Democratic dynasties? Internal party democracy in Bangladesh

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Democratic dynasties? Internal party democracy in Bangladesh

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Article

Democratic dynasties? Internal partydemocracy in Bangladesh

Inge AmundsenChr. Michelsen Institute, Norway

Abstract

First of all, this paper explores the rationale for internal party democracy, highlighting the ‘school for democracy’argument. Second, it identifies three crucial processes as determinants for the level of intra-party democracy; a demo-

cratic process for the election of leaders, for the formulation of policies and for coalition making. The first is emphasized.

Third, the quality of intra-party democracy in Bangladesh is analysed in terms of party leadership selection and the pre-

valent practice of dynastic rule. The overall finding is that the degree of internal democracy of political parties in Bangla-

desh is weak, due to the electoral parties’ weak organizations, strong centralization and prevalent informal decision-

making processes controlled by a limited number of party elites (dynastic parties). This general result has important impli-

cations regarding the prospects of democratizing party politics and consolidating democracy in Bangladesh.

Keywords

Bangladesh, intra-party politics, democratization

Introduction

Well-functioning political parties are essential for the consoli-

dation of democracy. As Schattsneider put it: ‘political parties

created democracy’ and ‘modern democracy is unthinkable

save in terms of parties’ (Schattsneider, 1942: 1). Teorell adds

that ‘no modern democratic state has been able to do without

political parties’, and it is intuitive to demand that political

parties be ‘democratically ruled’ just as ‘the systems ofwhich

they form a part’ (Teorell, 1999: 363).

This article analyses intra-party democracy in one partic-

ular country, Bangladesh, in order to answer the question of

whether (or to what extent) a dynastic party can still be dem-

ocratic. According to Chhibber (2013: 277), dynastic parties

are political parties in which ‘the top leadership comes from

within a family’. In theory, family leadership can still be

democratic so long as it is elected through sufficiently dem-

ocratic intra-party procedures, but are the party-ruling fami-

lies in Bangladesh democratically elected?

First, we explore the argument that internal party

democracy is essential for a political system to be demo-

cratic. The scholarly literature is largely in agreement about

what political parties should strive to accomplish, namely

interest aggregation, popular participation, policy formula-

tion, legislation and policy execution. These are, however,

descriptive and normative proposals on what political par-

ties should be, given a (Western) democratic ideal, and this

has led to a debate on what internal party democracy entails

in real-world (and developing world) politics. It requires

openness, inclusiveness and shared decision-making power

among leaders and members within the party, and some have

forwarded the ‘school of democracy’ argument that demo-

cratic party procedures will strengthen the overall demo-

cratic culture by nurturing citizens’ democratic aptitude.

Second, we will identify and outline the components of

internal party democracy as analytical tools for examining

the level of internal party democracy in the ‘real world’.

Three processes are crucial for intra-party democracy: a

democratic process for the election of leaders, for the for-

mulation of policies and for coalition making.

Third, based on the (normative) notion that democracy

requires democratic elections of party leaders, and based

on the (largely accepted) worldwide standards for demo-

cratic election of party leaders, we will analyse the demo-

cratic quality of leadership selection within the main

political parties of Bangladesh.

Paper submitted 17 May 2013; accepted for publication 30 September

2013

Corresponding author:

Inge Amundsen, Chr. Michelsen Institute, PO Box 6033 Bedriftssenteret,

N-5892 Bergen, Norway.

Email: [email protected]

Party Politics

1–10

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The theoretic argument is developed by using existing

academic literature on the topic of leadership selection in

political parties. Our sources on Bangladesh are primarily

internal party documents on constitutions and election pro-

cedures of the parties, seconded by existing literature (aca-

demic literature, reports, news, etc.). In addition, we have

conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with

around 15 politicians and party officials, along with a hand-

ful of academics, non-governmental organization (NGO)

representatives and government officials (including a for-

mer election commissioner). The party officials were MPs

and standing committee/presidium members of the ruling

party (Awami League), of the main opposition party

(Bangladesh Nationalist Party) and of several of the

smaller parties.

The overall finding is that the degree of internal democ-

racy in Bangladesh’s political parties is very limited.

Decision-making, including leadership selection, is largely

informal and handled by a restricted number of party elites.

This is unfortunate, especially for a country undergoing

democratic consolidation, where the political parties should

have been ‘schools of democracy’ aiming at enhancing cit-

izens’ civic skills through voice and participation.

Internal party democracy

There is a long research tradition on the internal life of

political organizations, and over the past 30 years scholars

have increasingly focused on internal party democracy

(Croissant and Chambers, 2010: 196). In addition, practi-

tioners and donors have been promoting internal party

democracy as one way of addressing the problem of ‘dem-

ocratic deficits’ in emerging democracies. Support for

political parties has been given by donor agencies directly

as funding via party-based foundations and institutes

and indirectly as an element of ‘good governance’ and

‘democracy support’ programmes (Amundsen, 2007: 10–

14; Caton, 2007: 14–15).

Despite (or rather because of) the increased attention by

scholars and donors, there is some debate on the question of

what internal party democracy entails in real-world poli-

tics. Although there seems to be a broad agreement that it

requires openness and inclusiveness as well as voice and

participation, some scholars emphasize participation of the

lower party structures and party members in party decision-

making processes (Croissant and Chambers, 2010:

196–197; Lotshwao, 2009: 903–904). There is, however,

also some disagreement about how wide the circle of

decision-makers should be. Most scholars argue that partic-

ipation of party members (the rank-and-file) and the vari-

ous party-affiliated institutions (like women, youth and

local party organizations) is required, but some would also

include the party’s support base, broadly defined as party-

independent social/economic/cultural organizations, civil

society and professional organizations, interest groups,

activists and voters (Scarrow, 2005: 6).

There is also some debate on the justification and bene-

fits of internal party democracy. A pragmatic argument is

that internally democratic parties will select more capable

and appealing leaders, formulate more responsive policies,

and thus gain a greater number of victories at elections. On

a more theoretic and normative level it is argued that dem-

ocratic internal party procedures will strengthen the overall

democratic culture. Internal party democracy has an

‘apparent potential to promote a ‘‘virtuous circle’’ linking

ordinary citizens to government, benefiting the parties that

adopt it, and more generally contributing to the stability

and legitimacy of the democracies in which these parties

compete for power’ (Scarrow, 2005: 3).

School of democracy

It has been argued repeatedly that internal democracy is

necessary for creating a viable democratic culture within

the party as well as in society at large. For those who

believe in the merits of participatory democracy, intra-

party democracy is an end in itself. This is the ‘school of

democracy’ argument: parties should be the incubators that

nurture citizens’ political learning, socialization and com-

petence. Opportunities for participation in decision-

making within the political parties can help citizens expand

their civic skills (Scarrow, 2005: 3; White and Ypi, 2010:

810).

The ‘school’ function of parties is to train, educate and

coach people in democratic values, principles and proce-

dures. It should encompass not only party members and

cadres, but also sympathisers, voters and the general public.

This function is regarded as additional to the four central

roles or functions of political parties in modern representa-

tive democracies: interest articulation (develop consistent

policies and government programmes), interest aggrega-

tion (pick up demands from society and bundle them into

realistic policy alternatives and programmes), recruitment

(engage, select and train people for elected positions and

office), and accountability (oversee and control govern-

ment) (Caton, 2007: 7).

Moreover, scholars holding the more outcome-oriented

‘responsible party’ position also defend the ‘school of

democracy’ argument. They maintain that the parties’

essential contribution to democracy is in offering clear and

distinct electoral choices, and argue that inclusive pro-

cesses can boost the legitimacy of the alternatives they pro-

duce. Inclusive parties can offer more acceptable policy

packages and programmes. Internally democratic parties

have a greater likelihood of being open to new ideas and

new personnel. For instance, democratic leadership selec-

tion can attract different and more capable people, and give

a broader social representation and a better representation

of ideas (Mimpen, 2007: 1; Scarrow, 2005: 4).

2 Party Politics


At the same time, some scholars and practitioners (and

indeed party leaders) are critical to intra-party democracy,

advocating for a more authoritarian or oligarchic style of

party leadership. They point to the risk that internal party

democracy can undermine party cohesion and decision-

making efficiency. They argue that too much internal party

democracy can ‘overly dilute the power of a party’s inner

leadership’ (Scarrow, 2005: 4) and that ‘internal demo-

cratic procedures may raise possibilities for party splits and

crises’ (Mimpen, 2007: 1).

This argument was advanced previously by Schattsnei-

der, who said democracy is ‘not to be found in the parties

but between parties’ (1942: 60). Duverger made a similar

statement when arguing that ‘an internally democratic

party is not well armed for the struggle of politics’ and that

‘a party that organizes itself along authoritarian and auto-

cratic lines is superior to others’ (1954: 134). These argu-

ments are in the same vein as Michels’s ‘iron law of

oligarchy’ (1915/1962), which holds that elite rule, or oli-

garchy, is (regrettably) inevitable in any democratic organi-

zation. The idea of rule by oligarchy is also in line with the

Leninist ideology of the ‘vanguard party’, for that matter.

In more pragmatic terms, Scarrow (2005: 3) argues that

some procedures are better suited to some circumstances

than to others, and Mimpen (2007: 1) argues that intra-

party democracy can have positive consequences as well

as adverse effects, depending on the political context.

However, as these scholars have not specified the circum-

stances, we will make one basic hypothesis: when democ-

racy is not in place, some vanguard parties are needed, but

when democracy is formally established, democratic

parties are needed.

In other words, in line with Schattsneider, Duverger and

others, we will make the hypothesis that non-democratic

parties might be needed in the context of democratization.

In a situation where an opposition fights for the establish-

ment of democratic politics and procedures (like institu-

tional checks and balances, rule of law, free and fair

elections) against the vested interests and resistance of

entrenched ruling elites, parties with an authoritarian or oli-

garchic style of party leadership might be needed.

By contrast, and in line with ‘participatory democracy’

theory and the ‘school of democracy’ argument, more

inclusive and internally democratic political parties are

needed in the context of democratic consolidation. When

democracy is formally established, when elections are free

and fair and their results generally respected, internal party

democracy is needed for the development of a broader

democratic culture.

This point is important. Authoritarian parties might well

be needed to defeat the ancien regime, but it is hard to be

convinced that a political party which is not internally

democratic will be working to establish a true democratic

system and a democratic political culture, and be open to

the possibility of its own electoral defeat. Internal party

democracy and open and democratic leadership elections,

on the other hand, will make it less likely that the party

leadership will be preoccupied with holding on to their

recently acquired power positions (Scarrow, 2005: 4) and

the personal benefits that come with it.

The elements of internal party democracy

Political parties have over the last two decades become sub-

ject to more legal regulation and state supervision. In many

developed countries, funding regimes have become stricter

and accounting regulations more rigorous. Ceilings are

introduced on campaign donations and spending, and

sometimes requirements are made as to how parties should

be organized (Gauja, 2008: 244).

This also takes place in some countries throughout the

developing world, due to transnational learning as well as

donor assistance and pressure.More developing countries are

introducing and strengthening laws on political parties, regu-

lating party and candidate registration, party funding and

campaign spending. However, state regulation on internal

party organization, internal party democracy and leadership

selection remains very weak in most developing countries.

In the real world, internal party democracy ranges from

the most centralized political parties, where the party pres-

ident has the final say, to the most decentralized political

parties, where the national party organization only has a

coordinating role. Within this continuum, three areas of

decision-making are identified, on which it is possible to

measure the degree of internal party democracy: leadership

and candidate selection (or election), policy selection and

formulation, and coalition formation (Croissant and Cham-

bers, 2010: 195–197; see also Scarrow, 2005: 7–11). In all

three areas, the question is on inclusiveness and on the

extent of formalization and institutionalization.

Leadership selection is the process of selecting or elect-

ing candidates for party office and public office (nomina-

tion for general elections). This raises a number of

questions, as outlined by Croissant and Chambers (2010:

197): who can nominate, who can be elected, and who can

elect? Do internal rules, regulations and procedures exist,

and are these rules obeyed? At what level of territorial and

organizational structure are the nominations, candidates

and electors chosen? Are there any functional criteria,

group quotas or veto powers?

In addition, one can ask about policy selection and coali-

tion formation. The question is again about inclusiveness

and centralization. What role do party elites, party mem-

bers and/or ‘militants’ and supporters play in setting party

policies? At which levels do they participate in drafting

party programmes and setting party positions? How and

when can a party form coalitions and alliances with other

parties? Are party leaders obliged by party regulations to

seek the approval of the party members or party substruc-

tures before entering into coalitions?

Amundsen 3


Coalition selection is increasingly important in Bangla-

desh, where the parties are coalescing into two blocks.

However, we have chosen to analyse leadership selection,

as intra-party democratization is, first of all, about broaden-

ing the inclusiveness of leadership selection, in Bangladesh

and beyond.

Dynasties in South Asia

Political dynasties are common in most of South Asia, with

the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty of the Indian Congress Party the

best known. Yet Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal have also

had their share of dynastic politics, with the Bhutto clan,

Bandernaike’s children and the Koirala family, respec-

tively, running political parties over several decades.

According to Tariq Ali, a leading figure of the international

left since the 1960s, even reluctant ‘heirs’ like Rahul

Gandhi are ‘dragged along and promoted’ because ‘this is

the only way they feel they can stay in power because their

policies are indistinguishable from all other parties in the

country’ (Saxena, 2012).

In India, the Congress Party and a ‘whole slew of

regional parties’ are dynastic, with the top leadership com-

ing from within a family (Chhibber, 2013: 277). Despite, or

rather due to, the growth of dynastic parties at the regional

level, the Congress Party and its Nehru-Gandhi dynasty are

in serious trouble. In the 2012 elections for the Uttar Pra-

desh legislative assembly, the state from which the party

‘rose as the beacon of freedom before independence from

Britain in 1947’, the party ‘won only a miserable fourth

place’ (Chalmers and Gopalakrishnan, 2012). The Gandhi

dynasty may never rule India again with a clear Congress

majority in the national parliament.

In Pakistan, family-based politics remain as one of the

main features of the political system (Rais, 2009). Paki-

stan’s leading political parties are dynastic, each with

national ambitions and a provincial stronghold. The Paki-

stan People’s Party is the party of the Bhutto family (the

chairman of the party is now 24-year-old Bilawal Bhutto

Zardari, son of President Asif Ali Zardari and former Prime

Minister Benazir Bhutto); the Pakistan Muslim League–

Nawaz is controlled by the Sharif clan; and the Awami

National Party is the party of the Wali Khan family (Lie-

ven, 2011: 57). One exception is the emerging Pakistan

Movement for Justice party, which claims to be internally

democratic and not corrupt, led by Imran Khan, a charis-

matic ex-captain of the national cricket team.

Observers and analysts generally refer to feudal culture

and family- and caste-based politics to explain political

instability, confrontation and the failure of democracy in

Pakistan (Rais, 2009). The parties are like family busi-

nesses. Coalitions are based on political convenience rather

than ideology or policy compatibility. Like in Bangladesh,

the main weaknesses are the absence of a democratic cul-

ture within the political parties, along with military

interventions that have disrupted civilian rule and caused

the decay of institutions and the political process.

Dynasties in Bangladesh

Villagers in Bangladesh seem to value their dynasties: they

value politicians who can ensure a continuous flow of

patronage from above. They prefer leaders with personal

qualities like education, wealth and generosity, and when

asked they explain that ‘ordinary people do not make good

political leaders’ (Ruud, 2011: 67–68). Dynasty is an effi-

cient branding, mobilization and vote-winning method in a

country where party programmes are vague and actual pol-

icies are moving into the populist middle.

Political parties in Bangladesh are neither totally auto-

cratic nor fully democratic, but incorporate elements of

autocracy, oligarchy (dynasty) and democracy, like in most

of South Asia (International IDEA, 2007: 89). Like Paki-

stan, Bangladesh has seen a seesawing political history,

with democratic experiments being aborted by military

coups several times since independence. The last military

dictator handed over power to a non-party caretaker gov-

ernment (NCG) in 1990, which subsequently organized

parliamentary elections (Jahan and Amundsen, 2012: 6).

Formal, multiparty democracy and the parliamentary sys-

tem were thus restored in Bangladesh with the elections of

1991. These were deemed free and fair and coincided with

democratization in large number of other countries, in what

has been called the ‘third wave of democracy’. Since then,

the two main parties, the Awami League (AL) and the Ban-

gladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), have dominated politics,

won every other election and ruled one after the other. And

both parties are unquestionably dynastic.

That is, Bangladesh had an interlude in 2007–2008 with

a military-backed caretaker government that made several

political reforms and attempted to ‘clean up politics’. It

strengthened the election commission and tried to reduce

election-related expenses and violence. But one core

reform element failed, namely its attempt to remove the

dynasties and introduce intra-party democracy by ousting

the two party leaders (popularly nicknamed the ‘minus-

two formula’). The leaders of the AL and BNP demon-

strated control of their respective parties and remained in

charge when elections were held again in 2008 (Jahan and

Amundsen, 2012: 13).

Dynasties and alliances

The AL is a centre-left, secular party, the ‘heritage party’

and a former socialist party, advocating nationalism,

democracy, secularism and socialism (described as social

justice and a society free from exploitation) (Awami

League, n.d.: 1).

Sheikh Hasina has led the AL since 1981. She was one of

the surviving daughters of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the

4 Party Politics


‘father of the nation’ and Bangladesh’s first president, who

was assassinated in 1975. Sheikh Hasina was the prime min-

ister from 1996 to 2001 and again today. During her first pre-

miership, in particular, the family established itself as a

ruling dynasty, building up a political base in government

and administration and expanding its economic power.

Sheikh Hasina’s uncle by marriage, Zillur Rahman,

served as the AL’s general secretary for many years. He was

also the president of Bangladesh from 2009 until he died

early 2013. His son Nazmul Hasan Papon is an AL member

of parliament. A couple of other cousins also play important

roles in the party, like Abul Hasnat Abdullah, member of the

working committee, and Sheikh Fazlul Karim Selim, mem-

ber of the presidium, MP and former minister.

Hasina’s younger sister, Sheikh Rehana Siddiq, is an

informal ‘advisor’, confidant and companion on state visits

and functions, but Hasina’s son, Sajeeb AhmedWazed (Joy),

now seems to be the one groomed to take over, although he

lives in the US. Joy joined the party in 2010 (as ‘primary

member’) (Joy joins politics, 2010), and he is a ‘special advi-

sor’ to the party president (his mother). He has recently also

taken part in international visits and political rallies and mass

meetings in Bangladesh, along with his mother (Joy to travel

around the country, 2013; Tusher, 2013b).

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party is a nationalist,

centre-right political party, opposing communism and

socialism and promoting free market policies. It has grown

distinctly more religious; it is actively voicing the Islamic

consciousness of the Muslim majority of Bangladesh, and

it is allied to distinctly Islamist parties like the Jamaat-e-

Islami and the Islami Oikya Jote.

Khaleda Zia has led the BNP since 1983. She is the

widow of military ruler Ziaur Rahman (‘Zia’, with no fam-

ily relation to the Rahmans of the AL), who established the

party in 1978 in an attempt to civilianize his rule. Zia was

murdered in 1981, and Khaleda, ‘much like her rival

Sheikh Hasina’, consolidated her control of the party ‘by

banning all major decisions taken in her absence and mak-

ing it impossible to remove her as its chief’ (International

Crisis Group (ICG), 2012: 9).

Khaleda’s son Tarique Rahman was made senior vice

chairperson in 2002 and effectively his mother’s successor

(‘in response to rising demand from ranks and files of the

party’, according to his web page). Tarique now figures

on placards and posters with his mother and deceased

father, and a personality cult is being nurtured in rallies,

on placards and with his web pages (www.tariquerahman.-

net and http://tariquerahmanfanclub.webs.com) and blogs,

where he is presented as ‘our next Prime Minister’.

Included in the political/business family were also

Khaleda’s sister Khurshid Jahan Haque, former MP and

minister (deceased 2006), and her brother Sayeed Eskandar,

former vice chairman of BNP and MP (deceased 2012).

Tarique’s younger brother Arafat Rahman is a businessman,

sentenced in court in 2011 in absentia for corruption

and money smuggling during his mother’s 2001–2006

premiership.

Dynastic succession is thus secured within the BNP.

Likewise, the same trend seems to be developing within the

AL, if Hasina’s son takes up the challenge. At the same

time, the AL/Mujib dynasty is larger, extended with family

members occupying a greater number of government, party

and business positions.

Beyond the two major parties, there are two other rela-

tively important parties, but these are not dynastic. The

third largest party, the Jatiya Party, was established by for-

mer military dictator Hussain Mohammad Ershad in 1984

in an attempt to civilianize his rule, and it is still in busi-

ness, allied to the AL, and is still led by Ershad, now an

octogenarian MP. In the last elections it secured 27 MPs,

but the party has split several times and is in terminal

decline. Without a clear successor, the party is more per-

sonal authoritarian than dynastic.

The fourth largest party is the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-

Islami (JIB), a conservative but pragmatic Islamist party

with links back to Muslim organizations of the colonial

period. Jamaat is the BNP’s largest alliance partner, although

the BNP seeks to distance itself from it as some Jamaat lead-

ers have been convicted for ‘crimes against humanity’ in the

belated Bangladeshi war trials, and because the party har-

bours radical ideas like the application of Sharia Law and

(old) sympathies towards Pakistan. Driven by Islam, Jamaat

(along with the communist party and some other small par-

ties) is more based on ideology than dynasty.

Of the remaining parties with parliamentary representa-

tion, three are allied with the AL in the Grand Alliance and

two are allied to the BNP in the 18-Party Alliance. In addi-

tion, four independents later joined the alliances. This means

that although there are eight parties in Bangladesh with rep-

resentation in parliament – and most of these are not dynastic

– none of them operate outside the two blocks or are indepen-

dent of the influence of the two dynasties. The two leading

parties are favoured by the ‘first-past-the-post’ (FPTP) elec-

toral system – a system that makes other parties gravitate

towards two distinct party coalitions (blocks) (Jahan and

Amundsen, 2012: 12) – and by a constitutional provision

(the famous Article 70) banning floor-crossing, thus making

all MPs follow the party leadership in every vote, including

the alliance partners that tend to vote along the same line.

So, from 1991 onwards, voters in Bangladesh have been

presented with two choices: one alliance led by the AL and

the Mujib dynasty and another by the BNP and the Zia

dynasty.

Legal provisions

Bangladesh has no provision for public funding of political

parties, maintains weak regulations for party funding and

campaign spending, and has no legal provision or state reg-

ulation of internal party organization or leadership

Amundsen 5


selection. Political parties are referred to only a few times

in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh

(1972, with later amendments), in the Representation of the

People Order (1972, that establishes the election system

and the election commission) and in the Electoral Rolls

Ordinance (1982, that deals with voter registration).

However, all political parties must register with the Ban-

gladesh Election Commission (BEC), and the BEC-

promoted Code of Conduct for political parties – along with

a noticeable pressure from the BEC under the last military-

backedand reformistNCG(2006–2008) –presents the parties

with a number of requirements (Hussain, 2012: 83–84;

International IDEA, 2007: 78). The more important provi-

sions include the disclosure of candidate and campaign

spending and transparency in finances and fundraising.

Beyond these financial requirements, there are ‘recommenda-

tions’ for a 33per cent quota forwomen in all party bodies and

internal decision-making through regular party elections.

The latter recommendations are not compulsory, as they

have never been promulgated into law (despite promises by

political parties that they would be). Besides, the election

commission’s sanctions on violations are toothless and neg-

ligible (a fact confirmed by various observers, including a

former election commissioner). In practice, the political par-

ties have been ignoring many of them; for a while some of

the larger parties even ignored the legal requirement that par-

ties had to be registered with the commission. There is not

much talk about the 33 per cent representation of women and

no more pressure for regular internal party elections. The

entire reform agenda seems to have come to a halt.

Leadership selection

Internal party democracy requires an open and inclusive

process of selecting candidates for party and public offices.

In Bangladesh, party leaders are to be elected at regular

party conventions or conferences, according to the proce-

dure laid down in the party by-laws. In the case of both

AL and BNP, however, leadership election, including the

selection of the party leader, is conducted beforehand and

only approved by the convention as a mere formality.

In formal terms, the AL party president and general sec-

retary are elected by the tri-annual party convention, called

the council, which is the party’s supreme body. The council

is composed of 3000–4000 district representatives, includ-

ing the president, general secretary and up to 25 party

members from the party’s 74 district bodies. Then, for the

selection of the other party bodies, the tri-annual council

elects the majority of the members whereas the party pres-

ident nominates a certain number.

However, opposition officials and independent observ-

ers, as well as two AL officials (a MP and an executive

committee member) we spoke with, made the claim that

in reality, the party leader is elected at the party convention

only through a formal approval of a single candidate.

Although possible alternatives are discussed behind closed

doors prior to the convention, our sources indicated that

elections for the party president (and general secretary) are

always devoid of alternative candidates. The leadership

issue has always been settled informally before being for-

mally endorsed by the council (by acclamation).

Moreover, the members of the presidium, executive and

advisory committees are for all practical purposes chosen

by the party president (International IDEA, 2007: 93). The

council authorizes the party president to nominate all mem-

bers, in ‘consultation with’ other office holders. This

applies to the 15-member presidium (the daily executive

body), the 71-member executive committee (the central

committee which meets monthly) and the 34-member advi-

sory committee (an advisory body that also includes non-

party members and meets about every three months).

If there are factions in the party at the level below the

leader, which is rather common, the party president will

ensure that people from the various factions are drawn into

the executive bodies (International IDEA, 2007: 92; inter-

view sources). It is reported, however, that the latest

changes in the AL executive committee did not include the

known reformists, despite hectic lobbying (Tusher, 2013a).

Thus, there is no real democracy in party leadership

selection within the AL. Although the outgoing presidium

formally functions as a nomination committee (it presents

the candidates), the wide-ranging nomination powers given

to the party leader means that the real bargaining between

factions and brokering over positions takes place mainly

before and after the tri-annual party council.

When it comes to nominating the party’s candidates for

parliamentary elections, the AL is, like some other parties

(including the BNP), increasingly ‘selling’ nominations.

‘You can now buy yourself a MP nomination the same way

as you buy an air ticket to Singapore: pay up and off you

go!’ said a Bangladeshi MP when referring to this practice

(Amundsen, 2014).

The fact that people can ‘buy’ parliamentary positions is

also described in another study: ‘Money raised by an appli-

cation fee from aspiring candidates for party tickets could

also be substantial during an election year’ (International

IDEA, 2007: 101–102). ‘The Bangladesh Awami League

reported most of its income by this method. In the 2001

elections it could gather a substantial sum of 24 million

BDT (c. 430,000 USD)’ (International IDEA, 2007:

fn23). The applications are then scrutinized by a core group

of leaders of various party organs but the final nominations

are made by the party president, ‘in consultations with the

executive committee and the parliamentary group’, accord-

ing to our interview sources.

In the BNP, the president (here called chairperson),

senior vice chairperson and the general secretary are for-

mally elected by the party convention (council), in a pro-

cess similar to that in the AL. But in reality the BNP

system is even more centralized and informal, as confirmed

6 Party Politics


by both BNP officials and others in our interviews. For one

thing, the three annual council meetings have not been held

regularly (between 1993 and 2009 there was a 16-year

lapse, and the 2012 council has yet to be held), and there

are no proper records of the meetings.

Furthermore, in the BNP, the 15 members of the stand-

ing committee and the 34 members of the advisory council

are all appointed by the chairperson. The approximately

250 executive committee members are elected among the

council representatives, in formal terms by the council but

in reality by the party chairperson. Concerning the selection

of candidates for parliamentary elections, BNP candidates

are (like AL candidates) selected by the top party leaders,

according to their applications, ‘fees’ and in ‘consultations’

with the party leadership, although the chairperson has the

final say. These are facts confirmed by the independent

observers as well as the BNP officials (standing committee

members and MPs) we have interviewed.

The third largest party, the Jatiya Party (National Party)

has a distinctly ‘dictatorial’ style: the JP founder Ershad

declared himself party chairman for life in 2009, he

appoints all posts, the central committee works under his

direction and he dominates the decision-making process.

According to Article 39 of JP’s constitution, the party

chairman has the power to form, suspend or abolish com-

mittees at all levels, under the condition that he consults

with the members of the presidium (according to our inter-

view sources; see also the JP Constitution, n.d.).

In contrast to the formal and informal ‘single man’ dic-

tatorship in the JP, the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami seems

to be well organized, guided by principle rather than person

and thus more internally democratic, according to our inter-

view sources. The party was quick to register with the BEC,

has held regular party meetings and congresses and

recently adapted its constitution to adhere to BEC regula-

tions and the country’s constitution (the party changed the

section on ‘establishing the rule of Allah’ to ‘establishing a

fair and just Islamic society’, and it now allows non-

Muslims to be members) (ICG, 2012: 10; Jamaat drops

‘rule of Allah’ from charter, 2012).

Jamaat is headed by a leader who is elected by the cen-

tral council (the Rokon) for three-year terms in a direct and

secret ballot with alternative candidates. However, the

party leader (Motiur Rahman Nizami) has been re-elected

continuously since 2001, which may indicate rather strong

leadership behind a democratic facade.

Programme formulation and coalition

making

All over South Asia, including Bangladesh, policies, pro-

grammes and election manifestos of parties are generally

worked out by the top party leadership. Party programmes

are discussed in the highest decision-making bodies before

they are made public or presented before the party

conventions for approval (which means, usually, an unani-

mous approval without any substantial discussion or

changes made) (International IDEA, 2007: 96). The daily

policy decisions are mostly made by the party president

in consultation with an informal group of party officials and

advisors. According to our interview sources, there are few

policy issues of any significance being discussed in formal

terms in the various party organs.

Regarding coalition making, decisions are taken at an

even higher and more informal decision-making level.

According to our sources, the question of whether this or that

party should join this or that party coalition is decided by the

party leadership (party president and close advisors),

although consultations are made in an informal way with

party dignitaries and factions, and the formal decision is

made by the presidium. There is no formal endorsement

by the national convention or council, and there is no written

agreement on terms and conditions. This is due to the heavy

horse-trading involved, as party coalitions in Bangladesh

entail in practical terms that the parties of a coalition are not

presenting competing candidates in any constituency. It is

the sheer weight of the candidates and parties in terms of

popular following and vote-winning possibilities that counts.

Local party democracy

At the local level there is a certain degree of democratic

procedure in electing committee chairmen and secretaries,

as the constitutions of all four parties provide for the elec-

tion of leaders at the sub-national level. This might indicate

a certain ‘school of democracy’ at the local level. But are

the political parties educating and coaching people in dem-

ocratic values, principles and procedures?

The AL constitution provides for election of leaders at

the district, ‘upazila’ (subdistrict), municipal and metropol-

itan level in local triennial meetings (called councils),

although it does not specify the election process at the

grassroots level, i.e. the union, ward and village levels. In

practice, members of the local committees are usually not

elected in local council meetings through secret voting, but

selected from above by the national level leadership and

‘elected’ by acclamation in the meetings, according to

independent observers as well as AL officials. Besides,

council meetings are rarely held and many committees con-

tinue for years beyond the expiry of their terms.

In two district and two upazila committees that we ran-

domly selected for scrutiny, we found that one AL district

committee was formed partly through election by secret

ballot and partly through selection. That is, eight senior

positions, including the president and secretary, were

elected through secret ballot, and this eight-member com-

mittee then selected the remaining positions. In the other

district, the committee was formed in 2002 through accla-

mation in an open council endorsing the party leadership’s

choices. Moreover, the two district committees were

Amundsen 7


formed in 2003 and 2002, respectively, and were still oper-

ating. In the two upazilas, the committees, which are still

operating, were elected in 2004 and 2009, respectively,

by acclamation of the leadership’s nominees.

In contrast to the AL, the BNP constitution stipulates

election of members of all committees from the district

down to the union and ward levels through local, biennial

meetings. However, as with the AL, local party committees

are often not elected but selected by the party leadership

and ‘elected’ by acclamation locally. In the BNP, local

council meetings are even more sporadic than within the

AL. In the two districts selected for scrutiny, we found that

one committee was formed on an ad hoc basis in 2003 and

another in 2010, and that the members of both were

selected by national-level leaders. Similarly, the two upa-

zila committees were nominated from above in 2009.

The constitutions of Jatiya and Jamaat also provide for

election of committee members from the district level down

to unions and wards. Nevertheless, in the two districts and

upazilas we examined, the party president of JP had simply

selected the local party committees, after consultations with

local leaders. In Jamaat, however, the local leaders of the

two district and upazila committees had been elected

through secret ballot, in 2011, in line with the party consti-

tution. In Jamaat, all party members can vote and can be can-

didates, and the candidates are elected by simple majority.

In sum, of the four parties we looked at, only Jamaat fol-

lows the practice of leadership selection by party members

locally and through secret voting. The AL has a mixed

practice of election through secret ballot and election by

acclamation of candidates presented by the party leader-

ship. The BNP and the JP were the worst performers; in the

BNP all local committees examined were selected by the

party leadership and in the JP by the party president. Con-

sequently, the level of local, internal party democracy is

underdeveloped in Bangladesh, and local party organs can

hardly be said to fulfil the role of a ‘school of democracy’.

Instead of regularized politics, the parties in Bangladesh

(in government and opposition alike) frequently call for

‘hartals’. Hartals are a form of mass protest, which includes

public agitation, street manifestations, road blockages,

stone throwing and varying degrees of civil disobedience.

Hartals can muster millions of protesters throughout the

country and shut it down for a day or two. Hartals illustrate

the party leaders’ influence on the political agenda and

their ability to mobilize the masses. This happens, however,

in a way that is not nurturing a democratic culture but rather

confrontation and violence.

Confrontational politics

There is a distinctly confrontational political climate in

Bangladesh. Politics is perceived as a zero-sum game in a

‘winner-takes-all’ system, in which the ruling party dynasty

(nomatterwhich) has always used the incumbencyadvantage

to the full and strived to establish hegemonic control over the

political agenda and over the use of public resources. One

writer argued that the confrontational politics is a manifesta-

tion of the undemocratic (feudal) political culture in which

each party seeks to monopolize state power as if the other

party does not have the right to exist (Hossain, 2000: 509).

Politics has to some extent become a battle of family

vendettas, with the two leading ladies and their families,

friends and supporters cultivating two opposite and incom-

patible narratives about the history of the liberation war,

international relations, religion and society. Each is demo-

nizing the other for being erratic, hegemonic, corrupt and

dictatorial.

This explains the frequent ‘hartals’ and the prolonged

boycotts of the parliament. In fact, the opposition

lawmakers (no matter the party) have boycotted roughly

half the parliamentary sittings over the last 20 years (Jahan

and Amundsen, 2012: 63). The current opposition has boy-

cotted the incumbent parliament since its formation.

The confrontational climate may indicate a basic strug-

gle for the establishment of democracy, which could, per-

haps, legitimize the oligarchic leadership style within the

parties. The two party leaders repeatedly claim that this is

what is going on, and the deepest political disagreements

are about the basic rules of democratic procedure, in partic-

ular the modalities of the next elections. A core question is

whether elections are to be held under a caretaker govern-

ment or an electoral commission. The current AL govern-

ment in 2011 abolished the constitutional provision for

caretaker governments, but the BNP wants to return to the

caretaker system, fearing an election commission will not

be independent. This is an important element of the current

deadlock situation in which the BNP boycotts the parlia-

ment and threatens to boycott the next elections.

But the political parties of Bangladesh are not engaged

in a struggle for the establishment of democracy. The mil-

itary dictators of Bangladesh are gone (even when they

could return relatively easily), and since 1991, two govern-

ments have stepped down following electoral defeat, and

elections are deemed relatively free and fair. Thus, it seems

that Bangladeshi politics is more of a struggle for hege-

mony through electoral means, in a strong ‘winner-takes-

all’ political system, than it is a struggle for establishing

democracy in the first place. This can also be seen from the

fact that political reform is hardly on the agenda; the parties

are not fighting for democratic reforms that can restrict

executive power and reduce dynastic influence, neither in

the polity nor within the parties.

Conclusions

Bangladesh’s two leading political parties are clearly

dynastic, led by the daughter and the widow of former pre-

sidents. The BNP has appointed a successor from within the

family, and the AL is about to do the same. The reason for

8 Party Politics


this strong dynastic inclination is, first of all, that the fam-

ilies themselves are holding onto power within the party,

and because the various party factions prefer an undisputed

leadership. Furthermore, dynastic politics is an efficient

branding and vote-winning method in a country where

party programmes are vague and people seem to prefer the

‘influential families’ when voting.

One of the consequences of the prevalent practice of

dynastic rule in Bangladesh is the continuation of a con-

frontational political climate, with two families in a dead-

lock battle. Another consequence of dynastic politics is the

low degree of internal party democracy. We have seen that

the party leaders have been ruling their parties for more

than 30 years, and how they have been re-elected without

contestation. Internal party democracy in terms of top lead-

ership election is not open for democratic procedure, and

vital decision-making in terms of programme formulation

and alliance building is the exclusive right of the party

leader and the inner circle. In Bangladesh, not even elec-

toral defeat challenges the position of the party leader.

From the Bangladeshi experience, then, it does not seem

that dynastic parties can be democratic. Here, the inherent

contradiction between dynasty and democracy is spelled

out to the advantage of the former; dynasty is protected

from democratic infringements.

Although the political dynasties are a hindrance to intra-

party democracy in Bangladesh, dynastic parties in other

countries can still, theoretically, be democratic. But that

possibility is reduced when adding the experience of India

and Pakistan to the present findings.

Now, are the political parties of Bangladesh engaged in

a struggle for the establishment of democracy, which can

legitimize the oligarchic party leadership styles? The two

parties and the two party leaders repeatedly claim they are,

and the deepest political disagreements are about the basic

rules for democratic procedures, in particular the modal-

ities of the next elections. But the parties in Bangladesh are

not struggling to establish democracy: recent governments

have stepped down and relatively fair elections have been

held. This, paired with the fact that parties are not fighting

for democratic reforms that can restrict executive power

and reduce dynastic influences suggests that Bangladeshi

politics is more of a struggle for hegemony through elec-

toral means, in a strong ‘winner-takes-all’ political system.

In terms of intra-party democracy, it could be that party

fragmentation would become worse with greater internal

party democracy. However, the most devastating fragmen-

tation has taken place within the Jatiya party, the most

authoritarian political party in Bangladesh. It could also

be that internal party democracy might weaken the parties’

policy-making power, but it seems that dynastic efficiency

is invested more in protecting family interests and in scorn-

ing the other party than in promoting democratic values.

In sum, Bangladesh is not in the early stages of democra-

tization; it is not in a situation of political parties fighting for

democracy against an entrenched undemocratic regime.Con-

sequently, the arguments for an authoritarian and oligarchic

style of party leadership in Bangladesh are weak. Rather, the

Bangladesh experience supports the rationale for internal

party democracy and the normative ‘school of democracy’

argument. Bangladesh needs political parties that can engage,

educate and coach people in democratic values, principles

and procedures (rather than in endless political squabbles and

confrontations), and Bangladesh needs inclusive politics and

party-internal democratic procedures that can produce more

legitimate and efficient policy programmes, give a broader

social representation and restrict the vested interests of the

party leaderships. Bangladesh needs political parties that can

contribute to the establishment of a democratic culture by

being themselves internally democratic.

Acknowledgements

I extend my thanks to Professor Rounaq Jahan, senior researcher at

the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) in Dhaka, Bangladesh, for

her assistance in data collection, and to the politicians and observ-

ers interviewed in Bangladesh. I am also grateful to the two anon-

ymous reviewers of Party Politics for their helpful comments, and

to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Embassy in Dhaka,

for funding the research cooperation between CPS and the Chr.

Michelsen Institute. Only the author, however, can be held respon-

sible for possible omissions, errors, and misrepresentations.

Funding

This work was supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs/Royal Norwegian Embassy in Dhaka, through its funding

of a research cooperation programme between the Centre for Pol-

icy Dialogue (CPD, Bangladesh) and the Chr. Michelsen Institute

(CMI, Norway).

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Author biography

Inge Amundsen is a political scientist and Senior Researcher at

the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Bergen, Norway. His

research focusses on democratic institutionalisation, parliaments,

political parties, political corruption, and natural resources

(petroleum resource management and revenue management).

10 Party Politics


Documents

Democratic dynasties? Internal party democracy in Bangladesh