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Debating Multicultural Korea: MediaDiscourse on Migrants and Minorities inSouth KoreaJoseph Yi & Gowoon JungPublished online: 09 Feb 2015.

To cite this article: Joseph Yi & Gowoon Jung (2015) Debating Multicultural Korea: Media Discourseon Migrants and Minorities in South Korea, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41:6, 985-1013,DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2014.1002202

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Debating Multicultural Korea: MediaDiscourse on Migrants and Minoritiesin South KoreaJoseph Yi and Gowoon Jung

Since the early 1990s, South Korea has experienced growing public debate aboutmigrants, minorities and related government policies. Much of this ‘multicultural’discourse occurs in the internet-based cyber-media, which offer space for variousproducers, including mainstream media professionals, netizens and resident foreigners.A prevailing discourse of victimhood is associated with small, ideologically homogen-eous groups of media producers (mainstream media and nativist websites); in contrast,mixed and nuanced discourses are more common in large and heterogeneous onlinecommunities, where users interact with a variety of viewpoints. Moreover, actors whoare framed in non-negative terms—as neither xenophobes nor corrupt elites—serve asmore effective brokers and bridges across various media. Most foreign-origin netizensare passive consumers of media discourse; but a few, active foreigners communicateeffectively with both mainstream media and netizens and help to diversify the prevailingdiscourse. We find supportive evidence from a content analysis of 15 websites,supplemented with informant interviews and observations.

Keywords: South Korea; Migrants; Media; Public Sphere; Multicultural; Netizens

Introduction

For centuries, an isolated, hermit kingdom, South Korea (hereafter Korea), now hostsmore than 1.5 million ‘foreign-origin’ residents, about 3% of the total population, asevenfold increase from 2000. The government defines ‘foreign-origin’ residents (or‘resident foreigners’ [oegug-in]) to include non-Korean citizens who stay for 90 days orlonger, naturalised citizens and children whose mothers or fathers are non-Koreans.

Joseph Yi is Associate Professor at Department of Political Science, Hanyang University, Seoul, South Korea.Correspondence to: Department of Political Science, Hanyang University, 222 Wangsimni-ro, Seongdong-gu,Seoul, 133-791, South Korea. E-mail: joyichicago@yahoo.com. Gowoon Jung is Doctoral Student at Departmentof Sociology, State University of New York, Albany, NY, USA. Correspondence to: Department of Sociology,State University of New York, 351 Arts & Sciences Bldg.1400, Washington Avenue, Albany, NY 12222, USA.E-mail: gjung@albany.edu

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2015Vol. 41, No. 6, 985–1013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2014.1002202

© 2015 Taylor & Francis

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Most are labour and marriage migrants from developing countries, nearly half fromChina. In the past decade, nearly a tenth of marriages in Korea included foreignspouses. More than a tenth of the foreigner population were illegal, mostly low-wagelabourers (179,516).1

In 2006, President Roh declared, ‘It is irreversible for Korea to move towards amultiracial and a multicultural society. We must try to integrate migrants throughmulticultural policies’ (quoted in Kim-NK 2009). The Committee for ForeignerPolicy chaired by the Prime Minister proclaimed policy goals for respecting humanrights, enhancing social integration and creating an open society where foreignerscoexist. During 2004–2007, the government enacted the Employment Permit System,which guaranteed equal wages and labour rights for migrants. The 2008 MulticulturalFamily Support Act promised significant benefits for families of marriage migrants,or ‘multicultural’ families. In 2013, the government budgeted 210.4 billion won ($198million) for multicultural community centres, educational and counselling services,translation hotlines, and other programmes to help resident foreigners adapt toKorean society (Cho 2013). In particular, multicultural families received educationalsubsidies, higher-interest bank savings, preferential college admissions and—untilrecently—exemption from military service.

In Korea, ‘multicultural’ (damunhwa) is a specific, legal term for families consistingof a Korean national and a foreign spouse. It is also used generally to describe thepresence of diverse racial and ethnic groups, relevant government policies andnormative ideas about accommodating diversity. As such, ‘multicultural’ has becomea prevailing term in media discourse covering migrants, minorities and related policies.Due to its many usages and connotations, the term stirs confusion and controversiesamong the public. Much of this discourse happens online, as Korea is a global leader inInternet-related services and media, with millions of netizens who produce, dissem-inate and discuss the news (Chung 2008; Chang 2008; Chang and Park 2012).2

Producers of multicultural-related discourse include elite professionals3 in themainstream media; non-elite ‘netizens’ (Internet citizens) in the cyber-media; and asmall, growing number of foreign-origin netizens. The academic literature focuses onthe discourse production of elites, which generally presents migrants as passive,sympathetic victims: ‘The sympathetic discourse describes migrants as victims ofracism, discrimination, physical/verbal violence’ (Kim 2012, 665; also see Park 2014).Kim criticises media discourse as politically correct, ‘happy talk’, which eschewsserious critiques of structural discrimination.

While progressive academics call for more critical, mainstream media discourse,they mostly ignore or castigate populist, netizen discourse. Populist, right-wing sites,such as Ilbe Storage, are described as ‘trash storage’ (Hwang Sangmin, psychologyprofessor at Yonsei University), ‘loser’ (Jin Joongkwon, professor, liberal arts atDongyang University) or ‘fascism’ (Kim Dongchoon, social science/NGO studies atSungkonghoe University; quoted in Jung 2013). Jung (2013) argues that young, malenetizens face extreme competition for gainful employment under neoliberal capital-ism. Feeling socially deprived and disconnected from the established political parties,

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young netizens regain their self-esteem by expressing hostility to women and migrantworkers. Kang (2013) discusses how distorted facts, such as on foreigner crimes, areuploaded and quickly disseminated among netizens.4

Scholars of multicultural discourse also overlook the significant presence ofresident foreigners from advanced countries (e.g., 140,000 Americans, 45,000Japanese). Multicultural discourse is concerned with socio-economic marginality,and advanced-country foreigners are not considered marginalised or victims ofdiscrimination (although many would beg to differ). However, if advanced-countryforeigners marry Korean spouses and bear mixed-race children, the latter would beconsidered objects of societal discrimination and therefore of multicultural discourse.

In summary, multicultural discourse in Korea is largely concerned with low-skilledmigrants from developing countries and mixed-race families. Academic accounts focuson the production of media discourse by professional elites; the discourse produced byforeign-origin residents or non-elite netizens is much less visible. The inattention toforeign-origin discourse is explained by its relative scarceness. The academic neglect ofthe voluminous, native netizen discourse on multiculturalism, however, seems largelybased on ideological distaste. To fill the gaps in the literature and to present a morecomplete picture of media discourse, our article updates previous studies of mainstreammedia and undertakes exploratory research of native and foreign-origin netizens.

Heterogeneous Institutions and Public Legitimacy

We find instances of both stereotypical (e.g., ‘we are victims’) and nuanced discoursesamong the three categories of media producers: (i) mainstream media professionals,(ii) non-elite, native netizens and (iii) foreign-origin netizens. Media professionalsusually portray foreigners and mixed-race children as pitiful victims of discriminationand other hardships; vocal, native netizens reverse the narrative and typically castKoreans as victims of criminal foreigners and government policies. We also findmedia producers who facilitate the exchange of different views and information; theycontribute to a bridging, middle-ground discourse that moves from Manicheanstereotypes to more nuanced, complex arguments.

We theorise that the type of discourse is influenced by institutional and discursivecontexts. Nuanced, non-stereotypical discourse is more likely within socially andideologically heterogeneous institutions, which ‘promotes a shared set of experiencesat the same time that it exposes countless people to information and opinions thatthey would not have sought out in advance’ (Sunstein 2009, 217). In contrast,stereotypical, victim-oriented and even conspiratorial discourse is more likely inhomogeneous settings where opposing viewpoints are rarely discussed, i.e., ‘informa-tion cocoons’ or ‘echo chambers’ (Sunstein 2009, 43).

In Korea, the expansion of cyber-media opens up space for various types of mediainstitutions. In some websites, the producers of discourse (i.e., users who write orcomment on articles) are relatively few and share similar social status and ideologicalstances on multiculturalism. In other sites, large numbers of diverse users supply thediscourse. We posit that sites with ideologically heterogeneous users are more likely

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to generate mixed and nuanced discourses than sites with homogeneous users; andthat sites with many users are more heterogeneous than sites with few users.

Another factor is the discursive structure, or how groups are interpreted (framed)by external publics. We define ‘frames’ broadly as ‘schemas of interpretation’ thatenable individuals to ‘locate, perceive, identify and label’ occurrences within their lifespace and the world at large (Goffman 1974, 21). In the social movement literature,framing theory largely ‘emphasises the internal perspective of movement actors’ ownmeaning-making strategies’ (Koopmans and Olzak 2004, 199). However, actors arealso part of a larger, discursive structure, in which external publics respond positivelyor negatively to their claims. Actors vary in terms of public legitimacy, or ‘the degreeto which, on average, reactions by third actors in the public sphere support an actor’sclaims more than they reject them’ (Koopmans and Olzak 2004, 205).

Building on Koopmans and Olzak, we theorise that framing work is done not justby internal, movement actors, but also by external actors in the public sphere. Forpublic deliberation, it is less important that external publics support an actor’s claimthan that they do not simply reject it out of hand. Some actors are framed by keyparties in the public sphere in neutral or non-negative terms, such as non-racist. Theclaim of a neutrally framed actor is more likely to be considered on its merits thanthat of a negatively framed one. In the multicultural debate, actors who are framed asneither xenophobes nor corrupt, political elites serve as more effective brokers andbridges (Burt 2004) across various media producers. The claims of such actors maynot be readily accepted, but they are at least considered by external publics.

In particular, we posit that the claims of ‘ordinary’ foreigners (not part of the corrupt,political establishment) are more likely to be considered on their merits by bothmainstream media and netizens than that of ordinary natives or politically connectedforeigners. Specifically, the claims of foreigners, with regards to multicultural policies,are more likely to be considered by mainstream media than that of supposedlyxenophobic natives; and the claims of ordinary, foreign-origin residents are more likelyto be considered by netizens than that of politically connected foreigners. When nativescriticise multicultural policies, they are often framed by mainstream media as ignorantor xenophobic; in contrast, resident foreigners are framed as non-xenophobic and asknowledgeable, grass roots critics of top-down policies. Similarly, the claims ofpolitically connected foreigners, such as National Assembly member Jasmine Lee, aredismissed by native netizens as self-interested and corrupt; but the claims of ordinary,foreign-origin workers and students are considered more on their merits.

Data and Method

We collected data from a sampling of online sites of mainstream media and non-mainstream, cyber-media, based in Korea. Following the media literature (Kim 2012;Park 2014), we include the most prominent conservative-leaning (Chosun Ilbo) andleftist (Hankyoreh) newspapers. Chosun is also the largest, total circulation newspaper.We add the English-language editions of the Korea Times and Korea Herald, the most

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popular in that category (English edition). The four major newspapers offer onlinesites, with posted articles and sections for reader comments.

In the non-mainstream, cyber-media, a search of keywords related to multiculturalresulted in hundreds of websites, many of which were social media ‘communities’.Communities are online discussion forums, where users post articles on a topicalboard and other users load comments on the particular article (Table 1). Somecommunities cover general social and political issues (e.g., Ilbe, Today’s Humour);others focus on specific topics, such as baseball (Major League Baseball (MLB) Park).

Our sample includes sites that vary along the number of discourse producers, theirideological stances and ethnic backgrounds. We use simple measures to countproducers: for mainstream media, the number of article writers; for a cyber-mediasite, the largest number of unique user comments on a posted article.

Sites with relatively few, active producers of discourse and an explicit, ideologicalstance on multiculturalism, include that of mainstream media and anti-multiculturalpolicy activists. Since 2008, a small, vocal group of activists has created a number ofInternet communities explicitly opposed to multicultural policies. Anti-MulticulturalPolicy was the largest in terms of registered users (10,815); I Love Korea: The Citizen’sSolidarity was the most politically active and organised.5

A site with many users, but mostly conservative and opposed to multicultural policy,was Ilbe Storehouse (‘daily best storage’). Ilbe was one of the largest sites in Korea andnumber one in the humour/entertainment category (140,000 daily visitors; Gwak 2013).

Sites that lacked an explicit, ideological stance on multicultural policy includedMLB Park (baseball), Hanryu Love (Korean culture), Today’s Humour (generalinterest) and Let’s Go Vietnam (travel). We assume that ideologically neutral siteswould attract more users with varying views than explicitly ideological ones.

A small number of Internet communities were organised by resident foreigners,mainly by Chinese citizens of Korean ancestry (or Joseonjok), the largest migrantgroup in Korea. The biggest in the portal Daum was Grand Group of Korean-Chinese(59,539 registered users). The members exchanged information related to visa status,employment, marriage and international travel. The Daum café Let’s Go Vietnam was

Table 1. Initial keywords used for data collection.

Major keywords Focused keywords

Korean English translation Korean English translation

다문화 Multicultural 조선족 Joseonjok (Korean Chinese)외국인 노동자 Foreign Worker 장기매매 Organ Trade외국인 Foreigner 다문화 반대 Anti-Multicultural

이자스민 Jasmine Lee샘 오취리 Sam Okyere

Note: We preliminarily searched using 15 keywords: multicultural, foreign worker, foreigner, mixed-blood,marriage migrant, Joseonjok, Vietnam, Japan, Philippines, Thailand, Uzbekistan, United States, Indonesia, andMongolia. We later narrowed these to the most relevant keywords: ‘major’ for general websites and articles;‘focused’ for specific articles of interest.

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mainly for Koreans to share information on visiting or doing business in Vietnam,but it included some members who married Vietnamese migrants.

Other than Joseonjok-related sites, we found very few, active sites run by foreign-origin persons. The most popular was a power blog from Komatsu Sayaka, a migrantfrom Japan married to a native Korean. From 2007 to 2012, her blog (Sayaka blog,http://sayaka.tistory.com) averaged 400,000 visitors and one million page views permonth. We also include a Daum café operated by Mr Bae Ki-cheol, a mixed-raceKorean and president of the Korea Alliance of International Families, and a blog fromMs Kim Nancy de Vera, President of Asia Women’s Community. Bae and Kim didnot attract many visitors to their sites, but—as discussed later—they conveyed keyclaims to the mainstream media.6

In total, we selected and analysed 15 websites (4 mainstream media and 11 non-mainstream sites; see Appendix 1). First, we reviewed postings on each website anduser comments on each non-mainstream site, to understand the general tenor ofdiscourse. For the leading conservative and progressive newspapers (Chosun,Hankyoreh), we initially searched from 2010 to mid-2014. For Korea Times andKorea Herald, the online sites automatically limited search findings to the mostrecent, few hundred articles. We found hundreds of postings for each mainstreamsite. In subsequent analyses, we limited the sample to the recent six months (up todate of analysis; Tables 2 and 4); or did an open search (no date limits) for narrowkeywords (e.g., ‘anti-multicultural’; Table 4).

For non-mainstream, cyber or social media sites, we sought a significant number ofarticles (at least 30) and comments (at least 30 per article) from the most recentperiod. For more-active sites, such as Grand Group of Korean-Chinese, Hanyru Love,and especially Ilbe, which generated dozens of multicultural-related postings andhundreds of comments daily, six months (up to date of analysis) were sufficient. Forless-active sites, we extended search periods by up to two years to collect morerelevant postings. (Today’s Humour site automatically deleted older postings,therefore, only the most recent ones were available).

Second, we coded a sample of the most recent articles (Table 2) and usercomments on the most popular, multicultural-relevant articles (i.e., generated mostuser comments; Table 3). Because reader comments were sparse and infrequent inmainstream media sites (0–10 comments per article), we only analysed the postedarticles. In contrast, social media communities, especially large ones, generated highnumbers of articles and reader (user) comments, and both were analysed. Weanalysed up to the first 100 comments, per article. We found early user comments(first hundred) to be more substantively engaged with the article than latercomments, which were often off-topic and pejorative (a.k.a., internet ‘trolls’). Thiswas especially the case with Ilbe and Sayaka blog, which attracted many anti-foreigneror anti-Japanese comments; and less so with MLB Park. Sakaya’s blog included 367articles authored by Sayaka. Because we were interested in user comments, not theauthor, we only analysed the user comments on her most popular article.

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Table 2. Content analysis of sample of posted articles in selected sites.

Total posted articles Native victim Foreign victim Middle-ground Practical-humour Other

Chosun (mainstream media) 42 5 Nov 2013 to 14 Apr 2014 2 (4.8%) 40 (95.2%) 0 0 0Hankyeoreh (mainstream media) 32 5 Nov 2013 to 3 Apr 2014 0 28 (87.5%) 4 (12.5%) 0 0Anti-Multicultural Policy(anti-multicultural social media)

41 2 Nov 2012 to 7 Apr 2014 41 (100%) 0 0 0 0

Ilbe (conservative social media) 42 9 Jan 2014 to 1 Jun 2014 42 (100%) 0 0 0 0I Love Korea (anti-multicultural socialmedia)

11 15 Dec 2013 to 5 Jun 2014 11 (100%) 0 0 0 0

MLB Park (neutral social media) 43 5 May 2013 to 29 May 2014 18 (41.9%) 6 (14.0%) 11 (25.6%) 8 (18.6%) 0Hanryu Love (neutral social media) 56 25 Nov 2013 to 6 May 2014 43 (76.8%) 4 (7.1%) 6 (10.7%) 3 (5.4%) 0Today’s Humour (neutral social media) 11 29 Dec 2013 to 9 May 2014 7 (63.6%) 1 (9.1%) 1 (9.1%) 2 (18.2%) 0

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Table 3. Content analysis on comments of posted articles in non-mainstream media.

Cyber mediaPosted article(coded ‘native victim’)

Total commentsanalysed (out oftotal)

Nativevictim

Foreignvictim

Middle-ground

Practical/Humour Other

Anti-Multicultural Policy ‘Multicultural mixed blood policieswhich harm Korea and Koreans whoare persecuted’—7 Jan 2014

13 (out of 13comments) 7 Jan2014 to 7 Jun 2014

11 (84.6%) 0 0 2 (15.4%) 0

‘Korean elites try to hide the organtrade by the Chinese’—2 Nov 2012

11 (out of 11comments) 2 Nov2012 to 3 Nov 2012

9 (81.8%) 0 0 1 (9.1%) 1 (9.1%)

Ilbe (conservative) ‘The reality of multicultural policy inKorea’—30 Jan 2014

100 (out of 166comments) 30 Jan2014 to 1 Feb 2014

52 0 3 29 16

‘The pathway in which Chineseorgan trade organisations arrive inKorea’—8 Mar 2014

100 (out of 414comments) 8 Mar2014 to 9 Mar 2014

14 0 31 40 15

‘Jasmin Lee bill, will you just see (andnot act)?’—10 May 2014

100 (out of 327comments) 10 May2014 to 11May 2014

42 0 5 35 18

‘Black guy who is popular amongKorean women these days’—18Aug 2014

22 (out of 22) 18Aug 2014 to 18Aug 2014

5 (22.7%) 2 (9.1%) 0 1 (4.5%) 14 (63.6%)

MLB Park (neutral) ‘One-person demonstration by afemale high school student for annti-multicultural policy’—5May 2013

100 (out of 267) 5May 2013 to 6May 2013

24 22 33 3 18

‘Jasmin Lee’s bill for the immigrantchildren is too much’—25 April 2014

23 (out of 23) 25April 2014 to 25April 2014

14 (60.9%) 0 5 (21.7%) 3 (13.0%) 1 (4.3%)

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Table 3 (Continued)

Cyber mediaPosted article(coded ‘native victim’)

Total commentsanalysed (out oftotal)

Nativevictim

Foreignvictim

Middle-ground

Practical/Humour Other

‘Why is Okyere not popular inunusual summit?’—24 Sep 2014

26 (out of 26) 24Sep 2014 to 24Sept 2014

2 (7.69%) 0 0 1 (3.85%) 23 (88.46%)

Hanrye Love (neutral) ‘The reason why multiculturalismfailed in Russia’—6 May 2014

64 (out of 64) 6May 2014

33 (51.6%) 7 (10.9%) 14 (21.9%) 5 (7.8%) 5 (7.8%)

Today’s Humour (neutral) ‘The law to support illegalimmigrants’—9 May 2014

8 (out of 8) 9May 2014

3 (37.5%) 0 4 (50%) 1 (12.5%) 0

Posted article (coded ‘foreign victim’) CriticiseSayaka/Japan

Support Middle Practical/Humour

Other

Sayaka’s Blog (neutral) ‘Please eliminate exorbitant feeswhich ruin the image of Korea’—20Feburary 2012

100 (out of 1288) 20Feb 2012 to 22June 2014

16 54 17 7 6

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Table 4. Content analysis of postings in selected mainstream media.

Keyword, date Postings

Totalquotedpersons Media Academic Government Business

(Pro-MC)Nonprofit

Anti-MCOrg Foreigner

Nativenon-elite

Chosun ‘Multicultural’ 10 Dec2013 to 17 Mar 2014

41 27 0 4 6 11 1 0 4 1

Korea Times ‘Anti-Multicultural,Korea’ 4 Aug 2010 to30 Jan 2013

7 12 1 2 5 0 1 1 2 0

Note: A keyword search for ‘multicultural’ in Chosun (recent six months) generated 41 articles. 27 persons total were quoted using their real names, but not any member of anti-multicultural (MC) organisation. (One article cited anonymous comments from eight netizens in twitter and other forums, but did not interview a single anti-MC activist byname.) An open-date, keyword search for ‘anti-multicultural’ and ‘Korea’ in The Korea Times (English edition) generated 7 articles. Only one member of anti-MC organisationwas directly quoted by name.

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For the least active sites, I Love Korea, Korea Alliance of International Families, andAsia Women’s Community, we collected data regardless of the time period (opendates), by searching the sites for any available posting and comment. The KoreaAlliance of International Families and Asia Women’s Community were the least activesites, with five and one articles, respectively, and zero user comments. Because of thepaucity of articles and comments, they were not coded like those in more active sites(Tables 2 and 3). Still, we retained the two sites in our overall sample, because theywere among the very few operated by non-Joseonjok resident foreigners andillustrated their online public discourse (or lack of discourse).

We used a mix of manifest and latent coding. Manifest coding draws on keywordterms and is more reliable; latent coding has more validity in understanding thesubtle and genuine intentions of the author. We coded articles and comments intofive, mutually exclusive categories: native victim, foreign victim, middle-ground,practical-humour and other. In ‘native victim’, the user claims or assumes that natives(in Korea or other countries) are victims of migrants, government policies, or elites(keywords: politicians, conglomerates, Europe experiencing troubles, do not careabout native Koreans). ‘Foreign victim’ claims that migrants or multicultural familiesexperience discrimination or other hardships; or that society should help foreigners(keywords: helping adaptation, social minorities, legal migrant workers). ‘Middle-ground’ stresses mixed or conditional views of native-foreigner relations andmulticultural policy; in some instances and conditions, natives (or foreigners) arevictims, in others, not. ‘Practical-humour’ refers to practical or humorous statementson native-foreigner relations and government policies, mostly not related to victimdiscourse. ‘Other’ means the user statement cannot be confidently categorised intoany of the above categories; it includes random, esoteric comments with littlerelevance to ethnic relations or government policies.

Figure 1 shows examples of foreign victim, native victim andmiddle-ground discourses.For Sakaya’s blog, the user comments were coded a bit differently: criticise (Sakaya/Japan),support, middle-ground, practical-humour and other. Instead of a general discussion ofwhether natives or foreigners were victims, much of the commentary revolved aroundpersonal criticism, or defence, of Sayaka and her country of origin.

We—the two authors—extensively discussed and jointly coded a sub-sample ofarticles and comments (up to ten each per site or 15% of total sample), to ensureinter-coder reliability. The second author coded the rest of the sample, but consultedwith first author about ambiguous cases (user comments). The second authorconsidered less than 4% of the user comments to be ambiguous. After discussion, thetwo authors reached agreement on categorising all ambiguous cases (mostly as ‘other’or ‘practical-humour’).

Our strategy of sampling the most recent, available articles (Table 2) and usercomments on the most popular article per keyword (e.g., organ trade, Jasmine Lee;Table 3), seems reasonable and practical. We were more interested in recent articlesthan older ones, and older articles were sometimes unavailable or automaticallydeleted. User comments on the most popular article were more likely to reflect the

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spectrum of views in a given website and to actively address each other than thesparse, unfocused comments in a less-popular article.

To supplement our content analysis, the authors collected detailed interviews (oneto five hours each) from informants of Anti-Multicultural Policy, I Love Korea, andGrand Group of Korean-Chinese, and attended meetings and activities of Anti-Multicultural Policy and I Love Korea. We also posted a Google survey questionnairein six online communities, and received 55 responses. This paper includes excerpts ofsite contents and personal interviews. The original Korean content was translated intoEnglish by two graduate students (including the second author); the first authorreviewed and edited the English translations.

Stereotypical Discourse, Homogeneous Producers

Mainstream Media

Mainstream media professionals are among Korea’s societal elites in terms ofeducation, occupational status, income and English proficiency. Lee (2005) reportsthat 30.8% of working journalists in Korea graduated from Seoul National University,

Foreign victim

‘The criticism against [Jasmine Lee] on the Internet reflects nothing but xenophobia’ (Chosun). ‘Members of [xenophobic] organisations should be ashamed of themselves’ (Korea Times).

Middle-ground

‘You guys are identifying yourselves as fact-finders but spread postings which are not grounded on evidence at all’ (Ilbe). ‘I talked about the severe problems of international marriage with my friend who married a Vietnamese woman. He listened to what I said, but then disagreed. He argued that the worst cases involve a small minority of families and most of these families are fine’ (Let’s Go Vietnam). ‘There is one interesting TV program called ‘Cackle Classroom’ which assists the children of multicultural families so that they better understand Vietnam, their mothers’ homeland. By providing these children with the opportunity to understand their mothers’ backgrounds, they differentiate their program from previous ones. The children do not cry simply because they belong to multicultural families’ (Today’s Humour).

Native victim

‘Look at the proportion of crime committed by foreigners and Joseonjok. Don’t you see that Chinese, especially Joseonjok, are the dominant group among criminals?’ (Ilbe). ‘Retarded group of Korean politicians are in a rush to hide the fact. How much money they’ve got from Chinese Communist Party to be quiet!’ (Anti-Multicultural Policy).

Figure 1. Types of discourse.

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the top-ranked university in Korea; followed by Yonsei (17.7%), Korea (16.8%),Sogang (4.6%), Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (4.6%) and Sungkyunkwan(3.7%). These six universities (out of roughly 400 colleges and universitiesnationwide) produced 78.2% of journalists. Journalists at top newspapers averagedannual incomes more than $50,000, with those at the most prestigious paper, Chosun,making more than $80,000 (82,740,000 won) as of 2011 (Hur 2012).

Journalists, in turn, disproportionately interview other, highly educated membersof the societal elite, especially government officials (Baek 2001; Yoon and Boydstun2014). Media, governmental, and academic elites connect with global networks ofpolicy-makers and opinion leaders, who largely believe that policies ‘recognizing andaccommodating ethnic diversity can expand human freedom, strengthen humanrights, diminish ethnic and racial hierarchies and deepen democracy’ (Kymlicka2007: 18).

Articles written by professional journalists, and the experts quoted in the articles,mostly portrayed migrants and multicultural children as vulnerable victims andargued for greater public tolerance and support (c.f., Kim 2012; Park 2014). They alsodismissed critics of multicultural policies as ignorant xenophobes:

Concern is being raised over an increasing number of xenophobic Koreans supportingand organizing online and offline campaigns against migrant workers and immigrantwives … Lee Ha-ryong, head of Korea Migrant’s Centre, [said] ‘Members of suchorganisations should be ashamed of themselves. It is just absurd to argue that foreignworkers take jobs away from Koreans.’ (Korea Times, 13 May 2011)The criticism against [Jasmine Lee] on the Internet reflects nothing but xenophobia …It does not befit one of the world’s 10 largest exporters … to react with hostility to animmigrant who achieves something here. (Chosun [English edtion], 17 April 2012)

Nearly all mainstream articles discussed foreigners as victims (40 out of 42 articles inChosun Ilbo; 28 out of 32 in Hankyeoreh; Table 2). Moreover, they rarely quotedmembers of anti-multicultural organisations. In a sample of Korea Times articles thatspecifically discussed anti-multiculturalism, only one person quoted was a member ofa nativist, anti-multicultural organisation. In a sample of Chosun articles, not a singleperson interviewed was a nativist activist (Table 4).

Anti-Multicultural Policy

Activists from Anti-Multicultural Policy claimed to be the social and ideologicalopposites of media elites. The claim was consistent with the demographic profiles ofsite leaders and users. Site administrator Ms Kim H (age 40) and spokesperson MrKang (45) were, respectively, a housewife and an unemployed software developer.Although only eight users responded to our Google survey, they also fit the low socio-economic status profile: average, monthly income under $1500 and little Englishproficiency. Anti-Multicultural Policy informants and respondents were mostlyunemployed, part-time or temporary contract workers (e.g., construction) and small

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business owners, with little income security. (We acknowledge possible bias in lownumbers of respondents).

In Korea, temporary workers generally receive one or two year contracts,renewable at employer discretion. Jang (2010) finds that job security is a significantcorrelate of attitudes towards migrant workers. Respondents with permanentemployment are more likely to agree with the statement, ‘Immigrants should gainthe same legal rights as Koreans,’ than respondents with non-permanent employ-ment. (Income and education are not significant correlates).

If mainstream media professionals saw themselves as educated, enlightened elite,Anti-Multicultural Policy activists described themselves as the voice of an angry andbetrayed nation. Activists drew on the populist language of a virtuous andhomogeneous people, whose rights, values and property were threatened by acoalition of corrupt elites above and dangerous ‘others’ below (Albertazzi andMcDonnell 2008, 3). Said Kim H, ‘Multicultural policy represents the interest of thetop 1%. They rarely pay attention to the Korean day labourers who are sufferingevery day.’

Contrary to embracing ethnic, pan-Korean solidarity (Shin 2006), activistsexpressed some of the sharpest criticism against their co-ethnics from China, theJoseonjok. Comprising nearly half of foreign residents, Joseonjok migrants wereserious competitors for the jobs of low-skilled natives. Kim H claimed that she, herhusband and father had all lost jobs, at one time or another, to the Joseonjok. TheJoseonjok were also linked with anti-social and criminal behaviour: the mostnotorious was Mr Oh Won-choon, who raped, murdered and chopped a nativewoman’s body into 365 pieces (1 April 2012).

Anti-Multicultural Policy users connected the Oh Won-choon murder case with awidely disseminated conspiracy theory: migrant gangs are kidnapping thousands ofKoreans and stealing their organs, and the mainstream media and government arecovering up these crimes. One user posted an article from a non-mainstream newssite (http://newdaily.co.kr/) that reported that the South Korean governmentcancelled a press conference featuring the noted human rights activist and formerCanadian cabinet minister, David Kilgour. The article speculated that Kilgour wouldhave disclosed the government’s negotiation with the Chinese Communist Partyabout the organ trade. Nine out of 11 user comments supported the article’s theorythat Korean politicians cancelled his press conference to appease China; the other twousers were non-committal (Table 3).7

Retarded group of Korean politicians are in a rush to hide the facts, but Dr. Kilgour canbe called a patriot even though he is not a citizen. How much money did they get fromthe Chinese Communist Party to be quiet! (Anti-Multicultural Policy, lack of 2%, 2November 2012)

Less sensationalistic, but just as widespread, were stories of abusive, Joseonjok nannies.At the conservative site Ilbe, one posting captured images of a Korean TV programmereporting the antics of a Joseonjok nanny, who threw the children to the floor, neglected

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to feed them and sent threatening text messages to their mother. The TV programmementioned a black list of Joseonjok nannies among Korean mothers. The posting useradvised parents to take care of their children and not to hire Joseonjok nannies (Ilbe,‘Bizarre Joseonjok Nanny’, x4 + 2 = 74, 26 August 2013). The posted article generated209 comments, most of which echoed the author’s warning. They argued that Joseonjokmay look and talk like native Koreans, but they were in fact low-class migrants fromChina, carrying the worst habits of their adopted land:

Why are Joseonjok people like that? Are they really a group of people who have theDNA of opportunists escaping from the Japanese Colonial Era? If we see KoreanJapanese and Korean Americans, there are many overseas Koreans who succeed andhelp Korea, but Joseonjok just swindle Korea. (Harymotor, 26 August 2013)Joseonjok is Chinese. Remember this. They are not Korean at all. (Clench your teeth, 26August 2013)Among Chinese, Joseonjok is the people who absorbed the most inferior customs.Strictly speaking, they are inferior to Chinese. (00Won, 26 August 2013)

Framing Nativists: I Love Korea

The political umbrella organisation, I Love Korea, distanced itself from thesensational rhetoric (e.g., organ trade, abusive nannies) of some netizens in Anti-Multicultural Policy and Ilbe. On its website, the mission statement emphasised thatKoreans were victims of unfair and ineffective government policies, not of foreigners:

‘I Love Korea: The Citizen’s Solidarity’ does not promote exclusive nationalism whichunconditionally excludes foreigners and foreign cultures. There are unfortunatemulticultural phenomena in Korea resulting from the indiscriminate policies of theKorean government. A preferential policy that supports the ‘multicultural family’, butbrings about reverse-discrimination against local citizens, should be immediatelyrepealed.

Postings on the I Love Korea discussion board expressed nostalgia for the values of anearlier, pre-modern Korea that emphasised ‘loyalty, justice, humanity and filial piety’(I Love Korea, Ddaksunsang, 15 December 2013). They warned about imitating thedisastrous, multicultural policies of western countries:

Multicultural policies were implemented in England, France, Germany, and Australia afew decades ago to advance democracy and tolerance. However, these countries recentlydeclared the abolition of multicultural policies due to various national crises, such asconflicts between natives and foreigners, cultural chaos, threats to national identity,increasing crimes, social insecurity, and stratification. (I Love Korea, Powerful KoreanWave, 28 May 2014)

In an interview, Dr Shin Man Sop, 57, the founder and co-president of I Love Korea,expressed a preference for people to better their home countries instead of migratingelsewhere; however, if they do migrate, they should quickly assimilate in the hostcountry instead of maintaining separate cultures and languages. He also avoided

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entanglement in the organ trade conspiracy, saying that any rumour should beinvestigated carefully by the government. He preferred debating policies rather thandemonising migrants.

The relatively moderate, sophisticated views of I Love Korea can be partlyexplained by the relatively heterogeneous and middle-class backgrounds of its leadersand members, compared with those in Anti-Multicultural Policy. According to Shin,I Love Korea included some college-educated persons and small business owners; theauthors also talked with 15 activists at a monthly meeting, who mostly fit this profile.Shin personally earned a doctorate in political science at the Université des SciencesSociales de Toulouse in France, and experienced first-hand the controversies overmulticultural policies in Europe.

Despite his relatively moderate, policy-oriented views and elite education, Dr Shinwas not able to land a lengthy interview or an opinion editorial with any majornewspaper. ‘We tried so many times to communicate with politicians and the media.They just do not listen’. Moreover, when his organisation appeared in news articles,its arguments were distorted and demonised:

When mainstream media approach us for an interview, they are very kind. Yet, theytotally change their tones in news articles. Korean media use several vocabularies tochallenge anti-multicultural parties. They ignore our intent and explanation, anddescribe us as xenophobes and racists. They simplify our purpose and distort ourargument. Korean media demonise anti-multicultural parties, organisations and people,including I Love Korea.

One factor explaining Dr Shin’s predicament was his relatively non-elite, occupa-tional status. Despite his prestigious education, Shin remained a part-time lecturer ata non-elite university. In general, only tenured professors at elite universities wereinterviewed by, or wrote opinion editorials for, major newspapers. Another, perhapsmore important, factor was how the media negatively framed (‘demonised’) Shin andhis fellow activists. When natives criticised multicultural policies, no matter howreasoned, they were often framed as backward or xenophobic.

Mixed Discourse, Heterogeneous Producers

In Korea, the number of mainstream media writers and regularly quoted experts onmulticulturalism amounted to a few hundred, at most; this was equivalent to thenumber of activists in the anti-multicultural policy organisations. The two groupsoperated in ‘information cocoons’ or ‘echo chambers’, where opposing viewpointswere rarely discussed (Sunstein 2009, 43). In fact, the more insulated group may bethe educated, progressive elites. In the United States, the most-educated, highest-income persons are the least likely to experience cross-cutting political discussion(Mutz 2006, 31). Moreover, mainstream supporters of tolerance and diversitysometimes deliberately exclude the voices of xenophobic populists from the publicsquare, akin to a cordon sanitaire (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 8). In Korea,

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media and academic elites rejected all overtures from Dr Shin and other anti-multicultural activists for serious dialogue.

However, in large, online communities, netizens discussed issues with users ofvarious viewpoints. They generally found nuanced, evidence-based arguments to bemore persuasive than sensational, conspiratorial ones. This was evident even in thelargest, conservative-leaning site, Ilbe. Ilbe users mostly agreed with a posted articlethat native Koreans were victims of government multicultural policies (52 out of 100comments); but they sharply disagreed on whether Koreans were victims of Chinese(Joseonjok) organ traders (Table 3). The organ trade article claimed:

Targeted kidnapping and organ trading mean that gangs target a person to remove hisorgans. OhWon-choon’s murder also belongs to the targeted kidnapping and organ tradecategory. There are various ways that these people kidnap Koreans: (i) they attract peopleby saying that they recruit models and entertainers, (ii) the elderly and disabled approachKoreans to ask for help, (iii) they advertise a good job posting, (iv) unauthorised taxidrivers kidnap customers, (v) they kidnap people by a car in a dark quiet street, and (vi)they approach people to give free products. (Ilbe, Let’s chase, 8 March 2014)

Of the first 100 user comments, more than twice as many (31) questioned the organtrade, and its connection to Oh Won-choon, than agreed with it (14). (The rest werenon-committal). Among the 31 sceptics, none expressed the view that foreigners werevictims of Korean society (‘foreign victim’). They expressed a more nuanced,conditional view (‘middle-ground’): clear evidence exists for many types of foreignercrimes and misbehaviours (e.g., abusive nannies), but not for the organ trade. Despitetheir anti-foreigner views, most Ilbe users identified themselves as advocates for afact-based approach (‘fact-ism’).

Such stupid Ilbe people. You guys are identifying yourselves as fact finders, but spreadpostings which are not grounded on evidence at all. It is ridiculous. (Ilbe, Support formurder, 8 March 2014)Ilbe user!! If what you said [about connecting Oh Won Choon with the organ trade] iscorrect … then why did Oh Won Choon [minutely chop the victim’s body into 365pieces] at home? Is not speed the key to the organ trade? (One night tonight, 8March 2014)

An additional 40 user comments joked about the organ trade conspiracy (‘practical-humour’):

This reminds me of one scene in the television show ‘Breaking Bad’, where Heisenbergpours chemicals in a plastic bottle to dissolve a corpse. (Slave in an island of rioters, 8March 2014)

Ilbe had a much larger, more heterogeneous, group of users discussing multi-culturalism than did Anti-Multicultural Policy. The organ trade article generated 414user comments in Ilbe; a similar article generated 11 comments in Anti-MulticulturalPolicy (Table 3). Our 19 survey respondents, plus available reports (e.g., Jung 2013;

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Kang 2013; Gwak 2013), show many Ilbe users to be university students or full-timeworkers at big companies. They generated more mixed and nuanced discourse thandid the lower-status members of Anti-Multicultural Policy.

Neutral Sites

Mixed and nuanced discourse was especially common at popular websites oriented to‘non-political’ interests, such as cosmetics, sports, technology and travel. MLB Parkbrought together a wide range of people to discuss baseball, the most popular sport inKorea. In this baseball community, users would sometimes discuss social and politicalissues. MLB was the cyber-media equivalent of an bridging, public forum, which‘promotes a shared set of experiences at the same time that it exposes countlesspeople to information and opinions that they would not have sought out in advance’(Sunstein 2009, 217).

In 2012, a female high school student, and supporter of I Love Korea, held a one-person demonstration against multicultural policies in front of the NationalAssembly. In MLB Park, posted photos of her protest generated 267 user comments(5–6 May 2013; Table 3). Most users appreciated the opportunity for rationaldiscussion of government policies, rather than emotional attacks against particulargroups:

At least, this is not just one-sided prejudice but an argument worth considering. Suchconcerns should’ve been raised before it all began. (MLB Park, Dr Rain, 5 May 2013)8

MLB users showed a wide range of responses. Of the first 100 user comments, 24agreed that Koreans were victims of discrimination (‘native victim’); but they mostlyavoided hostile rhetoric and one even offered supporting evidence from a famous,foreign-origin blogger:

Discrimination against our citizens does exist. A while ago, a famous Japanese bloggerSayaka, who is living in Korea and married to a Korean man, revealed that she refusedto accept child care subsidies from the Korean government. She was concerned thateven affluent multicultural families receive subsidies when the money should be spenton other families with real difficulties. That is clearly reverse-discrimination. I’m notagainst foreigners living in Korea. However, it doesn’t make sense to give them moneyjust because one of the spouses is from a foreign country. (Rigel, 5 May 2013)

Twenty-two users, however, emphasised that most multicultural families experiencedifficulties in Korea and need government support (‘foreign victim’):

Because of the Korean ideology of homogeneous ethnicity and culture, and the tendencyto look down on other colored people, many multicultural children face difficulties. Ifthey fail to adapt to Korean society, it can grow into a bigger social problem. Things aremuch harder for immigrants because they do not speak Korean well. Without supportfor these socially vulnerable people, they cannot stand on their own feet. (GoGo, 5May 2013)

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In the ‘middle’ were 33 users, who offered mixed, conditional views of multiculturalpolicies. Some argued for distinguishing between different categories of foreigners,with some deserving more support than others: ‘[The protester’s] argument does notdistinguish multicultural families from foreign or illegal migrants’ (Asterics). Otherssaid that migration and multicultural society bring difficulties to Koreans, but thatthey are inevitable for a modern, global economy.

Compared with mainstream media and nativist or conservative sites, wherepostings were predominantly victim-oriented (foreign or native victim), ideologicallyneutral sites showed more variety in the type of articles (Table 2) and comments(Table 3). In Hanryu Love, some members expressed complaints about migrants,often illegal, from developing countries; other members replied that the migrantsmostly came from countries (e.g., China, Vietnam and Philippines) where Hanryuculture was well received.

In Today’s Humour, one user criticised public advertisements that portrayedmulticultural children as pitiful victims; she lauded a new television show thattranscended the victim perspective and portrayed regular children learning aboutthemselves:

There is one interesting TV program called ‘Cackle Classroom’ which assists thechildren of multicultural families so that they better understand Vietnam, their mothers’homeland. By providing these children with the opportunity to understand theirmothers’ backgrounds, they differentiate their program from previous ones. Thechildren do not cry simply because they belong to multicultural families. ‘CackleClassroom’ has the right approach to multiculturalism: it does not appeal to pity.(Today’s Humour, Always pondering, 29 December 2013)

In Let’s Go Vietnam, many users’ prejudices against marriage migrants werechallenged by those who actually married Vietnamese women. One user recounted:

I talked about the severe problems of international marriage with my friend whomarried a Vietnamese woman. He listened to what I said, but then disagreed. He arguedthat the worst cases involve a small minority of families and most of these families arefine. (Let’s Go Vietnam, Dew and fog, 2 February 2013)

Foreign-origin Netizens

Foreign-origin netizens were mostly passive consumers, not active producers, ofmulticultural-related discourse. We found virtually no postings or comments fromself-identified foreigners in Korean-organised sites. One likely barrier was language,as most migrants (besides the Joseonjok) could not yet discourse fluently in theKorean language. Another was fear of prejudice. Our Joseonjok informant Choi Rvisited native-Korean sites, including Ilbe, but he never self-identified as a Joseonjokor posted comments contesting the anti-multicultural narrative. Even though userswere supposed to be anonymous, Choi expressed concern that thousands ofprejudiced netizens could hack into his account.

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A small number of Internet communities were organised by resident foreigners,mainly by Joseonjok migrants. Some expressed fears that the entire Korean societywas turning against them in the aftermath of the Oh murder case:

Due to Oh Wonchoon, other Joseonjoks are blamed as well. When he came to Korea, heshould have worked hard and returned home with money … why should he commitmurder? (Grand Group of Korean Chinese, Borrow me a child, 15 June 2013)This prejudice showed when I worked in a company, and I was very conscious of it …People said that Joseonjok eat human flesh and they are so brutal. (Confident, 20June 2013)

The isolation of foreign-origin netizens was partly countered by a number of nativenetizens, who visited migrant-related cafés and offered encouragement:

I feel sorry for Joseonjok people. Since I have worked in Yeonbyeon [a Chineseprovince] for a few years, I can understand them. There is a proverb that one or two fishdistort the entire clean river. Do not worry too much and I wish a good life for you.(Grand Group of Korean Chinese, Noknok, 16 June 2013)Hi. I am running this website; www.foodkn.com. I am so annoyed with all the rumours[surrounding Joseonjok]. I am dating one Joseonjok woman, and I would like to marryher. I am so sad and mad at the people who say bad things. We are all one ethnicity andbrothers. We should take care of each other, and I feel sorry about this situation.(Konan looking for a good restaurant, 18 June 2013)

If foreign-origin netizens overcome fears of prejudice and learn to communicatecomfortably in Korean (or English), they could potentially share their views with bothmainstream and social media. Resident foreigners were visibly interviewed in themainstream media: 2 out of 12 interviewees in a sample of Korea Times articles; fourof out 27 in Chosun (Table 4). This was equivalent to the number of academics(professors) interviewed in each newspaper. In contrast, the newspapers neglected tointerview members of anti-multicultural organisations or non-elite natives, in general.The mainstream media tend to interview predominantly well-educated elites fromleading universities, corporations, large non-profits and, especially, the government(Baek 2001; Yoon and Boydstun 2014), and this was also the case for multicultural-related articles. Resident foreigners were basically the only ones without elitebackgrounds to be interviewed.

The mainstream media sympathetically portrayed resident foreigners, even whenthey sharply critiqued government multicultural policies. Ms Kim Nancy de Vera, amarriage migrant from the Philippines, served as president of the Asia Women’sCommunity, the first non-governmental organisation led by immigrant spouses. In anewspaper interview, Kim urged the government to stop labelling ethnic minorities as‘multicultural’:

We are treated differently because the government has named us ‘damunhwa’(multicultural) people and defined us as people who need help … Going on free tripsto the Everland amusement park with other multiethnic kids is fun; but our kids would

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love to interact and play with other Korean kids as well. Instead of treating the‘damunhwa’ people to free trips, we’d appreciate the government teaching all kids andteachers about human rights. We just want to become equal citizens and have normallives. (Kim quoted in Korea Herald, 5 June 2013)

Bae Ki-cheol, 57, a mixed-race Korean, shared his experience with the mainstreammedia, as well as netizen bloggers. Until 2011, the Korean military excludedmulticultural children because of fears of discrimination from native soldiers. Baeclaimed that this well-intentioned policy had devastating consequences for mixed-race Koreans:

‘[The Army] did not give me any chance’, Bae told Roh Tae-gyeong, a ‘citizen journalist’who writes a blog … Although the constitution designates military service as one of thebasic duties of all male citizens without disabilities, men of mixed race were not allowedto serve in the military. For Bae, who is now president of the Korea Alliance ofInternational Families, that exclusion was symbolic of South Koreans’ discriminationagainst bi-racial citizens. He said that he could never get a full-time job, not onlybecause of his looks but also because of his lack of military experience, and that he hasrarely been financially stable as a result. (Korea Times, 5 September 2012)

Andrew Calhoun, a university graduate student and from Canada, wrote an opinion-editorial questioning the applicability of western models of multiculturalism to Korea:

Multiculturalism as national policy works well in a country like Canada whereimmigration levels are consistently high … This is in stark contrast to the Koreansituation where the overwhelming majority of the population shares a single culturaland linguistic background. Multiculturalism doesn’t make a lot of sense in this context.Why then are so many people, both foreign and Korean, calling for Korea to embracemulticulturalism as a positive and inevitable outcome of modern migration trends? …The principles of treating foreign workers and guests fairly and with respect are notincompatible with a rejection of multiculturalism. (Korea Times, 4 August 2010)

Calhoun’s op-ed articulated similar arguments from I Love Korea and was the onlyarticle from the Korea Times to show sympathy to anti-multicultural critics. Themainstream media’s differential treatment of Korean and foreign-origin criticsdemonstrates that, even if the message is similar, the messenger is critical. Ifnative-Koreans criticise multicultural policies, no matter how reasoned, they areframed as backward or xenophobic. If resident foreigners offer similar criticism, theyare framed as knowledgeable, grass roots critics of top-down policies. Because of theirconstructed identity, members of out-groups deflect charges of xenophobia and comeacross as policy entrepreneurs or magnanimous advocates of universal justice (c.f.,HoSang 2010, chapter 7). Ordinary, foreign-origin residents (e.g., Kim, Bae, Calhoun)helped diversify mainstream media discourse from predominantly pro-multiculturalto more mixed and nuanced.

Similarly, ordinary minorities such as Bae Ki-cheol were relatively well receivedby native netizens because they were not framed as part of the elitist, corrupt system.

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We can contrast Bae with the controversial Jasmine Lee. A marriage migrant from thePhilippines, Lee became the first migrant member of the National Assembly, as aproportional representative of the ruling Saenuri Party. Lee was accused of lackingproper qualifications and lying about her academic credentials, among other charges(Chosun, 14 April 2012). She was only selected as National Assembly member,netizens claimed, because of her corrupt ties with political and media elites. Netizensunfavourably compared the credentials of Jasmine Lee with that of other, femaleAssembly members, such as Na Kyoung-won and Jeon Yeo-ok, who attended eliteuniversities and even worked as judges.

Jasmine Lee was portrayed positively by mainstream media, including herproposed bill to provide education, health services and other rights to undocumentedmigrant children (e.g., Korea Times, 3 April 2014). However, Lee received over-whelmingly negative criticism from netizens. In the conservative Ilbe and the neutralMLB Park, articles about Jasmine Lee, specifically her proposed bill to assistundocumented children, received many more negative comments than positiveones: 44 Ilbe comments (out of first 100), and 14 MLB Park users (out of 23 total)described Lee as helping foreign workers at the expensive of native Koreans.

The mostly middle to low-income activists from I Love Korea and Anti-Multicultural Policy expressed strong resentment against Jasmine Lee and otherforeigners who (allegedly) received unfair benefits from a corrupt, elite-dominatedsystem. However, foreign-origin residents who were regular workers or students, whodid not receive privileges unavailable to natives, and who—in the case of Bae—actually wished to serve in the Korean military, deflected charges of corruption. Anti-Multicultural Policy spokesperson Kang S opposed special benefits for foreignworkers, especially the exemption from military service; but if foreigners were willingto work hard, follow the rules, and serve in the military, he personally had noproblems with them living in Korea.

We can also contrast Lee with another, well-known, female marriage migrant, theJapanese blogger Sayaka. From 2007 to 2012, her near-daily postings averaged 200reader comments. Her article on the exorbitant fees that Korean businesses (e.g., taxidrivers, shopkeepers) charge foreigners generated 1288 user comments (Table 3).Among the first 100 comments, a vocal minority (16) criticised Sayaka and hercountry of origin (Japan), sometimes in highly vitriolic terms. One even suggestedthat she and her Korean husband return to Japan:

If Japan continues to behave badly without apologizing to surrounding nations, Japanwill suffer one day (Sayaka blog, Dungkuk, 4 April 2014)Why is this woman living here when all she does is complain? Her husband can’tmigrate to Japan? (ddong, 16 April 2014)

The majority (54), however, defended Sayaka or expressed consolation for foreigners’experiences in Korea:

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Why do you [Korean users] not accept and try to fix what a foreigner advises from atourist’s perspective? (ㅅㅌㄹㅇ, 11 April 2014)As a Korean, I feel ashamed about the rip-off prices for foreigners. Someone calls itearning foreign currency. That’s just a rationale for crooks exchanging greed forpatriotism (nurungjimat, 3 May 2014).

Some (17) deferred judgment on whether Korean merchants discriminated againstforeigners, saying that ordinary Koreans were also victims of exorbitant fees or thatmerchants cheat in every country.

Whatever their views, the blog offered an opportunity for netizens to dialogue with aresident foreigner and with each other. The vast majority of engaged users consideredSakaya to be a credible, ordinary foreigner. Unlike Jasmine Lee, Sayaka did not succeedthrough her political connections, but supposedly through hard work and attractingnetizens to her blog. As such, Sakaya served as a trustworthy broker of ideas andinformation in social media. Even anti-multicultural critics, such as the MLB Park userRigel, cited Sayaka, namely her critique of blanket childcare subsidies to multiculturalfamilies.

In contrast to Jasmine Lee, articles focused on Sayaka or Bae were absent in Ilbeand MLB Park. But we did find articles and many user comments on Sam Okyere, ablack male, university student from Ghana and a famous entertainer in Korean-language television (Table 3). Although many Ilbe and MLB Park users described Leeas bad for Korea, they did not do so for Okyere. Only five out of 22 Ilbe users and twoout of 26 MLB users described Okyere as bad for Korea: one Ilbe user suggested thatmigrants like Okyere will bring the Ebola virus. Even in the conservative humour siteIlbe, the most popular article on Okyere, and most reader comments, avoided native-victim discourse. In their view, Okyere did not succeed through unfair, politicalconnections, but through his individual characteristics, including good looks,charisma, and hard work (e.g., becoming fluent Korean speaker).

These days, Samuel Okerye from Ghana is popular. Women say that he is tall, goodlooking, and has a good image. It is interesting that he is popular in a country like SouthKorea where blacks have not been welcomed … In the future many more foreigners willbe on air once the foreign population increases. (Ilbe, Think I am Gaining a LittleWeight, 18 August 2014)He is a good looking guy (Ilbe, Big Mac Large Set, 18 August 2014, Ilbe)Look at his coolness (Ilbe, Smoking Area 19, 1 8 August 2014)

Because most user comments discussed Okyere’s unique, individual characteristics(‘good looking’, ‘coolness’), rather than his ethnic minority or migrant status, theywere categorised as practical-humour or other (Table 3).

Discussion and Future Research

Empirical analysis of 16 websites, supplemented with informant interviews andobservations, largely supports our theoretical claims. A prevailing discourse of victimhood

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is associated with small, ideologically homogeneous groups of media producers, namelymainstream media and nativist websites; in contrast, mixed and nuanced discourses aremore common in large and heterogeneous, online communities, where users interact witha variety of viewpoints. Moreover, actors who are framed in non-negative terms—asneither xenophobes nor corrupt elites—serve as effective brokers and bridges acrossvarious media. Specifically, we find some evidence that ordinary foreigners are more likelyto be interviewed by mainstream media, with regards to multicultural policies, thanordinary natives; and ordinary resident foreigners are more likely to be accepted bynetizens than politically connected foreigners. The credibility of foreign-origin residentsand other actors among different media producers deserves further research.

Although beyond the scope of this project, an interesting finding was thestigmatisation of ethnic Koreans from China (Joseonjok) and, to lesser extent, NorthKorea (Talbukja). Among migrant groups, the Joseonjok were the closest to the hostpopulation in terms of genetic ancestry and ethnic culture; they bore Korean names,spoke the Korean language, and traced their ancestry to specific family lineages andhometowns in the Korean peninsula. However, this made them evenmore dangerous, inthe eyes of many natives. Having lived for several generations (or centuries) in China,the Joseonjok were no different from other, low-skilled migrants; but their ability to‘pass’ physically and linguistically allowed dangerous, criminal elements, such as organtraders or abusive nannies, to infiltrate an unsuspecting, host population. Physically andculturally distinct migrants, such as those from Africa, Americas, or Southeast Asia,were less likely to pose such a threat to native Koreans.

Public distrust ofmigrants, including and especially those of same ethnic ancestry, bodesill for a potential, post-unification future, when impoverishedmillions descend fromNorthKorea. The construction of stigmatised group identities in Korea merits future research.

This article adds to the literature on the media discourse of migrants andminorities in economically advanced democracies. It presents the first detailed,empirical study of multicultural discourse among all three categories of mediaproducers (mainstream professionals, native netizens, foreign-origin netizens) inKorea. It draws on venerable theoretical concepts (e.g., heterogeneous institutions)and develops new ones (public legitimacy, external framing). Relatively newdemocracies in East Asia (e.g., Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan) have muchto learn from and to share with their older counterparts in North America andWestern Europe. A comparative study of minorities, migrants and the media, as inthis special issue of JEMS, promises significant contribution to this essential debate.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding

This work was supported by Hanyang University Research Grant. We appreciate the studentresearch assistance of Min Joo (Heather) Yang.

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Notes

[1] Data from Korea Immigration Service as of June 9, 2013.[2] At the end of 2011, 97.2% of Korean households had Internet and broadband connections,

the highest in the OECD (http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/ieoutlook.htm). In 2013, 73% ofKorean internet users owned smartphones, including 97.7% of those agreed 18–24 (Google,‘Our Mobile Planet’, http://think.withgoogle.com/mobileplanet/en/).

[3] ‘Professionals’ are defined as people who earn income from applying complex bodies ofknowledge. ‘Elites’ are the top strata of personnel in government, academia, corporations,media and large nonprofits.

[4] A few articles and books by academics and journalists discuss populist, netizen discourse inother, East Asian countries. In Japan, vocal netizen groups use obscene language (e.g.,cockroaches, whores) to protest government benefits for the Korean-Japanese minority (e.g.,funding for separate schools) and to demand the immediate deportation of illegalimmigrants (Fackler 2010; Penney 2013; Yasuda 2013). In China, informal groups of mostlynon-elite, urban youth use the internet to ‘challenge the Chinese Communist Party’s officialpolicy of multiculturalism, while seeking to promote pride and self-identification with theHan race’ (Leibold 2010, 539).

[5] Communities actively discussing multicultural issues, including Anti-Multicultural Policy,were often hosted by Daum, the oldest of the three major Korean portals. Daum userscreated specific online communities (‘Cafés’) on any topic or theme.

[6] Although not part of our analysis, Migrant World Television (formerly Migrant WorkerTelevision, http://www.mwtv.or.kr/) is the site of a politically activist, pro-labour organisa-tion that advocates for the rights of migrants. It claims about 150 regular members,including many undocumented, migrant workers and activists (Prey 2011). It has receivedsignificant attention from academics (Prey 2011; Lee 2013), although little from netizens. Wecould not gain access to the site user comments at this time, but hope to do so in futureresearch.

[7] A user comment begins with a dash; a posted article does not.[8] MLB Park user comments were translated from Korea Bang, ‘A high school student protests

against multiculturalism’, 8 May 2013, http://www.koreabang.com/2013/pictures/one-woman-anti-multiculturalism-protest-ignites-debate.html.

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Appendix 1. List of websites and communities

# Name Link Date established & features (as of 21 April 2014) Keywords Sample

1 Chosun Ilbo www.chosun.com

. March 1920

. Most widely circulated newspaper in South Korea; consideredpolitically conservative

‘Multiculturalforeigner’

Postings: 738 10Jan 2010 to 15Jun 2014

2 Hankyeoreh www.hani.co.kr

. May1988

. Leading independent, leftist alternative to conservative media‘Multiculturalforeigner’

Postings: 257 18Jan 2010 to 29May 2014

3 The Korea Herald www.koreaherald.com

. 1953

. Daily English-language newspaper operated by Herald Media‘MulticulturalKorea’

Postings: 350 3Jan 2011 to 8Jun 2014

4 The Korea Times www.koreatimes.co.kr

. November 1950

. Oldest English-language newspapers; part of the same newspapergroup as Hankook Ilbo, a major Korean language daily

‘MulticulturalKorea’

Postings: 546 3Jan 2010 to 13Jun 2014

5 Ilbe Storage www.ilbe.com . April 2010. Leading humour/entertainment site in Korea; reputation as

dominated by youthful conservatives

‘Multicultural’ Postings: 43 9 Jan2014 to 1Jun 2014

6 Daum Café ‘Anti-multicultural Policy’

http://cafe.daum.net/dacultureNO

. June 2008

. Members: 10,815

. Topical Boards include foreign migrant workers’ settlement,media’s manipulation, multicultural policies, foreigners’ crime,public issues (unemployment, low fertility), Kosian, Joseonjok,and Muslim

‘Multicultural’ Postings: 41 2 Nov2012 to 7Apr 2014

7 I Love Korea http://www.ilovekorea21.kr/

. 2011

. Members: 200 (approx.)

. The leading political organisation against multicultural policy

‘Multicultural’ Postings: 11 15Dec 2013 to 5Jun 2014

8 Today’s Humour http://www.todayhumour.co.kr

. September 1999

. Internet community for humour/entertainment, current issues,science, and history

‘Multicultural’ Postings: 11 29Dec 2013 to 9May 2014

9 Daum Café ‘Let’s GoVietnam’

http://cafe.daum.net/gajavn

. April 2009

. Members: 29,581

. Vietnam’s life/travel/food/cities/map and multiculturalism. Somemembers belong to multicultural families, and actively participatein exchanging and sharing information about visa status, medicalexams, policy benefits, and other issues

‘Multicultural’ Postings: 66 11Feb 2012 to 28Mar 2014

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Appendix 1 (Continued)

# Name Link Date established & features (as of 21 April 2014) Keywords Sample

10 Daum Café‘Hanryu Love’

http://cafe.daum.net/hanryulove

. 14 December 2002

. Members: 243,396

. Nominated as a 2013 Daum superior café. Hanryu movie clips,K-POP, Korean food, culture and history, traditional costumes,traditional housing, social issues (e.g., military security, politics)

‘Multicultural’ Postings: 56 25Nov 2013 to 6May 2014

11 Daum Café ‘GrandGroup of Korean-Chinese’

http://cafe.daum.net/yanji123

. April 2006

. Member: 59,458

. The largest café in Daum dealing with Joseonjok issues. Boardsinclude currency exchange rates, insurance, employment, lan-guage translation, news and pictures about China, marriage anddating, humour and music, and travel

‘MulticulturalOrgan Trade’

Postings: 31 4 Nov2013 to 8Apr 2014

12 Daum Café ‘KoreaAlliance ofInternational Families’

http://cafe.daum.net/dawoori5060

. April 2008

. Member: 266

. Operated by Mr Bae and includes Bae’s columns and editorials;many newsarticles related to multicultural family policies

‘Multicultural’ Postings: 5 30 Mar2013 to 31Mar 2013

13 MLB Park http://mlbpark.donga.com/

. March 2001

. Sports community under Dong-Ah (dongah.com), a major newsmedia; forums to discuss USA major league baseball and Koreanbaseball

‘Anti-Multicultural’

Postings: 43 5May 2013 to 29May 2014

14 Asia Women’sCommunity (The AidaVillage)

http://blog.naver.com/aida_2008

. 2008

. ‘The Aida Village’ means the community for Asian migrantwomen. The blog has some advertisements about multiculturalfestivals and events. Ms Kim Nancy de Vera is the president ofAsian Women’s Community, which claims to be the firstnongovernmental organisation led by immigrants pouses

‘Multicultural’ Postings: 1 6Aug 2013

15 Sayaka’s blog http://sayaka.tistory.com/

. 2007

. Nominated as the best blogger in 2007, 2008, and 2009 by tstoryand Daum. The average number of visitors per month is 400,000,and the number of page view per month is one million. Her blogdelivers many postings which share interesting and embarrassingepisodes that she experienced while living in Korea

Open term Postings: 367 27Jun 2007 to 20Feb 2012

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