US corporation defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO

bring their own judge to the Marshall Islands US Corporations GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO exported

from the United States US District Judge John C. Coughenour to racketeer on their behalf to avoid Judgment in Default

USA's MEGA CORPORATIONS' PLIANT HENCHMEN: Does corporate money pay for personal judges acting in

sink-wells of spurious proceedings, fake trials and court fraud?

Facts are not generally exposed, because judicial corruption is the most unreported

news story in the US landscape. US media are afraid to report, even with clear proof in their hands. This, in consequence, leads to an escalation of further judicial corruption, since exposure is practically non-existent. The sink-well of corruption is a heaven for corporations who can tailor judicial outcomes

to their needs.

US judges – and lawyers (protected by judges) can commit felony crimes in blinding daylight, leave the proof thereof in the court files, and yet are not being prosecuted or even having such corruption and

fraud reported by the media.

The Source and the Western World's heritage of the Equal Protection Clause stems from the Magna Carta in 1215:

“No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled . nor will we proceed with force against him . except by the lawful judgment of his

equals or by the law of the land. To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.”

This statement of principle is enshrined in the Magna Carta, and carries the Great Seal of King John of England in 1215. From this principle stem all more recent constitutions' Equal Protection

of the Law Clause, which simply orders that no one is to be dealt with either a preferential or prejudiced manner by either police, courts or any other governmental agency. It is as such

enshrined in the US Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution. It is also enshrined in

the Marshallese Constitution under Article II, Section 12, Equal protection and freedom from discrimination.

If one goggles “judicial corruption” one is overwhelmed with material, most often from reliable sources with facts and supporting evidence. Thus, one gets the impression that the US judiciary is in fact worse than the judiciary in any of the Banana Republics, who are however always criticized by the US government for their non-independent judiciaries.

Unfortunately, non-US citizens living in other sovereign countries are not protected against ORGANIZED STATE CRIME by rogue corporations and judges and become victims of the US sink-well of spurious proceedings, fake trials and court fraud, because mega corporations like GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO wield such financial power that they can bring their own judge into another sovereign country.

This paper deals with the facts and supporting evidence of how US mega corporations, an US Federal Judge and two US lawyers were able to racketeer in ORGANIZED STATE CRIME for their clients in the Marshall Islands, officially a sovereign country.

THE US ACTORS IN THE ORGANIZED STATE CRIME

The “Judge”

US District Judge John C. Coughenour of the US District Court Western District Seattlefraudulently usurping judgeship in the High Court of the Marshall Islands

The Defendants

Larry Page, GOOGLE, Eric Schmidt, GOOGLE, Carol Bartz, YAHOO, S. Ballmer, MICROCOSFT C.B. Ingram, CJ RMI High Court

The non-authorized US attorneys purporting to appear for the non-resident defendants without support for such

hypothesis

Roy Vitousek, CADES SCHUTTE, HAWAII David Strauss, US ex Peace Corps Volunteer and attorney at Admitted to practice law in the RMI in 1982 in the Marshall Islands Vitousek and CADES SCHUTTE are tax evaders in the RMI since1983, and in law prohibited to participate in legal proceedings before any court, however, Vitousek is useful to RMI clients and thus may continueto evade taxes.

The Plaintiffs

Susanne and Lutz Kayser, foreign investors in the Marshall Islands, arguing the terminated case, forced into involuntary servitude by illegal legal process by GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO'S own judge

The Case before the RMI High Court

Civil Court Case 2011-022, ABUSE OF PROCESS, filed on February 4, 2011 by the plaintiffs in the High Court. Non-resident defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT, and YAHOO were served in accordance with the RMI Law 52 MIRC, § 22, by leaving a copy of the complaint with the RMI Attorney General who is the recipient of such matters in the case of non-resident corporations who have no resident agent. In addition, the CEO's were sent copies with Return Receipt, each CEO returned receipt.

The history that led to the Case 2011-022

In 2009, Kaysers by Order of the High Court in Majuro, amended their civil court case 2008-016 and 017 [consolidated] and added the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO as defendants and served the non-resident defendants by Return Receipt. Each corporation returned receipt. None of the corporations appeared, instead two US lawyers, both registered and admitted lawyers in the RMI appeared without authorization by the corporations, and filed their own arguments that are neither fact nor evidence before the court in their own motions without competent fact witnesses to dismiss plaintiffs case. Because the defendants had neither appeared nor authorized attorneys to appear on their behalf, the Clerk of Court entered, based upon a verified motion, affidavit and supporting evidence, Entry of Default against all non-answering defendants. Chief Justice Ingram of the High Court sua sponte and as proponent of the non-appearing defendants dispossessed plaintiffs of their legally acquired Entry of Default and racketeered with the non-authorized attorneys Strauss and Vitousek to hold plaintiffs from 2009 onwards in involuntary servitude to work for them, despite the fact that Entry of Default had terminated the case. The racketeering included illegal coercion by spurious legal process, creation of false evidence and forgery by the two lawyers, and illegal hearings where plaintiffs were forced to argue the arguments of the non-authorized attorneys that are not facts before the court. After four years of involuntary servitude, Kaysers filed the Civil Court Case CA 2011-022 for Abuse of Process in CA 2008-016 and 017 [consolidated].

The illegal installation of US District Judge John C. Coughenour of the US District Court Western District Seattle, State of Washington

The RMI Constitution provides under Article VI, Section 1 (10) that if a judge is temporarily disabled from performing the duties of his office, the Cabinet, acting on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission may appoint as an acting judge a person that is qualified.

Chief Justice Ingram was a defendant, therefore disqualified to act as chairman of the Judicial Service Commission. Associate Judge Plasman recused himself because of his friendship with chief justice Ingram, so he also could not preside as chairman of the Judicial Service Commission. Who then presided? It remains entirely unclear, however it is a fact that the then US citizen Frederick Canavor from Seattle, State of Washington arranged for US District Court Judge John C. Coughenour, likewise from Seattle in the State of Washington, where MICROSOFT has its corporate address.

The coercion of plaintiffs into involuntary servitude, the spurious proceedings, the fake hearing and the fraud upon the court

by the racketeers Judge Coughenour, GOOGLE, MICROSOFT, YAHOO, CJ Ingram and the non-authorized attorneys Vitousek and Strauss

Civil court proceedings in the Marshall Islands are governed by US Common Law and US Civil Procedure

CA 2010-207: On December 20, 2010, plaintiffs filed a verified complaint and supporting affidavit in the High Court against chief justice Ingram for Abuse of Process and Trespass on the case in CA 2007-078, and CA 2007-124

CA 2011-022: On February 4, 2011, plaintiffs filed a verified complaint and supporting affidavits in the High Court in Majuro against the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT, YAHOO and CJ Ingram for

Abuse of Process, and trespass on the case in CA 2008-016 and 017 [consolidated]. On the same day they delivered in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure and 52 MIRC, § 22 copies of their stamp filed complaint to the Office of the Attorney General who is the agent for corporation who have no other agent in the country. At the same time, plaintiffs mailed with Return Receipt copies of the file stamped complaint to each of the corporations' CEO’s. Each of them returned receipt.

In CA 2010-207, the Attorney General Frederick Canavor from Seattle appeared for the defendant CJ Ingram as his “lawyer of choice” and filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' verified complaint and supporting affidavit. Defendant CJ Ingram did not controvert plaintiffs verified complaint nor file a counter affidavit. The record of the case reveals that defendant CJ Ingram was at no time a witness to the facts and plaintiffs' facts were not controverted.

In CA 2011-022, the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO did not appear in the case, nor did they authorize attorneys to appear on their behalf. Instead, as in the underlying case CA 2008-016 and 017 [consolidated], the rogue attorneys Vitousek and Strauss, without authorization by the non-resident defendants on record, filed their own motions to dismiss plaintiffs' verified complaint and supporting affidavit. The defendants did not controvert the factual allegations, nor appear as competent fact witnesses to object to the jurisdiction in personam. Instead, Roy Vitousek, purporting to appear for MICROSOFT and YAHOO although without support for this hypothesis filed around March 10, 2011 his own arguments in a motion to dismiss. David Strauss, purporting to appear for GOOGLE although without support for this hypothesis filed on March 21, 2011 his own arguments as a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' verified complaint and supporting affidavit.

On March 27, 2011, plaintiffs filed verified motions and supporting affidavits, challenging the authority of the lawyers Vitousek and Strauss who purported to appear for the defendants. The defendants did not controvert the plaintiffs' affidavit, nor did they file proof showing that the rogue attorneys Vitousek and Strauss appeared in the case with their authorization.

Because the defendants had not appeared, nor authorized attorneys to appear on their behalf, plaintiffs requested on March 27, 2011 by verified motion and supporting affidavit ENTRY OF DEFAULT NIHIL DICIT. The appearance by two unauthorized attorneys, filing their own contentions without factual support by a competent fact witness where not an appearance by the defendants. Such was duly entered by the Clerk of Courts. Plaintiffs, as a courtesy and because the defendants had not authorized attorneys to appear for them, sent each of the defendant a file stamped copy of ENTRY OF DEFAULT NIHIL DICIT by return receipt. Despite knowledge of ENTRY OF DEFAULT NIHIL DICIT, defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT, and YAHOO did not appear and file a motion and supporting affidavit to set aside ENTRY OF DEFAULT for Good Cause Shown, nor did the rogue attorneys Vitusek and Strauss file their own arguments, purporting to be motions as is their wont. ENTRY OF DEFAULT NIHIL DICIT was ignored.

Defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT, and YAHOO'S PERSONAL JUDGE, US District Court Judge John C. Coughenour appears on their behalf in

case CA 2011-022

On April 6, 2011, plaintiffs in the RMI received a telephone call from a clerk of the District Court in Seattle on behalf of US District Judge John C. Coughenour, likewise in the District Court Seattle, State

Of Washington, USA, to set up a telephone scheduling conference for April 8, 2011, ordering plaintiffs in the Marshall Islands to call District Court Seattle on April 8, 2011, where US District Judge would hold the telephone conference to schedule the case.

On April 8, 2011, plaintiffs in the RMI called the District Court Seattle and were connected with Judge Coughenour in his court room. There, in violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, without oath upon the constitution of the Marshall Islands, without any form of jurisdiction, US District Judge did not set up a scheduling. Instead, over the telephone from his court room in Seattle, he, without jurisdiction, sua sponte and as the proponent of the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO illegally dispossessed the plaintiffs in the Marshall Islands of their acquired property right of the legally entered DEFAULT NIHIL DICIT.1 The record revealed however, that the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO had not filed motions to set aside ENTRY OF DEFAULT, showing by affidavit a meritorious defense. Nor had the rogue lawyers Vitousek and Strauss filed one of their own spurious “motions” requesting relief. ENTRY OF DEFAULT NIHIL DISIT cannot be set aside except upon application by a defendant, testifying to his Good Cause why he had not answered. US District Judge John C. Coughenour did not rule on such a motion and testimony of a competent fact witness, instead he dispossessed plaintiffs in the far away Marshall Islands on behalf of and as the personal agent of the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO2

Moreover, and without jurisdiction of the subject matter, without being constitutionally authorized as a judge to hear this RMI case in the RMI, and despite the fact that ENTRY OF DEFAULT NIHIL DICIT had terminated the cause of actions as to the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO, US District Judge Coughenour “ordered” the non-authorized attorneys to file “further briefings” (which are neither fact nor evidence before any court) and forced plaintiffs into involuntary servitude to work for him, the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO and the two rogue lawyers Vitousek and Strauss in their racketeering scheme.3 The general rule of law is that unless a defaulting party takes steps in the trial court to set aside ENTRY OF DEFAULT, any further action is futile since the defendant lacks standing. Until Default is set aside in a proper legal proceeding, defendants have no

1 The Tenth Circuit has noted that “it is well established that the good cause required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) for setting aside entry of default poses a lesser standard for the defaulting party than the excusable neglect which must be shown for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).” Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int’l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 775 n.6 (10th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).1 In determining whether good cause exists under Rule 55(c), judges in this district (including the undersigned) have considered factors relating to the defendant’s willfulness or degree

of culpability, the prejudice to the plaintiff, and whether the defendant has a meritorious defense. See, e.g., Meissner v. BF Labs Inc., 2014 WL 590377, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 14, 2014) (Rogers, J.); School-Link Technologies, Inc. v. Applied Resources, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1119 (D. Kan. 2007) (Lungstrum, J.).

2 A default will not be set aside if the defendant in failing to respond to the pleadings had exhibited some degree of culpable conduct. See Emcasco, 834 F.2d at 75. “[C]ulpable conduct means actions taken willfully or in bad faith.” Gross v. Stereo Component Sys., Inc., 700 F.2d 120, 123-124 (3d Cir. 1983). Culpable conduct by the defendant requires a showing of more than mere negligence. See Hritz, 732 F.2d at 1183. In ruling on a motion to set aside a default, the court must consider the following factors: “(1) whether setting aside the default would prejudice the plaintiff; (2) whether the defendant has asserted a prima facie meritorious defense; (3) whether the defaulting defendant’s conduct is excusable or culpable; and (4) the effectiveness of alternative sanctions.” Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1987); A defendant establishes a meritorious defense when the defendant’s allegations, if established at trial, would constitute a complete defense. Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1984). A proffered defense is sufficient if it is not “facially unmeritorious.” See Emcasco Ins. Co., 834 F.2d at 74. To satisfy this element, a defendant must allege specific facts that constitute a complete defense. See $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d at 194-96.

3 “We are instructed by Wooster that so long as the facts as painted by the complaint might have been the case they may not now be successfully controverted by Toolco. There was a time for that and Toolco cannot elect to default and then defend on the merits. It cannot have its cake and eat it too. The default had the effect of admitting or establishing the acts pleaded in the complaint” Trans World Airline Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d at 72, reversed on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363, 93 S.Ct. 647, 34 L.Ed 2d 577

legal standing. 4

The records of CA 201-207 and CA 2011-022 on April 8, and April 13, 2011 that preceded District Judge John C. Coughenour's ORGANIZED STATE CRIME for

the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO:

CA 2010-207:

• Verified Complaint and supporting Affidavit for Abuse of process and trespass on the case CA 2007-078 and CA 2007-124, defendant: Chief Justice Ingram of the RMI High Court

• A motion to dismiss plaintiffs verified complaint and affidavit by the Attorney General on behalf of defendant chief justice Ingram who did not support the motion upon his personal knowledge and who thus did not show any evidence which the court could consider.

CA 2011-022:

• Verified Complaint and supporting Affidavit for Abuse of Process and trespass on the case in CA 2008-016 and 017 [consolidated], defendants: GOOGLE, MICROSOFT, and YAHOO

• Unauthorized motions without factual support, filed by two non-authorized attorneys claiming to be empowered by the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO, albeit without factual evidence on record to support the hypothesis.

• Plaintiffs verified motion and supporting affidavit, challenging the authority of the attorneys Vitousek and Strauss to appear legally and for the defendants in the case-or-controversyuncontested and uncontroverted by the defendants (as well as uncontested and uncontroverted

even by the non-authorized attorneys)

• Plaintiffs verified motion and supporting Affidavit for ENTRY OF DEFAULT NIHIL DICIT against the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOOuncontested and no motion filed to set aside Entry of Default for Good Cause Shown

Remarks to Motions (56 Am Jur, § 19: A motion cannot prove itself and its allegations do not amount to any proof of the facts stated, § 22: an affidavit may be used to verify the facts on which the motion is grounded to insure that such evidence is put before the court in form of affidavits and declarations or by admission or sworn competent witnesses whose testimony has been reduced to writing or by the taking of oral testimony. § 33: A hearing on motions is a proceeding in which evidence is taken on the merits, it donates an opportunity to be heard and to adduce testimony from witnesses. § 36 The burden of proof is on the movant to support his motion by proving every fact essential to the relief requested. Ergo: A motion must contain all the important facts by a competent fact witness and arguments by a lawyer (Points and Authorities) . If no hearing is required in which a competent fact witness can testify, an affidavit must be attached to the motion, must be made under oath by the party upon his

4 Standing in federal law is essential and unchangeable requirement of case-or-controversy requirement if Article III of the Constitution, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed 2d 351

personal knowledge (lawyers cannot testify) and must be sworn and subscribed before a notary. It is the only form that tells the court of all the important and relevant facts in support of the motion. The affidavit so attached to a motion is a form of evidence that the court can consider when making decisions, just like live testimony in courts and exhibits. A trial court can only decide issues of fact on the basis of evidence whether written or oral introduced before it. Statements in pleadings or argument, whether oral or written, do not themselves constitute evidence. 5 Thus, a judge must base his decision on facts appearing on record. However, the record revealed that the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO had not made an appearance by authorizing attorneys to appear on their behalf, and had not objected to ENTRY OF DEFAULT NIHIL DICIT and not attempted to set it aside based on facts showing Good Cause. The record revealed further that plaintiffs verified motion and supporting affidavit that challenged the claimed authority of the lawyers Vitousek and Strauss remained uncontested.

On April 13, 2011, the “Order” in CA 2011-022 sent from the District Court Seattle to the High Court in Majuro, signed by US District Judge John C. Coughenour as UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE was firstly issued without subject matter jurisdiction and secondly was not based on issues of fact on the basis of evidence., see next page.

5 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. 466 U.S. 485, 501, (1984) The conclusiveness of a finding of fact depends on the nature of the materials on which the finding is based

US District Court Judge John C. Coughenour's “Order” is ipso facto not based either on established jurisdiction, or facts and evidence on record. From this prima facie fact that glaringly consists of any absence of facts and evidence by the defendants, the conclusion can be drawn under the rule of presumption that US District Court Judge John C. Coughenour collaborated with the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO and as their own judge engaged in racketeering to defeat the true course of justice.

A further fact for the racketeering lies in the “Order” that permits – after Entry of Default had terminated the case – the non-authorized attorneys to “file further briefings” and the illegal legal coercion that forced plaintiffs into involuntary servitude to work for US District Judge John C. Coughenour, the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO, and the rogue lawyers Vitousek and Strauss until they jointly have achieved their goal, namely to protect the defendants from their established default and give the non-authorized attorneys further opportunity to file arguments to fuel the pre-arranged dismissal of plaintiffs' verified complaint. When US District Judge Coughenour states in his “Order” that he presumes that the attorneys act for the defendants with “full power of attorney” then he either ignored willfully the rule of presumption that is a conclusion based on particular facts that must be drawn from other evidence that is admitted and proven to be true, or he mixes up his private negotiations with the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO whose lawyers came up with the scheme to employ two attorneys but not legally authorize them to appear in the case.

That such a scheme must have been considered jointly by US District Judge John C. Coughenour and the lawyers of the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO, since the non-authorized attorneys Vitousek and Strauss filed in consequence of the illegal and void ab intio “Order” their own absurd and incongruous motions under “Special Appearance”, nevertheless requesting relief in form of an Order to declare plaintiffs vexatious litigants. “Special Appearance”,abolished since decades, signals to the court that the defendant objects to the jurisdiction over his person. A party claiming that he is not in court must appear for the purpose of objecting to the exercise of jurisdiction over his person. A party who wishes to insist on the objection that he is not in court must ask nothing of the court inconsistent with the position that the court lacks jurisdiction. Such party is not entitled to any affirmative relief or favorable ruling unless the court possesses jurisdiction over his person.

These motions in their absurdity give rise to the presumption that either the lawyers Vitousek and Strauss are whole legally illiterate or that their course of illegal action was mapped out by the lawyers of the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO and they simply – against payment – engaged in racketeering scheme in order that the corporate lawyers not dirty their hands.

Plaintiffs, illegally coerced into involuntary servitude to foster the racketeering scheme of the defendants, their judge and their lawyers, filed verified motions and affidavits to strike the illegal motions that are a violation of Civil Rule 11.

The next stage in this ORGANIZED STATE CRIME AND RACKETEERING between the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO, their judge John

Coughenour and the two non-authorized attorneys Vitousek and Strauss

The spurious hearing in the clear absence of all jurisdiction and the theatrical performance by GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOOS judge.

Shortly before the “hearing” (without jurisdiction, and in the terminated case) US District Judge John C. Coughenour changed the place of venue from the Majuro Court House to the conference room in the Capitol Building. It remains unclear whether District Judge John C. Coughenour had left so much conscious that he had qualms to mount the bench of the High Court to commit a criminal act, or whether he changed the venue so that the Marshallese civil population that was very interested in the case could not attend the hearing, since they did not know about the change of venue.

US District Judge John C. Coughenour, who is not permitted to appear as a judge outside the jurisdiction of the United States, except such US territories as the Marianas and Guam, simply donned a High Court judge robe without oath upon the RMI Constitution and proceeded to enact the last act in defendant GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOOS racketeering scheme.

• He forbade plaintiffs to testify • He heard at length the non authorized attorneys Vitousek and Strauss illegal motions that are not

fact or evidence before the court but mere argument of counsel on which no decisions can be based6

The final act in the STATE ORGANIZED CRIME and racketeering scheme by the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO, jointly with their judge John C. Coughenour and the non-authorized rogue attorneys Vitousek and Strauss was

concluded on August 4, 2011.

Back in Seattle after his one day theatrical performance in the Marshall Islands, US District Judge John C. Coughenour dictated in the District Court Seattle, Western District, State of Washington, Civil Court Case CA No. 2009-047 his “Order” that dismissed plaintiffs verified complaints supported by affidavits based on the arguments in illegal briefs submitted by non-authorized attorneys in the Republic of the Marshall Islands High Court Cases 2010-207 and CA 2011-022.

US District Judge John C. Coughenour arranged that the clerks of the District Court Seattle sent his “Order” signed this time as “Associate Judge” of the Marshall Islands High Court by electronic means to the Clerk of the High Court. Since ENRTRY OF DEFAULT NIHIL DICIT had terminated the cause of action as to the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO, and since US District Judge John C. Coughenour acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction for the purpose to racketeer with the defendants, the District Court Seattle Order from August 4, 2011 is void ab initio.

The contents of the “Order” are a jumble of half truth and false assertions, however there are some facts and evidence in his “ruling” that give rise to the presumption that US District Judge John C. Coughenour had considerable stake and personal interest in satisfying his defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO:

On page 10, line 24, US District Judge John C. Coughenour finds in re Special Jurisdiction that: “The Court finds no specific jurisdiction over the Internet Defendants.

6 Statements of counsel in brief are never facts before the court. Statements of lawyers cannot be considered in the disposition of a case since statements of counsel are not sufficient for motion to dismiss, McDaniel v. U.S. Fidelity Guaranty Co., 324 S.Ct. 639, 644, 478 SE 2d 868, 871; “Attorneys cannot testify and statements of counsel in brief are not facts before the court. Manifestly, [such statements] cannot be properly considered by us in the disposition of [a] case, United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed. 2D 752

On page 12, line 7, US District Judge John C. Coughenour likewise finds in re General Jurisdiction: ...”finds no general jurisdiction over the Internet Defendants”.

However, on page 13, having found no jurisdiction over the defendants on page 10 and 12, District Judge John C. Coughenour states the following:

“The Internet Defendants have moved this Court for an Order declaring that Plaintiffs are vexatious litigants”. ...Plaintiffs are hereby declared to be vexatious litigants. Plaintiffs are prohibited from filing any new litigation in the courts of the Republic pro se without first obtaining leave of the presiding judge [defendant CJ Ingram] where the litigation is proposed to be filed. Disobedience of this order may be punished as a contempt of court.

• The Internet Defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT AND YAHOO and their corporate lawyers may have devised the racketeering scheme but it is a fact that the Defendants have not moved the Court for anything. The motions under Special Appearance albeit seeking relief in form of an Order declaring plaintiffs vexatious litigants and seeking security for cost in the proceedings were filed by the two rogue lawyers Vitousek and Strauss, after the case was terminated by ENTRY OF DEFAULT NIHIL DICIT, and were without factual allegations and supporting evidence by a competent fact witness, in fact these motions were merely illiterate legal arguments by non-authorized attorneys that are neither fact nor evidence before a court.

• It is a rule of law that if a defendant seeks any affirmative relief at the hands of the court or asks for a favorable decision upon some matter of a substantive character, no such action can be taken without the court possessing jurisdiction over his person. Under a Special Appearance, the merits of a controversy cannot be determined and the appearing party has no right to a hearing or decision on other matters involved in the controversy so long as he insists on his special appearance. However, it is also the rule that a defendant who seeks affirmative relief from the court by asking for example for security of cost have been held by most courts to constitute a general appearance (Nelson v. Jadrijevics, C.C.A. Canal Zone, 59 F.2d 25)

Further to that, US District Judge John C. Coughenour states on page 13, line 15: ….”[plaintiffs'] filing of motions with absolutely no legal basis whatsoever such as the motions challenging the authority of the attorneys to act for the parties...” evidence that US District Judge John C. Coughenour obviously believed that the court did have jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants based on the following facts:

• Roy Vitousek is a resident Marshall Islands lawyer who has been admitted to practice law and maintain an office in the RMI in 1983.

• David Strauss is a resident Marshall Islands lawyer who has been admitted to practice law and maintains an office in the RMI .

• From 2009 onwards, the attorneys Vitousek and Strauss purported to appear for the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO in the underlying CA 2008-016 & 017 [consolidated].

• Latest when the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO returned receipt of plaintiffs verified complaint in Civil action CA 2011-022 for Abuse of Process and Trespass on the case, they were informed that the attorneys Vitousek and Strauss purported to appear for them during the whole time of the underlying case. Since none of the defendants objected to the appearance of Vitousek and Strauss, and on the contrary, Vitousek and Strauss continued to appear albeit without authorization filed in the record, the defendants as a matter of fact consented to the appearance of the local lawyers to receive service of process, and in which case general

jurisdiction over the defendant is accomplished.7

• Moreover, the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO through the agency of the attorneys Vitousek and Strauss purposefully directed their activities of Abuse of Process and Trespass on the Case in CA 2008-016 and 017 from 2009 onwards in such tortious manner that plaintiffs were forced to seek relief from dispossession of civil rights and coercion by illegal legal process into involuntary servitude. Their tortious trespass on the case is sufficient to support personal jurisdiction in the underlying cause of action and in the cause of action in CA 2011-0228

That US District Judge John C. Coughenour was the agent of the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT, and YAHOO is evidenced by his contrary decisions. He could not claim on one hand that the court lacked jurisdiction over the defendants, and than assume jurisdiction over them and granting the attorneys Vitousek and Strauss motion to declare plaintiffs vexatious litigants. Do do so, the court needed to have general jurisdiction over the defendants. He could not have it both ways. Moreover, that US District Judge John C. Coughenour had orders from the defendants to declare plaintiffs by any means vexatious, lies in the fact that he denied them to testify in the spurious hearing and declared them criminally and illegally vexatious based solely on the motion under “special appearance” that contained nothing more than the arguments of the lawyers Vitousek and Strauss and which grossly violated plaintiffs right to due process that entails a hearing and a determination based on facts and evidence. It is hardly conceivable that US District Judge John C. Coughenour woke up on April 8, 2011 with the urge to commit in another sovereign country and against plaintiffs he did not know the crime to pervert the due course of justice and to dispossess plaintiffs entirely of their civil rights.

Conclusion: Based on District Judge John C. Coughenour's usurpation of jurisdiction, his illegal acts in violation of the Civil Procedure, due process and in contravention of all existing Case Law that are factual evidence on the record, the presumption, based on these facts, is drawn that the defendants GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO by illegal means unknown to the plaintiffs induced and convinced US District Judge John C. Coughenour that it was in his personal interest to racketeer with them and the rogue attorneys Vitousek and Strauss in their favor in the Civil Court Case 2011-022 in the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ARE SINCE OCTOBER 30, 2006 a party to the CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION

The United States of America as a state party was concerned about the seriousness of the problems posed by corruption to the stability and security of societies, undermining the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law. The United States of America also acknowledged the fundamental principle of due process of law in

7 Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. 243 U.S. At 95-97, 37 S. Ct. 344 holding that: “the forum has general personal jurisdiction over nonpresent defendant who has consented to such jurisdiction based upon appointment of agent for service of process. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703-05, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 72 L. Ed. 2D 492 (1982) (consent to be sued in the forum is an independent basis for general personal jurisdiction). There are two species of consent to personal jurisdiction – express and implied consent. Express consent occurs when a party somehow expressly agrees to be sued in the forum whether by contract, stipulation, or appointment of an agent for the purpose of service of process.

8 “Where a non-resident defendant “purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum”, his contacts with the forum are sufficient to support personal jurisdiction in any litigation that results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities” Burger Kind Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed. 2D 528 (1985)

criminal proceedings and in civil or administrative proceedings to adjudicate property rights.

Therefore, one cannot but wonder whether the United States simply made a lip service to the Convention against Corruption since the plaintiffs informed the Attorney General of the United States of the trespass upon the sovereignty of the Marshall Islands jointly by racketeering US corporations who by illegal means induced a Federal US judge to commit an international crime on their behalf and as their agent. The Office of the Attorney General had a duty under the Convention, Article 4.1 and 4.2 to investigate the matter of violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of the Marshall Islands:

Article 4. Protection of sovereignty1. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention

in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorialintegrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of

other States.2. Nothing in this Convention shall entitle a State Party to undertake in

the territory of another State the exercise of jurisdiction and performance offunctions that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other State by

its domestic law.

By ignoring the information by plaintiffs, the United States violated further Article 5.1:

Article 5. Preventive anti-corruption policies and practices1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles

of its legal system, develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinatedanti-corruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the

principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and publicproperty, integrity, transparency and accountability.

And Article 8.2 and 8.4:

2. In particular, each State Party shall endeavor to apply, within its owninstitutional and legal systems, codes or standards of conduct for the correct,

honourable and proper performance of public functions.

2. In particular, each State Party shall endeavour to apply, within its owninstitutional and legal systems, codes or standards of conduct for the correct,

honourable and proper performance of public functions.

Instead of investigating the serious matter of organized state crime by US corporations and a Federal US judge in a foreign country, the United States covered it up, which is a violation ofArticle 11:

Bearing in mind the independence of the judiciary and its crucial role in combating corruption, each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system and without prejudice to judicial independence take measures to strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for corruption among members of the judiciary . Such

measures may include rules with respect to the conduct of members of the judiciary.

The United States further ignored and refused to take measures against the corporations GOOGLE, MICROSOFT and YAHOO as provided for under Article 12:

2. In particular, each State Party shall endeavour to apply, within its owninstitutional and legal systems, codes or standards of conduct for the correct,

honourable and proper performance of public functions.

And violated further Article 15.2:

Article 15. Bribery of national public officialsEach State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may benecessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:

(a) The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly,of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity,

in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties

(b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly,of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity,

in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.

In addition to the information sent to the Attorney General of the United States, plaintiffs requested by letter the Chief Justice of the District Court in Seattle, Western District, to provide them in writing that an US District Court Judge – as which Judge John C. Coughenour signed his first fraudulent “Order” from April 13, 2011 – has no jurisdiction over matters in the sovereign Republic of the Marshall Islands, because the Compact of Free Association, Section 174 that explicitly denies such jurisdiction. Plaintiffs received not even an acknowledgment of their letter, which ipso facto once more evidences the morass of bribery and corruption in the Judiciary of the United States.

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