know less about who carried out the deportation of a quarter of amillion people, the looting and torching of most towns, and the murder ofperhaps a couple of thousand civilians, after the ballot result was announcedon 4 September. Militias seem to have been the main actors there too, althoughthe involvement by military and police was now much more direct than before.

The ky Suspects: An Introduction

Throughout the year it was also clear to most observers that the militias hadofficial backing. The main problem we therefore need to solve is who theseofficial backers were, and to what extent they share responsibility in the crimes.The present data set allows us to formulatl an a^r*e. that is perhaps betterinformed than ever before.

The first observation that must strike anyone who follows the links in theweb of relations presented in the following chapter is that there is no singlemaster.

This does not mean the perpetrators were acting alone. They were not'rogues', as many foreign diplomats tried desperately to pretend (with theirIndonesian colleagues), before the conflagration after 30 August made it im-possible to pretend any longer. The term 'rogue', by the way, was an Indone-sian Foreign Affairs Department translation of the standard New order Indo-nesian term 'oknum'. After every incident of human rights abuse, of whichthere were many under Suharto, officials always brought out the ,oknum, toexplain why this was not a structural consequence of their policies but ratherthe result of actions by ill-disciplined individuals. on the contrary, most if notall the individuals listed here uit"d i.r some way as an employ"" or the lndone-sian government.

In the ranks of the Indonesian govemment, indeed within the entire estab-lishment, there was widespread opposition to letting East Timor go its ownway. The mainstream mass media, with some heroic exceptions including thelakarta Posf, joined in the defence of 'Indonesia' in a way that pushed humanrights concerns to second place. some establishment figures did argue thatannexing East Timor had been a mistake (or that it was too expensive, tooungrateful, or too Catholic to keep) and should be let go, but they were few.

However, the government was large and sprawling. The actions that differ-ent parts of it took to help the cause often had an ad hoc character. Govemmenthad been thrown into serious disarray by the resignation of suharto, and co-herence in govemment policy was hard to find anywhere. This becomes clearwhen we look in turn at the cabinet, the civil service, the East Timorese elite,and various military groups.

The decision to hold a ballot in East Timor as soon as possible was not - asIndonesians anxious to distance themselves from it afterwards liked to sav -forced on Indonesia by foreigners. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said it had beenmade in response to a December 1998 letter from Australian prime MinisterJohn Howard to President Habibie. But that letter, while foreshadowing a pos-sible referendum, placed it in the distant future.7 In this respect Howard wasunwittingly quoting the peace plan promoted since '1993 by East Timoreseresistance leaders fose Ramos Horta and Xanana Gusmao.s

Nor was the decision taken by President Habibie alone. He discussed theEast Timor option intensively with a small number of close advisors, two of

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them military. One was MajGen (ret) Sintong Panjaitan, who had been removedfrom his position as commander of the Udayana military reglon (of which East

Timor was a part) over the November 1991 Santa Cruz massacre. The other wasCoordinating Minister for Politics and Security, retired LtGen Feisal Tanjung, aclose friend since they were together in Germany in the early 1.970s and a

strong supporter of Habibie's presidency.

The East Timor referendum idea (initially called a 'consultation', then a

'ballot') was also canvassed in lndonesia's cabinet. There was a limited meet-ing on 25 fanuary, and on 27 lanuary 1999 the full cabinet discussed the issue.Feisal Tanjung seems to play a prominent role in both. Did Feisal Tanjungconceive the idea of an immediate ballot? We think it is possible. He was proudof having helped win such a UN-supervised ballot once before - in Irian faya in1969. That ballot was won through military manipulation of key Papuan elites'

He had been a member (with Sintong Panjaitan) of the small military team thatdid it.e

Foreign Minister Ali Alatas recalled that the great majority of cabinet infanuary believed Indonesia could win: 'We were then very convinced we wouldwin the referendum.'l0 (Alatas himself said he had belonged to the dissidentminority.) Not until |une did this faith begin to waver in some quarters, whileothers did not give it up until the ballot result shook them out of it.

The ballot optiory if all went according to plan, would kill two birds withone stone. It would immediately win brownie points with the West and helpprise open the IMF aid tap closed due to unrest after Suharto's resignation.And it would tie East Timor to Indonesia once and for all, with UN recognition.

It was a gamble, but one that had worked before. The stick and the carrothad together done the trick in Irian Jaya - the stick of military intimidation and

the carrot of gifts for the elite. Indeed, cooptation and intimidation - albeit inmilder forms - were stock tools used by the New Order to win domestic elections.

It is worth remembering that, under Indonesian rule, East Timor had by farthe most state-dependent urban elite of any province. Several thousand East

Timorese civil servants were on the payroll of the lndonesian Sovernment, andthousands more had either married Indonesians or benefited in other waysfrom the occupation. For a significant section of the population then, the re-wards of integration were real. Jakarta must have believed that the suddenErnnouncement of the referendum would frighten broad sections of East Timoresesociety into rejecting independence. They were wrong, of course, but at thesame time there were East Timorese who were genuinely threatened by theprospect of independence. Only by understanding this can we comprehendthe militia phenomenon. While it is true that most of the militia organisationswere creations of the Indonesian military, we should not regard them, or theirleaders, as mere puppets, without domestic constituencies.rl

The Key Suspects: An lntroduction

As those who conceived it no doubt intended, the shock announcement ofthe referendum brought pro-integration leaders hurrying to Jakarta to pledgetheir support and to ask for help in return. They did not like the ballot, but,being unable to reverse the decision, were determined to win it - even moredetermined than Jakarta.

The meeting between a sizeable delegation of civil administrators from EastTimor with armed forces commander General wiranto in Jakarta on 19 Febru-ary 7999 was reinforced by a return visit to Dili by a high-level military delega-tion on 20 April. They asked for arms to defend themselves against the growingpro-independence movement. Wiranto said he denied their request. But theygot them anyway, even if not in huge numbers.

They also got money, in ad hoc ways. The Foreign Affairs Department, aswell as the Agriculture, Forestry, and Transmigration Departments, reportedlycontributed substantial sums out of their regular budgets.12 Later someonethought of raiding the World Bank social safety net fund, designed to helpvictims of the economic crisis then afflicting Indonesia (see the item on Gover-nor Abilio Soares). Someone else - perhaps several people - had the idea ofprinting counterfeit money, with military backing (see LGen Tyasno sudartoand Gen Subagyo H S). The money was reportedly intended for conductingpropaganda campaigns, for building new militia groups, and no doubt forlining pockets.

Winning the ballot was made the number one policy priority for civilianbureaucrats in East Timor in 1999. Continued employment in the civil servicedepended on their willingness to sign statements of support for integration.After April, the govemor and his district heads attended a constant round ofrallies, where they implored or threatened the population to choose safety bychoosing lndonesia. otherwise they sat and listened to inflammatory rhetoricfrom fierce militia leaders - the fiercer the better. Their policy statements wereill-considered to the last - Governor Abilio soares began vigorously to promotethe idea of a partitioned East Timor even as his militias were burning it down.He had long feared the ballot might be lost and now openly wanted to fall backon a pro-Indonesian buffer along the westem border.

The militias were the most unsavoury part of the whole campaigrr, and theyare the starting point of the present monograph. They date back to the mid-797Os, but they now experienced a revival. Existing militias undertook neworganising immediately after suharto's abdication in May 1998. New militiaswere already being formed several months before the Habibie announcement -in response to the growing clamour for independence after Suharto's depar-fure. But they, too, had an ad hoc character. There was a great variety of them, inmany different localities. The alliances they formed had more bluster than real-ity, and they acted in concert only rarely.

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106 Masters of Tmor

Many of their leaders, all East Timorese, are listed here as key suspects.

Some are not known to have engaged in violent acts and are not listed. Some,like |oao Tavares and Nazario Corte Real, were ageing men who had foughtwith the Indonesian army against other East Timorese whom they consideredtheir enemies in the war of annexation r 1975-76. Others, like Eurico Guterres,were young street thugs recruited by military intelligence in Dili, especiallyafter the Santa Cruz massacre of November 1991. Others again, most of them infact, were local government officials, ranging from departmental bureaucratslike Cancio de Carvalho, through village heads like Laurentino'Moko'Soares,to district administrators (bupati) like Vidal Doutel Sarmento. One was even thehighly educated deputy vice chancellor of the local university - NatalinoMonteiro.

Sometimes a family rivalry had escalated tragically when it led them to takeone side rather than another in the civil war of 1975 - a conflict the Indonesianmilitary exploited cynically. Some had reached their positions by helping In-donesian soldiers. But above all the militia leaders were government officials.Besides the formal bureaucratic positions many held, documents show that allwere paid with government money, taken either out of regular military or ex-traordinary provincial budgets. They were all appointed to special govern-ment service in public ceremonies in April 1999. When international partiesprotested, they were formally incorporated as civil defence forces under theterms of the Defence Act of 1982.13 Such forces (known by the acronyms Wanra,Kamra, Ratih, and lately Pam Swakarsa) are administered through the HomeAffairs Department - a militarised deparhnent that runs all of local govemmentaround the country. Formal responsibility in East Timor lay with the civiliangovernor, Abilio Soares.

However, the official image of the militias as Home Affairs Departmentnine-to-fivers is impossible to square with the facts. Government in East Timorhad been thoroughly militarised for a quarter of a century. Its civilian bureau-crats enjoyed limited autonomy. The numerous coordination meetings theyhad in 1999 with military officers, police chiefs, and militia leaders, as de-scribed in these dossiers, paint a different picture. Even the official job descrip-tions of these men show how blurred the distinctions between them were. Some

'civilian' officials were military officers at the same time, other civilian officialsactively led militia groups/ and some militia leaders were soldiers with regularranks (mostly sergeants).

Military officers were invariably the senior figures in these coordinationmeetings. The others aspired to be their friends and partners. So who werethese men in green? And who gave them their orders? For unlike the ratherlocal and ail hoc militias, these officers belonged to a reasonably cohesive or-ganisation directed along a chain of command that stretched back to fakarta.They make up three quarters of the names in the present list.

The Key Suspects: An lntroduction

As we read the reports fuom \999, we most often find the names of officerswithin the territorial command, beginning with the 13 district commandersaround the territory (dandim). Below them were the usually unnamed soldiersfrom sub-district commands (Koramil), who made their headquarters availableto militias, who beat up people the militias brought in and who took part along-side them in actions against people they saw as enemies. Above them stood theEast Timor commander Col Suhartono ('Tono') Suratman, who personally at-tended a host of coordination meetings with militia leaders. so did, thoughmore rarely, Suratman's superiors in the Bali-based Udayana command,MajGen Adam Damiri and his chief of staff BrigGen Mahidin Simbolon. Theselast two men each had teams of assistants who handled the routine logistical,operational and intelligence work.

Suratman controlled two 'territorial' battalions, numbered 744 and T4S.These had a good proportion of F:stTimorese members (butno FastTimorrese officers).IUa.ny of them are thought to have been'militias' rn1ry9. These battalions are men-tioned in reports throughout 1999 as responsible for human righb abuses.

One of the contradictions created by giving the military such an importantinternal policing role is that it left the police with little scope and even lessauthority for action. East Timor police chief Col (Pol) Timbul silaen cut a pa-thetic figure in 1999. A key challenge of reformnsi was to separate the policefrom the armed forces, but that process had then barely begun. Despite officialstatements that the police were responsible for security in East Timor in therun-up to the ballot the reality was that they acted only after taking orders fromthe military. Moreover, Timbul silaen had to accept police reinforcements fromJakarta (the Lorosae Contingent) over which he appears to have had no clearauthority. Nevertheless, Timbul Silaen took part in many meetings with militialeaders at which evil was hatched, and some officers under his command -such as LtCol (Pol) Budi Susilo - allegedly took part directly in atrocities.

As we go further up the chain of military command, our information aboutwhat they did in East Timor becomes sparser. Above Adam Damiri stood theArmy Chief of Staff, Gen Subagyo, the number two man in the armed forcesafter Gen wiranto. He personally may have been to East Timor only once in1999 (on 20 April, to meet pro-integration figures), and he acknowledged earlyon that the army was arming East Timorese militias. For the rest he probablyspent a lot of time invisibly working the intemal chain of command throughAdam Damiri.

However, and here things become interesting, Gen Subagyo also had hisown team of assistants, three of whom spent a lot of time working on EastTimor. Like practically all the senior military names mentioned in this data set,they were old East Timor hands: MajGen Kiki Syahnakri, BrigGen AmirulIsnaeni and LtGenJohny Lumintang. The first two were frequently on the groundtn 7999, and militia leaders said they were active organisers. They outranked

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Col Tono Suratman, the top territorial officer in East Timor, who must havesometimes wondered who was boss.

Indeed, Subagyo's assistants were not the only high ranking officers fromTNI Headquarters who spent a lot of time in East Timor n1999 allegedly doingnasty things. The key officer was MajGen Zacky Anwar Makarim, recentlyreplaced as head of the military intelligence agency BIA, and in 1999 listedonly as 'senior officer at ABRI headquarters'. Observers saw him and MahidinSimbolon (the Udayana chief of staff) as Indonesia's top intelligence experts.They also both had backgrounds in the Kopassus special forces. They also bothhad beckgrounds in the Kopassus special forces.

7-acky Makarim and his assistant BrigGen Glenny Kairupan (another 'sen-ior officer at ABRI headquarters') were housed in Dili as part of an officiallyaccredited task force acting under orders from Coordinating Minister for Poli-tics and Security, retired LtGen Feisal Tanjung. The mission of this task force

ftnown as P3TT) was to coordinate with Unamet. Zacky was its 'security advi-sor'. (Feisal Tanjung's man in Dili, by the way, was MajGen (ret) Garnadi, whobecame well known because his contingency plans for East Timor in the eventof a loss for hrdonesia in the ballot were leaked in July.)

Unofficially, however, Zacky Makarim did more than coordinate withUnamet. He got its hands so dirty that, just before the ballot, President Habibiecame under sufficient intemational pressure to remove Zacky from the territoryaltogether (which didn't happen). East Timorese sources said Z-acky appearedto be working in East Timor with a small team that included Glenny Kairupanas well as MajGen ICki Syahnakri, Gen Subagyo assistant. Another top intelli-gence officer to join the team just before the ballot was MajGen SjafrieSyamsuddin.

This small Zacky Makarim team evidently coordinated with Army Chief ofStaff Gen Subagyo (through his assistants), but it did not fall directly under hisline of command. Wiranto told Unamet Zacky was his personal representativein Dili. The links Zacky enjoyed with military intelligence BIA, and with the eliteforces Kopassus, create the suggestion of a black operatiory working out of TNIHeadquarters in Jakarta. These other Iinks take us to those parallel combat com-mand structureq reaching from Jakarta to the field in East Timor, which we intro-duced earlier. Bypassing the public face of the territorial command, these struc-fures were designed for counter-insurgency and were thus more clandestine.

Chief among them were the two sectoral combat commands. Sector A, basedin eastern East Timor, was corrunanded for a time by each of Col Sunarko andCol lrwan Kusnadi. Sector B was based in the west and commanded by LColTatang Zaenuddin. We know the names of some of their assistants, but little oftheir activities.

The Key Suspects: An lntroiluction

These sectoral commands were in the early years of the occupation at theheart of the military operation against Falintil. But between ']993 and 799s,under pressure to make East Timor look more 'normal', they were scaled backand to some extent dismantled. Authority was increasingly transferred to theterritorial command. (Of course the territorial commands were themselves hardlymore 'normal', but they were at least regarded that way elsewhere in Indone-sia.) Nevertheless, the sectoral commands never disappeared. As we shall see,they were even reinvigorated in 1999.

Another combat instifution was the much-feared special forces intelligence(and torture) organisation SGI, based in Dili. This was a Kopassus unit at-tached to its Group 3. Here the name of LtCol Yayat Sudrajat occurs repeatedlyin the East Timor human rights reports. Both the sectoral commands and SGIprobably took their orders from Kopassus, but they may not have been horizon-tally integrated.

Then there was a range of combat battalions based in East Timor in 1999.Among them (the list is not complete) were Battalions 143, 301.,401., 406, 492,52L, 621,623 and 700 Airborne. Most of their commanding officers are alsolisted in the present data set, as are some of their assistants. some belonged toKostrad, the Army Strategic Command, some did not. They may have been theonly units with the capacity to forcibly remove 250,000 people from East Timorafter the ballot.

To whom did the officers commanding these various non-territorial instifu-tions report? This question is not easy to answer. Formally speaking, they wouldhave had to report through the territorial commanders, that is, Col TonoSuratman and MajGen Adam Damiri. In reality, however, it seems they actedunder completely separate chain(s) of command that ran directly to fakarta.The two key groups most often mentioned are the elite forces, Kopassus andKostrad. Kopassus was in 1999 commanded by MajGen Syahrir, while Kostradwas commanded by LtGen Djamari Chaniago. Neither is on the public recordas being directly involved in East Timor in that year, but their subordinateswere, even if we do not know precisely how.

One of us (Douglas Kammen) has written about the seesaw in the early tomid-1990s between Kopassus and Kostrad for control of the non-territorialcombat strucfure in East Timor.la The two units were not unrelated. KoshadBattalion 432, for example, was made up of Kopassus rejects and was oftencommanded by a Kopassus officer (see Maj Eriet Hadi Uriyanto). Some officers- such LtGen (re) Prabowo subianto - switched back and forth between Kopassusand Kostrad throughout their careers. After 1997 and into 1999 the balancemay well have shifted in Kopassus' favour. Its officers were prominent in boththe sectoral commands, as well as in SGI. Kopassus not only took their ownline towards militias (a constantly reinvented idea in East Timor). They

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influenced the civilian bureaucracy by awarding honorary Kopassus ranks todistrict heads. They also exerted their influence on the territorial command, forexample by having officers who once commanded non-territorial battalionsposted as district military commandets (iknilim). East Timor commander ColTono Suratman was a Kopassus officer, as were the chief of staff at Udayana(BrigGen Mahidin Simbolon) and the Army Chief of Staff Gen Subagyo.

The declaration of martial law on 8 September imposed a new regime, un-der MajGen Kiki Syahnakri. It relegated the territorial command to secondarystatus. Kiki was a Kostrad officer and a member of the 7-acky Makarim team justmentioned. The post-ballot mayhem in East Timor was just reaching a cre-scendo. Since he had been fuelling the militias through most of 1999, it is hardlysurprising that he failed to fulfil Indonesian Bovemment promises to the worldto rein in their violence. Syahnakri set about reinvigorating the combat com-mand structure by appointing two combat officers, his deputy martial lawadministrators Col Gerhan Lentara and Col Irwan Kusnadi, to each of twosectoral commands. This war-making strucfure was the least accountable andthe most inimical to the interests of the East Timorese population.

The appearance here is of a sudden Kostrad dominance, since GerhanLentara and Irwan Kusnadi, like Kiki, had Kostrad backgrounds. But whetherthis indicates that it was Kostrad, rather than Kopassus, that should be heldresponsible for the final and most destructive phase of the 1999 campaigp mustfor the moment remain an open question. One possibility is that by this stage

the militias needed no further assistance and could be left to get on with theirwork undisturbed. Another possibility is that there was a Kopassus connec-tion after all - Gerhan Lentara, Irwan Kusnadi and Syahnakri's earlier assist-

ant Glenny Kairupan may all have Kopassus links as well as Kostrad ones.Kiki's deputy martial law administrator, BrigGen Amirul Isnaeni, was a

Kopassus man. Clearly the need for investigation is an urgent priority.

Some observers sidestep the question of institutional lines of command al-together. Institutions are after all only as real as the people in them. The Indone-sian army is, in this view, hardly a Napoleonic creature of iron discipline butsomething much more amorphous and riven by cliques. These observers are

looking at webs of personal relationships within TNI Headquarters. Cliquesare often bom at the military academy, and then shaped by career competitionin a sprawling organisation. The bonds could have been those of a commonreligion, birthplace or ethnicity, those created in combat, or the shallower ones

bom of shared disappointments or the promise of mutual advantage. Othershave been based on personal friendships, family or marriage.

One name that stands out in such discussion of personal bonds is that ofLtGen (ret) Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo. He had been sacked from his

command of Kostrad in May 1998 (and later from the armed forces entirely)

The Key Suspects: An lntroduction

because he had been exposed as responsible for kidnapping activists protestingagainst suharto. Being an ambitious son-in-law of the fallen dictator had nothelped his survival chances either. rn 7999 he was a guest of the king of Jordan,helping in his (Prabowo's) brother's oil business. Yet it was he, more thananyone else, who had shaped lndonesia's counter-insurgency strategy in EastTimor beginning in 1989-90. That strategy relied to a great extent on usingyoung East Timorese military informers to build militias, who would in turnexercise pressure on pro-independence activists. Several of the 1999 militiaswere in fact reincamations of the Gadapaksi organisation Prabowo set up in1995. Time and again the East Timorese at the head of the most vicious militiasfurned out to have been Prabowo recruits. Moreover, many of the military offic-ers named in this chapter had worked with him in East Timor - particularly in1990-91 and 1995-97.

The other name is that of General wiranto, who did survive the transitionfrom suharto to Habibie as armed forces commander, but only by walking overthe political corpse of Prabowo. Much commentary in 1998 and 99 revolvedaround the intrigues these two men were thought to be conducting against theother. such analyses are helpftrl to the extent that the armed forces, like govern-ment generally, was in the aftermath of suharto's demise even more reduced tofactionalism and ad hoccery than normal. But we need to take with a grain of saltthe allegation routinely made by the ascendant wiranto clique that prabowo hadbeen responsible for most of the long list of evils that soldiers had comrnittedunder Suharto. These allegations have about them the smell of partisan rhetoric.

wiranto's name appeared in the summary version of a report by the Indone-sian inquiry into atrocities committed in East Timor (KPP HAM), with the rec-ommendation he should be prosecuted for crimes against humanity. Expertopinion remains divided on whether he actively supported the militia strategyor stood by while others did the dirty work. The present collection shows thereis evidence for both views. However, he was ultimately responsible for all mili-tary policy. And it was the military as an institution, not any particular factionof it acting alone, that supported the rnilitias throughout 1999.webelieve, withthe drafters of the KPP HAM report, that wiranto should be investigated forcrimes against humanity.

Finally, President Habibie: the buck stopped at his desk. Like Wiranto ftutunlike most other army officers, whose careers continued to flourish), Habibielost his job. As they were Suharto loyalists, they probably would have lostanyway, but the East Timor episode counted against both of them. Habibie lostthe presidential race, and wiranto the race for vice-president, at a session of thesupreme legislative assembly (MPR) in October 1999. President Abdurrahmanwahid then sacked wiranto as Coordinating Minister for Politics and Securityin February 2000. It was not, however, the killing and destruction that wentagainst them but their humiliating 'loss' of Indonesia's 27th province.

111

112 Masters of Taror

Habibie has not been mentioned so far in any 'list of status', nor have weadded him to our list. If the ballot decision came about because cabinet felt itcould win, then he too committed not merely a sin of omission by failing tocontrol the men of violence, but a sin of commission. He engaged in a course ofaction predicated on the use of militia intimidation to ensure the ballot wasindeed won. On the other hand, the East Timorese themselves may be in twominds about blaming him. After all they did win their freedom - albeit at hor-rendous cost - because Habibie offered them a ballot. And there is no indicationthat the dreadful scorched earth policy, implemented once the ballot was lost, hadbeen planned or approved anywhere higher than in the TNI Headquarters.

Summing up, the evidence points to a broad tovernment policy aimed atwinning the ballot by various kinds of persuasiory including intimidation andterror against the East Timorese. The policy was implemented by different agen-cies in a somewhat ad hoc way. As the odds against ballot success began tolengthen by about fune, the policy evolved, especially in the minds of somesenior officers at TM Headquarters who were under the fewest delusions. Asfar as they were concemed, its purpose now was to create sufficiently extremedisruption ('civil war') as would undermine international determination tofollow up a pro-independence vote. In the end, when all was lost, East Timorwas bumed to the ground and a large proportion of its population expelled.The final contingency plan had been put into action. The crimes against hu-manity committed in East Timor n 1999 demand an accounting.

6The Key Suspects

Gerry aan Klinken €t Daaid Bourchier

By way of explanation

This chapter, which profiles the key suspects for the violence in East Timor, isdivided into three main sections:

. Newly recommended for investigation- Priority 1: those who have beenidentified as warranting further investigation. The entries in this sectionare not mentioned in any of the three official reports, but for each of thesuspects listed in this category there is a considerable amount of evidencepointing to their culpability.

' Newly recommended for investigation- Priority 2: those listed here canbe shown to bear significant structural responsibility for the atrocities,but for whom there is minimal data so far to show their involvement inthe violence.

. Previously recommended for prosecution and/or indicted in Indonesia:those mentioned in this section are mentioned in one or more of theofficial reports into the violence in East Timor. The reports are: Kpp HAM(see Chapter 2 in this volume; designated as K); James Dunn's report tothe UN (see Chapter 3 of this volume; designated as D); and the report forthe Indonesian Attorney-General's Department (designated as A).

As well, there are two smaller sections -one on those already tried and one forbackground information only.

Each section is in alphabetical order (by surname) and each of the names under-lined can be cross-referenced by looking at the apropriate section: [1] designatesNewly recommended for investigation

-Priority 1 suspects; [2] Newly recom-mended for investigation- Priority 2 suspects; [3] refers to those previouslyrecommended for prosecution and/or indicted in Indonesia; [4] refers to thoseindicted or tried in East Timor; and [5] is background information. Because of thefluidity of Indonesian naming practices, we begin by setting out a completeindex of all those surveyed by category.

11,4 Masters of Teror

Newly recommended for investigation- Priority L [11

Cancio Lopes de CARVALHO

Nazario Vital S [Jaime] CORTE REAL

Herminio da COSTA

Col (Inf) Gerhan LENTARA

LCol (Art) Kamiso MIRAN

Col (Inf) MUDIIONO

Lafaek SABURAI (Afonso Pinto)LtCol (Infl SARIPUDIN

Gen Subagyo Hadi SISWOJO

ATmindoSOARESMARIANO

LtCol (Inf) Qoko SOEKARSONO

Lt-GenSUGIONO

LCol (Inf) SULASTIYO

Col SLINARKO

LCol (Pol) BudiSUSLO

LCol (Inf) SLIWONDO

MajGen (Infl SYAHRIR M.S.

LtGen (ret) Feisal TANfUNG

LTUNTL]NG

M"j 0"0 RM Bambang WISNUMURTFIY

LtCol Tatang ZAENUDDIN SW

Maj (Inf) Rahmat PRIBADI

MajGen Muchdi (PURWOPRANJONO)

MajMaman RACHMAN

LtCol (lnf) Nus RN RAHASIA

Col (Inf) Mochamad NurhidajatRUSMONO

Vidal Doutel SARMENTO

LtCol (Infl Hardiono SAROSO

Maj(InflHMSINAGACapt (Inf) Bambang SUDARMANTO

LtCol (Inf) SUKOSO

LtCol (Inf) Bambang SLINGESTI

Maj(Inf) AhmadSUSETYO

MajGen Endriartono SUTARTO

Maj (Pol) Mangatas TAMBUNAN

Maj (Inf) Kustomo TryOSO

Maj 0"0 Eriet Hadi URIYANTO

Col (Inf) Pramono Edhie WIBOWO

LtCol (Inf) Sonny MDJAJA

LtGen Susilo Bambang YUDHOYONO

LtCol(Inf) Sigit YLIWONO

Newly recommended for investigation- Prionty 2 I2l

Col (Inf) ANWAR

Capt (Inf) Toyib ANWARI

SgtJoanico Cesario BELO

LtGen Djamari CHANIAGOLtCoI P DJAINUDIN SW

Maj(Inf) DediERIMPI

Capt (Inf) HARTONO

LtCol (Art) Lexi HERSON

LCol (Art) Hisar Richard HUTAIULU

Maj(InIIULIANTOLt I Dewa Ketut KALER

LCol (In0 LLIKITO

Agustinho'Sera MALIK' Boavide Ximenes

Capt (Inf) Salmun MANAFE

Maj (Pol) Wilmar MARPAUNG

MajGen Mochtar MA'RUF

Rear Admiral Yoost F MENGKO

Capt (Inf) Agus NURKASA

MajGen (ret) Sintong PANJAITAN

Capt (Inf) Edy Doso PRASETYO

ColNanangDJPRIADI

The Key Suspects 115

Previously recommended for prosecution and/orindicted in Indonesia [3]

Martinus BERE

Edmundo CONCEICAO E Silva

Vasco da CRUZ

MajGen (Inf) Adam DAMIRIMajGen (ret) HR GARNADILtCol (Pol) Hulman GULTOM

Eurico GUTERRES

BrigGen (Inf) Amirul ISNAENI

Brig-Gen (Inf) Glenny KAIRUPAN

LCol (Eng. Corps) LilikKUSHADIYANTO (Kushardiyanto)

Col (Inf) Irwan KUSNADI

LtCol (Inf) Asep KUSWANI

LtGen Johny Josephus LUMINTANGMajGen Zacky Anwar MAKARIMIgidioMANEKl,eonito MARTINS

Col (Inf) Ahmad MASAGUS

NatalinoMONTEIRO

OlivioMendoza MORUK

MOTORNUS

Col Nur MUIS

LCol Wioyotomo NUGROHO

LtCol NUR, Muhammad

LtCol (Inf) Endar PRIYANTO [Priyatno]LtCol Paulus Gatot RUDIANTO

Indicted ortried in EastTimor [4]LtSyatulANWAR

Joao Mendonca de ARAUJO

JoniMARQUEZLaurentino ('Moko') SOARES

Background tsl

LtGen (ret) Prabowo DJOJOHADIKUSUMO

LCol (Pol) Adios SALOVAGuilherme dosSANTOS

Maj (Inf) Jacob Djoko SAROSA

Col (Inf) Herman SEDIONO

LtCol (Cav) Burhannudin SIAGIANCol (Pol) Timbul SILAENMajGen Mahidin SIMBOLON

Abilio Osorio SOARES

Domingos SOARES

ManueldeSOUSA

LCol (Pol) Gatot SUBIAKTOROLtGen Tyasno SUDARTO

LCol (Inf) Yayat SUDRAJAT

LtCol (Inf) AS SUDRAIATFirst Lt (Inf) SUGITO

LtCol (Inf) SUIARWOCol (Infl Tono SURATMAN

FiTstLtSUTRISNO

Capt Agus SLIWARNO

MajGen (Inf) Kiki SYAHNAKRICapt Ahmad SYAMSUDDINMajGen (Inf) Sjafrie SYAMSUDDINCol (Inf) Suprapto TARMANCaptTATANG

Joao da Silva TAVARES

Gen WIRANTO

LtCol (Inf) Yagus YAKRAMAN

11,5 Masters of Tenor

Newly recommended for investigation - Priority 1 I11

Cancio Lopes de CARVALHOCommander of Mahidi militia, Ainaro (and Covalima)

ln1999, Cancio's name became notorious throughout East Timor. He was one ofthe small handful who allegedly met with commander MajGen Adam Damiri [3] on 10

or 12 August 1998 to mark the launching of the militia movement.l

In December 1998, acbing under inskuctions from SGI, he revived a pro'integra-tion youth group he had led in the early 1990s and renamed it Mahidi (Mati HidupDemi Integrasi, Dead or Alive for Integration). It was officially inaugurated at a cer-emony attended by the Ainaro military and police chiefs on 1 January 1999. Manyyoung men were press-ganged into joining up. Helping him was his younger brotherNemecio.2

Ainaro was the base for TM Sector B, a combat sector dominated by Kopassus.3

The sector was corunanded for most or all of 1999 by LtCol Tatang Zaenuddin [1].

The Mahidi militia was created following increasingly militant pro-independencesentirnent in Ainaro in late 1998, in which some houses had been burnt. By the follow-ing April it had 100G.2000 members, and about 500 firearms. Cancio himself told BBC

radio that he received automatic weapons from the Ainaro district military commandon 30 December 1998.a That command (Kodim 1633) was probably still led at this timeby LtCol Paulus Gatot Rudianto [3].s

Based in his home village of Cassa, near Ainaro, branches were set up in everyvillage of Ainaro district. The organisation was disciplined and always coordinatedclosely withSGI. On all its operations, Mahidi was assistedby military officers-promi-nent among them Sgt Domingos Sarmento [2] and Sgt Cesario Tilman (who doubledup as village head) [2], both from the local military command (Koramil) Hato-Udo.6

Cancio was known for his swagger - he wore a cowboy hat, and a dagger andrevolver on his hips.7

Mahidi's first operation was in the village of Raimea, Zumalai sub-district, nearAinaro, on 25 December 1998 - the gang arrested and torfured some village youths.On 2 January he stopped all traffic passing through Cassa village, and arrested eightpassengers. One of these later gave a detailed account of his experience of torture attheir hands. Cancio was personally implicated in this incident through the use of hisvehicle.s

On 3 January 1999 Mahidi (allegedly with some SGI personnel) shot dead twonamed youths in the village of Manutasi, and seriously injured four others. On 24

January they attacked Mape village in Zumalai sub-district, killing one. On 25 |anuarythey attacked Nagidar village in the same sub-district, and killed three and injured fivenamed individuals. One of them was a pregnant woman named Angelina de Araujo(24) - they sliced open her corpse and took out the foetus. This latter incident becameemblematic of his callousnes.s - it was talked about all over East Timor. Yet he spokeabout this incident on the BBC as if he was proud of it.e

On 19 February he was put up in a luxurious hotel in Jakarta in order to take partwith other militia Ieaders in a meeting with lndonesian armed forces commander

The Key Suspects [1.]

General wiranto [3] in Jakarta. wiranto said they had corne to ask for weapons (seeLtGen Sugiono [1]). Cancio claimed to have met President Habibie at this time.l0

on 25 February 7999 he and Eurico Guterres [3] signed a letter threatening Aus-halian journalists with death during Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer'svisit to Indonesia.ll

on 12 April two named East Timorese university students doing community serv-ice in the area were arrested at the Mahidi headquarters in Cassa. At least one andprobably both were murdered. Cancio told a newspaper he 'took responsibility, forthe arrests, because the sfudents were collecting money for CNRT.r2

A private Indonesian television (SCTV) news broadcast showed that, fuing a M-15rifle, he personally took part in an assault on 17 April on the Dili home of formerprovincial parliamentarian Manuel Carrascalao. At least a dozen died. Other militialeaders who allegedly took part were Eurico Guterres and Manuel de Sousa [3].13

Still in April1999 he was appointed Sector III Commander of the united militiaforces PPI. This nominally placed him in charge of the Mahidi, Laksaur, Ablai and Ahimilitias. In overall charge was Ioao Tavares [3].1a

On 10 June his militia conducted an alternative'voter registration'exercise in thevillages of Beikala and Leolima, telling voters they had to vote for autonomy andwere forbidden from registering with Unamet.ls

Cancio worked for the military but he also lived in fear of them. In June 1999 it wasreported that two of his men were shot dead by Indonesian soldiers for unclearreasons - either because they were accused of 'two-facedness' or in order to stimulatetheir emotions by sowing the idea that they were killed by Falintil.'6

His main job remained to intimidate the voters. On 18 August he told a rally in hisown village of Cassa, Ainaro sub-district, that the'wrong choice'in the ballot wouldlead to war and that those who chose wrongly would suffer the consequences.lz

Just before the ballot on 30 August 1999 he distributed a list of at least 100 knownpro'independence leaders to his militiamen and gave instructions to kill them (afterthe ballot?).lE

As the Indonesian pull-out from East Timor became imrninent in september 1999,he withdrew to his home base at Cassa, where a reign of terror ensued. Interfetsoldiers found the body of a man who had been tied to a chair and executed in frontof Carvalho's office when they entered the area in early October.le

After leaving East Timor, PPI was reorganised and he became southem sectorcommander, based in West Timor. In January 2000 he threatened to 'bum down'Kupang city with his militiamen if Indonesia forced the East Timorese refugees toreturn to East Timor.2o

As late as October 2000 he told a seminar at Hotel Cendana in Kupang that hismilitia forces were intact and he had sent some of his men into East Timor to conductguerrilla activities.2r

At the same time (October 2000) he and three other militia leaders (his brotherNemecio, Domingos Pereira, and Loanico Cesario Belo [2] put out feelers in a letter tothe uN Secretary General, offering to reveal all about his Kopassus backers in ex-change for an amnesty upon refum to East Timor.

1.r7

118 Masters of Terror

Background

ln his 30s tn1999, Cancio de Carvalho is the fourth of ten children to Mateus andMargarida l,opes de Carvalho. Mateus was the chieftain (liurai) of the village of Cassa,near Ainaro. As a child he was forced to help Indonesian soldiers during militaryoperations OBO - Tenaga Bantuan Operasi). After junior high school in Ainaro hewent to live with the family of an Indonesian soldier in Surabaya, where he did hissenior high school. He also lived in Jakarta for a time, with the family of Amaldo dosReis Araujo, a former govemor of East Timor under Indonesia. But they disliked hiswomanising and he retumed to East Timor, where he began work at the Dili office ofthe Justice Department. In 1994 he was confirmed as civil servant, and in May 1998 hernoved to the Kupang office of the sarne Department (which failed dramatically to liveup to its name by permifting him to do what he did in 1999). He is married to a womanfrom a Tetun-speaking part of West Timor.z

Like his better-educated brother Francisco de Carvalho, he became an informer tothe Kopassus organisation SGI following the Dli massacre of November 1991. Hewas asked to gather the sons of members of the pro-Indonesian political party Apodetiinto a youth group (unnamed, or vaguely named volunteer corps, 'pasukanSukarelawan'). The group was then used to intimidate pro-independence activists.Ainaro was the birthplace of Apodeti tnl974.B

In late 1997 Cancio allegedly raped the pregnant wife of Ainaro local Jose de

Fatima, leading her to miscarry.

Nazario Vital S [Jaimel CORTE REALCommander Ablai rnilitia, Same (Manufahi district)

Ablai is accused of intimidating and sometimes killing pro-independence activists

especially in the aftermath of the 30 August 1999 ballot. It was closely related to thelndonesian military, most likely Kopassus.

Nazario Vital S Corte Real, the general chairman of Ablai, was a 58-year-oldmilitary collaborator who fought with the invading Indonesian forces and in 7999worked as a district government official (Asisten I Tatapraja Sekwilda Manufahi).After 1980 the militia group with which he had fought was renamed Wisesa. He isalleged to have been close to Kopassus intelligence group SGI, and set up Ablai at theirinstructions.2a Ablai was officially inaugurated on 11 March 1999.b The SGI com-mander at this time was LCol Yayat Sudrajat [3]. The military district commander inManufahi :u:.1999 was at first LtCol Suwondo [1] and after that Maj Sinaga [2].

Nazario's house was the centre of radio communications for Ablai. He claimed inan interview that Ablai had 5000 members divided into 15 'companies', one of thementirely female. He traced the militia's origins to the need to respond to Falintil pres-sure following a Falintil ambush on a group that included Kopassus soldiers at Weberek,in the Same area, on 29 October 1998.

An Indonesian newspaper reported that in April 1999 Ablai had 400 men and 70

firearms.26 Its name is an acronym for'Aku Berjuang Lestarikan Amanat Integrasi' ('Iwill fight to Preserve the Mandate for Integration').

The Key Suspects [11

On 21 May 1999, Ablai members arrested Anina, a 3O-year-old womary in Letefohovillage, accusing her of sending food to Falintil. She was torfured and detained beforebeing released a week later.27 Ablai militiamen attempted to hinder villagers fromregistering for the Unamet ballot from early June 1999 onwards.a Among severalreports of Ablai terror against alleged pro-independence supporters was one claim-ing Ablai militiamen stabbed Antero da Costa on 6 August 1999.8 Ablai receivedIndonesian govemment funding. A leaked letter from East Timor govemor AbilioSoares [3] mentions Ablai slated to receive World Bank poverty relief funds.s TwoAblai members were brought to court in Dili early in 2001 for three murders commit-ted in August and September 1999.31

An intercepted TNI radio communication on27 August 7999, jusl before the bal-lot, included orders to the Ablai militia. This demonstrated a close link between themilitary (thought to be Kopassus) and the militia. The order included last-minuteefforts to pressure 'our people' standing in the queue to vote in the ballot.32

In the immediate ballot aftermath, Unamet Military Liaison Officers observedheavily armed Ablai militiamen (carrying a grenade launcher among others). Thernilitiamen threatened to kill any local unamet staff found in a uN vehicle.s At 10:00am on 4 September Ablai militiamen forced Unamet staff to evacuate the Same post,and four local staff disappeared.s

A 19-year-old Ablai member confessed to an NGO observer on 23 September1999 that after the ballot, he took part in coordination meetings with the Indonesianmilitary, and engaged in house bumings and killing alleged pro-independence sup-porters in Same.3s

Background

Nazario was born in Hatu Udo village, Ainaro. He completed only junior highschool education. Early on in the Indonesian invasion he moved to Manufahi districtand began work in the district govemment. He was a candidate for dishict head(bupati) in \997 , but failed due to inadequate support from the armed forces.

Herminio da COSTA [Hermenio, Herminho, Hermenio da Costa da Silva,Herminio da Silva da Costal

Chief of staff, pro.integration combined forces (PPI)

Herminio da Costa, aged 50 rn1,999, was third in command of the armed pro-integration group PPI (under hao_Tavares [3] and Eurico Guterres [3]), and one of itsmost militant spokespersons. On numerous occasions he issued threats of violence,and the fighters under his command did not hesitate to carry them out. An AustralianDefence Force handbook on East Timor also listed hirn as a commander in the Aitarakmilitia that terrorised Dili.36

When independence sentiment in East Timor surged following the resignation ofPresident Suharto in May 1998, he was at the forefront of declarations of support forJakarta.3T He worked in Dili as the chairperson of the civil servants' cooperative(Ketua Pusat KUD Timor Timur), and before that headed up the Baucau electricity A

t19

120 Masters of Terror

authority.s In subsequent months he was prominent among pro-integration lead-ers, and one of several who later led militia forces.s

By May 1999 he was chief of staff of the combined militia forces PPI. He told USjoumalist Allan Nairn that his militias had made a secret accord with East Timormilitary commander Col Tono Suratman [3] and East Timor police chief Col (Pol)

Timbul Silaen [3].* It authorised his men to'attack homes, interrogate and kill mem-bers of the [pro-independence] CNRT and Fretilin,' as long as the militias refrainsfrom common crirnes like'car theft and stealing food.' Da Costa said the accord 'gavepermission to do assaults on houses but not without [Suratman's] authorisation andknowledge.' The same applied to interrogations [of independence supporters]. Hedescribed how his men had executed unarmed 'enemies of the people,'but said thatthese killings had been carried out with prior clearance from the military. He praisedboth armed forces commander bWlagle [3] and TNI Headquarters intelligencespecialist MaiGen Zackv Makarim [3] as a 'verv eood friend'.

ln the same extraordinary interview, Da Costa said about the Liquica killings of 6April 1999 that they fell under the terms of the January accord. He claimed that(unnamed) local 'people asked us to kill them [the victims]. For us it wasn't a disaster.For the people of Liquica it was a liberation.' He added that in Liquica the militias hadasked the TM-Abri for backup - and got it from the Brimob, a police crowd-controlunit. As Brimob lobbed in tear gas and gunshots, the militia machete-men waded in.Da Costa said: 'We assaulted the church and the rectory as Fretilin command posts.Those who died were not simple people. They were activists, CNRT members.... If wekill them, they say they died as people. But no, they died as Fretilin.'

Da Costa also spoke about the militia attack on the house of former parliamentar-ian Manuel Carrascalao on 17 April 1999, which left Carrascalao's 1.5-year old sonManuelito among the dead. Manuel Carrascalao, he said, is'an enemy of the people'.When the militias arrived, they found that Manuel was not home. The execution ofManuelito was 'punishment for his father's activism', according to da Costa.

When in luly 7999 rnilitias attacked a convoy of church and humanitarian organi-sations (NGOs) taking aid to many thousands refugees driven from their homes bymilitias, hesaid the NGOswere Fretilin puppetswho acted without policepermits andintended to undermine the govemment and TNI.a1

Immediately before the ballot, he accused Unamet of bias and threatened to rejectthe result if it went against the pro-integration side.a2 After the ballot, and knowingthe result about to be announced would go against his side, he threatened to'slaugh-ter' all pro-independence East Timorese: 'If Unamet announces that the pro-inde-pendence side has won the ballot I promise it will be civil war again, . . . [T]hen the pro-independence forces don't deserve to live any more, because it is not fair.... My plan isto bring the problem to the UN and ask them to hold another ballot, this time organ-ised by Indonesia. If they refuse, I would rather go to war to slaughter all the pro-independence people, because we will be sure that they have cheated.'s From hisbase in Kupang, he afterwards wamed that PPI would bum East Timor to the ground(membumihanguskan). 'It is not war between Indonesia and East Timor, but warbetween autonomy and independence,'he said.s

The Key Suspects [1]

couple of days later, with much of East Timor in flames and its population deported,he said, as if to confirm they had been at war, that his forces had declared a ceise fireand had 'left all security matters to the Indonesian armed forces'.s He then began tosuggest, improbably, that he was not responsible for the destruction of East Tirnorbecause his commanders had'lost control of the guys since September 4', the day theresult was announced.4s

In West Timor it was reported he controlled a militia called Rusafuik that ran theNoelbaki refugee camp.aT

For a while he lobbied for the partition of East Timor into an independent sector inthe east and a pro-lndonesian sector in the west.s Despite his own protestations ofinnocence,ae his name was mentioned in the report of the Indonesian inquiry intoatrocities in East Timor - although in the body rather than in the list of those recom-mended for prosecution.il

However, by May 2000 he had acknowledged the result of the East Timor ballot,and formed a political party (PPT) to contest the elections in East Timor. He nowattributed the failure to win the ballot not to misconduct on the part of Unamet, but tocorruption among East Timor's polifical and military elite, as well as their gross viola-tions of human rights.sl Ignoring threats from his former associate Eurico Guterres,s2he sought contact with untaet s3 and apologised for the violence and destructioncommitted by members of his group and said he was prepared to face trial.s Heretumed to Dili for a brief visit in June 2000.

Col (In0 Gerhan LENTARACommander, Airborne Brigade (Brigif Linud 17); Martial law commander, Dili

sector, 9-27 September 1999

This combat officer was involved in the santa Cruz massacre in November 199'1.,and was then out of the limelight for a long time until reappearing at MajGen Kikisyahnakri's [3] side welcoming MaiGen Peter Cosgrove to East Timor in september1999 as Commander of the Dili region. He occupied this position at the time of theworst militia/ military violence and destruction.

ln1999 he simultaneously held the position of Commander,TTth Airbome Infan-try Brigade, Kostrad.ss (This brigade shares its headquarter location with that ofKopassus - in cijantung, East Jakarta). He had been its chief of staff in1,996-98. He wasassisted there by LtCol Adi Mulyono, his chief of staff.s6 No details are publicly avail-able of his activities in 1999. This particular combat unit has a record of human rightsabuse around Indonesia, including East Timor.

Gerhan's colleague in assisting Kiki syahnakri during the martial law phase wasanother Kostrad Airbome Infantry Brigade commander, Col Irwan Kusnadi [3].

some anonymous militia leaders who had moved to Java and Bali after the Indo-nesian withdrawal said in october 7999 that, provided their safety could be guaran-teed, they were prepared to testify that Gerhan Lentara was one of those who organ-ised the militia forces and occasionally visited the field himself. (Others mentioned byone of these sources were MaiGen Gamadi [3], MajGen Sjafrie Syamsuddin [3], aniMajGen Adam Damiri [3]).s'z

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122 Masters of Terror

He was reported to have helped Kiki round up some looting police.s ln response

to the killing of the Dutch journalist Sander Thoenes on 22 September, he likened the

Becora area where it happened to the 'wild West'. 'We don't know who did this. In thiskind of area, many things can happen.'s

Background

Gerhan l-entara is a high flier in his generation. He was bom in Makassar (UjungPandang) and graduated in 1978 from the military academy. He has a long history ofservice in East Tirnor with Prabowo. He served as lieutenant and captain in the East

Timor territorial battalion 744.50 By 1991 he was deputy commander of the non-territorial Infantry Battalion 700, still in East Timor, with the rank of major. Someobservers said this battalion was controlled by Kopassus. During the peaceful dernon-stration that preceded the Santa Cruz massacre on 12 November 1991, Lentara infil-trated the crowd. When he was spotted behaving provocatively, someone slashedhim with a knife. Troops soon afterwards opened fire on the demonstrators, killing a

large number. He was flown out of East Timor within hours and disappeared forseveral years. Mystery surrounded his absence from the official inquiry into the mas-sacre in 1992.61

When he re-appeared in East Timor as the officer in charge of sector A (Dili andsurroundings) in September 1999, it seemed as if the non-organic combat structurehad been reinvigorated for the purpose. Although combat sectors A, B, and C hadbeen formally disbanded many years earlier when the operational command called

Koopskam was disbanded, the structure remained in place. However, throughout1999 until the post-ballot crisis there had been only two combat sectors - A for easternEast Timor and B for westem East Timor, with none for Dili as such.62

LtCol (Art) Kamiso MIRANMilitary dishict commander @andim i639) Ambeno (Oecussi endave), till August 199

The Sakunar militia in Ambeno was led by the violent Laurentino'Moko' Soares

[4]. Its headquarters were allegedly located in the district military headquarters.6Kamiso Miran was mentioned in an indictment for crimes against humanity againstthe Sakunar militia in a Dili court in October 2001, as one of the govemment officialsresponsible for initiating the militia's activities.s

Kamiso Miran was replaced shortly before the ballot by LtCol Bambang Sungesti

[2]. The large-scale replacement of senior military officers just before the ballot issometimes attributed to Successful pressure from Unamet not to permit officers withpoor human rights records to remain in charge during the ballot. Just as likely, in ourview, it was a deliberate manoeuvre by TNI headquarters to increase deniability forthe serious abuses that had already been planned.

Background

Kamiso Miran graduated from the military academy in 1981. l^1994, while still a

Major, he ran the refugee camp on Galang Island, near Singapore. He presidedover a venal and exploitative regime where corruption and forced sex were

The Key Suspects [L]

commonplace.5s At the time n 1997 when he was appointed to the territorial com-mand of Ambeno district (this is the Oecussi enclave of East Timor within West Timor)he was comrnander of the 15th Air Defence Artilliery Command, based in Semarang,Java.56

Col (Inf) MUDJIONODeputy military commander East Timor (Wadanrem 164) till May or june 1999

Mudjiono was second in command in East Timor while the pro-integration vigi-lantes (officially known as Wanra) were being armed in January and February 1999.He defended their use, telling the Far Eastern Econornic Review that Abri's role was toprotect the people. He admitted that 100 rifles were distributed to integrationists inJanuary to even the odds between them and the Fretilin (Falantil) guerrillas.6T

Bishop Belo mentioned him in March 1999 as having been responsible for dis-charging (pelepasan) a thousand civil guards ('kamra') while instructing them to carryon working in the field, where they would be helped by the Mahidi rnilitia force. Thelatter were based in Ainaro and led by Cancio Lopes de Carvalho [1]. In an interview,Belo pointed to this as evidence of trickery (permainan).6

One account said he was personally present at the Liquica church massacre on G

April1999.0

Afterwards he accused Porfuguese interests section chief in Jakarta, Ana Gomes,of sending a biased report about East Timor to her government. She in turn won-dered how he had access to secret diplomatic reports she sent to her govemment.To

Background

He was probably promoted to Colonel while deputy commander in East Timor.After he was replaced by Nanang Priadi [2] he was posted to Lampung, southernSumatra (Commander, Korem 043/Garuda Hitam),7l then to Flores (Kodim 1512lManggarai, based in Ruteng), until he was relieved again in April 2000. The latter sub-district temporarily accommodated many ex-East Timor soldiers.

Lafaek SABURAI (Afonso Henriques Pinto)Commander, Makikit militia, Viqueque (also of Darah Merah militia)Lafaek Saburai - a nom de guerre for Afonso Henriques Pinto - was listed in April

1999 together with another 1975-75 partisan, Viqueque district head MartinhoFernandez, as commanders of the militia Makikit. This long-standing militia was basedin Viqueque and reportedly had 200 men and 100 rifles.z2

Makikitwas a feared militia. On20 March 1999 Makikit militiamen abducted Emilia,a 35-year-old housewife in Dilor, Viqueque, having been unable to find her husband.She was taken to the Dilor local rnilitary command (Koramil), where she was attackedsexually and threatened with death.R On the same day Makikit militia shot dead twomenin Lacluta near Viqueque.T4 On 10 and 11 August L999, Makikit militiamen attackedan office of pro-independence students in Viqueque, leaving three dead.Ts

t23

724 Mnsters of Taror

On 11 March 1999 Lafaek Saburai (Afonso Pinto) signed a letter to supreme militiacommander Toao Tavares [3] in his capacity as corrunander of Red Blood (DarahMerah), otherwise known as Right Wing Militia (Milisi Sayap Kanan), or East TimorCleansing Front (Front Pembersihan Timor Timur). This was not a known militiagrouping (not to be confused with the similarly named Darah Merah militias based inErmera and in Ambeno respectively; nor should Lafaek's name be confused with theCombat Lafaek later based in West Timor). Perhaps it was a propaganda ploy designedby his BIA masters.

In the letter he said the struggle by his fellows in the various militia gangs hadhitherto been too weak, and he was launching a planned operation called OperasiSapu fagad (Operation Clean Sweep). It aimed to eliminate all pro-independenceleaders after the pro-Indonesian East Timorese had been safely removed to the west-ern parts around Bobonaro.T6 The letter was (of course) leaked and considerablyraised political tension in East Timor - it was the first time the militias had announcedplans to kill pro-independence figures and start a war in East Timor over the ballot.Soon after, on 17 April 1999, militias went on a rampage following a large rally in Dili,leading to many deaths at the home of politician Manuel Carrascalao.

Throughout 1999 he shuttled several times between Jakarta and East Timor. InMarch 1999, jailed resistance leader Xanana Gusmao, under house arrest in Jakarta,said Afonso Pinto was one of two senior East Timorese collaborators recruited by thernilitary intelligence organisation BIA to organise intimidating demonstrations bypro-Indonesian East Timorese in front of Xanana's house.z

ln late April 1999 Afonso Pinto was again said to be in Jakarta, staying in theathletes quarters in Ragunan. His missiorl together with another East Timorese mili-tary collaborator named Hercules (or another report said Manuel de Sousa [3]), wasallegedly to kill former East Timor governor Mario Carrascalao (brother of ManuelCarrascalao). They were said to be acting under the orders of MajGen Zacky AnwarMakarim [3]. Carrascalao took the report seriously enough to flee the country toPortugal.TE

On 21 September, L999, just after the Indonesian pull-out from East Timor, he wasonce more in Jakarta, allegedly meeting with his military superior MajGen ZackyAnwar Makarim and planning to eliminate pro-independence East Timorese still inlndonesia.D

Background

Lafaek Saburai is an experienced fighter. He was a pro.Indonesian'partisan' al-ready at the time of East Timor's annexation by Indonesia lr.1975-76. He became headof the Makikit militia. Despite reports in the 1980s that these earlier militias had beendisbanded, Makikit was still on the military payroll in 1998.80

Early in 1994, despite the backing of governor Abilio Soares, he failed to be ap-pointed district head (bupati) of Viqueque. One report hinted that he might then havetaken out his disappointment by picking fights with some military in Viqueque, re-sulting in a wave of tit-for-tat killings.E

The Key Suspects IU

Perhaps to humour him after this affair, he was a member of the Indonesiandelegation to a 'reconciliation'meeting held in Chepstow, England, with members ofthe East Timorese resistance in September 1994.6'z

However, indications that he remained difficult to handle continued to surface. lnearly 1995 it was rumoured that the Indonesian military had assassinated him. It wasthought this might have happened because of disloyal sentiments he expressed inChepstow. However, the rumour fumed out to be false.s

LtCol(InO SARIPUDINCommander, Battalion 743/ TWEJ

This officer (serial no. 29763, rrnlltary academy graduate of 1983) commanded aninfantry battalion active in East Timor that is accused of numerous human rightsviolations, always in conjunction with local militias under their control.s4 Based inLampung (southem Sumaha), the battalion was seconded to the territorial command(thus becoming a territorial battalion, or Bfi - batalyon teritorial). It was located inMaubara, under the Liquica district command (LtCol Asep Kuswadi [3]).

It (also?) had a base in Gleno, Ermera District where it was commanded by TonyDarmansyah. The Darah Merah rnilitia in Ermera was based at the BTT 143 post inManusae Village, southem Ermera. According to Yayasan HAI( among those mur-dered at this post were Francisco Naicay (35) on 18 or 19 June 1999, and FranciscoAlves (28) shortly before 20 June 1999.s

One militia in Maubara was Pana, led by Graciano Filipe. It was supported bymembers of Battalion 143, as well as by the district head Leonito Martins [3], and bythe sub-district head (camat) for Maubara, Jose Afat. Pana was based at Fatuboro(Vafuboro) village near Maubara, and it was responsible for causing the majority ofMaubara sub-dishict population in this area to flee to Dili early in 1999.s AnotherPana militia commander was Domingos Policarpo, a spokesperson for the pro-inte.gration group FPDK irn Dili.87

Battalion 143 soldiers also supported the other, bigger militia in this area, the BesiMerah Putih (BMP), formed in late 1998 as a 'self-defence' force against possible Falintilattacks. BMP and Battalion 143 soldiers conducted joint patrols. One of its founders,Joaquim dos Santos, acknowledged regularly'consulting'with Battalion 143. Humanrights reports of BTT 143 soldiers working with BMP militiamen to 'control' the popu-lation of Maubara, 'so they are unable to carry out their daily tasks', were still comingin in June.Es

The BTT 143 soldiers and militiamen, according to the East Timor human rightsorganisation Yayasan HAK, were forcing villagers to sell coffee beans at a low priceand then taking the product to Dili for resale.se

Active Battalion 143 support for militias was first reported on 27 December 1998,when they joined Gadapaksi militiamen in arresting and torturing four villagers inMaubara sub-district. After that, over a hundred other villagers fled to Dili and soughtrefuge in the home of former parliamentarian Manuel Carrascalao.eo

r25

126 Masters of Turor

On 10 January 1999,8T1 143 soldiers joined Gadapaksi militiamen in an attack onthe inhabitants of Gugleur village, Maubara sub-district, leaving several injured andhouses bumt down. On 16 january, BTI 143 troops helped militiamen bum down thehouse of Cancio Morae (45), in Vaviquinia village.et The KPP HAM report listedBattalion 143 among the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in Appendix 5 overthese two incidents.

On 22 February, Battalion 143 soldiers joined BMP and Halilintar militias in fight-ing hundreds of villagers at Guiso, near Maubara. The villagers had struck back afterthe district head (Leonito Martins) fired in their direction for allegedly being pro-independence supporters. The BTT 143 soldiers joined the fray to assist BMP, leavingfour villagers injured and 39 houses bumt down. On the same day, BTT 143 soldiersjoined Rajawali (Kopassus) troops and BMP militiamen in an attack on Fatuvou(Fatuboro?) villagers, Ieaving four injured and eighteen arrested. Soldiers stopped an

ambulance that came to attend the wounded.e2

On 14 January 1999 BTT 143 soldiers and members of several militias (BMP, NagaMerah and Mahidi) arrested nine residents of Fatuboro village and detained them atthe BTT 143 post on suspicion of being supporters of independence. They were laterreleased.s

On 5 April 1999, n the buildup to the Liquica church massacre of 5 April, BTT 143

troops joined BMP militiamen in an attack on the village of Dato, three kilome-tres from Liquica. Shots were fired, killing five people and wounding at leasteight others.ea

Eyewitnesses said soldiers from Battalion 143 took part in the massacre at theLiquica Catholic church on 6 April 1999, which left (by one account) 35 dead (see

Manuel de Sousa. [3]).es

On 19 April 1999, Battalion 143 soldiers took part in the arrest of a staff member ofthe Intemational Committee of the Red Cross, Adao (36), from Camea suburb in Dli.The arrest took place after the same soldiers fired shots during a wild chase againstlocal youths suspected of pro-independence sentiments. Battalion 7t14 soldiers andAitarak militiamen also joined in the shooting, which was supposed to have beendirected against undisciplined Besi Merah Putih militiamery but was in fact directedagainst the local population. There were no reports of casualties.%

On 9 August 1999, four individuals, one of them named Mariano da Costa, weremurdered at the BTT 143 post near Ermera by the militia leader Mauona. The victimswere pro-independence activists.eT

After the ballot, eyewitnesses said Battalion 143 organised the forced evacuationof East Timorese civilians to Indonesian West Timor. Together with local rnilitias, whotold people they would all be killed if they did not leave, they ordered all of Liquica'sresidents onto a beach just down the hill from the church. For up to two weeks, shipscame and the militia ordered everybody to board, often splitting families.s

The Key Suspects [1.] 127

Gen Subagyo Hadi SISWOIOArmy chief of staff (KSAD)

The evidence for Gen subagyo's personal involvement in orchestrating the vio-lence in East Timor in 1999 is circumstantial, in that three of his assistants (MajGen KikiSyahnakri [3], BrigGen Amirul Isnaeni [3] and LtGen Iohny Lumintang [3]) appearedto play an active part in it. Subagyo was the highest ranked officer in the Indonesianarmed forces, after armed forces commander Gen Wiranto[3].e

In February 1999 he acknowledged the army was arming East Timor civilianmilitias, 'selectively', as part of reg.ular'Wanra' (civil defence) to help Abri secure EastTimor.100 He promised in Dili in the same month that Abri would not'engineer civilwar' in East Timor (thus appearing to know how these things are done).101

In March 'l'999 he promised to put soldiers into East Timorese classrooms if teach-ers were to leave. Thousands of Indonesian teachers were demanding hansfers (andsoon got them) because they felt threatened by the pro-independence movement.

subagyo visited Dili on 20 April 1999 as the central figure in a high level militarydelegation, involving most of those later accused of responsibility for human rightsabuse there. Besides Subagyo the delegation included armed forces chief Gen Wiranto,Kapolri (police chief) Roesmanhadi, Subagyo's operations assistant (Asops KSAD)Kiki Syahnakri, Subagyo's security assistant (Aspam KSAD - but that may be anincorrect designation) Maj-Gen Zacky Anwar Makarim, and military intelligence (BIA)chief Mai-Gen Tyasno Sudarto [3], who replaced Subagyo in December 1999).'02 An-other report says Subagyo's security assistant Brig-Gen Amirul Isnaeni also attendedthis meeting.to3

The 5 May 1999 |ohny Lurnintang telegram about evacuation plans in the event ofa pro'independence vote was actually written on his behalf. Lumintang was Subagyo,sdeputy army chief of staff. The telegram was drafted by Kiki Syahnakri.

Just after the ballot he said he could accept Australia in charge of a UN force, andoffered Indonesian participation as well (the latter offer was rejected). on 30 Novem-bet'1,999 he met Xanana and Ramos Horta, who had come to ]akarta to see presidentAbdurrahman wahid. He handed over to Gen Tyasno on 2 December 1999, and wenton to chair the supreme advisory council DPA (a sinecure).

Another of subagyo's staff to come to the notice of the courts over East Timor in1999 was Brig-Gen Soemaryono, a planning officer under Subagyo as army chief ofstaff in 1999. soemaryono had organised a counterfeit money operation, apparentlyto 'pay for' militia operations in East Timor. Some details of the operation wererevealed when Soemaryono was arrested and charged in May 2000. The case came tocourt in November 2000.104

Background

Subagyo was born on 12 June 1945 in Jogjakarta, Java. He graduated from themilitary academy in'l'970. His entire career has been in the special forces Kopassus.Between 7972-75 he was a platoon commander, then a company commander for twoyears. He took part in the invasion of East Timor at this time (Seroja). He was sec-onded to the Presidential Security Squad (Paswalpres) between 1976-78, where he

Masters of Terror

became President Suharto's personal escort (Walpri). He returned to a Kopassus(then still called Kopassandha) comptrny command 1977-81, (Group 4), taking part inthe raid on the hijacked Garuda DC-9 in Bangkok in 1981. Between 1,986-93 he wasonce more at the presidential palace, in charge of the security unit Paspampres.l0s

After a short stint at a military counter-intelligence unit (D2 Dit-D Bais Abri), and an

army coding office (Kadispamsanad), he was appointed commander of Kopassus7994-95. He then went on to command the Central Java military command (IV,/Dponegoro, 1995-97), before rising to Deputy Army Chief of Staff (1997-98). He heldthe Army Chief of Staff position 15 February 1998 - 20 November 1999.

The son of a market trader and her low ranking civil servant husband, he was thefirst graduate of the 1970 generation of military academy graduates to reach the rankof Brig-Gen, the first to be appointed a Kodam commander and then the first to reachthe rank of Maj-Gen.

As Kopassus commander he had to deal with the powerful Prabowo as hisdeputy.rffi He received trainingby Special Forces in the US and in Gultor, Germany,'otand has had overseas experience in Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Belgium, Russia

and China, most likely with President Suharto.rffi He chaired the military honourcouncil (Dewan Kehormatan Militer) set up in August 1998 to investigate Prabowo,Muchdie and Chairawan. Regarded as a strange choice because he was widely regarded as close to Prabowo and the rest of the council were not.

His son, Second Lieutenant (Inf) Agus Isrok, also a Kopassus soldier, was arrestedin a hotel room in Jakarta in August 1999 for drug dealing.l@

In mid-May 1999, Subagyo revealed plans to intensify (rather than reduce) mili-tary involvement in intemal policing throughout Indonesia by adding seven newmilitary regions (Kodam) to the existing ten, among others because of unrest in EastTimor (as well as Aceh, Maluku, etc).

Armindo SOARES Mariano

Speaker, East Timor provincial parliament (DPRD)

The central issue Armindo Soares should be asked to clarify is the allegation thathe was, with Dili district head Domingos Soares [3], one of the two main collaboratorswith East Tirnor military commander Tono Suratman [3] in organising the militias inEast Timor in 1999. These two and govemor Abilio Soares [3] (none related, despitethe same name), were the three most prominent East Timorese officials in the terri-tory in the period leading up to the ballot on 30 August 1999.

He was a strong supporter of the 'special autonomy' design being discussed at theUN late ' 1998.110 When that proposal was overtaken by President Habibie's dra-matic decision to offer the East Timorese a choice of autonomy or independence, heexpressed his strong disapproval.lrr In late February he began an aggressive Golkarcampaign to 'socialise' the autonomy option in East Timor.112

The campaign involved several incidents of serious violence. He promoted theviolence by his vigorous defence of the need to arm pro-Indonesian rnilitias (knownofficially as the civil defence forces Wanra and Ratih). Immediately after Habibie's

The Key Suspects I1l

announcement, he defiantly rejected the demand by armed forces commander Gen-eral Wiranto [3] that these forces should be disarmed without Falintil being disarmedfirst.l 13

According to some reports he was a member of a large group of prominent EastTimorese civilians that came to Jakarta to meet with armed forces commander Gen-eral Wiranto on 19 February 1999. Asking him to reverse his position on the armingof civilians, they wanted him to supply them with arms. wiranto said he did not agreewith the weaPons request, but East Timor governor Abilio Soares later claimed largenumbers of weapons were made available anyway by Armed Forces Chief of Gen-eral Staff LtGen Sugiono [1] (where the names are listed in detail).l1a

After the Liquica massacre of 6 April 1999 he supported statements by militarycommander Col Tono Suratman [3] that played down the number of victims ('five')and described foreign reporting on it as'pure lies'.rls

He was present on 17 April 1999 at one of the first large militia shows of strengthin Dili. Afterwards, militias murdered 12 people at the nearby home of former provin-cial parliamentarian Manuel carrascalao. He refused to condemn either the rally orthe violence afterwards, saying: 'Why make a fuss about the rally? This shows that thepro-integration forces are also consolidating to defend themselves.'116

Militia leader Eurico Guterres [3] himself reportedly said the blame for the russa-cre on 17 April should be shared with Domingos Soares and Armindo Soares.rrTStrengthening Eurico Guterres' claim, one report alleged that the 17 April event waspart of a campaign called Operasi Sisir planned by the military under Col TonoSuratman in conjunction with militia leaders. It then named Armindo Soares as one ofthe two key collaborators, together with Domingos Soares. Meetings were being heldto plan another round of violence in May, the report added.118

When Unamet arrived soon afterwards, it criticised the 'socialisation' campaign asthe kind of premature action ruled out by the 5 May UN agreement. The criticism ledArmindo Soares to lash out at Unamet as being under the influence of pro-independ-ence groups.lle

As chief of Golkar in East Timor, his job was to ensure that all Golkar membersand their families voted for Indonesia. A large proportion of the urban worKorce inEast Timor was employed in the civil service, and all of them were expected to beGolkar supporters. This led Armindo Soares to state after the ballot that the pro-autonomy vote should have been well over 100,000 (instead of less than half that), afigure that formed the basis of his argument that Unamet had 'cheated' in the ballot.tm

He frequently took part in meetings to coordinate strategy among militia leaders,the police and the military. One such meeting reportedly took place on 24 July 1999.121

Just before the ballot, on 25 August'1,999,he was one of four speakers at anotherlarge pro-autonomy rally that turned violent, this time on the Pramuka Field in Dli.Afterwards, militias went on a rampage, joined by Brimob police and soldiers. Fivenamed East Timorese civilians were killed.l22

He was a vigorous organiser, frequently travelling between Dili and Jakarta. Latein February 1999 he helped set up the pro-autonomy organisation FPDK. In June he

729

Masters of Tenor

helped set up the pre.Indonesian umbrella group Unif. In August, just before theballot, he formed an 'alliance' of most of the political parties that had taken part in thenational election earlier that month. The alliance expressed support for autonomy.

Unif rejected the ballot result. In October 1999 he (unSuccessfully) lobbied theIndonesian supreme legislative body MPR to reject it too and instead hold a national(Indonesian) referendum on the issue of East Timor's separation.lB

Background

Under the Portuguese he was a young primary school teacher. As Portugal pre-pared to decolonise East Timor in 1974 he joined Apodeti, which promoted autonomywithin lndonesia. He was not a significant figure at the tirne. After the Indonesianmilitary invasion he held a series of bureaucratic positions, at first within the Educa-tion Department. By the mid-1990s he had risen to second assistant to the provincialsecretary (Asisten II Sekwilda Timtim), and had become chairman of Golkar's East

Timor branch. He was twice candidated for provincial governor (1992 and 1'997)butlost each time to Abilio Soares, with whom he maintained a prickly relationship. In

July 1,997, on the recommendation of the armed forces faction in parliament, he wasappointed speaker of the provincial parliament.r2a

When President Suharto resigned in May 1998, students began a determined andpopular push for a referendum in East Timor. Armindo Soares publicly rejected thedemand as'dreaming', and instead backed the hard line within Golkar. He had themoderate Golkar national parliamentarian and newspaper proprietor SalvadorXmenes Soares 'recalled' from his post in ]akarta for 'disloyalty to Golkar'.r6

LtCol (InO Djoko SOEKARSONODistrict military commander Viqueque (Komandan Kodim 1530)

While nothing is known of this officer by name, soldiers acting under his com-mand worked closely with several militias in 1999 and were responsible for terroris-ing the population. The main militia in Viqueque in 1999 was Makikit, commanded byLafaek Saburai [1]. Another, which also had a poor human rights record and also

worked closely with Kodim officers, was '59 /75' , or perhaps more accurately 'NagaMerah', 'Bebui', or 'Senior 59l Junior 75'. It was led by Raimundo Soares and FrancelinoSoares.i26

Another report describes Viqueque Kodim soldiers taking part with unnamedmilitias ('Ratih') in intimidating the Viqueque population by shooting and arbitraryarrests on 10 and 11 March 7999.127

Just before the ballot, Unamet reported a serious human-rights deterioration inViqueque that seemed to be linked to the arrival of a new Kodim commander (un-named) on 12 August 1.999.12E Further research should try to discover whether thisnew Dandim was Djoko Soekarsono, or a replacement for him.

The KPP HAM inquiry listed two soldiers under his command in Appendix 5 of itsfinal report, among many other pelpetrators of crimes against humanity:

' Sgt Andreaso Pvt Magnes

The Key Suspects IU 131

Lt-Gen SUGIONO (Sugiyono, Soegiono)Armed Forces Chief of General Staff (Kasum Abri)The Chief of General Staff controls a large staff at TNI Headquarters and oversees

intelligence, personnel, operations, logistics and a range of specialist staff. Among ahalf dozen key assistants, the three who had most to do with East Timor in 1999 werethese: MajGen Endriartono Sutarto (operations - Asops Kasum, [2]), MajGen SiafrieSyamsuddin (territorial affairs - Aster Kasum, [3]), and Rear Admiral Yoost F Mengko(intelligence - Asintel Kasum, [2]). Another officer, possibly a personal assistant, whovisited East Timor repeatedly was Col Mochamad Nurhidajat Rusmono, intelligence [2].

on 19 February 1999 he was present at a meeting between several high-rankingmilitary officers led by Armed Forces Commander General wiranto [3] and a sizeabledelegation of pro-integration East Timorese led by FPDK chairperson Domingossoares [3]. The East Timorese asked wiranto to supply them with firearms so theycould face up to'Fretilin'pressure in the leadup to the UN-sponsored ballot. wirantosaid he did not agree to the weapons request.r2e However, a source in the office ofEast Timor governor Abilio Soares [3] revealed in late March that, according to Abiliosoares, LtGen sugiono had agreed to supply East Timorese pro-integration militiaswith'15,000' firearms. These were to be distributed via the local district military com-mands (kodim) beginning on 5 April. Although the earlier report did not mention Abiliosoares'presence at the high-powered meeting on 19 February, one is tempted to con-nect the two reports. Perhaps Soares was quoting one of Sugiono's assistants?ls

In July 1999 he attended a 'reconciliation' meeting in Jakarta between pro- andanti-independence East Timorese (Dare II).13r

A year later, with East Timor gone, he put President wahid on notice not to invitea foreign invasion force into Indonesia again, as President Habibie had done.132

Background

Sugiono was born in Central |ava in about 1948. He graduated from militaryacademy in1,97'1. He has had some training in the us (Fort Benning, 1977;FottLeavenworttr, 1988). In the last years of the Suharto regime he headed the presidentialsecurity guard (1995-97) and was then appointed to command Kostrad ('1997-gB),although he had not made his career within Kostrad. He became Deputy Army chiefof staff (March1998-January1999),and(concurrentlyforawhile)Chief of theArmedForces Staff for General Affairs (Kasum ABRI). He also headed the secretariat of the(considerably weakened) intelligence agency Bakorstanas from January 1998.

At the end of 7999 he became Secretary-General Defence Ministry, and then wentto Beijing as Indonesian Ambassador in early 2001.133

LtCol (Inf) SULASTIYO (Sulastyo, Sulastio)District military commander of Manatuto (Dandim 1531)

During his tenure, the north central coast district of Manatuto was the site ofseveral clashes between the Indonesian military and pro-independence elements aswell as militia activity.

132 Masters of Terror

Thousands of local East Timorese attacked the Manafuto headquarters in June1998 to protest against the shooting death of a civilian by a soldier.lv

In April L999 a 'Rajawali Team' under his command joined troops from Dili as wellas Aitarak and Mahidi militias and reportedly launched an operation against Falintiland pro-independence civilians in the villages of Tasivatil and Bikastula. An uncon-firmed report said that the troops attacked civi-lian houses and killed two people,injuring five others.ls

The two main militias in Manatuto were Mahadomi, led by Vidal Doutel Sarmento

[2], and the long-standing but rather small militia Morok, led by Thomas de AquinoKalla, a local civil servant. The latter was part of the regular military structure.rft

Sulastiyo was bom in about 1959 and graduated from the rnilitary academy inMagelang in 1982. He was appointed district military comrnander of Manatuto inNovember 1997 and, replaced just before the 30 August ballot by LtCol tcxi Herson [2].

Col SUNARKOCommander, combat Sector A (eastern East Timor); Intelligence assistant to

Kopassus comrnander

The sectoral commands probably played an important role in looting and thedeportation of East Timorese civilians after the ballot. Afterwards Sunarko was called

before the lndonesian inquiry into atrocities committed in East Timor (KPP HAM).13?

Despite allegedly playing a key role in East Timor in 1999, he was not punished, eitherby the inquiry or by the military itself. This is reflected in his later appointment as a

territorial (Korem) commander in Pare Pare, Sulawesi. While not technically a promo-tion, it increases his experience and his promotion prospects.l38

While commanding Sector A in East Timor, he simultaneously held the post ofIntelligence Assistant to the Commanding General of Kopassus (Asintel DanjenKopassus).

The following officers may have acted under his command within Sector A (based

on 1998 data), and are mentioned in one report as possible suspects in an East Timorwar crimes trial'l3e

' LtCol (lnf) Sunindyo. lnstitutional home: Kopassus Group 3; position: DeputyCommander (Wadan) Sector A; Serial no. 29508.

. Capt (Infl Ags Subiyanto. Institutional home: Kopassus Group 3; Position:Head, Operations Section (Kasi Ops) Sector A; Serial no. 17910029630867.

' Lt (Lettu Inf) Indra Heri. Institutional home: Battalion 327; Position: Head,Intelligence Section (Kasi Intel) Sector A; Serial no. 11930068460568.

' Lt ([€thr Inf) Bambang Yudi. Institutional home Battalion 327; Position: Head,Territorial Section (Kasi Teritorial) Sector A; Serial no.179400243ffi872.

The first two are Kopassus officers whose institutional base was Group 3. Thistraining unit (Pusdik Passus), based in West Java, also had a clandestine role of coor-dinating combat operations in East Timor (see MajGen Syahrir [1]). Battalion 327

Aonrf 327 / Brajawijaya), is based in Cianjur, West Java and seconded to East Timor.

The Key Suspects I1.l 133

Background

This long time Kopassus and intelligence officer was born in about 1952. He gradu-ated from the military academy in 1975. In August 1996 he was promoted to com-mand the Dili military dishict (Kodim 1627) from his previous post as head of theoperations section at the East Timor military command (Korem 164). In Novem-ber 1997 he was withdrawn to Abri headquarters in Jakarta.lao At some time in1999, possibly after Sunarko, the Sector A command was also held by Col IrwanKusnadi [3].

LtCol (Pol) Budi SUSILO

Bobonaro police chief (Kapolres), based in Maliana

Budi Susilo has been named by eyewitnesses as one of the key individuals respon-sible for a massacre on 8 September 1,999, four days after the ballot result was an-nounced. This was one of the largest single massacres of 1999. At about 5pm thou-sands of refugees sheltering at the Maliana police station under his command wereattacked from four sides at once by the local Besi Merah Putih militias, all wearingcamouflage paint or balaclavas. Behind them were soldiers from the territorial batallion,and policemen (including Brimob). A witness told an Australian joumalist she sawLtCol Burhannudin Siagian [3], with his intelligence chief Lt Sukisno [3] as well as localpolice chief LtCol Budi Susilo circulating among the crowd as militias went throughthe camp with death lists. These three men then ordered the bodies loaded ontotrucks and disposed of. witnesses counted 47 bodies hacked to death by machetes onthat day. More died later as militias hacked down those who escaped, but most bodieshave not been recovered.lal

On 15 August 1999 he presided at the surrender of hundreds of mostly traditionalweapons by pro-integration militias. This was part of the UN-sponsored 'cantonisation'of all armed groups just before the ballot.ra2 However, unlike Falintil, the pro.integra-tion militias were not confined to cantons and the exercise did nothing to stem theirviolence. Just two days later a wave of militia violence - by Dadurus Merah Putih, inwhich the police (as usual) stood by and did nothing - led the CNRT leadership andmany of their followers to seek refuge in the Maliana police station. It was theserefugees who were attacked on 8 September.

Some observers said Budi Susilo was under severe military pressure not to inter-fere in militia violence. He had personally been attacked and injured by soldiersduring a violent police-military dispute in Maliana at about the end of Aprit 1999.143

However, Budi Susilo did not merely fail to act preventively - his men themselvestook part in violent attacks against civilians. Police officers belonging to his commandtook part in a raid together with militiamen led by Natalino Monteiro ([3], deputyrector of the University of East Timor) on the village of Memo, 15 km from Malianatown, on 27 August. Four named East Timorese died in this attack.tg

. An officer under his command, Sgt-Maj (Pol) Triyonq sub-district police chief(Kapolsek) at Cailaco near Maliana, was recorunended for prosecution for In 1993 it

lv Mnsters of Terror

crimes against humanity in Appendix 5 of the KPP HAM report. Triyonoallegedly shot dead Comelio da Silva, a primary school teacher aged,34 (42?)

on 21 April 1999. His body was left by the Ruini River.l6

LtCol (In0 SUWONDOMilitary district commander of Manufahi, based in Same (Dandim 1534)

The main militia in Manufahi in 1999 was Ablai,led by Nazario Corte Real [t]. Thismilitia had a close relationship with the military. However, Suwondo may by this timehave been replaced bv Mai Sinaea [21.

On 13 November 1998, a farmer narned Aleixo Dias, 35, was arrested and torturedby members of Battalion 7tM in Fahinean village, Manufahi. Two days later he washanded over to Battalion 315 where he was torfured further. He was then handed

over to the military dishict corrunand, where he was tortured again by soldiers whowere under Suwondo's command.l46

The incident followed fighting between Falintil and many different units of TNI,both territorial and non-organic, at Alas, in Manufahi district.laT Afterwards, Suwondogave in to considerable public pressure and allowed a human rights investigationteam into the area to investigate the incident at Alas. Suwondo expressed regret forthe serious intimidation the team experienced, and said it had not been done bysoldiers under his command.l4E

MajGen (InO SYAHRIRMSKopassus commander

ln an interview soon after the Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor, Syahrirdenied flatly that any Kopassus troops were in East Timor at all and therefore thatthere was any connection between Kopassus and the militia.lae Numerous reportsdisprove his words. The number of Kopassus officers listed in the present publicationis sitnificant. However, Kopassus has so far been Successful in covering the tracks ofits most senior officers in this affair.ts

Officers who may have acted directly under Syahrir's command (based on 1998

data) and who have been mentioned as possible suspects in an East Timor war crimestrial are:ls1

t Maj (Inf) Suryana (Kopassus command headquarters, base commander =Komandan Pangkalan, NRP385170).

' Capt (Inf) Ponidjan (Group 3/Pusdik Passus, officer in charge of base logistics= Pasi Logrstik Pangkalan, NRP 503369).1s'?

. Capt (Inf) Suyitno (Group 3/Pusdik Passus, officer for clandestine affairs =Perwira Urusan Clandestin, NRP 584379)

Group 3 / Pusdik Passus, which crops up twice in this list, is a haining unit. lt isbased in Batujajar, West Java. However, it is thought that besides its training function,Group 3 had a clandestine role of coordinating combat operations in East Timor.

The Key Suspects [11

In 1993 it took over the functions of the disbanded Kolakops (combat command) forEast Timor. The SGI centres in East Timor were attached to Group 3. An importantillustration of this close connection between Kopassus Group 3 and combat in EastTimor is the fact that both before and after he served as East Timor commander,Tono Suratman [3] commanded this unit. The mysterious Groups 4 and 5, whosemembers do not wear uniforms and which have counter-insurgency and intelli-gence functions, are drawn almost entirely from Group 3.1s3

Background

Syahrir was born on 20 July 1947 in Baturaja, South Sumatra. He graduated in 1971from the military academy. His career has been largely within Kopassus (some witha Kostrad Airbome Brigade), including combat operations in East Timor such as the'Nanggala Operations' in the 1980s. In1,992 he studied at the Joint Services Academy,Weston Creek, Canberra, Australia. He has held territorial commands (in Bogor andBali), and became Kopassus commander in May 1998. In June 2000 he became Assist-antforOperations,ArmyChief of Staff (AsopsKasad).lsa HewasreplacedasKopassuscommander by MajGen Amirul Isnaeni [3].

LtGen (ret) Feisal TANJUNGCoordinating Minister for Politics and Security

The involvement of Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Feisal Tanjungin the crimes against humanity committed in East Timor in 1999 demonstrates themainstream nature of the violent project to retain the province.

On 25 January 1999 he led a coordinating meeting on politics and securif. It wasattended by more than 50 people, and considered a request from President Habibie toread a December 1998 letter from Australian Prime Minister john Howard likeningEast Timor to New Caledonia and urging the idea of a vote (in the distant future) thatincluded the option to separate. Habibie also conveyed a range of options for EastTimor to be discussed at the meeting, including separation from Indonesia.lss

Feisal Tanjung's report of that meeting, conveyed to a limited cabinet meeting on27 January 7999 and written together with Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and DefenceMinister Wiranto [3], supported the idea of an immediate referendum about EastTimor's future status. The option again won support at that limited cabinet meeting.Ali Alatas, who said later that he and Akbar Tanjung were the only ones to disagreewith the referendum option, later described the feeling in the meeting: 'We were thenvery convinced we would win the referendum.'ts

Although Habibie's spokesperson Dewi Fortuna Anwar said of the report to cabi-net on 27 January (of which Feisal Tanjung seems to have been the main author) thatits option to let go of East Timor was'honourable, just and democratic', Feisal in factnever expressed himself warmly about democracy. On the contrary, he repeatedlyspoke about the dangers of democracy.lsT Indeed, Feisal Tanjung had proposed inthis same cabinet meeting that, in view of rioting and especially serious fighting inMaluku, a state of civil emergency should be declared throughout Indonesia. Theproposal was rejected.rss

135

135 Masters of Tenor

Presumably Feisal Tanjung believed a referendum in East Timor could be won bythe methods that were familiar to him. He remembered that, exactly 30 years earlier,Indonesia had Successfully pulled off another UN-supervised 'act of free choice' inIrian Jaya, in 1969.

Feisal Tanjung, then still a Captain, had executed the military operation that en-sured Success in 1959. His biography says about the run-up to the UN vote in IrianJaya: 'The irnplementation mechanism for the Act of Free Choice (Pepera) had beenagreed between Indonesia and the UN.... For that reason it would have had disagree-able political consequences had the operation of Captain Feisal Tanjung and his menbecome widely known. Negotiations might have collapsed if UN diplomats or theintemationalcommunityhad known aboutthe intelligence operation. The long-stand-ing diplomatic strategy to liberate West Irian would have been imperilled and couldeven have failed completely.'

The East Timor chapter then picked up the Irian Jaya theme: 'Being asked to makea Success of the ballot in this way was for him the second time around, the first beingIrian faya. It could almost be said that Feisal Tanjung had been bom for this'. Military-style, he conveyed to his staff that his presidential orders were to ensure the ballotwas a Success. 'I take it that Success means, first of all, that it is democratic, secure,honest and fair, as Mr President stressed. Second, that it is won by the pro'integrationside. Thus our main fob is to guarantee the ballot as part of the strengthening of EastTimor into the territory of the Unitary Republic of lndonesia.'rs

Was Feisal Tanjung the driving source of the idea to hold a ballot as soon as

possible, using foul means rather than fair if that were necessary to win it? His close-ness to Habibie, his leading role in the 25 ]anuary rneeting and his satisfied memoriesof confounding the UN in Irian Jaya, make this appear likely.

While busy on many other fronts as well, Feisal Tanjung kept himself closelyinformed of developments in East Timor. In March 1999 he chaired a comrnittee toexamine the special autonomy proposal for East Timor (this proposal preceded thereferendum idea and later became the option East Timorese were invited to accept orreject).160

On 11 May 1999, just a few days after the UN Agreement to hold a ballot in EastTimor was siggred in New Yorl Feisal Tanjung established a team known by theabbreviation P4OKT (Satgas Pengamanan Pensuksesan Penenfuan PendapatOtonomiKhusus Timtim, Team to Secure and Make a Success of the East Timor Special Au-tonomy Ballot). Its stated task was to monitor security preparations in advance of theballot. However, that it may have done more than 'monitor' is indicated by thepresence on the team of MaiGen Zacky Anwar Makarim [3], an intelligence specialistwho had been working with the revived East Timor militias since July 1998.

On t7 May 1999, by presidential decision Keppres43/ 1999 (later strengthened bypresidential instruction tnpres 5/ 1999), another team was set up with the abbrevia-tion P3TT (Satgas Panitia Penentuan Pendapat Timor Timur, Special Committee forthe East Timor Ballot). The latter had a stronger Foreign Affairs Department face, andwas intended as a 'counter-part' to Unamet. Feisal Tanjung was indicated in the Keppresas responsible for security. Zacky Anwar Makarim was there again too - he was'security advisor' to P3TT.

The Key Suspects [11

In January 2000, BrigGen Glenny Kairupan [3] said that P4OKT lasted only a weekand that its personnel were then transferred to P3TT. However, there is evidence thatP4OKT continued a separate existence as a military-dominated organisation control-led by Feisal Tanjung. On 3 July 1999, MajGen (ret) H R Gamadi [3], wrote FeisalTanjung a report from Dili on the political situation. Garnadi was a staffer from Feisal'scoordinating minishy. The report was issued in the name of P4OKT.

Human rights lawyer Munir said other P4OKT documents were in existence untilAugust 1999. He suspected that while P3TT was meant to liaise with Unamet, P4OKThad the job of ensuring the 'Success' of the autonomy option. (For that matter, P4OKTcould have been the continuation of some team Feisal established much earlierthan 11 May 7999).161

The Garnadi document concluded that the earlier Indonesian optimism had beenpremature and the independence option was now likely to win. It urged that prepara-tions should be made for a large-scale evacuation of pro.Indonesian elements fromEast Timor, including the destruction of facilities. It described the militias as 'heroes ofintegration', who would probably fight it out. Feisal Tanjung himself denied all knowl-edge of the Gamadi document.r62

In early June 1999 Feisal Tanjung, quoting his Dli sources (P4OKT/ P3TT?), told acabinet meeting that the Unamet missiory barely a day old, was'siding with the anti-integration side'.r6

Feisal Tanjung twice visited East Timor before the ballot - on 12 July and 7 August- on both occasions in his P3TT capacity. One report said that on the first occasion thehigh-powered ministerial team carried instructions from Habibie to reign in militiaviolence, which was damaging Indonesia's image abroad.rs

However, rather than rein in militia violence, he came back from this visit moreconcerned to repeat his accusation of Unamet bias. He blamed 'certain groups' forcreating 'a fearful atmosphere' (mencekam - the same word used by Garnadi todescribe pro-independence activism) in order to force the UN to send troops.16

On 7 September he was the spokesperson for a group of cabinet ministers thatdeclared martial law in East Timor. The declaration was rejected by Indonesia's parlia-ment as a dangerous reversion to militarism, and even faced serious objections fromwithin cabinet. It led to rumours that Habibie was about to be deposed through amilitary coup.

Instead, Habibie accepted UN intervention on 12 September. Feisal Tanjung as-suaged his anger by cancelling the largely symbolic security treaty between Indonesiaand Australia on 15 September, because of Australian 'unhelpfulness' in East Timor.

Questioned in June 2000 over human rights abuse in East Timor after the ballot, hemerely said security was handled by local mi-litary officers, and not by Jakarta officialslike himself.t66

Background

Feisal Etno Tanjung was born in North Sumatra in 1939. He had a long career as acombat paratrooper, having been involved in several counter-insurgency operationsas well as in the invasion of East Timor. After serving eight years in the RPKAD special

'137

138 Masters of Terror

forces, he joined Kostrad, becoming Commander of the 17h Airbome Brigade, and in1981 chief of staff of Kostrad's Airborne Combat Command.

In 1985 he became regional commander of Kalimantan (Pangdam Kodam VIlTanjungpura) and from 1988 until 1992 he headed the influential Army Staff andCommand College (Seskoad) in Bandung. tn the wake of the 1991 Dili massacre hewas chosen to head the Honorary Military Council and was resPonsible in this capac-ity for a wave of sackings and transfers, supposedly directed mainly against allies ofGen Benny Murdani.

When Suharto moved to embrace Islamic political forces in the early 1990s, Feisal,a pious Muslim himself and a close associate of Habibie, became one of the president'skey agents in the rnilitary. After serving for a little under a year as Armed ForcesChief of Staff for General Affairs (Kasum Abri) Feisal was elevated to Armed Forces

Commander in L993, a position he held until 1998. In Suharto's last cabinet he was

Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, a position he kept in the Habibieadministration.

Feisal Tanjung had a penchant for 'direct action'. On 27 luly 1996, according tomuch testimony heard in court in May 2000, he ordered thugs backed by police toattack the headquarters of the political party PDI, which was at the time makingoppositional statements. In December 1994 he was allegedly part of a govemmentcampaign to unseat Abdurrahman Wahid from the leadership of the religious organi-sation Nahdatul lJlama. He always took hard-line views on what he perceived as

threats to the unitary state.

On many occasions in 1999 Feisal accepted temporary or interim cabinet positionson top of his coordinating minister's post under Habibie. He was acting foreign min-ister in June 1999 (using the moment to stop East Timorese resistance spokespersonRamos Horta from coming to East Timor),r67 and again in September 1999. He wasacting minister of interior affairs in September L999, ad interim state secretary in Mayand fune 1999, and interim attomey general in June 1999. He was also a member ofthe 'Tim Sukses' for Habibie in the run-up to the national elections in f une 1999. On29October 1999, with Habibie defeated, he handed over his ministership to Wiranto andwent into retirement.

LTTINTUNG

Local military commander (Danramil), Metinaro (32km east of Dli)This officer is on a list of officers who according to TNI Watch! should be investi-

gated for human rights crimes committed in East Timor.ls Another Danramil men-tioned for Metinaro in 1999 is Lt I Dewa Ketut Kaler [2] - their periods in command are

not yet clear. As the officer in charge of the Metinaro military, command he or Kalermay bear responsibility for the following murder allegedly comrnitted in his office bysoldiers and policemen on 5 September 1999:

'Other information obtained while on a ship comes from Marsel Seran, a Catholicgrade school teacher from the Metinaro sub-region of Dili. He said that the principal

The Key Suspects [1)

of the school, Antonio Femandes, had already been murdered by army and Metinaropolice on Monday, 6 September 1999. There had been efforts to kill him prior to thatdate as evidenced by the stoning of his house on Sunday, 5 September 1999 at about21.00 Central Indonesian Time. Feeling threatened, Antonio reported the incident thefollowing moming, Monday,6 September, to the Metinaro army headquarters. Thelocal police chief was there and visibly sitting not far from there were also severalIndonesian soldiers. Because it was already aftemoon and Antonio appeared to behungry he was called by a soldier to the back of the headquarters to have somebiscuits. After getting some biscuits, the victim returned to the headquarters.While eating his biscuit, the victim was shot three times at close range, being hitin the thigh, left arm and chest.'16e

Maj (Inf) RM Bambang WISNUMURTHYHead, Intelligence Section (Kasi Intel), Korem 164/ Wira Dharma (East Timor)

On 9 June 1999 the territory's only locally produced newspaper, Suara TimorTimur, carried interviews with some locals who were unhappy with the militarypresence in East Timor. Afterwards Bambang Wisnumurthy interrogated a joumalistfrom the paper, Lourenco Martins. Bambang reminded him that the paper's officeshad already been attacked before by militias (in April), and that Bambang had it in hispower to let them do it properly this time. He then told Lourenco that he had person-ally threatened to execute another STT journalist, Metha Guterres. He said: 'Youknow where Metha is now? In Jakarta isn't he? I'm telling you, Metha should neverimagine himself setting foot in Dili again. If he tries to step into Dili he won't live. Asfor you, Lourenco, don't you try to set foot in Liquica. If you dare to go there you'regoing to get killed by the BMP [militia]'.1?0

Intimidating journalists was all in a day's work for this intelligence officer. Afterthe first attack on the STT offices he said joumalists should follow their own profes-sional standards more closely if they did not want to be 'exposed to attack'.]zl

Just before the 30 August ballot, a 'Pak Bambang' occurs in the transcript of (twometre band) radio traffic between TNI command posts. The conversation concernedan order to collect five firearms after first reporting to Bambang, who is presumed tobe Wisnumurthy. The remainder of the conversation concemed orders to both sol-diers (Abri) and militias (Aitarak, Ablai, Mahidi), and used a language of war againstthe CNRT. The standard greeting exchanged was'goodnight, total integration greet-ings, until the last drop of blood' (' Selamat malam, salam integrasi total sampai titikdarah penghabisan';.tzz The conversation confirmed what Bambang later told the FarEastem Economic Review, namely that the rnilitary had organised the militia groups.ln

This officer (serial no. 30473) is on a list of officers who according to TM Watch!should be investigated for human rights crimes committed in East Timor.l7a

t39

140 Masters of Terror

LtCol Tatang ZAENUDDIN SW (Zainuddin)

Commander, combat Sector B (westem East Timor)

The sectoral commands probably played an important role in looting and thedeportation of East Timorese civilians after the ballot. Sector B was based in Ainaro.Tatang's area of authority in East Timor included the districts of Ainaro, Aileu, Liquica,Ermera, Bobonaro, Ambeno, Sema and Suai, where many killings were reported. Hewas interrogated by KPP HAM on 12 January 2000.r7s

He told KPP HAM that he was'withdrawn to Jakarta' two months before hostili-ties began and therefore bore no responsibility for abuses.rT6 He told joumalists afterhis questioning that he was not ordered to hand over his responsibility to any otherofficer. Tatang said he had little knowledge on the activities of the pro-integrationmilitias, contending his office was merely charged with territorial defence and helpedbuild houses and churches for the community and opened farmland. He said hiscommand also provided much needed medical services, sanitation and schoolteach-ers to the community. Tatang conceded that some rnilitias were trained in the area,but said this was under the direct authority of the East Timor military commander.'We were just overseers of the training and not directly involved.'

However, there are strong indications that precisely the sectoral command wasdeeply involved with arming and organising the militias in 1999. On one occasion amilitia leader may have directly implicated this officer as the one who supplied himwith arms. Ambeno militia leader Laurentino Soares[4] probably intended this officerwhen he gave partial names of two Kopassus officers who had given him weapons.rz

This Kopassus officer (serial number 29354) probably combined some Kostradposition with the command of the western Sector B in East Timor. He said he tookover the sectoral command from mid-August 1998 till 21 July 1999. However, thestarhing date at Ieast is probably incorrect. A media report as late as November 1998has the Sector B commander as LtCol Dainudin [2]. If Djainudin was indeed hispredecessor, the handover took place after November 1998. According to TNI Watch!,he is an intelligence officer.r78 Afterwards he lecfured at an army training facility inBandung.tD

The following officers may have acted under Zaenuddin's command in Sector B(based on 1998 data):lm

' Capt (Inf) Hartomo. Institutional home: Infantry Brigade 15; position: Head,Operational Section (Kasi Ops) Sector B; Serial no. 31155.

' Lt (Lethr Inf) JU Pangabean. lnstitutional home: lnf. Brigade 15; Position: Head,Intelligence Section (Kasi Intel) Sector B; Serial no. 11930079760271.

' Capt (Inf) Cecep Lukman. lnstitutional home: Army Training Centre (PusatPendidikan Teritorial TNI-AD); Position: Head, Territorial Section (KasiTeritorial) Sector B; Serial no. 3402.

Infantry Brigade 15 (Brigif 15l Kujang), mentioned twice in this list, belongs to theSiliwangi command in Westfava. Ithas threebattalions: 310,312,and.327. At least thelatter, if not the others too, were active in East Timor in 1999.181 Nothing else is on thepublic record about these three men in East Timor in 1999 - unless Capt Hartomo is amis-spelling for Caot Hartono [2].

The Key Suspects [2]

Newly recommended for investigation - Priority 2 I2lCol (InO ANWAR

Commander of the Combined Intelligence Task Force (Satuan Gabungan Intelijen,sGI),Diti

He was listed as both Kopassus Assistant for Logistics, and commander of theKopassus Intelligence Task Force sGI in Dili prior to the ballot.l SGI was an interroga-tion centre much feared by East Timorese activists for the torfure it conducted, amongother counter-insurgency activities.

Almost nothing is known about who staffed the sGI. other officers named as sGI'commanders' in 1999 are LGaLYayaLSugLqbt [3] and and LtCol Wioyotomo Nugrohotf1 V^91 another is Capt Siburian, of whom, like Anwar, nothing ebels known, eiceptthat Siburian was said to'help'Eurico Guterres [3].2 It seems likely that neither Siburiinnor Anwar are complete names.

Capt (Inf) Toyib ANWARILocal rnilitary commander (Danramil 1627-02/DB) in a suburb of DiliThis officer (serial no. 1910037970955) is on a list of officers reportedly slated for

investigation by an Indonesian human rights comrnission for crimes committed inEast Timor.3 Another report says he was intelligence officer in the Dili military district(Pasi Intel Kodim 1527).a His commanding officer for most of 1999 would have beenLtCol Endar Privanto [3].

SgtJoanico [da Costal Cesario BELOCommander Tim Saka militia, Baucau

Tim Saka and Tim Alfa were established in the eastern combat sector (Sektor A) asfar back as 1985 (another report says 1983) by a Kopassus officer, Capt Luhut panjaitan,evidently acting under orders from then col Prabowo subianto. Its base was in Lai-sorulai, near Baucau. Leaked army documents show that both were a regular part ofthe Indonesian military for combat/ anti-guerrilla operations. Joanico Belo was deputycommander but moved into the top position after his superior was killed in 1994. Atthe end of 1998 it had about 300 members.s

In advance of the August 1999 ballot, Tim Saka and TM soldiers threatened localswith bloodshed if they refused to support East Timor as a part of Indonesia.6

However, some reports suggest Tim Saka acted to moderate the influence inBaucau of the more radical Aitarak militia led by Eurico Guterres [3]. This could be onereason why Baucau community leaders did not protest against Joanico Belo's over-fures to retum in March 2000.7 Indeed, apart from some intimidation, there are noreports of acts of violence against civilians by this individual or by the militia he led in'1999.8

Disappointed at having been dumped by the tndonesian rnilitary after the ballotand anxious to make overfures to untaet for a retum to East Timor, he revealed toforeigrr reporters in october 2000 that 200 of his men had been trained by Kopassus inAileu and in the Kopassus base at Cijantung (west ]ava).e A foreign obiervei in mid-1999 said Joanico Belo openly showed her his identity card as a Kopassus officer.lo

Joanico Belo came to Untaet-controlled East Timor for a secret one-dav ,come andsee'visit in March 2000.

a ant+l

742 Masters of Ta'ror

LtGenDjamariCHANIAGOKostrad commander

As head of Kostrad, Chaniago commanded approximately 27,000 troops fromMay 1998 until November 7999, including several battalions in East Timor before andafter the ballot.

Koshad was the key element in reviving the sectoral command structure in theweeks of martial law under MajGen Kiki Syahnakri [31. This was the time when East

Timor was completely destroyed.

Chaniago is not on the public record as having made any statement on East Timorthroughout 1999, nor is he mentioned in any public document in connection with theterritory. He does, however, bear responsibility for the behaviour of his troops in EastTimor (includine Battalion 521. commanded bv Mai Ahmad Susetvo [2] and for thisreason is listed here.

Background

Djamari Chaniago was born to an army family in West Sumatra in 1949 andgraduated from the rnilitary academy lu:.l97l. He joined the Kostrad strategic reservern1974 and occupied several combat command positions in Aceh and East Timor inthe 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. ln 1995 he was appointed Commander of Kostrad's Sec-

ond Infantry Division near Malang in East |ava.

In ]uly 1997 he moved to Bandung as commander of the West Java military region(Siliwangi) where he served until Suharto's resignation less than a year later. Chaniago'sKostrad background and his Minangkabau Muslim origins saw him emerge as thefavoured candidate to take over the reigns of Kostrad on 23 May 1998 following theprecipitous removal of Prabowo [5].

He is reportedly close to Kiki Syahnakri, who lobbied for him to become Jakartacommander after leaving Kostrad. He was instead made Deputy Chief of Staff of theArmy (Wakasad), and in March 2000 became Armed Forces Chief of Staff for GeneralAffairs (Kasum TM).

LTCoI P DJAINLJDIN SW

Commander, Sector B, Western East Timor, in 1998

Sector B takes in the southwest coast area which includes Alas. MateBEAN reportsthat Djainudin gave permission to the human rights organisation Kontras to enter thearea in November 1998, soon after a massacre of villagers in Alas.rl

He would have handed over to LCol Tatang Zaenuddin [1]. The latter claimed inJanuary that he was appointed in mid-August 1998,12 but unless the MateBEAN re-port is ill-informed (eg. was Djainudin perhaps a deputy commander?) that is notpossible. The handover must have happened after November 1998.

Since the sectoral command is thought to have been primarily responsible forarrning the militias,l3 this makes it possible Djainudin was involved with at least theearly phase of that project in this district.

The Key Suspects [2] 143

Maj(In0 Dedi ERIMPICommander, Battalion 621l Manuntung (MTG)This officer (serial no. 30031, rnilitary academy graduate of 1984) commanded an

infantry battalion active in East Timor and has been mentioned in one report as beingin need of investigation for possible human rights violations.la originally fromKandangan and ranjung, south Kalimantan, this battalion was seconded to the EastTimor territorial command.

It was one of the last to leave East Timor late in September 1999.15 On its way out,via the port of Laga near Baucau, troops including Battalion 621 reportedly engaged in'widespread looting and property destruction by fire, as the TNI forces swept throughBaucau and Lospalos.' Battalions r()6 (commanded by LCol Sonny Widjaja [2]) and401 (LAoL€ukoEo [2]) were mentioned in the same report.r6

Capt (Inf) HARTONOOperations officer, Dili military comrnand (Pasi Ops, Kodim 1527)

This officer (serial no. 1.91.002468'1,267) is mentioned in one report as a possiblesuspect in an East Timor war crimes trial.17 His commanding officer for most of 1999would have been LtCol Endar Priyanto [3]. Nothing else is known of this man,scareer, unless he is the same Captain Hartono as was mentioned in a 1996 humanrights report. A series of arrests and disappearances occurred in same between Feb-ruary and April 1996, by soldiers under the command of Captain Hartono, evidentlya Kopassus officer.lE

LtCol (Art) LexiHERSONMilitary district commander of Manatuto (Dandim 1531), August-september 1999

He replaced LtCol Sulastiyo [1], who probably had a close relationship with thetwo rnilitias in Manatuto at this time. L,exi Herson continued the relationship.le EastTimorese human-rights organisations immediately before the ballot reported severalincidents in which soldiers from the Manatuto military district (Kodim Manatuto)worked with militias to intimidate civilians.

on 19 August at about 11:00am, Kodim Manatuto soldiers and the local Mahadomirnilitia destroyed the Manatuto branch office of the pro-independence political partyCNRT. Four days earlier, armed militia and Kodim personnel (among the latter Alexiode Carvalho and Filomeno Barreto) had paraded around town taking down CNRTelection symbols. They alleged CNRT had ripped an Indonesian flag. An independentinvestigation showed the allegation had no basis.2o

The day before the ballot, a militia group led by Manatuto district head vidalDoutel sarmento [2] and by two civilian employees of the Kodim command seizedthe car of the local Catholic parish and looted its contents. The other local militia,Morok, threatened the people of nearby Soibada and Laclubar with a 'flood of blood,no matter what the result of the ballot should be'.21

The day after the vote, the international observers' group IFET-OP said its teamwas evacuated from Manatuto after the local military commander [Lexi Herson] told

7M Masters of Tenor

the foreigners he could not guarantee their security because he was unable to controlthe militias.22

Lexi Herson graduated from the military academy in 1983.

LtCol (Art) HisarRichard HUTA|ULUMilitary district commander (dandim), Baucau (Kodim 1528)

This officer (serial no. 28832, military staff college class of 1978) assumed com-mand of the Baucau district some time before mid-1998. He is listed in one report as a

possible suspect in an East Timor war crimes trial.aln the aftermath of the 30 August 1999 ballot, Indonesian martial law administra-

tor MajGen Kiki Syahnakri [3] ordered Hutajulu to take action against looters.2a

Maj(In0|ULIANTOCommander, Battalion 521, / DY (Kostrad, from Kediri)

(See the item on his replacement some time in 1999, Maj (In0 Ahmad Susetyo [2])

Lt I Dewa Ketut KALERLocal military commander (Danramil) in Metinaro,32 km east of Dili

This officer (NRP 1147081, Danramil 7627-M) is on a list of officers, who, according

to TM Watch!, should be investigated for human-rights crimes committed in East

Timor.b Another Danramil mentioned in Metinaro is Lt Untung [1] - their respectiveperiods of command are not clear.

LtCol(In0LUKITOCommander,700 Airbome Battalion (Linud 700)

Together with Battalion 432 (commanded by Maj Eriet Hadi Uriyanto [2]), Battal-ion 700 was only sent to East Timor in 1999 (from its base in Makassar, South Sulawesi)upon the declaration of martial law on 7 September.25 When it landed at Laga har-bour on 15 September, East Timorese feared this combat battalion was about toentage Falintil militarily.z It was therefore in East Timor at the height of the destruc-tion.

It was the last to leave East Timor, on 30 fuober 1999.a Afterwards it was brieflyposted in neighbouring Flores, where local NGOs protested that its presence seemed

to signal a militarisation of the island.2e

Battalion 700 saw a lot of action in East Timor and had a reputation for cruelty. In'1976 lt took part in the siege of Mount Matebean in eastem East Timor, which left a

large number of civilians dead.m In 1991., then under the command of Gerhan Lentara

[L], Battalion 700 was cenhally involved in the Dli ma$sacre of 11 November.3l A1996 report had Battalion 700 troops distributed around several military districts inthe western part of East Timor: Aileu, Ainaro, Bobonaro and Suai. It turned up in

The Key Suspects [21

several resistance and human rights reports in the region at the time.32

Following a Falintil attack on an army post at Alas on 30 October 1.998, Battalion700 troops took part with other troops in reprisal actions in which dozens of civilianswere arrested and tortured.33

One report said it was controlled by the Kopassus intelligence unit SGI.il

Agustinho'Sera MALIK' Boavide XimenesCommander, Sera Team, Baucau

Sera Team was the last in an earlier generation of rnilitias, set up to help Abri fightFalintil in the hills rather than primarily to intimidate voters. It dates to the early ormid-1990s. It was so closely related to its fellow Saka Team (led by Sgt Joanico Belo[2]), that they were sometimes fused in reports. ln 1999 they had a combined mem-bership of 970 men,250 of them armed with modem weapons, according to onereport.3s This and other militias such as Halilintar and Saka Team were on the regularpayroll of the armed forces. It belonged to 1828 military district, Baucau.s In April1999 it was revealed that he was one of six militia leaders who coordinated the variousmilitia forces in East Timor.3z

He and the Saka corrunander took part in a meeting with MajGen Zackv Makarim[3] and Col Tono Suratman [3] at the Baucau Kopassus headquarters on26July 1999.The meeting concemed the dishibution of weapons in the event of a 'civil war'. Nodoubt it was one of many such meetings.s Perhaps this was part of Abri's less thansuccessful mobilisation of the pro-Indonesian militias in this part of East Timor. Littleviolence took place here in the aftermath of the ballot. There were reports that EastTimorese soldiers in the Indonesian army in this district had made an agreement withFalintil not to engage in fighting.3e There are no reports of violence or intimidationagainst civilians conducted by this individual or the militia he led in 1999.

After the Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor he moved across the border toWest Timor, where he remained as of October 2000.4

Sera Malik was captured by Falintil guerrilla commander Taur Matan Ruak inJanuary 1998, but was released unharmed. The capture may have been related todeath threats he had recently sent to Manuel Carrascalao, an increasingly outspokenformer parliamentarian. On the other hand, his release may have been related to thefact that he was a former comrade. One report says he had been a 'personal body-guard'for guerrilla commander Xanana Gusmao until he was captured by Indonesiantroops, presumably some time in the early 1990s. Abri often put captured guerrillas towork to track down their former comrades.al

Capt (Inf) Salmun MANAFE

Dili military district chief of staff (Kepala Staf Kodim 1627 Dih)He is on a list of officers, who, according to TNI Watch!, should be investigated for

human-rights crimes in East Timor.a2 His commanding officer for most of 1999 wouldhave been LtCol Endar Privanto [3].

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1M Masters of Tenor

Maj (Pol) Wilmar MARPALINGDishict police chief (Kapolres), Oecussi, Ambeno enclave

An indictment for crimes against humanity, read in a Dili court in October 2001

over the Passabe massacre of 10 September (see Laurentino 'Moko' Soares [4]), namedhim as one of those who had initiated the activities of the Sakunar militia that carriedout the massacre.a3

Marpaung was appointed to this position in June 1998. After East Timor he be-came district police chief in the city of Gorontalo, North Sulawesi.a

MajGen MochtarMA'RUFFormer Chief of Social and Political Affairs (Kassospol); possibly general without

posting in TNI headquarters in 1999

MajGen'Mahruf is mentioned in a few reports as involved just before the ballot incoordinating militia violence - in company with Zacky Makarim [3], Sjafrie Syamsuddin

[3], Kiki Syahnakri [3], Glenny Kairupan [3], plus Tyasno Sudarto [3].as

This could refer to former Chief of Social and Political Affairs (Kassospol) at TNIHeadquarters, MajGen Mochtar Ma'ruf, who was replaced by Syarwan Hamid inMay 1996 and then not heard from again. He certainly is East Timor-experienced, buthe may be rather too old to be doing these things.

Bnckgroundas

Mochtar Ma'ruf was bom in Central java, and graduated from the military acad-emy in about 1965. He was in charge of the East Timor command (danrem'164) 1987'88. At this time the territorial structure (Korem) was far less powerful than the Kolakops(non-organic) rnilitary one. He rose to Chief of Social and Political Affairs (Kassospol)1995-96.

Rear Admiral Yoost F MENGKOlntelligence Assistant to Chief of General Staff (Asintel Kasum)

This officer was one of three key assistants to Chief of General Staff Lt-Gen Sugiono

[1] involved in East Timor issues in 1999. Unamet chief Ian Martin wrote about his rolein the last days before the ballot 'Wiranto's intelligence adviser, Rear-Admiral YoostMengko, and [East Timor commander Col Nur] Muis [3] had become Unamet's mainTM interlocutors in our efforts to promote TNI, Falintil and militia commitments tothe laying down of arms.'a7 On 27 August he led a TNI delegation that also includedanother Kasum assistant, MajGen Sjafrie Syamsuddin [3], on a visit to a major Falintilbase in East Timor. This was the first time Mengko's role at TNI Headquarters hadbecome public.

He thus effectively replaced MajGen Zacky Makarim [3] as TNI's coordinator withUnamet in the last days of August. However, Zacky was never formally replaced onthe liaison committee P3TT, and Mengko did not stay in Dili as Zacky had done.

The Key Suspects [2]

With Chief of Territorial Affairs LtGen Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono [2] and For-eign Minister Ali Alatas he went to the UN early in september \999 to negotiate theterms of engagement for the peacekeeping mission in East Timor and coordinate thearrival of Interfet troops in East Timor.s

After the Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor he was appointed to head up anintemal rNI team to give 'correct' information KPP HAM.4e Just before the inquirybrought down its finding+ which were to prove damaging, he announced that themilitary were about to prosecute 'four former army district chiefs' (presumablydandims) for abuses committed in East Timor.. At the same time he warned Kpp HAMnot to be'emotional' in its report.s Nothing further was heard of the prosecutions.

A little while later again, human rights lawyers said he was at the heart of rNIpressure to compromise the neutrality of an inquiry into a 1984 incident at TanjungPriok in Jakarta that also involved military abuse.sl

Background

This naval officer may have been defence attache at the Indonesian embassy inCanberra, Australia, :u:.1992. By mid-1997 he had become chief of the naval maritimedevelopment service (Kepala Dinas Pembinaan Potensi Maritim TNI-AL), and sincethen appeared in public speaking about marine issues. After being appointed Assist-ant for Intelligence to the Chief of staff for General Affairs in January 1999, EastTimor became one of his top priorities. His predecessor in this position, Yuswaji,was also navy.

Capt(In0 AgusNURKASAInformation chief of East Timor military command (Kepala Penerangan Korem

'1.64/Wfta Dharma)

Besides his routine statements (underlining Falintil attacks on TNI officers andpro-Indonesian militias while ignoring or downplaying militia or military violence),nothing is known of this officer's career. He is on a list of officers, who, according toTNI Watch!, should be investigated for human-rights crimes in East Timor.s2

MajGen (ret) Sintong PANJAITANPresident Habibie's key military advisorHe held the position of Secretary of Development Operation (Sesdalopbang),

which gave him considerable access to funds. He was also a key rnilitary advisor toHabibie, possibly acting as a channel of communication with the military. sintong isreported to have been his'left hand', who always accompanied the president wher-ever he went.s3

Sintong Panjaitan may have played a crucial role in President Habibie's decision,announced on 27 January 1'999, to give East Timorese a vote to accept or reject anIndonesian autonomy offer. one account said Habibie held the'most intensive'dirus-sions with Sintong Panjaitan before the decision was made in two successive cabinetmeetings (see Feisal Tanjung [1] on this).s

747

148 Masters of Terror

Amid much media speculation about why top ranking active and retired generalssuch as Wiranto, Feisal Tanjung, Yunus Yosfiah and Sintong Panjaitan, all of whomhad spent their careers on the annexation, would now want to let it go, one reportstands out in hindsight as particularly prophetic. This report did not see the Indone-sian move as a genuine concession to East Timorese demands (and internationalsympathy) for self-determination. Instead, it was an (admittedly risky) attempt tointimidate the East Timorese elite into choosing to stay with lndonesia.

[S]ince the ball is in Indonesia's court, the game is completely on Indonesia's side.The threats Indonesia issues are not idle. Reject autonomy, and we're leaving. 'Andcivil war will break out,' says [Foreign Minister Ali] Alatas. To back up the threats,Abri has indeed already armed the preintegration groups in East Timor, even though[Defence Minister] Wiranto has denied it.ss

The report went on to note that the Jakarta govemment had already begun towithdraw educational and health workers from East Timor, ostensibly because those

workers felt threatened by the East Timorese pro-independence camPaign, but in factbecause it would give a foretaste of how difficult life could get without lndonesian'development' support.

There is only one report that Sintong Panjaitan involved himself directly in East

Timor affairs in 1999. It says he was in Dili in early August 1999 and worked with the

Zacky Anwar Makarim [3]-Kiki Syahnakri [3] team there on preparations for the

evacuation of East Timor in the event of the vote going against Indonesia. The groupallegedly had a budget of Rp 28 billion (approx US$2.8 million), allocated to it byGeneral Wiranto [3].ft

Background

Sintong Panjaitan was bom on 4 September 1941 in North Sumatra, and graduatedfrom the National Military Academy (AMN) in 1963. He became a soldier with the

elite forces RPKAD (later called Kopassandha and then Kopassus). In 1965 he was a

key Suharto ally in the suppression of a revolt by leftist soldiers belonging to the 30

September Movement. In 1969 Capt Feisal Tanjung [L] selected him as one of the'fighting heroes' (ago-jago tempur) for the military operation to ensure Papuan tribalchiefs voted for Indonesia in the Irian Jaya Act of Free Choice.sT He also served in East

Timor. By 1985-87 he had risen to Kopassus Commander.

Sintong Panjaitan later became Udayana military region commander (which in-cludes East Timor), but was dismissed following intemational outrage over the SantaCruz massacre of 11 November'I..991., in which a large number of civilians died. ThenCoordinating Minister for Politics and Security Feisal Tanjung, his commander in Irian]aya and also from North Sumatra, was thus effectively responsible for ending hismilitary career.

He went to the US around May 1992, where he did an English language course. Hewas found liablein a trialthere following a multi million dollar damages claim launchedby Helen Todd, the mother of Kamal Bamadhaj, the New Zealand student killed in theSanta Cruz massacre in Dili. The court ordered him in 1.994I?l to pay $US14 million toHelen Todd (US$4 million in compensatory damages and US$10 million in punitive

The Key Suspects [21

damages). sintong Panjaitan did not appear in court and has still not paid the fine.However, it was the fust time an lndonesian military officer had been arraigned in a UScourt over human rights abuse. Jahny-Lumirtang [3] became the second in March 2000.

Research and rechnology Minister Habibie appointed him Deputy for MilitaryAffairs at the Agency for the Assessment and Application of rechnology (Bppr) in1994, after which he became a trusted advisor to Habibie.s8

Capt (Inf) Edy Doso PRASETYOChief intelligence officer, East Timor military command (Korem 164)

He is on a list of officers, who, according to TNI watch!, should be investigated forhuman-rights crimes in East Timor.se

Col Nanang DJ PRIADIDeputy commander, East Timor (Wadanrem 164), from June 1999

Nanang Priadi replaced Col Mudjiono [1] as deputy commander of the East Timormilitary command on L1 ]une 1999, and served under both Col rono suratman [3]and col Nur Muis [3] during the worst of the atrocities in East Timor.60 He was latercalled by the joint Attomey General's team to testify in relation to alleged human-rights abuses committed by his superior Nur Muis.61

Bom in about 1954, he graduated n 1977 from the military academy. tn 1992 hecommanded the 9th Infantry Brigade (Danbrigif 9), Kostrad, based in Jember, East Java.

Maj (Inf) Rahmat PRIBADICommander, Battalion 301/ Praba Kian Santang (PKS)

This officer (serial no. 30414, t985 military academy graduate) commanded aninfantry battalion active in East Timor and has been mentioned in one report as beingin need of investigation for possible human rights violations.52 Battalion 301, origi-nally from sumedang, west Java (siliwangi Division), was seconded to the East Timorcommand (and was thus called a territorial combat battalion, Batalyon TempurTeritorial, BTT). It operated in the Aileu district, and was therefore at least norninallycontrolled by district commander Maj Maman Rachman [2].6 Immediately upon arrivalon 12 April 1999, it began counter-insurgency operations against Falintil in the hi-lls.e

MajGen Muchdi P R (PURWOPRANJONO)

Former Kopassus commander; general without posting at TNI headquarters

East Timorese resistance spokesperson Jose Ramos Horta named him in Septem-ber 7999, in company with Zacky Makarim [3] and Siafrie Syamsuddin [3], as one ofthe generals responsible for the destruction of East Timor.6 However, rumours thathe visited East Timor secretly in April 1999 appear to be incorrect.

t49

150 Masters of Terror

He was Kopassus commander till 'freed from all structural duties' in May1998 after allegations Kopassus had kidnapped student activists earlier that year.With Zacky he's an unemployed general at TNI headquarters - there were six ofthem in late 2000.

Background6s

Muchdi P R was born in fava 13 April 1948. He graduated from the militaryacademy in1970, and served in East Timor four times. He has served in territorialposts in Irian Jaya (late 1980s, early 90s), fambi and East |ava (mid-1990s), and West

Kalimantan (1997-98). He was Kopassus conunander for three months in 1998, beingremoved upon Suharto's resigrration. He seems to be a straight combat and problem-solving officer.

Maj Maman RACHMANMilitary district commander in Aileu (Dandim 1632)

If he were indeed in charge of Aileu as described \n1999, he would have takenover from LtCol H Saroso [2], who was still there in November 1998.67

In contradiction with the UN Agreement of 5 May L999, the Aileu military com-mand took part directly and early in 'socialising autonomy'. On 12 May, the Aileumilitary district chief of staff, Captain (Inf) Solavide Dolok Saribu, led an early pro-

autonomy rally in the military dishict headquarters attended by 500 people. This was

followed by three days of 'safaris' around the district, in which the population wasurged to vote autonomy.6E

The main militia in this district was Ahi. It was allegedly led by Horacio, apparentlyemployed in the Aileu military command (thus under the dandim).# However, an-other report lists the head of Ahi as Thomas Mendonca, former head of the Aileudistrict council (DPRD-II?).70 It operated in conjunction with Rajawali (Kopassus) and

the local military command (Koramil), the latter directly under the dandim's com-

mand. This is clear, for example, from a description of the arrest and subsequent

torture of eight individuals in Asu Mau village on 15 April 1999, written by the East

Timorese human rights organisation Yayasan HAK.7I

In the month before the ballot, the dandim told his non-comrnissioned officers(babinsa) in Remexio sub-district to 'register' at least ten supporters of autonomyeach, and handed out two bags of rice to each one to pass on to the militias stationed

in their respective posts.72

Other reports of militia violence in Aileu link it rather to the district head (bupati),Col Suoraoto Tarman [31. who in anv case exceeded the dandim in rank.

Maman Rachman (serial no.29505) graduated from the military academy in 1982.

The Key Suspects [2] 151

LtCol (InO Nus R N RAHASIADeputy commander, combat Sector B (westem East Timor)As deputy commander of Sector B, he is likely to have been implicated in the

looting and forced deportations in East Timor in 1999. His superior officer was LtColTatang Zaenuddin [1]. while serving as deputy commander in sector B, this officer(serial no. 29657) was also with the Kopassus combat unit satgas Darat Rajawali (setup by Prabowo).n

After East Timor, in 2001, he became chief of the Kopassus Tribuana Task Force inlrian Jaya.Ta Westem intelligence sources blamed this and other Kopassus units fordestabilising operations in several parts of Indonesia (Irian Jaya, Acetr, the Moluccasas well as East Timor) in 2000.7s

Col (In0 Mochamad Nurhidajat RUSMONOIntelligence officer, TNI headquarters Jakarta (Seconded Officer III/ tnternal Af-

fairs, Intelligence Section - Paban IIII Biddagri Sintel TNI)He was called to testify at KPP HAM in December 1999. The given reason given

was that he had been sent to East Timor to carry out a 'special assignment, on 3August 1'999. He allegedly received his instructions from the Chief of General Staff(Kasum, LtGen Sugiono [1]), on the basis of Surat Perintah Kasum TM No. Sprin/I41' /Vll/1999/Sin.76 He acknowledged conducting visits not just once but af leastthree times, between June and August l999.He said they were intended to'check onforeign press reports that TM was siding with pro.integration forces'.n

Rusmono was born in about 1949, Nd graduated from the military academy in 1922.

Vidal Doutel SARMENTOManatuto district head (bupati); Mahadomi (Madomi) militia commanderThis man appears on one list as a possible war crimes suspect.TE In his capacity as

district head he joined other 'pro-integration leaders' in a high-powered meeting withIndonesian armed forces commander Gen wiranto [3] in Dili on 20 April 1999.D

The militia, assisted by locally based soldiers, destroyed the CNRT office in Manatutoon 19 August 1999.m The attack followed a threat by Vidal Doutel Sarmento at a rallythree days earlier that all civil servants without exception had to choose autonomyand if the pro-autonomy option was rejected the Manatuto would tum into a sea ofblood ('lautan darah'). It also engaged in some looting on 31 August 1999.81

The militia had a close relationship with the military. Sixteen Mahadomi memberscaptured by Falintil and handed over to Interfet after the ballot said they had beenrecruited by 'an Indonesian soldier' in Manafuto.E2 The military district cbmmanderthere at this time was either LCol Sulastiyo [1] or his successor LtCol Lexi Herson [2].

Another report said the Mahadomi militia was led by Filomeno Antonio Britto(Bretto), who caused a stir in the Indonesian and international press by claiming(incorrectly) that Interfet had doused eight of his members and set them alight uponarrival in Dili.E3

152 Masters of Tenor

LtCol (In0 Hardiono SAROSOChief of staff East Timor command (Korem 164); Aileu military commander (Kodim

L632, early 1999)

This officer spent 15 out of 15 years of military service in combat positions. He ison a list of officers who, according to TNI Watch!, should be investigated for human-rights crimes in East Timor.e

He may have been in command in Aileu at the time of the mobilisation andarming of violent civilian paramilitaries in early 1999. The dominant paramilitarygroup in this area in April 1999 was Ahi.6 The district head in Aileu at this time wasalso a military officer, Suprapto Tarman [3], and most reports link militia violence inAileu with this man.

Some time during 1999 he handed over to Mai Maman Rachman [2] (the Ahimilitia is also described there), and went on to become chief of staff of the East Timorcommand in Dili, under Col Tono Suratman [3].

Background

Hardiono Saroso graduated from the military academy in 1981. He was first pla-toon commander, then company commander of Company 142 in East Tirnor, andsoon went on to head operations in the Manafuto and Lospalos areas (1983-85).e Inl997,by which time he had become Commander of Infantry Battalion 144, he wasappointed to the territorial command of Aileu district.ET

Maj(InOHMSINAGADistrict military comrnander of Manufahi, based in Same (Dandim 163)

If indeed Sinaga was there for most of 1999, then he is largely responsible (with the

SGI commander LCol Yayat Sudrajat [3]) for the violence perpehated by the Ablaimilitia (led by Nazario Corte Real [1]). This militia was close to the military. Hispredecessor LtCol Suwondo [1] was there in late 1998 and probably into early 1999.

Capt (InO Bambang SUDARMANTOLocal military commander (Komandan Koramil 1627 - 07 /W) in a suburb of Dili

This officer (serial no. 19'10037970966) is on a list of officers, who, according to TNIWatch!, should be investigated by an Indonesian human-rights crimes in EastTimor.sHis commanding officer for most of 1999 would have been LCol Endar Priyanto [3].

LtCol(InOSUKOSOCommander, Battalion t101 (Banteng Raiders)

Battalion 401, based in Semarang, Central Java, is an elite unit classified as Inde-pendent (Berdiri Sendiri, BS), meaning it can be sent anywhere as a strike force.Ee

The Key Suspects [2]

LtCol Sukoso was mentioned as the battalion commander in April 2000.m Hisdeputy commander at that time was Major (Inf) Dudung.el In August 1997 thebaftal-ion commander was LtCol (Inf) setyo sularso. It is not clear when the handoveroccurred, or whether Sukoso or Setyo Sularso was in charge r\ I999.ez

This battalion was seconded to the territorial command ('penugasan') in East Timor.In June 1998 it was listed as a Territorial Combat Battalion (Batalyon Tempur Teritorial,Bfi), based at the venilale military district headquarters in Viqueque (Kodim 1630).e3

However, it was also mentioned as being under the control of combat sector Acomrnander LtCol Irwan Kusnadi [3]. This combat commander also commanded the3rd Airborne Infantry Brigade (Brigif Linud III), a Kostrad brigade based in Makassar.

serious human rights abuses occurred in this area (see LtCol Djoko Soekarsono[1] probably the military district commander there in 1999). Battalion40l was often inbattle. It was in the news in April 1998 over a firefight it had with Falintil guerrillas.ea

It was one of the last to leave East Timor late in September 1999.% On its way out,via the port of Laga near Baucau, troops including Battalion 401 reportedly engaged in'widespread looting and property destruction by fire, as the TM forces swept throughBaucau and Lospalos.' Battalions 406 (commanded by LtCol sonny widiaja [2]) and621 (Maj Dedi Erimpi [2]) were mentioned in the same report.%

After a brief period based in neighbouring Flores, where local NGOs protestedthat its presence seemed to signal a militarisation of the island,eT it was sent in january2000 to Halmahera, North Maluku, still part of the brigade commanded by IrwanKusnadi.

LtCol (InO Bambang SUNGESTIMilitary district commander (Komandan Kodim 1539) Ambeno, based in

Pantemakassar

The militia in Ambeno, Sakunar, led by Laurentino ,Moko, Soares [4] washeadquartered in the military district command. It allegedly committed serious crimesagainst humanity in the period when this officer was in charge of security there. BambangSungesti took over from LCol Kamiso Miran [1] shortly before the ballot.es

Two soldiers under his command were among 11 men indicted in a Dili court inoctober 2001 for crimes against humanity over the Passabe massacre of 10 september1999. Both remained at large. They were:

t sgt Anton sabraka, commander in Passabe sub-dishict (Komandan Koramil?). Sgt Angre lllan, based in Passabe village.After the Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor he assumed command in the

military district of Manggarai, Flores.ee

Maj (InO Ahmad SUSETYOCommander, Battalion 52L/ DY (from Kediri)Ahmad susetyo (serial no. 30475) replaced Mai (InO Julianto [2] (serial no. 3005g,

1984 military academy graduating class) some time in 1999. Both their names appear

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t54 Masters of Tenor

on a list of officers, who, according to TM Watch!, should be investigated for human-

rights crimes in East Timor.rm

Soldiers from this battalion, according to an anonymous account, took part inshooting at pro-independence youths who were armed with bows, arrows and knives,in Becora, a suburb of Dili, on L9 April 1999. The shooting went on for two hours andleft ten wounded (four of them named), two seriously.rol

Upon the arrival of Interfet in Dili, his unit was one of the last to leave. (It was later

posted to Ambon). He told reporters the prevailing attitude - ('in effect, the policy',one journalist opined) - of the departing troops was: 'We're not going to leave any-thing for those idiots to take over.' He predicted that'all hell will break loose' in thecorning days. Deserters who had decided to fight on here, he said, 'will leave some-thing for the people to remember'.lo2

This Kostrad battalion was one of many combat units routinely posted to East

Timor outside the regular territorial structure. One report said it was controlled by the

Kopassus intelligence unit SGLIm

Lt Pilon Situmorang, intelligence officer (Pasi 1/ Intel Satgas Teritorial, serial no.1,1930070260259) with this battalion was also recommended for investigation.ls

MajGen Endriartono SUTARTO (Endiarto, Endrihartono Soetarto)

Assistant for Operations to the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces (Asops

Kasum Abri)

Endriartono Sutarto assisted the Armed Forces Chief of General Staff, LtGenSugiono [1]between September L998 and November 1999. This was the crucial periodin East Timor. Operations Assistant (Asops) is a high status job - the most senior of the

Kasum assistants - with extensive responsibilities. Technically he occupied a key place

in the chain of operational command, and would have been one of those responsible

for organising the scorched earth policy.

At the height of the militia rampage in East Timor, he did not deny that pro-integration rnilitia were engaging in some killings, but added: '[Tlhat is quite normalin the kind of situation now prevailing in East Timor.' He denied the military werebacking the militias.los

ln a rare television interview in ftober 2000 he said about the military-militiarelations: 'It is in the psychology of our soldiers, because, for so long, they've had

links, to work together (with the militias) to secure East Timor as part of lndonesia.'He said that, after the ballot, the government had told the militias no longer to use

weapons but only political means in their struggle to retum East Timor to Indonesia.

However, the message was not getting through yet: '[B]ecause they have such a

fighting spirit, such strong will, they haven't quite understood Indonesia's interest

[or] their own so as not to (make trouble).'16

After the Indonesian withdrawal to East Timor, he supported the 'right' of East

Timorese soldiers, after shedding their army r:niforrrl to join the militias, who had in rnind a

action to recover East Timor. He denied they retained their weapons.lo7

The Key Suspects [2] 155

Background

Endriartono Sutarto was born on 29 April "1947 n Central Java, and graduatedfrom the rnilitary academy in'1977. His combat career has been in Kostrad, includingparticipating in operation seroja, the invasion of East Timor. He has had some train-ing in the US and Britairy and led uN peacekeeping troops in the Middle East in 19gg.In the early 1990s he was on the staff of territorial commands in Jakarta and in Irian)aya. He moved to TNI Headquarters duties in 1995, first at Kostrad, then assisting theArmed Forces Commander, followed by head of the Presidential Guard, and (in 1998-99) assistant to the Armed Forces Chief of General Staff.

Human-rights groups have alleged that troops under his command were respon-sible for the murder of labour activist Marsinah in Surabaya in 1993108 and also that asthe head of suharto's personal guard, he is likely at least to have known about theabduction, torture and murder of activists by the Kopassus Tim Mawar, which report-edly took its orders from suharto.l'e He is a hardliner on Aceh, pushing foi theestablishment of a new Kodam for Aceh against the objections of the Acehnese com-munity,rlo and also on Maluku, arguing that the solution lay in declaring martialIaw.lrr He has never served as a territorial (Kodam) commander, does not speak a lotand therefore has received little press coverage in the past.lt2

In November 1999 he was moved to the staff command college (Dansesko TNI).Adam Damiri [3] moved in to replace him. He became Army Chief of staff in March2000, where he was assisted by Kiki syahnakri [3]. Together they would help 'rebuildTM's image', said Kiki Syahnakri's colleague Glenny Kairupan [3].'13 After Kiki,sinstallation, Sutarto said that'the entire rank-and-file of the army is ready for combatto carry out the state's mission to crush separatists'.1r4

Maj (Pol) Mangatas TAMBUNANDeputy police chief (Wakapolres) DiliThis officer (serial no. 50127273) is on a list of officers, who, according to TM

Watch! should be investigated for human-rights crimes in East Timor.115At the end of 1997 he interrogated Xanana Gusmao in a Jakarta prison in connec-

tion with the arrest of some resistance activists armed with explosives in Dili.Like some other senior ex-Dili police officers, he joined the crime squad in jakarta

after the Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor.

Maj (Inf) Kustomo TIYOSOOperations head, East Timor military command (Seksi Operasi, Korem 154)

He is on a list of officers, who, according to TNI Watchl, should be investigated forhuman-rights crimes in East Timor.116 He held this position at least in April 1999.

Maj (Inf) Eriet Hadi URIYANTOCommander, Battalion (Yonif) 432

This battalion is part of the 3rd Airbome Infantry Brigade (Brigif Linud III), com-manded in 1999 by LtCol Irwan Kusnadi [3], who was at the same time East Timor

155 Masters of Tenor

combat Sector A commander.lrT It was based in Makassar, South Sulawesi, and spentonly a few weeks in East Timor in 1999. The brigade was formed in 1985 out ofKopassus personnel who had been with the counter-insurgency Group 3, but whohad been shed from Kopassus after a reorganisation. It was often still commanded bya Kopassus officer (of whom Irwan Kusnadi was probably one).l1E

Together with Airborne Battalion 700 (see Lukito [2]), Battalion 432 was sent toEast Timor upon the declaration of marlial law on 7 September 1999.11e It was there-fore in East Timor at the height of the destruction. Previously it had been in Ambon.Battalion 432 had been in East Timor several times before.rb

On 17 October 1,999, Battalion 432 arrived in Atambua, in West Timor near theborder with East Timor. It was assigned border security duties (including joint patrolswith Interfet), but also had to disarm militias among the refugees.l2r However, Interfetaccused it of granting'impunity' to the militia force Sakunar, led by Laurento 'Moko'Soares [4], which was launching incursions into East Timor.122

Battalion 432 personnel allegedly tortured eight individuals in the Belu district,near Atambua, on 29 November 1999.12s

Col (InO Pramono EdhieWIBOWOKopassus commander, Group V

He assumed command of Kopassus Group V (anti-terrorist) in 1999. We knowfrom other evidence that this group was also deployed in East Timor - for example inBaucau, through a unit called Detachment 81 (D-81). At present we have no details ofpossible human rights abuse committed by Pramono, or the group he led, in EastTimor in 1999.124

Background

He is the son of the late LtGen (ret) Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, one of the 'red beret'troops who helpedbring in the New Order under General Suhartoin'1965/66.In 1998

he commanded Kopassus Group I, based in Serang, West Java.16. He is regarded as a

Prabowo ally. If he was corrurnnding this group in May'1997, his troops took part ina US JCET-funded program called 'BalanceIrongT-5A', receiving training in SpecialReconnaisance/ Combat Patrolling Small Unit Tactics, 15 May-27 June 1997.1%

LtCol (InO Sonny WIDJAJACommander, Battalion 406/ Candra Kusuma

This officer (serial no. 29466, military academy graduate of 1982) commanded aninfantry battalion active in East Timor and has been mentioned in one report as beingin need of investigation for possible human-rights violations.l2T f'he battalion comesfrom Purbalingga, Central Java, but was seconded to the East Timor territorial com-mand (and thus became a territorial combat battalion, BTT). The battalion was based

at Viqueque and engaged in fighting with Falintil in April 1999.128

It was one of the last to leave East Timor late in September 7999.18 On its way out,via the port of Laga near Baucau, troops including Battalion 405 reportedly engaged in

The Key Suspects I2l

'widespread looting and property destrucfion by fire, as the TM forces swept throughBaucau and Lospalos'. Battalions 401 (comrnanded by LtCol Sukoso [2]) and 621 (WDedi Erimpi [2]) were mentioned in the same report.r3o

LtGen Susilo Bambang YUDHOYONOTNI Chief of Territorial Affairs (Kaster TNI)The position of Chief of socio.Political staff (Kassospol) was in November 199g

changed to Chief of Territorial Affairs (Kaster). It was still held into 1999by the sameofficer, LtGen susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. He was one of two chiefs who com-manded staff at TNI Headquarters and reported directly to the Commander of theArmed Forces (Pangab, Gen wiranto [3]). The other was the Chief of General staff(Kasum, LtGen Sugiono [1]). Both had East Timor responsibilities in 1999.131

The Chief of Territorial Affairs technically coordinates all the territorial commandgincluding the udayana command (held by MajGen Adam Damiri [3]), and the EastTimor command (Col Tono Suratman [3]). He had two assistants: one for territorialaffairs (Aster), held in 1999 by MajGen Djoko Mulono, and one for socio-politicalaffairs (Assospol, sometimes called Askomsos), held by MajGen sudi silalahi.

LtGen sugiono and both of Bambang Yudhoyono's assistants, as welr as a range ofother military top brass, were present at a meeting in Jakarta on 19 February 7999between General Wiranto and a large delegation of pro.integration East Timorese ledby Domingos Soares [3]. They had come to ask for weapons.l32

Bambang Yudhoyono is often portrayed as an intellectual and a reformer. But heis also a nationalist, who felt offended by foreign pressure on Indonesia's humanrights policy in East Timor and elsewhere.ls After the withdrawal from East Timor hedefended the TNI against allegations that it had committed crimes against humanityby presenting what had happened in East Timor as far less serious than Rwanda,Bosnia or the Nazis in world war II. 'There is a conspiracy, an intemational move-ment... to comer Indonesia by taking up the issue,'he said. A western joumalist whohad covered some of those other tragedies commented: 'The tragedy of East Timor isindeed as bad as anything I witnessed in Africa. when it comes to slaughter, theRwandans and the Somalis have a new competitor on the block.,rs

He was appointed Mines Minister in the new Abdurrahman wahid cabinet (octo-ber 1999), and then became coordinating Minister for politics and security in thereshuffle of August 2000. under international pressure, he took responsibility forattempting to reign in the East Timor militias in West Timor after some of them killedwestem aid workers early the following month. After at first denying they still ex-isted,ls he took some action to disarm the militias.

Background

susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was born n 1949 in East Java, the son of a retiredlieutenant. He graduated from the military academy rn'l9Zg, and is married to thedaughter of 'Red Beret'commander Col sarwo Edhie, who commanded the miritaryoperation to ensure 'success' during the 1969 Act of Free Choice in lrian Jaya.

1,57

158 Mnsters of Teror

He took part in Operation Seroja, the invasion of East Timor, and had several

tours of duty there since, including commanding the Dili-based battalion 744 some

time in the 1970s.136 Much of his career has been with Kostrad airbome units. tn the

1980s and 90s he took several military courses in the US (as well as an MA in businessmanagement from Webster University) and in Europe. Has travelled widely on ob-

server missions around the world, including Chief Military Observer in Bosnia 1995-

95. In the 1980s he lectured at the staff command college (Seskoad), and he has writtenseveral books. In the mid-1990s he worked in territorial commands in Jakarta and

then in southem Sumatra (Pangdam IIl Sriwijaya). He was aPPointed Chief of the

Armed Forces Social and Political Affairs Staff (Kassospol Abri) n 1997, and retiredfrom active service on 1 April 2000. Observers regard him as a Wiranto protege.l3z

LtCol(InO Sigit YLJWONO

District military commander of Belu, based in Atambua (West Timor) (Dandim 1605)

As the executive chairman of a committee to handle East Timor refugees (Kefua

Pelaksana LJrusan Pengungsi Timtirn), he was one of the key organisers, at the WestTimor end, of the forced exodus of East Timorese into West Timor after the ballotresult was announced. He said the refugees had come because in East Timor theywere being 'terrorised, intimidated, and killed'.rs While 600 vehicles a day werecrossing the border at Motaain, he complained of a shortage of vehicles.l3e

The Key Suspects [31

Previously recommended for prosecution and/or indicted in Indonesia [3]

K=KPP-HAM report; D= Dunn report; A=Attorney-General's report

MartinusBERE KALaksaur militia leader, Suai

KPP HAM listed him in the executive summary of its report for his involvement inthe Suai church massacre of 5 September 1999. However, his name did not appear inthe final report - perhaps because the militia he helped lead was listed in its entirety inAppendix SHe is said to be from (Indonesian) West Timor and to have been a teacherin Suai. The Indonesian Attorney General's Department initially also listed him, butthen dropped him from the list to be prosecuted in April 2001 'because we haven'tbeen able to find them'.r

Edmundo CONCEICAO E Silva KADistrict head (bupati) Lautem (t ospalos)

Edmundo Conceicao was 53 in 1999. He is the son of a local king (Raja MoroLautem). When Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos Horta were awarded the Nobel PeacePrize in 1996,he led a delegation to Jakarta to pledge loyalty to lndonesia.2

In August 1997 he presided at a 'traditional ceremony' where arrested pro-inde.pendence youth were forced to swear an oath to the Indonesian ideology Pancasila, tothe regional government, the armed forces and the church.3

Like several other district heads in East Timor tn1.999, he played a leadership rolein a militia force, Tim Alfa, that inflicted terror on his own population. Tim Alfa wasestablished as long ago as 1986 by a Kopassus officer acting under the instructions ofPrabowo Subianto. Indonesian army documents leaked in October 1998 list Tim Alfatogether with other militias as armed forces staff.a

In 1999 Tim Alfa had 300 members with 300 arms. This exceptionally completearming level indicates a high degree of cooperation with the military (probably throughthe district military commander LtCol Sudrajat [3]. One source said Kopassus gavenew members a bank account with Rp 500,000 (US$60) and a monthly wage.s

Both this militia and another he also led - Jati Merah Putih - have a record ofviolence. Intimidatory anti-independence rallies were held frequently from mid-March1999 onwards. On 14 April 1999 a rally of Tim AIfa and Jati Merah Putih militias led bylocal government officials and Kopassus soldiers toured the Lospalos area threaten-ing those who opposed Indonesia with the same fate as the victims in Liquica on 6April, and that rejecting autonomy meant a refurn to 1975 (the brutal military inva-sion). On 19 April 1999 Edmundo Conceicao said at a rally that any civil servant whosupported CNRTwouldbeseverely dealtwith. The local military cornmander (DandimLospalos, LtCol Sudrajat) said at the same rally that anybody who did not sup-port autonomy would be shot in the head. The rally was followed two days laterby another tour, in which two pro-independence civil servants were picked upand tortured.6

159

150 Masters of Tmor

Another source quotes Edmundo Conceicao telling a campaign meeting: 'Youhave to support integration and autonomy with Indonesia. If you don't, you won't besafe. We'll cut you down with weapons. What will you eat if you're independent? Youcan't even make a sewing needle, and you want to be free.'7

One 15 May 1999, he was the first district head to follow the governor's inshuc-tions to hold rallies to 'socialise' (promote) the autonomy option. Underlining therepressive nature of the campaign, 'socialising the autonomy plan' was everywhereto be done by the district head, local military and police officials acting together.s

Tim Alfa members led by Joni Marquez [4] murdered nine people including twonuns near Lospalos on 25 Septemberl999.

Edmundo Conceicao left East Timor after the Indonesian pull-out, and was inter-rogated by the Indonesian Human Rights Commission in December 1999.e But he didnot respond to further calls for interrogation from the Attomey-General's Depart-ment in May 2000.10 In June 2000 he visited Untaet-controlled East Timor looking fora way to refum to his homeland.tr

Vasco da CRUZ AMahidi militia leader (Mati Hidup Integrasi dengan hndonesia), Suai

Aged 38 in 1999, this man was local police chief in the village of Zumalai near Suai1983-93. After that he became Zumalai village head, a post he retained also afterforming the Mahidi militia in February 1999. Mahidi militias cooperated closely withthe local military - which was corunanded by LtCol Ahmad Masagus [3]. Unametchief Ian Martin questioned local officials over da Cruz'responsibility for two deathson 8 June L999, and several other deaths on 5 April 1999.

Indonesian military sources said he signed a 'truce' agreement with Falintil in theSuai region on 30 june 1999.

He was mentioned in the executive surrunary of the KPP HAM report over hisinvolvement in the Suai church massacre of 6 September 7999. His name did notappear in the final report, but the militia he helped lead does.. The Indonesian Attor-ney General's Department initially had him on their list for prosecution too but thendropped him in April 2001 because other militia witnesses able to testify against him(Martinus Bere [3], Manek [3]) 'could not be found'.l2

MaiGen (In0 Adam DAMIRI KADCommander(pangdam) of militaryrcgion (kodam) Udayana,whichindudesEastTimor

In East Timor in 1999, the military were formally in control of security for only a

few days - between 5 (or 7) September 1999 and the handover to Interfet on 27September 1999. Before that brief period of Indonesian martial law, under the termsof the UN Agreement of 5 May 1999 (elaborated in six 'preconditions' by the UNSecretary General on22May 1999), the military were to 'redeploy', leaving police incharge of security.l3 However, the police remained institutionally part of the military

The Key Suspects [31

at the beginningof 7999, while at the end of the year it had in stages become a moreor less separate organisation.ta The fluidity and lack of transparency in the wholestructure made buck-passing an art form. (lnterestingly, police told Unamet civpolthat before SMay 7999 East Timor was in a state of war and therefore under militaryresponsibility/ something the military never acknowledged.)ls

Operasi Sapu jagad (Operation Clean Sweep), apparently launched in January1999 to kill pro-independence activists, is only known on paper from a single docu-ment signed by a militia leader (Lafaek Saburai [1] on 11 March 1999). Yet it is believedSapu Jagad was an elaborate joint territorial and intelligence operation coordinatedby MajGen Adam Damiri.15 Such a clandestine operation, conducted by a military thatdid not acknowledge it was responsible for security, lay at the heart of the 'dwifungsi'(dual function) security role of the army throughout New Order Indonesia. Its well-practised aim was to exercise power while maintaining deniability.

Evidence that MajGen Adam Damiri and his deputy commander at Udayana,BrigGen Mahidin Simbolon [3], were central to the organisation (training, funding,arming) of the East Timorese militias is circumstancial.

A team of his assistants was reportedly questioned by KPP HAM. They were:r7. LtCol (Cav) Halomoan Chrisman Silitonga: Seconded mid-ranking officer for

regional security, Kodam IX/Udayana (Perwira Bantuan Madya bidangPembinaan Keamanan Wilayah pada Teritorial Kodam IXl Udayana). Silitongagraduated from the military academy in 1983.18

t Mai [nf) Soemartono: Seconded mid-level officer to administration, intelli-gence staff, Udayana command (Perwira Bantuan Madya bidang Administrasipada Staf Intel Kodam IXl Udayana, serial no. M7036)

' Capt (Cav) Gunung Iskandar: Seconded mid-ranking officer for operations,Kodam IX/ Udayana (Perwira Bantuan Madya bidang Operasi pada Staf OperasiKodam IXlUdayana, serial no. 32726).

Damiri himself held numerous meetings with militia leaders, clandestinely as wellas openly, in East Timor as well as in Denpasar, throughout 1999. He defended thesemeetings as a normal part of his territorial duty to keep in touch with societal leaders,or as support for a legally constifuted civil defence organisation.le

On 10 or 12 August 1998 he attended the official launch of the renewed militias ata meeting that included Col Tono Suratman [3], and men who in 1999 were to becomeimportant militia leaders - Ieaq Tavalcq [3], Eurico Guterres [3], and Cancio de Carvalho[1]. Damiri told the meeting they had to organise to protect integration.2o Damiriattended similar meetings in 'late 1998' (another report mentions October 1998) andFebruary 1999, and again told them to set up militias.2l

In January 1999, either just before or after the day that President Habibie an-nounced the independence ballot, MajGen Adam Damiri appointed Eurico Guterreshead of Gardapaksi and gave him money (Rp 50 million, about US$5000 at the time)to revive the organisation that had become dormant after it was first set up in 1994.,2

Guterres boasted to journalists that he took his orders directly from Adam Damiri.ts

761

Masters of Tenor

On 23 February 7999, accompanied by two military officers most deeply impli-cated in the East Timor violence ot1999, MajGen Zacky Anwar Makarim [3] and ColTono Suratman, Damiri visited East Timor resistance leader Xanana Gusmao in his

Jakarta jail cell.'za

In March 1999 Damiri told a luxurious media awareness seminar for militia leadersheld in Bali that Indonesia 'was behind them 100 per cent and would never abandonthem'.6 He was in East Timor immediately before militias launched the first murder-ous attack - against refugees sheltering in the Catholic church in Liquica on 5 April1.999.He told reporters the armed forces had given weapons to a 'limited number'ofpro-Jakarta militia groups, including Joao Tavares.26

In a public ceremony at this same time he installed Herminio da Costa [1] as chiefof staff of the new militia umbrella organisation (PPI). Herminio afterwards toldAmerican joumalist Alan Naim he had been given a licence to kill CNRT leaders byEast Timor police chief Col (Pol) Timbul Silaen [3] and military commander Col Tono

Suratman.2T

After the 6 April 1999 Liquica massacre Damiri engaged in a public polernic withNobel Peace Prize winning Bishop Belo about the number of victims. Damiri said onlyfive had died, whereas Belo believed there were 25. Damiri also blamed the priestRafael, rather than the militias and police and military, for the killings at Liquica, and

did not respond to Belo's complaints that bodies were surreptitiously removed.28

On 17 April 1999 he was present at a large militia rally in Dili at which newlyinstalled militia commander Eurico Guterres urged his followers to 'capfure and kill ifyou need'those who had'behayed integration'. They went on to do precisely that atthe home of Manuel Carrascalao, leaving at least 12 dead. Damiri did nothing.

On 5 May 1999, Damiri received a telegram from newly installed deputy chief ofstaff LtGen Johny Lumintang [3] ordering him to make contingency plans includingthe evacuation of East Timor should the independence option win the ballot.2e

In June 1999 he refused to withdraw his troops to barracks, as the newly arrivedUnamet had requested (based on the latter's interpretation of the word 'redeploy'inthe UN Agreement), because, he said, they were keeping the peace in East Timor.3o

Militia leaders wanting to defect to Untaet a year after the post-ballot mayhemtold journalist Joanna Jolly in October 2000 that Damiri, together with President Habibieand Gen Wiranto [3], were present at a secret meeting in Dili on 20 Augusl 1999.

However, this claim is almost certainly false.3l

On 29 August 1999, on the eve of the ballot, Damiri was in Dili and held meetings

with top military personnel from throughout the territory. Observers noted com-plete police and military inaction in the midst of widespread militia intimidation aroundEast Timor.

On the day the ballot result was announced, 4 Septembet 1999, Damiri signedorders for weapons and supplies to be given to his troops in East Timor. The humanrights organisation Yayasan HAK, which discovered the signed orders, said: 'If these

troops were out of control, why were they being supplied from the highest level?'32

The Key Suspects [31

Questioned by KPP HAM following the post-ballot violence in East Timor, Damirisaid he was responsible for security in East Timor only during the short interval ofmartial law between 5 September (even though martial law was not officially declaredrill 7 September), presumably until 8 September, when MaiGen Kiki Svahnakri [3] wasmade martial law administrator. Syahnakri was responsible directly to Jakarta. This wasthe period of the worst atrocities, perpetrated and supported by the military. (In addi-tion, Damiri had unexpectedly brought a lot of new troops to Dili on 3 September.)33

In December 1999 Damiri was promoted to operational assistant to the armedforces chief of staff (Asops Kasum), at armed forces headquarters in Jakarta. He wasresponsible for troop movements to Aceh.

Background

Adam R Damiri was born on 20 November 7949. He graduated from militaryacademy in1972.By 1997 he had risen to chief of staff of the Jakarta garrison. He wasappointed to command the Udayana region in june 1998 and held the position untilNovember 1999.

MajGen(ret)GARNADI,HR KAssistant Coordinating Minister I (Feisal Tanjung) ,/Home Affairs

As assistant to Coordinating Minister Feisal Tanjung [1], he sat on two teams sentout from Jakarta to Dli to monitor developments in East Timor and liaise with Unamet.(For details of P3TT and P4OKP, see Tanjung.) He was secretary of P4OKP,& anddeputy chairman of P3TT.$ This was the formal institutional home of intelligenceexperts MajGen Zacky Anwar Makarim [3] and BrigGen Glenny Kairupan [3], fwomen who are suspected of having played an active role in organising militias.

He was the author of a secret report to the Coordinating Minister of Politics andSecurity entitled 'The report of the Politics and Security Team in Dili. Subject: GeneralAssessment if Option 1 Loses'dated 3 July 1.999. The report called for a large scalecoordinated plan for evacuation from East Timor and recommended that vital instal-lations or objects be destroyed.36 It was of a preliminary nature, according to thescholar and Unamet officer Geoffrey Robinson.3T The final report of KPP HAM rec-ommended he be investigated for his authorship of this report, which it said proposed'repression and scorched earth' in the event of the first option being rejected.

Gamadi (a military academy graduate of 1965) did not merely write memos. Theso-called Gamadi Document was written from Dili, and there is evidence that heactively organised militias there. One militia source who had come to Java after theIndonesian withdrawal from East Timor named him as one of four such organisers.The others were Col Gerhan Lentara [1], MajGen Sjafrie Syamsuddin [3], andMaiGen Adam Damiri [31.3E He said he was oreoared to testifv in court providedhis safety could be guaranteed. This tends to confirm the suspicion of somehuman rights investigators that the P4OKP team in particular did much morethan merely liaise with lJnamet.3e

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164 Masters of Tenor

LtCol(Pol)HulmanGULTOM ADili police chief (Kapolres Dili)He was appointed Dili police chief on 27 June 1998.{ He does not stand accused of

personal participation in acts of violence. Indeed in May 1999 he gave refuge to hun-dreds of pro-independence refugees fleeing militia violence,ar and made a (weak andvain) attempt to stop Besi Merah Putih militias entering the city at the same time.a2

However, East Timor was not formally under martial rule, and he is thereforeresponsible for failing to halt many acts of violence that occurred in the city through-out 1999, including the militia attack on the house of Manuel Carrascalao that left atleast 12 dead on t7 April, and the sacking of Dili following the announcement of theballot result on 4 September 1999.

Eurico Banos Gornes GUTERRES KAAitarak militia comrvmder, Dili; deputy commandermilitia umbrella organisation PPI

Eurico Guterres was the most prominent militia leader in East Timor in 1999.Hewas always more a street fighter who followed the money than a political player. On10 or 12 August 1998 he and several other men who were to Iead militias in 1999 0oaoTavares [3] and Cancio de Carvalho [1]) met with East Timor military commanderBris-Gen Tono Suratman [3] and Udavana militarv reqion commander Mai-Gen AdamDamiri [3]. The military men told the East Timorese they must organise'to protectintegration'. This was the launching date of an East Timor-wide militia movementdevised over the orevious two months bv Mai-Gen Siafrie Svamsuddin I31 and Mai-Gen Zacky Anwar Makarim [3].s

In January 1999, either just before or after the day that President Habibie an-nounced the independence ballot, MajGen Adam Damiri appointed Eurico Guterreshead of an earlier but now neglected militia organisation called Gardapaksi (orGadapaksi). He gave him Rp 50 million (about US$50fi) at the time) to revive it.s Itwas renamed Aitarak, but most of its members had been in Gardapaksi. Some wereactive members of Kopassus. Leaked Indonesian army documentsas establish thatAitarak was a regular part of the Indonesian armed forces. He boasted to joumaliststhat he took his orders directly from Adam Damiri, and told others he communicatedwith Maj-Gen Zacky Anwar Makarim.6

On 26 February 1999 he and another militia leader, Cancio de Carvalho, faxed a

death threat to Australian journalists in Jakarta intending to cover East Timor. On 30

May 1999 he again threatened to kill Australian joumalists.aT

Throughout 1999 he engaged in numerous acts of violence and intimidation, whilestaying in intimate contact with top Indonesian military and civilian officials. On 25

March 1999 he attended a meeting in Dili with other senior militia leaders includingfoao Tavares, as well as Govemor Abilio Soares [3], and military commander ColTono Suratman. At this meeting Govemor Soares urged that pro-independence nunsand priests should be killed. It was one of several such meetings throughout Februaryand March 1999.

The Key Suspects [31

On 6 April 1999 he was personally involved in the Liquica church massacre. Hewas indicted by a Dili judge for this in his absence in October 2000.

On 17 April 1999 he was recorded on national and international television asinciting his own and thousands of other militiamen from every district in East Timorgathered in a rally of 3-5000 to kill pro-independence supporters. The rally, to launchan anti-independence'cleansing'campaign in Dili, was attended by the governor andall top govemment and military officials in East Timor. At this rally Eurico Guterreswas made deputy commander of the militia umbrella organisation PPI (Pasukan Pro-Integrasi), under Joao Tavares. Playing the role of flamboyant agitator, he deliveredan inflammatory speech urging his men to 'capture and kill if you need' those whohad 'betrayed integration'. His men then attacked the home of Manuel Carrascalao,located next door to Eurico Guterres' Gardapaksi (later Aitarak) Dli headquarters,and left at least 12 dead. He was present while bodies were dumped into the well.4

Afterwards Col Tono Suratman gave Eurico Tavares and Joao Tavares some card-board boxes full of money - which fumed out to be counterfeitl4e

Two days after the murders at Manuel Carrascalao's house, Dili district headDomingos Soares [3] appointed him chief of a 'voluntary civil security force' (PamSwakarsa, also called Kamra) for Dili.s The appointment was little noted at the timebut attracted widespread intemational condemnation when it was confirmed by ColTono Suratman and by East Timor police chief Col (Pol) Timbul Silaen [3] in early june.His Aitarak rnilitia used the police station at Komoro, Dili, as its base. Apart fromGuterres' own record of violence, the appointment contravened the UN Agreement,which made the Indonesian police alone responsible for security in East Timor.

Thereafter Eurico Guterres attended numerous militia rallies around East Timor,which were always well attended by government and military officials. At one suchrally in Atsabae near Maliana at the end of April he admitted having ordered the killingsat Manuel Carrascalao's house, saying the aim was to kill Carrascalao himself.sl

On 10-11 May 99 he led an attack on Quintal Bo'ot village in Santa Cruz, a suburbof Dili, that left several civilians dead.s2

On 24 July 1999, according to one uncorroborated report, Eurico Guterres andMaj-Gen Zacky Anwar Makarim were both present at a secret six-hour meeting ofmilitia and military leaders in Dili to plan action after the ballot. Makarim gave Guterresa list of 370 people to be eliminated, as well as detailed plans to instigate riots, targetand assassinate proindependence leaders, and fully mobilise militias and the armedforces.s3

On 26 August 1999, just four days before the ballot, Guterres told a rally of 15,000in Dili that the city would become a 'sea of fire'if independence was declared. After-wards his mun ki[ed two pro-independence East Timorese while police looked onpassively.sa

In the critical days between 30 August and 6 September 1999 Guterres and his menruled the streets of Dili, and controlled the harbour and ailport, issuing'exit permits'to ensure no pro-independence people escaped his net.

KPP HAM listed his Aitarak militia in its Appendix 5 as among the perpetrators oftwo attacks on church property. On 5 September men in Aitarak uniform but appar-ently led by TNI officer Capt Agus Suwamo attacked the diocesan chambers (Camra

165

't66 Masters of Tenor

Eclesestica), leaving an estimated 25 dead and five wounded. Aitarak D Companycommander Mateus Carvalho allegedly helped lead the attack.

The next day,6 September, Aitarak militiamen and TNI personnel includingKopassus elite troops, totalling about 100 men and allegedly led by Kostrad officers,torched the official residence of Bishop Belo. More than 2,000 refugees sheltering therewere moved first to the police headquarters in Dli and then into Indonesian-conholledWest Timor. At least two people were killed.s

After the Indonesian pullout, he moved to Kupang, where he established a news-paper (Timor File), and the Gema Insan Bumi Lorosae Foundation.

Despite his role in the violence in East Timor both before and immediately after the30 August l999ballot, Eurico Guterres continued to have regular meetings with seniormilitary and civilian government officials, who treated him like a tovernment func-tionary. In June 1999 he was selected by the state party Golkar to stand for election inthe national parliament. In March 2000 he left Golkar for the PDIP, saying this partyhad done more than any other to help keep East Timor within Indonesia. ln August2000 PDIP chairperson Megawati made him chief of Banteng Pemuda, a PDIP security

8rouP.When questioned by KPP HAM in Dec 7999,he was unrePentant about his own

role and blamed President Habibie for the violence in East Timor (through the latter'sdecision to abandon the province).

Although the militias were ostensibly disbanded at a ceremony in December 1999,

in fact the militia command structure remained intact, as was demonstrated by theirsubsequent control over the refugee camPs in West Timor, and their organised pres-ence at the funeral of Moruk [3] in September 2000.

If, overseag Guterres became a symbol of the Indonesian violence in East Timor,within Indonesia he became a national hero of sorts who enjoyed almost completeimpunity. In June and July 2000 police in Kupang charged him for shooting at the tyresof a car, but the judge said he could not decide if Guterres was civilian or military andtherefore dismissed the charge as'vague'.s On 30 August 2000, the anniversary of theEast Timor ballot, Guterres led a violent rally in Kupang at which journalists werebeaten up and windows smashed at the office of the Nusa Tenggara Timur gover-nor.57

In October 2000 a judge in Dili (now under Untaet administration) named EuricoGuterres a suspect for crimes against humanity, issued an arrest warrant and appliedto Indonesia to have him extradited. fakarta refused to extradite Guterres but invitedan Untaet team to come to Jakarta to interview him. However, he refused to meet

Untaet officials who had been permitted to come to jakarta in March 2ff)1.

In the same month (October 20fi)), under considerable intemational pressure (for-eign governments were meeting in Tokyo at the time under the aegis of CGI toconsider fresh loans to tndonesia), police in jakarta put up Eurico Guterres on a weaP-ons charge. The fakarta court initially dismissed the charge on a technicality, but policepersisted and he was eventually (30 April 2001) sentenced to six months'prison. De-spite considerable intemational outrage about the lightness of the sentence, he wasallowed to serve most of it under house arrest in a comfortable Jakarta residence. Hewas released in June 2001.

The Key Suspects [31

Throughout all these proceedings Eurico Guterres had the vocal support of most ofthe political elite, as represented by parliamentary speakers Amien Rais and AkbarTanjung. A PDIP group in Semarang claiming to represent several political partiesawarded him the 'Red and White Award' in November 2000.

In May 2001, while still in 'prison', he was made head of an 'Anti CommunistAlliance' (AAK) that intimidated bookshops around Indonesia to withdraw 'commu-nist' books from its shelves. The alliance was allegedly supported by figures withinGolkar.s8

In October 2000 the Attorney General's Department added his name to an initiallist (April 2000) of 18 men suspected of human rights abuse in East Timor in 1999. Butfollowing pressure on President Wahid by the military, his name was dropped againin May 2001.5e

Background

Eurico Guterres was 27 (some reports say 28) n 7999. He was bom in Uatulari,near Viqueque in eastern East Timor. He explains his pro-lndonesian feelings bysaying his parents were killed by Fretilin, but independent sources say they were infact killed by TNI n 1976 for their pro-Fretilin views. He was brought up by anIndonesian civil servant in Viqueque, then moved to Dili where he did his junior highschool. He could not complete his senior high school education at the Sacred Heart ofJesus Catholic school in Becora, Dili. At this time he became involved in (semi-)crimi-nal and petty gangster activity, especially at the govemment-protected gambling hall(bola guling) at Tacitolu, Dili. He is also thought to have been an activist in the pro-independence clandestine movement Santo Antonio.s

In 1988 military intelligence detained him for his alleged involvement in a plot toassassinate President Suharto, who visited Dili in October of that year. From that timeon he was'fumed' and became an informer for Kopassus. The counter-insurgencyofficer Prabowo Subianto [5] took a special interest in his abilities. He continued as a

double agent for some time, apparently playing a role in the pro-independence pro-tests during the pope's visit in late 1989, but after that he was expelled from themovement. He went to Suai but still could not finish his high school rr:e militarysupposedly arranged a graduation certificate that allowed him to attend the Econom-ics Institute (Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi, STIE) in Dili in 1.997.Here too he com-pleted only three semesters. He is married to the niece of Bishop Nascimento ofBaucau, and has three children.6r

BrigGen(InOAmirulISNAENI DDeputy Assistant for Security to the Army Chief of Staff (Waaspam KSAD); deputy

martial law administrator East Timor (September 1999)

He became deputy assistant to army chief of staff Gen Siswojo [1] in ]anuary 1999.Like two other Subagyo assistants (Kiki Syahnakri [3] and Johny Lumintang [3]),Amirul Isnaeni had substantial East Timor involvement throughout 1999.

Dunn estimated that his involvement in East Timor violence in 1999 may havebeen 'peripheral'.62 However, militia leader Thomas Goncalves said after his April

t57

168 Masters of Tenor

1999 defection that Brig-Gen Amirul was one of those who organised the militia effort

in East Timor.63 He is reported to have accompanied Zacky Anwar [2] and Kikisyahnakri to East Timor 20 April 1999 on a secret mission, probably liaising withpro-integration militias.6a

When martial law was declared in East Timor on 8 September L999, Arnirul was

appointed Deputy Martial Law Commander in East Timor (wakil Panglima Penguasa

Darurat Militer Timor Timur) under Kiki Syahnakri. This was a time when Kiki was

actively directing the activities of the militias.6

Background

Amirul Isnaeni was bom in about 1952.He graduated from the military academyin 1975.6 His career has been with Kopassus, including an anti-insurgency stint inAceh in the early 1990s. In 1995 he commanded the Kopassus intelligence task force

sGI in East Timor. After holding a territorial command in java (Korem 071 based in

Purwokerto - a reward for helping Prabowo release hostages in Irian ]aya in i995) he

was appointed to command the Army lntelligence Centre in 1998 (Dan Pusintelad).57

He was promoted to comrnander (danjen) of Kopassus in fune 2000.58

Brig-Gen (Infl Glenny KAIRUPAN D

Officer in TNI headquarters without clear job description

Glenny Kairupan was'security advisor', with MajGen Zacky Makarim [3], to the

Dili-based Special Committee for the East Timor Ballot (Satgas Panitia Penentuan

Pendapat Timor Timur, P3TT). This team was accredited to liaise with Unamet.However, KPP HAM suspected the team did more than merely liaise. It was aP-

pointed in May 7999 and began its work early in funs.e zozt

What few details we know about Glenny Kairupan's activities in 1999 all revolve

around his role in organising militia violence. On 18 June he took part in a meetingat the Dili military headquarters (Korem) together with his superiors MajGen ZackyMakarim, Army Chief of Staff operations assistant MaiGen Kiki Syahnakri [3], Koremcommander Col Tono suratman [3], and several militia leaders. The meeting alleg-

edly drew up two comprehensive contingency plans. One attempted to derail the

vote, either during the three month run-uP period or on polling day in August,

through coordinated violence. A second, far more complex, contingency plan was

prepared in case the vote was held and went against Indonesia. This involved using

the militias to reject the results and to demand that East Timor be partitioned, withthe western districts (particularly Covalima, Bobonaro and Ambeno) remainingwith Indonesia. Additional measures called for the forced relocation of the local

population across the border into West Timor, so that there would be no populationto object, and potentially flooding non-East Timorese back across the border torepopulate these regions. These plans were ambitious, indeed partially unrealistic,but they lie at the root of the post-referendum events.72

one disaffected militia leader who later acknowledged that Glenny Kairupan

was among the rnilitary officers who organised the militias was Tomas Goncalves.Ts

Kairupan was said to have a very good understanding of the political configuration

The Key Suspects I3l

of East Timor dating from his earlier tenure there, but, being less well known thanZacky or Kiki, he was less likely to attract media attention.Ta

On 30 August, the day of the ballot, Glenny Kairupan took part in a similar meet-ing, again attended by his team mates Zacky Makarim and Kiki Syahnakri, and heldat the official residence of military commander Tono suratman. The meeting decidedthat a 'very big riot' would break out at the moment of the ballot result announce-ment, then scheduled for 7 September (see Kiki Syahnakri).?s

On 2 September, in the lull before the storm he and his colleagues were about tounleash, Kairupan told the Indonesian Protestant newspaper suara Pembaruan thatwhat the confused people of East Timor most needed at this time of crisis was 'thereligious touch of a spiritual leader', rather than more political talk. 'I greatlyregret that Bishop Belo has until now not held any special masses to pray forpeace,' he added.26

Background

Bom in 1949, Glenny Kairupan graduated from the '1972 class of the militaryacademy (Akabri) in Magelang. He was deputy commander of the East Timor com-mand (Korem '164/ r{jra Dharma) in 1995, but was unexpectedly passed over ascommander by Mahidin Simbolon.z One source says he has a Kopassus backgroundand maintains his links there. Enjoyed some US haining while a Lieutenant (initially asa helicopter pilot). He is regarded as a hardliner.

LtCol(EngineeringCorps)LiIikKUSHADIYANTO(Kushardiyanto) ADistrict rnilitary commander of Covalima, based in Suai (Komandan Kodim 1635)

LtCol Lilik Kushadiyanto was appointed to the Suai command on 29 August 1999,just a day before the ballot, taking over from LtCol Ahmad Masagus [3]. He wasremoved on 8 September 7999, the day on which the massacre at the Suai churchoccurred. He was responsible, as the military officer responsible for security in Suaiunder the terms of the UN agreement, for security. The Suai church massacre of 8September 1999 was directed by soldiers under his command (see Lt Sugito [3]).

Rui Lopes, a militia leader in Suai, told a private television station in Jakarta on 12September 1999 that the day before the ballot result was announced he had taken partin a district level meeting at the house of the district head (bupati) in Covalima. He saidthe bupati (Col Herman Sediono, [3]) and the district military commander (presum-ably Lilik Kushadiyanto) were present and conveyed orders that the militias were toburn down Covalima, drive Unamet out and drive all the local residents into WestTimor. This is precisely what happened.ru

It seems the Suai command retumed to LtCol Ahmad Masagus on the day of themassacre.

During his nine-day stint as district military commander of Covalima he retainedhis position as chief of intelligence staff in the Bali-based Udayana regional militarycommand that covers East Timor.

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170 Masters of Tanor

Soon after the Indonesian pull-out from East Timor, he retumed to his intelligencepost in Bali, from whence he assisted the newly installed martial law administratorMajGen Kiki Syahnakri [3], regarded as one of the architects of the army's East Timorstrategy. Lr September 2fi)0 his lawyers said in his defence that his appointment as Suai

commander had never been formalised, but Attomey-General's Department officers

have implied that his actions in suai may have been part of his intelligence role.

Lilik Kushadiyanto played a liaison role with Interfet troops on the border withEast Timor in November 1999. He is an army engineer (zeni).n

Bom in about 1953, t ilik Kushadiyanto graduated from the military acaderrry in 1975.

Col (InOIrwanKUSNADI D

Commander, combat Sector A (eastern sector)

He commanded the eastem combat sector as the scorched earth policy was beingimplemented in East Timor following the ballot. He had at least two battalions underhis comrnand in East Timor: 40L and 432 (commanded respectively by LCol Sukoso

[2], and Maj Uriyanto [2]). These were among the last to leave, and mustbe suspected

of having taken part in the deportation and destruction of East Tirnor.e

After the ballot, he served with Col Gerhan Lentara [l](the Dili sector commander

and another Kostrad Airbome Brigade Commander) under the martial law adminis-

trator MajGen Kiki Syahnakri [3].61

At some time in 1999, probably before Kusnadi, this post was also held by Col

Sunarko ([1] - a list of subordinate officers in Sector A is also there).82

Background

He commanded various Koshad combat units in East Timor in the 1990s. In 1995

he was Commander of Battalion 432 (though another source has him as commander

of Battalion,l33, which with 432 was a part of the 3'd Airbome Brigade, and which was

involved in santa Cruz and played a major role in East Timor for a long time). In 1999

he doubled up the command of combat sector A with Commander, 3'd Airbornetnfantry Brigade (Dan Brigif Linud). Although a Kostrad unit, based in Makassar, the

brigade had rather close connections with Kopassus.&

After East Timor he and his 3d Brigade went to Ambon. In 2000, while commander

of Ambon Sector A (Ambon city and surrounds) he retained the Airbome InfantryBrigade command. He was also Commander of the Kostrad Battalion 303.84 He was

shot in the head on 18 May 2000, seriously injuring him.s Many men from his Battal-

ion 303 were sent to Irian Jaya in November 20fi) to 'maintain order and national

unity,.e In 2001, apparently recovered, he became Border security Task Force Com-mander in West Timor, with responsibility for the East Timor border. He oversaw

three battalions of about 2000 soldiers.ET

The Key Suspects 131

LtCol (Infl Asep KUSWANI (Kuswadi, Kuswandi, Kuswanto, Kuswaya) ALiquica district military commander (Komandan Kodirn 1638 Liquica)This officer (serial no. 29468,1982 military academy graduate) was appointed to

the Liquica district command on L october 7997.He was the highest military author-ity in the district at the time of the attack against about 2,000 pro-independencerefugees sheltering in the Catholic church in Liquica on 5 April 7999. A Dili courtcharged him with crimes against humanity over this event in November 200188.

The attack was conducted by members of the Besi Merah Putih militia, mobilepolice (Brimob), members of 143 Battalion stationed at Kuswani's district headquar-ters, as well as territorial soldiers under his command. It left 59 named individualsdead, according to human-rights reports. An eyewitness, local priest Rafael dos santos,said that soldiers of Kuswani's territorial command took part in the shooting, and thatthe BMP militia withdrew to his headquarters after the massacre. An Australian em-bassy report on the massacre accused the military of at least colluding in the lead-upto the incident, and of failing to stop the killing. It said Asep 'Kuswanto' was 'said to bein the town but not actively involved in the events at the church'.8e

The attack on 5 April followed an earlier attack the previous dap in which sevenpeople were wounded by BMP militias. After that earlier attack, jailed East Timorresistance leader Xanana Gusmao had issued a call to the East Timorese to take stepsto defend themselves against the civilian militias.

The Besi Merah Putih militia had been formed in Liquica on 8 January 1999. It wasled by Manuel de sousa [3]. Pro-independence sentiment was strong in the town. Byearly February the militia had caused hundreds (some reports said thousands) of localresidents to flee to Dili.s

On 13 March a confrontation between BMP and thousands of local dernonstratorsbroke out after the priest Rafael dos Santos'robes were stained with blood because hehelped a man injured by the militias. According to rumour, Rafael himself had beeninjured.el Asep Kuswani was among a committee of local government officials inLiquica (Muspida) who listened politely to community protest about the BMp brutal-ity, but did nothing to rein it in.e

Kuswani, while not mentioned in the executive surrunary, was recorrunended forfurther investigation in Appendix 5 of the final KPP HAM report. The Attorney-General's Department made him a suspect in the Liquica massacre, but in september2000 he gave no explanation for not attending an interrogation.e3

soldiers apparently under his command also recommended in Appendix 5 of theKPP HAM report for investigation for crimes against humanity over the Liquicamassacre are:

' Lt Fransiscus Asisi Ali Baba. Lt Damianus Dapa

' 2d Sgt Yakobus, Kodim staff, from Atambua in West Timor. 1st Sgt Tome Maria Goncalveso 1't Sgt Raimundo Cesario. 1't Corp Abilio Martins

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172 Masters of Toror

' 1't Corp Antonio Gomes [Lopes?]

' 1s Corp Tobias [dos Santos]. 2d Pvt Domingos Askopas. Antonio Kopas. Jacinto Pereiraea

. Alberto

' Teofilio

' Other individuals listed in Appendix 5 over the Liquica massacre (withoutaffiliation) are Victor [Ediri?], Domingos Mendeg Venancio, Boaventura dos Santos,Tome Diogo, Manuel Marques, Agusto Freitas Martins, Afonso de Jesus, Zacarias

Correia, Isak, Tomi, and Jacob.

After the Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor he assumed command in the

military dishict of Sikka, Flores.es

LtGenJohnyJosephusLUMINTANG KDeputy Army Chief of Staff (Wakasad)

Nine days after Lumintang became deputy army chief of staff, President Habibie

announced to the world that East Timor could have a referendum on independence.

Whether or not Lumintang knew about this in advance, it presumably became one ofhis major responsibilities.

On 5 May 1999 he signed a secret order sent to the Udayana Kodam Commander(Maior-General Adam Damiri [3]), the military region that included East Timor. The

letter ordered its recipients to: 1. Be ready to confront all possibilities in the choice ofoptions for the East Timorese; 2. Prepare a security plan with the aim of preventing

the outbreak of civil war including preventative action (creation of conditions), police

actions, repressive/ coercive actions as well as plans for evacuation if the second

option eventuated.%

Lumintang was recorrunended for further investigation in the the final report ofKPP HAM inquiry for having issued an order in the name of the Army Chief of Staff

that was the basis for the forced mass evacuation after the ballot.e KPP HAM inter-

viewed him (for 20 minutes!) on this issue on 23 December 1999. Albert Hasibuan,

who led the investigation, said that Lumintang was not actually one of the'targets'ofthe KPP HAM, to which the Kompas editor added: because as Deputy Army Chief ofStaff he was not closely involved in operational activities in East Timor. Kompas te-

ported that the telegram was written by Lumintang in the name of the Army Chief ofstaff (Gen subagyo HS[1]). Lumintang confirmed its existence but said it was an

intemal military document. Hasibuan said Lumintang had claimed that the evacuees

referred to in the telegram included only TNI members and their families, but the KPP

HAM appears to have made no issue at all of the other parts of the telegram.e8

In March 2000 he was presented with a case against him by several East Timorese

at a US District Court in Washington for gross violations of human rights in 1999. The

The Key Suspects I3l

case was heard in March 2001. Lumintang did not appear. He was convicted in Sep-tember 2001 and ordered to pay US$ 55 million to six plaintiffs - a ruling the Indone-sian Foreign Minister imrnediately said would be ignored (see the contribution byRichard Tanter in this volume).e

Background

Johny Lumintang is a Protestant bom in Menado, northem Sulawesi, n 1947. Hegraduated from the military academy n 1970. In his 20s and early 30s he was aninfantry commander in Irian Jaya and then East Timor. He was involved in the inva-sion of East Timor in7975 and the brutal pacification campaign in the four years thatfollowed.

There is little information about his activities in the 1980s but it is known that heundertook some training in the US in 1987 and again, under the IMET program, in1990.100 After heading Kostrad's 18th Airbome Infantry Brigade from 1990 to 1992 herose quickly through the ranks to become military comrnander of East Timor (1993-94) and n 1,996 commander of the Trikora military region encompassing Irian Jayaand the Moluccas.

Six months prior to Suharto's resignation he moved to Jakarta to take up theimportant position of Assistant for Operations to the Armed Forces Chief of Staff forGeneral Affairs. Amid the drama of May 1998, Lumintang was installed as head ofKostrad to replace the disgraced Prabowo.10l Dissatisfaction in Habibie's govern-ment that a Christian identified in the past with Benny Murdani could hold such apowerful position saw Lumintang removed 17 hours later and transferred to Bandungto head the Armed Forces Staff and Command School (Sesko ABRI/TNI). ln ]anuary1999 he replaced Fachrul Razi in the number two man in the army, the Deputy ArmyChief of Staff (Wakasad), where he remained until November'1999.

Lumintang then became the governor of the National Defence Institute(Lemhannas) - which some saw as a slight given his operational experiencelo2 - and inFebruary 2001 was appointed as Secretary General of the Defence Department. Presi-dent Abdurrahman Wahid saw him as an ally when, on the eve of his impeachment inJuly 2001, he sought in vain to have Lumintang installed as Deputy Commander ofthe Armed Forces.

MajGenZackyAnwarMAKARIM KDSecurity advisor to lndonesian govemment task force P3TT

MajGen Zacky Anwar Makarim was the most senior military officer in East Timor,yet he had no real job description known to the public in1.999. What is known abouthis role is pieced together from scattered news clippings and the accounts of disaf-fected militia leaders.

Together with Mahidin Simbolon [3l,7.acky Makarim was mentioned in August1998 as 'the army's most experienced officers in covert operations' and 'two of themen most intimately involved in East Timor in recent months.lo3 The Dunn reportclaims he and MajGen Sjafrie Syamsuddin [3] were in July to September 1998 already

t73

174 Masters of Terror

planning a militia shategy to counter the post-New Order surge of independencedemands in East Timor.lu Zacky was at the time head of the military intelligencebody BIA.

When he was replaced as BIA chief in ]anuary 1999 by LtGen Sudarto [3], an officerregarded as close to armed forces chief General Wiranto [3], some saw it as part ofWiranto's strategy to remove from positions of influence officers still loyal to dis-rnissed former Kopassus commander LtGen Prabowo Subianto l5l. Zacky after thathad only a hazy formal job description - he was usually described as a senior officer at

Abri headquarters (Pati Mabes Abri).105 However, it should not be concluded that hisactivity in EastTimor in 1999 was thereforenon-instifutionalor'rogue'.Zacky Makarimremained part of a military institution that, for all its arcane officer cliques and infight-ing, was united in its determination to prevent East Timor from breaking free.

One Indonesian magazine disparagingly called his methods 'Malay intelligence'(intel melayu) - low-tech terror and intimidation.rtr Nevertheless, low-tech or not,Abri's model for achieving that aim was Ali Murtopo's successful hijacking of the UNballot in Irian Jaya in 1969.

ln 1999 he shuttled energetically between East Timor and jakarta, and travelledthroughout East Timor as well. Only a few dates are known from this itinerary.

On 23 February 7999 he and two other senior officers (Damiri [3] and Sudarto) metEast Timorese resistance leader Xanana Gusmao in his Jakarta jail cell. It was the firstof many such meetings, aimed at persuading Xanana to participate on their terms.107

After one such meeting in late July, Zacky told Xanana: 'l can't accept losing East Timor.'Xanana in tum said he knew Zacky so well he could 'foresee all his strategies'.tm

Zacky arrived in Dili (but was it the first time tn 1.999?) on 14 April 1999.18 Threedays later he attended the militia show of force in Dili at which Eurico Guterres [3]urged his followers to kill pro.independence supporters - they went out to do pre-cisely that, leaving at least twelve dead. Three days later again he accompanied adelegation of senior officers in Dili - Siswojo, Kiki Syahnakri [3], Sudarto, police chiefRoesmanhadi, and armed forces commander Gen Wiranto. The delegation dined atlength with pro'Indonesian militia leaders.rl0

On 1L May 1999 he at last acquired a 'reason' for being in East Timor. CoordinatingMinister for Politics and Security Feisal Tanjung [1] established a team known by theabbreviation P4OKT (Satgas Pengamanan Pensuksesan Penentuan Pendapat OtonomiKhusus Timtim, Team to Secure and Make a Success of the East Timor Special Au-tonomy Ballot). Zacky was a member of it. On 17 May, with Unamet quickly becom-ing a reality, another team was established, with a stronger Foreign Affairs Depart-ment presence, known by the abbreviation P3TT (Satgas Panitia Penenfuan PendapatTimor Timur, Special Committee for the East Timor Ballot). Z-acky was its 'securityadvisor' - a position formalised for him in a letter of appointment from armedforces chief Gen Wiranto. He arrived in Dili (again!) to take up this post on 4 June.His job was to liaise with Unamet on security matters, but his schedule suggestshe did much more.rrl

The Wiranto letter made Zacky responsible directly to the armed forces chief. Onecommentator concluded that at this point, coinciding with the arrival of Unamet in

The Key Suspects [31

Dili, control over the militias was no longer solely in the hands of the territorialcomrnander Damiri, but was now shared, through Zacky, with the armed forcescommander in |akarta, Gen Wiranto.1l2 His deputy in P3TT was BrigGen GlennyKairupan [31.

However, Zacky's activism in East Timor before 4 June makes the Wiranto letterappear more like a cover than a change of shategy. The militia strategy had beenrunning for more than six months by that stage - it was a mainstream Indonesiangovemment project. It was implemented by means of close coordination between theterritorial structure in East Timor and in Jakarta, as well as with the special forces andintelligence strucfures. 7-acky was almost certainly an important cog in that coordina-tion effort throughout 1999.

Unamet chief executive Ian Martin said in his book said he regarded Zacky as thekey person on P3TT to answer queries about the militias. The answer always legiti-mated the militias as Wanra, Kamra or Pam Swakarsa - civil defence units attached tothe police or civil government. About the intemational displeasure with Zacky afterparticularly egregious incidents in Maliana and Suai in the days just before the ballot,Martin wrote:

The gap between the stated intentions of the government in jakarta and thereality in East Timor had become more glaring than ever. The US delegation's [avisiting congressional group led by Tom Harkin] angry report to Habibie in Jakartaled him to order the withdraw al of Zacky , and the Bobonaro and Cova Lima districtcommanders were at last replaced. However Zacky rcappeared in Maliana on 28August, and the Bobonaro commander was seen again in the post-ballot violencethere, casting doubt on whether their roles were effectively ended.113

During a high-powered ministerial visit led by Feisal Tanjung on 12 July, GenWiranto reportedly criticised Zacky and his deputy Glenny Kairupan for inadequatelycontrolling the militias, who were embarrassing the Indonesian military abroad.Wiranto was here reflecting President Habibie's concerns.rla

We have only snippets about what he did during these tours of East Timor. Onesaid that he influenced a newspaper proprietor to drop an objectionable senior editorfrom the territory's only daily.115 Another said that he helped governor Abilio Soares

[3] set up the pro-Indonesian political party Partai Nasional Timor (PNT) in mid-June.116 Herminio da Costa [1], chief of staff of the militia umbrella organisation PPI,said Zacky was a 'very good friend', as was Gen Wiranto. He added that the army andpolice in East Timor, with Jakarta's approval, had formally guaranteed that the mili-tias would not be prosecuted for assassinating pro-independence figures.ll7

Zacky lravelled all over East Timor, holding meetings with pro-independencefigures including militia leaders, and encouraging them to engage in both 'political'and 'physical' tactics to ensure success in the ballot. These meeting were held either inthe dishict rnilitary command or in the office of the civilian dishict head (bupati).118

One such meeting (or were there two on the same day?) was rather well docu-mented. It was held on 26July 1999 in the Kopassus 'Red House' in Baucau. One reportsaid the secret meeting brought Zacky and East Timor commander Col Tono Suratman

[3] together with several military dishict commanders as well as commanders of the

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176 Masters of Tetror

militias Tim Saka and Sera. On the agenda: distribution of weapons to militias, and a

'civil war' scenario in the event of the autonomy option losing.lle

Another report described a meeting on the same day in the same town in whichZ,acky led a 'general coordination meeting' that brought together civilian govemmentofficials from the provincial as well as the district levels. It is not clear if these officialswere literally from all over East Timor or perhaps only from its eastem part. Provin-cial-level pro-integration representatives were also present. From there, the districtheads (bupatis) were expected to disseminate the information to lower officials intheir own district.l2o

Zacky himself told KPP HAM, (not directly in relation to this alleged meeting) thatmilitia weapons were stored in various military barracks, and could be taken backwhen needed.l2r

The moment when they were needed, according to Eurico Guterres, was after the

ballot results were announced. According to testimony, Zacky , who realised on 30

August that the result would go against Indonesia, began to work intensively on a

plan for the destruction of East Timor. Human Rights Commissioner Albert Hasibuansaid Zacky was present at a meeting in Dili between Indonesian military intelligenceand militia leaders, where the order was given to destroy all buildings and kill all thepro-independence leaders if the result favoured independence.r22

Hasibuan did not reveal the date of this meeting. But another report issued on 1

September 1999 said that Zcky and his colleague MajGen Sjafrie Syamsuddin (newlyarrived from operations in Aceh) were at that moment leading a 'marathon' session

to make a 'scorched earth'plan for East Timor in the likely event of a vote favouringindependence. At that moment the results were expected to be announced on 7 Sep-tember. Besides these two major-generals, the meeting involved 'a number' of offic-ers of brigadier-general and colonel rank.lB

A British newspaper reported that Zacky had initiated planning for the destruc-

tion of East Timor on 31 August, the day after the ballot. The plan Zacky outlined thatday to military officers of East Timor, and to the leaders of three of its biggest militias,corresponded in detail with what actually happened. The militias were to put Diliunder siege, seek out pro-independence people, women and children were to be

trucked out, and joumalists and the UN were to be forced out.12a

These reports, incidentally, make it clear that the high level intemational protests

against Zacky had not resulted in his replacement at P3TT by Gen Tyasno Sudarto [3],as one newspaper claimed. Tyasno never arrived. Zacky did briefly refum to Jakarta,but he was soon back in East Timor again. Indeed, he was joined by another intelli-gence officer as senior as he, MajGen Sjafrie Syamsuddin.ls

After the destruction of East Timor, Tacky gave what one human rights lawyercalled'mystical'answers to KPP HAM questions about his conduct in East Timor. Hedid not know, for example, to whom he was reporting.126

Back in Jakarta,Zacky was appointed head of a TNI headquarters team to arrangelegal defence against charges that he was most to be blamed for the mayhem in East

Timor.r27 He hired the most expensive and highest profile Iawyers in the country

The Key Suspects [3]

(formercabinet minister Muladi, formerhuman rights lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution,and corporate lawyers Ruhut Sitompoel and Hotma Sitompoel). Their efforts werecrowned with success. Zacky's name did not appear on the Attomey-General's list ofsuspects for the East Timor mayhem.

He told investigators P3TT had done a good job at securing the ballot, but thatpeople were simply violent. Unamet had supplied weapons to Falintil, he said, andUnamet's cheating had occasioned the violent reaction.lts

As at October 2000, he remained at headquarters, still without a job definition.t2e

Background

Zacky Makarim was born on 14 April 194tt in jakarta. He graduated from in 1971

from the military academy. He has spent most of his career in Kopassus, includingtours of combat duty in East Timor and Irian Jaya, increasingly in an intelligence role.By 1997 he had risen to head of BIA, the armed forces intelligence agency. He held thispost until January 1999.

After Suharto's resignation in May 1998 he was questioned over his role in severalcases of military human rights abuse. A joint government-civil society comrnission(TPGF) interrogated him over his role in the kidnapping of activists, the murder ofstudents, and the instigation of the riots in Jakarta the previous May. In November 1999

he was questioned by a special parliamentary committee (Pansus) about abuses com-mitted when he was in Aceh n1991-92. And in October 2000 he was named a suspect forhis role in the attack on the headquarters of the political party PDI in July 1995.

IgidioMANEK(Izidio) KADeputy commander Laksaur militia, Suai

Eyewitnesses to the massacre at the Suai Catholic church on 5 September L999 saythat Igidio Manek (30), Laksaur militia deputy commander in Suai, was the one whoactually murdered Father Hilario Madeira, one of three priests killed that day. Theysay he shot him in the chest, then trod on his body. The attack was led by LtColHerman Sediono [3] and Lt Sugito [3]. Several other Laksaur militia members werealso indicted for the same massacre. Soldiers standing outside the church compoundshot refugees trying to flee, and took away the bodies afterwards.

tn July 1999, according to the East Timor human rights group Yayasan Hak, Manekand his militia tried to prevent villagers in the Suai area from collecting baptismalcerbificates from the church that would allow them to register with Unamet in ad-vance of the ballot.ts

Yayasan Hak also said that on 5 April 1999, Manek and his militia, together withsoldiers at the Tilomar local headquarters (Koramil) where both were stationed, ar-rested and tortured five named civilians and held them for two days, for unclearreasons. Two days later they arrested and tortured four other named civilians, andtook them to the Covalima military headquarters (Kodim 1635 Covalima).l3l

After the Indonesian pull-out he moved to Atambua just across the border in WestTimor, where he wielded considerable influence over the refugee population.

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178 Masters of Terror

Indonesian prosecutors who had made him a suspect for the church massacre failedto interrogate him because they were 'unable to find him' there in May 2000. YetIndonesian soldiers presented him to westem journalists in Atambua on 18 April2000. Manek had in the meantime been accused by East Timorese human rightsgroups of kidnapping and raping a 16year old girl, juliana dos Santos, after killing herbrother in Suai. He used this opportunity to defend himself by saying she was willinglyhis wife.

On 5 September 2000, following a 'mourning' ceremony for the anti-Indonesianvote exactly a year earlier led by JoaoJ[avares [3], Manek and other members of hisfamily, as well as the Bere family (MarHnus-Bcrc-[3]) were prominent in an attackagainst fellow Laksaur militia man Olivio Moruk [3]. Moruk, who was also a suspectin the Suai church massacre, died in the attack. In fum, Moruk's enraged supportersthen vented their anger on the local office of the UNHCR in Atambua, leading to thedeaths of three foreign workers. This in tum led to intemational anger and to the pull-out of UNHCR from West Timor.132

By April2001 Indonesian prosecutors had dropped him from their list'because wehaven't been able to find them.']s However, in fuly 2001 Indonesian police arrestedManek and 22 of his followers in Atambua, West Timor, after his gang killed a soldierduring a massive brawl there.rs

LeonitoMARTINS KADistrict head (bupati) of Liquica

Leonito Martins comes from Vatuboro village near Liquica. He completed highschool education under the Portuguese, then went on to an academy for bureaucratsin Jakarta (APDN) after the Indonesian annexation. Upon graduation he was aP-

pointed subdistrict head in Maubara, before becoming Liquica district head or regent.

Martins worked closely with civil servant Manuel de Sousa [3] to establish Liquica'sBesi Merah Putih militia in December 1998. Martins was the advisor, and de Sousa didthe work. The militia was supported from its formation by military intelligence SGI

and the local military command. Its purpose was to respond to the increasingly vigor-ous push for independence by the CNRT, also in Liquica. Maubara was BMP's mainbase. This was the first of many new militias formed around the territory. 'The BMPsucceeded in seizing Liguica back from CNRT conhol,'Martins said proudly, reveal-

ing the warlike way in which he viewed the ballot. 'Thousands of CNRT members fledto the forest, where they plotted their chance to seize Liquica back.'

Orders for BMP raids on surrounding villages were often given jointly by I-eonitoMartins and Manuel de Sousa, for example in May 1999.1s Despite promises to dis-band the BMP, given after thousands of East Timorese demonstrated in front of hishouse in March 1999 following militia threats against a priest, he did nothing to con-trol militia violence in Liquica.ltr

He also refused to listen to appeals from priests to stop the militia violence thatculminated in the massacre in the Liquica church on 6 April 1999. A Dli court chargedhirn with crimes against humanity over this event in November 2001.137 Despite the

The Key Suspects [31

great loss of life in an area under his jurisdiction, no action was taken against LeonitoMartins by his superior, govemor Abilio Soares [3].138

Jose Afat, as sub-district head (camat) of Maubara one of his subordinatet wasdirectly implicated in the 6 April massacre.r3e This man was also responsible for deathsand injuries when on 23 February 1999 he personally shot into a crowd of hundreds ofvillagers who had accepted an invitation to come to a meeting at Guiso (Guico) village.l4

Leonito Martins also supported another militia group, called Pana and based in hishome village of Vatuboro. This group, led by Graciano Filipe, had connections with anearlier militia known as Gadapaksi, established in 1995 by Prabowo [5]. Like BMP, thisgroup also launched many attacks on villages, assisted by territorial soldiers, andhelped cause the refugee crisis in Liquica.tat

On 12 June 1999 Leonito Martins attended a meeting of military and militia ieadersat which plans were discussed to forcibly evacuate women and children to WestTimor.ra2

In September 2000 he gave no explanation for failing to appear for questioning atthe Attorney-General's Department in relation to his involvement in the East Timorviolence of '1999.18

LtCol(InOAhmadMASAGUS KDMilitary district commander of Covalima, based in Suai (Komandan Kodim

Covalima,/ Suai 1535)

He was (de facto if not de jure) responsible for security in Suai throughout 1999.Unamet Chief Executive Ian Martin writes that he called for his removal following a

visit to the area on 18 August'1999, because he and his men were'contributing torather than addressing the impunity of the militia, some of whom were servingmembers of the TNI. .... I now wrote to [head of Indonesian Task Force AmbassadorAgusl Tarmidzi and CMLO Rezaq to [MajGen] Zacky [Anwar Makarim] [3], listingnames which included the district commanders in Bobonaro and Cova Lima.'1a

The Australian observer James Fox wrote: 'The local military commander sta-tioned in Covalima, who was the chief organiser of the campaign of violence in thedistrict, was reputed to be among the most vicious local commanders in East Timor.'145

It is not yet clear if he was formally responsible for Suai at the time of the massacrein the church on 8 September 1,999, as the Suai command was briefly held by LtCol(CZI) Lilik Kushadiyanto [3] between 29 August and 8 September. However, theUdayana regional military command told Australian joumalist Hamish McDonaldthat the officer responsible for Suai on the day the incident occurred was LtCol AhmadMasagus.r6

Among the dead were Fathers Hilario and Francisco and three Catholic sisters.Newly ordained Indonesian priest Father Dewanto was also killed. These priests helda reconciliation mass only days before the massacre. A pro-autonomy leader whoagreed to reconcile was killed along with the others.

The strongest militia groups in the Suai area at the time were Laksaur (Eagle) ledby Olivio Mendoza Moruk [3], who operated from a building in a police compound,and Mahidi, led by Vasco da Cruz [3].

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180 Masters of Teror

Masagus was also under investigation by military prosecutors for having shotPrivate (Praka) Agusto da Carmo, evidently in Surabaya.laT

NatalinoMONTEIRO KCommander, Dadurus Merah Putih militia, Bobonaro district

This highly educated militia leader is implicated in serious crimes against human-ity. When President Habibie announced on 27 January 1999 that a ballot would beheld in East Timor, Natalinobegan to work closely with the Kopassus intelligence unitSGI to establish a militia in his home village in Bobonaro dishict. He often made hisown car available for the militias to use. The Dadurus [Dadarus] Merah Putih militia(Red White Tornado, DMP) was based in Ritabou. Its Maliana town branch was run byJose da Silva Tavares, the son of Joao Tavares, before this a diplomat with the tndone-sian Foreign Affairs Department. In overall command of militias in Maliana was theageing pro'Indonesian fighter Ioao Tavares [3].148 DMP was one of six rnilitia grouPsin the Maliana district. All the groups were initiated and coordinated by the Bobonaro

military district corunander based in Maliana, LCol Burhannudin Siagian [3].14e

Apart from heading up the DMP he also chaired the pro-Lrdonesian political asso-ciation FPDK in Maliana.

On 8 April 1999 DMP took part in what was probably the first show of armedstrength of militia units from around East Timor, held in Maliana. The rally was led by

Joao Tavares. Natalino was in prominent attendance.rso

The Dadurus Merah Putih mfitia soon acquired a reputation for extreme brutality.

The Dadurus Merah Putih militia soon acquired a reputation for extremebrutality.Within three days of the 8 April rally, it took part in a series of attacks on allegedly pro-independence villagers over several days that left at least six and possibly as many as

36 dead, ten houses bumt down, and L5 people arrested and tortured. The best docu-mented was the execution of six people at Cailaco village on 12 April (see Siagian [3]and Tavares [3]), in which DMP members took part.

On 29 June, according to Appendix 5 of the KPP HAM report, Natalino Monteirodirected his militia to attack the Unamet office in Lahomea village, Maliana. The at-tack, like other DMP actions, was coordinated by Bobonaro military intelligence chiefLt Sutrisno [3]. It left several wounded, including Unamet staff.

On 27 August, backed by Brimob police, the militia tried to force villagers inMemo, 15 km from Maliana, to participate in a pro'autonomy rally. When they re-

fused, the militias killed four named East Timorese civilians, and burned down 22

houses.151

Demonstrating the close links between the militias and the lndonesian military,some reports list the leader of DMP as a Sergeant Domingos [Domingus] (alias KofiAnnan!).

After the ballot, and even before the result was announced, the DMP militia wenton a murderous rampage. Five people, two of them local Unamet staff, were mur-dered while police and military stood by on the evening of 2 September.ls2 The East

Timorese human rights organisation Yayasan HAK alleges that Natalino Monteiropersonally committed two murders - those of Dorninggos Soares and Ruben Baros, a

The Key Suspects [3]

Unamet driver and a Unamet administrator.rs3 KPP HAM listed him in Appendix 5 ofits report over this incident, with the recommendation he be prosecutred for crimesagainst humanity.

Dadurus Merah Putih members were involved in the massacre of 47 persons atMaliana police station on 8 Septemb er 1999. They were joined by the Halilintar militia,conholled by |oao Tavares. The massacre was mainly directed by LCol BurhanuddinSiagian.rsa

DMP members under his command who have been indicted or recorrunended assuch are:

. Jo6o Fernandes, DMP leader. He became the first person to be sentenced forcrimes against humanity in East Timor after being prosecuted by the SeriousCrimes Unit. He was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment for the murder of avillage chief, Domingos Gonsalves Pereira, in Bobonaro Dishict on 8 Septem-ber 1999.rss

. Victor Lopes, DMP company commander. He was in July 2001 under arrest byUntaet for his involvement in the Maliana police station massacre.ls

' Martinho Mau Buti, DMP leader. On 22 April 1999, together with other militia-men and soldiers, arrested and then tortured to death a 26-year old villagernamed Almeida in Ritabou village. Mau Buti was listed in Appendix 5 of thereport of the Indonesian inquiry into atrocities in East Timor (KPP HAM) forthis incident with the recommendation he be prosecuted for crimes againsthumanity.rsT

' Joao Gomblo, Antonio Metan, and Marito, all DMP members. Also listed inAppendix 5 for their participation in the Maliana police station massacre, aswell as for other abuses.

' Marcus, Luis Metan Frans, Agusto dos Santos Martins, Joao dos Santos, Juliao,Paulus, Dominggos, Adriano, Afonso, Ejebio de Jesus, Alberto, Batista, InacioMetan, probably all with DMP. Listed in Appendix 5 for intirnidating villagersand looting in the Ritabou, Holsa, and Lahomea areas.

Background

Natalino Monteiro was born in Ribatou on 5 fune 1963. After earlier schooling inMaliana he did his senior high school in Belu, over the border in West Timor. In 1984he enrolled in a bachelor's degree in agriculture at Brawijaya University, Malang, EastJava. Upon completion in 1989 he worked in the East Timor agriculture department(Kandep Pertanian). He also taught agriculture at the territory's small University ofEast Timor. He then undertook Master's studies in agriculture at Gadjah Mada Uni-versity, in Jogjakarta, Java. Upon completion in1994 he retumed to the University ofEast Timor, where he became third deputy rector (student affairs). Here he becameinvolved in the competition to be appointed rector. This sensitive position requiredmilitary approval, and in order to improve his chances he took a military course atLemhanas in Jakarta in 1,995. However, he did not have enough support within thecampus and failed in his bid. He is married to the daughter of an Indonesian soldier.ls

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1.82 Masters of Terror

OlivioMendozaMORUKlAlivio/AlisioMau,Mendonca,Mendioncal KALaksaur militia commander, Suai

This 45-year-old Laksaur militia commander was indicted for his role in a massacre

at the Suai church on 6 September'1999.

The militia he led had been formed by the military in February 1999 - it had about500 men with 100 firearms. It was based at Salele, on the border with West Timor justwest of Suai. According to one report, its headquarters were located in the militarypost. Immediately after the Indonesian pull-out he was prominent among militiacommanders along the Indonesian border with East Timor promising to wage a

guerrilla campaign to recover East Timor.

He had only been indicted by the Indonesian Attomey-General a week beforewhen he was murdered by fellow militiamen on 6 September 2000 in an area of(Indonesian) West Timor close to the border with East Timor. The continued coher-

ence of the militia forces was demonstrated at his funeral, when Moruk was virfuallygrven a military burial (televised nationally), with armed guerrillas standing in ranks

alongside military and police units and led by Eurico Guterres [3]. He was reportedlya Kopassus informant and had been trained by them. 'The fact that he continued tooperate as a thug with complete impunity in West Tirnor indicates how unwilling theIndonesian govemment has been to act,' said Joe Saunders, deputy Asia director atHuman Rights Watch.

The death of Moruk would have been a relief to Lt Sugito [3] and LCol Herman

Sediono [2], the two local military officers in Suai indicted for directing the massaoe.

Moruk was scheduled to testify in cases against these two men that could have ex-

posed the institutional culpability of the military. This led Indonesian Attomey-Gen-eral, Marzuki Darusman, to suspect that Moruk's killing was politically motivated: 'Ithink it was too coincidental that Olivio was killed right after he was named a susPect.'

Moruk had already been questioned by KPP HAM in Jakarta in December 1999. Othermilitias, in Kupang following Moruk's death, feared the Indonesian govemmentwouldnow kill them as well.

He and/or militiamen under his command may also have been involved in an-other massacre, this time at Foholulik, near the militia's headquarters at Salele. Mahidi,commanded by Cancio de Carvalho [1], is also implicated in this massacre. At least sixnamed individuals were killed by Laksaur Merah Putih militiamen and soldiers fromthe local military post (Koramil) at this village on 24 April 1999 at about l'1:30am. Atthe same time about 200 villagers were taken away in rnilitary trucks to an unknownfate. Another report named 12 dead out of what it said were at least 30 dead.ls

The spelling variations in his name have produced confusion among Indonesian

prosecutors, where KPP HAM lists him as Olivio Moruk while the Attomey-General'sDepartment lists him as Alisio Mau. The identification is made clear in'Atambua citygnpped, 5 killed, 69 houses bumed' (English translation, Pos Kupang, T September

2000).160 In another report he is referred to as Oliveira Mendionca'161

The Kev Suspects [3] 183

MOTORNUS [Maternus Bere?] KALaksaur militia leader, Suai

KPP HAM mentioned him in the executive summary of its report for his involve-ment in the Suai church massacre of 6 September'1.999.He was not named in the finalreport - perhaps because the militia he helped lead was named in its entirety. Thelndonesian Attomey4eneral's Department initially listed him as well,butthen droppedhim and some others from the list to be prosecuted in April 2001 'because we haven'tbeen able to find them.'162 East Timorese sources tell us he could be Matemus Bere,not to be confused with Martinus Bere [3], but like the latter a teacher in Suai originallyfrom Belu district in West Timor.

CoINuTMUIS (NoerMoeis, Mohd Muis) KADEast Timor military commander (Danreml64/ Wira Dharma) 13 August'1999 -30

March 2000

Replaced Tono Suratman [3] only two weeks before the 30 August referendum inEast Timor. No clear reason was given but the change followed strong UN criticism ofTono Suratman's partisan attitude to the militias.163 He was thus responsible forsecurity in East Timor precisely when security broke down completely.

On 25 August 1999 he met Falintil commander Taur Matan Ruak in Dili, a meetingfacilitated by Unamet in an attempt to prevent violence.l6a

Before the ballot he several times wamed that war was likely to break out if thepro.independence option won. But the 'possibility of war and violence would be verysmall if pro-integration faction won'.r65

Just before the ballot result was announced Nur Muis said that the military hadprepared detailed contingency plans to evacuate 250,000 East Timorese civilians byland, sea and air in the event of full-scale civil war breaking out. This plan is so close towhat actually happened in subsequent days that it is fair to conclude the evacuationwas conducted according to the same military plan. The only missing factor, appar-ently not so essential after all as a condition for executing the evacuation plan despiteNur Muis' frequent 'prediction' of it, was the 'civil war'. War was prevented, andworld opinion therefore failed to fum against East Timor, because Falintil refused torespond to intense pro-Indonesian militia provocations.r6

Nur Muis took some disciplinary action against the commanding officer of the745Battalion that had killed around 20 people in the course of their panicky withdrawalfrom East Timor, including joumalist Sander Thoenes on 2L september 1999. How-ever, he also told soldiers from the same battalion when they arrived in Dili: 'Youdon't need to tell anyone about what you have done on your way here. Don't eventell your wives.'167

In practical terms he lost his power as territorial commander when MajGen KikiSyahnakri [3] became martial law administrator. He claims that, before that moment,the police, not the military, were in charge of security in East Timor.rs This muststrike observers as a hand-washing statement.

184 Masters of Terror

When quizzed by human-rights prosecutors in January and then in May 2000, he

consistently blamed Unamet 'cheating' for the outbreak of post-ballot violence. InOctober 2000 he reportedly publicised a TNI'White Paper'revealing'Unamet fraud'in the referendum in East Timor.16e

Background

He is one of the high fliers of his generation, with a background in both Kopassusas well as Kostrad.rT0 Is said to have served a two year term in East Timor earlier in hiscareer. Owes his rather quick ascent to the hurry-up that the classes of 1975 and 75 gotbecause Prabowo (class of 7974) was given a very quick promotion in 1997, thus'pulling' up a couple of younger classes with him.

Nur Muis was born in about 1953 in Aceh (another source says Madura), andgraduated from the military academy in 1976. Has had some Australian training, as

well as UN experience as a peacekeeper in Iraq.ln His Kostrad experience included a

stint at one time as chief of staff for the 17th Infanhy Brigade, based in Cijantung, East

fakarta (replacing Ryamizard Ryacudu, who recommended him). At another time he

was Commander, 18th Airbome Infantry Brigade (Trisula), based in Malang for abouttwo years. When Feisal Taniung [1] was Comrnander of the Armed Forces, he servedas his personal assistant (Spri).

Befween July 1998 and July 1999,before coming to East Timor, he was com-

mander in a Central Java district (Korem 07t/Wijayakusuma/ based in Purwokerto).Here he appeared to play a moderate role amidst the inter-party conflicts of the pre-election period (PPP-PKB clash of fune 1999, PDI-Golkar clash December 1998) as wellas handling a major fishermen riot in Cilacap June 1998. He also very briefly held thecommand of the Army Combat Training Centre, in Baturaja, South Sumatra(Komandan Puslatpur), in August 1,999.1n

After the Indonesian pull-out on 25 September 1999 he moved his command toKupang, whence he was kept busy demobilising unhappy troops in the territorialbatallion 745, then liquidating the Wira Dharma corunand on 30 March 2000. Afterfirst being mooted as chief of staff for the Brawijaya command (East Java) he wasappointed chief of staff for the Udayana command (Bali and eastem lndonesia), risingto BrigGen. This makes him the first of his 1976 generation to reach this rank.r73

LColWioyotomoNUGROHO D

Commander of the Combined Intelligence Task Force (Satuan Gabungan Intelijen,SGD,DiIi

According to a report by David Jenkins, Nugroho was at the centre of East Timoroperations until about December 1998 or January 1.999, taking an active role in settingup the militias.tT4 One source says that he was reassigned to Jakarta early in 1999.17s

SGI ran a series of interrogation centres much feared by East Timorese activists forthe torture it conducted, among other counter-insurgency activities. Almost nothingis known of who staffed the SGI. Other officers named as SGI 'commanders' in 1999

are LtCol Yayat Sudrajat [3] and Col Anwar [2]. Yet another is Capt Siburian.176

The Key Suspects [3] 185

Background

Wioyotomo Nugroho graduated from the military academy in 1983 and is knownto have taken two haining courses in the US funded by IMET (Intemational MilitaryEducation and Training), the first in intelligence while he was a captain, the secondpossibly in airbome combat.177

David Jenkins lists him as 'Kopassus intelligence chief', but given his rank of Lieu-tenant Colonel this is more likely to mean that he was assistant for intelligence to thecommander-general of Kopassus (Asintel Danjen Kopassus) rather than commanderof Kopassus' Group [V (Intelligence/ Secret Warfare). He may have doubled in thisposition as Commander of the Combined Intelligence Task Force (Satuan Gabunganlntelijen, SGI) in East Timor, a position he apparently held since at least June 1998.178

Some time in7999 he took up a position in personnel in Kopassus.

LtCol(InOMuhamadNUR DMilitary district commander (dandim), Ermera (Kodim 1637)

Muhamad Nur (serial no. 29478, military academy graduating class of 1982) isresponsible for a wave of killings that took place against pro-independence support-ers in Ermera district in April 1999, before the arrival of Unamet. In the middle of Aprilat least six were killed in the remote village of Talimoro. Then in the third week ofApril at least seven local CNRT leaders were shot dead by soldiers from the ErmeraKodim. Among them were Antonio da Lima, a local councillor, and village headBartholo Borromeu.lD He is listed in one report as a possible suspect in an East Timorwar crimes trial.lm

Indonesian authorities were initially unsuccessful in forming paramilitary groupsin the Ermera region (30 km southwest of Dili) because the cash payments theyoffered did not induce people. Ermera is richer than many other areas, receiving$US30 million a year for coffee.18l Much of the early violence in April 1999 was con-ducted directly by the military, because locals were reluctant to leave the coffee busi-ness to join militias.

The dominant paramilitary group in this area was reported to be Darah Integrasi,led by a low-ranking TNI officer on 'civilian duty', Antonio dos Santos.lE2 Anotherreport mentioned Naga Merah.183

Muhamad Nur was appointed to this command in December 1997. After thelndonesian withdrawal from East Timor he assumed corrunand in the military districtof Alor, near Flores.l&

LtCol (InO EndaTPRIYANTO [Priyatnol ADDistrict commander for Dili (Komandan Kodim 1,627 Drll)LtCol Endar Priyanto was appointed district commander for Dili on 27 November

1997. Previously he had been chief of staff for operations there.ls Just before the 30August ballot in 1999 he handed over conunand to LtCol Suiarwo [31.

186 Masters of Tenor

In July 1998 he was involved in an elaborate (but unsuccessful) deception to give

over 100 foreign joumalists the impression there were far fewer Indonesian troops inEast Timor than proved to be the case.le

He does not stand accused of direct participation in atrocities, but he was militarycommander in Dili at the time of the mobilisation and arming of violent civilianparamilitaries in early 1999. The dominant group operating in that area was Aitarak(The Thom, led by Eurico Guterres [3]). Together with many other top military offic-

ers, he attended a rally in Dili on 17 April 1999 in which the militia leader urged hissupporters to kill pro-independence supporters, and then did nothing to stop themmurdering at least 12 people in an attack on the home of former parliamentarianManuel Carrascalao.

His name appears on an informal list of officers who should be investigated foratrocities committed in East Timor.167 With serial number 29353,he belonged to the

1981 graduating class at military academy.

LtCol Paulus GatotRUDIANTO DMilitary district commander in Ainaro (Komandan Kodim 1633)

First reported in this position in September 1998,1s he is quite likely to have stillbeen commander in Ainaro at the time of the mobilisation and arming of violentcivilian paramilitaries in early 1999. The dominant paramilitary group in his area is

reported to be Mahidi, led by Cancio Lopes de Carvalho [1]. Together with the Sector

B combat command, led in 1999 by LtCol Tatang Zaenuddin [1], Rudianto is likely tohave been the main sponsor of this group, which had an estimated 2,000 members

carrying 500 firearms in April 1999.1Ee

LtCol(Pol)AdiosSALOVA ADistrict police chief Liquica (Kapolres Liquica)

Salova was appointed district police chief in Liquica on 27 June 1998 and wasreplaced a year later in early July 1.999largely due to Unamet pressure over his failureto prevent a militia attack on a humanitarian convoy on 4 ]uly 7999.1%

When Besi Merah Putih militias began their reign of terror in Liquica in early 1999,

he did nothing to satisfy the pleas of the legal political party CNRT for protection.lel

Militia terror soon caused up to 20,000 refugees to flee their homes into what one

observer described as 'concentration camps', but again Adios Salova did nothing and

told foreign joumalists: 'They can go back to their homes if they want.'1e2

Police officers under his command took part in the massacre of unarmed refugees

in the Catholic church in Liquica on 5 April 1999. When the Indonesian NationalHuman Rights Comrnission came to investigate a few days later, he gave the commis-sion no explanation. All the blood and bullet marks at the church had been systematically

removed.re3 A police officer under his command mentioned in Appendix 5 of the KPP

HAM report as among the perpetrators of the Liquica massacre is 1$ Lt (Pol) Johanis Rea.

The Key Suspects [31

ln December 2000 he refused to meet UN investigators who wished to interviewhim along with four other military and police officers for masterminding the wave ofterror in 1999.1e4

After East Timor, he was transferred to Aceh, where he remained LtCol (nowcalled Superintendent). He appeared in public as public relations officer for the highlyunpopular combined police-military operations there (Kasub Sektor ORS III - OperasiRencong Sadar III, Kasubsektor OCM - Operasi Cinta Meunasah).res

Guilherme dos SANTOS KADistrict head (bupati) of Bobonaro (Maliana)

Guilherme dos Santos became district head of Bobonaro in 1990 (or 1995?).Before that he chaired the East Timor provincial assembly (DPRD). His predeces-sor was Ioao Tavares [3], one of the most senior East Timorese to assist theIndonesian invasion in 7975.

On 24 March 1999 he issued an instruction requiring all civil servants in the town ofMaliana to fill in a form stating if they supported independence.le6

He frequently endorsed violence to resist the planned UN ballot or to influence itsoutcome. On 8 April 1999 his district hosted a show of force of hundreds of armedmilitias from all over East Timor, where the pro-Indonesian option in the UN ballotwas canvassed militantly in front of military and civilian officials.le7

On 7 July 1999, after he had addressed a pro-autonomy (anti-independence) rally,he beat and then threatened to kill his own wife for saying she preferred independ-ence. She was evacuated for medical treatment.les

ln June 1999 he appeared to approve of an attack on relatives of prominent EastTimorese human rights campaigner Aniceto Guterres, saying 'if they [human rightscampaignersl come here, I'll deal with them'.1ee

A self-confessed'loud-mouth', he in mid-July 1999 threatened to kill AustralianUN personnel as part of a plan to force the closure of the local UN office. Dos Santosenjoyed close contact with militia leaders and praised pro-integration Indonesianarmy officers.2oo

In the run-up to the 30 August 1999 UN ballot, he exacerbated an already seriousrefugee problem by telling people it was better flee to West Timor than face theconsequences of voting for independence. Militias operating in his area of responsibil-ity had threatened to unleash 'wat' if the people rejected the pro-lndonesian au-tonomy option. 'If you want to be safe', Guilherme dos Santos said, 'leave Bobonaroand flee to Atambua. You don't have any money [to flee], but I have lots of money soI can live anywhere, so long as it's not in East Timor.'ml

He also hampered the regishation process by ordering police, military and mili-tias in his district to force voters to not present baptismal certificates, as required bythe rules. This was done in an attempt to illegally bring in voters from (Indonesian)West Timor. Guilherme dos Santos had discussed a plan to bring in 20,000 Indonesianvoters at a meeting on 22 July 7999. 'I do not need to participate in the registration, and

't87

188 Masters of Tenor

as Bobonaro chief I will tell my people not to participate in the registration,' he told thelndonesian official news agency Antara.@

He was still in charge of Maliana on 8 September 1999, when militias, soldiers and

police attacked a large number of refugees at the local police station, leaving at least 47

dead (see LtCol Burhanuddin Siagian [3]). He took no action to stop the violence,which went on into the next day.

In January 2000 he was interrogated by the Indonesian Human Rights Comrnis-sion in Jakarta.2o3 In August 2000 he was in (Indonesian) West Timor, helping lead

Untas, a gouping of East Timorese militia leaders still hoping to reverse the inde-pendence process for East Timor.20a

Maj (InoJacob Dioko SAROSA KCommander, Battalion 745 (Lospalos)

KPP HAM recorunended he should be investigated further by the Public Prosecu-

tor's office for involvement in the killing of Dutch joumalist Sanders Thoenes.26 Italso listed his battalion with many other perpetrators in Appendix 5 of its final report,for killing and buming in the Lospalos and Baucau area in the aftermath of the ballot.

Interviewed by Christian Science Monitor (CSM) in ]anuary 2000, Sarosa deniedthat his troops murdered any civilians as they pulled out of East Timor last Septem-ber.2c A detailed CSM special investigation into the activities of Battalion 745,how-ever, claims it had orders to shoot specific independence supporters as they retreated

and were ordered to shoot people who came within range of their departing convoy.The same report claims that Battalion 745 killed Sander Thoenes on 21 September1999. This was backed up, though not conclusively, by Gregory Cavanagh, the Aus-tralian coroner who investigated the case. A Dutch investigator and an Australianmilitary policeman concluded in a document of 10 November 7999 that Battalion 745

was responsible.

The battalion reportedly cooperated closely with the militia group Tim Alfa inmid-September 1999 (this was led by Jom Marquez [4]). A soldier from the battalioninterviewed by CSM said that Jacob had told them that if pro-independence forceswon the referendum, they would have to 'destroy everything'.

Jacob admitted to being jailed for a week by East Timor commander Col Nur Muis[3] for failing to maintain discipline when his troops shot up a taxi being used byBritish journalist |on Swain near Dili on 21 September. His soldiers stole Swain'sequipment. Swain's interpreter was taken away and never seen again' In all, CSM'sinvestigation found evidence of 20 killings and disappearances shortly before theThoenes killing. Many were reportedly killed along the way simply because theywere visible from the convoy. In an interview with CSM, Jacob denied his troops hurtanyone but acknowledged the encounter with Swain.2@

Sarosa appeared before the Attorney-General's joint investigative team for East

Timor human rights abuses on or about 4 May 2000, when he confirmed that hissuperior (presumably Muis) had told hirn to mobilise troops after the East Timorballot on August 30. He also confessed that he told his troops to intimidate the pressby damaging their cars and cameras (as quoted by his lawyer Herman Umar)'2s

The Key Suspects [31

Jacob Sarosa, from Java, graduated from the military academy in 1984. He had sixmonths training in the USA at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1990. Battalion 745, based inthe eastern end of East Timor, was one of two attached to the territorial comrnand.Sarosa is a young high flier, and after East Timor he was promoted to LieutenantColonel.2oe

Col(InO HeTmanSEDIONO KADDistrict head (bupati) of Covalima (based in Suai)

Sediono is a Kopassus officer who was seconded to the civilian govemment postof district head (bupati) of Covalima, in southwest East Timor, whose main town isSuai. Testifying to KPP HAM, eyewitnesses to the massacre of intemally displacedpersons sheltering at the Ave Maria Catholic church in Suai said that he, along with thelocal military commander Lt Sugito [3], directed the attack that began at 2:30pm on 6September 1999. Witnesses said he and Sugito wore combat fatigues, carried M-16rifles, and ordered the Laksaur and Mahidi militias, soldiers and police (BrimobKontinjen Lorosae) to kill the refugees and priests. At least 50 and up to 200 peopledied in the attack, including three priests who had been negotiating with the militaryfor days.

Herman Sediono is a former commander of Sector B based in Baucau - this is a

combat command outside the regular territorial structure. He had served in EastTimor since 1975. James Fox wrote about the district head of Covalima: 'By August, hewas nearing the end of his period of service; his family had already returned to Soloand he was facing the prospect of a humiliating loss of all that he had devoted hiscareer to achieving.'2ro

Sediono has denied responsibility, saying he instead tried to arrange safe passagefor the refugees who were caught in'factional fighting'. However, he told KPP HAMthat several days before the poll results were announced on 4 september 1999 he hadprepared transport to shift the population out. Government and military officialsforced a large proportion of the Covalima population to flee to West Timor in theaftermath of the announcement.

Refugees had been sheltering at the church in Suai since January 1999, when theanti-independence militias were first formed by the local military and began harrassingvillagers in nearby Zumalai and Maudemo. The East Timor press quoted Hermansediono as promising thousands of suai refugees in February 1999 that he would notallow the formation of militias in Suai, neither in his capacity of district head nor in hismilitary capacity. He apparently did nothing to keep this promise.

Defecting militia commander Rui Lopes told an independent television station inJakarta on 12 September 1999 that he (Lopes) had taken part in a meeting at the homeof the district head in Covalima before the atrocity occurred. He said the district headand the districtmilitarycommander (probably LtCol Ahmad Masagus [3]) werepresentand conveyed orders that the militias were to bum down Covalima, drive Unametout, and drive all the local residents into West Timor. He said the idea was to convincethe outside world that the East Timorese were not h"ppy with the result, so that

i89

190 Masters of Tenor

Unamet would be forced to conductthe poll again. He said thatthemilitiasinCovalimawere full of SGI (army intelligence) agents.21l

An assistant in his district administration, Toao Mendonca de Araujo ([ ], thirddeputy secretary), was arrested by UN police in March 2001 for involvement in the

Suai massacre.

The names of other perpetrators of the Suai church massacre listed in Appendix 5

of the KPP HAM report are:

' Americo

' Juannico

LtCol (Cav) Burhannudin SIAGIAN KD

District military commander (Dandim 1535) for Bobonaro, based in Maliana

Unamet Chief Executive Ian Martin called for his removal following a visit toMaliana on 18 August 1999, because he and his men were'contributing to rather thanaddressing the impunity of the militia, some of whom were serving members of theTNI'. Ian Martin continued: 'I now wrote to [head of Indonesian Task Force Ambassa-dor Agusl Tarmidzi and CMLO Rezaq to [MajGen] Tacky lAnwar Makariml, listingnames which included the district commanders in Bobonaro and Cova Lima.'2r2

Siagian was withdrawn for a little while, but reappeared in Maliana township on

30 August, the day of the ballot. His reappearance coincided with reports of a fresh

distribution of weapons to the militias, who were observed by Unamet staff in Bobonaro

openly carrying both traditional and automatic firearms. Over the next three days

those militias bumed several houses and killed at least two Unamet local staff, leadingUnamet to withdraw from Maliana for their own safet5r.2r3

Unamet personnel had experienced harrassment from this officer from the begin-ning. They believed Burhannudin Siagian and his local intelligence chief (Lt Sutrisno

t3l) had planned a militia stoning attack on the newly established Unamet office on 29

June 1999, in which several locals and one foreigner were injured.

Unamet political affairs officer in Bobonaro, Peter Bartu, said LCol BurhannudinSiagian 'oversaw the creation of the militia system in his diskict.... The militia structurein Bobonaro district was the most developed in terms of organisation and funding....Bobonaro would appear to have been the subdistrict [sic - district] of greatest rePres-

sion. One resident described the situation there as the worst it had been since 1975.'214

Burhannudin Siagian was allegedly the main actor in one of the biggest single

massacres in East Timor in 1999.lt occurred on 8 September 1999, four days after the

ballot result was announced. At about 5pm thousands of refugees sheltering at the

local police station were attacked from all sides at once by the local Besi Merah Putihmilitias all wearing camouflage paint or balaclavas. Behind them were soldiers fromthe territorial batallion, and policemen (including Brimob). A witness told an Austral-ian joumalist she saw Siagian, with Sutrisno and local police chief LtCol Budi Susilo [1],circulating among the crowd as militias went through the camp with death lists. These

three men then ordered the bodies loaded onto trucks and disposed of. Witnesses

The Key Suspects [31

counted 47 bodies hacked to death by machetes on that day. More died later as rnilitiastracked down those who escaped, but most bodies have not been recovered.2ls

Before that, in April 1999, Siagian was responsible for the deaths of at least sixvillagers. On 12 April Falintil had ambushed a car carrying pro-tndonesian militias andsoldiers, leading to the deaths of a rnilitia leader and a soldier, with five others injured.The next day, in revenge for the Falintil ambush, Halilintar militias commanded jointlyby Siagian and Jaaa_Tavarcg [3] kidnapped, tortured and then executed five (anotherreport says six) named Timorese from Cailaco (Kailako) village, thought to be inde.pendence supporters. The executions took place in front of relatives mouming themilitia leader killed by Falintil the previous day. Three of the victims were primaryschool teachers. The bodies were removed in a car belonging to siagian. In subse-quent days the military went on a rampage in the district, leading to the destruction ofhouses and possibly further deaths.2l6

Questioned in fakarta in May 2000 about this incident he denied responsibility andinstead presented 50 pages of documents that he said detailed cheating by unametand violations carried out by CNRT that were blamed on TNI.217 KPP HAM recom-mended he be prosecuted for crimes against humanity over the Cailaco executions, aswell as for attacks he organised on Unamet in Maliana.

On 14 June 1999, Siagian spoke at a rally organised by the local Dadarus MerahPutih militia and said that the Indonesian autonomy plan had to be accepted in thedistrict of Bobonaro. If the people of Ritabou and the whole district of Bobonaro didnot accept the plan, he said, they would all be wiped out.2t8

]ust after the UN ballot, siagian is reported as having told unamet local staff thatthey would be killed afterwards. Indeed two local Unamet staff in the area under hisjurisdiction were killed by a TNI sergeant on 2 September 1,999.

Burhannudin Siagian belonged to the 1981 graduating class at the military acad-emy (Akabri). In 1995 he became commander of the 7th Cavalry Battalion in GreaterJakarta. He was appointed district military commander in Bobonaro on 1 october1997.

His career has not suffered as a result of his actions in East Timor. After thebrdonesian pull-out he became chief of staff at the Denpasar district military com-mand (Kasrem 163/ Wira Satya). In May 2000 it was reported he would be promotedto colonel and become operational assistant at the Jakarta regional rnilitary command(Kodam laya)."'

Col(Pol)TimbulSILAEN KADEast Timor police chief (Kapolda)

Col Timbul Silaen came from assistant police chief in Central Sulawesi to be ap-pointed East Timor police chief on 22June 1998. (He was an appointed member of thesupreme legislative assembly the MPR, representing the regions, in 1998).20 He wasnominally in charge of security in East Timor for all of 1999 except during the shortperiod of martial law after the ballot. He took part in meetings with military and militialeaders where violencewas advocated and planned, and he failed to act decisively against

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192 Masters of Terror

those who committed violence. Some policemen under his command took part di-rectly in violence against civilians - notably in Liquica on 5 April 1999 and in Suai on 6

September 1999. Unamet chief executive Ian Martin says that the deportation of East

Timorese after the ballot was coordinated by the police.zl

However, with the police still part of the armed forces in 1999, and still treated

there as the 'little brother' of soldiers, his actual authority was much less than his

formal one.

Throughout his term in East Timor he consistently failed to act against or evencondemn violence committed by groups in favour of East Timor's continued integra-tion with Indonesia. Among the examples are the following:

. ln an interview in mid-1998 he downplayed'ninja'violence against civilians as

mere'naughtiness'.222. Admitting the incarceration of villagers in the Liquica district by prolndone-

sian militias in April 1999 (in conditions joumalists described as'like a concen-

tration camp'), Timbul Silaen did nothing and merely said:'At most, there are

100 [people being held], and they are from the pro-independence faction.'223o When this situation deteriorated into a massacre of refugees in the church in

Liquica on 5 April L999, he again downplayed it as fightingbetween two groups,

and ignored eyewitness rePorts of direct police involvement in the killing.za. Still in April 1999 he refused when asked to give a guarantee of security for the

territory's only local newspaper, Sunra Timor Timur, after it had been closed

down by militias who said they disliked the tone of its reporting.2E. In June 1999 he defended the appointment of notorious rnilitia leader Eurico

Guterres [3] as chief of a civil defence force based in Dili, saying: 'We have yetto find evidence that Guterres and (Manuel de) Sousa [3] were involved in the

recent murders.'226

In the meantime, in contrast with his tolerance of violence committed by anti-independence activists, he did act rather vigorously in two cases of violence commit-ted by pro-independence activists. These included the killers of Femando Maia, whowas murdered in Salesa on 12 fuly, and Joao da Silva, who allegedly killed an Aitarakmilitiaman on 29 August.z7

Throughout 1999 he attended many meetings with military and militia leaders at

which plans were made to commit, orchestrate or condone violent acts. We know the

dates of only a few of these.

The most damning evidence of the kind of agreements reached at such meetingswas given by militia leader Herminio da Costa [1] to US journalist Allan Naim. He toldNaim that Timbul silaen and Tono suratman [3] had since January 1999 issued himand other militia leaders with immunity from prosecution in the case of militia attacks

on CNRT leaders - including interrogation, assaults on their houses, or even theirdeaths.22E

In early April 1999, Timbul Silaen attended a meeting in Gleno, in which East

Timor Govemor Abilio Soares [3] said that the safety of those civil servants whorefused to sign a statement of support for autonomy (within lndonesia) could not be

guaranteed.

The Key Suspects [3]

On 1 May 1999 he attended a meeting at Oesilo (just inside the Oekussi enclave),together with East Timor military commander Col Tono Suratman and governorAbilio soares. tn front of 2000 people, govemment officials held speeches in whichamong others they said the CNRT should no longer be allowed to exist.ze Two dayslater, he and East Timor military commander col rono suratman attended a cer-emony in Ambeno (the enclave in West Timor) where the local CNRT'voluntarily'dissolved itself and said it had given up the idea of independence. Other CNRT leaderssuggested the dissolution was forced on the Ambeno branch.tso

Militias launched attacks around Dli for two days on 9 and 10 May in which policeacknowledged four independence supporters died. Timbul Silaen took no action, andmerely described the attacks as fighting between two East Timorese sides.Bl

Immediately after this round of violence, on 11 May, he allegedly attended ameeting with Tono Suratman, Domingos Soares [3], the Kopassus counter-insur-gency unit SGI, and militia leaders at the East Timor military headquarters in Dili. Themeeting discussed plans to conduct a second phase of the so-called 'Operasi Sisir'(Combing Operation) of 17-L9 April. This second phase, planned by Tono Suratman,was to be executed by militia groups from 15 to 25 May under the motto'Autonomyor Death'.82

On 24 July 1999 Tirnbul Silaen allegedly took part in a secret meeting at the EastTimor military headquarters, together with military commander Tono Suratmary theprovincial parliamentary speaker (Armindo Soares Mariano [1]), and militia leaders. Themeeting discussed plans for a scorched earth campaign in East Timor in the likely eventof the proindependence vote winning. Police and military personnel were assigned to'assist'the Aitarak militia, which would play the central and most visible role.H

14/hen just before this meeting a letter was leaked to the media in which the Aileudistrict allegedly passed on instructions from the armed forces commander (GenWiranto [3]) ordering militia Ieaders in his district to harass Unamet officials, TimbulSilaen took a strong role in denying the letter's reality.234

He did not react well to the UN police force (civpol) that came to East Timor to 'assist'Indonesian police in the run up to the referendum, waming there could be'misunder-standings' if they were perceived to be syrnpathetic to the pro-independence side.5

Timbul Silaen's human-rights record in '1.999 was not all negative. Unamet chiefexecutive Ian Martin in his book praised Timbul Silaen for his'active involvement' in'addressing particular local problems of intimidation'.236 The reference was to July1999, but it could also have applied to April, when he sheltered CNRT leaders LeandroIsaac and Manuel Carrascalao following militia attacks on them and their followers.tsT

After the ballot, during the militia attack on the home of Bishop Belo on 5 Septem-ber, police officers under his command (led by BrigGen Pol J D Sitorus) 'saved' BishopBelo by helicoptering him to Baucau.a8

However, these were small victories amid the great failures that represented histour of duty in East Timor. A UN High Commision on Human Rights delegation toEast Timor questioned his ability to maintain security.be The East Timor human-rights organisation Yayasan HAK said more straightforwardly: 'Clearly, the securitysituation has failed to improve not because of "conflict between the two sides" but

193

t94 Masters of Terror

because terror and intimidation by the pro-integration militias has been allowed con-

tinuously to go unchecked by the police and the military in East Timor.'24

Speaking in his own defence, Timbul Silaen usually blamed the 'extremely brutal'character of the militias for his own failure to act.za1 Others rejected this defence bypointing out that he had a vastly expanded police force at his disposal that should have

permitted him to contol the militias. In June '1,999 an additional 3100 Brimob elite

policemen were brought in from outside (the so-called Lorosae Contingent) and

placed under his command. Together with 1000'civil defence'members (Kamra), thisgave him 8000 men.2a2

After the East Timor ballot Tirnbul Silaen was promoted to Brigadier General andbecame first head of the police anti-corruption force at nafional headquarters, thenhead of the anti-narcotics unit. In February2OOT he was reassigned to a special team totrack down the fugitive son of President Suhartq'Tommy'Suharto (thus compound-

ing his own record of consistent failure). tn june 2001 he revealed that his Personalwealth stood at Rp 1.2 billion (US$100,000).

He was qwizzed extensively about his responsibility for the 1999 abuses in East

Timor - first in january 2000 by KPP HAM and again in May 2000 by the Attomey-General's team. KPP HAM investigators revealed that an unnamed witness had said

Timbul silaen ordered police to take part in killing and destruction in East Timor.2€

However, when KPP HAM named him as one of those responsible for the East Timormayhem, his superiors dismissed the report as biased to the pro-independence side.2a

MajGenMahidinSIMBOLON DChief of Staff, Udayana command (Kasdam Udayana)

One of his jobs as chief of staff in Udayana military region, based in Bali but whichincluded East Timor, was probably to provide Iogistical support for the East Timormilitias.

We know little about his own direct involvement in East Timor in i999. On l2Mayhe attended a meeting at the Dili military headquarters with East Timor commander

Tono Suratman [3] and militia commander Joao-Tavarcs [3].'zs

His six assistants were all called to testify at the KPP HAM hearings in December

1999. The given reason (for all except Col Endang Riswanda) was that they had been

part of the Udayana tactical command (Komando Taktis Kodam Udayana) in theframework of the referendum in East Timor. They were:26

' Col (Inf) Abi Kusno,Assistant for Logistics (Aslog Kasdam lXlUdayana)

' Col (Inf) Budi Heryanto, Assistant for Operations (Asops Kasdam IXlUdayana). Bom in about 1951, he graduated from the military academy inMagelang :'u;.1974.In October 2000 he was aPPointed to head up the militarycommand for West Timor (Korem 151,/Wirasakti) based in Kupang, where he

took special action to secure the border with East Timor. Besides having tohandle East Timorese refugees angry over having lost their property in East

Timor, and running a less-than-successful weaPons buy-back scheme frommilitias, he faced local opposition to the expanded military Presence he was

The Key Suspects [3]

building along the border. A new military base for batallion 744 was intended(he said) 'to anticipate disturbances from a foreign country whose ideology isdifferent to that of Indonesia'.2a7

' Col (Inf) Eddy Sunadi, Assistant for Intelligence (Asintel Kasdam IXlUdayana). Col (Inf) Endang Riswanda, Assistant for General Planning (Asren[a] Kasdam),

Kodam IXlUdayana). Born in about\949, he graduated from the militaryacademy lu:.1972.

' Col (Inf) Hamdani, Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster Kasdam IXlUdayana).Bom in about 1951, he graduated from the military academy :u:.1974.

' Col I Ketut Redeng Warjana, Personal Assistant (Aspers Kasdam IX/ Udayana,serial no. 25379).

Background

Mahidin Simbolon (serial no. 27155) was born in North Sumatra on 2 May 1951.He graduated from the military academy in1974. Fought in Operasi Seroja, the inva-sion of East Timor, and has since then been there on six tours. Has spent time inKopassus as well as Kostrad - more in the latter, apparently. ln 1,992 he was SGIcommander in Dili - it was a newly formed unit under Prabowo. He was involved inthe operation that captured Xanana on 20 November that year. Later took over theEast Timor command after Kiki Syahnakri (I995-9n [3]. Mentioned in August 1998,together with Zacky Anwar Makarim [3], as'the army's most experienced officers incovert operations' and 'two of the men most intimately involved in East Timor inrecent months'.248

JoseAbilioOsorioSOARES KAGovemor of East TimorTogether with East Timor military commander Tono Suratman [3], Abilio Soares

strongly opposed the offer of a ballot announced by President Habibie late in Januaryl999.He appeared less than committed to implementing it.2ae Almost immediately hebegan using warlike language, and said that he rather favoured partitioning EastTimor into an Indonesian west and an independent east. Sources said he took part ina survey of likely pro-Indonesian bases in the westem districts around Suai, Malianaand Ambeno.so

On 25 March 1999 at a secret meeting of military and militia leaders he urged thatpro-independence leaders, and even nuns and priests, should be killed.El

In late March a source in his office revealed that Abilio Soares claimed that Presi-dent Habibie had personally promised to nearly double the provincial budget fromRp 400 billion to Rp 750 billion (US$ 75 million). 'Habibie said that the money could beused for anything at all, especially to maintain integration [with Indonesia],'the sourceadded. Abilio also said he had an agreement from Armed Forces Chief of GeneralAffairs LtGen Sugiono [1] to supply 15,000 guns via the district military commands(Kodim) commencing on 5 April. The extra budgetary resources were to be used topay for these weapons, he said. A new united pro-integration front would also soonbe launched whose military forces were to be led by loao Tavares [31 this acfuallyhappened a few days later. On the day of the ballot, these pro-integ,rairon forces

lv5

196 Masters of Terror

would withdraw to a 'base camp' to be located in Suai. But afterward+ with the UNgone, they would emerge and launch simultaneous attacks on'Dli, Baucau, l.ospalos,Same, Ainaro, Viqueque and Manafuto', killing all pro-independence leaders in those

places. This had been decided in a meeting at Abilio's home, the source said.E2

At the time, many foreign observers tended to dismiss such plans as fanciful. As ithappened, though, they tumed out to be remarkably accurate. There was an enlargedbudget controlled by the govemor, there was a coordinated militia front, extra weap-

ons were channeled to militias through local district rnilitary commands, ballot daywas quiet, and there were massive, well-coordinated attacks immediately after the

ballot in which many pro-independence figures were murdered. Abilio Soares stood

at the heart of these plans.

Abilio Soares was present at a large show of militia force in Dili on 17 April 7999, atwhich Aitarak militia leader Eurico Guterres [3] said that pro-independence leaders

should be killed. Afterwards on the same day, the same militias killed at least a dozen

people in the house of opposition figure Manuel Carrascalao. Abilio Soares took noaction against those who had committed the murders.

Throughout 1999 he also took no action against those district heads under his

control who were clearly identified with acts of violence: Leonito Martins [3], Manuelde Sousa [3], Domingos Soares [3], Edmundo Conceico [3] and Guilherme dos Santos

[3]. Instead, for example in the case of the Liquica church massacre on 5 April 1999, he

traced violence by pro-Indonesian militias to pro'independence 'provocation'.63

In May 1999 he ordered the police and military, as well as local government all

over the territory, to run a Program to 'socialise' the prolndonesian autonomy oP-

tion. This contradicted the 5 May 1999 LIN Agreement not only because it began the

campaign early but because it involved the threat of force. In June 1999 letters wereleaked in which Govemor Abilio Soares promised to use millions of dollars in WorldBank poverty relief to pay for the'socialisation' program. Five per cent of the alloca-

tion for each district was set aside for the prolndonesian militias there. Other docu-

ments showed the militias were part of the military strucfure.B

In February 200\, a year and a half after the Lrdonesian withdrawal from East

Timor, he angrily rejected President Abdurrahman Wahid's apology for human-rightsabuses committed against the population of East Timor, and said he would continueto campaign for the 'refum' of East Timor to Indonesia.6

Background

Bom in Laclubar, Manafuto district in central East Timor, Abilio Soares was aged

52 n lggg. His elder brother ]ose Femando Osorio Soares was the secretary-generalof the pro-Indonesian party Apodeti, and died at the hands of the pro-independenceparty Fretilin in the civil warbefore the lndonesian invasion late in 1975. Abilio Soares

himself worked with the rnilitary to facilitate the invasion. ln 1976 he became (in hisown words) 'very close friends' with (thm) Lieutenant Prabowo Subianto [5]' He isnot well educated.

Before being appointed governor in late 7992 he was first mayor of Dili, thendistrict head (bupatfi in his native Manafuto. As govemor, he was much closer to the

The Key Suspects [31

military than his predecessor Mario Carrascalao had been. Just after becorning gover-nor he triggered international outrage by an unrepentant remark about the santaCruz massacre of L1 November 1991 ('many more should have died').86

The three ('inseparable') pillars of East Timor society, he said on one occasion, are'the military, the provincial government, and the church'.57

He was assisted throughout his tenure as governor by a succession of largelyinvisible but almost always military deputy governors: (1) Timor veteran Col./Brig.Gen ]ohanes Haribowo, (2) Col fohanes Suryo Prabowo (no relation to PrabowoSubianto), who resigned prematurely, (3) former provincial secretary RajakarinaBrahmana, apparently very briefly if implemented at all, and (4) Air CommodoreMusiran Darmosuwito, known as'an intel man'who went on to become acting gov-ernor in Irian Jaya in 2000.

In May \994, again with the backing of Prabowo Subianto, he put forward anautonomy proposal for East Timor, but President Suharto rejected it as 'unconstitu-tional'and Abilio Soares was sent to a rnilitary course in Jakarta for four months as anapparent disciplinary measure.

During his career as govemor he faced a growing nationalist revolt within EastTimor. He combatted this revolt by frequently threatening to sack civil servants whofavoured independence, and cutting off scholarship funding for students thought tofeel the same way. In 1995 he presided at the inauguration of a military-backed vigi-lante group called Gadapaksi (sometimes spelled Gardapaksi) which, along the linesof the militias that terrorised East Timor in 1999, engaged in violence and intimidationagainst people suspected of pro-independence sentiments.b8

In September 1,997 he was appointed for a second term as govemor. It was widelyreported that corruptbusiness practices involving Suharto's family were crucial sourcesof support. His corruption - through his family's Anak Liambau Group - was soodious that it led his deputy governor suryo Prabowo to resign within a few monthsof arriving in 1998. ln the first weeks after suharto's resignation in May 1998, AbilioSoares' corruption was the theme of strong demonstrations against him. However,the demonstrations soon acquired a political character, demanding a referendum.

Like his own sponsorship of Gadapaksi, his relatives sponsored a range of organi-sations that were in fact fronts for military interests. Among them were the EastTimor student Movement led in ]ogjakarta in r995by his nephew octavio soares,Klibur Klibur Oan Timor Badame (KOTB) set up in February 1999 and run by hisbrother-in-law Gil Alves as a moderate pro-autonomy forum, and the Morok militiain Manatuto district run by his family members in 1999.be All these organisationswere insufficient to damn the East Timorese nationalist surge of 7998-99.

Domingos Maria das Dores SOARES ('Koli7'Coli') KADistrict head (bupat i) DlliDomingos Soares is often described as a young intellecfual, and has a postgradu-

ate law degree from Airlangga University, surabaya. He is married to the daughter ofthe last Indonesian govemor of East Timor, Abilio Soares l3l.In 1997 he ran and lostagainst the latter as a candidate for East Timor govemor.m

r97

198 Masters of Tmor

During the 1990s he frequently represented the lndonesian official view at meet-

ings on East Timor overseas. After finishing university sfudies he served as mayor ofDili and then as district head of the greater Dili district.

On 27 January 1999, the same day President Habibie announced that a ballotwould be held on East Timor's independencg he was appointed head of an umbrella

organisation to represent Indonesian interests in the coming struggle. The FPDK(Forum Persafuan, Demokrasi dan Keadilan - Unity, Democracy & fustice Forum)was closely related to the govemment - its branches in all East Timor's 13 districtswere well equipped and usually headed by the district head or district secretary. It was

funded from the govemment budget.%l

Militias under the FPDK were known as Milisia Pro-Otonomi (MPO), although inpractice militias were maintained through military contacts at the local and the East

Timorese level. Thus while Domingos Soares is not personally known to have en-

gaged in violence he is responsible for organising (including funding) the militias thatdid commit acts of violence.262

Apparently less interested in militias but enjoying more backing from some key

Jakarta figures was another prolndonesian East Tirnorese organisation, BRTT (Barisan

Rakyat Timor Timur). Established on 30 April 1999 and led by veteran pro-Indonesiandiplomat Lopes da Cruz,it was allegedly backed initially by Wiranto [3] and Foreign

Minister Ali Alatas.26 In June 1999 the two joined together under the name United

Front for East Timor, led by Lopes da Cruz and Domingos soares together. IoasTavares [3] commanded the group's militia forces.

On 19 April 1999, r^ his capacity as DiIi district head, Domingos Soares appointedEurico Guterres [3] to head a civilian civil guard [Pam swakarsa]. This was only twodays after Guterres' troops murdered 12 people in Manuel Carrascalao's house, fol-Iowing a large militia show of strength.d At that 77 Apnl militia rally, Domingossoares said the'civilian guards' were each being paid Rp 10G200,000 a month (us$10-

20), taken out of his Dili district budget.26

On 11 May 1999 Domingos Soares was present at a secret meeting in Dili of militialeaders, territorial military, military intelligence and police officers, at which plans

were discussed to repeat violent operations against pro-independence actors of the

sort conducted the previous month, under the slogan 'Autonomy or Death'. The

military source for this leak said that East Timor military commander Col TonoSuratman [3] was the main initiator of these plans, while Domingos Soares and Golkar

chairman in East Timor Armindo soares Mariano [1] were the main organisers.266

On 20 September \999, the day tnterfet landed in East Timor, he became chairman(head of the consultative board) of a new organisation, which was in February 2000

relaunched as lJntas, dedicated to reclairning East Timor for Indonesia. DomingosSoares has persistently rejected the ballot result. Although he publicly rejected the use

of violence and denied that armed militias remained under Untas control (and deniedthat they even existed), in reality relations were close, though sometimes strained as

militia leaders accused Untas leaders of elitism.%7 Domingos Soares' rhetoric at Untas

meetings has been laced with racism, blaming the 'albinos' for East Timor's Present'colonialism'.2s

The Key Suspects 131

In December 1999 he was questioned by KPP HAM, but he refused to show up forinterrogation by the Attomey-General's Department in May 2000.%e Untas engagedin some negotiation with CNRT in December 2WO.n0

Manuel de SOUSA KBesi Merah Putih militia conunander, Liquica

Manuel de Sousa was a member of the local asssembly (DPRD-II) in Liquica 1992-97 for the political party PDI. He had been a leader in the Kpassus-sponsored militiagroup Gadapaksi, formed in 1995. In late December 1998 he worked with the Liquicadistrict head (bupati) Leonito Martins [3] and the local military comrnand (LtCol AsepKuswani [3]) as weU as the Kopassus intelligence organisation SGI (headed by LColYavat Sudrajat [3]) to establish the Besi Merah Putih militia. It was based in Maubara,just west of Liquica. De Sousa said it was formed in self-defence against pro-independ-ence groups.zTr

Pro-independence sentiment was strong in the Liquica area, and the main purposeof the Besi Merah Putih militia was to reverse that sentiment through terror. In Feb-tuary 1999 his militia allegedly attacked the Guiso village near Liquica, arresting andthen torturing women and children. De Sousa said the action was taken to punishvillage heads who were paid by the govemment while opposing it at the same time.He likened the push for independence to 'war'. 'Besi Merah Putih are planning forwar, we are ready to be held responsible,' he said.272

In March 1999 the militia attacked the pro-independence party CNRT in Liquica,leaving (by one account) 35 dead, and forcing survivors to flee to the forest.273

A private Indonesian SCTV television broadcast showed him on 17 April 1999leading a crowd that attacked the house of opposition politician Manuel Carrascalaoin Dili that left at least 12 dead.

In Liquica itself Besi Merah Putih worked together with police and military per-sonnel to terrorise Liquica town. Manuel de Sousa said he wanted pro-independencepeople sheltering in the church to surrender to police. Refusing attempts by priests tomediate, he then launched an attack on the church, saying it was in revenge for friendskidnapped and killed by Falintil. About 50 men, women and children were killed inthe attack on 5 April 1999, which was conducted by militias together with soldiers andpolicemen. The massacre in the church in Liquica is one of the worst single incidents of1999.274

In mid-May militias under his command successfully intimidated the territory'sonly daily newspaper, Suara Timor Timur, into closing down. Manuel de Sousa, in a

Ietter to the editor before it closed, blamed a previous attack on the newspaper (byanother rnilitia group) on'biased' reporting by the paper itself. The paper later reap-peared but its editorial line was much less independent than before.2Ts

In the same month of May 1999 Manuel de Sousa was allegedly a member of a

team that went to |akarta to assassinate former East Timor govemor Mario Carrascalao,who had spoken out in favour of East Timorese self-determination. Carrascalao fledto Porfugal when he leamed of the team, which he was told contained known killers

799

200 Masters of Terror

such as Lafaek Saburai [1] and Hercules (both close associates of former Kopassuscommander Prabowo Subianto [5]).276

In May 1999 he and Martins, no doubt with the military, brought in many newmilitia members from outside East Timor, including West Timor, Sulawesi andSumatra.2z Also in May 1999, Manuel de Sousa and Leonito Martins ordered Besi

Merah Putih to conduct military-style operations in villages around Liquica, in whichhouses were destroyed and alleged preindependence villagers were arrested'2n

Despite strong evidence of his violent activities, he continued to be prominent inlndonesian govemment circles. East Timor's police chief Col (Pol) Timbul Silaen [3] in

June 1999 appointed him and Eurico Guterres [3] as leaders of a civil defence force(Pam Swakarsa). 'They will be in charge of maintaining security under the coordina-tion of the Indonesian Police,'he said.2D In the TJune 1999 national election he ran ona Golkar ticket, together with two other prominent rnilitias leaders Eurico Guterresand ]aae--TavarcL[3].'*

The East Timorese human-rights organisation Yayasan HAK says that Manuel de

Sousa was present at a meeting in Liquica on 12 June 1999 with local government,military and other militia leaders where plans were discussed to forcibly evacuatewomen and children to West Timor. Human Rights Watch Asia says he was alsopresent at another meeting of militia leaders on 2 September 1999 at which Besi MerahPutih commanders explained that with the population cleared out, it would be easier

for the militias to fight a war for integration.2E

After the lndonesian pull-out he went to Atambua in West Timor' He told KPP

HAM about his involvement in the attack on Carrascalao's house and the Liquicachurch massacre, that he was not a militia leader but that he regretted Habibie'sdecision to let East Timor'go', and was angry at UN 'cheating'in the ballot.a2

He allegedly ordered his 200-strong Besi Merah Putih militia to conduct cross-

border strikes into East Timor. Indonesian military told UN personnel in August 2000

that de Sousa had been arrested for doing this.a

In September 2000 Attomey-General's Department officers were unable to findhim (thus casting serious doubt on the military claim that he had been arrested a

month earlier.2&

LtCol (Pol) GatotSUBIAKTORO [Subiaktol APolice chief (Kepala Polres Covalima) in Suai

He was appointed police chief in Covalima (Suai), southwestem East Timot, on27

June 1998 (then still with the rank of police major).2s Together with the militarycommanders LtCol Ahmad Masagus [3] and briefly LtCol (CZ) Lilik Kushadiyanto[3] for security in Suai throughout the lead-up to the 30 August 1999 and its bloodyaftermath.

One of the worst single massacres after the ballot occurred at the Suai Catholicchurch on 6 September 1999. Eyewitness said police officers for whom he was resPon-

sible took part in the attack on unarmed refugees sheltering there that left at least 50

dead (see footnotes for Lt Sugito [3]).

The Key Suspects I3l 20'l

LtGenTyasnoSUDARTO DHead of military intelligence (Kepala BIA)A former militia leader who fled overseas in April 1999, Tomas Goncalves, told

Radio Hilversum (5 October 1999) that he had heard Tyasno's name at several meet-ings between militia leaders and military officers in early 1999. East Timor commanderTono Suratman [3]and officers from the Kopassus intelligence organisation SGI toldthe militia leaders it was alright to kill, and that they were speaking in the name ofTyasno. A senior East Timorese joumalist told us in May 1999 that he believed BIA hadbeen tasked to 'success' the direct ballot in East Timor, and that it was BIA officers,together with Kopassus, who were most active in running the militia operations.46Tyasno may have been part of a 'black' operation that also involved MajGen ZackyMakarim [3] and MajGen Sjafrie Syamsuddin [3], reporting to Tyasno. If so, the actualofficer movements and assignments are not yet known.

On 19 February 1999 Tyasno joined Gen Wiranto [3] and other senior officers toreceive a delegation of angry pro-Indonesian East Timorese, Ied by Domingos Soares[3], who came to Jakarta asking for weapons. Wiranto said no weapons could begiven them. He then visited Dli as part of a high-powered delegation on 20 April 1999,to meet with pro-Indonesian figures.

Tyasno was named in 2000 in connection with a US$2.2 million counterfeit moneyscandal. Retired intelligence officer Ismail Put(e)ra said Tyasno in July 1999 asked him,in the name of his commanding officer Gen Wiranto, to print the money and said itwas meant to fund militias. 'Gen Tyasno told me that Gen Wiranto had picked BIA torun the counterfeit money operation to fund the (prolndonesia) East Timorese rnili-tias,'Ismail Putera said after the verdict. 'He (Tyasno) told me that the army could notafford to lose East Timor. He said I had to do this for the army,' Ismail said. IsmailPutera and his co-defendants were arrested in February 2000 and brought to court inAugust-September 2000.47

It is not clear if there was a connection between this counterfeit scandal and an-other linking counterfeiter Soemaryono, also a military man, with army chief of staffGen Siswoio [11.

An Australian newspaper reported that Tyasno had been sent a few days beforethe ballot to replace Zacky Makarim as security advisor to the unamet liaison bodyP3fi. The move came in response to intemational pressure (following the visit of a USCongressional delegation led by Tom Harkin) about the role being pla yedby Zacky.asHowever, the report seems to have been in error, as Tyasno never arrived.

Tyasno's name was among officers, said to be plotting a coup against Habibieimmediately after the ballot result was announced.4e

Background

Tyasno Sudarto is a Cenhal javanese Christian bom in 1948. He graduated fromthe Magelang Military Academy in 1970 and spent seven years in Kostrad. He isreported to have been a prot6g6 of intelligence czar Benny Murdani and appears tohave spent most of his career in intelligence positions, including a period as DefenceAttachd in Paris. In 1995 he became head of Directorate C (military affairs) in the

202 Masters of Tenor

Armed Forces Intelligence Board (BIA), and the following year he served under Wirantoas Assistant for Planning to the Army Chief of Staff (Asrena Kasad).

Tyasno enjoyed close relations with both Suharto and Wiranto.2m Amid wide'spread rioting in April 1998 he was appointed to the sensitive position of militarycommander of Central Java. In January the following year Wiranto installed him as

head of the Armed Forces Intelligence Board (BIA). This was seen by reformers as a

step backwards. 2er

LtCol (In0 YayatSUDRAJAT KAD

Commander of the Combined Intelligence Task Force (Satuan Gabungan Intelijen,sGr),Dili

This Kopassus intelligence operative was listed by KPP HAM for passing weaPonsto rnilitia groups. Much of the evidence rests on the testimony of Tomas Goncalves,local government regent (bupati) in Ermera and a militia leader who defected toMacau in April 1999. Goncalves said he first met senior military officers at a meeting inlate 1998 to discuss plans to recruit local militias to counter an expected referendum onEast Timor's future. Present at the meeting at the Dili military headquarters wereregional commander Maj-Gen Adam Damiri [3] and East Timor commander ColTono Suratman [3]. Other meetings followed. Govemor Abilio Soares [3] was present

at at least one of these in March 1999, where he said an 'operation' was being plannedthat involved killing pro.independence leaders and their families.a2

Regularly present at these meeting+ claiming to represent both Adam Damiri and

Tono Suratman, was the commander of the intelligence unit Combined tntelligenceTask Force (Safuan Gabungan Intelijen, SGI). This was a unit run by Kopassus eliteforces through its Tribuana Task Force. East Timorese had long feared SGI for theimpunity with which it employed torture against detainees. The unit largely fell out-side the territorial military command, although it was formally seconded to the terri-torial commander (Bawah Kendali Operasi, BKO).

Yayat Sudrajat replaced LtCol Wioyotomo Nugroho [3] in this post some timeearly in 1999. He is mentioned as commander of Special Task Force Tribuana VIII, an

offshoot of the elite combat unit Kopassus.2e3

One such meeting was held on 15 February 1999' Sudrajat was in charge of distrib-uting money (Rp 200,000 for a new recruit) and weapons. Goncalves said Yayat Sudrajat

tumed up in Ermera in March 1999 with three pickups loaded with hundreds offirearms to be distributed to militias.

Another report says he was involved in the Liquica massacre of 6 April 1999. Heworked closely with the territorial military command structure'e

He revealed little during interrogation by Indonesian officials in September 2000,

saying he was only doing his job. His career has not suffered. After his SGI appoint-ment in Dili he briefly held the position of deputy commander of Kopassus Group 4(Sandi Yudha, intelligence/ secret warfare), based in Cijantung, Jakarta. He was then

promoted to battalion commander of Kopassus Group V (counter-terrorism), and

then in about March 2000 to intelligence assistant to the Kopassus general commander

The Key Suspects [3] 203

(Asintel Danjen K), replacing Sunarko [1], at the same time rising in rank tocolonel.2es

Kopassus was, according to Western intelligence sources, involved in destabilisingoperations in several parts of Indonesia (Irian Jaya, Aceh, the Moluccas as well as EastTimor) in 2fi)0.2%

LtCol(In0SUDRAIATAS KDMilitary district commander, Lautem, based in Lospalos (Komandan Kodim 1629)

Sudradjat occupied this position from November'1.998. As such he is presumed tohave been responsible for the mobilisation and arming of militias from early 1999.The militia group with the highest profile in the Lautem area was Tim Alfa, with about300 members and 300 firearms.DT

According to a MataBEAN report, Sudradjat said at a ceremony in Lospalos inApril 1999 that local citizens and officials who did not support the autonomy causewould be shot in the head. The threat created an atmosphere of insecurity among thepeople of Lospalos.2es

Sudradjat was named in the KPP HAM inquiry for having supplied weapons tothe militias and allowing them the use of a military base.2e

Two soldiers under his command were listed in Appendix 5 of the KPP HAMreport for allegedly shooting a man named Thomas Soares in Lospalos (no date):

. 2d Sgt Thomas

' L$ Pvt SikuThe report recommended they be investigated for crimes against humanity.

Firstlt(In0 SUGITO KALocal rnilitary commander (Komandan Koramil) in Suai, CovalimaSuai is the main town in southwestern East Timor. Eyewitnesses testified to the

Indonesian investigation KPP HAM that he and Covalima district head Col HermanSediono [3] stood by in military fatigues and carrying rifles while they ordered police,soldiers and militias to kill refugees who had been sheltering at the Ave Maria Catho-lic church for months. The attack occurred on 5 September 1999, two days after theresults of the independence ballot were announced. Following this attack severalwomen survivors were reportedly taken to Covalima Kodim Headquarters and sexu-ally assaulted. Lieutenant Sugito later led 31 soldiers and a group of Laksaur militia-men who trucked 27 bodies to the village of Alas in Belu, West Timor, where theyburied them. The bodies were exhumed by a KPP HAM delegation more than twomonths later. The attack on the church was preceded by random attacks on villagersand townsfolk that began within four hours of the ballot announcement. Sugito tookpart in at least some of these attacks, alongside other soldiers and Laksaur militiamen.

The final KPP HAM report recommended him in Appendix 5 for prosecution forcrimes against humanity over this massacre, as well as over the subsequent bumingand looting of Suai city.

204 Masters of Tenor

When called to testify in Jakarta by KPP HAM early in 2000, he refused to attend,saying he was 'traumatised'by his family's suffering in the Ambon riots. Sugito(sometimes listed as Sugito Karman) denied responsibility for the attack, saying the

chaos was caused by factional fighting among Timorese.3m

LtCol (Infl SUJARWO (Soedjarwo, Soedarwo, Soejarwo) ADistrict military commander of Dili (Dandiml'627)

Sujarwo took over from LCol Endar Priyanto [3] as commander of the Dili mili-tary district close to the 30 August ballot date. He was thus responsible, under theterms of the UN agreement, for security there at the time of the ballot and also, underthe Indonesian declaration of martial law on 7 September L999, during the subsequentmilitia rampage that destroyed much of Dili. The Attorney General listed him amongthe military officers to be prosecuted for human rights crimes in East Timor.sl

In |uly 1999, when still an officer in the East Timor command (Korem 164lWiradharma), he wrote a 13-page 'Operational Plan Wira Dharma 99'. Under the

heading 'Enemy Forces', it described not only the guerrillas of the resistance move-ment, Falintil, but also civilians, including unarmed student groups and political or-ganisations.12

Sujarwo (Serial 29303) probably belongs to the graduating class of 1981 at themilitary academy (Akabri). Before moving to the Dili command, he commandedBattalion 303 (part of the 13th Infantry Brigade within Koshad), based in Garut, West

Java. This non-organic battalion's combat experience in East Timor includes beinginvolved in the Santa Cruz massacre of November 1991.3m

After the Indonesian pull-out from East Timor he was transferred first to East

Flores, where he again became district military commander (Dandim 1624, 11 Apnl2000), then to Irian Juyu.*

Col (InO Tono SURATMAN F X KADEast Timor military resort commander (Komandan Korem 164/ Wiradharma)

According to Untaet consultant James Dunn, Suratman was involved with theformation of the latest phase of militias in East Timor from as early as August 1998. On10 or 12 August 1998, in the face of rising independence demands following Suharto's

resignation the previous May, Suratman and his superior officer, Udayana commander

MaiGen Adam Damiri [3], met with three men who were already or were to become

prorninent militia leaders: Ioaglavarcg [3], Eurico Guterres [3] and Cancio de Carvalho

[1]. The East Timorese were told they must organise 'to protect integration'.ffi

Suratman was openly critical of the decision announced by President Habibie on

27 January 1999 that gave the East Timorese an intemationally supervised referen-

dum, and he seemed less than comrnitted to implementing it.sAfter that, according to defecting mfitia leader Tomas Goncalves, his office be'

came one of two key military organisers of the militias around East Timor, the otherbeing the Kopassus-run SGI (headed by LCol Wiyotomo Nugroho [3], then LCol

The Key Suspects [31

Yayat Sudraiat [3]).30? His two closest civilian associates in this endeavour wereArrnindo Soares [1], the speaker of East Timor's provincial parliament, and DorningosSoares [3], the district head (bupati) of Dili.s

Another militia leader (Herminio da Costa [3], not a defector) told Americanjournalist Allen Naim that he had made a secret accord with Tono Suratman and EastTimor police chief Col (Pol) Timbul Silaen [3]. It authorised his men to'attack homes,interrogate and kill members of the [pro-independence] CNRT and Fretilin'. The onecondition, he added, was that they must refrain from common crimes like 'car theftand stealing food'.s

After the deadly militia attack on the home of former provincial parliamentarianManuel Carrascalao on 17 April, Suratman allegedly paid militia leader Eurico Guterres,with money that furned out to be counterfeit!31o

Throughout 1999 he held a constant round of meetings with militia leaders. Atmany of these meeting+ it is alleged, plans were made to conduct unlawful activitiesincluding (threats of) murder and forced deportation. We know only some of thedates. They included the following:

' 25 March, in Dili: a coordination meeting, including with notorious militialeaders Joao Tavares and Eurico Guterres, at which Govemor Abilio Soares [3]allegedly said even priests and nuns should be killed.3ll

' 1 Map in Oesilo (Ambeno enclave in West Timor): a rally at which govem-ment officials say the CNRT should not be allowed to exist. Two days later, heattended another meeting at which the CNRT 'voluntarily' disbanded itself inAmbeno.312

r 11 May, in Dili: Tono Suratman led a meeting with Domingos Soares, SGI, andpolice chief Timbul Silaen, at which plans were discussed to conduct a secondphase of the so-called'Operasi Sisir' (Combing Operation) of 17-19 April. Thissecond phase was to be executed by militia groups from 15 to 25 May underthe motto 'Autonomy or Death'.313

' 18 June, at the East Timor military headquarters (Korem) in Dili: coordinationmeeting with MajGen Zacky Makarim [3], BrigGen Glenny Kairupan [3], andMajGen Kiki Syahnakri [3](who all outranked Suratman!), and several rnilitialeaders. The meeting developed two detailed contingency plans. The first aimedto derail the vote through coordinated violence. The second, far more com-plex, plan was prepared in case the vote was held and went against Indonesia.This involved using the militias to reject the results and to demand that EastTimor be partitioned.3la

' 24July, at the East Timor military headquarters: similar coordination meetingwith police chief Timbul Silaen, Armindo Soares Mariano, and militia leaders.The meeting discussed plans for a scorched earth campaign in East Timor inthe likely event of the pro'independence vote winning. Police and militarypersonnel were assigned to 'assist' the Aitarak militia, which would play thecentral and most visible role.315

' 26 July, at Baucau Kopassus headquarters: coordination meeting with localmilitia commanders, accompanied by MajGen Zacky Makarim. The meetingconcerned the distribution of weapons in the event of a 'civil war'.316

205

206 Masters of Teror

He told Australia's Channel 9 program Sunday about four months prior to theballot: 'I want to give you this message: If the pro-independence side wins, it is notgoing to be just the govemment of Indonesia that has to deal with what follows. TheUN and Australia are also going to have to solve the problem, for there will be nolimit. Everything is going to be destroyed. East Timor will not exist as it does now. It'llbe much worse than 23 years a9o.'317

Largely due to Unamet pressure to remove officers who were sponsoring militiaviolence, Tono Suratman was replaced on 13 August 1999, a fortnight before theballot, by Col Nur Muis [3]. Tono Suratman was promoted to Brigadier-General, andbecame deputy spokesperson at TNI Headquarters - a desk job that would probablynot please a Kopassus officer.3l8

Among his direct subordinates at Korem L64, two who are also suspected ofinvolvement in arming militias were his deputy corunander Col Mudjiono [1], and

his intelligence head Maj RM Bambang Wisnumurthy [1).

He was reportedly named in the Indonesian KPP HAM investigation into atroci-ties in East Timor for having failed to prevent soldiers under his command fromparticipating in militia activities, and for having conducted briefings for the militias.3le !

In a book he wrote about his East Timor experiences, he said he had to overcomedeeply-rooted conflicts among East Timorese (eg pp.63, 75,98) - and a 'culture ofviolence' (pp.15, 24) and'civil war' (p.27) - in order to preserve law and order and

carry out the ballot successfully. He categorically denied any TNI command responsi-bility for the militia violence, which he said emerged spontaneously (pp.45-45,76).3n

One observer has argued that Suratman's actions to support violence in 1.999

could have been carried out in defiance of contrary orders from Gen Wiranto inJakarta. Such a case of 'broken command' could have arisen from officers on the

ground who feared losing all that they had fought for. A more likely alternative, if weneed an altemative at all to the idea that Suratman was simply following orders, wasthat he may have acted under a parallel fakarta command issuing from Kopassus.

Kopassus exercised a strong influence over many key military positions in East Timorin 1999.3'?1

Background

Suhartono Suratman was bom in about 1952, and graduated from the rnilitaryacademy :u:.1975. He commanded combat Sector A (in eastem East Timor) for a timeuntil 1995. He then commanded Kopassus Group 3, a training unit based in Batujajar,West Java. This unit also trained East Timorese militia leaders.322 He spent some timetraining in England in this period.3a He was appointed to the East Timor commandon 10 June 1998 after the incumbent was killed in a helicopter crash.32a Suratmanretained the Group 3 command after becoming Korem commander, thus facilitatingthe continued flow of arms from Kopassus to paramilitary groups even afterPrabowo's [5] fall from grace.s5

The Key Suspects [31 207

FiTstLtSUTRISNO KDeputy commander and chief of intelligence at the Bobonaro district military

headquarters, based in Maliana (Kodim 1635 Bobonaro)

Lt Sutrisno allegedly played a major role in one of the biggest single massacres inEast Timor in 1999. It occurred at the Maliana police station on 8 September 1999, fourdays after the ballot result was announced (see LtCol Burhannudin Siagian [3], hiscommanding officer). Eyewitnesses say Sutrisno was present and helped dispose ofthe bodies afterwards. KPP HAM noted Sutrisno's direct involvement in killing.326

In other incidents, Lt Sutrisno is said to have organised a 29 June 1999 stone-throwing attack on the UN compound in Maliana. When presented with evidence ofcomplicity in the attack, he jokingly replied: 'If I was involved, everyone would havebeen killed.'327

According to East Timorese human rights activists, Lt Sutrisno on 8 luly 1999addressed a meeting of all the militias in Bobonaro, named Dadurus Merah Putih,where he encouraged them to kill at least four or six Unamet staff, in order to provoke'Nato' into attacking Jakarta. (This was a reference to the Nato intervention in Kosovoat the time.) He also told the meeting, held at the local military headquarters (KodimBobonaro in Maliana), that if the independence side should win the TNI was ready tofight anyone. He then instructed the militia to organise a boycott of the ballot, and toforce people to display the Indonesian colours red and white.34

Also in July 1999, the East Timor press reported that Lt Sutrisno had issued a deaththreat to joumalist Lourence Vicente Martins, who worked for the laknrta Posf as wellas SuaraTimorTimur. Lourence was the'enemy' of all the militias and of the Bobonaromilitary command, Sutrisno shouted emotionally in front of a crowd. He accusedLourenco of having brought a Unamet staff member to Bobonaro and of reportingviolent incidents that had occurred there. 'We will find him wherever he may try tohide,' Sutrisno yelled. The previous April, heavily armed militias controlled by JoaoTavares [3] had destroyed the home in Maliana of this same joumalist, for writingreports that'discredited' them.3D

First Lt Sutrisno, a M-year old officer from Surabaya, previously served as mili-tary commander in nearby Cailaco from 1990 to 1994.

CaptAgusSUWARNO KStaff of East Timor or Dili military command? (Kasesterpol, possibly at Korem)

KPP HAM listed him among the direct perpetrators in Appendix 5 of its finalreport. It recomrnended he be prosecuted for crimes against humanity over his roleon an attack against the Catholic Diocesan Chambers (Camra Eclesestica) in Dili atabout 2:30pm on 5 September 1999, the day after the ballot result was announced.Refugees sheltering in the chambers saw men wearing the black shirts of the Aitarakmilitia attack and bum the offices, leaving an estimated 25 dead and five injured.m

We are not familiar with the Kasesterpol position in the military hierarchy.33lA Sgt Agus Suwarno is mentioned as an army officer in charge of police in Dili inNovember '1.992.332

208 Masters of Teror

u.",O*". perpetrators listed in Appendix 5 of the KPP HAM report over this incident

' Mateus Carvalho (Commander of Aitarak D Company, possibly the same as

Mateus Hera also listed there)s. Marcelino (nicknamed'Knal Pot')

' Marcal (member of Brimob)

MajGen(InflKikiSYAHNAKRI DOperations Assistant to Army Chief of Staff; Martial law administrator 7 Septem-

ber - 27 September 1999

The Dunn Report concluded that Kiki Syahnakri's involvement in human rightsviolations in East Timor in 1999 may have been 'peripheral'.s It is more likely to havebeen substantial, first as a member of a special Abri headquarters team for East Timor(headed by MajGen Zacky Anwar Makarim. [3]), then briefly as post-ballot Indonesian martial law administrator responsible directly to armed forces commander GenWiranto [3], and finally as Indonesian regional military commander for Udayana, aterritorial command that included West Timor, which became the base for retreatingpro-lndonesian militias.

Kiki Syahnakri was the East Timor expert on the staff of army chief of staff GenSiswojo [1]. On 29-30 March 1999 he joined the Indonesian delegation to a closed-doormeeting with East Timorese and other intemational actors at Chatham House inLondon. He was one of only two senior Indonesian military officers there, the otherbeing Air Vice'Marshal Graito Usodo.3$ A confidential source who was there told usthe entire Indonesian delegation was'fully involved'with the pre.ballot rnilitia shat-egy, as well as 'informed' about the post-ballot contingency plans.

Upon his retum to Indonesia he met several East Timorese pro-Indonesian militialeaders, including Tomas Goncalves, at Abri headquarters in Jakarta. Goncalves, whodefected in April 1999, said Kiki impressed on them the need to go ahead with themilitias. The TNI, said Syahnakri, 'was getting weaker and the only way for the pro'autonomy forces to defend themselves is by organising the militia. If there are anysons of Timorese who wanted to fight for the red-and-white flag, they would supportthem with guns and money.'3s Goncalves named Kiki Syahnakri as one of ninesenior military officers implementing the militia strategy within Abri.sT

On 14 April 1999 Syahnakri arrived in Dili on a 'working visit' that saw him con-duct high level meetings until at least 20 April, the day a powerful military delegationled by General Wiranto arrived from Jakarta to dine with militia leaders.ffi

Immediately after the militia attack on the home of Manuel Carrascalao in Dili on17 April 1999, Kiki Syahnakri, Zacky Makarim and East Timor commander Col TonoSuratman [3] visited Bishop Belo. All three as.sured him of their readiness to guaranteethe safety of the people, 'down to the level of the village'.se

Several reports indicate that MajGen Kiki Syahnakri and Kiki's former assistantBrigGen Glenny Kairupan [3] were part of a three.man team led by MajGen ZackyAnwar Makarim [3](even though Kiki and Zacky had the same rank). Their likelymission, to attempt to slow down the drift towards independence by reviving themilitias, went back to November 1998.34

The Key Suspects [31

Syahnakri acknowledged that it was he who drafted the telegram of 5 May 1999that was signed by his immediate superior LtGen Iohny Lumintang [3] and sent to awide range of senior military and government officials. The telegram envisaged amajor evacuation from East Timor in the event of the pro-independence option win-ning the ballot.sl

On 18 June 1999 he took part in a meeting at the East Timor military headquarters(Korem) with Zacky Makarim, Glenny Kairupan, Tono Suratman and several militialeaders. The meeting developed two detailed contingency plans. The first aimed toderail the vote through coordinated violence. The second, far more complex, plan wasprepared in case the vote was held and went against Indonesia. This involved usingthe militias to reject the results and to demand that East Timor be partitioned.a2

From this time until the vote on 30 August Syahnakri likely spent much of his timein East Timor. A source dated 1 August said he had been in East Timor as part ofZacky's team for about 'a month'.343

On the other hand, Unamet chief executive Ian Martin makes no mention ofMajGen Syahnakri's presence in East Timor after Unamet's arrival in early June and aSyahnakri visit in late August. Martin would no doubt have mention"a it it he hadknown. On25 or 26 August Unamet helicoptered Syahnakri from Dili to a Falintil basein the mountains in a last-ditch attempt to head off violence through dialogue.s

On 30 August, the day of the ballot, realising the vote would go against Indonesia,the core team of three - 7-acky, Kiki and Glenny - met at the official residence of theEast Timor military conunander (by then Col Nur Muis [3])). They decided that amassive riot would break out on the day the ballot result was announced - at thatstage thought to be 7 September 1999. Telephone and electricity would be cut. TheDili-based Aitarak militia would have the major role of controlling all transport pointsin and out of East Timor.s

As martial law administrator between 7 and 27 September 1999, he was oftencredited by foreign observers as one TNI officer who tried his best to reign in militiaviolence. However, the fact remains that the worst of the post-ballot atrocities tookplace under his command. If his role in planning that violence was indeed as impor-tant as it is described above, his failure to reign in the violence is not merely a sin ofomission but one of commission.

Kiki's deputy as martial law adminishator was LtCol (CZI) Lilik Kushadiyanto [3],who may have played a role in the Suai massacre of 8 September.

More importantly, Kiki was assisted by Col Gerhan Lentara [1] and Col IrwanKusnadi [3], both commanders within the Kostrad combat Airborne Brigade andboth with extensive East Timor experience. In effect the appointment restored the oldKolakops system in which a commander outside the territorial apparatus commandscombat operations.ffi It is thought that these sectoral commands were a key elementin the militia strategy throughout 1999.347

According to a radio interview with Alan Naim just before he was deported fromEast Timor on L5 September 1999, the Aitarak militia were operating out of the Korem164/ Wira Dharma (East Timor) headquarters which Kiki was using as a base for themartial law command. He added it was obvious that the militias were working closelytogether with Kiki.ffi

209

2ro Masters of Teror

On 27 September 1999 Syahnakri handed over securilr control in East Timor toInterfet commander MajGen Peter Cosgrove and withdrew to Bali, where he re-

placed Adam Damiri [3] as Udayana regional military commander. The region in-cludes West Timor, which had become the base for East Timorese militias.

Following a militia attack in Atambua, West Timor, on 5 September 2000 that leftthree foreign UN humanitarian workers dead, US ambassador to Indonesia RobertGelbard called for Kiki Syahnakri's dismissal as Udayana commander for failing tocontrol militia violence. The murders caused worldwide outrage and led to UN hu-manitarian workers among the refugees pulling out of West Timor.ile

In July 2000 he was mooted for commander of the Jakarta military region, butfailed to win the appointment. However, in November 2000 he did even better, beingappointed deputy army chief of staff. He attributed the promotion to strong supportby'pro-integrafion'people. Glenny Kairupan echoed the sentiment, saying Kiki had'widespread' support within the armed forces.H

Just after the announcement that he would move uP to Jakarta, four dissidentmilitia leaders, fearing assassination by the TNI, made moves to cross over to Untaet,

offering the UN information about military backing for the militias in exchange forimmunity. Syahnakri threatened to arrest them. In resPonse, one of the dissidents,Nemecio de Carvalho, hinted that Kiki was responsible for the refugee exodus fromEast Timor and that his appointment to deputy army chief of staff would only invitefurther intemational pressure on Indonesia.sl

Syahnakri appears to have played a leading part in allowing if not organising, the

expansion of militia activities in West Timor since his appointment as Udayana com-

mander. US ambassador Gelbard publicly attacked him on 25 September 2(X)0, sayingthat'syahnakri has not been able to disarm the militia grouPs in the last 10 months,since he was appointed military commander. The question now is how come that the

armed groups are even stronger than ten months before?'s2

The militia dissidents also said Kiki Syahnakri had money to run a campaign toprevent refugees from retuming to East Timor.s3

Syahnakri always denied that the TNI armed or organised the militias. In October2000 he challenged militia leader tumed dissident, Ioanico Cesario Belo [2], anotherone of the four, to prove his assertion that he (Kiki Syahnakri), as a Timor veteran,knew precisely who was arming and training the militias.s Rather than by a TNIplan, Syahnakri said the territory was devastated by both East Timorese sides, 'run-ning amok'.s

His fust job as deputy army chief of staff was to prevent Untaet officials frominterviewing TNI officers over human rights abuse in East Timor. 'We will never handover our soldiers for questioning conducted in the interests of Untaet' he said.ffi

Background

Kiki Syahnakri (Sjahnakri Yudha Kusuma) was born in 1947 in West Java. Hegraduated from military academy in1977. His career has been in Kostrad, mostly inEast Timor, where he speaks the local language. ln 7994-95 he was in charge of the

East Timor territorial command (Danrem 164). One source says he was close to Prabowo

The Key Suspects [31

and 'was linked with various unsavoury things that Prabowo's units used to get up to,in Timor and elsewhere'.$7 He was removed from his East Timor command in 1995on the recommendation of the Military Honour Council investigating the murder ofsix East Timorese in Liquica by a Korem officer.

CaptAhmadSYAMSUDDIN AChief of staff, Covalima rnilitary district comrnand (Kodim 1635), based in Suai

It is likely the Indonesian Attorney General indicted him for his role in the massa-cre that took place in Suai on 6 September 1999. For a description of this event, see theentry on Herman Sediono [3]

MajGen (InO Sjafrie SYAMSUDDIN DTerritorial Assistant to Chief of General Staff (Aster Kasum)

A senior officer at Abri Headquarters in Jakarta, Sjafrie Syamsuddin was formallyan assistant to the Chief of General Staff (LtGen Sugiono [1]).3s He is thought to havespent much of 1999 leading a clandestine counter-insurgency campaign in Aceh, fum-iog tp in East Timor for the fust time just three days before the UN ballot. He thenprobably stayed on and helped lead the planning of the scorched earth campaign thatfollowed the ballot announcement. On one occasion he allegedly took part in thatcampaign personally.

Francisco Kalbuadi ('Chico') identified Sjafrie at the invasion of Bishop Belo's houseby militia men on 6 September 1999. All the men were separated from the crowd ofthousands and feared killed. Sjafrie was directing the operation from his car across theroad. Chico was a long-standing former SGI informant and knew Sjafrie well.3se

Denying Chico's allegation, Sjafrie says he was at Abri HQ at the time of the 5September attack on Belos' house. He claims he left for East Timor as a member of acombined TNI Polri team under Rear Admiral Yoost Mengko [2] (Intelligence Assist-ant to Chief of General Staff) on 27 August 1999. The team went to visit a major Falintilbase at the instigation of Unamet, in order to arrange an end to violence just ahead ofthe ballot on 30 August. Unamet chief executive Ian Martin confirms that Sjafrie wasbrought from Jakarta about that time for this purpose. Sjafrie says he then retumed toJakarta the next day, 28 August. He claims he made a second visit, this time of just a

few hours, to oversee security preparafions for a UN delegation, on 11 September.s0

However, contrary to Sjafrie's claims, the anonymous internet news serviceMateBEAN on 1 September issued a news bulletin that Sjafrie was in Dili at thatmoment, engaged in a 'marathon'session making contingency plans in the likelihoodthat the vote would favour independence. The session was led by Sjafrie and MajGenZacky Anwar Makarim [3]. The plans involved burning or damaging vital installa-tions such as telecommunications and electricity supplies in advance of an Indonesianpull-out. Military intelligence was also providing lists of pro-independence politicianswho had to be killed, the report said. At the time it was thought the ballot result wouldbe announced on 7 September.sl

211

212 Masters of Tetror

Background

Sjafrie Syamsuddin was born on 30 October 1952 in Makassar, South Sulawesi. Hegraduated from the military academy in7974. Most of his career has been in Kopassus,including participating in the invasion of East Timor (Operasi Seroja) in7976, the firstof many tours there.s2 He has also had combat experience in Aceh. His specialisationwas intelligence. In 1985 he took the Infanhy Officer's Advanced Course, in FortBenning, USA. In 1990 he commanded the Kopassus'SGI (Intelligence Task Force) inEast Timor, where he is reported to have been closely involved in planning the Santa

Cruz massacre.3a

In 1993 he took a two-week training course at Special Air Service base, Swanboume,Perth, Australia.K He led the presidential guard for Suharto in 199995. After gainingexperience in territorial commands, especially in Jakarta, where he became Com-mander (1997-98), he was appointed Assistant for Territorial Affairs to the Chief ofStaff for General Affairs (Aster Kasum ABRI, Fachrul Razi) in July 1998.

After East Timor he was listed as expert staff to the Coordinating Minister forPolitics and Security (Wiranto) (Staf Ahli Menko Polkam).

CaptTATANG KCommander of B Company in Batallion 7t14 (Dankipan B Yonif 7tt4)

KPP HAM recommended he be investigated further because he supposedly knewabout corpses stored in the battalion headquarters.ffi Batallion 7M was a territorialbatallion made up of many East Timorese soldiers and based in Dili. It was responsiblefor many human rights abuses throughout the Indonesian occupation. (He is not thesame as Lt-Col Tatang Zainuddin [1]).

Col (In0 SupraptoTARMAN KDistrict head (bupati) of AileuHe probably became district head in 7994, taYtng over from Femao Verdial. His

record throughout 1999 is one of repeated intimidation against the very populationhe had swom as district head to protect.K He worked closely with the local militiagroup Ahi for this purpose.

On Saturday, 29 May 1999, he told about 200 villagers who attended a blood-swearing ceremony in Cotolau, 12 kilometres south of Dili, that nobody would beable to protect them if people voted for independence.sT

In July 1999 a leaked letter circulated in East Timor allegedly over his signature.Addressed to all prointegration forces, including the local military, police militia (Ahiand Pam Swakarsa) and the pro.integration political group FPDK, the letter claimedto be following up a July instruction from military headquarters in Jakarta (no.X/ A/MB/VIl/1999). ln order to'stabilise integration', it listed six orders. These includedmonitoring Unamet personnel, ensuring they went nowhere without reporting tothe police or military and certainly not after 5pm, and beating them up and wreckingtheir car if they failed to comply.ffi

The Key Suspects [3] 213

Suprapto Tarman denied the letter was genuine. This was one of several letters in therun-up to the ballot alleged to be from Indonesian govemment officials detailing plannedviolence against pro-independence East Timorese or the UN (see Gamadi [3]).

In August, shortly before the ballot, Suprapto Tarman told a rally in Remexio, notfar from Dili, that all local civil servants must choose autonomy. He added that ifautonomy were to lose, the head of (human rights monitor) Alfrldo da Silva wouldbe cut off and used as a football on the playing field. Suprapto Tarman also said civilservants' salaries would be withheld until they had given their ballot registrationnumber to their superiors.36e

Alfredo da Silva Alpha was the coordinator of the (Catholic) Justice and PeaceCommission in Aileu. Amnesty Intemational reported that he had also been threat-ened with death by paramilitaries the previous April.370

Immediately after the ballot was over, Ahi militia men assisted by local militarypersonnel went looking for CNRT leaders in Remexio, Liquedoe and Laulara. A re-port by the human rights organisation Fortilos alleged that Suprapto Tarman hadordered therazzia because he was angry that people had not heeded his instructionfor the populace to stay away from the polls.371

A leaked Unamet document dated 3 and 4 September 1.999, a few days after theballot, confirmed Suprapto Tarman's close relationship with the local militia. SupraptoTarman told Unamet's civilian police (CivPol) team in Aileu that he had been ap-pointed a militia 'platoon leader, in preparation for the conduct of a civil war if theautonomy proposal was rejected'. A militia leader told the same team that he wasacting under instructions from Suprapto Tarman, and that it was now he (instead ofthe local police) who was 'in charge of the Unamet security'. The Unamet report wenton: 'When exercising this so-called security duty, he [the militia leader] threatened tobum down the Unamet residence. He reiterated the threat in front of a Polri [Indone-sian policel Liaison Officer who did not follow suit. CivPol witnessed the CNRT officebeing bumt down by rnilitias in the presence of Polri which did not intervene. A PolriLiaison Officer finally told the CivPols that if was no longer safe for them to remain intown and that they should join a convoy of deparling Polri families. So they did.'sn

The KPP HAM inquiry recommended he be investigated for using govemmentmoney to fund militias under the guise of a civil defence force (Pam Swakarsa).3z3However, in May 2000 he refused to answer a call to be interrogated by a joint teamfrom the Attorney General's Department.3Ta

This officer (Serial no. 26431) was bom on 2 February 1951 in Singkawang, WestKalimantan. In 1993 he had been military district commander in Manufahi (Com-mander, Kodim1634/ Manufahi, East Timor), with the rank of LtCol.37s

JoaodaSilvaTAVARES KLeader, Halilintar militia, Bobonaro district

Joao Tavares was an ageing militia leader whose name inspired fear and hate inmany East Timorese.On 1.0 or 12 August 1998, in the face of rising independencedemands following Suharto's resignation the previous May, he allegedly met

214 Masters of Tenor

Maj-Gen Adam Damiri [3] and Col Tono Suratman [3], who told him and two othermilitia leaders, Eurico Guterres [3] and Cancio de Carvalho [1] they must organise'toprotect integration'. This meeting represented the official launch of the militias - partof a strategy worked out by Generals Syamsuddin [3] and Zacky Anwar Makarim [3]between July and September 1998.375

On 17 February 1999 Joao Tavares reportedly told a meeting of sub-dishict andvillage heads in Bobonaro that they would be sacked if they failed to mobilise theircitizens to attend a pro-govemment rally in Balibo. On February 19 he told a Baliborally that there would be war if people rejected the autonomy proposal.3z

On 27 February 1,999, witnessed by senior military officers and hundreds of rnilitiamembers, he was installed as head of an East Timor-wide militia organisation. Thisformally made him responsible for all unlawful acts comrnitted by the many militiagroups around East Timor for the remainder of 1999.378

On 1 March 7999 Joao Tavares at a meeting said at least one Australian diplomathad to be 'sacrificed' in order to stop a civil war among East Timorese caused byAustralia[n support for the ballot].3n

On 11 March 1999 he received a letter from the militia leader Lafaek Saburai(Afonso Pinto [1]), informing the 'highly respected pro-integration war general' ofplans to remove pro-integrationist (prolndonesian) people from Dili. It then went onto say that the rest'whether they be men, women, children or old people, are anti-integration and must be eliminated', beginning on 1 May 1999.

On 19 March '1999 Joao Tavares was implicated in the murder of four pro-inde-pendence villagers in Mariabo village near Maliana.m

On 13 April 1999 he and LtCol Burhanuddin Siagian [3] personally ordered theexecution of six East Timorese civilians from the village of Cailaco near Maliana, inrevenge for a Falintil attack on pro-Indonesian militias.sl On 15-17 April 1999 thesame militia torfured five people from the village of Aidabalete, Bobonaro district.s2

On 17 April 1999 he and Eurico Guterres spoke at a large militia rally in Dili, afterwhich militias under his command murdered at least 12 people in the house of ManuelCarrascalao. On the same day militias directly under his command destroyed equip-ment at the only local newspaper, forcing it to close down. A few days later his militiasdestroyed the house of a journalist with the same newspaper who lived in Maliana.s

Despite his record of violence, the state party Golkar did not hesitate to put him onits ticket for the 7 Jwre 1,999 election.s

On 17July 1999 he allegedly wrote a letter to all his militia forces, with copies to allmilitary and police commanders, ordering them to step up 'terror and intimidafion'against pro-independence leaders, and informing them of plans to launch widespreadviolence should the independence option win. The letter may have been a fake.s

On 8 September 1999 he and Eurico Guterres reportedly met MajGen Adam Damiriand told him they had ordered their militias to stop the destruction of East Timor. Thismeeting once more demonstrated the close and hierarchical relationship betweenmilitias and the military. However, there was no change on the ground until Interfettroops arrived two weeks later.3e

The Key Suspects I3l

Following the Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor, Joao Tavares first openlysupported armed incursions into East Timor, by'59,5O0'troops under his command.Many of them were ethnic East Timorese who had defected from the Indonesianarmed forces after the withdrawal.3sT

He was questioned by KPP HAM in December 1.999, wherc he did not deny hismilitias had engaged in destruction of East Timor after the ballot, but (implausibly)denied they had any contact with TNI at all.

He claimed that militias under PPI were disbanded on 13 November 199L. How-ever, in October 2000 four militia leaders contemplating a refurn to East Timor said

Joao Tavares had threatened them with 'exhajudicial action' for acting treachously,thus demonshating that the militias remained a coherent organisation.ffi In Decem-ber 2000 his name was linked to a fresh surge in militia incursions into East Timor. Itwas alleged he had distributed more money to militias.3se

Several Halilintar militia members under his command are listed in Appendix 5 ofthe KPP HAM report with the recommendation they be prosecuted for crimes againsthumanity. They murdered two named individuals, a student and a farmer, in BobonaroDstrict on 21 April 1,999, as well as committing other abuses:3m

. Flaviano Dasilelo

' Adao Babo. Paulo.

Background

Born into a wealthy farming family in Atabae village, westem East Timor, on 6April 1932 (another report says 1931). He is said to have married the daughter of anaristocrat (Raja Atambua) from (Indonesian) West Timor. Indeed he has several wives,and his constant need for money made him easy prey to military manipulators. Hehas a son, Jose da Silva Tavares, in the Foreign Affairs Department. A younger brother,Jorge Tavares, also led a militia band. By 1999 he was described by one obseryer as'asick old man at the beck and call of the TNI', a militia leader who 'did not have a graspof militia activities in wider East Timor'.3el

As a pro-Indonesian 'partisan' in 1975 (he belonged to UDT), he supported theIndonesian army incursion into East Timor in October 1975. The Dunn Report saysabout this episode: 'The way East Timorese were used in this operation marked thebeginning of a TNI policy of using willing Timorese in operations conceived andplanned by military commanders, in which the former provided a political frontdesigned to mask the leading role of the Indonesian military.'3sz

While still leading the Halilintar militias he was made district head for Bobonaro(1976-1989) - a mixing of military and civilian roles never thought incompatible underthe Indonesian occupation. However, real power resided with several military offic-ers stationed in every district. He became a wealthy landowner. After 1989 he becamea member of the East Timor provincial parliament.3e3

The Halilintar militia was inactive through the 1980s, but was revived in 1995,again with Joao Tavares at its head. Since then he built a record of lethal violence,

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216 Masters of Teror

especially well documented throughout 1999. The militia he led was closely integratedwith the Indonesian armed forces.3ea

On 4 January 1998, a combined team of the Rajawali battalion, a territorial battal-ion, SGI (Special Intelligence Unit) and Halilintar militiamen, led by Joao Tavares,torfured and shot dead four suspected pro-independence East Timorese men near theNunura-Bebai River in Coilima, Atabae sub-district, Bobonaro.3es

GenWIRANTO KArmed Forces Commander (Pangab), Defence Minister

Wiranto was ultimately responsible for everything his soldiers did. His subordi-nates at TNI Headquarters, in the Udayana command, and in East Timor itself, crop

up in numerous reports of human rights abuses in East Timor in 7999. lt is for thisreason that his name was included in the report of the KPP HAM.

However, there is debate over how actively he supported the militia strategy inEast Timor or whether he stood by while others did the damage. One experiencedobserver has argued that Wiranto, a Kostrad careerist, may have lacked control overhis forces because of the existence of a Kopassus-dominated parallel command oper-

ating through the sectoral commands, and/or because officers on the ground were

unwilling to cooperate with shategies that may have been intemationally acceptable

but were likely to lose them the East Timor they had fought fior for 24 years.3% Thisbrief item can do rnore than marshall some of the evidence.

Wiranto is mentioned as one of President Habibie's six closest advisors in thedecision in January 1999 to give East Timor an almost immediate referendum Timorunder UN supervision.3eT

When a large delegation of prominent East Timorese came to him on 19 February

1999 to express their fears about the referendum plan and to ask for weapons toprotect themselves against pro-independence supporters, Wiranto told them anymilitias should be unarmed. They had already formed a militant pro.integration group(FPDK) that included a militia component.3es Late in April Wiranto reportedly pre-ferred to support a less militant pro-integration group @RTT) led by veteran Pro-Indonesian diplomat Lopes da Cruz.3e However, BRTT became the junior partnerwith FPDK in a new grouping called Unif in June.

The suggestion that Wiranto was disfurbed by militia excesses - no doubt as De'fence Minister he had to do lots of explaining to foreign visitors - was strengthened bya report that he had criticised MajGen Zacky Anwar Makarim [3]and BrigGen GlennyKairupan [3] during a high-powered ministerial visit to Dili on 12 July for letting theirmilitias run wild.{o A militia claim that he and President Habibie had personallyvisited Dili to encourage the militias on 20 August, meanwhile, was almost cer-tainly false.aol

However, at no time throughout 1999 did he openly act against anyone commit-ting violent acts. Afterwards, he worked hard toblunt the demand for prosecutions ofany TNI officer for crimes against humanity.

The Key Suspects [31

He by no means dissociated himself from the East Timorese who had helpedsecure East Timor for Indonesia and were now fighting to win the referendum. Justafter the ballot he explained his failure to rein in militia violence by saying his soldierssuffered 'psychological constraints' in acting against those who had been their col-leagues in the past.

On 20 April he led a large delegation of senior military and other officials from

Jakarta to dine with pro-integration figures, including militia leaders, in Dili. Theofficial purpose of the visit was to sign an agreement creating the Comrnission onPeace and Stability.0'z

The chief of the military intelligence agency BIA, LtGen Tyasno Sudarto [3], alleg-edly quoted Wiranto's name in July 1999 for authorising a counterfeit money oPera-

tion to fund the militias. Retired intelligence officer Ismail Put(e)ra said Tyasno had

told him'that Gen Wiranto had picked BIA to run the counterfeit money operation tofund the (pro-Indonesia) East Timorese militias'.m3 Tyasno himself, regarded as closeto Wiranto, may have had links to the militias that go considerably beyond irregularfunding methods.

Another indication that Wiranto may have actively funded militia organisations inEast Timor came during a 2001 court case against the head of the state logistics boardBulog (which handles rice distribution). Bulog head Rahardi Ramelan said he took Rp10 billion (approximately US$ 1 million) from Bulog 'non-budgetary' funds in May-

]une 1999 and 'loaned' them to General Wiranto to help pay for the 'civil defence'force Pam Swakarsa, in view of the 'extremely worrying' security situation. Since PamSwakarsa were little used in the June 1999 Indonesian elections, we may suspect thesefunds were intended for the East Timor militias. Indeed, he told one press conferencethe money was used to make the East Timor ballot a 'success'.aa

Other senior soldiers who worked in East Timor with direct authorisation fromWiranto and who were linked to the violence included MajGen Kiki Syahnakri [3] andMajGen Zacky Makarim. Zacky arrived in Dli early in June armed with a letter fromGen Wiranto appointing him a 'security advisor' to a committee supposed to coordi-nate with Unamet. Wiranto told Unamet Zacky was his personal representative inDili. Zacky's appointmenttied military control overthemilitiasmore closely toWiranto.

Kiki also worked with militias throughout 1,999, and then became martial-lawadministrator reporting directly to Wiranto at the height of the militia rampage fol-lowing the ballot result. That the militia violence could be tumed off 'like a tap' on 11

September for just the day that Gen Wiranto came to Dili on an inspection tour has

been seen as just one indication of how centrally controlled it was.4s

One report claimed Wiranto provided the Kiki-Zacky team with a budget of Rp 28

billion (approx US$2.8 million) in early August for the evacuation of East Timor in theevent of the vote going againt Indonesia.a6

Background

Wiranto was born on 4 April 7947 in Jogjakarta Jogjakarta, and graduated fromthe military academy in 1958. His field career was entirely with Kostrad, taking part inEast Timor operations in 1981. By 1988 he had risen to Assistant for Operations to

2r7

218 Masters of Teror

Chief of Staff in Kostrad's Second Infantry Division. The next year he became adjutantto President Suharto (1989-93). He probably travelled extensively at this time, but isnot known to have had any foreign training.

He commanded the Jakarta military command n 199+95, and became Kostradcommander in 1996-97. After a brief stint as Army Chief of Staff fluly 1997-February1998) he was appointed Armed Forces Commander in February L998, as well as

Defence Minister the next month. He retained both positions throughout the Habibiepresidency, which ended with the MPR session in October 1999. PresidentAbdurrahman Wahid appointed him Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security,but sacked him in February 2000, after which he went into retirement. The sackingwas interpreted as a blow to military privilege in the top levels of government.

His personal network is supposed to be based on graduates of the Infantry Weap-ons Centre he led in the 1980s. His most important protege is Bambang Yudhoyono[2], whom he is alleged to have helped speed through the ranks.{7 Usually assumedto be a supporter of the secular nationalist stream within the military.

LtCol(In0YAKRAMANYagus(Agus) KDCommander, Battalion 74; Military district commander of Covalima, based in

Suai (Dandim 1.635)? (early 1.999?)

Yakraman Yagus (serial no. 30,140) graduated from the military academy in 1985.

He was appointed cmmander of the Covalima territorial command (Komandan Kodim1535) in 7997.4N However, because of his youth and low rank he may have been onlya temporary commander there, and was probably not there at the time of the mobi-lisation and arrning of violent civilian paramilitaries in early 1999. lt so, it was hissuccessor (LtCol Ahmad Masagus [3]) who would appear to have been the majorsponsor of Laksaur, a paramilitary group centred in Suai with 500 members carryingabout 100 firearms.@

Battalion 744 was attached to the East Timor territorial command. As its com-mander in 1999 he was recommended for prosecution by KPP HAM for having failedto prevent men under his command from taking part in terror.aro He admitted to thecommission that his men were very angry with the result of the ballot and that someof them had gone out onto the street and fired their guns. He said he did not knowwhether anyone was shot and did not take the houble to check with the hospital.allAs commander of Battalion 7rl4 he would have led the evacuation of the battalion andprobably played a key role in the forced deportation of East Timorese after the ballot.For a few months he led the 744 battalion in 'exile'in West Timor, and then oversawits absorption into Korem 161, unlike its sister East Timorese battalion 745 which wasdissolved 30 March 2000.412

' One of his men, Private Luis, was listed in the KPP HAM report as warrantingprosecution. As a rank-and-file soldier he has not been listed separately in thepresent database.

Another of his men, Capt Tatang [3], was also listed by KPP HAM as warrantingprosecution.

The Key Suspects [4] 279

Indicted or hied in East Timor I4lLtSyafulANWAR

Deputy commander, Kopassus unit, Lautem

Lt Syaful Anwar was allegedly in overall charge of the Alfa Team militia, nomi-nally commanded by Ioni Marquez [4]. He has been indicted by a Dili court for crimesagainst humanity over the murder of a Falintil detainee named Evaristo Lopes at theAlfa Team base in April 1999. He remains at large in Indonesia.

Revelations made in this court case by Joni Marquez have strengthened the widelyheld supposition that Kopassus was responsible for managing the militia groups inEast Timor. 1

foao Mendonca de ARAUJOThird deputy secretary of Covalima districtHe was formerly the chief (camat) of Tllomar sub-district, in Covalima district near

Suai. On 5 September 1999 eyewitnesses saw him standing outside the Suai Catholicchurch, giving orders to militias to attack those within. UN police arrested him uponhis retum to East Timor on 23 March 2001, tor his involvement in the Suai churchmassacre.2

He is the son of Caetano Mendonca, speaker of the Covalima elected assembly(DPRD-II) in Suai under Indonesian rule, and the brother of Helio Moniz. Both wereIeaders within the pro-autonomy organisation, Untas.

JoniMARQUEZCommander of Tim Alfa militia, Baucau

In Indonesian military (TNI) documents leaked in late 1998, Tim Alfa is listedamong the militias that were a part of the military structure in East Timor.3 Appendix5 of the KPP HAM report details six events in which Tim Alfa was implicated. Theyincluded the murder of four independence activists in different incidents beginning inApril'1999, and the buming of more than a hundred homes and the expulsion ofresidents in Leuro village 8-12 September 7999.

On 21 April 1999, his militia was allegedly responsible for torturing and thenmurdering Evaristo Lopes (Averisto Lopez) at the militia base.a Marquez said intestimony that the murder was actually committed by Lt Syaful Anwar [4].

On 25 September 7999, three weeks after the ballot result had been announced butbefore lnterfet troops reached the Lospalos area, he led a Tim Alfa militia attack on a

church delegation at Lautem Junction. The delegation was travelling to Baucau. Of thenine killed, two were nuns, one was a chance passerby who refused to join the attack,and one was Indonesian joumalist Agus Mulyawan. Marquez allegedly shot dead a

wounded nun. The bodies were dumped in the river.s

220 Masters of Terror

After the attack on the Catholic party, his militia encountered a grouP of Falintilsoldiers, who arrested him and his men and eventually handed them over to the UNauthority. In 200i he was tried and convicted for crimes against humanity.6

Joni Marquez,SS .il:.L999, confessed to the Baucau murders, and told investigatorsthat Tim Alfa was set up, trained and armed by Kopassus (through a unit namedTribuana). He told one group of investigators that the attack was ordered by theLospalos military district commander (Komandan Kodim Lospalos, LCol SudrajatAS [31. Another report of Marquez' confession said it was ordered by 'a number ofKopassus officers', and yet another that it was ordered by 'a general in jakarta'.7

He told court hearings in Dili in August 2001 that he was recruited by formercommander Prabowo [5] in 1985 to set up Alfa Team for the military, and that hehimself was recruited into Kopassus. Along with other Kopassus personnel he re-ceived training from Australian special forces in Bandung in 1984.8

Nine other Alfa Team members also faced trial in Dili for crimes against humanity.In early December 2001 they were all sentenced to the prison terms indicated inbrackets.e

' Joni Marquez (33 years)

' JoSo da Costa (33 yrs)

' Paulo da Costa (33 yrs)

' Goncalo dos Santos (23 yrs)

' Manuel da Costa (19 yrs)

. Amelio da Costa (18 yrs)

. Hilario da Silva (18 yrs)

' Gilberto Fernandes (5 yrs)

' Mauterca Moniz (4 yrs)

' Alarico Fernandes (4 yrs)

Laurentino ('Moko') SOARES

Deputy commander, Sakunar ('Scorpion') militia, Ambeno (Pantemakassar)

Sakunar already appears in 1998 as one of many militia organisations institution-ally attached to the Indonesian armed forces.lo It consisted of a large number ofschool dropouts.rr

That its establishment is dated in later reports to 18 April 1999 indicates how littlewe know about this particular militia. Ambeno, the small East Timorese enclave withinWest Timor, was the district forgotten by the world during 1999. However, like all theolder militias, Saikunar certainly experienced an injection of fresh organisational en-ergy and money in April 1999.1'z

The Key Suspects [41

Sakunar had its headquarters actually within the Ambeno military base (Kodim1639, led for at least partof 1999 by LtCol Kamiso Miran [1]). In its firstburst of activityin 1999, in April and May, it mostly intimidated public servants into voting for Indone-sia in the ballot.l3

Upon retuming from the large militia rally in Dili of 17 Apil, Sakunar militiamembers and Battalion 745 soldiers bumt or damaged the houses of at least six CNRTmembers, and beat up and detained at least two named individuals. On 1 May 1999

Govemor Abilio Soares [3] East Timor military commander Col Tono Suratman [3]and East Timor police chief Col (Pol) Timbul Silaen [3] attended a large meeting inOecussi at which threats were allegedly made to the lives of CNRT members, result-ing in the CNRT closing down its office in that district.la

Sakunar's commander was Simao (Simau) Lopes, a former sub-district head(camat). However, most of the human rights abuses the group is accused of areconnected with Lopes' second-in-command, Sakunar's operational commanderLaurentino 'Moko' Soares, the former head of Cunha village. Sometimes anothersecond-in-command is mentioned, Belarmino da Costa, but the latter is also men-tioned as having his own rnilitia called Meo ('Warrior').ts

Moko Soares had a reputation for extreme cruelty. On one occasion in 1999 hemade a new recruit shoot his own uncle dead. Moko then took the new press-gangedrecruit to a neighbouring village where Moko shot the unfortunate man's own brotherdead before his eyes.16

Between 7 and 19 luly 1999 Moko Soares was a leading figure in a series of plan-ning meetings held at the sub-district office of Costa in Ambeno. Others presentincluded the other militia leaders Simau Lopes, Belarmino da Costa, and Elvis Lopes,as well as the district head (camat) of Pante Makassar, Miguel Soares. The discussionconcemed how to eliminate pro-independence sentiment in the village of Costa bymeans of intimidation or even murder. It was decided that up to 100 firearms wouldbe distributed to the Sakunar militiamen for an operation on 24 July. It is not knownif this operation was in fact carried out.17

Appendix 5 of the KPP HAM report, which lists perpetrators of crimes againsthumanity, details seven events in which Sakunar was implicated, often in conjunctionwith police and military,

Militia violence in Ambeno peaked in the ballot aftermath. Details remain sketchybut one report says 23 died already in a big action that began with buming the CNRToffice in Pante Makassar on 27 August 1999.18

The worst atrocity committed in Ambeno in 1999 took place over three days, &10September 1999, culminating in the systematic execution of 47 people at Passabe earlyin the morning of 10 September.

The mass execution followed the killing of 74 at the villages of Tumin, Kiobiselo,Nonkikan and Nibin by a combined force of various militias dominated by Sakunar,and TNI soldiers. The two main individuals alleged to be responsible are Moko Soaresand Passabe village chief and Sakunar leader Gabriel Colo.te

On 20 September Sakunar allegedly killed another seven East Timorese inAmbeno.2o It took until 2 October for Interfet to reach the Ambeno enclave. In the

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222 Masters of Terror

interval, Moko Soares conducted a reign of terror. Practically the entire populationfled their homes. On 28 September Moko Soares set fire to about 350 abandonedhomes belonging to CNRT supporters.2r As late as 2 October 1999, Sakunar and BesiMerah Putih militias allegedly destroyed the entire village of Cutete.z

After Interfet assumed control in East Timor, the militia was officially'disbanded'on 13 December 1,999, but it in fact was not disbanded at all.E Interfet placed greatpressure on Indonesian military commander Kiki Syahnakri [3] to arrest Moko Soares,because it had evidence that his militiamen were continuing to launch raids across theborder into East Timor. lnterfet accused Koshad Battalion 432, guarding the borderarea near Ambeno, of giving Moko Soares impunity.24

Moko Soares was eventually arrested by Indonesian military and police on 7February 2000, and sentenced to 18 months jail on 26 April 2000. The sentence was forattempting to sell a gun to a local farmer - thus unrelated to his 1999 militia activities.sPeeved, Moko Soares complained in court that he had been abandoned by TNI, andwent on to make a damaging revelation.b

The firearms, he said, were given to him by two Kopassus (SGI) officers, namedBambang and Zainuddin.2T These two men were not further identified. Could they berespectivelv Mai RM Bambane Wisnumurthv [11. intellieence chief for East Timor andknown to be responsible for distributing weapons, and LtCol Tatang Zaenuddin SW(Zainuddin) [1], Kopassus officer and the comrnander of combat Sector B, whichincludes Ambeno? The latter acknowledged that he had 'overseen' the training ofmilitias.

However, the court did not pursue this important lead. The prosecutor rejectedSoares' defence statement that the guns (now described as 'organic' - ie TNI weapons)were legal because they had been'given'to him by TNI members to defend the pro-integration cause.B

A Porfuguese TV crew interviewed Moko Soares at length in Kefamenanu beforehis arrest, and believed the material they presented helped convict Moko Soares.2e

In October 2001, Moko Soares was among 11 men indicted by a Dili court for thePassabe massacre. Other Sakunar militia men indicted for crimes against humanitywere:

' Simao Lopes, Sakunar commander

' Gabriel Colo (Kolo), Passabe village chief and local Sakunar leader

' Bonificio Bobo alias Bone

' Tomas Bubun

' Elvis Popes. Domingos Obe

' J. Falio da Costa

' Floreneo (Florenco) TacaquiTwo TNI sergeants were also indicted (see LCol Bambang Sungesti [2]). All sus-

pects remained at large except Tacaqui, who was in detention in Dili awaiting trial. Theindictment said the massacre had been planned at a meeting in Oecussi on 7 Septem-ber 1999. 'It was state-sponsored and organised ... a real merciless extermination,' saidprosecutor Mohamed Othman.3o

The Key Suspects I5l 223

Background I5l

LtGen (ret) Prabowo Subianto DjojohadikusumoFormer commander, Kopassus and Kostrad

Retired LtGen Prabowo is not a suspect in the 1999 violence in East Timor. He ismentioned here only as background, because so many of the suspects were con-nected with him earlier in their careers.

Although a major influence on Indonesian counter-insurgency tactics in East Timorbeginning in1989/90, he was out of the country throughout 1999. Having beendismissed from his Koshad command in May 1998, and from the military entirely inAugust 1998, Prabowo had no TNI position in 1999.lnstead he was in self-imposedexile in Jordan, doing business with his wealthy brother. The many rumours, all ofthem unproven, that he was still in lndonesia anyway, and directing clandestine op-erations in East Timor, indicate the power he once held.

Among the many 1999 militia leaders who were Prabowo's proteges were EuricoGuterres [3]and loni Marquez [4]. Govemor Abilio Soares [3] owed his career largelyto Prabowo's support. Many of the soldiers (especially in Kopassus) who directed themilitias n 1999 had been Prabowo's subordinates at some stage. Among them were:MajGen Adam Damiri [3], MajGen Mahidin Simbolon [3], BrigGen Amirul Isnaeni [3],Col Gerhan Lentara [1] and LtCol Wioyotomo Nugroho [3]. Others had been hiscolleages: Gen Subagyo H S [1], MaiGen Zacky Anwar Makarim [3], MajGen SjafrieSyamsuddin [3], MajGen Kiki Syahnakri [3], LtGen Johny Lumintang [3] and ColPramono Edhie Wibowo[2].

Background

Prabowo was bom on 17 October 1951 in Jakarta, the son of noted economist (anddissident politician) Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. While his father was on therun for supporting a failed regional revolt in 1957, Prabowo grew up in Singapore,Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, Switzerland and Britain. He graduated from the militaryacademy in 1,974.

1n1976 he went to East Timor as part of Tim Nanggala X, a special forces unit thatbelonged to Kopassandha, later called Kopassus. He undertook anti-terrorist trainingin the US (Fort Bragg, 1980; Fort Benning, 1985), and in West Germany (GSG-9, about1981), scoring'top graduate'each time. In 1983 he married the daughter of PresidentSuharto, Siti Hediati Harijadi (Titiek). In 1988-89 he was in East Timor again, in com-mand of the Kostrad combat Battalion 328. He tumed it into such a highly trained unitthat it was chosen as the best battalion in East Timor.3l

After eight years in Kostrad he returned to Kopassus in 1993 as commander of itsGroup 3, a special forces training unit in Batujajar, West Java, that also played a roletraining militia leaders. He rose to Deputy Commander of Kopassus in 19911-95, andto Kopassus Commander in 1995-98. ln March 1998 he was moved back to Kostrad,becoming Kostrad Commander.

However, with Suharto gone, his fortunes quickly declined. He was exposed ashaving organised the kidnapping of anti-Suharto activists early in 1998, and was finallydismissed from the armed forces in August 1998 after an intemal inquiry (DKP).

7

Practical Justice in Doe o. Lumintang: The Successful Useof Civil Remedies against'an Enemy of All Mankind'

RichnrdTanter

In a Washington DC courtroom on 10 September 2007, US Magistrate fudgeAlan Kay brought down a judgment for compensatory and punitive damagesof more than $65 million against the defendant in the case of lane Doe et aI aersus

lohny Lumintang. Six East Timorese plaintiffs, known by their legal pseudo-nyms of Jane Doe and John Doe I-V, brought the civil suit against Lieutenant-General Johny Lumintang, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Armythroughout most of 1999,'for designing, ordering, and directing a campaign ofviolence and intimidation against the people of East Timor which resulted inthe wrongs suffered by the plaintiffs'l. The US District Court had jurisdictionover the case under the provisions of at least two US laws, namely the AIim TortClaims Act 1789 (ATCA) and the Torture Victim Protection Act 1991.

East Timor activists in the US discovered that Lieutenant-Ceneral Lumintangwas scheduled to deliver a talk in Washington DC at a public symposium ofthe United States-Indonesia Society in late March 2000. The news was passed

on to East Timor, and the principal plaintiffs requested that the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR)'? and the San Francisco-basedCenter for Justice and Accountability (CJA) commence proceedings againstLumintang on their behalf. An attempt to serve notice on General Lumintangdramatically at the symposium was thwarted for logistical reasons, but he wastracked to Dulles Airport and served while waiting to board his plane.Lumintang left the US immediately and has never retumed.

Lumintang failed to appear or be represented at the Washington DishictCourt hearing for liability in November 2000, and was subsequently held to bein default, and hence legally responsible under US law 'for war crimes, crimesagainst humanity, gross violations of human rights'.

The proceedings then moved to the next stage: the determination of dam-ages, both compensatory and punitive. Three days of hearings were held beforeUS Magistrate Judge Alan Kay in Washington between 27 March and 29 March2001. Three of the four living plaintiffs gave testimony, and the fourth pre-sented video testimony. Five expert witnesses spoke for the plaintiffs: myself,appearing as an expert witness on Indonesian military issues3; Amold Kohenof the Humanitarian Project and biographer of Bishop Carlos Belo; TheodoreFolke, an UNTAET film-maker, attesting to the extent of physical destructionvisible in videos presented in evidence; Ian Thomas, an American cartogra-pher and remote sensing specialist, testifying on the extent of deliberately litfires in September'1999; and Estella Abosch, social worker and member, Advo-cates for Survival of Torture and Trauma. Since the defendant had chosen not

Practical lusticc in Doe a. Lumintang

to appear or be represented, only lawyers for the plaintiffs were present at thehearings, led by Steven Schneebaum, Anthony DiCapio and Judith Chomskya.

The six plaintiffs included the following people:

Jane Doe, a S5-year-old woman, lost her house in the 1975 invasion, and sawher home and community destroyed once more in September 1999. An Indone-sian soldier neighbour warned her that she would be killed following the an-nouncement of the ballot, and urged her to flee to West Timor. Her youngestson, who became lohn Doe 1, wanted to flee at the time of the ballot, but hismother pleaded with him to remain with the rest of the family. He left theirvillage of Becora and she never saw him again. On 5 September they wereforced to flee by an Indonesian soldier seizing their house. She fled with the restof her family to West Timor and later Flores, where she leamed of her son'sdeath. He had been shot in the leg and died in Dili.

lohn Doe 2, a shy, nervy, slightly built, prematurely aged 30-year-old man,lost his leg after he was shot by Indonesian soldiers in Dare on 10 Septemberfor carrying a packet of biscuits for the Falantil resistance, according to thesoldiers who shot him.

lohn Doe 3 is a tall confident and articulate 27-yeat-old human rights activ-ist who was often threatened because of his work and kept under surveillance.In August 1999, his father, John Doe 4, was arrested, interrogated and threat-ened with death. His younger son, John Doe 5, was arrested some time later andnothing was heard of him. Lr February 2000, lohn Doe 4 received a letter from amilitia member saying that he had witnessed lohn Doe V's torture mutilation,execution and buming. He was fust shot in the legs and then stabbed repeat-edly. While lohn Doe V was still alive, his Indonesian torturers cut his throafhacked off his legs and hands and burned his remains.s

Civil remedies forcrimes againsthumanity in US law

The initiative to sue Lumintang for damages in a US civil court representedan alternative path to justice in the face of massive crimes against humanity inEast Timor. After the violence of 1999, it was hoped that prosecutions of well-known major Indonesian and East Timorese suspects would take place eitherunder the auspices of the United Nations or the newly elected democratic Wahidadministration in Indonesia or, conceivably, in East Timor itself. None of thesecame to pass because the political leadership of each state body felt disinclinedor unable to prosecute.

The use of civil remedies in US courts offered a viable altemative, and onethat did not depend on the vagaries of Indonesian or United Nations politics.Since 7979, a series of civil actions had been brought successfully under theAlicn Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act based on the unwuallybroad jwisdiction these acts possess. The Alien Tort Claims Acf specifies that

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226 Masters of Te'rror

[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdictional of any civil action by an

alien for a tort only committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty ofthe United States.6

Civil remedies may include awards for compensatory damages for injuriesand punitive damages intended to express moral outrage for particularly egre-gious behaviour and to deter future occurrences of similar actions.

In addition to any money that can be awarded, these cases are important to thevictims and their families. Plaintiffu are allowed to tell their stories to a court,can often confront their abusers and create an official record of theirpersecutions. This in turn could lead to a criminal prosecution. Filing these civilsuits can empower the victims and give them a means for fighting back. It can

also help them heal.7

The first successful application of the Alien Tort Claims Act in a humanrights case occurred 1981 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for theSecond Circuit, Filartiga o. Pma-Irala.lr.1979, a young man named foel Filartigawas torfured by Paraguayan police authorities because of his father's politicalactivities. The torfurer moved to the United States, where by chance the victim'ssister Dolly happened to see her brother's murderer, Americo Pena, on the

streets of New York. The family then sued under the Alien Tort Claims Act.

In his summation to Judge Kay, Steven Schneebaum summarised the legalsignificance of Filartiga:

Filartiga against Pena stands for two propositions: One, that treatment ofcitizens of a country by that country may be a matter of legitimate interna-tional concem and not just diplomatic but legal concem; and second, JudgeKaufman held that the law under which the case aros€ was the law of the

United States because customary intemational law and conventional law are

parts of the laws of our country. It has always been thus, but never before 1980

in the Second Circuit had the rules of intemational human rights law beenbrought into an American courtroom as the rule of decision.E

Moreover, Schneebaum argued that for the first time Filartiga establishedthe doctrine of individual legal responsibility for human-rights violations/ as

the first part of a

movement of international law toward individual accountability. Individualsnow at the beginning of our century may be said to have both rights and

obligations in intemational law. tndividuals are now properly said to be sub-jects of intemational law, they have what we used to call intemational legal

personality. They may bear obligations, they are entitled to rights. And na-

tions, countries, armies, do not violate human rights; people violate humanrights; and the people who commit those acts of violation may be held Person-ally accountable. That's new. It's new in the sense that it was the judgment atNuremberg, it was the judgment in Yamashita, it was the judgment in othercases in which acts of war have entailed individual responsibility, but never

Practical lustice in Doe a. Lumintang

before Filartiga had it been held that human rights norms and human rightsviolations also entail such responsibility.

The court asserted its jurisdiction over Pena, even though he was a foreignnational whose criminal activities took place outside the United States againstnon-US citizens. |urisdiction under the ATCA is universal, based on the uni-versally accepted right to be free from torture. 'lndeed,' wrote the Court, 'forpurposes of civil liability, the torturer has become - like the pirate and slavetrader before him - hosfls humani gefleris, an enemy of all mankind.'

In the years after L981, the range of potential defendants was widened, fromactual perpetrator, to those with command responsibility who authorised orordered the criminal action, and who failed to prevent it. Moreover the range ofpossible defendants expanded from the representatives or employees of statesto include non-state actors: for example, in 2000 a jury awarded damages of$4.5 billion against the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, who was at thetime a diplomatically-unrecognised leader. Foreign political groups may besued, and in current cases, major US and European corporations are beingsued for their complicity in gross human rights abuses in Burma and Nigeria.e

Lumintang and command responsibilityl0

The core of the case against Lumintang was that he was derelict in hisexecution of his responsibilities as a legally-appointed officer within the Indo-nesian Armed Forces. Under the doctrine of command responsibility, com-manders may be held responsible for certain actions even though the com-mander did not participate in the crirninal actions.

The theory underlying the doctrine of command responsibility is that thecommander is in the best position to prevent violations of humanitarian law;because commanders are in positions of great public trust and responsibilityand are empowered to prevent or punish abuses, a heightened legal duty isimposed upon them. As emphasized by the court in Kadic u. Karadzic, 70 F.3d

232,242 (2'd Cir. L995),'international law imposes an affirmative duty on mili-tary commanders to take appropriate measures within their power to controltroops under their command for the prevention of atrocities'.rl

In fact, Judge Kay held Lumintang both directly and indirectly responsiblefor the human rights violations endured by the plaintiffsr2. Following the an-nouncement of the damages judgment against him, Lieutenant-GeneralLumintang claimed that'[a]s a deputy Army chief of staff at the time, I was notdirectly involved in any decisions on East Timor'.l3 Lumintang and his sup-porters have maintained that as a headquarters staff officer he had no com-mand responsibility for what took place in East Timor, that he had no involve-ment in crimes committed in East Timor, and that he was not in a position toinfluence what took place. Accordingly, it is argued, it is both factually andlegally wrong to impute any responsibility to Lumintang.

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228 Masters of Terror

This position is incorrect both in fact and in law, and its currency indicateseither mendacity or ignorance of and contempt for universally-accepted princi-ples of international law, to say nothing of morality. Most importantly, suchclaims are based on a misconception of the character of high command posi-tions in relation to operational command, and of Lumintang's acfual rolela.

Establishing Lumintang's responsibility for wrongs in East Timor involvesboth matters of fact and matters of law. To establish Lumintang's commandresponsibility, the plaintiffs needed to establish three things about Lumintang'srole in the 1999 events: that he was in a superior-subordinate relationship tothe personnel who carried out gross human rights violations; that he knew orshould have known about them; and that he did not exercise his authority toprevent these violations of law or failed to punish the perpetrators of such acts.

Lumintang was appointed Deputy Army Chief of Staff on 18 fanuary 1999,

and remained in that position until 4 November of that year. Sometime duringhis previous appointment as Commandant of the Armed Forces Staff and Com-mand School from November 1998 to January 1999, Lumintang had been pro-moted to Lieutenant-General (three-star), the second highest rank in the Indo-nesian armed forces, making him part of the highest echelon of the Indonesianarmed forces high command. In Lumintang's time as Army Deputy Chief ofStaff, there were only two other three-star army generals serving in TNI andArmy headquarters at the time. Lumintang was outranked in the Army by onlytwo full generals (four star): Wiranto (Armed Forces Commander) and Subagyo(Army Chief of Staff)ls. As Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, Lumintang was inplain terms one of the most important figures in the entire armed forces, andarguably, the third most important in formal terms after Wiranto and Subagyo;certainly in the top five.

The Indonesian Armed Forces is a legally-constructed, bureaucratically struc-tured organisation, with the roles of office-holders specified in documents is-sued under the authority of the Comrnander of the Indonesian Armed Forces.

The position of Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army is one such office, and itsduties and responsibilities have been clearly set out in Decisions of the TNICommander. Following a major re-organisation of the Armed Forces, the thenTNI Commander, General Moerdani, issued a document entitled Organisationand Procedures of the lndonesian Army (TNL-AD), Decision of the Armed Forces Com-

mander : Kep /0 I /P Iil /1 9 8 4.M

The Army is formally organised into two levels, Army Headquarters andArmy Principal Commands, the latter including the Army Strategic Reserve

[Kostrad], Special Forces Command [Kopassus], and the Military Area Com-mands [Kodam], of which there were ten in 1999. The Deputy Army Chief ofStaff is designated as the second position within the Lead Echelon of ArmyHeadquarters, responsible to the Army Chief of Staff , who is himself responsi-ble to the Armed Forces Chief of Staffl?.

Practical lustice in Doe a. Lumintang

The specified duties and responsibilities of the Deputy Army Chief of Staffinclude the following:

A. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army is the principal aide and ad-viser to the Army Chief of Staff who has the duty and obligation to lead,organise and guide staff and leadership bodies, central service and ex-ecutive bodies (except the Military Academy and the Army Staff andCommand School), as well as other duties as instructed by the Chief ofStaff, with responsibilities as follows:

1. Making proposals and suggestions to the Chief of Staff on matters conceming his areas of responsibility.

2. Leading the Inspectorate-General, General Staff, Special Staff, Budgetand Planning Staff, and formulating plans and programs for the execution of the Army's duties.

3. To ensure coordination is effected and maintained:a . between Army Headquarters Staff and Army field bodies and Commanfub. between Army Headquarters Staff and the Headquarters Staffs ofother parts of the Armed Forces and Police;

c. between Army Headquarters Staff and the Staff of Armed ForcesHeadquarters and the Staff of the Ministry of Defence and Security.

4. To coordinate, control and supervise the execution of Army decisions,plans and prograrns, as well as personnel, materiel and financial ar-rangements.

5. To coordinate, supervise and give direction to the Staff, Cenhal Serviceand Executive bodies.lE

Moreover,

[w]henever the Chief of Staff is prevented from carrying out his responsibili-ties, he will be replaced by the Deputy Chief of Staff.

It is clear from this statement of duties that the Deputy Army Chief of Staff ,were he executing his duties diligently, had a responsibility to know what wasoccurring in the Indonesian Army's most important zone of engagement: 'toensure coordination is effected and maintained between Army HeadquartersStaff and Army field bodies and Commands'; 'to coordinate, conkol and super-vise the execution of Army decisions, plans and programs'; and 'formulatingplans and programs for the execution of the Army's duties'.

Moreover, the execution of these duties involves the Deputy Army Chief ofStaff in close and regular contact with the three Army commands, involvesknowledge of all their significant activities, collaboration in the planning ofoperations and assessment of their efhcacy and conformify with Army policy -and law.

One of the Deputy Chief's designated responsibilities is 'leading theInspectorate-General, General Staff, Special Staff, Budget and Planning Staff'.The Army Headquarters manual specifies one particular duty of the DeputyChief of Staff in relation to a part of the General Staffle:

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Masters of Tenor

a. The Operations Staff is an Army General Staff body with the duty of assist-

ing the Army Chief of Staff effecting the function of the General Staff in thearea of the development and control of forces, which includes doctrine, or-ganisation, training, uplifting the combat performance of Army units, and thepreparation and readying of Army forces. ...

c. The Operations Staff is led by the Assistant for Operations to the Army Chiefof Staff [Asops KasAD], who is responsible for the performance of the dutiesoutlined above to the Army Chief of Staff, and in the day-to'day execution ofthese duties is coordinated by the Deputy Army Chief of Staff.

It is clear, then, that in terms of formal responsibility, the position GeneralLumintang held in 1999 had formal responsibilities and powers that both re-quired him and enabled him to know of the activities of combat units, and toexercise designated authority for certain aspects of their activities. The sugges-

tion that 'staff' positions at a high level carry no resPonsibility for actions ofcombat units or involvement in their systematic and regular activities is in factcompletely specious, and in law irrelevant to the interpretation of commandresponsibility.

It might be argued that whatever the formal de jure specification of DeputyArmy Chief of Staff's authority, the actual position the incumbent found hirn-self in was quite different, and that he did not in fact have the specified Powersand responsibilities. By a long-established principle of international law, thisargument has been rejected, especially in cases where there were no militaryimpediments to the officer meeting his responsibilities.

The Lumintang telegram

In fact, there are two pieces of physical evidence that connect Lumintangquite concretely with criminal actions in East Timor, and which survived theplanned destruction of evidence by the retreating Army. The first is a telegramsent from Army Headquarters on 5 May 1999 to the Commander of MilitaryArea lXlUdayana, Major-General Adam Damiri. The telegram is from the ArmyChief of Staff, but signed by Lumintang. The Chief of Staff is also listed as

receiving a copy, suggesting that Lumintang signed and sent the telegram whilestanding in for the Chief of Staff. It begins by referring to a letter three weeksearlier 'regarding the order to anticipate situations that might arise with regardto the choice of options for the East Timorese people'. The addressees, which, inaddition to the Kodam IX commander, include the Army Inspector-General,Assistants to the Army Chief of Staff, and the local Army commander in EastTimor (Military Resort 1.64), are then ordered to:

1. Be ready to confront all possibilities in the choice of options for the East

Timorese.

2. Prepare a security plan with the aim of preventing the outbreak of civil warincluding preventative action (creation of conditions), police actions, rePres-

sive/coercive actions as well as plans for moving back/evacuation [of East

Timorese] if the second option becomes the choice.D

Practical lustice in Doe o. Lumintang

Written in 'telegraphic' shorthand form, the telegram is clearly part of anongoing stream of consultations between Jakarta and Kodam IX headquartersin Denpasar about how to deal with the developing situation in East Timor.Details exist of a number of subsequent meetings between senior Indonesianofficers (including recipients of the telegram), Indonesian civil authorities inEast Timor and militia leaders discussing the implementation of the order. Theend result was of course a massive and murderous re-location of hundreds ofthousands of people, the great majority of whom were coerced or intimidated.The scale of the final operation was vast, involving more than one third of theterritory's population, and requiring complicated and relatively highly coordi-nated logistical planning, using large numbers of Indonesian military person-nel and equipment.

The telegram clearly orders the preparation of plans for evacuation in theevent of a vote for independence, and in that respect the most important aspectof the telegram is that it indicates Lumintang's official role as the instigator inthe planning process that led to the mass forced re-locations. The telegramanticipates the need to create certain security conditions, with the aim of 'pre-venting the outbreak of civil war'. Given the level of terror obtaining in iastTimor at that time as a result of undoubted lndonesian Army activities in con-cert with the militia it controlled, the meaning of that statement of aim is, to saythe least, ambiguous.

The telegram also orders local commanders to use 'repressive/coercive ac-tions' ltindalean rEresif/kaersifl. Ithas been argued that the original Indonesianphrase does not necessarily carry the brazen and brutal connotations of theEnglish. As one respected colleague with far better command of Indonesianthan myself put it to me, represif does not carry all of the sinister connotations of'repressive' in English, and that it is often used in official documents to refer tolegal action of the part of an authority2l .

However in the context of a formal order to senior corunanders conductinga semi-covert war, the sense is arguably much stronger. The actions to be car-ried out include standard terms listed in Indonesian Army officer trainingmanuals - creating conditions (which would include social, political, militaryconditions), police actions (a term which in the context of New Order Indone-sia could refer to some very harsh techniques) and'repressive/coe,crve ac-tions'. The three types of actions are, in context, comprehensive. Almost noth-ing is excluded. Represif coupled with koersif, together with the other two rec-ommended actions in the context of an ongoing war, would seem to meansomething very close to its English meaning. It is difficult to think of whatstronger word would be likely used in an official written order in such a con-text to describe the activities that were already being conducted by the Army.The reality was that Indonesian Army activities were already extremely violentand, as Lumintang had good reason to know, likely to become more so. There is

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232 Masters of Tenor

nothing in the telegram that indicates any limitation on the means to be used increating appropriate conditions or the limits of 'repressive/coercive actions'.There were in fact none, and given the prior history of the Indonesian Army inEast Timor, with which Lumintang was directly familiar, none could be ex-

pected22.

As early as June 12, a little more than a month after the Lumintang order toprepare an evacuation plan, there was evidence to indicate that the evacua-

tions the Indonesian military had in mind were indeed coercive - in fact a

forced evacuation and re-location.

Yayasan Hak, an East Timorese human rights organisafion in Dili, reported on

June 13, 1999 that sources within the Besi Merah Putih militia had leaked infor-mation that a plan to forcibly evacuate women and children to West Timor had

been discussed at a meeting on June 12 in Liquica attended by the district head,

Leonido Martins Rebeiro; Manuel Sousa, commander of the BMP militia; the

head of the Liquica dishict military command and other BMP leaders'23

A week later another meeting of senior rnilitary officials and militia leaderswas held at the Military Resort [Korem 164] headquarters in Dili, in order todraw up a two-track comprehensive plan to deal with the likelihood of losingthe referendum. A key part of the plan was the partitioning of East Timor and

the forced relocation of the local population in the western districts - and

potentially their later re-population with loyal non-East Timorese.

The participants of this Korem 164 meeting included Task Force head Gen-eral Zacky Anwar Makarim and his deputy Glenny Kairupan, Korem com-mander Colonel Tono Suratman, and several of the militia heads, and mostimportantly for the present pu{poses, Major-General Kiki Syahnakri, the As-sistant for Operations to the Army Chief of Staff4. In that position, Syahnakri

reported directly on a day-to-day basis to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieu-tenant Johny Lumintang.

Lumintang is directly linked to the vast forced re-location and ethnic cleans-

ing plan both through the telegram that initiated the evacuation planning proc-ess and the activities of his immediate subordinate. Either Lumintang knew ofSyahnakri's activities, and at least tacitly approved of them, if not positivelydirected them; or he did not know of them, and was hence derelict in his re-

sponsibility. In either case, under the well-developed doctrine of commandresponsibility, to say nothing of common moral duty, Lumintang was culpablein planning for major crimes against humanity.

The secret warfare manual

The second piece of physical evidence that ties Lumintang's official activi-ties to crimes against humanity in East Timor is unambiguous. An Army Secret

Warfare manual of development guidelines issued over Lumintang's name as

Practical lustice in Doe o. Lumintang

Deputy Army Chief of Staff was discovered in Dili after the Indonesianretreat.s The manual is intended to systematise Army preparations for secretwarfare, and the goals of training in particular. As the manual points out, theprincipal part of the Army using such secret warfare skills is the Special Forces

Command [Kopassusl. The manual26 specified exactly what techniques were tobe taught to Kopassus personnel, and how they were to be examined on paperand in the field:

Tactics and Techniques of War of Nerves ['Strategy of Tension']27

Tactics and Techniques of Propaganda

Tactics and Techniques of Abduction

Tactics and Techniques of Terror

Tactics and Techniques of Agitation

Tactics and Techniques of Sabotage

Tactics and Techniques of InfiltrationTactics and Techniques of Surveillance

Tactics and Techniques of Wiretapping/Bugging

Tactics and Techniques of Photo Intelligence

Tactics and Techniques of Psychological Operations

In signing the manual, which was developed precisely in accordance withthe designated responsibilities of his office, Lumintang was signifying his un-derstanding that terror, murder, disappearances and torture were standardoperating procedure for one of three Commands under his authority in theIndonesian Army - as indeed they had been in practice for Kopassus in EastTimor and elsewhere for many years2E. The signed manual demonstrates notonly Lumintang's knowledge and approval of conduct treated as criminalthroughout the world, but his acknowledgment and acceptance of the fact thatin the organisation, in which he held very senior rank and almost the highestlegal authority, terror, murder, disappearances and torture are unexceptionaldesirable skills to be passed on to new Kopassus recruits in a rationalisedmanner. Nothing more clearly indicates the depth of the normalisation of uni-versally condemned standards of morality in the culture of impunity in whichLumintang spent his working life and which he was proud to represent.

Lumintang himself was not known as a torfurer or particularly cruel fieldcommander. He had a model career as a fast-rising elite infantry officer, receiv-ing rapid promotion in the 1990s, appointment to a series of coveted StrategicReserve Command posts and territorial commands in three of core securityconcern at the time: the Greater Jakarta region, East Timor, and Irian faya.Lumintang was a good example of the Indonesian Army's idea of a rnodelsoldier - who found nothing unusual or disconcerting about organising aneducation in terror and torfure for trainees.

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Masters of Terror

What could Lumintang have done?

One requirement for demonstrating a dereliction in command responsibil-ity is to show that Lumintang not only knew that criminal actions were takingplace in East Timor within his own arena of designated responsibility, but thathe failed to take appropriate actions to end or limit such practices. Apart fromwhatever understanding of military law Lumintang received from his exten-sive military education in Indonesian and the US (the latter on three occa-sions), and his understanding of Indonesian law as Commandant of the ArmedForces highest educational institution, Lumintang had also been close to thedisciplining of his predecessor as Commander of Korem 1.64, Brigadier Gen-eral Rudolf Samuel Warouw by President Suharto over his responsibility forSanta Cruz massacre in 1991. In other words, Lumintang was perfectly awarethat Kopassus actions in East Timor were criminal under Indonesian law, letalone international law, and that in the past, Indonesian officers had been heldresponsible by their superiors.2e

What could Lumintang have done as Deputy Army Chief of Staff in 7999?The one thing he could not do was directly order Kopassus, Kostrad and KodamIX soldiers to stop these actions: that was a prerogative of the commanders ofthe three Commands. But there were in fact many other avenues open to him, a

number of which were explicitly specified duties of his position. Lumintangcould have attempted to stop or restrain the crimes being carried out in EastTimor by:

. directly investigating widespread public allegations of extra-judicial kill-ings, terror and torfure in East Timor;

' initiating a review of these activities by his direct subordinate, the In-spector-General of the Army

. initiating altemative approaches to realising TNI goals in east Timor bydirecting the Army General Staff and Operations Staff accordingly;

. drawing the attention of his immediate superior, Army Chief of StaffSubagyo, to what was occurring, pointing out its illegal character, itsviolations of military procedures and policy (which includes the up-holding of Indonesian law), and its violations of a number of interna-tional treaties and agreements to which Indonesia was a party, includ-ing the 5 May Agreement with the UN and Portugal;

. making statements to this effect in military discussion forums, where, as

a 3-star general and former Commandant of the Staff and CommandCollege, he would have been at the very least heard oub

' making statements in public and in the mass media, as did, for example,Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah; and

. Lumintang could have resigned his position or even his Army commis-sion, and made the reasons for doing so public.

Practical lustice in Doe a. Lumintang

There is no evidence that Lumintang did any of these things, or any sugges-tion that he did anything comparable. In fact, he undertook no action whatso-ever to restrain the criminal behaviour of TNI personnel in East Timor aboutwhich he knew so much. Since he had the authority and capacity to attempt allof these actions, Lumintang's failure to act is singularly culpable. At no timedid Lumintang behave with honour.

Some sympathisers of Lumintang, and indeed some serious observers ofIndonesian politics, argue that Lumintang was effectively powerless. One ar-gument is that as a staff officer, Lumintang was not a commander and thereforehad no responsibility for actions taken by troops under the command of others,and no way of intervening. This is clearly quite untrue on both counts.

A more serious argument is that as a matter of political fact, Lumintang waspossibly quite unable to exercise the authority vested in him: to have spokenout against the crimes in East Timor. To have attempted, for example, to bringKopassus to heel, would have evoked derision from his fellow generals at best,and at worst marginalisation from policy-making, with dismissal probable.There is some merit in both these arguments. Having authorised and signeddocuments such as the Army Secret Warfare manual, for Lumintang to claim tohave suddenly discovered evidence of TNI criminal actions would indeed haveinvited derision. Lumintang acted for many years as an uncomplaining part ofthe military bureaucracy and command structure that believed, apparentlywithout even reflection, that it could commit crimes against humanity withimpunity.

It is also true that Lumintang would most likely have faced a very hostileresponse, and that he would have been subjected to intense political pressurewithin the Armed Forces, and most likely forced out of power. This is true, butit is hardly a defence. It is not even the case that Lumintang could claim to havea history of having fought such policies from within, and hence have goodreason to play a balanced hand, retreating to fight another day. There is noevidence to suggest Lumintang did anything of the kind.30

To be sure, Lumintang was not the worst of Indonesian officers responsiblefor the crimes against humanity in East Timor. He was not known as person-ally sadistic or having a predilection for torture. He was not known as theauthor of particularly extreme or harsh policies in his time as Korem com-mander in East Timor or Kodam commander in Irian Jaya, although normalTNI terror and extra-judicial killing happened on both watches. He was notpart of the most dreadful unit in the Indonesian Army, Kopassus, and had norecord of involvement in intelligence and covert operations. He was not aPrabowo, a Zacky Anwar Makarim, a Kiki Syahnakri, or a Mahidin Simbolon.Lumintang was a straight elite Army infantry officer, and in the norms of Indo-nesian Army culfure, a very good one, receiving well-deserved promotion tothe highest echelon of the lndonesian Armed Forces.

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236 Masters of Teror

But that is precisely the problem. I{hen the standards of morality are set atthe level of the torturer, the sadistic killer, the terrorist in uniform acting undersuperior orders, then we have already abandoned most claims to humanity. Itis precisely because Lumintang is a good career officer, a straight elite infantrysoldier apparently exempt from sadism that his demonstrable dereliction of hisspecified duties as a member of the Indonesian high command and his failureto comply with broader duties under the standards of intemational law andcommon responsibility to humanity become so important. The problem thatLumintang represents is the normalisation of profoundly immoral and illegalmilitary conduct in a culture of impunity that has taken root in the IndonesianArmed Forces. Those who seek to excuse his conduct by favourably comparinghim to torfurers and sadistic killers only demonstrate their acceptance of andcomplicity in that culture of impunity. Lumintang indeed represents, in Arendt'sphrase describing Adolf Eichmann, the banality of evil3l .

Some experienced analysts of Indonesian politics have attacked the suitagainst Lumintang as a political error. One prominent Australian specialist onthe Indonesian military refused to assist the plaintiffs for two reasons. Firstly,because Lumintang was a staff officer and not a commander he held no respon-sibility for crimes in East Timor. Secondly this specialist declined because he

considered Lumintang an important Army reformer and the suit would do adisservice to the cause of human rights in East Timor. As it happens, there is noevidence to mark Lumintang as an important political reformer beyond somelate, muted enthusiasms for 'democracy' after October 1999.

Matters of fact aside, the difficulty with this type of position is that it foreverpostpones issues of justice and the allocation of legal responsibility in favourof the alleged political utility of leaving criminals in place. The rule of law,domestic as much as intemational, is subordinated to the demands of politicalmanoeuvring. The analysis of Indonesian politics by foreign and Indonesiananalysts alike has been dominated for half a century by such realpolitik thoughtpatterns, and the quiet but persistent demands for adherence to law have been

marginalised as both unrealistic and impractical. Doe o. Lumintang, togetherwith the reports of the Indonesian and United Nations inquiries, marks thefirst effective incursion of thinking based on legally-binding universal moralnorms into Indonesian politics.

This same pattem of political realist thinking is not only antipathetic to therule of law and universal legal norms in politics: it is equally unsympathetic tothe concept of individual accountability for gross violations of human rights.There is a deeply statist presumption at work here, which is reluctant to ac-knowledge, as Schneebaum put it, that 'nations, countries, armies, do not vio-late human rights; people violate human rights; and the people who committhose acts of violation may be held personally accountable'.

Practical lustice in Doe a. Lumintang

The four living plaintiffs are most unlikely to see any of the $66 millionawarded in compensatory and punitive damages. But they have been able tospeak and be recognised in a court of the most powerful country in the world.Their story has been told and adjudged true. The man they accused of respon-sibility for wrongs against them has been judged to bear that responsibility.The size of the award is an attempt by the judiciary to express the depth ofthose wrongs.

But the award is not merely symbolic. Johny Lumintang, now a senior statemanager (Secretary of the Department of Defence), can never again visit theUnited States without threat of demand for payment. This judgment will followhim wherever he goes, as will the fact of his cowardice in failing to appear incourt.32

Moreover, the fact that Lumintang was found liable means that many otherIndonesian senior officers implicated in the East Timor crimes can visit theUnited States only at the risk - indeed the likelihood - of facing similar suitsand even stronger cases. Prabowo, Wiranto, Zacky Anwar, Kiki Syahnakri,Mahidin Simbolon and their ilk can only safely enter the United States eitheron diplomatic passports or in secret.

Most importantly, the same risk will face future gross violators of humanrights in the Indonesian armed forces. Precisely because Lumintang is not aPrabowo or a Zacky Anwar, the significance of the case for their future behav-iour of 'normal' mainstream military professionals in Indonesia is enormous.\A/hether states or soldiers like it or not, the laws that express universal moralnorrw such as the UN Conaention Against Torture and Other Cruel, lnhumnn orDegrading Treatment or Punishmenf in national law are now legally binding inevery jurisdiction as customary international law - which, in the case ofthe United States, is recognised as part of the federal common law of theUnited States.

The judgment in Doe a. Lumintang exactly expresses the generous anduniversalist intentions of the framers of the Torture Victims Protection Acf: in theUS case those universal norms are to have universal jurisdiction. The doctrineof universal jurisdiction for crimes committed by 'the enemies of all humankind' in that Act was not accidental and is not unique.33 In the future there willbe more of such applications of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. The es-tablishment of the International Criminal Court is one such, establishing asystem of state-prosecutions of crimes against humanity and war crimes. ThePinochet decisions, added to the limited but gathering successes of the Interna-tional Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, are augu-ries of what is to come.

The Torture Victim Protection Act and the Alien Tort Claims Acf supplementuniversal jurisdiction with a rare empowerment of individual citizens in the

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face of state indifference to wrongs suffered. Prosecutions in the IntemationalCriminal Court, like the International Tribunals for Rwanda and the FormerYugoslavia, will always be dependent on the will and consent of states. Doe o.

Lumintang extends the existing possibilities of citizen-initiated civil remediesand the possibilities of practical justice against 'the enemies of all humankind'in East Timor and Indonesia.

Postscriph 'Pak Johny will certainly be arrested'

Two months after the Kay judgment, the Indonesian government abruptlyabandoned its position of ignoring the Doe o. Lumintang judgment. Speaking toa parliamentary committee on late November, Minister of Defence Matori AbdulDjalil criticised his predecessor's failure to provide Lumintang with legal sup-port, and announced the formation of a legal defence team within his ministry.With Lumintang at his side, Matori made the rationale for the about face quiteclear: 'If Pak Johny goes to America now he will certainly be arrested... This isnot just for Johny's interest, but for the moral interests of all soldiers.' Theprevious day, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayudha acknowledged the obviouspoint that this move entailed recognition of the jurisdiction of the US court. Nodetails were forthcoming of the form of legal intervention contemplated by theMinistry of Defence team. s

While accompanied by familiar dismissals of the judgment itself, and com-plaining of Lumintang's lack of representation in the proceedings (by his ownchoice), the two senior ministers - and Lumintang himself - were making clearthat in their eyes Doe a. Lumintang was opening an effective, if however limited,challenge to the culture of impunity in the Indonesian military.

8

Silent Witness: Australian Intelligence and East TimorDesmond Ball

The relationship between intelligence and policy is complex and delicate. Itcan easily become politicised, so demeaning the intelligence process and ulti-mately risking national security. Intelligence is supposed to be objective, frankand unaffected by the views and policy directions of the Government it in-forms. But it must also be relevant to the needs and political interests of Minis-ters and their senior policy advisers. Of course, the Ministers have other inter-ests, perspectives and pu{poses, as well as other sources of advice. The headsof the intelligences agencies in Canberra know that they must compete forMinisterial attention, and that assessments which are irrelevant or do not sup-port current policies will inevitably marginalise their organisations. The pres-sures to tell policy-makers what they would like to hear can become irresistible.

The policy-makers in turn often have great difficulty in utilising intelli-gence. Sometimes they are unable to exploit their special knowledge because ofthe possibility of exposing their 'sources and methods'. This is especially thecase with signals intelligence (SIGINT), the effectiveness of which is relateddirectly to the extent that secrecy is maintained. Indeed, in World War II, cities,convoys, warships and army divisions were sacrificed to protect code-break-ing achievements.r Sometimes policy-makers would prefer not to be told aboutparticular intelligence matters, either because they do not wish to carry theburden of secrecy or because they have already decided upon their policies andplans, and do not wish to be obstructed by irreconcilable information. Therelationship between policy and intelligence has been especially problematicwith regard to Indonesia and its actions in East Timor, since 1974-75 whenIndonesian intelligence officers planned the annexation of the Portuguesecolony. Successive Governments have judged that a politically stable Indone-sia is an important Australian national interest, and that Australian security isenhanced by good relations with fakarta. Policies towards Indonesia musttherefore be made by Prime Ministers, for whom intelligence is only one ofmany considerations. For Prime Ministers, whether Gough lly'hitlam in 1975 orJohn Howard1n1999, knowledge of Indonesia is less important than the sound-ness of their political judgments. Too much intelligence can be an encumbrance.

In 7975, when Indonesia invaded East Timor, the intelligence was quitedifferent to the public pronouncements of the Government. The intelligencecommunity closely monitored Indonesia's preparations for the invasion, butthe Government professed ignorance of these. It knew that Indonesian militaryforces had covertly invaded East Timor in October - and indeed, had deliber-ately killed five Australian-based journalists at Balibo on 16 October - butofficially denied any knowledge. A cover-up was instituted to ensure that thetruth about Balibo never surfaced.2

240 Masters of Teror

Ln1999, when the Indonesian Army sought to prevent East Timor's inde-pendence, the politicisation of the intelligence Process by the Howard Govern-ment was manifold. Its consequences were grievous. Hundreds of East Timorese

died unnecessarily. The intelligence relationship with the US was damaged,

albeit only temporarily. Despair grew within the intelligence community, pro-ducing an unprecedented spate of leaks of intelligence documents - the assess-

ments of which were often at great variance from the Govemment's statedpositions. They revealed that on some key issues the Australian public wasmisled by the Govemment.

This article discusses several dimensions of the role played by the Austral-ian intelligence community in Indonesia/East Timor matters in 1999. It de-scribes the various organisations involved, as well as the intelliSence cooPera-

tion and exchange relationships between Canberra and Jakarta, Canberra and

Washington. It shows that the collection agencies provided an extraordinaryvolume of detailed, essentially real-time information about developments inEast Timor, and that the assessment agencies provided reports which weremostly of high quality in terms of accuracy and timeliness. But it also shows

that serious problems emerged in the relationship between intelligence and

policy, including the propensity of policy-makers to ignore unpalatable intelli-gence, a lapse in professionalism by the intelligence managers and organisa-

tional inadequacies. It concludes with some discussion of the problems and

possibilities for using Australian intelligence material in war crimes tribunals.

The Australian intelligence communit5r

Australia has five intelligence agencies that produced intelligence concern-

ing Indonesia and East Timor. Two of them are concerned with intelligence

analysis and assessments - the Office of National Assessments (ONA), Aus-

tralia's premier intelligence agency, which reports directly to the Prime Minis-ter and which has some oversight and tasking prerogatives over the other agen-cies; and the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO). Three of them are con-

cerned with intelligence collection and processing: the Australian Secret Intel-ligence Service (ASIS), the foreign intelligence collection and liaison service

and organisationally a division of the DePartment of Foreign Affairs and Trade

(DFAT); the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), responsible for the interception

of foreign radio and electronic signals, and decryption of foreign codes andciphers; and the Australian Imagery Organisation (AIO), the newest agency,responsible for the processing and interpretation of photographic and digitalimagery. Four (ie., ONA, DIO, DSD and the AIO) work together in various

buildings in the Department of Defence complex at Russell Hill in Canberra.

Three of them (ie., ONA, DIO and ASIS) maintain cooperation and exchange

relations with Indonesian counterparts.

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On the whole, the intelligence community performed very well in terms ofproviding detailed, accurate, relevant and timely reporting to policy-makers.Even ONA, which was found complacent and laggardly about Indonesianmatters in 1997-98, was at least from April 1999 producing accurate reportsabout developments in East Timor, with grimmer prognostications than thePrime Minister wanted.3 Its reporting during the next six months was consid-ered by the Prime Minister's office and the Department of Foreign Affairs tohave been excellent.a The working relationships between the various agencieswas generally harmonious, although there were some differences which reflectedDeparhnental lines, and some personal acrimony in parb of the ONA-DIO rela-tionship. There was a lapse in professionalism around April-May - which evi-dently involved DIO rather than ONA, where it had not been uncommon.

The Office of National Assessments (ONA)

ONA has a small staff of only 28 analysts, who provide the Prime Ministerand other Ministers and designated officials with both current intelligencereports and in-depth assessments. The analysts, who are mainly on second-ment from DFAT, are located in the Defence complex at Russell Hill, but theymust satisfy the demands of the Prime Minister and his advisers.

All of ONA's six heads since its establishment in 1978 have been seniorofficers of DFAT, although they have varied greatly in terms of diplomaticbackgrounds, intellectual qualities, and management abilities. Two were formerAmbassadors to Indonesia - the founding Director General, Bob Furlonger(1,978-81,); and Philip Flood (1995-96), who then became Secretary of DFAT(1,ee6-e8).

The politicisation of ONA began with the circumstances of Furlonger's dis-missal by Prime Minister Fraser in 1981. Its assessments became very colouredby the views at the very top of successive Australian Govemments about thecritical importance of the US alliance and the need to support US global strate-gic policies during the Cold War, even as the Soviet Union crumbled.

ONA had become very involved in Iiaison arrangements with Indonesia'sBAKIN (Badan Koordinase lntelijen Negara, or State Intelligence CoordinatingAgency). It had taken over this relationship from the joint tntelligence Organi-sation (DIO's predecessor) in 1978, but it had been considerably enhancedduring the 1990s. It was regarded by ONA as a valuable connection, whichneeded to be protected even (or especially) when the public relationship be-tween Indonesia and Australia floundered.

ONA receives material for its assessments from all relevant Australian Gov-ernment departments and agencies. Most of its material comes from DFAT,including copies of both the cable traffic to Canberra from Australian missionsabroad and reports by DFAT desk officers. As the premier agency, it not only

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242 Masters of Tetor

receives raw material and analyses from the other intelligence agencies, butalso directs the collection and/or analytical tasks of the other agencies. DIOreports become inputs into ONA assessments, although the quality of the DIOanalysis has often been superior.

The improvement in ONA's performance around April 1999 was due inlarge part to the appointment of Kim Jones as Director General in December1998. He had previously been a Deputy Secretary in DFAT, where he wasresponsible for oversight of ASIS and the defence, regional security and intelli-gence sections of the department and where he was noted for his conceptualability. In early 1999, Jones appointed to head ONA's Strategic Analysis Brancha DFAT colleague who was the most knowledgeable person on regional secu-rity matters in the govemment.

The Australian Seuet lntelligence Sercice (ASIS)

The headquarters of ASIS is located in the DFAT building near ParliamentHouse, where about 100 staff support about 40 officers serving abroad. TheService prepares intelligence reports (so-called 'CX' material) based on the re-ports of its overseas officers, and distributes this material to relevant Ministersas well as the other intelligence agencies.

ASIS maintains stations in Aushalian embassies in about L8 countries inEast, Southeast and South Asia. The Jakarta station is the largest. ASIS initi-ated liaison with BAKIN in 1971, and an ASIS Liaison Officer was accreditedto BAKIN in 7977.

The Director of ASIS is Allan Taylor, who was appointed on 1 March 1998.

He had previously headed the Intemational Division of the Department ofPrime Minister and Cabinet and was Ambassador to Indonesia from 1993 to7996. He was consulted frequently by both the Prime Minister and the ForeignMinister as the East Timor crisis unfolded and was appointed to head thePrime Minister's Task Force set up in mid-October 1999.

The Defence lntelligence Or ganisation (D IO)

DIO provides intelligence analyses and assessments to the Australian De-fence Force (ADF), the civilian policy planners, and the Minister for Defence.During crises, it also provides briefs for the Prime Minister. It is located inBuilding L in the Russell Hill complex in Canberra. Its Director in 1998-99 wasMajor-General Bill Crews, its civilian Deputy was Doug Kean, and it had a staffof about 300 (about 175 military and 125 civilian). Kean had previously servedin ONA for more than a decade, including several years as head of its StrategicAnalysis Branch.

The organisation produces a range of current intelligence reports andlonger-term assessments, including the Current lntelligence Brief and the

Silent Witness

Defence Intelligence Report. The CIB, which is only one or two pages, is pro-duced most frequently - there were 145 issues in 1998, and nearly 200 in 1999,of which more than 40 were issued in September. The DIR is usually about sixpages/ and provides a more in-depth analysis of a particular subject, such as'political factions and figures [in] East Timor', and 'the ingredients of conflict[in] East Timor'. Two or three Reports are produced each week.

The Defmce Signals Directorate (DSD)

DSD is Australia's largest, most secret and most valuable intelligence agency.Its headquarters is in Building M at Russell Hill, and it was headed by MartinBrady until October 1999, when he was appointed to the position of Chairmanof a new Defence Intelligence Board (DIB) created to improve the oversight andmanagement of the Defence intelligence agencies.s

Since the 1980s, the interception and decryption of Indonesian signals hasbeen DSD's highest priority in terms of organisational focus, manpower, andbudgetary resources. DSD's largest intercept station is located at Shoal Bay,near Darwin, where some 120-L50 people worked through 1999, listening withearphones to Indonesian radio traffic, recording encrypted signals, and moni-toring satellite telephone conversations.5

The Shoal Bay station has two different signals interception systems. Oneis a large circular antenna array/ code-named Pusher, which is used for inter-ception, monitoring, direction-finding (DF) and analysis of radio signals in thehigh frequency (HF) band.7 This system intercepted radio communicationsamong ABRI and militia units in East Timor, between ABRI officers in the fieldand the East Timor Command in Dili, between Dili and the HQ of the UdayanaRegional Military Command or KODAM (Komando-Daerah Militer) IX inDenpasar in Bali, and between Dili and ABRI HQ in Jakarta.

The second system, code-named Inrkswood, is concerned with the intercep-tion of Indonesian satellite communications, and especially those involvingIndonesia's own Palapn communications satellite system. It became opera-tional in \979, and during its first decade had only two dish antennas, formonitoring the two Palapa satellites then in service.s In the late 1980s, accord-ing to the then Minister for Defence, 'the station [was] modified in response tochanging requirements and this included the installation of several dish an-tennas'.e These must have been temporary, because at the time of the massacreat the Santa Cruz cemetery in Diii in November 1991., there were still only twodish antennas.lo But many more were installed in the late 1990s, making elevenas at September 7999 (including two small dishes on the roof of the main opera-tions building). Most of the new antennas were designed to intercept varioussorts of satellite communications involving Indonesia, including mobile satel-lite telephone (satphone) conversations using INMARSAT and other services.

243

Masters of Terror

By 1998, it seemed that ABRI officers throughout the archipelago were us-ing satphones more than their Army radios to communicate with Jakarta. Someof the new dishes were installed to provide direct relay of the intercepted mate-rial, as well as 'first echelon' translations and analyses, to the DSD HQ and theDSD liaison offices in the ONA and DIO buildings at Russell Hill.

In addition, small teams of Navy SIGINT personnel from Shoal Bay servedaboard some of the Navy's frigates and patrol boats, which were able to operateclose to East Timor. These teams intercepted VHF/UHF transmissions as wellas low-power HF signals, such as walkie-talkie and field radio communica-tions. DSD was also able to use two P-3C Orion aircraft which had been spe-cially configured for SIGINT operations in 1995-98 (under Project Peacemate).11

DSD monitored the stage-managed withdrawal of Indonesian troops fromEast Timor in fuly-August 1998. This was a much-publicised exercise, in whichIndonesian authorities released a variety of inaccurate and conflicting num-bers, claiming inter alia that there had been 3,000 new troops brought in throughthe course of normal troop rotation and a net decrease of L,000 in the totalnumber, leaving some 6,000 still in the country. In fact, leaked ABRI docu-ments showed that there were 17,941. troops in East Timor in late August 1998

(as compared to 15,912 in November 1997). (The remaining hoops included a

Kopassus company and a Kopassus intelligence and headquarters unit, al-though Indonesian authorities had said that all Special Forces would depart.)l2On the day of the withdrawal, DSD intercepted 'a number of radio transmis-sions' from the Indonesian ships, which revealed 'how the landing craft hadjust gone around the island and dropped the troops off again'.l3 DSDreported the subterfuge, but the Australian Government publicly welcomedthe withdrawal.

The Australian Imagery Organisation ( AIO )

The Australian Imagery Organisation (AIO) mainly serves the DIO, and ishoused on the sixth floor of Building L, where it replaced DIO's own ImageryBranch. It also provides imagery to other intelligence agencies in Canberra, as

well as (unclassified) geographic information to other govemment departrnents.Images of East Timor, from broad-swath tenain feafures down to picfures ofvehicles and individuals, were obtained from the AIO's three principal sources

- first, highly-classified, high resolution (6-8 cm) images provided to Australiaby the US National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and produced by its KH-11(Kennnn) and Advanced KH-11 imaging satellites; second, lower resolution (1-

10 metres) imagery obtained commercially from SPOT and other companies;and, third, imagery collected by the RAAF's RF-111 reconnaissance aircraft(including infra-red imagery).

Silent Witness 245

Management and coordination

The organisational machinery for management and coordination of Aus-tralian national security policy had been improved under the Howard Govern-ment, but it was still defective at the outset of the East Timor crisis. Informaland ad hoc arrangements became much more important. The machinery re-mained unsatisfactory until at least mid-October 1999, when the Prime Minis-ter's Task Force was formed.

At the apex of the formal structure is the National Securilr Committee ofCabinet (NSCC), chaired by the Prime Minister and including the Minister forDefence, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Treasurer, and theAttorney-General. It is supported by the Secretaries Committee on NationalSecurity (SCONS), which is chaired by the Secretary of the Department of PrimeMinister and Cabinet and consists of the Secretaries of the Departments ofDefence, Foreign Affairs, and the Treasury, the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF),and the Director General of ONA. The NSCC met about once a month untilSeptember, when it met several times a week. However, it lacked the bureau-cratic infrastructure to maintain effective oversight or coordination.

Throughout the East Timor crisis, Australian policy was determined by thePrime Minister, who discussed policy matters almost daily with Treasurer Pe-ter Costello and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, and frequently with De-fence Minister fohn Moore. Prime Minister Howard demonstrated a remark-able ability to stay attuned to public opiniory with its latent fears about Indonesiaand, when Australian peacekeepers were deployed, the popular support thatcoalesces for Australians serving in potentially dangerous conditions overseas.

In formulating policy, Howard consulted mainly with two of his closestofficials. The first was Michael Thawley, his Senior Adviser (Intemational), acareer DFAT officer who had moved to ONA in 1983, headed the Current Intel-ligence Branch of ONA in 1986-89, and had been First Assistant Secretary ofthe Intemational Division of the Department of PM & C from 1993 until April1996, when he moved to the Prime Minister's office. The second was MichaelL'Estrange, the Secretary to the Cabinet and head of the Cabinet Policy Unit,and intellectually the most capable of all the Govemment's senior advisers.

The Prime Minister and his key Ministers and advisers were supported bya four-man ad hoc group called the Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG),which since the early 1990s has been the most influential group in the nationalsecurity bureaucracy in Canberra. In 1999, its members were Hugh White,Deputy Secretary (Strategy and Intelligence) in the Department of Defence; AirVice Marshal Doug Riding, Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF); John Dauth,Deputy Secretary in DFAT; and Peter Varghese, another DFAT officer who hadsucceeded Allan Taylor as First Assistant Secretary of the Intemational Divi-sion of the Department of PM & C. It was the most influential body until thePrime Minister's Task Force was organised.

246 Masters of Terror

DFAT established an East Timor Task Force in February to monitor eventsand consider policy options. It grew to nine members in October, all from withinthe Department, including officers from the lndonesia Sectiory and reported toDeputy Secretary Dauth. From March to September, the Department of Defence

had a small informal team which reported to Hugh White. Two groups wereestablished in the first week of September - a Defence Policy Coordination TaskForce, headed by the Director of Regional Engagement Policy and Programmesin the Departmen| and the Coalition Management Team, headed by MajorGeneral Mike Keating, which designed the structure of the Australian contri-bution to INTERFET (the International Force in East Timor). These two groupsreported to White, who had become Acting Secretary at the beginning of Sep-tember, and Admiral Chris Barrie, the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF).

The Prime Minister's Task Force, officially called the East Timor PolicyGroup, was formed in midOctober, to coordinate all the policy dimensions ofAustralia's involvement in East Timor. Chaired by Allan Taylor, it reporteddirectly to the Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, MaxMoore-Wilton, and thence to the Prime Minister and the NSCC. Its memberscame from several key Departments, including Foreign Affairs, Finance, theAttomey-General, and Defence (both civilian and ADF).14

Watching ABRI plan murder

By the end of 1998, most analysts in the Australian intelligence communityhad concluded that ABRI had armed various pro-integrationist militia grouPsand was planning to use them against East Timorese who supported movestowards independence. As DIO reported in a Cunent lntelligence Brief on 6

January 1999:

ABRI's decision to arm local militias has drawn its first blood. As long as ABRI

continues to contract-out some of its security responsibilities/ more clashes are

likely.The killing of two pro-referendum supporters on 3 |anuary in Manutasi, a

village in the Ainaro regency, is the first major clash between Pro-referendum(essentially separatist) and 'pro-autonomy' (essentially integrationist) groupssince ABRI began to arm local civil defence units (WANRA) last year. ...

ABRI has developed a defensive operational posture that aims to reduce the

profile of regular units and tum some of the armed activity over to WANRArnilitia.. ABRI has identified ,140 villages where the population is sufficiently

integrationist to permit WANRA units to be armed.

ABRI recognises that using force against pro.referendum grouPs will con-

tinue to attract intemational criticism.

' So using force against the referendum movement looks likely to continueto be sub-contracted to WANRA.

Silent Witness 247

Another DIO Current lntelligence Brief, issued on 4 March, gave more detailsof the links between ABRI officers and militia leaders, and advised that'furtherviolence is certain'. Headed 'Indonesia/East Timor: ABRI Backing Violence',it is quoted here in full:

. ABRI personnel in East Timor are condoning the activities of pro-lndo-nesian militants who have threatened Australian lives. Further vio-Ience is certain and Dili will be a focus.

0 ABRI in East Timor are clearly protecting, and in some instancesoperating with, militants who have threatened Auskalian lives.

0 ABRI soldiers have been identified as involved in a Besi Merah Putih(militant pro-Lrdonesian group) attack on a home in Suai last week.

Q A soldier and a local government official fired on independencesupporters in Guico village.

Q Xanana Gusmao has received reports that ABRI's Combined Intelli-gence Unit has been inciting violence in Dili and westem East Timor.

0 ABRI could apprehend or easily control pro-Indonesian militants buthas chosen not to.

' Senior officers in KODAM IX (the Bali-based Military Area Commandresponsible for East Timor) have built up personal networks inintegrationist politics over the years.

Q ABRI's East Timor commander, Colonel Suratman has spent much ofhis recent career in East Timor. And KODAM IX Chief of StaffMahadin Simbolan has a background in KOPASSUS operations inEast Timor and a close relationship with militant leader Cancio daCarvalho.

. We don't know if these activities are the result of local initiative, or arebeing directed from Jakarta.

Q Wiranto's views on ABRI's involvement with militants are not known,but no vigorous action to rein in ABRI have been noted, implying thathe is at least tuming a blind eye.

Q The Combined Intelligence Unit is operationally responsible toKOPASSUS. And although supported by Suratman's East Timorcommand, he does not control their activities.

. Unless Jakarta takes firm action, ABRI elements will continue to supportintimidation and violence or at least won't prevent it.

. ABRI may be less than committed to protecting Aushalians in the territory.

This was unwelcome intelligence for the Government. It contradicted sev-eral of its key policy themes: that the violence was unorganised; that any ABRIinvolvement was limited to 'rogue elements'; that neither General Wiranto norany other senior ABRI commander was involved; and that Canberra's special

248 Masters of Teror

relationship with |akarta, manifested in the myriad of defence and intelligencecooperation arrangements, would ensure that the Indonesian authorities re-mained both frank and responsive in their dealings with Canberra over East

Timor. The Government response was to deny the conhadictory intelligence orto point to ambiguities and vagueness in the reporting. The Foreign Ministerchose to ignore the intelligence. As he stated on 7 March:

If it is happening at all, it certainly isn't official Indonesian Government policy;it certainly isn't something that's being condoned by General Wiranto, thehead of the armed forces, but there may be some rogue elements within thearmed forces who are providing arms of one kind or another to pro-integrationists who have been fighting the cause for lndonesia.

When I raised it [arrning the militia] with Ali Alatas the other day !i.e.,23Februaryl, he said that it certainly wasn't happening, that they weren't armingparamilitaries; there was some arming of the informal police support groupwho are civilians in East Timor but that applies in all of the provinces of Indo'nesia. There is nothing different or unusual about that, so I mean, I do accept

the Indonesian Govemment's word for it, that it's not official Indonesianpolicy.ls

The Foreign Minister was not in a good position. It would have beenundiplomatic, if not provocative, to have contradicted Alatas or other seniorIndonesian officials, at a time when maintenance of cordial communicationswas considered imperative. Moreover, because of the sensitivity of the sourcesand methods involved, he would have been unable to produce the dammingintelligence anyway.

The period from March to June 1999 was a very difficult time for the intelli-gence community. As the pace of political developments accelerated in both

fakarta and East Timor, and the possibility of Australian involvement became

considerable, the intelligence workload became much heavier. ASIS, and moreespecially DSD, 'dramatically boosted' their activities in March.rs The two P-

3C Orion (Peacemate) SIGINT aircraft began regular collection flights aroundTimor.rT The US provided new computer equipment for intelligence processingand dissemination, but it also deployed additional technical intelligence col-lection capabilities to the region, and this greatly increased the data flow. Extraeffort was put into producing more frequent reports of the fast-moving events.

However, the assessments were not well received by the Govemment dur-ing these months. The Prime Minister's office and the senior bureaucrats fromthe Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs did not want to know aboutABRI's involvement in militia violence. The Prime Minister's key advisers be-lieved that the violence could be contained, that Australia's close defence rela-tionship with Indonesia would be a sobering influence on lndonesian behav-iour in East Timor, and that any necessary external assistance should comefrom Australia rather than the United Nations. In February, when some US

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officials had suggested that a peacekeeping force might be needed, Australianofficials were dismissive. For example, Peter Varghese, from the Department ofPrime Minister and Cabinet, argued in Washington on 23 February that:

An early offer of a peacekeeping operation would remove any incentive forthe East Timorese and the Indonesians to sort out their differences.

Intelligence assessments which linked the Indonesian military to the vio-lence, or which indicated that sorting out their differences might involve intol-erable levels of violence, were not welcome.

By April, the pressure was showing. At the beginning of the month, whenBasi Merah Putih militants massacred about 50 pro-independence supportersat a church in Liquica, DIO analysists had no doubt about the complicity ofABRI. As DIO reported on 8 April:

ABRI's exact role in the incident is unclear. But it is known that ABRI had fuedtear gas into the church and apparently did not intervene when the pro.inde.pendence activists were attacked. BRIMOB [Indonesian Police] were allegedlystanding behind the attackers at the church and firing into the air. There seemsto be no physical evidence that they fired at the church.

But ABRI is culpable whether it actively took part in the violence, or simply letit occur.

At the end of the month, however, DIO reports included less detail aboutparticular militia atrocities, were fairly sanguine about the prospects for large-scale violence and presented a more benign assessment of the role of the Indo-nesian military (by now called TNI). Indeed, a five-page Defence lntelligenceReport on'The Ingredients of Conflict [in] East Timor', distributed on 30 April,argued that:

TNI paradoxically provides a moderating influence on both sides by decreas-ing the likelihood of widespread and serious conflict. Its presence seryes torestrict [pro-independence militia] operations and it has some control, when itchooses to exercise it, over the pro-Indonesia militant groups.

It acknowledged that TNI had formed, armed and retained control over thepro-Indonesian militias such as WANRA, Besi Merah Putih, Aitarak and Mahidi,and that there were 'distinct limits on the ability of the militant groups to oper-ate without support, official or otherwise, from Indonesia'.

But by April-May the evidence about the Indonesian Army's plans for vio-lent retribution, the chain of command within TNI concerning East Timor, andTNI's official sponsorship of the pro-Indonesian militias was incontrovertible.Both DSD and ASIS had identified the senior Indonesian military officers in-volved, and reported that the chain reached up to General Wiranto, the Com-mander in Chief of the TNI, and that implementation of the plan was the re-sponsibility of the TNI's SGI (Satuan Tugas lntelijen, or Combined IntelligenceTask Force), directed by Kopassus (the Indonesian Special Forces Command).

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250 Masters of Tenor

DSD had provided details of specific links between particular TNI officers andmilitia leaders.

Covert operations were undertaken in East Timor by special elements of theAustralian Defence Force to provide unique intelligence. Members of the SAS

and Navy's Clearance Diving Team (CDT) began operating clandestinely inEast Timor in April. Deployed by submarine and extracted by helicopter, theSAS conducted reconnaissance of Indonesian Army activities in the hinter-land and movements of military traffic across the West Timor frontier, whilethe CDT scoured Dili harbour and nearby anchorages. Sensor systems wereleft on the island, sending intercepted signals and other recordings to DSD inCanberra for processing and analysis.ls

ASIS also received a windfall in April. One of the most important militialeaders in East Timor, Tomas Goncalves, defected to Macau and had four meet-

ings with an ASIS officer from the Hong Kong station. Goncalves had been the

Commander of the Apodefi forces, which had served with Indonesian forcesduring the covert invasion of East Timor in October-November 1975, and, in-deed, he had been present during the killing of the joumalists in Balibo. By thebeginning of 7999 he had established a pro-Indonesian militia group in histown of Emera and was being considered by ABRI to head the pro-integrationistmovement in East Timor as a whole.

Goncalves told his ASIS interlocutor about ABRI plans to wipe out the pro-independence movement and gave him the names of the ABRI commandersinvolved in the planning.re Goncalves had 'his first high level meeting' aboutthe training and arming of the militias in late 1998, when he met Major GeneralAdam Damiri (Commander of the Udayana Regional Military Command), Colo-nel Tono Suratman (the TNI commander in Dili and a Kopassus officer) andLieutenant Colonel Yayat Sudrajat (the head of the SGI and also a Kopassus

officer) at the TNI Headquarters in Dli. They discussed the rumoured referen-

dum in East Timor, and the Indonesian officers disclosed their secret plans forusing the SGI to arm the militias.2o On 16 February, Lt. Col. Sudraiat held ameeting in Dili attended by all the militia leaders from East Timor's 12 regions,at which he described his plan for the post-ballot period and 'demanded inde-pendence leaders and their families be wiped out.'21 On 24March, Sudrajatdelivered 'three pick up trucks loaded with weapons' for Goncalves to distrib-ute to his group in Emera.z

On 26 March Goncalves went to a meeting in Dili, organised by the Gover-nor of Timor, Abilio Osorio Soares, who told him to:

[Prepare] to liquidate all the senior pro-independence people - and their par-ents, sons, daughters and grandchildren. If they sought shelter in the churches...

kill them all, even the priests and nuns.a

Golcalves was shaken by this meeting, but nevertheless agreed. Then, inearly April, he and other pro-autonomy leaders were sununoned to fakarta,

Silent Witness

and advised by Major General Kiki Syanakhi that the TNI would support theirmilitia groups 'with guns and money'.24 Goncalves defected from Indonesiaon 18 April. He says that the level of violence being contemplated was morethan he could bear.2s

DFAT also received information from Australian aid workers and membersof non-govemmental organisations (NGOs) working in East Timor. The mostactive and conscientious of these was Lansell Taudevin, who was in charge ofAustralia's largest foreign-aid project in East Timor from May 1996 to April1999. He had lived in Indonesia for the previous 13 years and speaks fluentIndonesian. He wrote regular reports about matters affecting community aidin East Timor, which were sent to both the Australian Embassy in fakarta andDFAT in Canberra, and which by 1998 featured 'the escalation of violence thatthreatened our project, its staff, and the people of East Timor'.26 Taudevin'sreports, which proved to be remarkably accurate, provided details of the arm-ing and training of the militia, their organisational and leadership structures,meetings between militia leaders and ABRI officers, the involvement of ABRIpersonnel in various atrocities, and their preparations for post-ballot violence.2THowever, his warnings were dismissed by DFAT officials as 'alarmist'; he wastold he was 'too close to the East Timorese' and '[ignorant of] the importance ofprotecting the special relationship between Indonesia and Australia'.26 How-ever/ some of the information reported by Taudevin in early 1999 appears tohave been used by DIO in its reports.2e

The ASIS and DFAT reports were confirmed by DSD intercepts. DSD hadfound by early 1999 that many of the militia leaders communicated by mobiletelephones and that Indonesian commanders mainly used satphones for com-munication between Jakarta, Bali and Dili. By May, DSD had intercepted'doz-ens of hours' of telephone conversations between militia leaders and ABRIcommanders, including Colonel Tono Suratman. Some of the intercepts werequite incriminating, such as one described in the The Age in late May:

Sources cited the recent phone call from a militia leader to one of the mostsenior ABRI commanders where the commander advised the militia leader to'stop coming'into his office in East Timor to avoid scrutiny. He advised himinstead to deal directly with a senior figure in the Army's regional intelligencediscussion in Dili.

'On analysis the phone conversations put forward strong evidence that themilitias are being actively supported and directed by ABRI to disrupt the bal-lot', a source said. 'There is no doubt that they [the militia] are feeding out ofthe same trough.'s

By May-June the Government was persuaded about both the complicity ofthe TNI and the likelihood that a peacekeeping force would be required. It nowmoved both to try and persuade the TNI to stop its sponsorship of militiaviolence and to consider organisation of a UN peacekeeping force underAustralian leadership.

251

252 Masters of Tenor

Air Vice Marshal Doug Riding, the VCDF, was given a tough assignment inmilitary diplomacy. On 21 June, in jakarta, he met with a group of senior TNIofficers, led by Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the ABRI chief of Territo-rial Affairs. He had with him 'a pile' of intelligence reports, sanitised to protect'sources and methods', evincing complicity by TNI, particularly Kopassus, in'the establishing, fostering, funding, kaining and coordination of the militia'.The evidence showed that the links to the militia went'all the way to the top' ofTNI, although Riding did not name Wiranto. The Indonesians at the meeting'resented the allegations'.3r

The organisation of UNAMET, the UN Mission in East Timor, to whichAustralia contributed some 50 Australian Federal Police (AFP) officers, de-manded intelligence support. UNAMET was tasked with oversight of the prepa-rations for and conduct of the proposed referendum. The AFP officers inevita-bly came across useful information about TNI and the militias. An AFP intelli-gence officer, Wayne Sievers, collected material from a variety of sources, in-cluding East Timorese serving with TNI and Indonesia's security services. Itdescribed 'secret meetings, plans for violence, funding arrangements, arming,and the provision of TNI intelligence officers to monitor and control militias'.32According to Sievers:

On the moming the result of the vote was announced, we knew what wasgoing to happen, when it was going to happen, and how it would happen. Itwas like waiting for the sky to fall in on you.s

Seivers gave his material to officials in the Consulate in Dili, but he does notbelieve that they were very interested.v

The Prime Minister and his advisers had undoubtedly realised by now thatthe TNI intended to instigate widespread violence in the event of a pro-inde-pendence vote, but they now supported an early ballot rather than deferring ituntil some peacekeeping force was organised. Indeed, the enorrnity of the likelybloodshed would energise international support for an Australian-led peace-keeping operation.35

The Canberra-Washington intelligence relationship

The intelligence relationship between Canberra and Washington is at thecore of the Australia-US alliance, and is thus regarded by security plannersand policy-makers in Canberra as Australia's most important strategic asset. Itis govemed by a plethora of secret agreements and working arrangements, atthe centre of which is the UKUSA agreement of 1947-48 conceming SIGINTcooperation and exchange activities.36 It provides Australia with an enonnousamount of intelligence - about developments in Australia's region of strategicinterest as well as in other regions around the world - and this greatly supple-menb intelligence about Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific produced bythe Australian agencies (and mostly given to Washingtory Ottawa and London

Silent Witness 253

as the Australian contribution to the exchange process). Some US technicalintelligence capabilities are critical to the maintenance by Australia of 'theknowledge edge', identitied by defence planners in 1997 as the highest priorityin Australian defence planning.3T In terms of national security, the intelligencerelationship should be continually cultivated and regularly reassessed, butnever politicised.

The US moved to provide Australia with additional intelligence collectionand processing capabilities in April, as soon as some Australian involvementin East Timor became a possibility. According to US Brigadier General JohnCastellaw, who was later attached to INTERFET: 'We have intelligence capa-bilities, technical elements, that are unique and that add an element that ishard to obtain', and which were made available to Australia at'the beginning'of the East Timor crisis.38

The US Navy deployed its E-P3 ARIES (Airborne Reconnaissance IntegratedElectronics System) SIGINT aircraft to the area. These aircraft flew for up to 12

hours each sortie, intercepting communications and sending the processedintercepts back to Australia.3e The US Navy also secretly tapped underwatercable links carrying ABRI communications.a0 US warships with intelligencecapabilities anchored offshore.al

At different times during the year, the US agreed to the realignment of one ofits geostationary SIGINT satellites, controlled from Pine Gap in central Aus-tralia, to provide coverage of signals from the VHF up to the Super High Fre-quency (SHF) band (i.e., from walkie-talkies to satphones).

On several occasions from April to November, US Air Force transport air-craft delivered tonnes of computer hardware, software and other electronicequipment to Canberra for installation in DSD, AIO and DIO to upgrade theirprocessing, integration, and dissemination capabilities.a2

However, there were serious policy differences between Canberra and Wash-ington which led to great pressure on the Australian intelligence community,and which contributed to the lapse in professionalism evident in DIO reportsin April-May and to personal tragedy in june. The principal difference duringthis period, as evinced in the discussions between Dr Ashton Calvert, Secretaryof the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Stanley Roth, the StateDepartment's Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, in Washington inFebruary, concemed the need for an intemational peacekeeping operation. DrCalvert argued that it was unnecessary. He said, according to the DFAT tran-script of the meeting, that 'Australia had not sensed any broad internationalappetite for a large scale UN intervention, though Canberra would be pre-pared, if necessary, to send military personnel; but not into a bloodbath'. Hesaid: 'to avert the need for recourse to peacekeeping, what we were proposingwas to be active in the first instance.... Australia's preferred approach wasdesigned to avoid a military option by the use of adept diplomacy.'

2il Masters of Tenor

Roth, on the other hand, was less sanguine about the prospects for diplo-macy and more interested in considering'the peacekeeping option'. Accordingto the transcript:

Roth emphasised the fact that not enough had been done by the Indonesiansto reverse the declining security situation.

[Roth believed] that a full-scale peacekeeping operation would be an unavoid-able aspect of the transition [to autonomy as well as independence]. Without itEast Timor was likely to collapse.

For that reason, Roth did not consider Australia's proposal ... to be the opti-mum approach. In Roth's view, it was more important ... to build a UN-basedconstituency for pushing the peacekeeping option. Roth suggested that Aus-tralia's position of keeping peacekeeping at arm's length was essentially de-featist.

Roth commented he now was convinced that provocateurs were responsiblefor at least some instability in lndonesia. ... It was time to pressure Wiranto intotaking a harder line against rogue elements, particularly in light of reportsfrom within ABRI that Wiranto was being too soft. Roth said he had contem-plated sending messages directly to the suspected sources of these problems(former Kopassus chief and Soeharto son-in-law Prabowo by way of exam-

ple), encouraging them to desist, but had decided it was better to go to the

centre. Accordingly, Secretary [Madeleine] Albright would raise it with Wirantoduring her forthcoming visit.

Dr Calvert ... was relieved ... and suggested the message be cast in a mannerwhich acknowledged the positive tendencies which Wiranto had shown, suchas his alignment with constifutional process and the non-partisan posfure he

was taking towards the elections.

In March, Roth asked Ambassador john McCarthy in Jakarta on severaloccasions, including in a face-to-face meeting, for material describing linksbetween ABRI and the pro-Indonesian rnilitias, but was told that it could not beprovided because of the 'need to protect Australian intelligence sources on theground in Indonesia'.a3 Roth later made the same request to the AustralianAmbassador in Washington, Andrew Peacock, but was again rebuffed.s

The American attempts to obtain more detailed intelligence about Indone-sia's activities in East Timor were evidently a contributing factor in the suicideof Merv Jenkins, the DIO Liaison Officer stationed in the Australian Embassyin Washington, D.C., in mid-June. They caught Jenkins in the middle of a bu-reaucratic turf fight between ONA and DIO over their working relations withthe CIA. When it was establishedtnT9TS, ONA took over from DIO the princi-pal liaison responsibility with the CIA, leaving DIO in charge of relations withthe Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in the Pentagon. Under a recent secretagreement between Washington, London, Ottawa and Canberra, the Austral-ian intelligence community accepted greater responsibility for intelligence

Silent Witness 255

collection and assessments concerning various countries in Southeast Asiaand the Southwest Pacific, including Indonesia. In this context the CIA wasnow seeking a closer working relationship with DIO and was pressing DIO formore material on areas that Australia was now supposed to be looking after.

ONA, however, opposed a direct CIA-DIO connection, insisting that theirrelationship be through its rubric, and the relations between fenkins and theONA liaison officer in Washington became strained. The DIO managementwished to pursue the CIA relationship, and Jenkins was told to provide the USagencies with more information, including raw intelligence material about EastTirnor, some of which was designated for Australian Eyes Only (AUSTEO). Inmid-May, he was noticed doing this by other staff in the Embassy, who re-ported him to Canberra. Then, on 20 May, he received an e-mail message fromLaurie Wiseman, the DIO Security Officer in Canberra, advising him not todesist but to be more careful:

I have been asked by Doug Kean [to contact you].

Issues are becoming exhemely sensitive ... as there are Foreign policy implications.

It is imperative that extra care is taken with the passing of material to the USand Canada.

In his last e-mail message, to Doug Kean at DIO, on 11 June, Jenkins said that:

The pressure on me to pass on information has been intense and is building.I am experiencing a range of emotions from frustration to anger to remorse.

Three weeks after fenkins' death, Canberra moved to both allay suspicionsin Washington about Australian withholding of intelligence, and ensure thatWashington had no illusions about the involvement of the TNI in militia vio-lence in East Timor. On 9 July, the Head of the Defence Section at the Embassyin Washington was directed 'as a matter of priority' to brief the Pentagon 'franklyon TNl-militia links'. The directive said:

We would be grateful if Head of Defence Section could as a matter of priorityapproach key Pentagon interlocutors to pursue Pentagon perceptions of TNI'srole in East Timor.

It would appear some key Pentagon officials are overly generous towards TNIin their interpretation of TNI's role in supporting the militia activity in EastTimor.

This is a matter of considerable concern.as

Monitoring the carnage

The Australian intelligence agencies were able to provide the Governmentwith a ringside seat at the mass killings and forced deportations that beganwhen the result of the ballot was announced on 4 September - though thelevel of destruction and the scale of the deportations were beyond theirworst predictions.

256 Masters of Tenor

Several days before the ballot, DSD began intercepting conversations be-tween ABRI officers and the militia leaders that not only referred to prepara-tions for the violence, but also identified specific individuals for killing or cap-ture. For example, the following radio conversation between a Kopassus officerand a militia leader was intercepted on 27 August:

We can't be the first ones to start it. We have to be on stand-by so that wewon't get a bad mark from Unamet [the UN mission in East Timor]. But ifwe're not the first ones and fight back, then we're on stand-by. But if they fishfor it, then we will use a hard hand. There is no other way out. That's how itwillbe.It is better we wait for the result of the announcement [of the ballot]. It isbetter we wait for the result of the announcement. Whether we win or lose,

that's when we'll react.6

Militia leaders also discussed their plans for intimidation on voting day, suchas the following:

I'm asking all members of Ablai [a militia gang] to be placed in pairs to watchthose who are voting, to observe them, organise them, monitor them, and allthe happenings of the popular consultations.az

On 1 September, there were conversations between a Kopassus officer andmilitia members over two-way radio, in which the Kopassus officer instructedthe latter to kill human rights observers present in East Timor to monitor theballot:

Kopassus: Those white people ... should be put in the river.

Militia (passing the order to other militiamen): If they want to leave, pullthem out, kill them and put them in the river.

Kopassus: They need to be stopped. The car needs to be stopped.

Militia: It will be done.

Kopassus: If they go to Ainaro, they should send people to close the road there... the green Kijang [jeep] with the big tyre in the back.

Militia: I'll wipe them out, all of them. Nobody gets to get out, especially if thewhite guys want to go. Hold the car, let them walk.

Another militia voice: I'll eat them up.

Kopassus: Nobody gets to go out. Hold the car. If they want to go to Dili.Then hold the car. If they want to walk, that's their business. Hold the car. No,send it back.

Militia voice: I'll make the stop there.

Third militia voice: Better to send them up to Dadina [a settlement in themountains with a militia command postl and we'll put them in the river ofKara Ulu.4

(These particular killings did not eventuate because the targeted 'white peo-ple'happened to have also monitored this radio conversation.)ae

Silent Witness 257

The DIO reports around the time of the ballot acknowledged the inevitabil-ity of 'some turmoil' and noted that 'TNI will continue to support' the use ofviolence by pro-Indonesian milifias and also that General Wiranto maintainedhis chain of command down to the TNI officers in East Timor; however, theyseverely under-estimated the extent of the violence, and repeated the strangenotion that the TNI might serve as a reskaining influence on the pro-autonomymilitia groups. For example, DIO reported on 30 August that:

The violence in East Timor is likely to remain within assessable parameters forat least the next few weeks. So the form and extent, if not the timing, ofviolence will remain predictable.

' Pro-Indonesia militant violence occurs within strict guidelines laid downby TNI.

' And the purposes and functions of violence in the territory are clear.

' We have good and timely indicators of any likely change in TNI policy onviolence.

The report noted that 'the East Timor warning problem remains at WatchCondition (WATCHCON) 3', a 'threatening situation', but that if the militiaviolence grew 'a higher WATCHCON level may be necessary by October'. On 3September, the day before the result of the referendum was announced, the DIOreported that:

Some turmoil is inevitable in the post-ballot period and there will be acts ofrevenge and payback. The potential for civil strife is considerable, particularlyas the UN will still be undermanned and without executive authoritv in theprovince ....

The militias depend on both lndonesian leadership and assistance with weap-ons. The withdrawal of TNI ... will remove an element of restraint from theextremist militia members, who will probably attempt to murder key inde-pendence figures and foreigners perceived to have worked against integra-tion. This will be as much for revenge and frustration as for political impact.

GEN Wiranto has been fully aware of TNI activity, but until late August hadnot acted forcefully to control it. His chain of command is intact, with loyalofficers in operational control. He was personally represented by MA|GENZacky Anwar (who now appears to have been withdrawn to Jakarta andreplaced by RADM Yoost Mengko) and MAJGEN Adam Damiri, and he regu-larly directed the East Timor military commander. Wiranto did not, however,effectively rein in TNI support to the militias, and orders supposedly issued

from Jakarta were not being fully heeded by officers in the province.

TNI's actions after the ... vote are problematic. They could accept the resultand assist transition: this is only likely if autonomy is the outcome. TNI'ssupport for a transition to independence is likely to be marginal at best. Theyare more likely to impede progress by deliberate obfuscation and obstruction.

258 Masters of Teror

There will probably be acts of destruction and looting of buildings and facili-ties, most likely carried out by militias with TNI assistance.

The failure to foresee the magnitude of the killings and deportations thatoccurred in the two weeks following the announcement of the ballot result on 4September was the greatest and most critical mistake made by the intelligencecommunity during the course of the year. DSD and ASIS had reported theexistence of an 'evacuation plan', Operation WIRADHARMA, about a monthbefore the ballot but they did not ascertain its full scope. They thought it wasfor evacuating pro-lndonesian supporters in the event of a vote for independ-ence. DIO reported on 3 September that'contingency plans, encompassing theevacuation of foreigners as well as Indonesian citizens, are being developed'.But the evacuation plan had been 'switched' to a deportation plan about threeweeks before the ballot, and 'the big sweep' was being 'increasingly discussedby even junior officers at least two weeks before'.s It should have been detectedby the intelligence agencies. However, Foreign Minister Downer has acknowl-edged that:

The evacuation of people in the way they did it surprised me.... The level ofviolence came as a surprise to me. That people were deported [came] as asurprise to me and obviously at the time we were talking to the Indonesiansconstantly about what was going on and their explanation was these peoplewere being moved out for their own security.sl

Believing the Indonesians, at this stage in the process, was a fundamentalmisjudgment.

On 9 September, DIO issued a Cunent Intelligence Brief which described theTNI's strategy in East Timor and linked it to General Wiranto's political ambi-tions in Jakarta. It stated that:

TNI has pursued a cenhally conceived and directed strategy throughout theEast Timor crisis. The strategy has been flexible, and perhaps extended as

events developed. Its immediate aim was to retain East Timor as part of Indo-nesia. Its broader and longer-term aim was to strengthen the position of TNI,and Wiranto, in the Indonesian political system.

TNI has not accepted the inevitability of East Timor leaving Indonesia underPresident Habibie's Tripartite Agreement with Portugal and the UN.

' Instead TNI embarked on a finely judged and carefully orchestrated strategy to retain East Timor as part of Indonesia.

' All necessary force was to be employed, but with maximum deniability,maintaining public adherence to Indonesian commitments under the agree

ment while privately subverting the pnrcess of selfdehrnination in East Timor.

Looming defeat in the ballot in East Timor blended with wider TM concernsabout their diminishing power in lndonesian reformist society and Wiranto'suncertain prospects for higher office.

Silent Witness 259

' TNI strategy since aboutluly has increasingly addressed all these concems.An end state has been sought which sees TNI holding East Timor, reestablishing political aedibitity and advancing Wiranto to at least the Vice Presidenry.

TNI has used East Timor as a vehicle for its broader aspirations, with its strat-egy judted to contain the following elements:

' A coordinated process of revenge, destruction of infrastrucfure and records,killing of key pro-independence leaders, and both short and longer-termdestabilisation of East Timor.

' The violent ballot campaign served an immediate purpose in East Timor,but also sent increasingly clear messages beyond East Timor about TNI'sindependence as a player and simultaneously undermined Habibie, towhom international complaints were mostly made and who looked increasingly ineffective as the violence continued.

Seeking to overturn the entire self-determination process - by forcing theprocess to be aborted.

' TNI began developing OP WIRADHARMA - the evacuation of East Timor- when it realised that the ballot might be lost.

' WIRADHARMA was adapted from an evacuation to a deportation, whenUNAMET began to buckle.

' TNI seized the opportunity to take more dramatic action in East Timor.t And this is now being done through the deportation of the population and

their dispersal throughout the archipelago.

' Even if the ballot outcome could not be frustrated at least a 'cleansed','independent' East Timor would be a mendicant Indonesian client.

Creating a domestic political environment in which the MPR [the People'sConsultative Assembly in fakartal would reject the ballot outcome.

' A high level of violence was always likely after the ballot, to persuade theMPR that a strong enough body of opinion existed to warrant a refusal toendorse the ballot result.

Creating a political environment which undermines President Habibie, andenhances the prospects of Wiranto to gain a senior position or influence in thenew administration.t Intemational and domestic reactions to the carnage in East Timor probably

exceed TNI expectations and TNI has manoeuvred for Habibie to take theblame.

Wiranto has destabilised Indonesia by reintroducing violent confrontation andrepression as a means of doing business.

On 24 September, four days after Major General Cosgrove and the INTERFETforce arrived in East Timor, the DIO reported that the TNI had initiated a propa-ganda campaign intended to 'discredit the Australian contribution' and

250 Masters of Tenor

ultimately cause INTERFET to withdraw from East Timor. A Current Intel-Iigence Brief noted:

The Indonesian government's propaganda campaign against INTERFET ispromoting perceptions of INTERFET aggression, brutality and ineffective-ness, with the objective of stirring up resentment against INTERFET and Aus-tralia. The Australian Commander of INTERFET, MAJGEN Cosgrove, has

already been singled out in an attempt to discredit the Australian contribu-tion.... TNI may well manipulate the militias to provoke a violent incident withINTERFET, drawing media attention to serious casualties on either side.

TNI and the rnilitias doubt INTERFET's staying power drawing analogies withSomalia [where the killing of IJN peacekeepers prompted their withdrawal in19931.

And TNI sees advantages in continued instability - INTERFET should not suc-

ceed where TNI failed and East Timor should continue to be punished for its

vote rejecting Indonesia.

I n t elli g ence and human s e curity

The scale of the killings, relocations and destruction during the 16 daysfrom 4 to 20 September 1999 and the increasing public awareness that it was apremeditated campaign by militia groups armed and directed by the Indone-sian military has prompted various inquiries into the human rights abusesand widespread calls for the organisation of war crimes tribunals.

Australia has an enormous amount of intelligence about the carnage - aboutthe planning, sequence of orders, and the TNI and militia units and individu-als involved in particular atrocities. The human intelligence (HUMINT) col-lected by ASIS concerns both the role of various ABRI/TNI commanders in

fakarta and the officers involved in directing the militia groups in East Timor.There is photographic intelligence showing details of massacre sites and peo-ple involved. DSD has a wealth of information, documenting the violence fromthe sporadic killings such as at Manutasi on 3 fanuary 199,9 and Liquica on 5April through to the mass killings and disposal of bodies after 4 September. Forexample, on and around 7 September, DSD intercepted signals pointing tomany East Timorese being either killed on boats or on land and their bodiesthen dumped at sea. Some intercepts specifically indicated that 'a large numberof East Timorese students were killed at sea' on 7 September.s2

The DSD and ASIS material implicates dozens of Indonesians and pro-Indonesian Timorese in the atrocities. In addition to General Wiranto, for whomthe killing and destruction was motivated by political ambition, senior ABRI/TNI commanders involved in organising and directing the militia grouPs wereMajor Generul Zacky Anwar Makarim, a Kopassus officer who had headedBIA (Badin lntelijn ABRI, the Armed Forces Intelligence Agency) from Novem-ber 7997 to January 1999,s3 and who was appointed as General Wiranto's

Silent Witness

liasion officer with UNAMET, to assist with organisation of the ballot, in |uly;sMajor General Syafrie Syamsuddin, who prepared the plans for ABRI andmilitia operations in East Timor at ABRI headquarters in Jakarta; and MajorGeneral Adam Damiri, the Bali-based head of the Udayana Regional MilitaryCommand, who directed the operational planning. The key ABRI officers inEast Timor itself were Colonel Tono Suratnam at the Dili headquarters and Lt.Col. Yayat Sudrajat, the SGI head who personally directed the militia leaders.The then Govemor of East Timor, Abilio Osario Soares, and the chief of police,Colonel Timbul Silaen, were also implicated.

In January 2000, Foreign Minister Downer acknowledged that 'Australiahad already provided classified intelligence material to the UN panel investi-gating human rights violations in East Timor. According to the Minister, 'Weused the precedent of what the British and Americans did in supplying intelli-gence material on Bosnia'.ss However, this involved a minuscule proportion ofthe Australian holdings, and none of the most incriminating material.

Because of the purported sensitivity of the 'sources and methods' involved,the Government has not been prepared to hand over any DSD or much ASISmaterial. (Most of the high resolution imagery, which could identify individu-als in particular incidents, was given to Australia by the US, and is notAustralia's to share.)

In the case of DSD, successive govemments have considered that SIGINTmaterial should be protected as much as possible. There should be no acknowl-edgment of any alleged SIGINT operation; no use should be made of SIGINTmaterial; and no SIGINT material more recent than 1945 should be released. Itis argued that SIGINT is the most lucrative form of intelligence; that revelationsabout SIGINT operations invite counter-measures (such as use of different com-munications systems, or more sophisticated encryption techniques); and hencethat absolute secrecy is essential.

In fact, however, the need to protect sources and methods is never absolute,and the injunction against actions that might compromise SIGINT operationsis really not so compelling. Secrecy may be critical where crypto-analyticalactivities are involved, but the great volume of DSD intercepts during the Timorcrisis involved unencrypted radio and satphone conversations. Yet it is nosecret that these can be monitored by anyone with appropriate receivers.

With regard to radio and satphone conversations, the calculations are notvery complex. Releasing transcripts may induce others to use more secure com-munications or be more discreet in the future. On the other hand, ensuring thatevidence conceming gross violations of human rights will be brought to bearagainst war criminals not only serves justice but may also deter fufure violations.

25',t

Notes

Chapter 2

1 This article first appeared n the Sydney Morning Herald as a special Heraldinvestigation. The original article was accompanied by selected KPP-HAMrecommendations and a chronology. These are not reproduced in this versionof the article, as they are carried in full elsewhere in the present volume. Seepp. 58-59 for the KPP-HAM recommendations, and pp. 91-98 for James Dunn'schronology.

Chapter 3

L Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Timor Timur, the Inves-tigative Commission on Abuses of Human Rights in East Timor. [The inscrip-tion at the head of the report states: 'Secret: For the Investigative Purposes ofthe Attorney-General's Office'.]

2 Conceming this first generation militia see 'Profile and Challenge of the Fight-ing Force of East Timor (Former Group and Simultaneously Fighters for Inte-gration)', Kupang December 1999.

3 The concerns were evident when the Porfuguese government postponed a

meeting scheduled for 19 November 1998 and asked for an explanation. UNSec. Gen. Kofi Annan and the US State Department also showed their concern.It was agreed that UN emissary Tamrat Samuel would visit the area, but uponarrival he was denied entry to the Alas sub-district.

4 The first militia group was formed on 17 December 1998 at Ainaro by CancioLopes de Carvalho, an official of the Justice Department and a son of thetraditional chtef (Iiurai) of Cassa village. This group said it would fight to thedeath for integration. On l fanuary 1999, Mahidi (Mati Hidup Demi Integrasi,Live or Die for Integration) was inaugurated in a ceremony attended by theAinaro district militarv commander and several members of the local electedassembly. This group 6ecame well-known after it attacked villagers in Galitas,sub-dishict of Zumala| Covalima, on 25 January 1999. Six people, including a

child of 15 and a pretnant girl, were killed. Two days earlier the same grouphad killed four people in the same area.Furthermore on 27 December 1998 in Maubara, the Besi Merah Putih (BMP,Red and White lron) group was formed, led by Manuel de Sousa, formermember of the provincial parliament for PDI-P. He was strongly supported bythe Regent of Liquica, Leoneto Martins. On the day of its formation, BMParrested and tortured four locals in Maubara sub-district. BMP together with a

Gada Paksi unit then searched the houses of local people, under the protectionof territorial combat battalion 143. As a result of this torture and intimidation,hundreds fled to DiIi. Some of these refugees asked to shelter at the house ofManuel Carrascalao. This group became well known after they set up roadchecksalong the main road between Liquica and Maubara, and arrested young menthey suspected of pro-independence sentiments.

Noles 263

5 For this quotation see Report on the Development of the Situation and Condi-tions in the Region of East Timor on the Eve of the Opinion Poll, Dili, July 1999,p.2. The pahiotic Indonesian organisations referred to in the report were noneother than the armed militias like BMP, Mahidi, AHI, JMP, ABLAI, Laksaur,Darah Integrasi, Halilintar, Aitarak, Morok, Makikit, Pejudang 59l75, Alfa andSakunar.

5 On the involvement of Eurico in Gada Paksi, see weekly reporting telegramDandim/'1.627 / Dili to Danrem 1.64 / WD of 27 November 1998, classified secret.

7 This Decision, signed by the Regent, Head of Region Level II Dili, DominggusM.D. Soares, Sh, was written without number and without date.

8 The funding of the operation of militia units known as Pamswakarsa whichaccording to the statement of several Regents who were investigated origi-nated from Regional Government budget funds.

9 See Plan of Action to Face the Full Contingency for Failure of Determination ofOpinion in East Timor Opsi-1, p.10. This plan was issued in August 1999, meaningthat the plan was made a long time before the poll took place to address thepossibility that might happen if the offer of autonomy from Indonesia was re-jected by the people of East Timor. Printed with additional material.

10 In this regard, see the letter Minister of Defence/Commander of tl-," TNINo.K/352/P /IY /1,999,daled 15June 1999. Classified confidential. Printed withadditional material.

11 Regarding the attitude of Adam Damiri, see 'Development of the Situation andConditions in East Timor on the Eve of the Opinion Poll, Dili,' July 1.999, p.3.This report was directed to the Minister for Coordinating Political and SecurityAreas, classification Secret, and signed on 11 July 1999, at Dili.

12 Ibid,p.2.13 [Reference to transcript.]14 [Reference to transcript.]15 Conceming the connection between the militia and the TNI see the statement

of Bonifacio dos Santos, Head of the Dstrict Office, Social Department, Lutem;Gabriel de Jesus, Second Sergeant, Army, TNI, Intelligence Staff, MilitaryDistrict Command 1629 /LauIern; Antonio Fernandes, Private Class II, Army,TNI; Watch Post Makodim.

L5 Intelligence Taskforce Tribuana began to be BKOed into Korem 1,54/WD nthe second week of Febnrary. Several witness statements have been rejectedby the Commandant of the Tribuana Task Force Lieutenant Colonel YayatSudrajat TNI.

17 See document no. Pol: R/355/N /1999/Ditserse.18 Individual responsibility for crimes against humanity is reflected in the deci-

sion of the Intemational Military Tribunal in Nuremburg n'1946, which inessence said: 'crimes under intemational law are committed by human beingsnot by something abstract, and only by punishing the individuals who com-mitted these crimes can international law be upheld.'

19 Reference to literafure in an appendix.20 Reference to literafure in an appendix.21 Protocol ll (1977).

264 Masters of Tenor

22 Law no.39/1,999, Govt. Regulationl/1999,Law no.8/1,991 and others.

23 Rome Statutes 1998 clause 8.

24 *e Chapter lV[ie,pp.35-48, this volume].25 [Reference to transcript.]25 [Reference to transcript.]

27 [Reference to transcript.]

28 [Reference to transcript.]29 See BAP Fransisco da Silva.30 [Reference to transcript.]31 [Reference to transcript.]32 [Reference to hanscript.]

33 [Reference to hanscript.l

34 [Reference to transcript.]

35 [Reference to hanscript.]36 [Reference to transcript.]37 [Reference to transcript.]38 [Reference to transcript.]

39 [Reference to hanscript.]

40 More complete and detailed data regarding witnesses, victims and perpetra-tors is in the 'Report of the National Commission Against Violence TowardsWomen'.

41 See brochure, 'Accusations and findings of abuses of the law, order and humanrights after the poll in East Timor,' published by PUSPEN TNI, year not shown.

42 [Reference to transcript.]

43 The reports referred to were continued for clarification from UNTAET. See theCommunication of KPP HAM with UNTAET [Bib.Id.913].

Chapter 4

A word about sources of information and acknowledgments: The informationcontained in this report is based on an examination of documents held byagencies of UNTAET in East Timor, including the records made available bythe Serious Crimes Investigation Unit, Civpol, military assessments, UN re-ports and assessments, interviews of UN officials, Interfet officers and, notleast, East Timorese, the KPP HAM report, a Yayasan Hak report, a report byFOKUPERS, NGO reports and accounts in the media. I have also made use ofsome thousands of email items on the unfolding drama in Timor accumulatedduring 7998/99. My conclusions are based on a considered evaluation of thesesources, against the background of my own lengthy experience as an analystand chronicler of events in both East Timor and Indonesia. The conclusionsand views expressed herein are of course essentially my own.

Nofes 265

1 See'Situation of human rights in East Timor - Note by the Secretary General',8 December 1999.

2 See KPP HAM report, i6 August 2000.

3 ICI Report, para 150.

4 See p.21 Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, on hismission to Indonesia and East Timor from 3 to 13 July 1994 (in E/CN.4/1995/51lAdd.1).

5 Harold Crouch, 'lndonesia: Impunity versus Accountability for Gross HumanRights Violations' (ICG Asia Report No. 12, Iakarta/ Brussels, 2001)

5 lbid, p.30.

7 See KPP HAM report, para27, press release.

8 See Ian Martin, Self-determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the ballot andinternational interaention, Boulder (Col.): Lynne Riener, 2001.

9 This operation was referred to in a leaked militia document, dated LL March. Init the Militia commander, Lafaek Saburai, informed Joao Tavares that hisgroup would carry out Operasi Sapu Jagad to'exterminate the leaders, cadres,and supporters of the anti-integration movement. This brutal plan was notcarried out, but in April there was a surte of killings in some sectors.

10 See Tomas Goncalves, transcriptof testimony.11 Battalion 744 came under the command of Major Yunus Yosfiah, who had led

the attacking force into Balibo.

12 See James Dunn, Report on Talks with Timorese Refugees in Portugal (Canberra:Parliamentary Library, 1977).

13 See 'Indonesia Confronts Unruly Past', article by Dan Murphy, in ChristianScience Monitor, 20 Nov. 2000.

14 See Desmond Ball'Silent Witness', Chapter 8 in this volume.

15 See Peter Bartu, 'The Militia, the Military and the People of Bobonaro District'(unpublished paper).

Ibid,p.2.Serka - Top Sergeant.

For more details on the militia structure and its operations, see 'LaporanPelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia, Januari'- September 1999, Chapters IV andV ( Yayasan Hukum, Hak Asasi dan Keadilan Timor Timur).See FOKUPERS: Progress Report: Gender-based Human Rights Abuses dur-ing the Pre and Post-Ballot Violence in East Timor, January - October 1999(Dli,July2000).Although Halilintar was the leading group, there were at least six other militiagroups, including the notorious Dadurus Merah Putih, led by Natalino Monteiro.

21. Bartu, op cit., p.11.

22 Based on an interview of an Aushalian intelligence officer, who was amongthe first troops to reach Maliana.

23 According to my talks with Liquica residents, the total killing around thatevent in fact amounted to more than 200!

24 Bartu, op cit.

76

17

l6

19

20

266 Masters of Tenor

25 Ibid, p.11.

26 Laporan Lengkap KPP HAM, 15 August 2000.

27 KPP HAM Report,para 6, press release.

28 KPP HAM Report,para'1,92.

29 rbid.

30

31

32

33

u

35

HAM Report, para 193.

Ball, op cit.KPP HAM Report, Para 191.

David Bourchier, 'Key People in the Chain of Command Responsible for EastTimor' (Department of Asian Studies, University of Westem Australia).Ed's Note: Some spellings of the names in this Annex have been changed toconform with the spellings used in Chapter 5.

Ed's note: See note 3 in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5

1 The Executive Summary, released on 31 January 2000, was made available on31 January (see Chapter L of this book). The list of names extracted from it wastranslated as 'Indonesian Commission of Investigation into Human RightsViolations in East Timor', Sydney Morning Herald,3O April 2001. This list mis-takenly differs from the Executive Summary in one respect - it contains theadditional name of Sgt Tome Maria Goncalves (there spelled 'Gonzalves').

The full text, handed to the Attomey-General on 9 February 2000, has not beenreleased to the public, but was leaked and is published for the first time in thepresent volume. The list of perpetrators it contains is longer than the list in theExecutive Summary. The following names were new: LtGen Johny Lumintang,Col Suprapto Tarman, LtCol Ahmad Masagus, MajGen (ret) HRGamadi and(in Appendix 5) ltCol Asep Kuswani (there misspelled Kuswanto), Capt AgusSuwamo and Natalino Monteiro. Many new junior names found in Appendix5 we placed under the entry for their respective superiors.

2 The earliest list of suspects at the Attomey-General's Department contains L9names (Susan Sim,'The exigencies of indicting a general', StraitsTimes [Singa-porel, 3 September 2000). It appears that three district heads had already beendropped from this list since they were named suspects in May 2000 - thesewere Domingos fuares, Edmundo Conceicao, and Guilherme dos Santos ('AGOto force ex-officials to testify on Timor melee', lnilonesian Obsenter, 17 May2000). By April2001, oneof themilitia suspectshad died (Olivio Moruk/ AlisioMau), while four others had been added to the list - militia leaders Motomus,Vasco da Cruz, and Eurico Guterres, plus one military officer, LtCol EndarPriyatno ('Pelimpahan berkas kasus HAM Timtim tunggu hakim "ad hoc"',Kompas,26 April 2001. It contains 18 suspects, with an additional 4 whose caseswere dropped due to'inability to find witnesses'). We have included all thoseever (to our knowledge) considered suspects - a total of 26.

5

6

Moles 267

See James Dunn's Annex A, reproduced in this volume at pp.84-90. One ofthese was, we believe, Iisted in error

-Jeffry Sanakri. This may be a confusion

with MajGen (Kiki) Syahnakri.For example:'Gus Dur setujui aparat militer dihukum', TNI Watch!,3 Novem-ber 1999; TNI Watch! 'Komisi Ham PBB daftar nama jenderal lndonesia', postedto SiaR News Service, 29 September 1999 (similarly, 'Ingin Nobel, dapat penjahatperang', Xpos, No. U/11,2-8 October 1,999);'Prcjurit Yonif 406lCk digaji uangpalsu', TNI Watch! 9 December 1999;'Daftar nama perwira tinggi yang akandibela Muladf, TNI Watch! 12 December 1999. The spelling of names variessomewhat in different reports - we have used the most common spelling.Ajianto Dwi Nugroho, 'Abadi dalam foto', Pantau, July 2001, pp.43-47.

Samuel Moore,'The Indonesian military's last years in East Timor: An analysisof its secret documents, lndonesia 72 (October 2001).

The text of Howard's letter is in Tim Fischer, Seaen days in East Timor, Sydney:Allen & Unwin,2000, pp. 9-18. Fischer was Deputy Prime Minister of Australiaat the time.See an annex to Herb Feith, The East Timor issue since the capture of XananaGusmao (Melboume: East Timor Talks Campaign, December 1993).

Irian Jaya was a former Dutch colony that provisionally became part of Indo-nesia early in 1963, on condition that the United Nations conduct a poll of localopinion to determine if they agreed. The so-called Act of Free Choice was heldin 1959. The parallels with East Timor, a former Portuguese colony that hadbeen incorporated into Indonesia r 1975, are clear. One big difference, how-ever, was that the Irian Jaya vote was conducted indirectly- by means of a

council of 1000 elders - whereas East Timor was to be a universal vote. OnIrian Jaya see Sam Blay, 'Why West Papua deserves another chance', Insidelnilonesia, no.61, January-March 2000 (www.insideindonesia.org).'Ali Alatas: "Santa Cruz Incident a tuming point in our diplomacy."',Tempo,18-24 September 2000. See also the helpful chronology in'Kronologi lepasnyabekas propinsi ke-27', Kompas, 1 February 2000. 'Dewi Fortuna Anwar: '1.7

bulan bersama Habibie', Tajuk, No.17tM, approx. 28 October 1999. Nothingwas said about East Timor in the press briefing about this 25 January meeting('Rakor Polkam: Masyarakat dimanfaatkan sebagai alat manuver politik',Kompas, 25 January 1.999).

This point is elaborated in Geoffrey Robinson,'The fruitless search for a smok-ing gun: Tracing the origins of violence in East Timor', paper prepared forinternational workshop on'Violence in Indonesia', University of Leiden, 13-15December 2000.

Mark Davies, SBS 'Dateline' TV program, broadcast 16 February 2000 (han-script at www.sbs.com.au /dateline).See Robert Lowry, The armed forces of lndonesia (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995),pp.111-12.Douglas Kammen, 'The trouble with normal: The Indonesian military,paramilitaries, and the final solution in East Timor,' in Benedict Anderson (ed.),Violence and the state in Suharto's Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Comell Southeast AsiaProgram, 2001).

10

11

12

13

t4

268 Masters of Terror

Chapter 5N aaly recommended for inaestigation -Prioity 1

1 James Durw; Crimes against humanity in East Timor, lanuary to October 1999;Their nature and causes, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur onCrimes Against Humanity, 2001.

2 'Getting away with murder: A chronology of Indonesian military sponsoredparamilitary and militia atrocities in East Timor from November 1998 to May1,999',East Timor Intemational Support Center (Etisc), 75May 1999.

3 'Political overview Atambua-Cova Lima-Ainaro, 15-17 June 1999', United Na-tions Mission in East Timor (Pol), 18 June 1999 (leaked Unamet document).

4 john Roosa, 'Info on ABRI's paramiliaries in East Timor, http:/ /www.easttimor.com/html/notices16.htm, 12 February 1999;'EastTimor: Seizethe moment', Amnesty Intemational (ASA 21 / 49 / 99), 27 lune 1999.

5 'The Indonesia's military remain large in East Timor: How can Unamet copewith the situation before and post the ballot?', Tapol,3lJuly 7999.

5 'Fortilos: Timor Lorosae: Apa yang harus dilakukan?', MateBEAN,3l August't999.

7 Maggie O'Kane, 'Urgent inquiry starts into who inspired atrocities', The Guard-ian lUKl, 18 September 1999.

8 'Kesaksian korban kekejaman Mahidi', Fortilos,22 April1999.

9 John Roosa, 'Info on ABRI's paramiliaries in East Timor, http:/ /www.easttimor.com /html /noticesl 5.htm, 72 F ebruary 7999.

10 The Wiranto meeting is derribed in'Delegasi prointegrasi Timtim rninta senjatapada Pangab' , Republika,2O February 1999. This report did not list him as beingpresent at the Wiranto meeting, but another one does: 'Getting away withmurder: A chronology of Indonesian military sponsored paramilitary andmilitia atrocities in East Timor from November 1998 to May 1.999', East TimorInternational Support Center (Etisc), 75May 7999.

11 'Timor excerpt from Annual Report'Attacks on the Press in1999', Committeeto Protect Journalists (CPI, http: / / www.cpj.org / attacY's99 / frarneset-att99 /frameset_at99.html,22 March 2000. The complete text is in'Milisi prointegrasiancam wartawan Australia', MateBEAN,28 February 1999.

12'HAK: Laporan situasi Ham Timor Timur April 1999 (1)', Yayasan HAK(Hukum, hak Azasi & Keadilan), MateBEAN, 25 May 1 999;'Mahidi bertanggungjawab terhadap penangkapan dua mahasiswa: Prointegrasi tangkap 18pemuda', Media Indonesia, 19 April 1999.

13 'Milisi pro-integrasi teman siapa? - Whose friends are the pro-integrationmilitia?', Cari, Charles Coppel mailing list, 13 October 2000.

14 'Prointegrasi pamer kekuatan, Timtim tegang', lawa Pos,18 April 1999.

15 Komite untuk fajak Pendapat yang Bebas dan Jujur), 'Laporan Komite No. 2:Pelanggaran terhadap proses pendaftaran jajak pendapat', Yayasan HAK,26Juli 1999.

1 6'Milisi dan aparat mulai bentrok', MateBEAN, 22 June'1.999.

17 Ian Martin, Self-determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the ballot, andinternntional interaentisn (Boulder (Col): Lynne Riener, 2001), p73.

Notes 269

L8 Perkembangan situasi 3I /8/99 (bagian 2): Kekerasan makin meningkat - Staflokal Unamet dan pemantau jadi sasaran, Laporan, 31, / 8 / 99 - 15:48 waktu TL',Fortilos, 31 August 1999.

19 'lnterfet takes control of ambush area', AFP, 7 October 1999.

20 Carmel Egan, 'Investigators to dig up massacre victims', The Australian,'l'lJanuary 2000.

21 'Humanitarian NGO Forum of West Timor: Information for the United Na-tions Security Council delegation regarding the situation in West Timor', postedon east-timor@igc.apc.org by Charles Scheiner, 15 November 2000.

22John Roosa, 'Info on ABRI's paramiliaries in East Timor, http:/ /www.easttimor.com/html/noticesl6.htm, 12 February 1999.

23 'Pratiwi: Catatan perjalanan di Bumi toro Sa'e (10)', MatreBEAN,8 October 1999.

24'Prattwil- catatan perjalanan di bumi Loro Sa'e (11)', MateBEAN, 13 October1999. The assumption here is that he is the same person as Jaime Corte Real,who appears on one list as a possible war crimes suspect ('Ingin Nobel, dapatpenjahat perang', Xpos, No. U/ll/2,8 October 1999).

25 'Nazario Vital S Corte Real, Ketua Umum Ablai: Saya tidak mau membalasdengan air tuba', Kotnpas,20 August 1999.

26'Ada M-16 hingga Mower di Prointegrasi,' lawa Pos,12 April 1999. This item isquoted (but wrongly says the number of men is only 100) in 'Stop bank loansuntilmilitiasdisarmed', Human Rights Watch (NY), media release,20 April1999.

27 'Pratrwil. Catatan perjalanan ke bumi Loro Sa'e (15)', MateBEAN, 12 Novem-ber 1999; 'Fokupers: Kekerasan terhadap perempuan di Timor Timur, Januari- luli 1999', MateBEAN, 20 August 1999.

28 'Laporan Komite no. 2 pelanggaran terhadap proses pendaftaran jajakpendapat', Yayasan HAK, 25 luly 1,999.

29 'Penyerangan milisi terhadap Sekretariat Dewan Solidaritas Mahasiswa danPemuda Timor Timur dan Kantor CNRT di Viqueque, 10 dan 11 Agustus1999',Yayasan HAK, 13 August 1999.

30 'Proposed socialization budget special autonomy package for East Timor prov-ince in Manufahi regency', Govemor of the province of East Timor to Regentof Ambeno Re: Approval of proposal and funds release, Dili, June l999,Eng-lish translation posted on mailing list reformasitotal,29 June 1999; Mark DaviesSBS 'Dateline' TV program, broadcast on 16 February 2000, transcript avail-able at www.sbs.com.au/dateline.

31 'Daily briefings', Untaet, 29 January 200'1.

32'Rekaman radio antar komandan TNI di Timtim', TNI Watch! 6 October 1999.Also see'Revealed: proof that Indonesian army directed Timor slaughler',TheIndependent [London], 20 September'1,999.

33 E Cantier-Aristide, 'Same evacuation notes - MLOs'viewpoint', Unamet Politi-cal Affairs Office,4 September 1999 (leaked Unamet document).

34'Fortilos: sifuasi sernakin gawat', MateBEAN, 4 September 1999.

35 Galuh Wandita,'Eyewitness report: The situation in Dili and surrounding areaafter announcement of the referendum results' (unpublished report, approx.30 September 1999).

Masters of Terror

36 Mark Dodd, 'Guerillas wary of visiting militia leader', Sydney Morning Heralil,15 June 2000.

37 'Tolak referendum, ribuan warga Timtim unjuk rasa', Media Indonesia Online,27 lune1998.

38 'Catatan perjalanan di Bumi Loro Sa'e (11)', MateBEAN, 13 October 1999.

39 'Menlu Ali Alatas mendadak bertemu tokoh Timor Timur', Media IndonesiaOnline, 15 October 1998; 'Wiranto gagal temui kubu prokem', lawa Pos,21.April1999.

40 Allan Nairn,'License to kill in Timor', TheNation [NY],31 May 1999.

41 'Selama empat bulan 85 pengungsi Timtim meninggal dunia', Kompas, 7 July1999; 'Indonesian rnilitary accuses UN of abusing mandate', AFP,7 July'1999.

42 'East Timor: Integration supporters plan to reject ballot result, says rnilitialeader', Lusa,2 August 1999.

43 'If poll is lost the slaughter will begin', The Independenf [London], 3 September1999.

44'Kebrutalan ancam perang saudara: 145 orang lebih tewas', Kompas,6 Septem-ber 1999;'ETimor pro-independence militias demand new vote or "we willbum everything"', AFX-Asia, 7 September 1999.'We will bum (East Timor)down and start all over again ... we are ready to go the jungles for 20 years,'hetold another joumalist (Claudia Gaz.ziti,' E.Timor in flames as martial lawimposed', Reuters, 7 September 1999). Elsewhere, he said: 'We have to worktogether, but if that can't be done and the international community does notreview the vote process, we are ready to deshoy everything' (David Lamb,"'Military option-" to sway vote in E. Timor wenf awryi Los Angeles Times, 1.6

September 1999).

45 'Militia leader says cease-fire in force in E.Timor', Reuters,9 September 1999.

46 'East Timor: Alatas pledges cooperation while militia chief issues veiled threat',Lusa, 1.5 September 1999.

47 Humanitarian NGO Forum of West Timor, 'Information for the United Na-tions Security Council delegation regarding the situation in West Timor', dis-tributed on east-timor@igc.apc.org, 15 November 2000.

48 'Panjang jalur penyanggah', Gamma,31 October 1999; 'Diplomasi milisi yangterjepit', Gamma, 28 November 1999.

49'Jikajenderal TNI diadili jangan berhubungan dengan Timor Lorosa'e', SuryaTimor, 22 December 1999.

50 Komisi PenyelidikPelanggaraan HakAsasimanusia diTimorTimur.'RingkasanEksekutif Laporan Penyelidikan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusiadi TimorTimur', detikcom,3l |anuary 2fi)0, Chapter II. The two other PPI senior com-manders, Eurico Guterres and Joao Tavares, were on the list recommendedfor prosecution.

5L 'Herminio reports formation of new party to Vice Governor' (English transla-hon), Sasanilo Pos,23 May 2000.

52 'Eurico threatens to disperse Timorese Popular Party, Hermenio lazy to know',SuryaTimar,29 May 2000.

53 'Da Costa temui de Mello', Kompas, 9 June 2000; 'Militias urged to provesincerity by releasing refugees', Kyodo News,12 |une 2000.

Notes 271

5405/09/2000 BBC Monitoring Source: RDP Antena 1 radio, Lisbon, in Portu-guese,9 June 2000 - RDP: Militia leader apologizes, willing to stand trial', tran-script made available on east-timor@igc.apc.org, 9 june 1,999;Tirn Johnson,'Anti-independence leader apologizes to E. Timor 's Gusmao', Kyodo News,'l'5

June 2000.

55 It is not unusual for the position of Commander, Sector A East Timor, to beheld by the commander of Brigif 17. Ryamizard was a previous example (TNIWatch! 'Kol Inf Geerhan Lantara kembali nongol di Timtim', posted to SiaRNews Service,22 Septembet 1999; 'Brigif Linud 17: Menebar kekerasan dariDili ke Semanggi', TNI Watch!, L October 1999).

55 Adi Mulyono's name appears on a list of officers who should be investigatedfor atrocities committed in East Timor (TNI Watch! 'Komisi Ham PBB daftarnama jenderal Indonesia', posted to SiaR News Service, 29 September 1999).

Bom in about 1959, he graduated from the military academy in 1981. In 1995

he was moved from the position of Maliana military district chief of staff(Kasdim 1535) to command the EastTimor Territorial Battalion 7M. After oriythree months he was moved to Jakarta, where he may have joined KopassusGroup 3.

57'Milisi siap jadi saksi untuk pengadilan intemasional', MateBEAN,20 October1999. See similarly 'The Kopassus-militia alliance', Tapol Bulletin, No. 15415,November 1999, which says Gerhan Lentara emerged as head of Kopassusintelligence in 1995.

58 'Penguasa militer di Timtim tangkap belasan poltsl' , Waspada, 13 September 19D.

59 'Killed newsman exposed US$250 scandal', Straits Times,23 September 1999.

50'Yonif 7a4/ Syb tetap dipertahankan'TNI Watch! 31 March 2000.

51 'The army's casualty: Who is he?',Tapol Bulletin, No. 108, December 1991.

62 'The Kopassus-militia alliance', Tapol Bulletin Online, No. i54, October 1999(htf'p:. / / ***.gn.apc.org,/tapol/ 154nkopa.htm).

53 His name appears on a list of officers who should be investigated for atrocitiescommitted in East Timor (TNI Watch! 'Komisi HAM PBB daftar nama jenderallndonesia', posted to SiaR News Service, 29 September 1.999).

5a Jiil Jolliffe, 'East Timor justice suffers in the big picture', /sh Tima, 5 adober 2ffi1 .

55 'Report on corruption in the screening process under the comprehensive planof action in Galang Camp, Indonesia 20 August 1994' (posted to: bpsos-list@freeviet.org '[Refugees] Report on corruption in screening in lndonesia'from: BPSOS@aol.com, 72 Jun 1996 (http: / /www. freeviet.org / tynan / new I /msg00008.html).

56 Antara,20 November 1997.

67 'Up in arms', Far Eastern Economic Reaiew, 18 February 7999:25.

58 Record of interview between Bishop Belo and a team from the Komisi NasionalAnti-Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan, 11-19 March 1999 (manuscript) p.12.

59'situasi Liquisa tegang, Serda Sofyan tertembak', MateBEAN, T April1999.

70'East Timor: Indonesian vice-commander accuses Ana Gomes of conhibutingto worsening public security situation', Lusa,14 April 1999.

71 'Daerah sekilas', Kompas,8 May 1999.

272 Masters of Tenor

72 'Menelusuri mereka yang bertikai di Liquica (1): Ada M-15 hingga Mouser diProintegrasi', Jawa Pos, i2 April 1.999;'Antara Timor Timur dan Timor Leste',Kompas,23 August 1999.

73'Fokupers: Situasi kekerasan terhadap perempuan di Timtim (L/2): Laporan 5bulan - Januari-fuli 1999', MateBEAN, 7 October 1999; 'Aparat keamanantelanjangi ibu rumah tangga', MateBEAN,25 March 1999.

74 'Getting away with murder: A chronology of lndonesian military sponsoredparamilitary and militia atrocities in East Timor from November 1998 to May1999', East Timor Intemational Support Center (Etisc), 15 May 1999; Rui Manuelda C Viana, 'Report on human rights abuses: january - February 7999',YayasanHAK, 10 February 1999 (sic - approx. 12 April 1999); 'Makikit serang penduduksipil, 2 orang luka parah', MateBEAN, 23 March'1,999.

75 'Penyerangan milisi terhadap Sekretariat Dewan Solidaritas Mahasiswa danPemuda Timor Timur (DSMPTT) dan Kantor CNRT di Viqueque, 10 dan 11

Agustus 'l-,999',Yayasan HAK, 13 August 1999.

76 The text of the letter was posted on the intemet as 'Darah Merah: Operasipembersihan', Solidamor <Solidmor@centrin.net.id>, 26 April 7999.

77'BlA dalangi aksi anti-Xanana', MateBEAN,20 March 1999;'Xanana didemoorang-orang bayaran', Solidamor,lT March 1999. Afonso Pinto was said to befrom'Kramaf V/7', a notorious rnilitary intelligence complex in central Ja-karta. The other was Capt Eusebio Belo.

78 'SGI, dalang pembantaian Timtim', Xpos, No. 15/lI, 25 April-1 May 1999; 'Mariodiburu Kopassus', Xpos, No. 15/11,25 April-15 May 1999.

79 Max Lane, 'Information received by Asiet from ]akarta regarding Indonesianblack operations', Asiet <asiet@asiet.org.au>, 24 September 1999.

80 'East Timor under the Indonesian jackboot An analysis of Indonesian armydocuments', Tapol, 15 November 1998.

81 'Mendagri punya mau', Editor, 3 March 1994; George J Aditjondro, 'Experi-ences of clergy and lay persons in ET in e arly 7994' ,unpublished letter, Salatiga7 March1994.'

82'Some prelirninary notes on the forthcoming "reconciliation talks" in London',Tapol Report, 27 September 1994.

83 'East Timor: Indonesia trains mercenaries to harass civilian population - Terrorincreases, dissapearances continue', National Council of Maubere Resistance(CNRM), Media release, 1 February 1995;'ETCHRIET Human Rights Report',East Timor Centre for Human Rights Lrformation, Education and Training (N-:6 /95),8 September 1995.

84 TNI Watch! 'Prajurit Yonif 406/Ck digaji uang palsu', TNI Watch! 9 December1999. This item also lists nine of his subordinate officers ranked from Captainto Lt.

85 Leaked Unamet correspondence l4luly 1999.

86 John Roosa, 'Info on ABRI's paramiliaries in East Timor', http:/ /www.easttimor.com/html/noticesL6.htm, 12 February 1999.

87'Getting away with murder', East Timor lnternational Support Center (Etisc),15May 7999.

Notes 273

88 Yayasan HAK report, 21 June 1999, as reported to Unamet Political Affairs inErmera (leaked Unamet document 14Ju1y 1999).

89 Mark Dodd, 'Women abducted by East Timor militia, says rights group', TheAge [Melboumel, 5 June 1999.

90 'Getting away with murder', East Timor Intemational Support Center (Etisc),15 May 1999.

91 'Escalating violations in East Timor: Is a peaceful solution possible?', Annualreport of human rights violations in East Timor 1998', East Timor HumanRights Centre (Ref: SR2/98),28 February 1999; Rui Manuel da C Viana (Moni-toring and Investigation Advocacy Division), 'Report on human rights abuses

January - February 1999', Yayasan Hak, 10 February 1999 (sic).

92 'Getting away with murder', East Timor International Support Center (Etisc),15 May 1999.

93'EastTimor:Seizethemomerrf,Amnetylnternational,2lJunel99(ASA2I/49/9).94 ?IAK: laporan khusus pembantaian Liquica ]6 Mei'l99' ,MateBEAN,24 May 199.

95 'Stop Bank loans until militias disarmed', Human Rights Watch,20 April1999;'The dismissal and indictment of TNI officers for human rights violations inEast Timor', Tapol (ww.gn.apc.orgltapol), 15 June 1999; Xanana Gusmdo, 'Thepeople of East Timor have the right to self-defence', CNRT Timor-Leste, pressrelease,5 April 1999.

95 TIak taporan situasi HAM TimorTimur April1999 (2)', MateBEAN,2SMay 199.97 Helene (Political Affairs Officer, Ermera), 'Sitrep 14 August 1999', Unamet

(leaked internal document).

98 Lindsay Murdoch, 'Diggers refum rnilitia stronghold to wary rcfugees', Syd-ney Morning Herald,29 September 1999.

99 His name appears on a list of officers who should be investigated for his role inatrocities committed in East Timor (TNI Watch! 'Komisi Ham PBB daftar namajenderal Indonesia', posted to SiaR News Service, 29 September 1,999.

100 'KSAD jelaskan soal sipil dipersenjatai. Demonstrasi melanda kota Dili', MediaIndonesia, 2 February 1999.

101 'ABzu takkan rekayasa perang saudara di Timtim', Kornpas,9 February 1999.

102 'Wiranto gagal temui kubu prokem',lawa Pos,2'l April1999.103 'NN: Yet another report from bloody East Timor', MateBEAN, 29 April1,999

(where he is identified as Brig-Gen'Amirullah').104 'Membongkar mafia uang palsu'/ Xpos, No. 78/III,29 May-4 June 2000; 'Re-

tired general faces 4-year term', Indonesian Obseraer,28 November 2000; 'Twoex-Army colonels nabbed over fake rrlon€)y''r lakarta Post,3 July 2000.

105 Also mentioned as Dan Satpam Paswalpres (Media brdonesia Online, 5 August 196).

106 Forum Keadilan, 15 Sept 1994; Forum Keadilan, 13 Oktober 1994.

107 Republika Online 25 November 1995.

108 lnformation from biodata on Abri home page athttp:/ /www.abri.mil.idlindex6/kasad.htm.

109 'Setelah Agus Isrok digaruk operasi narkotik', Tempo, 16 August 1999.

Masters of Tenor

110 'Wawancara Armindo Soares Mariano: "Kalau tak pro integrasi, saya tak bisajadi anggota dewan"', Tempo,25July 1998.

111 'Golkar bentuk tim khusus untuk Timtim', Detikcom, 13 February 1999.

1.'1.2 'April, otonomi luas disosialisasikan', Kompas,l March 1999.

113 'Ratih abaikan perintah Pangab', MateBEAN,5 February 1999.

1,'14 'E Timor rebel leader calls for peace, slarns pro-lndonesian warmongers', AFP,2 March '1999;'Delegasi prointegrasi Timtim minta senjata pada Pangab',Republika, 20 February 1999.

115 'ABRI siap hadapi ancaman Xanana', Suara Pembaruan,T April7999.116 'Prointegrasi pamer kekuatan, Timtim tegang', Jawa Pos,18 April 1999.

117 'Minggu malam kota Dili sunyi', MateBEAN, 19 April 1999.

118 'Fortilo>FPDK: Otonomi atau mati', MateBEAN, 18 May 7999.

119 'Belum ada yang mendaftar penertuan pendapat Timtim', Y,snps,2l June 199.

120 'Al<bar Tanjung bantah Flabibie sepakat dengan AS lepaskan Timtim', Wasryda,2sAugust I99;'Mbye,land of loro Sae', Gaha nol t[3/V 11 September 1999.

121 Andrew West, 'Timor action puts officer in firing line', The Age [Melbourne], 9january 2000.

122 'Kronologis insiden Kuluhun Dili', MateBEAN,3l August L999;'Bentrokanmelanda Dili: Saat kampanye prc.otonomi digelar' KIPER-Net, 25 August1999.

123 'Pro-integrasi minta: MPR tak putuskan status Timtim', Detikcom,ll ftober1,999.

124 'Armindo Mariano Soares Ketua DPRD Timtim' , Kompas,27 July 199| 'Pratiwi:Catatan perjalanan di bumi [,oro Sa'e (10)', MateBEAN,8 October 1999;'RollyTanos Ketua DPRD Sulut, Armindo Soares Mariano Ketua DPRD Timtim',Suara Pembaruan, 20 July 7997.

125 'Fraksi Karya Pembangunan: Terima kasih Salvad or' , Gatra no. '1,4 /Y , 20February 1999.

125 'Urgent Action Progress Report', East Timor Human Rights Cenhe, 19 August1.999;'HAK: Laporan situasi Ham Timor Timur April 1999 (3)', MateBEAN, 25May \999;'Mahidi bertanggung jawab terhadap penangkapan dua mahasiswa:Prointegrasi tangkap 18 pemuda', Media lndonesia, 19 April1,999.

1,27 'Tndakan Ratih dan pasukan ABRI di Viqueque', Fortilos,ll March 1999.

128 'Briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr Ian Mar-tin', Unamet, 19 August 1999.

129 'Delegasi prointegrasi Timtim minta senjata pada Pangab', Republika,20 Feb-ruary 1999. Besides General Wiranto, the military side consisted of LtGenSugiono, Defence Department Secretary LtGen Fachrul Razi, chairperson ofthe Council for the Enforcement of Security and Law (DPKSH) LtGen Arie JKumaat, military intelligence chief (Ka BIA) MajGen Tyasno Sudarto, Socialand Political Assistant to the Head of Territorial Staff (Assospol Kaster) MajGenSudi Silalahi, Territorial Assistant to the Head of Territorial Staff (Aster Kaster)MajGenJoko Mulono, and Abri/ Defence spokesperson (Kapuspen Hankam/Abri) MajGen Syamsul Ma'arif. The EastTimorese side was not listed in full butincluded district heads (bupati) from four districts, all of them later implicatedin militia violence. They were those from Dli (Domingos Soares), lospalos

Notes 275

(Edmundo Conceicao), Manatuto (Vidal Doutel Sarmento), and Liquica(Leonito Martins). Resistance leader Xanana Gusmao said East Timor parlia-mentary speaker Domingos Soares (qv) and FPDK leader Dorningos Policarpowere there too, while militia leader Cancio de Carvalho himself also claimed tohave been there.

130 '15 ribu senjata disiapkan Abri untuk pertahankan integrasi', MateBEAN, 1

April 1999. 'Integrasi atau mati?' (Xpos, No. 13/11,11,-'17 April 1999) lists thenumber of firearms somewhat differently - here Sugiono promises to supply5,000 and says L5,000 had already been sent to East Timor. Sugiono's nameappears on a list of officers who should be investigated over atrocities commit-ted in East Timor (TNI Watch! 'Komisi Ham PBB daftar nama jenderal Indone-sia', posted to SiaR News Service, 29 September 1999).

131 'Jajak pendapat di Timtim, keamanan dijamin', Tajuk, ed2-tM, mid-July 1999.

132 Paul Daley, 'Howard's defence plan riles Indonesia', The Age [Melboume], 7july 2000.

133 'Lumintang appointed Defense Ministry's Secretary General', lakarta Post,14February 2001

134 'Penembak pemuda Timtirn disidangkan', MateBEAN,26 August 1998.

i35 'TNI kembali datangkan pasukan', Solid-Net, Solidaritas untuk PenyelesaianDamai Timor Leste (Solidarmor) Jakarta, 27 Aprll 1999. Sulastiyo's name ap-pears on one list of officers who should be investigated for atrocities commit-ted in East Timor (TNI Watch! 'Komisi HAM PBB daftar nama jenderal Indone'sia', posted to SiaR News Service,29 September 1999).

135 'East Timor under the Indonesian jackbool An analysis of Indonesian armydocuments', Tapol, 15 November 1998; 'Nazario Vital S Corte Real, KetuaUmum ABLAI: Saya tidak mau membalas dengan air tuba', Kompas,20 Au-gust 1999;'Sama susahnya, menang atau kalah', Tajuk, No. Iz_tll.z, approx 12August 1999. Another report incorrectly places the Ablai militia, commandedby Nazario Corte Real in Manatuto - it was based in Same, Manufahi dishict(Dr Frank Frost and Dr Adam Cobb, 'The future of East Timor: Major currentissues', [Australian] Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, Research Pa-per 21 1998-99, 24 May 1999).

137 'Kemenangan di pihak TNI', TNI Watch! 5 January 2000.

138 TNI Watch! 'Rekomendasi KPP HAM tidak mempengaruhi karir perwira',Indonesia-I, 18 February 2000.

139 'Prajurit Yonrt 406/ Ck digaji uang palsu', TNI Watch! 9 December 1999.

140 Angkatan Bersenjata, 20 November 1.997.

141 Jill Jolliffe, 'A traumatised town craving UN justtce' , Sydney Morning Herald,27November 1999.

142 '280 pucuksenjata pro-integrasi diletakkan', Kompas,18 August 1999.

143 Di Martin, reporting on the attack on the Unamet office in Maliana, AustralianBroadcasting Corporation's Asia Pacific radio program, approx. 30 June 1999.

1t14 'Polisi dan milisi serang rakyat', MateBEAN, 28 August 1999;'Hundreds of ETimorese brace for violence ahead of vote', Associated Press,28 August 1999;Sabine Hammer and Russell Anderson, 'East Timor consultation: Campaignperiod ends in wave of pro-integration terror', International Federation forEast Timor Observer Project [FET-OP) media release, 28 August 1999.

276 Mastus of Tenor

145 'HAK: I-aporan situasi FIAM Timor Timur April 1999 (1)', MateBEAN, ?SMay 199.145 'ETHRC Annual Report: Part 3', East Timor Human Rights Centre, 1 March

7999.

147 'CNRT: Laporan kronologis peristiwa Alas', MateBEAN, 1 December 1998.

148'Tim pencari fakta peristiwa Alas ditembaki Abri Same', MateBEAN,4 De-cember 1998.

149 'Interfu called to disclose iderrtities of those arrested' , Ial@rta Post,4 October 1999.

150 Syahrir's name appears on an informal list of officers who should be investigatedfor atrocities committed in East Timor (TM Watch! 'Komisi Ham PBB daftarnama jenderal lndonesia', posted to SiaR News Service. 29 September 1999).

151 'Prajurit Yonif 406/Ck digaji uang palsu', TNI Watch! 9 December 1999.

152 A 'Ponidjan' sent death threats to public intellectual Christianto Wibisono in1998 for 'criticising Suharto' (menghujat Suharto). The threats appeared socredible to Wibisono that thev caused him to fall into a depression and flee tothe United States. ('Lebih jauh dengan: Christianto Wibisoio' ,Ibmpas,7 March'teee.)

153 'The Kopassus-militia alliance', Tapol Bulletin 154,/5, November 7999.

154 'Daftar lengkap mutasi di tubuh TNI', Kom?as,16 ]une 2000.

155 Komelius Purba, 'Habibie wants "to be remembered for E. Timor"', lakartaPost, 16 February '1,999;'East Tirnor move not an instruction: Alatas', lakarta

756

Posf, 5 February 1999.

'Ali Alatas: "Santa Cruz Incident a tuming point in our diplomacy."', Tempo,18-24 September 2000. See also the helpful chronology in'Kronologi lepasnyabekas propinsi ke-27', Kompas, L February 2000. 'Dewi Fortuna Anwar: 17bulan bersama Habibie', Tajuk, No.17-tM, approx.28 October 1999. Nothingwas said about East Timor in the press briefing about this 25 january meeting:'Rakor Polkam: Masyarakat dimanfaatkan sebagai alat manuver politik',Kompas, Z5January 7999.

For example, 'Reformasi dipahami secara kefuu', Mdin Indonsia,26la'vuy 1994.

'Sejumlah menteri usulkan diberlakukan darurat sipil', Republkn,l5 F&ruary 1999.

Usamah Hisyam (Ketua Tim Penyusun), Feisal Tanjung:Terbaik untuk rakyat,terbaik bagi Abi, Jakarta: Dharmapena, 1.999,pp.222,722,724.

|on Land,'Indonesia plays delaying game with East Timor', Green Itfi Weekly,24March1999.

L51 'Diakui, ada aparat lepas tembakan di jalan-jalan', Kompas,31 Desember 1999.

152 Mark Dodd lakarta plo,t to rcclaim ftee Tinof , Syfuey Morning Heruld,ZJJuly 1999;'Solidamop Surat rahasia Asrnenko I/ Poldagrf, IvIateBEAN, 17 July 1999; E"gli"hhanslationof theGanardidocumenf, Etanhttp://www.etan.ory24]uly 199; TeisalTanjung: Tak pemah lihat dokumen Gamadt' , Ibtrry414 ]anuary 20ffi.

163'UNteamofficiallyraisesflaginEastTimor',StraitsTimes,4Jvnel999;'lndone.sia Criticizes U.N. Mission', AP,2 june 1999.

164'Xpos: Rahasia kunjungan L4 menteri', Sia& 18 July 1999.

165 'Ada yang Sengaja Paksakan Hadimya Pasukan PBB' , Republika, l3luly 1999.

765'Ex lndonesian Security Min quked over Timor atrocities', Associated Press,20 June 2000.

157

158

159

160

Nofes 277

157 'Indonesia does not want Ramos Horta to visit East Timor: minister', AFP, 30

June 1999.

158 'Gus Dur setujui aparat militer dihukum', TNI Watch!,3 November 1999.

159 'The situation in Dili and surrounding area after announcement of the referen-dum results', Yayasan Pikul,24 September 1999.

170 'Kasi Intel Korem 154 ancam STT', MATEBEAN, 11 June 1999.

171 Reporters sans frontidres, 'RSF annual report 2000 (East Timor section)', RSF(Vincent Brossel - Asia Pacific Desk <asie@rsf.fr>),2 May 2000.

172 'Rekaman radio antar komandan TNI di Timtim', TNI Watch! 5 October 1999.Westem intelligence archives will contain many more such transcripts. Thisexample underlines the need for these archives to be opened.

173 'East Timor: Scondrcd eafih' , Far hstern Eeorwmb Reuiew,16 September 199.

174 'Gus Dur setujui aparat militer dihukum', TNI Watch!,3 November 1999.

175 'Mantan Danramil Suai tidak penuhi panggilan KPP HAM karena stres' , SuaraPembaruan, 12 January 2000.

175 'Former key officers deny role in E. Timor mayhem, lalurta Post,13 January 2000.

777 'Moko Soares: that weapon sold by TNI members' [English translation], SuryaTimor,l'1, April 2000; Karen Polglaze,'Timor militia leader Mokoback in court',AAP, 10 April 2000; 'End of Moko's confession, military police examine twoTNI individuals' [English translation], SuryaTimor, T April 2000.

178 'Kemenangan di pihak TNI', TNI Watch! 5 January 2000.

179 'Former key officers dery role in E. Timor mayhun, lalarta Posf, 13 January 2000.

180 'Prajurit Yonif 406/Ck digaji uang palsu', TNI Watch! 9 December 1999.

181 'Istilah satuan militer: dari regu hingga divisi', TNI Watch!, 27 Octobet 1999.

N ewly recommended for inaestigation -P

riority 21 His name appears on a list of officers who should be investigated for atrocities

comrnitted in East Timor (TNI Watch! 'Komisi Ham PBB daftar nama jenderalIndonesia', posted to SiaR News Service, 29 September'1,999).

2 'Fortilos: Apa yang harus dilakukan?', MateBEAN,3l August 1999.

3 'Gus Dur setujui aparat militer dihukum', TNI Watch!,3 November 1999.

4 'Prajurit Yonif ,106/Ck digaji uang palsu', TNI Watch! 9 December 1999.

5 james Dur:u:. Cimes against humanity in East Timor, lanuary to October 1999;Their nature and uuses, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur onCrimes Against Humanitp 2001; ETISC report; 'East Timor: An analysis ofIndonesian army documents, October L998', Tapol Occasional Report No. 26,15 November 1998.

6 For example,'Getting away with murder: A chronology of Indonesian mili-tary sponsored paramilitary and militia atrocities in East Timor from Novem-ber 1998 to May 1,999', East Timor Intemational Support Center (Etisc), 15 May1999,for26 Apil1999.

7 Mark Dodd, 'Photos reveal violent history', Sydney lvlorning Herald,ZSMay 199.8 Appears on one list of possible war crimes suspects ('Ingin Nobel, dapat penjahat

perang'/ Xpos, No 34/Il/2,8 October 1999).

278 Masters of Terror

9'Political movements and parties: prc- autonony', East Timor Observatory/Observat6rio Timor Lste/Observatoire Timor-Oriental (OL01-12/02/ 2001eng),13 February 2001, quoting Kyodo Newswires 8 October 2000.

1 0'Skenario bumi hangus di Loro Sa'e', Tempo, 1 9 September 7999, pp2&29 (quot-ing Annette Clear of the Carter Centre). Joanico won TM praise for planningthe capture of Xanana Gusmao in1992.

11 'Aparat militer ijinkan Konhas mazuk ke Alas', MateBEAN, 27 November 1998.

12 'Former key officers deny role in E. Timor mayherrl lahrtn Post,13 January 2000.

13 Samuel Moore, 'The Indonesian military's last years in East Timor: An analysisof its secret docurnents, lndonesia 72 (October 2001).

14 'Prajurit Yonif 406lCk digaji uang palsu', TNI Watch! 9 December 1999. Thisitem also lists nine of his subordinate officers, ranging in rank from Captain toLieutenant.

15 'TNI di Timtim: Tinggal Yon 700 dan tiga kompi pasukan elite', Kompas,27September 1999.

15 East Timor Human Rights Centre, 'Urgent action (Ref: UA18/99)',30 Sep-tember 1999.

17'Prajurit Yonif 406lCk digaji uang palsu', TM Watch! 9 December 1999.

18 'Urgent Action: 38 East Timorese Arbiharily detained' , East Timor HumanRights Cenhe, 15 August 1996.

19 His name appears on an informal list of officers who should be investigated foratrocities committed in East Timor (TNI Watch! 'Komisi Ham PBB daftar namajenderal Indonesia', posted to SiaR News Service, 29 September 1999).

20'Yayasan HAK> Gelombang kekerasan adalah sabotase terhadap jajakpendapat: Laporan pemantauan 22 Agustus L999', MateBEAN, 20 August 1999.

21 'Fortilos> Laporan harian Timor Lorosae: Apa rencana TM dan Polri? (3)',MateBEAN, 29 August 1999.

22 'IFET-OP warns of ominous signs of renewed paramilitary violence in after-math of vote', Intemational Federation for East Timor Observer Project (IFET-OP), media release, 1 September 1999.

23 'Prajurit Yonif 406lCk digaji uang palsu', TNI Watch! 9 December 1999. Thefollowing report incorrectly lists LtCol Gordon Siregar as dandim Baucau:'Komisi Ham PBB daftar nama jenderal Indonesia', TNI Watch!,29 September1999. In fact Siregar was Hutajulu's predecessor.

24'PenguasamiliterdiTimtimtangkapbelasanpo\a',Waspda,13Septernber1999.

25 'Gus Dur setujui aparat militer dihukum', TM Watch!,3 November 1999.

25 'Penerapan darurat militer: Landasan hukum bagi militer untuk lebih kerasdan tegas', Kompas,8 September 1999.

27 'Pasukan Kostrad mendarat di Baucau', MateBEAN, 18 September 1999.

28 'Bendera Merah Putih tak lagi berkibar di Timtim', Kompas,31 Oktober 1999;'TNI di Timtim: Tinggal Yon 700 dan tiga kompi pasukan elite', Kompas, 27September 1999.

29 Pos Kupang,28 September 1999.

30 'Pasukan Kostrad mendarat di Baucau', MateBEAN, 18 September 1999.

Noles 279

31 'The army's casualty - who is he?', Tapol Bulletin, No. 108, December 1991.

32 'A Report from the Congressional Research Service [Translated From Porfu-guese by David Skelly, CRS Language Servicesl', Appendix to Senator ClaibornePell, 'Democracy: An emerging Asian value', A report to the Committee onForeign Relations, United States Senate, June 1.996, US Government PrintingOffice, Washington: 1,996.InMay1,996 it tortured an arrested Falintil guerrillanear Ermera (National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM), 'East Timorreport', 5 June 1996 (broadcast Indonesia-L, 5 June 1995)); In July 1995 Battalion700 detained and tortured seven named men in Gleno for a fortnight (EastTimor Human Rights Centre (ETHRC), 'Urgent action - progress report', 24October 1996); On Christmas Eve,'1.996, troops from Battalion 700 killed twocivilians in Ermera town as part of a hunt fbr the local Falintil commander(fohn Martinkus/ pers. corun. with Tony O'Connor,5 February 1997); In Janu-ary 1997 Battalion 700 troops took part in a counter-insurgency action nearErmera (Falintil Guerrilla Autonomous Region No.4,'Guerrilla Communiquecovering January '1997 to 10 February 1997', National Council of MaubereResistance (CNRM), 14 February 1997 (broadcast on internet nusa-l@indopubs.c om, 2 July 1,997)).

33 Sekretariat CNRT, 'Laporan kronologis peristiwa Alas', Dili, 21 Nopember1998 (broadcast on intemet by MateBEAN, 1 December 1998); 'Pembantaian diSame hantui kemesraan Lisabon-]akarta', MateBEAN, 24 November 1998.

34 East Timor Observatorv / Observat6rio Timor Leste / Observatoire Timor-Oriental, 'ETO - Numbers and identification of lrdonesian mlitarv in East Timo/(Retuence FA0gl9 fD- U7{fr:l:ry|,, 13 July i999 (http: / /homepage.esotirica.ptl-cdpm).

35 'Antara Timor Timur dan Timor Leste', Kompas, 23 August 1999;'Menelusurimereka yang bertikai di Liquica (1): Ada M-15 hingga Mouser di Prointegrasi',Jawa Pos,12 April 1999.

35 'East Timor: An analysis of Indonesian army documents, October 1998', TapolOccasional Report No.25, 15 November tggS;'d, Report from the Congres-sional Research Service [Translated From Portuguese by David Skelly, CRSLanguage Services]', Appendix to Senator Claiborne Pell, 'Democracy: Anemerging Asian value', A report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, UnitedStates Senate, lune 1995 (Washington: U.S. Govemment Printing Office,1996).

37 'Wiranto gagal temui kubu prokem', lawa Pos,21 April 1999. The others wereJoao Tavares, foanico da Costa, Eurico Guterres, Cancio de Carvalho, and RuiEmiliano Texeira Lopes.

38'Skenario bumi hangus di Loro Sa'e',Tempo, L9 September 1999,pp28-29.

39 'Alan Dermody' (pers. comm. to G van Klinken, 24May 1999).

40 'Eurico to come home to overcome difference of opinion: Tavares-Cancio splitnow tense' [English translation], NTI Ekspres,2T Oclober 2000.

41 'Behind the lines: With Timor's forgotten guerrillas', Far Eastern Economic Re-oieut,3kptember 1998; 'East Timor: Indonesia accused of creating youth groupto eliminate MRUPTL' , Lusa, 1,2 ]anuary 1998; 'Former East Timor GPK wifejubilant her husband has come to his senses', IMN, 25 January 1,997.

42'Gus Dur setujui aparat militer dihukum', TNI Watch!, 3 November 1999.

43 Jill Joiliffe 'East Timor justice suffers in the big picture', /sh Times, 5 October 2ffi1.

4 'i3 Kapolres di Timtim diganti', Kompas,29 June 1998; 'Gorontalo: Crowdrampage at police torture', Detikunrld,29 August 2000.

280 Masters of Terror

45 Kiper Jakarta, 'Mafen Sjafrie Sjamsudin masuk ke Timor Timur', Kiper-Net,29 August 1999 (reproduced in: 'Menguji taring Komisi Ham', Xpos, No.43lII,28 November-4 December 7999); "'Operasi Sapu lagad" - Indonesian mili-tary's plan to disrupt independence', East Timor Observatory $470-1999 /10 /21eng), 28 October 1999.

46 With thanks to Douglas Kammen.

47 Ian Marfin, Self-determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the ballot, andinternational intervention, Boulder (Col): Lynne Riener, 2001, p77.

,18 'Yudhoyono dan Frederick Mengko dampingi Menlu ke PBB', Kompas,14 Sep-tember 1999.

49 'Mahkamah pilihan Sang Panglima',Tempo,27 December 7999-2January 2OOO;

'Presiden akan berhentikan Menko Polkam Wiranto', Kompas,l February 2000.

50 'Four officers to be charged East Timor abuses - admiral', Associated Press,28

January 2000; 'KPP HAM tetap akan umumkan temuannya: Laksda YoostMengko: Jaga kredibililas', Kornpas,29 January 2000.

51 'Kontras: Rekomendasi KPP HAM Priokharus ditarik kembali Komnas HAM',Sunra Pembaruan, L8 June 2000.

52 'Gus Dur setujui aparat militer dihukum', TM Watch!,3 November 1999.

53 'Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Primadona istana dari Payakumbuh', Forum Keadilan,8 August 1999. His'right hand'was the academic Dewi Fortuna Anwar, whooften even overshadowed Foreign Minister Ali Alatas.

54 Komelius Purba, 'Habibie wants "to be remembered for E.Timor' ,lalurtn Post,

15 February 1999. This report identifies Habibie's closest advisors in the deci-sion as Minister of Defense and Security/ Armed Forces Commander GenWiranto, Minister of Justice Muladi, Minister of Information LtGen MuhammadYunus [Yosfiah], Minister/ State Secretary Akbar Tandjung Secretary of Devel-opment Operation (Sesdalopbang) LtGen (ret) Sintong Panjaitan, and DewiForfuna Anwar. Note that half of these six are active or retired military officers.

55 'Dewi Fortuna, di balik heboh Timtim', Xpos, No. 04lII, 4-10 February 1999.

55 'Tugas khusus Zacky Makarim di Timor Timur', MateBEAN, 5 August 1999.

57 Usamah Hisyam (Ketua Tim Penyusun), Feisal Taniung:Terbaik untuk rakyat,terbaik bagi Abi, Jakarta: Dharmapena, \999, p.227.

58 Tapol Bulletin, September 1.985, p.27;lohn McBeth, 'Soldiering on', Far EasternEconomic Reoiew,4 June 1998; Suara Pembaruan, l4lune 7998.

59 'Gus Dur setujui aparat militer dihukum', TM Watch!,3 November 1999.

60 'Soal ke Timtim, Horta harus pikirkan ulang', lawa Pos,12lunel999.

51 'Letkol Asep Kuswandi tidak datang', Kompas,13 Septernber 2000.

62'Ptajvit Yonif 406lCk digaji uang palsu', TNI Watch! 9 December 1999. Thisitem also lists nine of his subordinate officers.

53 'The lndonesia's military remain large in East Timor: How can Unamet copewith the situation before and post the ballot?', Tapol, 30 luly 7999.

54 TM serang Falintil dan geledah rumah penduduk', Solid-Net, ?2 Apn1199;'Falintilkembali serang pm batalyon teritorial', Media lrdonesia Online, 15 April 1999.

Noles 28'1.

65 'Tentang penjahat perang Timtim: Komisi HAM PBB akan bersidang di Jenewa',Suara Pembaruan,2L September 1999; 'Dugaan TNI terlibat kejahatan perang:Wiranto: TNI pertahankan integrasi di Timtim', Kompas,21 September 1999.

66 Thanks to Douglas Kammen.

67 'The Indonesia's military remain large in East Timor: How can UNAMET copewith the situation before and post the ballot?', Tapol, 30 luly 7999; PrajuritYonif t106lCk digaji uang palsu', TNI Watch! 9 December 1999.

68 'Report on the monitoring of the ballot (May-June 7W9)', Fortil6,?jJwrel9ff.59 James Durlr:', Cimes against humanity in East Timor, lanuary to October 1.999;

Their nature and causes, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur onCrimes Against Humanity,2001; also implied in Komite Jajak Pendapat yangBebas dan Jujur, 'Gelombang kekerasan adalah sabotase terhadap jajakpendapat: Laporan pemantauan 22 Agustus L999',Yayasan HAK 20 August1999 (the'22 Agustus' date in the title is a mistake).

70 'lII. The plight of East Timorese refugees in West Timor', Human Rights Watch(http:/ /www.hrw.orglrep orts/1999 /wtimor/westmr-02.htm#P107 _'1.8697),18 December 1999.

71. 'Yayasan HAK> Laporan situasi HAM Timor Timur April 1,999', MateBEAN,25May'1999.

72'lPP 04 Yayasan Hak: Lagi, bencana di Liquica - ]umal penentuan pendapatrakyat Timor Timur 04-06 Agustus 1999', Fortilos, 9 August 1999.

73 'Prajurit Yonif 405/Ck Digaji Uang Palsu', TNI Watch, 9 December 1999.

74 'New team negotiates with hian Jaya kdnappers',lakann Pwt,Z2Jarvary 2ff7.75 Vaudine England, "'Shadowy" unit blamed for conflicts', South China Morning

Post,2'1. August 2000.

76'Daftarnama perwira tinggi yang akan dibela Muladi', TNI Watch! 12 Decem-ber 1999. The letter reference indicates Rusmono was Sugiono's personal as-sistant (Spri).

77 'Dua lagi perwira TNI diperiksa', Suara Pembaruan,30 December 1999. Thedates of these visits were24-29 june,3-8 August, and27-28 August.

78 'tngin Nobel, dapat penjahat perang', Xpos, No. U/lI/2,8 October 1999.

79 'Wiranto gagal temui kubu prokem',lawa Pos,21 Apr1l1999.

80'Gelombang kekerasan adalah sabotase terhadap jajak pendapat: Laporanpemantauan 22 Agustus '1999',Yayasan HAK, 20 August 1999.

81 'Fortilos> Laporan harian Timor Lorosae: Apa rencana TNI dan Polri? (3)',MateBEAN, 29 August 1999.

82 john Martinkus in Waimori, for AAP, 'Dispatches: Falantil fighters saddened bydestruction of East Timor', Australian Broadcasting Corporatiory 1 October 1999.

83 'Aushalia coba kaburkan', Waspada,25 September 199P;Tim Dodd, 'Official newsservice daims UN akocities', Austrilian Financial Rniew,25 September 199.

84 'Gus Dur setujui aparat militer dihukum', TNI Watch!, 3 November 1999.

85 Brian Woodley, 'Red and White Tenor, The Weakmd. Australian,l.2-May'199.86 Suara Timor Timur, 21, Auglst 1,997.

87 Kompas,AMarch 1998: 'New Army officers installed in East Timor' ,lakartaPost,6 August 1997.

Masters of Tenor

88 'Gus Dur setujui aparat militer dihukum', TM Watch!,3 November 1999.

89 'Istilah satuan militer: Dari regu hingga divisi', TNI Watch!, 27 October 1999.

90 '150 Senjata rakitan disita Batalyon 401 Diponegoro', Afelc./ Antara, Ternate,11 April2000.

91 'Kolonel Irwan Kusnadi cedera berat di Ambon', TTNI Watch! 20 May 2000.

92 'Setyo Sularso Danyonif nI /BR' , Suara Merileka, L9 August 1997.

93 'Helikopter TNI AD jatuh di Timtim: Pangdam IX Udayana dan 11 lainnyagugur', Kompas,SJune 1998. It was similarly listed as seconded to the territorialcommand ('penugasan') in 1999 (East Timor Observatory / Observat6rio TimorLeste / Observatoire Timor-Oriental, 'ETO - Numbers and identification ofIndonesian mlitary in East Timor' (Reference: FA09-1999-07-06eng), 13 July1999 (hftp:/ /homepage.esoterica.ptl-cdpm)). Others in this category wereBattalions IM,315, 401, 5'12, &2.

94'GPK: Bunker dan senjata di Baucau', Gatra,No.23/ tV,25 April 1998;'Securitydisturbance gang headquarters raided, three gangsters die', Kompas Online,lTApril 1998. A 1996 report has Battalion tl01 located in Ermera, EastTimor ('AReport from the Congressional Research Service [Translated From Porfugueseby David Skelly, CRS Language Servicesl', Appendix to Senator ClaibornePell,'Democracy: An emerging Asian value', A report to the Committee onForeign Relations, United States Senate , June 1995, U.S. Govemment PrintingOffice, Washington: 1996).

95 'TNI di Timtim: Tinggal Yon 700 dan tiga kompi pasukan elite', Kompas,27September 1999.

96 East Timor Human Rights Centre,'Urgent action (Ref: UAIS/99)',30 Septem-ber 1999.

97 Pos Kupang,28 September 1999.

98 TNI Watch! 'Komisi Ham PBB daftar nama jenderal Indonesia'posted to SiaRNews Service, 29 September'1999.

99 'Dandim Sikka, Manggarai, Alor and E. Flores transferred' (English transla-tion), Pos Kupang, 11 April 2000.

100 'Gus Dur setujui aparat militer dihukum', TNI Watch!,3 November 1999.

101 'Reposted from a foreigner currently in Dili; originally written Tue, 20 Apr1999 3 pm Dili time', posted by Charles Scheiner <cscheiner@igc.org> to east-timor@igc.org, 20 April 1999.

102 Seth Mydans, 'Tense encounters as lndonesian trooPs begin withdrawal' , The

N eto Y ork Times, 24 September 1999.

103 EastTimorObservatory / Gservat6rioTimorleste / ObservatoireTimor0riental,'ETO - Numbers and identification of Indoneian mlitary in East Timol (Refurence:

FA09-199907{6qrg), 13 July 1999 (http://hornepage.esoterica.ptl-cdpm).

104 'Gus Dur setujui aparat militer dihukum', TM Watch!,3 November 1999.

105 'Laporan Maggie dari Dili', Gamma,10 October 1999.

106 Channel NewsAsia (Singapore), 12 October 2000

107 'Anak muda yang bangkit dari wacana berbahaya', Gamma,17 October 2000.

108 'Mantan Kepala Bia diduga terlibat pembunuhan', TNI Watch! 31 January 2000.

Nofes 283

109 'Penunjukkan Kasad: Ancaman terhadap reformasi di TNI-AD dan dampaknyaterhadap HAM di Indonesia', Indonesia's Forum for Human Dignity (postingto indonesia-views@indopubs.com), 9 October 2000.

l'1,0 Suara Pembaruan, 18 September 1999.

117 Gamma, no.3/1,14 March 1999.

112 Julius Pour, 'Endriartono Sutarto, "Soldiers' soldier"', Kompas,11 Oct 2000.

113 TNI, analysts defend Syahnakri's promotion', lndonesian Obvruer,8 November 20(D.

114 'House questions state of emergency pl,an', lndonesian Obseruer,25 November2000; see also'Profil Endriartono Sutarto', Forum Keadilan, 19 October 2000.

115 'Gus Dur setujui aparat militer dihukum', TNI Watch!, 3 November 1999.

116 'Gus Dur setujui aparat militer dihukum', TNI Watch!,3 November 1999.

117 'TNI di Timtim: Tinggal Yon 700 dan tiga kompi pasukan elite', Kompas,27September 1999.

1 1 8'Dua mantan komandan Brigif 3/ Kostrad terbelit masalah pidana', TM Watch!7 July 2000;'Kudeta setelah lebaran', Xpos, No. 47 /1I,26 December 1999 - 1.

January 2000. The other two battalions in this brigade were 431 and 433.

119 'Penerapan darurat militer: Landasan hukum bagi militer untuk lebih kerasdan tegas', Kompas,8 September 1999.

120 The times included December 1998 (Komando Region III Falintil, 'Berita dariTimor Leste', Soliilamor,ll December 1998); and july 1995 (National Council ofMaubere Resistance, 'News release', 15 July 1995 (reg.easttimor)).

1.21 'Gara-gara akan lapor ke PBB: Mantan milisi Tim-Tim merasa terancam' ,TempoInteraktif, 13 October 2000; 'Lintas Udara 432 secepatnya bersihkan senjatapengungsi', Kompas, 19 October 1999.

122 'East Timor: lnterfet, Indonesian officers discuss Oe Cusse militia clashes', Lusa,21 January 2000. The commander of Battalion 432, according to Interfet, wasCol Manurung at this time.

123 'Kekerasan TNI di Timor Barat', TNI Watch!, L4 January 2000.

124 'The Indonesia's military remain large in East Timor: How can Unamet copewith the situation before and post the ballot?', Tapol, 30 luly 1999. His nameappears on a list of officers who should be investigated for atrocities commit-ted in East Timor (TNI Watch! 'Komisi Ham PBB daftar nama jenderal Indone-sia', posted to SiaR News Service, 29 Septembet'1999).

125 Angkatan Bersenjata, 17 April 1998. ' "Paket Prabowo" bakal pimpin Kopassus',TNI Watch! 30 March 2000.

125 'Training courses provided by the US military to the Indonesian military be-tween 1992 and1997'. This document is among the US Deparbment of Defensedocuments released 12 February 1,998by Deputy Secretary of Defense fohn JHamre in response to a request by Representative Lane Evans.

127 'Prajurit Yonif 405lCk digaji uang palsu', TNI Watch! 9 December 1999. Thisreport also lists nine of his subordinate officers, ranging in rank from Captainto Lieutenant.

128 'Falintil kembali serang pos batalyon teritorial', Media Indonesia Online, 15April1999.

129 'TNI di Timtim: Tinggal Yon 700 dan tiga kompi pasukan elite', Kompas,27September 1999.

Masters of Tenor

130 East Timor Human Rights Cenhe, 'Urgent action (Ref: UA78/99)' ,30 Septem-ber 1999.

131 Both are on a list of officers in need of investigation over atrocities committedthere: 'Ingin Nobel, dapat penjahat perang', Xpos, No. 34/1I,2-8 October 1999.

132 'Delegasi prointegrasi Timtim minta senjata pada Pangab', Republilcn,20 Feb-ruary'1.999.

133 "'Tangan tak terlihat" coba dikte RI', Media Indonesia,29 lanuary 1999.

134 Vaudine England, 'East Timor: "Too early" to plan trials for atrocities', SoafhChina Morning Post,21. September 1999; Keith Richburg, 'Horror I thought I'd leftbehind', Washington Posf,25 September 1999; Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 'KrisisTimor Timur dan masa depan lndonesia', Tajuk ed.5 yr 2,8 October 1999.

135 Devi Asmarani, 'US: Gus Dur may be too optimistic again',The StraitsTimes,l2September 2000.

135 TNI Watch!,'Don't cry for me veteran Seroja', posted to SiaR News Service, 9

September 1999.

137 See also John McBeth, 'The thinking general', Far Eastern Economic Reaiew, 12October 2000.

138 'Pengungsi Timtim di Belu rninta TPS', Kompas,21 June1999.139 'Atambua, super sibuk dan menegangkan', Kompas, 15 September 1999.

Prniously recommended for prosecution and/or indicted in lndonesia t311 Lindsay Murdoch,'Ballot violence: Six to go free', Sydney Morning Herald,3

May 2001.

2 'Pemuda Timtim ldes Horta Terima Nobel', hnm Metdeb,17 December 1996.

3 '160 "Clandestines" swear allegiance to Indonesia', Kompas,15 August 1997.

4 'East Timor under the Indonesian jackboot An analysis of Indonesian armydocuments', Tapol, 15 November 1998.

5 'East Timor: Stop bank loans until militias disarmed', Human Rights Watch,20April 1999. 'Sama susahnya, menang atau kalah', Tajuk ed.12 yr.2, mid-August1999, inflated Tim Alfa's membership to 2000.

6 'Laporan Situasi Ham April 1999 (3)', Yayasan HAK,25 May 1999.

7 'Masyarakat Lautem rayakan Paskah dalam suasana mencekam', MateBEAN,3 April1999.

8 Committee for a Free and Fair Ballot,'Report on the Monitoring of the Ballot:May-June'1,999', F ortilos, 23 Jvne 1999.

9 'Pemerintah tolak peradilan intemasional: Tiga ahli luar negeri bantu KPPHAM', Kompas,22 December 1999.

10 'AGO to force ex-officials to testifu on Timor melee', Indonesian Obseruer,17May 2000.

Noles 285

11 Mark Dodd, 'Guerillas wary of visiting militia leader', Sydney Morning Herald,15 june 2000.

12 'Militia leaders to skip trials for East Timor violence', AFP,25 April2001;'Politi-cal overview Atambua-Cova Lima-Ainaro 15-17 June 1,999', United NationsMission in East Timor (Unamet), POL, 18 June 1999 (leaked Unamet intemaldocument); 'Group of independence fighters sign truce in East Timor', AFP,30June 1999.

13 Amnesty Intemational,'EAST TIMOR: Seize the moment',21 June 1,999, ASA21 /49/99.

14 'Indonesia:national police reform report', International Crisis Group(www.crisisweb.org), 20 February 2001.

15 Helene, PAO Ermera, to Ian Martin, 21 July 1999 (leaked internal Unametdocument).

16 'Indonesia's dirty war in East Timor', Tapol Bulletin, T June 1999; East TimorObservatory, 'Operasi Sapu Jagad - Indonesian militarys plan to disrupt inde-pendence', Comisso para os Direitos do Pauve Maubere, Ref:FA10-1999/10/21eng,28 October 1999; East Timor International Support Centre [ETISC], 'Thesystematic annihilation of a people' (Darwin: ETSIC Occasional Paper No.3, 15September 1999).

1,7 'Daftar nama perwira tinggi yang akan dibela Muladl', TNI Watch! 12 Decem-ber 1999. Silitonga and Iskandar had been posted to East Timor in anticipationof the ballot on 1 August '1,999, on the orders of the Udayana commander

18 One is tempted to connect this person with a Chrisman Silitonga who, it wasrevealed early in 1999,had taken Rp 108 million in'extra-budgetary'fundsfrom the State Logistics Board Bulog between 1,994-99. One thinks of the fund-ing needs of militias. Military organisations were prominent among the other32 recipients. However, there seems indeed to have been an apparently civil-ian Chrisman Silitonga within Bulog - a different person? ('Menikmati 2 triliunuang Bulog', Xpos, No. 16/1II,15-21 May 2000; Kompas,SMay 1992).

19 'Mayjen Adam Damiri akui anggota Wanra dipinjami senjata', SuaraPembaruan, 2 May 2000;'Mantan Komandan Korem 164/Wiradharma: PamSwakarsa di Timtim dibina Polri, dibiayai Pemda', Kompas,Z8 December 1999.

20 James Durn, Crimes against humanity in East Timor, lanuary to October 1999;Their nature and causes, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur onCrimes Against Humanity, 2001.

21 "'Operasi Sapu Jagad" - lndonesian military's plan to disrupt independence',CDPM, FA10-1999 /10/2leng,28 October 1999; Marian Wilkinson,'Justice mustbe done', The Age [Melboume] and Sydney Morning Herald,29 January 2000.The latter was based on interviews with defecting militia leaders TomasGoncalves and Rui Lopes, who were present at some of these meetings both inDili and Denpasar. Sirnilarly Tomas Goncalves in Radio Hilversum,5 October1999, and Mark Davis, SBS'Dateline'TV transcript at www.sbs.com.auldate-line), broadcast 16 February 2000.

22 Annemarie Evans, 'Militia leader picked to head secret group', South ChinaMorning Post,2'l September 1999.

23 Joanna Jolly, 'Militias vow to rise from the ashes, South China Morning Post,19November 1999.

286 Masters of Tenor

24 'EastTimor: Gusmao meets key Indonesian military officials', Lusa,23 Febru-ary 1,999. The generals spoke about'reconciliation' among East Timorese, butXanana said afterwards he was disappointed with their lack of interest in hisproposals.

25 Dan Murphy, 'Spotlight School's out' , Far Eastern Economic Reaier:u, 23 Septem-ber 1999.

26 'Timor needs no foreign soldiers', lnilonesian Observr,S April 1999.

27 Allan Naim,'License to kill in Timor', TheNation,3l May 1999.

28'IJskup Belo tanggapi stabmen Pangdam Damir{,SuamTimor Timur,9 Aprt' 199P.

29'Text of order to develop "security plan" translated by Human Rights Watch(www.hrw.or g/ rcports / 1999 / wtrrnor / westmr-(X.htm#1249 -ffiV2), posted 18December 1999. The telegram was addressed to seven other military officers.

30 'TNI Jamin Keamanan Falintil', lawa Pos,l2June'1999.

31 Joanna Jolly,'Habibie behind the violence, militia say', Tlu Age (Aushalia), 19

October 2000. President Habibie allegedly told the militia leaders: 'l give theorder to all of you that if autonomy loses, your job is to clean East Timor fromthe East to the West and leave nothing alive but ants.' The allegation (byJoanico Belo, qv) is repeated in 'Anak muda yang bangkit dari wacanaberbahaya', Gamma, 17 October 2000. However, serious doubts have beenraised against the claim that Habibie was really there. 'To say the [then] Indo-nesian president could have visited East Timor without our knowledge is ludi-crous,' a UN source said (Joanna Jolly and Vaudine England, 'East Timor: Fearand loathing spreads in militia ranks', South China Morning Post,21. October2000). It indeed seems difficult to believe that Habibie would expose himself tothe risk of media revelations by coming to the volatile town of Dili merely toencourage rnilitia leaders. The militia leaders who told this story were fright-ened of army retribution. By making Habibie responsible they echoed com-mon military sentiment, possibly in an attempt to deflect arrny anger awayfrom themselves.

32 John Martinkus, 'Report the first step on road to justice: rights gouP', AAP, 1

February 2000.

33 TM tambah pasukan siap menghadapi "kemungkinan terburuk"', MateBEAN,3 September 1999; 'l was responsible for security in E. Timor: Adarn', The

Jaknrta Post,19 September 2000;'Timtim mulai pulih', Rqublika,9 September1999;'Darurat militer diTimtim: Telepon pun akan dikuasai Militer...',Konpas,8 September 1999 (argues that the martial law regulation was unclear becauseit did not name anyone responsible);'Laporan dari Timor Lorosae s/d23September 1999: Laporan Yayasan HAK', Fortilos, 5 October 1999.

34 Hestiana Dharmastuti, 'Kasus Timtim: Munir - Dokumen Gamadi benar ada',Detikum, 28 December 1999.

35 Teisal Tanjung Tak pemah lihat Dokumen Garnadf , Kontps,14 January 20(X).

35 'Solidamor> Surat rahasia Asmenko I/ Poldagi', MateBEAN, 77 July 1999;'Alleged secret Indon gov't document on E.Timor contingencies' (English trans-lation), posted on foyo@aol.corn27 August 1999.

37 Geoffrey Robinson, 'The fruitless search for a smoking gun: Tracing the ori-gins of violence in East Timor', paper prepared for intemational workshop on'Violence in Indonesia', University of Leiden, L3-15 December 2000, quoted in

Nofes 287

Ian Martin, Self-determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the ballot, andinternational intmtention (Boulder (Col): Lynne Riener, 2001), p82 fn5.

38 'Milisi siap jadi saksi untuk pengadilan intemasional', MateBEAN, 20 October L99.

39 'Diakui, ada aparat lepas tembakan di jalan-jalan', Kompas,31 December 1999.

40'13 Kapolres di Timtim diganti', Kompas, 29 June 1,998.

41 'Ratusan orang mengungsi di Polres Dili', Kompas,12May 1,999.

42 'Lagi, dua prokemerdekaan tewas', Kompas, 11 May 1999.

43 James Dunn, Cimes against humanity in East Timor, lanuary to October 1999;Their nature and causes, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur onCrimes Against Humanity, 2001.

44 Annemarie Evans, 'East Timor: Militia leader picked to head secret group',South China Morning Post,Zl September 1999.

45 'East Timor under the Indonesian jackboot An analysis of Indonesian armydocuments, Tapol, 15 November 1998.

46 Joanna Jollp'Militias vow to rise from the ashes', South China Morning Post,1.9November 1999.

47 Reporters sans frontidres, 'RSF annual report 2000 (East Timor section)', RSF(Vincent Brossel - Asia Pacific Desk <asie@rsf.f>), 2May 2000; 'Timor excerptfrom Annual Report "Attacks on the Press in 1999"', Committee to Protect

Journalists (CPI, http://www.cpj.orglattacks99/frameset-att99 /frameset_att99.html, 22 March 2000.

48 Amnesty International,'EAST TIMOR: Seize the moment',21 June 1999, ASA2l / 49 /99. This report also describes how four days earlier Eurico Guterres hadpresented the govemor with a list of pro-independence civil servants who inAitarak's opinion should be sacked. On Aitarak generally see Amnesty lnter-national, 'Indonesia: Shuggle against impunity - one step forward, two stepsback', AI Index ASA 21, /008 /2001, - News Service Nr. 74, 25 April 2001.

49 'Milisi pro-integrasi teman siapa? - Whose friends are the pro-integrationmilitia?', Cari (on Charles Coppel news list), L3 October, 2000. It is not clearexactly when this money was handed over - quite likely more than once. Otheritems on the counterfeit money are 'Sejumlah jendral tersinggung denganusulan penyelesaian damai Timtim', MateBEAN, 19 April 1999;'Two ex-sol-diers jailed for counterfeitrng' , The laknrta Post,22 September 2000. The coun-terfeiting operation was later traced to LtGen Tyasno Sudarto (qv), at the timehead of military intelligence (Kepala BIA), who in turn claimed to be actingunder orders from Gen Wiranto.

50 Conor O'Clery, 'Indonesia's promise on Timor is deeply suspect', lrish Times

[Dublin],21. ApnID99.51 'East Timor: Pro-Jakarta militia leader adrnits ordering April 17 attack on house

of Manuel Carrascalao', Luw,3May 1999.

52 'Fortilos>Fokupers: Berita dari Timtim', MateBEAN, 13 May 1999;'PrattwiCatatan pe{alanan di Bumi Loro Sa'e (10)', MateBEAN, 8 October'1999.

53 Anouk Ride,'Green light to the generals', Neu) Internationalisf, No.318,November 1999.

288 Masters of Tenor

54 James Durn, Cimes against humanity in East Timor, lanuary to October 1999;Their nature anil causes, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur onCrimes Against Humanity, 2001.

55 'Human rights questions: Human rights situations and reports of specialrapporteurs and representatives: Situation of human rights in East Timor',United Nations A/54/660 General Assembly, Fifty-fourth session, Agendaitem 115 (c) (in accordance with resolution 7999 /94/ 7 of 27 September 1999 atthe UN Human Rights Commission), 10 December 1999.

55 'Kupang District Court awaits', GATRA, 2L October 2000.

57 see East Timor Observatory/Observat6rio Timor Leste/Observatoire Timor-Oriental,'POL01 : Political movements and parties: pro- autonomy', CDPM, 12

February 2001.

58 'Phony anti-communism' , Tempo Magazine, L5-21. May 2001.

59 Lindsay Murdoch, 'Ballot violence: Six to go free', Sydney Morning Herald, S

May 2001.

50 ?ratiwi: Cahtan perialanan di Bumi Loro Sa'e (10)', MateBEAN,8 October 199.

51 Annemarie Evans, 'East Timor: Militia leader picked to head secret group',South China Morning Post,2l September 7999. Gamma says he was born 17 July1974,but that is unlikely to be true ('Anak muda yang bangkit dari wacanaberbahaya', Gamma, 17 October 2000).

52 James Dunn, Cimes against humanity in East Timor, lanuary to October'1.999;Their nature and causes, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur onCrimes Against Humanity, 2001.

53 Radio Hilversum, 5 October 1999 (in the transcript Amirul is mis-typed as'Amirut').

54 'NN: Yet another report from bloody East Timor', MateBEAN, 29 April1.999(listed here as'Brigadier General Amirullah').

55 He is listed as a likely candidate for war criminal status by a source in Xpos('fendral-Jendral penjahat perang'/ Xpos, No 32/11,12-1'8 September 1999).

55 'Tentang Brigjen TNI Amirul Isnaeni', TNI Watch! 21 June 2000;'MeunaSAH>Mahasiswa Aceh gugat Feisal Tanjung dan Syarwan Hamid', SiaR News Serv-ice <siar@minihub.org>, 12 August 1998.

67 Angkatan Bersenjata, 5 September 1997; Suara Pembaruan,22February 7998;Suara Merdeka, 4 July 1998; 'Jendral-Jendral penjahat pera B' , Xpos, No 32lII,12-18 Septemb er 1999 ;'BlbitPangdam IV, Sugiono Kasum ABRI', Swra Merdeka,

5 january 1999;'Lembaga Kolakops yang luput dari perhatian' TM Watch!,Siar News Service, 13 December 1999.

68 'Daftar lengkap mutasi di tubuh TNI', Kompas, 16 June 2000.

69 'Diakui, ada aparat lepas tembakan di jalan-jalan', Kompas,31 December 1999.

70 'Bubrt Pangdam IV, Sugiono Kasum ABRI', Suara Merdeka,S January 1999.

71 TNI Watch!, 'Komisi Ham PBB Daftar Nama Jenderal Indonesia', SiaR,29September 1999.

72 Douglas Kammen, 'The trouble with normal: The Indonesian military,paramilitaries, and the final solution in East Timor,' in Benedict Anderson, ed,

Notes 289

Violence and the state in Suharto's lndonesia (Ithaca, NY: Comell Southeast AsiaProgram, 2001); 'Revealed: army's plot to destroy a nation,' The Guardian,'11.September 1999.

73 Radio Hilversum,6 October 1999.

74 TNI Watch! 'Kol Inf M. Noer Muis akan jadi Kasdam', SiaR, 6 September 1999.

75 'Operasi pasca jajak pendapat', Xpos,No.31,/ II, 5-11 September 1999.

75 'Warga Timtim perlu sentuhan religius', Suara Pembaruan, 3 Septembet 1999.77 Ak$i News Service, 'Penguasa Militer Baru di Timor Timur', Jakarta,2T May

1995, indonesia-l@igc.apc.org, intemet, 3 June 1995.

78 ' Indonesia/ East Timor: Forced expulsions to West Timor and the refugeecrisis', Human Rights Watch , Vol. 11, No. 7 (c) (http:/ /www.hrw.orglre-ports / 7999 / wtimor,/), December 1999.

79 'Aushalia Tarik Pelajaran dari lnsiden Motaain', lawa Pos,23 November 1999;'Letkol Asep Kuswandi tidak datang', Kompas,13 September 2000. Zeni unitsoften do electronic work. Part of a technical support group known as Zipalhub,engineers can be placed with any combat unit as required (banpur).

80 'TNI di Timtim: Tinggal Yon 700 dan tiga kompi pasukan elite', IQmpas,27September 1999.

81 'Kolonel Irwan Kusnadi cedera berat di Ambon', TNI Watch!, 22May 2000.

82 Kusnadi's name appears on a list of officers who should be considered forprosecution for atrocities committed in East Timor (TNI Watch! 'Komisi HamPBB daftar nama jenderal Indonesia', posted to SiaR News Service,2g Septem-ber 1999).

83 'TNI di Timtim: Tinggal Yon 700 dan tiga kompi pasukan elite', Kompas,27September 1999.

84 'Wiranto diperiksa Ambon kembali bergolak', TM Watch! 22May 2000.

85 'Kolonel Irwan Kusnadi cedera berat di Ambon', TNI Watch!, 22May 20{Jl0.

86 'Kmtrad hmps bound for Irian Jaya', lndonsian Obserwr, 15 November 2ffi.87 Radar Timor, 23 February 2001.

88 Jill Jolliffe and Lindsay Murdoch,'Charges laid over church massacre', SydneyMorning Heralil,23 November 2001 (where his name is misspelt asKusumawandi).

89 Accounts of the Liquica massacre that include Asep Kuswani's name are:'Fokupers: Kisah pembantaian di Liquica', Soliilamor, g April '1999; 'lointdemarche needed on East Timor militias', Human Rights Watch ,9 AprII 1999;'KesaksianPastorRafaelatasinsidenLiquica', SuaraTimorTimur,sApril 1999(translated in HRW report above); 'The dismissal and indictment of TNI offic-ers for human rights violations in East Timor', Tapol (www.gn.apc.org/tapol),15 june 1999; Don Greenlees, 'Soldiers watched Timor massacre - Australianembassy report', The Australian, 17 Apnl D99.

90 'Membalas teror, membela Merah Putih', Pos Kupang, 14 February 1999.

91 'Liquica rusuh', Kompas, 14 March 1999; 'Pastor Rafael terluka saat selamatkanFelisberto: Bupati l-eonitoberlindungdipastoran', SwmTimorTimur,'15March199.

92 'Kesepakatan bubarkan Besi Merah Putih', Suara Timor Timur, 1.5 March 1999(also MateBEAN,20 March 1999).

290 Masters of Terror

93 'Letkol Asep Kuswandi tidak datang', Kompas,13 September 2000.

94 This individual and the next two are listed only as'individuals'in the KPP HAMreport but are mentioned as soldiers based in Liquica in reports by Dili-basedhuman rights organisations: 'Interim report Liquisa massacre, 05 - 07 April7999',Yayasan HAK, Dili, East Timor, 14 April 1999;'Pembantaian di LiquicaTimor Leste', Fokupers,9 April 1999.

95 'Dandim Sikka, Manggarai, Alor and E. Flores transferred' (English transla-tion), Pos l(upang,11 April2000.

95 Text of order to develop 'Security Plan' translated by Human Rights Watchand posted 18 December L999 to indonesia-l@indopubs.com. Available onlineatt hW : / / w ww.hrw. org,/ rep orb / 1999 / wtimor / westmr- M.htrrr#P24g -ffiOLIt was apparently copied to the Army Chief of Staff (General Subagyo HadiSiswoyo), the Wakasad (himself), the Inspector General of the Army (Major-General Djoko Subroto), the Assistants to the Army Chief of Staff (these in-cluded Maj-Gen Suprapto, Territorial Affairs; Maj-Gen Sugiarto Maksum, Gen-eral Planning; Maj-Gen Kiki Syahnakri, Operations (whose deputy at the timewas Brig4en Tony Anton Rompis), and the Commander of Korem 164 in Dili(Col Tono Suratman).

97 'Menyeret Wiranto ke pengadilan', Xpos, No. 05/il, 13-19 February 2000.

98 'J Lumintang diperiksa soal telegram 5Mei', Kompas, 24 December 1999. A TNIWatch! report, meanwhile, argued that Lumintang was one of the less relevantpeople to be called before the KPP HAM because it was a long time since heserved in East Timor ('Wiranto sedang mencari cara untuk menghindar daripemeriksaan KPP HAM', TNI Watch! 23 December 1999.

99 'Govt opposes in-absentia hial of Lt. Gen. Lumintang', The lakarta Post,6 Aptil2001; Stephen Collinson, 'General's US trial told of post-vote horror', Associ-ated Press, 28 March 2001; Andrew Buncombe, 'General ordered to pay outover Timor abuses', The lndqeruIent IUKI,5 October 2001.

100 'Latihan melibas demokrasi', Xpos, No.13/I,28 March - 3 April 1998.

101 'Johny Lumintang gantikan Prabowo', Kompas,23 September 1998.

102 'Letjen TNI Tyasno Sudarto tertunda jadi KSAD', TNI Watch! November 1999.

103 John McBeth, 'East Timor is about to vote; So is lndonesia's military lettinggo?' , Far Eastern Economic Reoiew,2 September 1999.

104 James Dunrt, Crimes against humanity in East Timor, lanuary to October 1999;Their nature and causes, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur onCrimes Against Humanity, 2001.

105 'Wiranto gagal temui kubu prokem',larna Pos,21 April 1999. He is here de-scribed as Assistant for Security to the Army Chief of Staff (Aspam KSAD),Gen Subagyo, but David Bourchier (pers comm to G van Klinken) says this is'is almost certainly given wrongly. This aras his position before he became thehead of BIA in August 1997.'

106 'East Timor is enough', Tajuk,37 December 1999.

107'EastTimor:Gusmaomeebkeykrdoneianmilitaryofficials',Luu,?3F&ruary799.

108 |ohn McBeth,'Indonesia - military challenge: East Timor is about to vote;So is Indonesia's military letting go?', Far Eastern Economic Reaiew,2 Sep-tember 1999.

Notes

109 "'Operasi Sapufagad"- Indonesianmilitary's plantodisruptindependence',East Timor Observatory (F A'lO-7999 / 10 / 21eng), 28 October 1 999.

110 'Wiranto gagal temui kubu prokem', lawa Pos,21 April1999.111 'Daftar nama perwira tinggi yang akan dibela Muladi', TNI Watch!, 12 Decem-

ber 1999. Other 1999 'arrivals' in Dili noted by observers are 26 fune - to stayfor a month - and 1 August ('Pratiwi: Catatan perjalanan di Bumi Loro Sa'e (9)',MateBEAN, 5 October 1999).

112 'Blood on their hands', Sydney Morning Herald,2 October 1999.

113 Ian Martin, Self-determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the ballot, andinternational interoention (Boulder (Col): Lynne Riener, 2001,), p77.

114 'Xpos: Rahasia kunjungan 14 menteri', SiaR, 18 luly 1999.

115 'Konflik intem redaksi STT kian memuncak', MateBEAN, 1,6July 1,999.

116 Hamish McDonald, 'Magic man ruffles Gusmao's vision', Sydney Morning Her-ald,20 January 2001 (quoting Xanana Gusmao).

117 Allan Naim, 'License to Kill in Timor', The Nation,31, May 1999.

118 'Pemantau jajak pendapat: Pemerintah lndonesia memihak pro otonomi', Ra-dio 58 H, 22 August 1999;'Dua jenderal satu misteri', Panji Masyarakat,25August 1999.

t1.9

120

t2

122

r23

124

125

'Skenario bumi hangus di Loro Sa'e', Tempo,19 September 7999, pp28-29.

'Dua jenderal satu misteri', Panii Masyarakat,Z5 August7999.'Laying the blame: East Timor January-September 1999', Sydney Morning Her-ald,28 Aprll2001,.

'Inquiry unravels Indonesian plot to destroy East Timor, seeks Wiranto', AFP,20 Novembet 1999.

'Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin siapkan rencana darurat', MateBEAN, 1 September 1999.

'Revealed: Army's plot to destroy a nation', The Obseroer [UK], 12 September1999; Rui Lopeq a pro.Indonesian militia leader in Suai who changed sidesafter the post-ballot violence and fled overseas, also implicated Zacky Makarim(and Kiki Syahnakri) in planning the post-ballot violence ('Para jendral Indo-nesia perintahkan pembantaian', MateBEAN, 14 September 1999).

Mark Dodd, 'World pressure brought military shake-up', Sydney Morning Her-ald,30 August1999.

126 'Zacky's testimony deemed "mystical"', lndonesian Obsenter,5 January 2000.

127 'Xpos: Wiranto segera mundur?', SiaR, 13 December '1,999.He was chief of thethe law enforcement and security coordination centre at TNI headquarters(Kepala Pusat Koordinasi Penegakan Hukum dan Sistem Keamanan MarkasBesar (Mabes) TNI).

128 'Persiapan pemanggilan KPP HAM Timtim: Mayjen Zacky Anwar Makarimungkapkan cerita lengkap kepada Muladi', Kompas,9 December 1999.

129 'Experts warn of low morale in TNI', The lakarta Post,14 October 2000.

130 'Laporan Komite no. 2: Pelanggaran terhadap proses pendaftaran jajakpendapat', Yayasan HAK,26 July 1999.

131 't^aporan situasi HAM Timor Timur April 199 (1)', Yayasan HAK, ?SMay lW.132 'Olivio Moruk's nightmare', Gatra Magazine (No. tMlVI), 16 September 2000.

292 Masters of Tenor

Lindsay Murdoch, 'Ballot violence: Six to go free', Sydney Morning Herald,3May2001; 'Militia leaders to skip trials for East Timor violence', AFP,% April 2001.

'Feared militia gang under arrest in lndonesia', AFP, 10 July 2001.

'Urgent Action S/99:Dsappearances in Bazartete', East Timor Human RightsCentre (ETHRC), 20 May 1999.

'Muspida Liqiusa, Gereja dan CNRT sepakat bubarkan BMP',SuaraTimor Timur,L5 Maret 1999;'Liquica rusuh', Kompas, 14 March 1999; 'Isu pastor kena panahbergolak', W aspaila, 15 March 1999.

Jill jolliffe and Lindsay Murdoch,'Charges laid over church massacre', SydneyMorning Herald,23 November 2001.

'Pratiwi: Catatan perjalanan di Bumi Loro Sa'e (11)', MateBEAN, 13 October1.999; 'Dua kelompok bersitegang di Timtim', Kompas, 7 luly 1999.

Bishop Belo said Govemor Abilio Soares had promised to dismiss Afat overthe Liquica massacre. However, he failed to fulfil his promise ('Uskup BeloDanrem Tono dan Kapolda Timtim Silaen tinjau situasi Liquica', Suara TimorTimur,S April 1999). The same man earlier wounded four named civilians in anincident at Guiso village on 23 February 1999 ('Teror, kekerasan dan intimidasiAbri danmilisi pro-integrasidi TimorTimur: Laporansifuasi hak azasi manusiadi Timor Timur periode Januari - Maret 1999',Yayasan HAK, MateBEAN, t9April 1999; 'TL up-date: Teror milisi pro-otonomi di sektor Barat', Forfilas,23February 1999). In late April/ early May he was implicated in the disappearanceof about twenf young men held at the local military headquarters (Koramil)('Milisi bersenjata kembali unjuk kekuatan', MateBEAN, 18 May 1999).

Yayasan HAK, 'Report on human rights abuses, |anuary - February 7999',12April 1999. A mistaken report that Leonito Martins himself had done the firing('Pasukan pembunuh Indonesia (2)', Solidamor,25 May 1999) may have ledKPP HAM to mention this incident when it listed Leonito Martins in Appendix5 of its final report.

141 John Roosa, 'Info on Abri's paramiliaries in East Timor', http:/ /www.easttimor.com/htrn]/noticesl5.htm, 72 February 1999.

142 'Indonesia/ East Timor: Forced expulsions to West Timor and the refugeecrisis', NY: Human Rights Watch (HRVD, Vol. 11, No. 7 (c) (www.hrw.orglreports / 1,999 / whmor / ), December 1999.

143 NoerMuis:Sayahanyamenjalankaninstruksidaiatas',I6nWs, 12September2000.

144 Ian Martin, Self-determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the ballot, andinternational interaention (Boulder (Col): Lynne Riener, 2001), pp7G77.

145 James J Fox, 'Ceremonies of reconciliation as prelude to violence in Suai, EastTimor', paper presented at ASAA triennial conference 'Whose rnillennium?',Melboume, 4July 20[fJ,p4.

146 'Nuns and priests reported slaughtered', Sydney Morning Herald,lO September'1.999;

James Fox, 'East Timor's mass for the dead', The Canbena Times, 'll Srep-

tember 1999; James Fox, 'More at stake than independence', Washington Post,19 September 1999.

1,47 'KPP HAM tetap akan umumkan temuannya: Laksda Yoost Mengko - Jagakredibilitas', Kortpas,29 lanuari 2000; 'PBB: Oknum militer terlibat di Timtim',Bali Post,30 January 2000.

133

1U135

136

1,37

138

139

140

Nofes 293

L4ti Pratiwi: Catatan perjalanan di bumi loro Sa'e (11)', MateBEAN, 13 Octob€r 1999.

149 'Intelektual pun bisa membunuh: Belajar dari Maliana,Timor Timur', YayasanHAK, November 1,999.

150 'Pasukan perang pro-integrasi gelar apel akbar di Maliana', SuaraTimorTimur,9 April 1999.

151 'Di Maliana Brimob memaksa penduduk kampanye pro-otonomi', MateBEAN,20 [sic - that should probably be 28] August 1999. Similarly, 'Polisi dan milisiserang rakyat', MateBEAN,28 August 1999.

152 'Fortilos: Pembantaian sudah dimulai!', MateBEAN,3 September 1999.

153 'Fortilos: Pembantaian sudah dimulai!', MateBEAN, 3 September 1999.'Intelektual pun bisa membunuh: Belajar dari Maliana,Timor Timur', YayasanHAK, November 7999.

154 'Accusedof terror,militiamangiveshimself upto justiceonhometurf', SydneyMorning Herald,5 July 2001; James Dunn, 'Crimes against humanity in EastTimor, January to October 1999: Their nature and causes', Sydney MorningHerald,28 April2001.

155 'East Timor: Justice past, present and future', Amnesty Intemational, ASA57 /001 /2001,27 luly 2001.

155 'Accusedof terror,militiamangiveshimself uptojusticeonhomefurf', SydneyMorning Herald,5 July 2001.

157 'HAK: laporan situasi HAM Timor Timur April 1999 (2)', MateBEAN, ?SMay 7999.

158 'Pratiwi: Catatan perjalanan di bumi Loro Sa'e (11)', MateBEAN i3 October1999; Helder da Costa, 'Who will be ET University Rector ?', Indonesia-L, 2May 1997.

159 'HAK: Laporan situasi HAM Timor Timur April 1999 (2)', MateBEAN,25 May1999. (Foholulik is also spelled Faholulik, Faululik, Fatululik). See also 'Pasukanpembunuh Indonesia (4)', Solidamor,25 May 1999. This report dated the inci-dent to 23 ApriL1999.

150 'Atambua residents tense' [English translation], SuryaTimor, T September 2000;Surya Timor,29 September 1999; Lindsay Murdoch, 'Rampage became a cer-tainty after militia leader's murder', Sydney Morning Herald,8 September 2000;'Olivio Moruk's nightmare', Gatra Magaziine, No. 44/Vl, 15 September 2000;

Joanna jolly, 'Habibie behind the violence, militia say', The Age (Australia), 19October 2000;'Trial of Laksaur corrunander's murder case underway' [Englishtranslation], Radar Timor, 21 February 200.

151 Hamish McDonald, 'Nuns and priests reported slaughtered', Sydney MorningHerald, 10 September 1999.

162 'Militia leaders to skip trials for East Timor violence', AFP, 25 Apnl200l; 'Wirantonot among East Timor suspects', lnilonesinn Obseroer,25 Aprll 2001.

1 63 Mark Dodd 'Army drief in sulprise recall, Sydney Moming Huald, 1,4 Aug:.tst 1999 .

164 'East Timor: Falintil leader meets with Indonesian commander in Dlll' , Lum,26August 1999.

165 James Dunrt, Crimes against humanity in East Timor, January to October '1999;

Their nature and causes, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur onCrimes Against Humanity, 2001.

294 Masters of Tenor

166 'Military ready to evacuate up to 250,000 from East Timor', lakarta Post, 3September 1999.

167 Cameron Barr, 'A brutal exit', Chistian Science Monitor,13 March 2000.

158 'Ner Muis: Saya hanya menjalankan instruksi dari atas' ,I@mps,12 September 2ffi.159 'TNI "White Paper" tells of referendum fraud', Suara Timor, 10 October 2000.

170 Aris Santoso, 'Mafen Prabowo jadi Panglima Kostrad?' Tempo Interaktif Edi-tron39/02,28 November 1997;'Gus Dur setujui aparat militer dihukum', TMWatch!, 3 November 1999.

171 John McBettU 'East Timor is about to vote; So is Indonesia's military lettinggo?', Far Eastern Economic Reaiew,2 September 1999.

172 TNI Watch! 'Kol tnf M. Noer Muis akan jadi Kasdam', posted to SiaR NewsService siar@minihub.org, 5 September 1999.

173 'Akhir kejayaan Korern 154lWira Dharma', TM Watdr!, Kupang 31 March 2m.174 David Jenkins,'Indonesian military's dirty tricks brigade unleashed on Timor',

Sydney Morning Herald, S July 1999.

175 Tomas Goncalves interview on Radio Hilversum, 6 October 1999.

175 'Fortilos: Apa yang harus dilakukan?', MateBEAN,3L August 1999.

177 DavidJenkins, 'Indonesian military's dirty tricks brigade unleashed on Timor',Sydney Morning Herald,8 fuly 1999.

178 'Referendum bakal munculkan perang saudara di Timtim', Republ*v,30lvre19P8.

179 'The dismissal and indictment of TNI officers for human rights violations inEast Timor', Tapol, 16 June 1999. The second Ermera massacre was also de-scribed in The Observer, 25 April 1999. See also Helene van Klinken, 'Takingthe risk, paylng the price: East Timorese vote in Ermera', pp.97-707 in RichardTanter, Mark Selden and Stephen R Shalom (eds),Bitterflowers, sweetflowos: EastTimor, lndonesia and the unrld communi{t (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), pp.93-93.

180 'Prajurit Yonif 406/Ck digaji uang palsu', TNI Watch! 9 December 1999.

181 John Martinkus, 'The never ending nightmare', The Bulletin,4May 1999.

182 Helene van Klinken, 'Taking the risk', p.92.

183 Brian Woodley,'Red and White Terror,The Weekend Australian,l-ZMay 1999.

184 'Dandim Sikka, Manggarai, Alor and E. Flores transferred' [English transla-tionl, ,11April2000.

185 Antara, 20 November 1997; Kompas, 21 June 1998.

185 'Abri undang ratusan wartawan liput penarikan pazukan', MateBEAN,3l July 198.187 TNI Watch! 'Komisi Ham PBB daftar nama jenderal Indonesia', posted to SiaR

News Service, 29 September 1,999.

188 Margot Cohen, 'Crack in frte wall' , Far Enstem Ercnomic Review,3 September 1998.

189 Brian Woodley,'Red and White Terror',The Weekend Australian. l-2May 1999.

190 'Kapolres di Timtim digantr', Kompas,29 June 1998; 'Diputuskan pekan depan:Pengiriman pasukan PBB ke Timtim', Kompas,5July 1999.

191 'CNRT minta polisi kendalikan situasi', Kotnpas,19 February L999.

192 Keith B. Richburg, 'Acampaign of terror: Army-backed militias use violence tosway vote on E. Timor independence', Washington Post,9 May 7999.

Nofes

193 'KomnasHAMusutkasusLiquica:TimPBBtiba diDili',Kompas,Z3April1,999.194 'Intemational tribunal likely as TNI refuses UN quiz', Indonesian Obseroer, 13

December 2000.

L95'Aparatbantahpungliawaktruk',Serambi,SAugust2000;'KolonelSyarifuddinTippe: Hilangkan prasangka buruk', Serambi,l0 May 2000.

196 Karen Polglaze, 'East Timor public servants quizzed over loyalty', AAP,29March 1999.

197 'Pasukan Perang Prolntegrasi gelar apel akbar di Maliana', SturaTimorTimur,9April1.999; 'Profil "Panglima Perang" Joao Tavares', MateBEAN, 23 Aprt 1999.

198 'Garagara beda pilihar; bupati Bobonaro aniaya istrinya', MateBEAN, 11JuIy 1999.

199 'Parents of Aniceto Guterres Lopes terrorised and their house surrounded',Fortilos, 14 June 1999. Aniceto Guterres comes from the same village (Memo)as Guilherme dos Santos, and had previously clashed with the latter over a

human rights issue in 1995.

200 'Mayor threatens to kill Aussies', Syilney Morning Herald, 17 luly 1999; MarkDodd, 'Frontier town becomes the UN's acid test', Sydney Morning Herald,27July 1.999 (where Sutrisno's name is mis-spelled Satrisno); Jo Jolly, 'Liaisonofficer accused of bias', Sydney Morning Herald,25 August 1999.

201 'Bupati Bobonaro paksa warganya mengungsi', MateBEAN,20 July 1999.

202 'Yayasan HAK - Komite untuk Jajak Pendapat yang Bebas dan Jujur, LaporanKomite no. 2: Pelanggaran terhadap proses pendaftaran jajak pendapat: 25 juli1999',MateBEAN, 1 August 1999 ;'Y ayasanHAK - Komite untuk Jajak Pendapatyang Bebas dan jujur Yayasan HAK (KLIJP-YH): Laporan Pemantauan MasaPendaftaran, 25 Juli - 8 Agustus 1999' , MateBEAN, 10 August 7999;'Calonpemilih dicari di daerah sebelah', MateBEAN,2S iuly 1999;'East Timor leaderasks UN to simplifu ballot requirements', Antara, 23July 1,999.

203 'Pemerintah tolak peradilan intemasional: Tiga ahli luar negeri bantu KPPHAM', Kompas,22 December 1999.

204 'UNTAS regional leadership board in Bobonaro installed' [English translation],Surya Timor, 4 August 2000.

205 M Gunadi Henoch, 'Daftar nama yang direkomendasikan KPP HAM untukdisidik, Satunet.com on lndonesia-I, 31 January 2000.

205 Cameron W. Barr, 'Interview/ Battalion 745 Commander: "There was no vio-Ience"', Christian Science Monitor, 17 March 2000.

207 Cameron Barr,'A brutal exit', Christian Science Monitor, L3 March 2000(www.csmonitor.com/ atcsmonitor/ specials/timor/).

208 'Officer admits order to mobilize boops in Timor, lndonesian Obvruer,S May 2000.

209 'Jenderal Wiranto dan Mayjen Sjafrie lolos dari rekomendasi KPP HAM', TNIWatch! 31 January 2000.

210 James J Fox, 'Ceremonies of reconciliation as prelude to violence in Suai, EastTimor', paper presented at ASAA triennial conference 'Whose millennium?',Melboume, 4 July 2000, p4; also 'Wianto-Zacky koboi kebal hukum', Xpos,No.28lIII, 15-23 September 2000; 'J Lumintang diperiksa soal telegram 5 Mei:Wiranto ditunggu fumat ini,' Kompas,24 December 1,999; 'Menyeret Wirantoke pengadilan', Xpos, No. 05/ilI, 13-19 February 2000;'Pengungsi di paroki

295

296 Masters of Tenor

Suai menjadi 71,5 orcng' , Sunra Timor Timur, 4 March 1999; 'Masters of terror',Sydney Morning Heralil,28 April 2001; James Dunn, Crimes against humanity inEast Timor, lanuary to October 1999; Their nature and causes, Report of the UnitedNations Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity,2001 pp. 32& 53.

211 'Indonesia/ Eeast Timor: Forced expulsions to West Timor and the refugeecrisis', Human Rights Watch, Vol. 1L, No.7 (c), December 1999 (www.hrw.orglrcports / 1999/wtimor /westmr-03.htm#P77 I

-4241.0), quoting Carter Center

Weekly Report on East Timor, No. 9, 13 September 1999.

272 lan Martin, Self-determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the ballot, andinternational interuention (Boulder (Col): Lynne Riener, 2007), pp76-77.

213 E. Cantier-Aristide,'Report on the incidents in Maliana 30 Augwt to 3 September1999', Unamet Political Affairs,4 September 1999 (leaked Unamet document);Craig Skehan, 'UN finds high level terror role, The Age,6 September 1999.

214 Peter Bartu,'The militia, the military, and the people of Bobonaro',pp73-90 inRichard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R Shalom (eds), Bitter Jlowers, sweet

flowers: East Timor, Indonesia and the roorld communify (New York: Rowman &Littlefi eld, 2001), pp.7 6, 78, 83.

215 Jill Jolliffe, 'A traumatised town craving UN justice', Sydney Morning Huald,27November 1999.

216 Yayasan HAK (Hukum, hak Azasi & Keadilan),'Laporan situasi Ham TimorTimur April 1999', MateBEAN,25 May 1999; 'Fortilos: Situasi terakhir Cailaco-Bobonaro 15 April 1999', MateBEAN,20 April1999.

217 'Anti-integration victory known before referendum' [English translation], NTTEkspres, 9 May 2000; 'Arming militia raises a dilemma' [English translation],NTT Ekspres, 11 May 2000; 'The dismissal and indictment of TNI officers forhuman rights violations in East Timor', Tapol, 15 June 1999.

218 'Report on the monitoring of the ballot: May-June '1.999' , Fortilos,2S June \999.219 'Penyidikan Kejaksaan Agung tidak menghambat karir perwira', TNI Watch!

15 May 2000.

220 Waspada, 13 August 1998.

221 lan Martin, Self-determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the ballot, andinternational intercention (Boulder (Col): Lynne Riener, 2001), p.96. ['Police tooparticipated in violence, although their major role was the implementation ofthe removals to West Timor'.1

222 'Wawancara Kolonel (Pol.) Drs. GM. Timbul Silaen: "Ninja adalah kelompokpengacau yang sporadi s"', Tempo, 25 luly 1'998.

223 Keith B. Richburg, 'A campaign of terror: Army-backed militias use violence tosway vote on E. Timor independence', Washington Post,9 May 1999.

224 'Uskup Belo, Danrem Tono dan Kapolda Timtim Silaen tinjau situasi Liquica',Suara Timor Timur, 8 April 1999.

225'Empat wartawan diburu Kopassus', MateBEAN, 29 Apri, 1999.

226 'Police advocate militia chiefs appointment',The laknrta Posf, 10 June 1999.

227 'CIash mars East Timor regishahon', The lakarta Post, 17 July 1999; 'Fortilos:Situasi Dili 1,/9/99 - 27:00', SiaR, 31 August 1999 [the title of this report isprobably mistaken - it should be3'l/8/991.

Noles 297

228 Allan Naim,'License to kill in Timor' ,TheNation,3TMay 1999.

229 Amnesty International,'EAST TIMOR: Seize the moment',21 June 1999, ASA21/49/99.

230 'CNRT Ambeno bubar, terima otonorni luas: Tolak jajak pendapat', Kompas, S

May 1999.

231 'Wartawan asing berperan dalam aksi demo di Dili', Pos Kupang,l2May 7999.

232 'Fortilos>FPDK: Otonomi atau mati', MateBEAN, 18 May 1999.

233 'Skenario bumi hangus TNI dijalankan di Timor Timur', MateBEAN, 9September 1999.

234 'Propaganda hitam merajalela di Timtim: Bupati Aileu mengadu ke Polda',Kompas,23luly 1,999.

235 'Indonesian police wam of "misunderstandings"', Sydney Morning Herald,6May 1999.

235 lan Martin, Self-determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the ballot, andinternational interuention (Boulder (Col): Lynne Riener, 2001), p56.

237 'CNRT bubar, ikut pro-integrasi', Ibmpas,27 Apnl1999.238 Tidakbenar, Uskup Belo tertembak mati', Stnm Pembanun,T %ptellbrer19q9.239' PBB minta penegakan hukum di Timtim', Kompas, 23 May 7999.

240 'HAK: Laporan pemantauan masa pendaftaran,26 Juli - 8 Agustus 1999',MateBEAN, 10 August 1999.

241 'Kesepakatan damai Timtim: Hari ini ditandatanganT', Kompas,21 April 1999.

242 The Kontingen Lorosae were commanded by Brig-Gen Pol James DanielSitorus, mentioned above as 'saving' Bishop Belo. Since Sitorus outrankedTimbul Silaen, it is not clear in what sense this additional unit was actuallyunder Silaen's command. The Kontingen Lorosae was part of a police opera-tion named 'Hanoin Lorosae', with its headquarters at the East Timor policeheadquarters in Dili. It may be that these elite police acted directly under thecomrnand of Jakarta, perhaps even directly of General Wiranto, under whosecommand the police still fell n 1999. ('Skenario bumi hangus di Loro Sa'e',Tempo, 19 September 1999, pp28-29. One of the sources for this long report,though not for the info above, is A Carter Center weekly report, no.4 writtenby Annette Clear.) We do not yet know a great deal about Hanoin Loro Sae - forexample, how did these special police forces interact with the military officershere named? However, see 'Wiranto kritik oknum Unamet', Kotnpns,29 July1999; '8.000 Personel Polri amankan jajak pendapat', Kompas,l june 1999.

Curiously, the ceremony marking the arrival of these elite police reinforce-ments on 5 June 1999 was also marked as the moment at which the police 'tookover' control of securitv over East Timor from the militarv. Policemen toldUnamet staffers that Eait Timor before this was in a state of war and thus notunder police control. ('Police take over security in E. Timor', The laknrta Post,6June 1999). The facts on the ground certainly strengthen the impression of a

continuous state of war since the invasion of 1,975. However, the military havenever formally acknowledged that East Timor remained in a state of war until5 June 1999.

243 Lindsay Murdoch, 'Militiaman implicates genenH , Sydney Moming Hemld,l Dec€m-br 1999. Another report said a police wihress in the Timbul Silaen case was Gunfur

298 Masters of Tenor

Gatot Setiawan, ddef of the pahol directorate at East Timor police headquarters (KaditSamaptaPoldaTimtim).WasdristhewibresrrefierrredtobyLindsayMurdoch? ('t€tkolAsep Kwwandi tidak datang', Ibrrys,13 SePtember 20m).

244 ?olri tidak akan tindak lanpung Timbul Silaen' , SuamPunhrumr, 3 February 2ffi0.

245 '300 biarawan "Long March" di Timtim', Media Indonesin,T(May 1,999.

245 'Da{1ar nama perwira tinggi yang akan dibela Muladi', TM Watch! 12 Decem-ber 1999. The seniority of these assistants, as compared with the assistants ofhis superior officer Adam Damiri, is a little puzzling.

247 'Kafemanu,NTT: Markas militer di abs larburan' ,Tanpo,26March- 1 April201.248 John McBeth, 'East Timor is about to vote; So is Indonesia's military letting

go?', Far Eastern Economic Reaiew,2 September 1999.

249 SanderThoerres,TastTimor:Officialscriticalofvote',FiwncialTbne,29Apnll998.250 'Masyarakat lautem rayakan Paskah dalam flrasarur rnencekam', MateBEAN, 3 April

1999;Timor Govemor propces partition of hrribqy', Llts,24 February 199.

251 'Interview: Orders to kill,' Erpresso,lT September 1.999, translated from thePortugese.

252 '15 Ribu senjata disiapkan Abri untuk pertahankan integrasi', MateBEAN, 1

April 1999. The new front was to be led by led by l-rllpez da Cruz (Indonesianroving ambassador for East Timor), Rui Lopez (former Covalima districthead),Marcal Almeida (provincial Golkar head), and Joao Tavares.

253 'Gubernur Abilio : Ada pemerintahan bayangan CNRT, Pa Kttpng,18 April 199.

254 Mark Dodd, 'fakarta raids aid cash to buy E Timor votes', SydnE MorningHerald,15 June 1999.

255 'Abilio slams at govt's leniency toward E Timor', Antara, 22 February 2001.

256 Forum Keadilan, 29 October 1992;'Soares comments cause outrage in Aus-tralia', AAP,4 November l992.In the same Forum Keadilan interview he alsospoke of 'my friend' Hendropriyono, another military officer with a seriousrecord of human rights abuse. In 1998, just before the end of the New Order,he spoke warmly about his relationship in the late 1970s with Kopassus officerMuchdi Purwopranjono ('Setelah L2 tahun Muchdi kembali lagi ke Kopassus',Meilia lndonesla, 28 March 1998. Another outspoken defence of Indonesia'smilitary role in East Timor by Abilio Soares, dismissing serious human rightsallegations even after the Dili massacre of November 1991, is'Timtim Pasca-Kolakops', Editor,22 May 1993.

257 'Ker,1a sama tiga pilar di Timtim harus kukuh', Kontpas,6luly 1996.

258 Reuter, Dili, 19 July 1995.

259 See the Osorio Soares family history in Joao Angelo S Mota and Octavio A J OSoares, The fights for fteedom of Timor Loro Sn'e People: A PIus tilogy (Jogjakarta:East Timor Sfudents Movement, 1997).

260 'Lima tokoh diunggulkan jadi gubemur Timtim: Domingos & Abilio calonkuat', Media Indonesia, 76 July'1997.

261 Mark Davis, SBS Dateline TV broadcast 15 February 2000 (transcript availableat www.sbs.com.auldateline). The forthcorning bookby Greenlees and Garran(The presidents folly, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2001) has an overview of militiaorganisation especially after the Indonesian pull-out. Also see East Timor Ob-

Notes

servatory/Observat6rio Timor Leste/Observatoire Timor-Oriental,'POL01 :

Political movements and parties: pro- autonomy', CDPM, 12 February 2001.For this and following paragraph see 'Antara Timor Timur dan Timor Leste',Kompas,23 August 1.999;'Sama susahnya, menang atau kalah', Tajuk ed.12yr.2, mid-August 1999.

262 'The TNI's "Dirty war" in East Timor', Tapol (www.gn.apc.orgltapol/rp9906tni.htm), 8 |une 1999.

253 'Deklarasi BRTT dianggap saingi FPDK: Lopes da Cruz terpilih, DomingosSoares mbalelo', lawa Pos, I May 1999.

264 Conor O'Clery, 'Indonesia's promise on Timor is deeply suspect', lish Times

[Dublin], 21 April 1999.

255 'Kehadiran Aitarak dan teror, intimidasi, penyiksaan & pembunuhan di TimorTimur', Yayasan HAK, 19 April 1999 (distributed on the intemet email group'act-indonesia' <indonesia-act@igc.org> by Fortilos <fortilos@indo.net.id> on20 April i999).

255 'Fortilos>FPDK: Otonomi atau mati', MateBEAN, 18 May 1999.

267 'UNTAS regional leadership board in Bobonaro installed' (English translation),Surya Timor,4 August 2000; Bertil Lintner, 'East Timor: Can it stand alone?',lane's lntelligence Reoiew (Section: Asia, Vol. 12, No. 11), 1 November 2000.

258 'If Untas dares, let it expel Untaef @nglish hanslation), Su rya Timal 6 May 2ffi.269 'AGO to force ex-officials to testify on Timor melee', lndonesian Obseruer, 17

May 2000.

270 'Unlas hasn't split' (English translation), NTI Ekspres , 27 January 2001; 'EastTimorese end talks in Bali on high note', The laknrta Post,20 December 2000.

271 Andrew Marshall,'Armed militias sow fear in East Timor', Reuters, 12 March1999; 'Pertikaian kembali meletus di Maubara: 100 KK disandera dan 500 wargamengungsi', Srnra Timor Timur,3 March 1999;'Laporan dari Yayasan HAK:Anggota Besi Merah Putih telah memperkosa saya' (report from a womanwhose husband was member BMP), Fortilos, 1 March L999;'Pratiwi: Catatanperjalanan di Bumi Loro Sa'e (11)', MateBEAN, 13 October 1999.

272 'Mernbalas teror, membela Merah Putih', Pos Kupang, 14 February 1999;'Menelusuri mereka yang berbikai di Liquica (1)',lawa Pos,12 April 1999.

273 'Sama susahnya, menang atau kalah', Tajuk (ed.2 yr2),5-I9 August 1999.

274 'Liquica rusuh lagi:2 tewas, 10 luka dan 8 rumah dibakar milisi', MateBEAN, 7April 1999; 'Laporan kasus pembantaian di Liquiqa tanggal 5 - 5 Mei 7999',Yayasan HAK,24May 1.999; (in English)'Lnterim report Liquisa massacre,05 -07 April '1999',Yayasan HAK, 14 April 1999;'Aksi pembantian di Liquica',Fokupers,9 Apri1999.

275 'Suara Timor Timur tak terbit, Dili', MateBEAN, 11 May 1,999; Mark Dodd,'Presses roll but Dili paper a puppet of its old enemy/ Sydney Morning Herald,4May 1,999.

276 'Maio diburu Kopassus', Xpos, No 75/11,25 April-1 May 1999.

277 'Getfing away with murder: A chronology of Indonesian military sponsoredparamilitary and militia atrocities in East Timor from November 1998 to Mayiggg',Eastiimor Intemational Support Center (ETISC), 15 May 1999; 'Fortilos:Apa yang harus dilakukan?', MateBEAN, 31 August 1999.

299

300 Masters of Tenor

278 'Urgent Action 5/99:Asappearances in Bazartete', East Timor Human RightsCentre (ETHRC), 20NIay 7999.

279 'Pohce advocate militia chiefs appointment' ,laknrta Posf, 10 June L999.

280 John Zubnycki 'Militia swoop to check on voters', Tlu Austmlian,S'l May 7999.

281 'lndonesia/ East Timor: Forced expulsions to West Timor and the refugeecrisis', NY: Human Rights Watch (HRW), Vol. 11, No. 7 (c) (www.hrw.orglreporls/1999 /wlirnor /), December 1999.

282 'Komandan rnilisi seperti anak pramuka', Tempo Interaktif,3l December 1999;'The militia commandant regretted Habibie's decision', Tempo Interaktif, 31December 1999.

283 'East Timor: Wounded peacekeeper dies, speculation mounts of guerrilla strat-egy', Lusa, 11 August 2000.

284 'Abilio Soares tidak datang', Kompas,15 September 2000.

285 '13 Kapolres di Timtim diganti', Kompas,29 fune 1998.

286 Interview 10 May 1999 (Perth).

287 'Two ex-soldiers jailed for counterfeiting',The lakarta Post,22 September 2000;'Alleged counterfeiter claims army used him to finance Timor militia', AFP, 13

September 2000; 'Sidang kasus uang palsu: Giliran nama Wiranto disebut',Kompas, 13 September 2000.

288 Mark Dodd, 'World pressure brought military shake-up', Sydney Morning Her-ald, 30 Augusr 1999.

289 'Xpos: Kudeta setengah hati', SiaR, 14 September 1999.

290 John McBeth, lrViranto's wat', Far Easton Fnrcmic Rniew,25 November 199.

291 'Pangab: Mutasi di ABRI tak perlu', Republika Online, 5 ]anuary 1999.

292 'Menyeret Wiranto ke pengadilan', Xpos, No. 05/ilI, L3-19 February 2000;'Laying the blame: East Timor january-September 1999', Sydney Morning Her'ald,28 Apnl2001; 'The Kopassus-militia alliance', Tapol Bulletin, No. 15415,November 1999;'Rekomendasi KPP HAM tidak mempengaruhi karir perwira',TNI Watch!, 18 February 2000;'The ties that bind', Four Comers TV programtranscript,Aushalian Broadcasting Corporation, broadcast 14 February 2000;Marian Wilkinson, 'Justice must be done', The Age [Melboume] and SydneyMorning Heralil,29 January 2000; Interview with Tomas Goncalves, RadioHilversum,6 October 1999;Iill Jolliffe, 'Army plot "to seize territory ahead ofvote"', Sydney Morning Herald, 23 June L999; 'Noer Muis: Saya hanyamenjalankan inshuksi dari atas', Kornpas, 12 September 2000.

293 'Johny Lumintang investigated over May 5 cable', Kornpas,24 December 1999.

294 'The Kopassus-militia alliance', Tapol Bulletin, No. 15415, November 1999.

295 'Penyidikan Kejaksaan Agung tidak menghambat karir perwira', TNI Watch!15 May 2000.

295 Vaudine England, "'Shadowy" unit blamed for conflicts', South China MorningPost,2'1. August 2000.

297 Bian Woodley, 'Red and White terrol, TIE Welend Austmlian,l'-2May 1999.

298 MateBEAN,'HAK: Laporan situasi HAM Timor Timur April 1999 (3)', SiaRNews Service, 25 Mav 1999.

3&r

Nofes 301

299 'Menyeret Wiranto ke pengadilan', Xpos, No.05/I[, 13-19 February 2000.

300 'Masters of terror', Sydney Morning Herald,Z8 April2001; 'Wiranto-Zacky koboikebal hukum', Xpos, No. 28IIII, 15-23 September 2000; 'Menyeret Wiranto kepengadilan', Xpos, No. 05,/[I, 13-19 February 2000; 'Abilio Soares tidak d atang' ,Kompas, 16 September 2000; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 'Source:Kompas, Jakarta, in Indonesian 18 Jan 00, Indonesian commander admits burialof 27 people killed in violence', 19 |anuary 2fi)0; 'Ringkasan eksekutif laporanpenyelidikan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia di Timor Timur', Jakarta, 31 Januari2000; 'Mantan Danramil Suai tidak penuhi panggilan KPP HAM karena stres',Sunra Pembaruan,l2January 2000; 'Para jenderal layak gemetar', Xpos,No. 4'l /II, 1t1-20 November 1999; Tom Fawthrop, 'Man behind Timor massacre named',The Age [Melboume],5 November 1999.

301 He is also on a list of officers who according to TNI Watch! should be investi-gated for human rights crimes committed in East Timor ('Gus Dur setujuiaparat militer dihukum', TM Watch!, 3 November L999).

302 'How Jakarta's generals planned the campaigtr of terror in East Timor', TheIndependent, 5 February 2000.

303 TNI Watch! 'Don't cry for me veteran Seroja', posted to SiaR News Servicesiar@minihub.org, 9 September 1999.

'Dandim Sikka, Manggarai, Alor and E. Flores transferred' [English transla-tionl, Pos Kupang,11 April2000.

James Dunn, Cimes against humanity in East Timor, lanuary to October 1999;Their nature and cnuses, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur onCrimes Against Humanity, 2001.

Sander Thoerres,'East Timor: Officials critical of vote', Firuncial Tima,29 Apin 1999.

Interview with Tomas Goncalves, Radio Hilversum, 6 October 1999.

'Fortilos>FPDK: Otonomi atau mati', MateBEAN, 18 May 1999.

Allan Naim, 'License to kill in Timo{ , The Nation [NY], 31 May 1999.

'Milisi pro-integrasi teman siapa? - Whose friends are the pro-integrationmilitia?', Cari (on Charles Coppel news list), 13 October,2000. A counterfeitingoperation was later traced to LtGen Tyasno Sudarto.'Interview: Orders to kill,' Expresso, 17 September 1999, translated from thePortugese.

312 Amnesty Intemational,'EAST TIMOR: Seize the moment',21 june 1,999, ASA27 / a9 /99;'CNRT Ambeno bubar, terima otonomi luas: Tolak jajak pendapat',Kompas,3 May'i,999.

313 'Fortilo>FPDK: Otonomi atau mati', MateBEAN, 18 May 1999.

314 Douglas Kammen, 'The trouble with normal: The Indonesian military,pararnilitaries, and the final solution in East Timor,'in Benedict Anderson, ed,Violence nnd the state in Suharto's lndonesia (Ithaca, NY: Comell S. .st AsiaProgram, 2001).

315 'Skenario bumi hangus TNI dijalankan di Timor Timur', MateBEAN, 9September 1999.

315 'Skenario bumi hangus di Loro Sa'e' , Tempo,19 September 1999, pp28-29.317 Ross Coulthart, 'Timor on the brink', Sunday program, Channel 9, Sydney,

Australia. Screened Tune 1999.

305

306

307

308

309

310

311

302 Masters of Terror

318'Wiranto snipes back at military's crittcs', l aknrta Post, 1.6 August 1999.

319 'Menyeret Wiranto ke pengadilan', Xpos, No. 05/il, 1$19 February 2fi)0. TheIslamic nationalist group Front Pemuda Islam escorted him into the hearinguntil they were horrified to hear he was a Catholic, according to TNI Watch('Tinggal Bang Buyung yang mendukung Wiranto', TNI Watch! 4 February 2000).

320 Tono Suratman, Merah Putih: Pengabdian & tanggung jtwab di Timor Timur luni1998-luli 1999 flakarta: Lembaga Pengkajian Kebudayaan Nusantara, 1999).Thanks to Geoffrey Robinson for these notes.

321 Geoffrey Robinson,'The fruitless search for a smoking gun: Tracing the ori-gins of violence in East Timor', in Freek Colombijn & Thomas Lindblad, eds,Historical roots of political aiolence in contemporary lndonesia (Leiden: KITLV Press,forthcoming 2002). See also Samuel Moore, 'The Indonesian military's lastyears in East Timor: An analysis of its secret documents, lnilonesiaT2 (October2001).

322 Kompas Online,5 March 1998.

323 Pikiran Rakyat,2'l.. February 1997.

324 Suara Pembaruan, 11 June 1998.

325 Douglas Kammen, 'Note on the hansformation of the East Timor military commandand its implications rn lndonda', Indoneia,no. 57 (April 199), pp. 57-76.

325 Jill Jolliffe, 'A traumatised town craving UN justrce', Sydney Morning Herald,27November 1999.

327 Mark Dodd, 'Frontier town becomes the UN's acid test', Sydney Morning Her-ald,27 July 1999 (where Sutrisno's name is mis-spelled Satrisno).

328 'Catatan perjalanan di bumi Loro Sa'e (18)', MateBEAN,29 December 1999.

329 'Lagi,wa:rtawan STT diancam TM', MateBEAN, 7 July 1999; 'Rumah wartawanSTT dihancurkan', MateBEAN,29 April 1999.

330 'Full report of the Investigative Commission into Human Rights Violations inEast Timor (KPP-HAM)', in this volume.

331 One speculative possibility is that it stands for Kases Terpol, Kepala SekretarisTeritorial dan Politik, or Head Secretary for Territorial and Political Affairs.The militarised intelligence agency Bakorstanas had Kases at various levels,but we are not familiar with the'Terpol' qualifier in this context.

332 Moses Manoharan, Reuter, 12 November 1992.

333 Former village head at Hera, 10km east of Dili centre. He was also mentionedas responsible for the death of a Unamet local staff member, an unnamedprimary school teacher, at Hera just after the ballot ('Fortilo* Laporan harianTimor Lorosae: Kekerasan makin meningkat (2)', MateBEAN,3l August 1999),

as well as in reports of several other abuses in April and |une 1999 ('HAK:Laporan situasi HAM Timor Timur April 1999 Q e.q', MateBEAN, 25 May1999; 'Milisi Aitarak terus beraksi', MateBEAN, 14 June 1999.).

334 James Dvrrn, Crimes against humanity in East Timor, lanuary to October 1999;Their nature and causes, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur onCrimes Against Humanity, 2001.

335 Sabam Siagian, 'Diskusi tentang transisi di lndonesi a' , Sunra Pembaruan,S Apil1999; 'Intelligence' , Far Eastern Emnomic Reaiew,8 April 1999.

Nofes 303

336 Marian Wilkinson, 'Justice must be done', The Age [Melboume] and SydneyMorning Herald,29 January 2000.

337 Radio Hilversum interview 5 October 1999. The nine can be divided into agroup of five from Abri headquarters clustered under the Abri chief of staffand military intelligence BIA - namely Zacky Makarim, 'BrigGen Amirut'(BrigGen Amirul Isnaeni), Glenny Kairupan, Kiki Syahnakri, and TyasnoSudarto - then two in the territorial structure - Adam Damiri and Tono Suratman- plus the SGI commander. Goncalves named Tono Suratman and the SGIcommanders, first (Wiyotomo) Nugroho then Yayat Sudrajat, as the two chiefexecutives, who always said they acted in the name of the other more seniorofficers. Tomas Goncalves was a militia leader who had fought alongside theIndonesian rnilitary in the 1975 invasion, and had since had a local govemmentcareer in East Timor. He knew all these military men well. But he becamedisillusioned with the gruesome task when asked to do it again in 1999.

338 "'Operasi SapuJagad"- Indonesianmilitary's plantodisruptindependence',East Timor Observatory (F A10-1999 / I0 / 21eng), 28 October 1999;'Wirantogagal temui kubu prokem' , lawa Pos, 21 Apnl 1999 .

339 'Renewed violence rocks troubled East Timor capital', AFP, 18 April 1.999;'Belosesalkan bentrok fisik di Timtim', Kompns,l9 Apnl7999.

340 Some reports have connected their operation with one code-named 'HanoinLoro Sae' ('Skenario bumi hangus di Loro Sa'e', Tempo, 19 September 1999,pp28-29). However, Hanoin Loro Sae seems to have been a purely policeaffair, albeit one whose line of command was unusual in that it involved policeunits sent to East Timor directly from Jakarta (see Timbul Silaen).

341 'Alatas: There was nothing suddenly in the East Timor problem: TNI admittedthat the troops were not yet ready', Kompas,5 january 2000.

342 Douglas Kammen, 'The trouble with normal: The Indonesian military,paramilitaries, and the final solution in East Timor,' in Benedict Anderson, ed.,Violence and the state in Suharto's Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Comell Southeast AsiaProgram, 200L).

343 'Tugas khusus Zacky Makarim di Timor Timur', MateBEAN, 7 August 7999;'Xpos: TNI ancam perang di Timor Timur', Sia& 18 August 1999.

3M lan Martin, Self-determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the bnllot, andinternational interuentbn (Boulder (Col): Lynne Riener, 2001), p.77 fn7 .

345 'Xpos: Operasi pasca jajak pendapat', SiaR, 5 September 1999. District head andmilitia leader Rui Lopes, who defected shortly after the 30 August ballot, alsonamed Kiki and Zacky, as well as SGI, as the main ones who planned the post-ballot mayhem ('Para jendral Indonesia perintahkan pembantaian', MateBEAN,14 September 1999).

345 'TNI Watchl-Mengenal Panglima Wilayah Darurat Militer Timtim', posted toSiaR News Service, 10 September 1999.

347 'Kikr Syahnakri, Sang Pembantal', Xpos, No. 32lII, 12-18 September 1999.

3,18 'PM'ABC Radio National (Australia), 15 September L999.

349 'House mernbers stage a peaceful rally against Gelbard' , lalarta Posf, 16 October 2ffi.350 'TNI, analysb defend Syahnakri's promotion' ,lndonesian Obvroer, S November 20(tr.

304 Masters of Tenor

351 'Militarv commander and NTT Attomev General have different views: Matterof Cancio and friends' arrest' (transl ation), Surya Timor,2 November 2000. Seealso other items in this paper this day.

352 'Syahnakri should concentrate on his task Gelbard', Jakarta Post website newsupdate, 25 September 2000.

353 Joanna Jolly, 'Fear and loathing spreads in militia ranks', South China MorningPost,27 October 2000.

354 'Anak muda yang bangkit dari wacana berbahaya', Gamma, 17 October 2000.

Joanico Cesario was a Kopassus sergeant in charge of the Saka militia in Baucau.

355 'Zacky's testimony deemed "myshcal"' , lnilonesian Obseruer, 5 January 2000.

355 'Indonesia army, MPs rally behind Timor violence suspects', AFP,9 December1999. His name appears on a list of officers who should be investigated foratrocities committed in East Timor (TM Watch! 'Komisi Ham PBB daftar namajenderal Indonesia', posted to SiaR News Service, 29 September 1999).

357 David Jenkins, 'Nervous about Mr Nice Guy', Sydney Morning Herakl, 10 Sep-tember 1999.

358 'Selasa milik Gamadi dan Timbul, Rabu giliran Syafrie', Tempo lnteraktrf ,27December 1999.

359 Philip Comford, 'Belo's aide implicates top general', Sydney Morning Herald, 17September 1999;'Xpos: Sjafrie diduga terlibat di Timtim', Sia& 5 January 2fi)0.

360 'Sjafrie denies role in attack on Belo's residence',lakarta Post,30 December1.999;lan Martin, Self-determination in East Timor: Thc United Nations, the ballot,and international interuention (Boulder (Col): Lynne Riener, 2001'), p.77 tn7.

351 'sjafrie Sjamsoeddin siapkan rencana darurat', MateBEAN, 1 September 1999.

352 Forum Keadilan,5 October 1,997; Angkatan Bersenjata,13 September 1997.

363 TNI Watch! 'Zacky dan Sjafrie sampai di sini', posted to SiaR News Service,22September 1,999.

354 David Jenkins,'Where Syafrie goes, trouble will follow', The West Australian,4September 1999.

365 'Menyeret Wiranto ke pengadilan', Xpos, No 05/il, 13-19 February 2000.

355 Darmadji, 'Pengadilan kasus Timor Lorosae: Sebuah catatan kritis', owner-indonesia-l@indopubs.com, 5 September 2000.

357 Lindsay Murdoch, 'Military takes blood oaths for Jakarta: Unregistered voters"harassed"', Sydney Morning Herald land, The Agel,37 May 1999.

368 'Propaganda hitam merajalela di Timtim: Bupati Aileu mengadu ke Polda',Kompas,23JuIy 7999.

369 'HAK: Gelombang kekerasan adalah sabotase terhadap jajak pendapat -Laporan pemantauan 22 Agustus 1999',MateBEAN, 20 August 1999.

370'Fearforsafety',AmnestyIntemational,AIFI0S0/99-ASA2I/35/99,264pri11999 (Further information on UA 80/99 (ASA 2l/31,/99,19 April1999).

371 Fortilos, 'Situasi masih mengkhawatirkan: Apa rencana TNI dan Polri?Perkembangan situasi, Sl/8/99 (bagian 3)',via Wahana, 1 September 1999.

372 'Incidents on 3 and 4 September which led to the relocation to Dili of Unametstaff from Aileu, Ainaro, Maliana, Liquica and Same regencies', undated leakedintemal Unamet (civpol) report.

378

380

381

Nofes 305

373 'J Lumintang diperiksa soal telegram 5 Mei: Wiranto ditunggu Jumat ini',Kompas, 24 December 1999.

374 'AGO to force ex-officials to testify on Timor melee', lndonesian Obseruer, 17May 2000.

375 Kolakops Timor Timur Dalam Gambar dan Peristiwa Tahun 1992-1993, Kolakops,East Timor, 7993, p.8'1.

375 James Durur, Crimes against humanity in East Timor, lanuary to October L999;Their nature and causes, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on

377

Crimes Against Humanity, 2001.

James Dunn,'Crimes against humanity in East Timor: Their nature and causes- Annex B - Select chronology May 1998 - October 1999', Sydney Morning Her-ald,28 April}}}L'Panglima perang prointegrasi, Joao da Silva Tavares: Pro integrasi tetappertahankan Merah Putih', Suara Timor Timur, approx 5 March 1999 (after 27February 1999).

'Getting away with murder: A chronology of Indonesian military sponsoredparamilitary and militia atrocities in East Timor from November 1998 to May1999',East Timor lnternational Support Center (ETISC), 15 May 1999.

'Rekayasa penembakan untuk diskreditkan Abri. Kelompok prokemerdekaankorbankan anggotanya sendiri', Media Indonesia,22 March 1999;'East Timor:Militia leader Joao Tavares denied responsibility for murder of four civilians',Lusa,25 March 1999;'Civilians shot dead in East Timor', CNRT Press Release,20 March 1999.

fames Dunn,'Crimes against humanity in East Timor: Their nature and causes- Annex B - Select chronology May 1998 - October 1,999', Sydney Morning Her-ald,28 April2001.HamisltMcDonald,'Architecbof massmurdel ,SydneyMorningHemld,ZSApnl2ffi1.'Rumah wartawan STT dihancurkan', MateBEAN, 29 April 1999; 'Empatwartawan diburu Kopassus', MateBEAN, 29 Aprl|1999.'Anggota milisi jadi caleg Golkar', MateBEAN, 15 june 1999.

'Instruksi PPI tentang kesiapan dan kesiagaan pasukan pejuang integrasi',MateBEAN, 1 August 1999; 'Solidamor> Surat rahasia Asmenko l/Poldagri',MateBEAN, 17 July 1999; 'Skenario bumi hangus TNI dijalankan di TimorTimur', MateBEAN,9 September 1999. One report says General Wiranto per-sonally slapped JoaoTavares in the face for'embarrassing the armed forces'when this letter was widely leaked to the public ('Panglima pejuang integrasiditamparJenderal Wiranto', MateBEAN,5 August 1999). Unamet considered ita fake (Geoffrey Robinson,'The fruitless search for a smoking gun: Tracing theorigins of violence in East Timor,' in Freek Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad,ed,s. Historical roots of political aiolence in antemporary lndonesia (Leiden: KITLVPress, forthcoming 2002)).

'Kekerasan masihberlangsung di Timtim: Komnas HAM: Cabut status daruratmiliter', Kompas,9 September 1999; 'RI bahas masuknya pasukan perdamaian',Kompas, 12 September 1999.

'Bersama PPI siap mati', Gamma, 10 October 1999; Derwin Pereira,'InsideAitarak's jungle hideout', Straits Times lSingaporel, 10 October 1999.

379

382

383

384

385

385

387

305 Masters of Tenor

388 'Joao Tavares threatens Cancio and co.' (English translation), Radar Timor, 30

October 2000.

389 Joanna Jolly, 'Militia pay-day linked to attack and rise in forays', South ChinaMorning Post,13 December 2000.

390 TIAK: laporan situasi Ham Timor Timur April 1999 (1)', MateBEAN, ?SMay '1999.

391 Peter Bartu, 'The militia, the military, and the people of Bobonaro', pp.73-90 inRichard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R Shalom (eds), Bitter floloers, s'Ioeet

flouters:East Timor, lnilonesia and the world communify (New York: Rowman &Littlefi eld, 2001), p78.

392 James Dwnn, Crimes against humanity in East Timor, lanuary to October 1999;Their nature and causes, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur onCrimes Against Humanity, 2001.

393 'Rela mati demi leluhur', Gamma,24 October 1999.

394 'East Timor Centre for Human Rights Information, Education and TraininpETCHRIET (Human Rights Report N-:6 /95), 8 September 1995; 'East Timor:Stop bank loans until militias disarmed', Human Rights Watch,20 April 1999.

395 'East Timor: No solution without respect for human rights - Biannual reportof human rights violations in East Timor, January to June, 1998', East TimorHuman Rights Centre (SR1/98, Part2), 18 August 1998. Was this the sameincident asbne reported for'early 1998', when his Halilintar hoops killed fivesuspected pro'independence minded villagers in Aidabalete, Bobonaro dis-trict? The Lrdonesian National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM)looked into this event but nothing further was done. See another reference toAidabalete below. 'Laporan situasi Ham Timor Timur April 1999', YayasanHAK,25 May 1,999.

396 Geoffrey Robinson, 'The fruitless search for a smoking gun: Tracing the origins of violence in East Timor', in Freek Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad(eds),Histoialrntsofpoliticaluiolenceincontemporarylndonesia (Leiden:KITLVPress, forthcoming 2002).

397 Komelius Purba, 'Habibie wants to be remembered for E. Timor', Iaknrta Post,

16 February 1999. The others were Minister of |ustice Muladi, Minister ofInformation LtGen Muhammad Yunus [Yosfiah], Minister/ State SecretaryAkbar Tandjung, Secretary of Development Operation (Sesdalopbang) LtGen(ret) Sintong Panjaitan, and intellecfual Dewi Forfuna Anwar.

398 'Delegasi prointegrasi Timtim minta senjata pada Pangab', Republika,20February 1999.

399 'Deklarasi BRTT dianggap saingi FPDK: l,opes da Cruz terpili]; DomingosSoares mbalelo', Jawa Pos,7 May 1999.

400 'Xpos: Rahasia kunjungan 14 menteri', SiaR, 18 July 1999. According to anotherstory, he slapped the face of veteran militia leader Joao Tavares for 'embarrasingthe armed forces'when a letter over Tavares'name urging violence was circu-lated in the press ('Panglima pejuang integrasi ditampar Jenderal Wiranto',MateBEAN, 5 August 1999. The Tavares letter may have been a fake.)

401 Joanna Jolly, 'Habibie behind the violence, rnilitia say', The Age (Australia), 19

October 2000; Joanna folly & Vaudine England, 'East Timor: Fear and loathingspreads in rnilitia ranks', South China Morning Post,21 October 2000.

Noles 307

402 'Wiranto gagal temui kubu prokem', Jawa Pos,21 April1999.403 'Two ex-soldiers jailed for counterfeiting',The lakarta Post,22 September 2000.

404 'Soal dana Bulog Rp 54 milyar: Rahardi- Diserahkan kepada Akbar Tandjungdan Wiranto', Kompas, 10 October 2001; 'Wiranto akui dana Rp 10 M untukjajak pendapat Timtim', Detikcom,3l October 2001.

405 Geoffrey Robinson, 'The fruitless search for a smoking gun: Tracing the ori-gins of violence in East Timor', in Freek Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad(eds), Historical roots of political aiolence in contemporary lndonesia (l,e iden: KITLVPress, forthcoming 2002).

'Tugas khusus Zacky Makarim di Timor Timur', MateBEAN, SJuly 1999.405

407 'Analisis sosial-politik menjelang Pemilu 1997 dan SU-MPR 1998',posted to as'Istiqlal: Analisis CPDS', 27 March 1997.

408 Suara Timor Timur,20 October 1997.

409 Brian Woodley, 'Red and l4y'hite terror',The Weekend Australian, 1-2May 1999.

410 'Menyeret Wiranto ke pengadilan', Xpos, No. 05/[, 13-19 February 2000.

411 'Diakui, ada aparat lepas tembakan di jalan-jalan', Kompas,31 December 1999.

412 'Jenderal Wiranto dan Mafen Sjafrie lolos dari rekomendasi KPP HAM', TNIWatch! 31 January 2000.

lndicted or tried in East Timor I Background t4t e ts|1 Mark Dodd,'War crimes defendant given special protection', Sydney Morning

Herald,27 luly 2001;'Court told of beating until death', Sydney Morning Herald,8 August 2001; 'East Timor: Justice past, present and future', Amnesty Intema-tional (Al-index: ASA 57 /001/2001), 27 July 2001; 'First trial for 1999 crimesagainst humanity opens in East Timor', UN Department of Public Information(DPD, 9 JuIy 2001; Seth Mydans, 'Modest beginnings for East Timor's justicesystem', The New York Times,4 March 2001; 'Kopassus officer escapes justice',Laksamana.Net, 14 December 2001.

2 Radar Timor, 24 March 2001.

3 'East Timor under the Indonesian jackboot An analysis of Indonesian armydocuments', Tapol, 15 November 1998.

4 Kafil Yarnin, 'Indonesia: Human rights still a nebulous concept', Inter PressService, 27 December 2000.

5 'Laying the blame: East Timor January-September 1999', Sydney Morning Her-ald,28 April2001. Details of Marquez and the other ten charged in this case arein: 'East Timor: Justice past, present and fufure', Amnesty International (AI-index: ASA 57 /001/200'l),27 July2001.

6 Vanya Tanaja, 'East Timor: UN lets Indonesian military off the hook', GreenLeft Weekly,lssue#447,9 May 2001.

308 Masters of Terror

7 Tribuana mentioned in Chapter IV of KPP HAM report (Komisi PenyelidikPelanggaraan Hak Asasi manusia di Timor Timur.'Ringkasan Eksekutif LaporanPenyelidikan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusiadi Timor Timur', Detikom, 31

fanuary 2000); see also'Pengadilan Wiranto dkk. sudah dekat', Xpos,No.46/lI, 1.9-25 December 1999; 'Militia leader says Indonesian intelligence orderednuns massacre', AFP, 14 December 1999; Lindsay Murdoch,'Militiaman impli-cates generals',Sydney MorningHerald,l. December 1999; Ajianto Dwi Nugroho,'Abadi dalam foto', Pantau, July 2001, pp.4T47.

8 Mark Dodd & Craig Skehan, 'Diggers hained me, says Timor thug', SydneyMorning Herald, t0 August 2001; Mark Dodd, 'War crimes defendant givenspecial protecfion', Sydney Morning Herakl,27 July 2001.

9 'East Timor:Justice past, present and future', Amnesty International (Al-index:ASA57 /0U/2007),27 July 200L; Paul Toohey,'Justice is hard work for militiasuspects', The Australian, 15 October 1999; Jill |oliffe, 'Heavy sentences formilitia killers', Sydney Morning Heralil, 12 December 2001. Ioao, Manuel andAmelio da Costa were also recorunended for prosecution in the summaryreport of the Indonesian inquiry KPP HAM.

10 '50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: January -December 1998 - A surunary of human rights violations based on reports,complaints, and investigations conducted by the Diocesan Justice and PeaceComrnission - Iustitia et Pax - East Timor', Diocesan Justice and Peace Commis-sion (Report delivered in the press conference in Camara Eclesiastica), 11 De-cember 1998; 'East Timor under the Indonesian jaclboot An analysis of Indo'nesian army documents', Tapol, 15 November 1999.

L L 'sakunar militia masterminded the Ambeno attack' [English translatton), SuryaTimor, 23 September 1999.

12 Amnesty Intemational,'East Timor: Seize the moment' (21 june 'l'999, ASA27 /49 /99) reports an establishment date of 18 April 1999, that is, immediatelyafter the big militia rally in Dili.

13 'HAK: Laporan situasi HAM Timor Timur April 1999 (1)', MateBEAN,25 May1999; 'East Timor: Possible "disappearance" - Jose Talue', Amnesty Intema-tional (UA 147 /99, ASA21./52/99),25 June 1999;'Getting away with murder:A chronology of lndonesian military sponsoted paramilitary and militia atroci-ties in East Timor from November 1998 to May 1999', East Timor InternationalSupport Center (Etisc), 15 May 7999;'Paramiliter Sakunar di Oekussi',MateBEAN, 20 April 1999.

14 Amnestylntenrational,'EastTimor:Seizethemomenf,2lJunel99(ASA2L/49/99).

15 'The Indonesia's military remain large in East Timor: How can Unamet copewith the situation before and post the ballot?', Tapol, 30 July 1999.

15 Richard Lloyd Parry, 'A cynical bandit and vicious murderer', The lndependent

[LIK], 31 ]anuary 2000.

77 'Laporan pemantauan di Kab. Ambeno rgl 2O-2L Juli 1999', Kiper |akarta<Kiper@jakarta.wasantara.net.id>, 23 luly 1999.

18 'Perkembangan situasi,31/8/99 (bagian 3): Situasi masih mengkhawatirkan -Apa rencana TNI dan Polri?',Fortilos <Iortilos@indo.net.id>, 1 September1999.

19 James Durw9 Cimes against hutnanity in East Timor, lanuary to October '1999;

Their nature and causes, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on

Noles 309

Crimes Against Humanity, 2000. The Dunn report says these soldiers werefrom 745 Battalion, but that seems impossible, since 745 was at the time inLospalos. The error has been widely {uoted. Ii also incorrectly said GabrielColo was Ambeno police chief.

20 James Durn, Crimes against humanity in East Timor, lanuary to October 1999;Their nature and cnuses, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur onCrimes Against Humanity,2001, Annex B - Select chronology May 1998 -October 1999.

27 SuryaTimor,30 September 1999.

22 'Oecusse: further killings in the forgotten enclave', East Timor Human RightsCentre media release, 4 October 1999.

23 'Cerernony heralds "end" of E. Timols militias',lalurtn Posf, 14 December 199.24 'East Timor: Interfet, Indonesian officers discuss Oe Cusse militia clashes', Lasa,

21 January 2000.

25 'Moko Soares sentenced to 1.6 years' [English translation], NTT Ekspres, 27April2000.

25 'Moko Soares disappointed to be left by TNI: Continuation of fire arms trial'[English translation], NTT Ekspres, 12 April 2000.

27 'Moko Soares: that weapon sold by TNI members' [English translationl, SuryaTimor,l'), April 2000; Karen Polglaze, 'Timor militia leader Moko back in court',AAP, 10 April 2000; 'End of Moko's confession, military police examine twoTNI individuals' [English translation], SuryaTimor, T April 2000.

28 'Prosecuting attorney rejects defense statement, demands two year sentencefor Moko Soares' (English translation), SuryaTimor,24 April 2000.

29 'Portuguese TV crew detained in West Timor', Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7February 2000.

30 'Oecussi crimes against humanity indictment filed', Untaet daily briefing (UnitedNations Transitional Adminishation in East Timor),28 September 2001.

3'l Catra,28 March 1998.

Chapter

'l Findingsof FactandConclusionsof law,Jane Doeetal v. Lumintang. p. 1. Thefulljudgment is available at http : / / w ww.etan.org / n ew s / 2001 a / l0lumjud g.htm(accessed 7.10.01).

2 The Center for Constitutional Rights were counsel for the plaintiff nTodd a.Paniaitan (No.92-12255, slip op. [D. Mass. Oct.25,1994]) in a successful civil suitagainst Major-General Sintong Panjaitan for his role in the Santa Cruz killingsin Dili in 1991.

3 I would like to gratefully acknowledge the support and assistance of DavidBourchier in my preparation for the trial hearings. Not only did he provide thebulk of the biographical material on which was able to rely, but his role asdevil's advocacy was immensely helpful. Douglas Kammen also contributedmaterial and forced me to rethink certain positions. Judith Chomsky, Anthony

310 Masters of Tnror

DiCapio and Jennifer Green worked patiently to ease my transition from thesecurity of academic prevarication to a presenter of usable evidence. I am grateful to them all. Russell Goldflam and Gerry Van Klinken provided helpful com-mentary on this chapter. Needless to say, any errors remain my own.

4 The lawyers involved in the case were Anthony DiCaprio (CCR), JudithChomsky (CCR), fennifer Green (CCR), Steve Schneebaum and Brian Hendricksof the Washington law firm Patton Boggs, Susan Shawn Roberts (CJA) and

Joshua Sondheimer (CJA).S Doe a. Lumintang, Jud'gement, Findings of Fact,paragraphs 25 - 98.

5 Alien Tort Claims Act codified at 28 U.S. Code Section L350.

7 Michael Ratner, 'Civil Remedies for Gross Fluman Rights Violations', http:/,/www.humanrightsnow.org, (accessed 7.10.01).

8 Doe a. Lumintang, Transcript of Trial, March 29, 2001, p. 72' See also Ratner,

op.cit.

9 Ratner, op.cit.

L0 The material presented in the remainder of this chapter develops the informa-tion and argument presented by myself in evidence. Se Doe a. LumintangTran-script of Evidence, March27,2001, pp. 26-136. For an outline of Lumintang'smilitary biography, see Chapter 5 of this book.

11 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Doe et al u. Lumintang,p'30.

12 'In the present case, Defendant Lumintang is both directly and indirectly re-

sponsible for the human rights violations committed against the Plaintiffs.Lumintang had "direct" responsibility for these acts: as the third-ranking mem-ber of the Indonesian military, he

-along with other high-ranking members of

the Indonesian military - planned, ordered, and instigated acts carried out bysubordinates to terrorize and displace the East Timor population, to rePress

East Timorese who supported independence from Indonesia, and to deshoyEast Timor's infrastructure following the vote for independence. Lumintang'ssignafure on the May 5,7999 telegram was sent to subordinates in the lndone-sian army that furthered the events in East Timor in 1999. The June 30, L999

manual that was issued over his signature advocated haining tactics for use byIndonesian soldiers that violate intemational law and were the same tactics thatwere actually used by these soldiers both before and after the Popular Consul-tation. These official acts support a finding that Lumintang was directly in-volved in ordering, instigating or planning acts which led to the plaintiffs'inju-ries in this case. The defendant also had indirect command responsibility for theplaintiffs' injuries. tn his position as Vice Chief of Staff of the TM, and as a

member of the TNI High Command, Lumintang (1) served as commander ofsubordinate members of the TNI in East Timor who perpetrated the acts ofviolence which injured the plaintiffs; (2) knew or should have known that sub-ordinates in East Timor were committing, were about to commit or had com-mitted widespread and systematic human rights violations, and (3) failed to actto prevent or punish the violations. Based on the principles of command re-sponsibility, the Court finds that defendant may be held liable for the actions ofhis subordinates, including the abuses suffered by plaintiffs in this act-ron." Ibiil,pp32-33.

18

t920

Nofes 311

13 'Johny denies responsibility over mayhem in East Timor', The lakarta Post,October 6,200'1.

14 For a comprehensive review of the question of command responsibility inintemational law, see Ilias Bantekas, 'The contemporary law of superior re-sponsibility', Ameican lournal of lnternational Law, v.93, no. 3, luly 1,999.

15 From the listings fot 7999 in 'Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite:January 1, 1998-January 31,,1.999', lndonesia, 57 (Apnl 1999), the seven activeduty Army lieutenant-generals were Sugiono (Chief of General Staff of thearmed Forces), Bambang Yudhoyono (Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces forSocial and Political Affairs), Arie Kuma'at (Head of the State Intelligence Coor-dinating Board), Agus Widjojo (Commandant of the Armed Forces Staff andCommand School), Johny Lumintang (Deputy Army Chief of Staff), Maulani(Head of the State Intelligence Coordinating Board). In addition there were asmall number of one-star and two-star generals in the Air Force and Navy, butreal power within TNI since thebeginning of the New Order always lay withinthe Army.

16 Keputusan Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata Kep/08/PIU/1984 tentang Pokok-PokokOrganisasi dan Prosedur Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat (TN/-AD).

17 *e Robert [,owry, The Armed Forces of lndonesia (Sydney: Allen & Unwin,1996) for a general study.Ibid., pp.1,3-1,4.

Ibid., pp.'1,8-19.

A copy of the telegram was discovered in the headquarters of the Dili MilitaryDistrict Command [Kodirn]. The text of the Indonesian language original andan English translation (from which the above is taken) has been published byHuman Rights Watch. See 'Text of Order to Develop 'Security Plan', htp:/ /www.hrw.or g / r eports / 1999 / w ttmor / westmr-O4.htm (accessed 6. 1 0.01 ).

David Bourchier to Richard Tanter. 18.3.01.

See Richard Tanter, 'East Timor and the Crisis of the Indonesian IntelligenceState', in Richard Tanter, Mark Selden & Stephen R. Shalom (eds), Bitter Flota-ers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Inilonesia and the Worlil Communi{r (New York:Rowman and Littlefield; Sydney: Pluto Press), and Tanter, 'The totalitarianambition: the Indonesian intelligence and security apparatus', in Arief Budiman(ed), State and Sooiet in Contemporary lndonesia (Clayton, Victoria: Centre ofSoutheast Asian Studies, Monash University), pp.215-288.

Human Rights Watch, 'Evidence that the expulsions were the result of a coor-dinated lndonesian Army campaign', htlp:' / / www.hrw.or g / reports / 1999 /wtimor/westmr-03.htm#TopOfPage (accessed 2.10.01), citing Yayasan Hak,Lap or an H aian P elan ggar an H AM No. 1 8 / LH / YH-DA / VI'1,999, June 17, 1999.

Douglas Kammen 'The Trouble with Normal: The Indonesian Military,Paramilitaries, and the Final Solution in East Timor'in Benedict Anderson (ed),Violence and the State in Indonesia (Southeast Asia Program Publications, South-east Asia Program, Comell University, Ithaca, New York 2001) (also: Studieson Southeast Asla No.30). Kammen designates Syahnakri as ABRI Assistant forOperations, but this is not correct. As Kammen points out Syahnakri andKairupan had served in Dili in 1995 at the height of the worst period of socalled ninja terror activities by the Army.

21.

22

23

24

312 Masters of Tenor

25 Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Markas Besar Angkatan Darat, Buku PetunjukPembinaan tentang Sandi Yudha TNI-AD, Nomor: 43-8-01,30 |uni 1999. Themanual was issued on June 30, 1999. Lumintang's signafure is on the fourthpage. There is no suggestion that the manual is not authentic, and indeed it isprecisely the kind of development and training document that Lumintang'soffice was authorised to produce. Language, style and layout, in addition toLumintang's authorisation and signature all attest to its authenticity.

25 Ibid , p.35.

27 The phrase'strategy of tension'used by contemporary Italian neo-farist terror-ist groups is probably a more effective translation. See Geofftey Harri+ Thc DarkSide of Europe: Tlu Extreme Right Today (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U.P .,1990), p.1'07 .

28 Lumintang in particular knew from his own experiences in command posi-tions in East Timor and Irian Jaya in the mid-1990s that such techniques werestandard operating procedure for Kopassus. He arrived as Korem 164 com-mander in East Timor in 1993 after the Santa Cruz massacre. From 7996-1998he was Chief of Staff and then Commander of Military Area Command [Kodam]VIII/Trikora for Irian Jaya and Maluku, a bitter period when Kopassus wasparticularly active in Irian Jaya. There is a suggestion that as Kodam com-mander Lumintang clashed with then Kopassus corurutnder Prabowo SubiantoDjojohadikusomo over the latter's operations in lrian, but the key conflictseems to have been over the clash of lines of authority between the MilitaryArea Command and the free-roaming Special Forces Command.

29 The editors of Indonesia argue that the Santa Cruz massacre was actually insti-gated by anti-Warouw officers within Korem 164 in an atternpt to end hisattempts to end their illegal actions by discrediting him. See'Current Data onthe Indonesian Military Elite: July 1,1989 -January1,1992',Indonesia,S3 (Apil7992), p.98. See also Douglas Kammen, 'Notes on the Transformation of theEast Timor Military Command and its Implications for Indonesia',Indonesia 67(April't999), p.64.

30 One possible defence of Lumintang's non-action that has been proposed is thatthe worst atrocities in East Timor were carried out by Kopassus troops, eitheralone or in conjunction with militia. To the extent that East Timor was a

Kopassus-controlled region, it is argued, then the writ of Army headquartersdid not extend to East Timor. Accordingly, Lumintang may well have beenwringing his hands with frustration at the sight of Kopassus criminal actions.There are three problems with this position. The first is that there has been noevidence put forward to suggest that this was indeed Lumintang's attitude.The second is that as a matter of fact there were quite complicated and fluidrelations of competition and cooperation between different units in East Timorin 1999. But electronic intercepts by Australian military intelligence led thoseauthorities to conclude that there was no breakdown in the Indonesian chainof comrnand, however it was internally strucfured. (See Desmond Ball, 'SilentWitness' in this book.) To the extent that is so, then Lumintang's stated domainof authority as Deputy Army Chief of Staff covered troops of all three ArmyCommands operating in East Timor: Kodam, Kostrad, and Kopassus.

31 HannahArendt,Eichmanninlnusalem:AStudyintheBanalityofEuil(NewYork:Penguin,l994).

Nofes 313

32 Lumintang's cowardice in failing to appear to answer the plaintiffs' claims inDoe o. Lumintang is of a piece with his general outlook and character. He hasrepeatedly denied any responsibility for what happened in East Timor, and hasexpressed neither regret nor remorse. Had Lumintang chosen to appear incourt, counsel for the defence would have been able to argue a case explaininghis denial of responsibility. Not only would the testimony of the plaintiffs andthat of experts who appeared for them have been tested in court, but new andfuller information of the events of 1999 could have been presented in his de-fence. Apart from his own desire to avoid the public humiliation of explainingthe inexplicable and to avoid the devastating gaze of his victims, Lumintang'schoice to not appear has another important cause. Had he chosen to present adefence, UScivil legal procedures include'discovery'requirements, under whichcounsel for the plaintiffs could have required access to Indonesian militarydocuments, which would without doubt have shown a much more completepicture of the planning for crimes against humanity than has been liteiallypieced together from very fragmentary and inadequate sources.

33 The attitude of the US govemment to civil cases under the Alien Tort Claims Actand the Torture Victim Protection Act has almost always been equivocal at best,and hostile normally. The most important exception was the original Filartigacase, where the Department of justice supported the plaintiffs' claims for USjurisdiction as a way of implementing President Carter's human rights policy.Certainly there was no support for the plaintiffs' suit against Lumintang, norhad there been in lhdic a. I(aradzic. AsThe Economlsf put it, 'the executive branch[of the US] may be able to tolerate, for example, war crimes in Bosnia; thejudiciary does not'(March 22,D9n.

34 See 'Dephan Bela johnny Lumintang Sesalkan Kurangnya Bantuan Hukum'lMinister of Defence defends Johny Lumintang, regrets lack of legal ai dl, Koidor,29 November 200; available at http://www.indopubs.com/earchives/0002.html; and 'Defense Ministry to Provide Johny Lumintang with Legal As-sistance', Antara, October 26, 2001,.

Chapter 8

1 Desmond Ball & David Homer, Brmking the Codes: Australia's KGB Network,1944-1950 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin 1998), pp.2-6.

2 Desmond Ball & Hamish McDonald, Death in Balibo, Lies in Canbena (Sydney:Allen & Unwin,2000).

3 John Lyons, 'The Secret Timor Dossier', The Bulletin, 12 October 1999, p.28.4 Glenn Milne,'Timor Intelligence Was Spot-on',The Australian,ll October 1999,

P.17.5 John Moore, Minister for Defence, 'New Defence Intelligence Arrangements',

Press Release MIN321/99,28 October 1999.

314 Masters of Tenor

6 For a more comprehensive discussion of the Shoal Bay station and its capabili-ties, see Desmond Ball,'The Defence Presence in the Northem Territory', inDesmond Ball & J.O. Langtry (eds), The Northern Territory in the Defence ofAustralia: Geography, History, Economy, lnfrastructure and Defence Presence (Can-berra Papers on Strategy & Defence No.53, SDSC, ANU, 1990), pp.250-258.Seealso Desmond Ball & Hamish Mc Donald, Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra,Chapter 5.

7 For details of the technical characteristics and performance capabilities of thePusher system, see 'Strategic Direction-Finding System', International DefenceReuiew, (no.7), 1.983, p.942; Plessey Radio Systems, 'PRS 1120 Multi-beam HFReceiving Antenna System 1.5 to 30 MHz', (Plessey Radio Systems, Havant,Hampshire, 1984); Plessey Radio Systems,'Automatic Direction Finding Equip-ment - PRS ?"70 Technical Description and Principle of Operation', (PlesseyRadio Systems, Havant, Hampshire, 1984); R.T. Pretty (ed), lane's Weapons

Systems1979-80, (Macdonald &fane's, London,lfth edition, 1979),pp.638-639;

J. Hockley, 'A Goniometer for Use With High Frequency Circularly DisposedAerial Arrays',RadioandElectronicEngineer, (Vo1.43, No.8), August 1973,pp.475'485; and I.T. Starbuck, 'A High Frequency Direction-Finding Equipment for the1 .5 MHz to 30 MHz Band', in Institute of Electronics Engineers (lEE), Communi-cations Equipment B Systems,IEE Conference Publication 139, June 1976, pp.l5-18.

8 For further discussion of the Larkswood system, see Desmond Ball, Australia'sSetet Space Programs, (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.43,SDSC,ANU, 1988), chapter 3.

9 'Satellite Terminals: Shoal Bay', Hansard (Senate),29 May 1989, p.17M.

10 See the photograph of the Shoal Bay station in Desmond Ball, Defence Aspects ofAustralia's Space Activities, (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.91,SDSC,ANU, 7992),p.32.

11 Peter La Franchi, 'Australian Orion Spy Expo*d' , Flight Intetnational,9-l5 May2000, p.4; Geoffrey Barker, 'RAAF Spy Planes Secretly Watch Indonesia', Aas-tralian Financial Reuiew,11 May 200{J., pp.l,10; and Ian McPhedran, 'RAAFSends Spy Planes Over Timor', The Couiet Mail (Brisbane), l?May 2000,p.6.

12 Don Greenlees, 'Troops Stand Firm in East Timor', Thc Australian, 30 OctoberL998, p.8.

13 See'The Ties That Bind' , Four Comers, ABcTelevision, 14 February 2000, citing'a senior intelligence and policy official in Canberra'.

14 Tony Wright & Paul Daley, 'PM Sets Up Secret Unit on Timor', The Age,22October 1999, p.1.

15 Cited in John Lyons, 'The Secret Timor Dossier', The Bulletin, 12 October7999, p.28. See also 'The Ties That Bind', Four Corners, ABC Television, 14

February 2000.

16 Paul Daley,'Spy Effort Stepped up in Timor', Thc Age,20 March 1999,p.5.

17 Peter La Franchi,'Australian Orion Spy Exposed',Flight International,9-llMay2000, p.4; Geoffrey Barker, 'RAAF Spy Planes Secretly Watch Indonesia', Aus-tralian Financial Reoiew, 11 May 2000, pp.7,10; and Ian McPhedran, 'RAAFSends Spy Planes Over Timor', The Couier Mail (Brisbane), 12May 2000, p.6.

l8

19

Nofes 315

Ian Hunter,'Elite Forces Scouted Island From Apil', Sydney MorningHerald,'|7October 1999, p.1,1.

Interview with Tomas Goncalves,'The Ties That Bind', Four Corners, ABC Tel-evision, 14 February 2000.

Marian Wilkinson. 'Timor: The Quest for Justice', Sydney Morning Herald,31.January 2000,p.4.

Lynne O'Donnell, 'Jakarta's "final solution" exposed', The Australian, 17 Sep-tember 1999, p.8.

Marian Wilkinson. 'Timor: The Quest for Justice', Sydney Morning Herald,37January 2OOO,p.4.

Ibid; and Interview with Tomas Goncalves, 'The Ties That Bind', Four Corners,ABCTelevision, 14 February 2000.

Marian Wilkinson, 'Timor: The Quest for Justice', Sydney Morning Herald,3lJanuary 2000, p.4.

Interview with Tomas Goncalves, 'The Ties That Bind', Four Corners, ABCTelevision, 14 February 2000.

Lansell Taudevin, East Timor:Too Little Too late, (Sydney: Duffy & Snellgrove,1999), p.5.

Ibid, p.178.

lbid, pp7,I97.Ibid, pp.249-250.

Paul Daley, 'East Timor: Armed With Information, Now What?', The Age,29May 1999,p.4.

fohn Lyons, 'The Secret Timor Dossier', The Bulletin,'1.2 Oclober 1999, p.25.

Lincoln Wright,'Secret Defence Papers Show "Conspiracy" at Highest Level',Canberra Times,24 November 1999, p.1.

tbid.

hrterview with Wayne Seivers, The Ties That Bind', Four Corners,l4 February 2000.

Laurie Oakes, 'Canberra's Massacre We Had To Have', The Bulletin,2l Septem-ber 1,999,p.32; and Tony Kevin,'Machiavellian Diplomacy Reaps a Bitter Har-vest', The Australian, 1 lApril 2000, p.13.

leffuey T. Richelson & Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation

Between the UKUSA Counties - United Kingdom, the United States of Amenca,Canada Australia and New Zealand, (London: Allen & Unwin,1985), Chapter 7;and Desmond Ball & David Homer, Breaking the Codes: Australia's KGB Network,19U-L950, op cit, Chapter 10.

Australia's Strategic Policy, (Department of Defence, Canberra, 1997), pp.55-57.Cited in Marian Wilkinson, 'Timor: The Quest for Justice', Sydney MorningHeralil,3l January 2000,p.4. The US Ambassador to Australia, Genta HawkinsHolmes, has also said that the US provided 'unique intelligence capabilities'.See'USA Fully Backed Australia's Role', Letter to the Editor, CanberraTimes,2TMarch 2000, p.8.

27

22

24

27

28

29

30

33

34

35

31

32

5/

38

31.6 Masters of Tenor

39 Marian Wilkinson,'Timor: The Quest forJustice'. For details of the E-P3 ARIESSIGINT aircraft, see Jeffrey T. Richelson, The US Intelligence Community (Boul-der, Colorado: Westview, 4th edition, 1999), pp.I94195.

40 Ian Hunter,'Elite Forces Scouted Island From April' , Sydney Morning Herald,l'lOctober 1999, p.11. For details of USNavy cable-tappingcapabilities, see SherrySontag & Christopher Drew, Blind Man's BIuf: The Untold Story of AmeicanSubmarine Espionage (New York Public Affairs,'1998).

41 Marian Wilkinson, 'Timor: The Quest for |ustice', Sydney Morning Hetald,3lJanuary 2000, p.4.

42 Lincoln Wright, 'American Jets Add a Touch of Mystery to Our Airpoft', Can-

bena Times,25 September 1999,p.2.; and Lincoln Wright, 'US Spy Gear Used inCanberra', CanberraTimes,2O March 2000, p.5.

43 Marian Wilkinson, 'Why We Kept Timor Secrets From the US', Sydney Morn-ing Herald,13 August 1999, p.1.

,u Ibid.45 Dennis Shanahan,'US Was Wamed of Militia Ltnk',Tlu Australian,24 Septem-

ber 1999, p.8.

45 David Usbome,'Revealed: Proof That lndonesian Army Directed Timor Slaugh-ter', The Indqendent [,ondon], 20 September 1999, p.7.

47 rbid.4tt Ibid. See also Dennis Schultz,'Timor Observer Eavesdrops on Her Own Death

Warrant', The Sunday Age,72 September 7999,p.1'2; and 'Militias Took OrdersFrom Army: Radio Transcripts', CanbenaTimes,2l. September 1'999, p.5.

49 David Usbome,'Revealed: Proof That Indonesian Army Directed Timor Slaugh-ter', The lndependent (London), 20 September 1'999, p.l.

50 Marian Wilkinson, 'Exposed: Jakarta's Scorched Earth Plan', Sydney MorningHeralil,3l January 2000, p.4.

51 Cited in ibid.52 Paul Daley, 'Massacre Evidence Grows', The Age, 12 November 1999, p.A^71;-

'The Ghosls of Timor', The Age,13 November 1999,p.6; and Martin Chulov,'If20,000 East Timorese Were Butchered, Why Can't Anyone Find the Bodies?',The Sun Herald,14 November 1999, p.51.

53 John B. Haseman, 'Indonesia: Intelligence Power Positions Reviewed', lane'slntelligence Reaieu, November 1'997,p.1O; and John Mc Beth,'Cameo RoIe', FarEastern Economic Reaiew,18 March 1999, p.28.

54'sensitive Position', F ar Eastern Emnomic Review, 22 July 1'999, p -8 -

55 Marian Wilkinson & Peter Cole'Adams,'Aushalia May Hand Over ClassifiedData', Sydney Morning Huald,22Januaty 20ffi, p.23'

SDSC Publications

Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence

TitleAustralia's Seuet Space Programs by Desmond Ball

by Ross BabbageCP46 US Bases in the Philippines: lssues and lmplications

by Desmond Ball (ed)CP47 Sooiet Signals lntelligrnce (SIGINT) by Desmond BallCP48 The Vietnam People's Army: Regulaization of Command

1975-1988 by D.M. FitzGeraldCP49 Australia and the Global Strategic Balance by Desmond BallCP50 Organising an Army: the Australian Erpeience 1957-1955

by J.C. BlaxlandCP51 The Eooloing World Economy: Some Alternatiae Secuity

Questions for Australia by Richard A. HiggottCP52 Defending the Northern Gateway by Peter DonovaCP53 Soaiet Signals lntelligence (SIGINT); Intercepting Sstellite

Communications bv Desmond Ball

SDSC Publications 377

$A (excl.GST)15.00

No.CP43CP44

CP45

High Personnel Turnooer: The ADF ls Not a Limited LiabilityCompany by Cathy Downes 15.00Should Australia Plan to Defend Christmas and Cocos Islands?

15.00

15.0020.00

15.0015.00

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CP58CP59

CP5O

CP51CP62

CP54 Breaking the Americnn Alliance: An Independent NationalSecurity Policy for Australia by Gary Brown 20.00

CP55 Senior fficer Professional Deuelopment in the AustralianDefence Force: Constant Study to Prepare by Cathy Downes 20.00

CP55 Code 777: Australia and the US Defense SatelliteCommunicntions System (DSCS) by Desmond Ball 22.50

CP57 China's Cisis: The International lmplicationsby Gary Klintworth (ed) 17.00lndex to Parliamentary Questions on Defence by Gary Brown 20.00Controlling Ciail Maritime Actiaities in a DefenceContingency by W.A.G. DoversThe Security of Oceania in the 1990s. Yol.l, Views fromthe Region by David Hegarty and Peter Polomka (eds)The Strategic Significance of Tones Strait by Ross BabbageThe Leading Edge: Air Power in Australia'sUnique Enaironment by P.J. Criss and D.J. Schubert

CP63 The Northern Territory in the Defence of Australia: Geography,History, Economy, lnfrastructure, and Defence Presenceby Desmond Ball and J.O. Langtry (eds) 24.50

CP64 Vietnam's Withilrawal from Cambodia: Regional Issuesand Realignmentsby Gary Klintworth (ed) 17.00Prospects for Cisis Prediction: A South Pacific Cax Studyby Ken Ross 20.00Bougainaille: Perspectiaes on a Crisis by Peter Polomka (ed) 20.00The Amateur Managers: A Study of the Management ofWeapons System Projects by F.N. Bennett 22.50

17.00

15.0030.00

22.50

CP55

CP66CP67

318 Masters of Tenor

CP68 The Secuity of Oceania in the 1,990s. Yol.2,Managing Change by Peter Polomka (ed)

CP69 Australia and the World: Prologue anil Prospectsby Desmond Ball (ed)

CP70 Singapore's Defence Industries by Bilveer SinghCP71 P'4AF Air Power Doctine: A C.ollection of Contemporary

Essays by Gary Waters (ed)CP72 South Pacific Secuity: lssues and Perspectioes

by Stephen Henningham and Desmond Ball (eds)CP73 The Northern Tenitory in the Defence of Australia: Strategic

and Operational Considerationsby I.O. Langtry and Desmond Ball (eds)

CP74 The Architect of Victory: Air Cnmpaigns for Australinby Gary Waters

CP75 ModernTaiwan in the 1.990s by Gary Klintworth (ed)CP75 New Technology: Implicntions for Regional and Australian

Secuity by Desmond Ball and Helen Wilson (eds)CP77 Reshaping the Australian Army: Challenges for the 1990s

by David Homer (ed.)CP78 The lntelligence War in the Gulfby Desmond BallCP79 Proaocattue Plans: A Critique of US Strategy for Maitime

Conflict in the North Pacifcby Desmond Ball 20.00

CP80 Soviet SIGINI Hawaii Operation by Desmond Ball 77.50

CP81 Chasing Gravity's Rninbow: Ktr,ujalein and US Ballistic MissileTesting by Owen Wilkes, Megan van Frank and Peter Hayes 22.50

CP82 Australia's Threat Percqtions: A Senrch for Secuityby Alan Dupont t7.00

CP83 Building Block for Regional Secuity: An AustralianPerspective on Confidence and Security Building MeasuresGSBMs) in the Asia/Pacific Region by Desmond Ball 77.00

CP84 Australia's Secuity Interests in Northeast Asiaby Alan Dupont 18.50

CP85 Finane and Finarcial Policy in efene Cantingmciaby Paul l-ee 77.00

CP86 MitE Warfare in Australin's First Lhu of Defene by Alan Hinge 23.00

CP87 Hong Kong's Future as a Regional Transport Hubby Peter ]. Rimrner 20.00

CP88 The Conceptual Basis of Australia's Defence Planning and Force

15.00

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20.00

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24.0017.50

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Structure Deoebpment by Paul DibbCP89 Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional

and Australian P erspectiaes

by Desmond Ball and David Homer (eds)

CP90 The GuIf War: Australia's RoIe and Asian-Pacific Responses

by J. Mohan MalikCP91 Defence Aspeas of Australia's Spae Actiuitia by Desmond BallCP92 The Fiae Power Defence Arrangements and Military Cooperation

among the,ASEAN States: lncompatible Models for Secuity inSoutheast Asia? by Philip Methven

CP93 lnlrastructure and Secuity: Problans of Deoelopment

intluWestSqkPru:ineofPryuaNaaGuinmbyT.M.Boyce 23.00

CP94 Austmlia and Spaeby Desmond Ball and Helen Wilson (eds) 26.00

SDSC Publications 31,9

CP95 TANDFORCE: 20L0: Some lmplications of Technology

for ADF Future land Force Doctine, kadership and Structuresby David W. Beveridge

CP96 The Oigins of Australian Diplomatic lntelligence in Asia,1933-1941 bv Wavne Gobert

CP97 lapan as Peaiekcepir: Snmurai State, or New Ciailian Power?by Peter Polomka

CP98 The Post-Soaiet World: C,eopolitics and Crisesby Coral BellCP99 lndonesian Defence Polica and the Indonesian Armeil Forces

by Bob LowiyCP100 Reglonal Secuity in the South Pacific:

The Quarter-Century 1970-95 by Ken RossCP1.07 The Chnnging RoIe of the Military in Papua New Cuinea

by R.J. MayCP1.02 Strategic Change and Naoal Forces: lssues for a Medium

Leuel Nawl Pwr by hm Baternan and Dck Sherwood (eds)CP103 ASEAN Defenu Reoientation 1975-1992: The Dynamics of

Modernisation and Structural Change by J.N. MakCP104 The United Nations and Cisis Management: Six Studies

by Coral Bell (ed)CP105 Operational and Technological Deaelopments in

Maitime Warfare:lmpliations for the Western Pacificby Dick Sherwood (ed)

CP'1,06 More Than Little Heroes: Australian Arma Air LiaisonOfficers in the Semnd World Warby Nicola Baker 23.00

CPl07 Vanuatu's'1980 Santo Rebellion: International Responses to aMicrostate Security Crisis by Matthew Gubb 14.00

CP7O8 The Deaelopment of Australian Army Doctrine 1945-1954by M.C.l. Welbum

CP109 The Naoy and National Security: The Peacetime Dimensionbv Dick Sherwood

CP n0 Signals lntelhgerw (SIGINT) in Suuth Korea by Desmond BallCPl1l India Looks East: An Emerging Power and lts Asia-Pacific

Neighbours by Sandy Gordon and Stephen Henningham (eds) 24.00CP'1.12 Nation, Region and Context: Studies in Peace and War

in Honour of Professor T.B. Millarby Coral Bell (ed.) 24.00CP173 Transforming the Tatmailaw: The Burmese Armed Forces

since 1.988 bv Andrew Selth 23.00CP114 Calming the Waters: Initiatiaesfor Asia Pacific Maritime

Cooperation by Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds) 23.00CP'l15 Strategic Guidelines for Enabling Resmrch and Deaelopment to

Support Australian Defence by Ken Anderson and Paul Dibb 77 .00CP'l'15 Security and Security Building in the Indian Ocean Region

by Sandy GordonCP1,17 Signals lntelligarce (SIGINT) in South Asia: India, Pakistan,

Si Innkn (Ceulon) by Desmond BallCPllS The Seas Unite: Maitime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region

by Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds) 25.00CP119 ln Search of a Maritime Strategy: The Maritime Elemmt in

15.50

1.7.50

15.0015.00

20.00

23.00

15.00

23.00

24.00

77.50

20.00

15.00

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24.00

17.50

Australian Defene Planning sfue 190L by David Stevens (ed) 24.00

320 Masters of Tenor

CP'120 Australian Defence Planning: Fioe Views ftom Policy Mal<ers

by Helen Hookey and Denny Roy (eds) 15.00CP121 A Bief Madness: Australia and the Resumption of French

Nuclqr Testingby Kim Richard Nossal and Carolynn Vivian 15.00CP1,22 Missile Diplomacu anil Taiwan's Future: lnnoaations in

Politics and Military Powerby Greg Austin (ed)CP't23 Grey-Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug

Trfficking and PoliticnlTenoism by Peter ChalkCP124 Regional Maritime Management and Secuity

by Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds)CP125 The Enaironment and Security: What are the Linkages?

by Alan Dupont (ed.) 17.00

CP126'Eduuting an Amty': Australian Army Doctinal Datelopmentand the Operational Experience in South Vietnam, 1965-72by R.N. Bushby '17.50

CP127 South Afriu and Secuity Building in the lndinn Ocean Rimby Greg Mills 20.00

CP128 The Shape of Things to Come: The US-lapan Secuity Relationshipin the New Era bv Maree Reid 17.50

CP'129 Shirying and Refional Secuityby Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds) 20.00

CP1.3O Bougainaille 1988-98: Fiae Searches for Security in the NorthSolomons Proaince of Papua New Guinea by Karl Claxton 23.00

CP'131. The Next Stage: Preaentiae Diplomncy in the Asia-Pacific Region

by Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya (eds) 25.00CP132 Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacifc Region: Cunent Situation

25.00

17.50

24.00

23.00

30.00

17.50

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25.00

18.50

18.50

26.00

26.00

22.50

26.00

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and Prospects by Sam Bateman (ed)CP1.33 Maintaining the Strategic Edge: The Defence of Australia

in 201,5 by Desmond Ball (ed)CP1,34 An lnilependent Command: Command and Control of

the l"t Australian Task Force in Vietnam bv R.W. CableCP'1.35 Armed Rebellion in the ASEAN States: Persistence and

lmplications by Andrew TanCP736 Burma's Seuet Military Partners by Andrew SelthCP1.37 Where Are They When You Need Them? Support

Anangements for Deployed Air Power by Peter MclennanCP138 ASEAN, the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

and the Challenge of Denuclearintion in Southeast Asia:Problems and Prospects by Bilveer Singh

CPl39 The Council for Secuity Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP):

Its Record and lts Prospects by Desmond BallCP140 Wars of Conscience: Human Rights, National Secuity

and Australia's Defence Policy by John HutchesonCP'1.41. Ciail-military Relaiions in Dimoiratising lndonesia:

The Potentials and Limits to Change by Bilveer SinghCP I42 Giaing Peace a Chance: Operation Iagaon, Bougainaille, 1994:

A Case of Military Action and Diplornacy by Bob BreenCP 143 The Real C-Cubed:Culture, CAreeers & Climate, and how

they affect capabilityby Nick fans with David Schmidtchen

CP 7M The Human Face of Secuity edited by David Dickens

SDSC Publications 321

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BrowntNP227 Australin and Papua Ntw Guinea: Foreign and Defence Relations Since 1975 by

Katherine BullocktNP228The Wrigley Report: An Exercise in Mobilisation Planning by J.O. LangtryWV229 Air Power, the Defmce of Australia and Regional Security by Desmond BallWP230Cunent Strategic Deaelopments and Implicntions for the Aerospace lndustry by

Desmond BallWP23lArms Control and Great Power Interests in the Korean Peninsula bv Garv

KlintworthWP232Power, the Gun and Foreign Policy in China since the Tiananmen Incident by Ian

Wilsonl /t233 The GuIf Crisb: Tafing a Nat World Order? by Amin Saikal and Ralph KingWP2UAn Australian Perspectiue on Maitime CSBMI in the Asia-Pacific Regionby

Desmond Ball and Commodore Sam Bateman RANWP231lnsurgency and the Transnational Flow of Information: A Case Study by Andrew

SelthWP236lndia's Security Policy: Desire and Necessity in a Changing Worldby Sandy

GordonWP237The Introduction of the Ciailian National Service Scheme for Youth in Papua New

Guinea by Lieutenant Colonel T.M. BoyceWP238Command, Control, Communiutions and lntelligence in the GuIf War by Shaun

GregoryWP239Reflections on Cambodian Political History: Backgrouniler to Recent Deoelopments

by Stephen R. HederWP24OThe Asia-Pacific: More Secuity, Less Uncertain!, New Opportunities by Gary

KlintworthWP241A History of Australia's Space Inaolaemenf by Matthew L. JamestNP242Antarctic Resources: A Dichotomy of Intuest by John WellsWP2(i The Right ta lnteroene' in the hmntic ,Affuirs of Stataby Gary KlintworthWP2MAn lsolated Debating Society: Australia in Southeast Asia anil the South Pacificby

Greg johannestNP2\SRecent Deaelopmmts in China's Domestic and Foreign Affairs: The Political and

Strategic lmplications for Northeast Asiaby Di HuaWP246The Eaolution of US Maitime Power in the Pacificby E.A. OlsenWP24T lndex to Parliamentary Questions on Defenu, 1991 by Gary BrownWP248CaII Out the Troops: An Examination of the Legal Basis for Australian Defence

Force Inaolaement in 'Non-Defence' Matters bv Elizabeth WardV{n49 The Austmlian Defvne Force and theTotal Force Policyby Charles E. HellerWP2llMobitisation: Thb Gulf War in Retrospect by James iVoodtdP2ll,Mobilisation: The Benefits of Experience by James WoodWP21ZStrategic Studies and Extended Detenence in Europe: A Retrospectiae by

Andrew ButfovtNP2\3Geographic Infirmation anil Remote Sensing Technologies in the Defence of

Australia by Ken GrangerWP254The Military Dimension of Common Secuity by Andrew ButfoyWP2\STaiann's New Role in the Asia-Pacific Region by Gary Klintworth

322 Masters of Terror

WP216Focusing the CSBM Agenda in the Asia/Pacific Region: Some Aspects of DefenceConfidenu Building by Paul Dibb

WP2STDefence and lndustry: A Strategic PersVectiue by Stewart WoodmanWP2SSRussia and the Asia-Pacific Regionby Leszek BuszynskiWP2S9NationaI Secuity and Defence Policy Formation and Decision-Making in lndiaby

Bruce VaughnWP260A Question of Pioities: Australian and Ncw Zeahnd Security Planning in the

1990s bv Stewart WoodmanrNY251, PaVua New Guinu-Austmlia Ddene anil fuidty Relatiotsby Peto I. PeipulWP262The Regional Secuity Outlook: An Australian Viaopoint by Paul DibbWP263Pakistan's Security Concerns: A Chinese Perspectiae by Liu |inkunWP264The Military Build-up in the Asia-Pacific Region: Scope, Causes anil Implications

for Secuityby Andrew Mack and Desmond BallrNP265Pinciples of Australian Maitime Operations by W.S.G. Bateman and R.J.

SherwoodWP265Sino-Russian Detente and the Regional Implications by Gary KlintworthWP26TAustralia and Asia-Pacific Regianal Secuity by Peter JenningsrNPA6SCambodia's Past, Present and Future by Gary Klintworth'NP2SgAustralia's Aerial Suroeillance Programme in the South Pacific: Reuiew and New

Options by Wing Commander R.W. GreytNPL7\Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacifc Region (With Some lmplicntions for Regional

Secuity Cooperation) by Desmond BallrNPL7lAustralian Security Planning at the Crossroads: The Challenge of the Nineties by

Stewart WoodmanWP2T2lndex to Parliamentary Questions on Defence, L992by Gary BrownWPZTSTrends in Military Acquisitions in the Asia/Pacific Region: bnplications for

Security and Prospects for Constraints and Controls by Desmond BallWP274A Proposal for Cooperation in Maitime Secaity in Southcast Asla by Wing

Commander R.W. GrevtNP27SThe Preparation and Mniagement of Australian Contingents in IIN Peacel<eeping

Operations by Captain Russ Swinnerton RANtNP275The Future of Australia's Defence Relationship with the United States by Paul

DibbWP2TTRussia's Military and the Northern Territoies Issue by Geoffrey JukesWP278A Regional Regime for Maitime Surueillance, Safety and lnfonnation Exchanges

by Captain Russ Swinnerton RAN and Desmond BallWP279The Political Role of the Singapore Armed Forces' Officer Corps: Towards a Mili-

tary-Administratiae State? by Tim HuxleyWP2SOThe East Coast Armaments Complex GCAC) Locatbn Project: Strutegic and

Defnce Aspects by Desmond BalllNP287RuIes of Engagement in Maitime Operations by Captain Russ Swinnerton RANWP282The Political and Strategic Outlook, 1994-2003: Global, Regional and Australian

Perspectiaes by Paul Dibb'NP283Index to Parliamentary Questions on Defence, 1993by Gary BrowntNP2MNew Dimensions to the lapan-Australia Relationship: From Economic Preference to

Political Cooperation by Nobuyuki TakakiWP2SlWinners and Insers: South Asia After the CoId War by Sandy GordonWPlfl6Australia and New Zealand: Towards a More Effectiae Defnce Relationship by Jim

RolfeWP2STChina's Policy Towarils the Spratly Islnnds in the 1990s by Sheng Lijun

SDSC Publiations 323

WP288How to Begin lmplementing Specific Trust-Building Measures in the Asia-PacificRegionby Paul Dibb

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Desmond BalllNY297lndia'sNatnlStratcgy and theRoleof ihe AndamanandNimbar IskndsbyD.N. ChristieWP292lapan and Australia: A New Security Partnership? by Naoko SajimaWP293Chinese Strategy and the Spratly Islands Dispute by Brigadier Chris RobertsWP29{Transnational Crime: The New Security Paradigm by John McFarlane and

Karen MclennanWP29SSignaIs Intelligence (SIGINT) in North Koreaby Desmond BalllNP296The Emerging Geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific Region by Paul DibbWP297 Maritime Strategy into the Twenty-First Century: Issues for Regional Naaies by

Jack McCaffrieVVI298 The CnA War in Retruyd: Wbmacq, Stmtegy and Regiannl lrcWct by Coral BellINY2D Australia-Irulonqia Secuity Cmpation: For Better or Wors? by Bob towryWP300Reflections on Ameican Forcign Policy Strategy by John Chipmanl4IP301Near Requiranents for Multilateral Conflict Management by UN and Other Forces:

Nordic Responses by Jaana KarhiloWP3lTDeueloping Army Doctine in the Post-Cold War Era by Bill HoustonWP303The loint Patrol Vessel (lPV): A Regional Concept for Regional Cooperationby

Desmond BallWP?[A Australian-Ameriun kktiorc afier tle Cnlwse of Cnmmunismby Harry G. GelberWP3OSPolicy Coorilination for Asia-Pacific Security and Stability by Yukio SatohWP306Force Modernisation in Asia: Towarils 2000 and Beyond by Paul DibbWP307PMC, ARF and CSCAP: Founilations for a Secuity Architecture in the Asia-

Pacific? by Jom DoschlNP3\SBurmn's lntelligence Apparatus by Andrew SelthWP3l9Burma's Defence Erpenditure and Arms Industies by Andrew SelthWP3'l0Australia's Vulnerability to lnformation Attack: Towards a National lnformation

Policy by Adam CobbrNI€l-[, Australio, tlu US Alliance and Multilatemli.sn in Saihenst Asiabv Desmond BallWP3l2Fttm Dbtant Counhis to Partners: the lapn-Australia Rektiansiip by Yukio SatohWP313The Burma Narubv Andrew SelthWP3'llProbtems and lisues in Malaysia-singapore Relations by Andrew TanWP31,5The Burma Air Forceby Andrew SelthINI?3IS Australia's National Secuity inta tlu hnnty-Fitst Centuryby Brigadier Mike SmithWP3'17 Alliances, Alignments and the Global Order: The Outlook for the Asia-Pacific

Region in the Next Quarter-Century by Paul DibbWPSlSThe South African National Defence Force: Betzaeen Downsizing and New

Capabilities? by Greg MillsWP3l9The Eaolution of China's Perception of Taiwan by Sheng LijunWP320UN Peacekeeping, UNIFIT and thc Fijian Experienceby Jim SandaytNI€2l The Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum: An Austmlian Viewby /'Jan DupontWP322Singapore's Defence Policy in the New Millennium by Andrew TantNP323Responses to NATO's Eastwaril Expansion by the Russian Feileration by Alexei

MouravievWP324The Remaking of Asin's Geoppolitics by Paul DibbWP325The Nuclur Cisis in Asia: The Indian and Palcistani Nuclear Programmesby

Desmond Ball and Mohan Malik

324 Masters of Tenor

t{PS26Researching Secuity in East Asia: From'Strategic Culture' to'Secuity Culture'bv Pauline Kerr

\NP32TBuilding the Tatmailaw: The Organintional Dnelopment of the Armed Forus inMyanmar,1948-98 by Maung Aung Myoe

WP238Drugs, Transnational Cime and Security in East Asia by AIan DuponttNP329The Releoance of the Knowledge Edgeby Paul DbbWP330The US-Australian Alliance: History anil Prospects by Desmond BallWPS3llmplications of the East Asian Economic Recession for Regional Security

Cooperation by Desmond BallWP332Strategic lnfonnation Warfare: A Concept by Daniel T. KuehlW[Ansecunry Dewloryenb and Ptwryts for Cnpation in the Asia-Pacific Rqion, with

Particular Refermce to the Mebng Rhnr fusinby Desmcnd BallWP334Burma and Weapons of Mass Destruction by Andrew SelthWPS31Transnational Cime and lllegal lmmigration in the Asia-Pacifc Region:

Background, Prospects and Countermeasures by John McFarlaneWP336Burma and Drugs: The Regime's Complicity in the Global Drug Tradeby

Desmond BallWP337Defence Strategy in the Contetnporary Era by Paul DibbWR!38Ttre Burme Amrd Forca Nd C-entury: Contiruity or Chmge? by Andrew SelthWP339Military Doctine and Strategy in Myanrnar: A Historical Perspectioe by Maung

Aung MyoeWP34OThe Eoolaing Secuity Architecture in the Asin-Pacific Region by Desmond BallWP341The Asian Firuncial Cisis: Comrytion, Cronyism and Organised Cinu

by John McFarlaneV'lIry2The Tatmodaw in Myanmnr sinre 1988: An Interim Asw.ffient by Maung Aung Myoe\NP343Cnmbodia and Southeast Asiaby Tony KevinWPWThe Pinciple of Non-lntercention anil ASEAN: Eaolution and Emerging

Chnllenges by Herman KraftWP3ASWil America's Alliances in thc Asia-Pacific Region Enilure? by Paul DibbWP346Ofricer Education and kadership Training in the Tatmadaw: A Survey by Maung

Aung MyoeWPMTT4e Prospects for Southeast Asia's Secuity by Paul DibbrNP348The Army's Capacity to Defend Australia Offshore: The Neeil for a loint Approach

by John CaligariWP34glnterpreting China-lndonesia Relations: 'Good-Neighbourliness', 'Muttnl Trust'

and' All-rounil Cooperation' by He KaiWP3lDStrategicTrads in the Asia-Pacifc Region by Paul DibbWPSilBurma's Order of Battle: An Inteim Assessmmt by Andrew SelthWP3lllandmines in Birmn: Tlw Military Dimension by Andrew SelthWP3\3lapanese Airborne SIGINT Capabilities by Desmond Ball and Euan GrahamWP 354 The Indonesian Military Business Complex: Origins, Course fi Future

by Bilveer SinghWP 355 Professor A.D.Trendall and His Band of Classical Cryptogrryhers

bv R.S.MerrilleesWP 355 Factionalism and the Ethnic lnsurgent Organisations by Des Ball & Hazel LangWP 357 ABM as BMD: The Issue of Ballistic Missile Defence by Ron HuiskenWP 358 South Africa's Defencc Industry: A Template for Middle Powers?

by Greg Mills & Martin EdmondsWP 359 The New Subnnine Cpmbat lnformation System and Australia's Emerging

Information Warfare Architecture by Desmond Ball

SDSC Publications

WP 350 Missile Defence:Trends, Conflicts and Remedies by Desmond BallWP 361 lndonesian Secuity Responses to resurgent Papuan Separatism:

An Open Source lntelligence Case Study by Matthew N. Davies+WP 362 ANZUS: Lrfe after 50: Alliance Managament in the 21st Cantury

by Ron HuiskenWP 363 A Strategic Framework for Missile Defence by Ron HuiskentNP 364'The First War of the 27st Ccntury': Asymmetric Hostilities and the Norms of

Conduct bv Coral BellWP 355 The Utiliiy and Limits of The lnternational Coalition against Tenorism

by Paul Dibb

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Restructuring the Papua New Guinea Defence Force: Strategic Analysisand Force Structure Pinciples for a Small Stateby Paul Dibb and Rhondda Nicholas 1996 U.50

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bockground moleriol on implitoted persons, fierehy providing o plotfom for further specific

invesligolion by xholors ond humon rights bodies.

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(over imoges: Joonsoulh, Sydney llwning Heroldondlhe Age