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Eppur non si muove? Prospectsfor constitutional reforms inItaly after the 2009 Europeanand 2010 regional electionsArianna Farinelli a & Emanuele Massetti ba Baruch College (CUNY)b University of EdinburghVersion of record first published: 17 Nov 2011.

To cite this article: Arianna Farinelli & Emanuele Massetti (2011): Eppur non si muove?Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy after the 2009 European and 2010 regionalelections, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 16:5, 685-704

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Eppur non si muove? Prospects for constitutional

reforms in Italy after the 2009 European and 2010

regional elections

Arianna Farinelli

Baruch College (CUNY)

Emanuele Massetti

University of Edinburgh

Abstract

The results of the 2008 Italian general election aroused expectations for theundertaking of a much awaited reform of the political system. This article discussesthe prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy after the 2009 and 2010 ‘mid-term’elections in order to provide informed speculation of the foreseeable outcomes. Itanalyses the interplay between the preferences of parties and the change of powerrelations amongst and within them in the context of the extant institutional vetopoints. The article concludes that: (1) a consensual ‘grand reform’ negotiatedbetween government and opposition is the least likely outcome; (2) a partisan reformcarried out by the governmental forces is also unlikely because of deep divisionswithin the governmental majority; (3) the most likely outcome is no, or very limited,reform. From a normative (liberal-democratic) perspective, given the populistconstitutional preferences of the most prominent political actor (Silvio Berlusconi), italso concludes that ‘no reform’ is not the worst outcome.

Keywords

Constitutional reforms, Veto players, Italian transition, Berlusconi.

Introduction

The results of the 2008 general election were welcomed by analysts and

commentators as a watershed in the Italian transition, as they seemed to

represent a crucial step towards the consolidation of a non-fragmented party

system and the prelude for a much awaited reform of the political system. The

following events, however, have hardly provided elements for the substantia-

tion of these predictions. In the following two years, no constitutional reform

was seriously debated, with the exception of the financial autonomy of the

regions (the so-called ‘fiscal federalism’).1 Even on this area, the parliament

approved only a vague framework law and a legislative decree on devolution of

state property to the regions, leaving the actual substance of the matter in

waiting for other legislative decrees.

Yet, the reform of the political system has remained very much on the

agenda, with analysts presenting the period 2010–2013 as a real window of

Journal of Modern Italian Studies 16(5) 2011: 685–704

Journal of Modern Italian StudiesISSN 1354-571X print/ISSN 1469-9583 online ª 2011 Taylor & Francis

http://www.tandfonline.com http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2011.622474

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opportunity, given the absence of major electoral appointments after two years

of almost uninterrupted election campaign. But, in what conditions have the

2009 European and the 2010 regional elections left the still fluid Italian party

system? What are the implications for the prospects for constitutional reforms?

Have the moderate forces within both government and opposition

strengthened themselves, thus making a consensual reform more likely? Have

the government forces remained united enough to be able to push through a

partisan reform? Has any transversal alliance that cuts across the government/

opposition divide become more likely?

This article aims at investigating these questions by bringing together the

discussion of Italian political parties’ positions on constitutional reforms with

the analysis of changes in power relations (both amongst and within parties) as a

result of the outcomes of the two ‘mid-term’ elections. Considering the

relationship between veto points and veto players (Tsebelis 2002), we argue

that, while the 2008 general election reduced (at least formally) the frag-

mentation of the party system and consequently the number of veto players in

parliament, the two ‘mid-term’ elections contributed significantly to re-

increasing the number of veto players by exacerbating divisions within the

main political parties and leading, in the case of the People of Freedom, to a

crucial split. Combined with strong divergences amongst political forces on

important constitutional areas, this increase in veto players is likely to close the

door not only to consensual but also to partisan (i.e. governmental) reforms.

From a normative (liberal-democratic) point of view, we also argue that, given

the populist constitutional preferences of the most prominent political actor,

Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, the perspective of no reforms in this

parliamentary term should not be taken as a negative outcome.

The article is organized as followed. The first part provides a justification for

conceptualizing Italy as a political system in transition and in waiting for a

reform of the political system. The second part explains very briefly the main

institutional veto points for constitutional reforms. In part three, we analyse the

party system that emerged after the 2008 general elections to point out the

number of veto players in Parliament. The fourth part provides an analysis of

parties’ (and factions’) positioning on the most relevant constitutional issues, so

as to point out their relative distances and the state of the art of the debate after

the 2008 general election. The fifth and sixth parts analyse respectively the

results of the two elections and their impact on the number of veto players. In

the concluding section, we discuss the changes in order to formulate informed

speculation on the fate of constitutional reforms being carried out within this

parliamentary term.

Italy: a political system still in transition?

The dramatic changes that occurred in the Italian political system – particularly

in the party system – between 1992 and 1994 are often referred to as the end of

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the Italian ‘First Republic’. Since then, there has been an overwhelming

consensus that Italy has remained in a state of transition. First, since 1994 the

Italian party system has gone through a long and, arguably, unfinished phase of

restructuring based on three pillars: the highly divisive figure of Berlusconi, the

consolidation – but not definite solidification – of electoral/political coalitions,

and the establishment – but not unanimous acceptance (Donovan 2008) – of

bipolar competition (Bardi 2007; Bartolini et al. 2004; Diamanti 2007; Di

Virgilio 2006; Massetti 2009; Pasquino 2001). Second, the transition phase was

generated and accompanied by strong and enduring expectations for the

emergence of a ‘normal democracy’, after decades of partitocrazia and ‘blocked

democracy’, which would be achieved primarily thorough a ‘modernization’ of

the political system.

In such a political context, the idea of a ‘grand constitutional reform’, which

was first put on the agenda in the 1980s, has regained momentum (Bull and

Pasquino 2007). The establishment of a new Republic has, therefore, been

envisaged as the necessary end point of the transition. Although these aspirations

have not been fulfilled, attempts to carry out such a ‘grand reform’ have, indeed,

been undertaken: a bicameral commission headed by centre-left politician

Massimo D’Alema managed to reach compromise amongst most parties on

several constitutional areas in 1997, but in early 1998 it had to acknowledge its

failure because of Berlusconi’s U-turn; while the extensive constitutional

revisions passed unilaterally by the centre-right majority in the period 2003–

2005 were all rejected by the Italian electorate in a referendum in June 2006

(Bull and Newell 2009).

While we acknowledge that the absence of a commonly agreed destination

makes the completion of transition more difficult, the fact remains that a

comprehensive reform of the Constitution is still very much on the agenda and

this, per se, already determines a diffuse perception of the current system as a

transitory one. Influential politicians, opinion makers, important stakeholders

(such as the business organization Confindustria) and even the President of the

Republic keep emphasizing the need for a more efficient and streamlined political

system. Even those academics who have rightly pointed to the problems related to

the application of the concept ‘transition’ seem to end up rehabilitating it:

the need for constitutional overhaul is now an unquestioned and taken-for-

granted matter of consensus right across the political spectrum at the elite

level – and ultimately it may be this – the fact that politicians themselves

see things that way – that makes it meaningful to apply to the Italian case the

term ‘transition’. (Newell 2009a: 7, emphasis in original)

We argue that this conceptualization of the Italian political system as a ‘work

in progress’, justifies our questioning about an event, comprehensive

constitutional reform, which has not happened yet and, indeed, may not

happen in the foreseeable future (Morlino 2009).

Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy

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Institutional veto points for constitutional reforms

Revisions to the Italian Constitution are regulated by article 138 of the

Constitution itself, which envisages a long and complicated process, with

several veto points. The aim is clearly that of favouring well-meditated and

consensual reforms: meditated because two votes in each House with at least

three months of interval are required, which give doubts and controversies

more chances to emerge and be (re-)considered; and consensual because the

final approval must be achieved either by an absolute majority and a popular

(confirmative) referendum or by a two-thirds majority in parliament. Since the

opposition is always able to call for a popular referendum, if parties are unable

to reach a wide compromise in Parliament, the voters will have the final word.2

This was the case of the reform passed by the centre-left government (led by

Giuliano Amato) in 2001. That reform enhanced the powers of the regions vis-

a-vis the state, including the possibility of financial autonomy. It was strongly

opposed by the then centre-right minority and especially by the Northern

League. On that occasion the referendum was called for by both government

(to have their reform legitimated by voters) and opposition. However, the

opposition parties (which at the time of holding the referendum in October

2001 had already gone back to power) did not campaign to block the reform,

proving that their position against it was more instrumental than substantial. As

a result, the centre-left reform was confirmed by the referendum without much

recrimination by the centre-right. By contrast, the partisan reform pushed

through by the centre-right majority led by Berlusconi (2001–2006) faced a

much stronger and convinced opposition. As a result, the following

referendum campaign (which gain took place after the centre-left opposition

had gone back to power) was a real political struggle and ended up with the

scrapping of the reform in June 2006.

Institutional veto points decrease significantly when it comes to reforming

constitutionally relevant areas without the necessity to change the Constitu-

tional text. This is particularly the case of implementing constitutional norms

through ordinary legislation or changing the electoral system, which was never

included in the Constitution. These kinds of reforms are, therefore, within the

government’s reach, at least in principle. For instance, the third Berlusconi

government (2005–2006), which was sufficiently cohesive and united,

succeeded in passing unilaterally a new electoral law in 2005. By contrast,

the subsequent centre-left government (2006–2008), which included about

fifteen veto players, was unable to pass a counter-reform of the voting system in

spite of an explicit and public commitment of the then Prime Minister,

Romano Prodi (Zuccolini 2006). As this example points out, institutional veto

points constrain political actors, but it is the interaction between the number of

relevant actors (veto players) and their constitutional preferences that,

ultimately, determines the outcome. These will be analysed in the following

sections.

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Veto players: the new Italian party system after the 2008 general

election

The Parliament that emerged from the 2008 general election boasted the

lowest number of (relevant) parties in the ‘Second Republic’. On the left-of-

centre camp, the Democratic Party (PD) dominates the scene, at least

numerically. The new party, which had been formed in 2007 from the merge

of the Left Democrats (DS) and Margherita (Ma, Catholics and social liberals)

under the leadership of former left-democrat Walter Veltroni, appeared,

however, from the very beginning as a rather divided and, therefore,

potentially fragile political creature. There were influential politicians both

within the DS and Ma, such as D’Alema and Franco Marini, who were not

fully convinced of the necessity to create a united party and, especially in the

view of the 2005 electoral reform, preferred a strategic ‘centre-left’ alliance,

which would allow both parties to keep ‘fishing in their respective

electorates’.3 This division also implied a different orientation towards coalition

politics and, in turn, towards the preferred electoral system.

In the run-up to the 2008 election, Veltroni entered an electoral alliance

only with ‘Italy of Values’ (IdV), the party formed by former public prosecutor

Antonio Di Pietro, and the Radicals, the latter being directly hosted within the

PD’s list. The idea was to incorporate the IdV within the PD after the election,

but Di Pietro eventually decided to remain autonomous. The parties of the

radical left – Communist Re-foundation (RC), Italian Communists (PdCI) and

the Greens – formed a coalition on their own but did not succeed in being

represented in parliament.

On the right-of-centre camp, Forza Italia (‘Forward Italy’; FI) and the

National Alliance (AN) decided to present a common list under the label

‘People of Freedom’ (PdL), with the explicit commitment to merge into a

united party after the election. They formed a coalition with the Northern

League (LN) and a sort of Sicily-centred southern league called Movement for

Autonomy (MpA). This coalition, in which only the first three parties (FI, AN

and LN) are relevant, won the 2008 general election and formed the cabinet.

The Union of Christian and Centre Democrats (UDC) was given a pre-

election ultimatum: either to merge with the PdL or to remain out of the

coalition. It decided to form a ‘centre coalition’, Union of Centre (UdC),

which managed to get elected in both Houses of Parliament. As a result the

party finds itself in a sort of limbo: part of the centre-right in terms of ideology

and social constituency but out of the government and, therefore, formally part

of the opposition.

The format of the party system that emerged from the 2008 general election

boasted, therefore, only six relevant parties: FI and LN representing the

populist right (throughout Italy and in the North respectively), AN and UdC

representing a moderate centre-right (secular and Catholic respectively), the

PD representing a moderate centre-left and the IdV representing a form of

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left-leaning populism that focuses primarily on issues of justice and repression

of white-collar crimes. The eventual merge of FI and AN into the PdL in

March 2009, represented a further move towards the concentration of the party

system, leaving the number of relevant parties at just five. However, it also

represented a somehow confused aggregation, as it brought under the same

roof a right-wing populist and charismatic/personal party, territorially balanced

throughout Italy (FI), with a moderate centre-right party (at least as far as its

leader, Gianfranco Fini, is concerned) with a marked southern tradition (AN).4

In so doing the resulting party, PdL, internalized potential tensions concerning

(among other issues) constitutional reforms.

Positions of political forces on constitutional reforms

In the last two decades of debate about constitutional reforms all political

parties have had a chance to advance, discuss and/or vote proposals. This allows

us to chart, in spite of some incoherent positioning over time, the overall

stances of each party or relevant faction within parties. As a preliminary

consideration, it is important to underline the existence of a wide consensus on

few and very general ideas. Virtually all parties, at present, support the idea of

streamlining the legislative process by reducing the number of MPs and

diversifying the competences of the two Houses of Parliament. In addition,

although more disagreement remains on these issues, there seems to be an

emerging consensus on the general idea of turning Italy into a federal system

(or, at least, a state of autonomies) and in providing the Head of Government

with more powers within the cabinet (e.g. by directly hiring and firing

ministers). The presence of a general consensus on these few areas is confirmed

by the bipartisan approval of a proposal (the so-called ‘Violante draft’) in the

Parliamentary Commission for Institutional Affairs in 2007.5 Yet, it is

important to stress that the failure of the ‘Violante draft’ was due not only to

the premature end of the parliamentary term but also to persisting divergence

on the details of the abovementioned reforms. In addition, strong disagreement

persists on virtually all other areas, and in particular on the voting system, on

the role and organization of the judiciary, on national solidarity, and even on

the overall system of ‘checks and balance’ (i.e. the relationship between the

executive and the other organs).

As far as the electoral rules are concerned, in the aftermath of the 2008

general election a referendum on the voting system was pending. It proposed,

amongst other things, to assign the majority bonus to the plurality list rather

than to the plurality coalition of party lists (Sartori 2009). The positions of

parties are, therefore, analysed in respect to the current system, to the amended

system envisaged by the referendum, and in respect to alternative systems that

have been discussed.

The PdL, and in particular the majority faithful to Berlusconi, is the

strongest supporter of the current system, as it allows voters to de facto elect a

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Prime Minister with his parliamentary majority and manifesto, rather than to

elect a Parliament in which the formation of a government is subsequently

negotiated (Sartori 2010). The blocked-list system also shifts the attention of

voters from individual candidates to the party and, in turn, from the party to

the leader. Yet, initially, Berlusconi and, more consistently Fini, saw favourably

the victory of the ‘yes vote’ in the referendum as this promised to benefit major

parties, such as the PdL. Not surprisingly, the LN opposed the referendum and

made clear that a victory of the ‘yes vote’ would put at risk the survival of the

government. Until he remained within the PdL, Fini was open to consider the

adoption of other electoral systems that could favour big parties and maintain

bipolar competition, such as a two-round single-member constituency system

(like in France) or a Proportional Representation (PR) system with a low

district magnitude (like in Spain). However, as the convergence amongst

Berlusconi and the LN on the current system is crucial for the stability of the

government, the willingness to avoid governmental crisis has kept the two allies

anchored to supporting the current election rule (Diamanti 2010).

On the opposition camp, the UdC was the most resolute opponent to the

referendum, as the party prefers either a return to a pure PR system or the

adoption of a mixed-member proportional system (similar to Germany’s),

which allows parties more room for negotiating alliances after, rather than

before, elections. By contrast, the PD, despite its dislike of the current system,

appeared deeply divided on alternatives. Veltroni, the first PD leader, preferred

the ‘French system’ but the party has also flirted with the idea of adopting the

‘Spanish system’, as well as going back to the pre-2005 Italian system.

However, a substantive minority within the party (especially those who were

sceptical of the creation of the PD in first instance, such as D’Alema and

Marini) seems to have developed a position very close to the UdC’s (Il Sole 24

Ore 2010). Finally, the position of the IdV is rather ambiguous too. Although

the party maintains to be in favour of bipolar competition and a reduction of

the number of parties, it is also too small to support voting systems that would

advantage the bigger parties in the two poles. Indeed, it campaigned for ‘No’ in

the referendum.

The two most controversial issues on the reform of the judiciary concern

the belonging of judges and public prosecutors to the same career track (which

allegedly poses the defence side systematically at a disadvantage), and the

relationship between the judiciary (especially public prosecutors) and

politicians. Since the time of the tangentopoli scandals, they have contributed

to create a sort of ‘justice versus politics’ cleavage in the Italian party system.

The supporters of ‘justice’ argue that politics should be ‘cleaned up’ from

corruption and, therefore, politicians must undergo judicial checks and trials

like any other citizen. The supporters of ‘politics’ argue that, with the abolition

of MPs’ immunity in the early 1990s, the equilibrium was disturbed, with

‘justice’ gaining the upper hand and keeping ‘politics’ consistently under

blackmail.

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Not surprisingly, the great majority of political forces leans towards the

‘politics’ side. Berlusconi and the majority of the PdL represent the most radical

element in this respect. They have consistently advocated the separation of the

judges’ from the public prosecutors’ career track and the subjection of, at least,

the latter category under governmental control. They have also tried to re-

introduce immunity for politicians, though limited to those taking up

important institutional positions (with the obvious intent of including

Berlusconi amongst those covered by immunity).6 In this position they are

followed by the LN. Although this party has often indulged in anticorruption

discourses, it has always advocated the primacy of ‘politics’ over ‘justice’. In its

constant engagement with ‘simulative politics’ (Cento Bull 2009), it has even

proposed a reform for direct election of judges.

A number of political actors seem to occupy a much more moderate

position, though still within the ‘politics’ side. A minority of the PdL (led by

Fini), the UdC, the MpA and a minority of the PD accept the argument that

‘justice’ has invaded the space of ‘politics’, with prosecutors taking decisions

to investigate politicians too light-heartedly, given the deleterious con-

sequences of judicial implications on the politician’s career, even in the case of

eventual acquittal. Many within these political forces also agree that

Berlusconi has been, at least to some extent, the victim of a persecution by

biased (if not ‘partisan’) public prosecutors who aimed to end his political

career. For these reasons, they would be in favour of some kind of rebalancing

of the relationship between ‘justice’ and ‘politics’. Most of these forces would

be prepared to discuss the reintroduction of some kind of immunity for MPs,

though this remains a hugely unpopular provision. They would also take into

consideration the separation of career track between judges and public

prosecutors. However, posing the judiciary under the control of the executive

would entail an important departure from the basic principles of the 1948

Constitution which meets a lot of resistance within most of these political

forces.

On the other side, the IdV and its leader, former prosecutor Antonio Di

Pietro, represent the champions of ‘justice’. For them, the main problem is that

some individuals use ‘politics’ as a shield against the due judicial consequences

of their own private crimes. Berlusconi is, in their view, the paradigmatic

example. They reject any form of immunity for politicians and any proposal for

separating the career of judges from that of public prosecutors, let alone the

idea of posing the judiciary under the control of the executive. Although

more moderated in tone and more nuanced in the substance, the orientation of

the majority of the PD appears to follow the IdV’s.

Concerning the issue of national solidarity, de facto linked to the issue of

unity and indivisibility of the country, the main division is between the

Northern League, on one side, and the MpA, UdC, IdV, the PD and a

minority of the PdL on the other side. Berlusconi and the majority of the PdL

occupy, in this area, an intermediate position. However, sharing governmental

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responsibilities with the LN seems to make Berlusconi prone, most of the time,

to give way to its ally.

As mentioned above, in the last two decades, a consensus on the general,

though rather superficial, idea of creating a federal state has emerged. The

problem is, however, how to proceed on that path without jeopardizing

the unity, both formal and substantial, of the country. The Northern League,

which is still formally a secessionist party, aims to use this reform to retain more

financial resources in the rich Northern regions.7 This approach is strongly

opposed by parties that explicitly protect the interests of the south, like the

MpA, and by parties that claim to be concerned with the unity of the country

(UdC, IdV, PD and the minority of PdL). Part of the latter forces, however,

could turn in favour of fiscal federalism if it was financially sustainable for the

South and encouraged virtuous management of public resources at regional and

local level throughout Italy (Fini 2010).

Last, but definitely not least, the political forces are divided on the overall

‘checks and balance’ system. Here the main division is between Berlusconi and

all the other political forces, including Fini. Some of the latter are determined

to maintain a purely parliamentary system, while others (like Fini) are prepa-

red to discuss proposals for the establishment of a semi-presidential system (after

the French model) if accompanied by a reform of the electoral law (similar to

France’s) and by the checks and balance that such a system entails, including the

possibility of ‘cohabitation’ (Panebianco 2009b). By contrast, Berlusconi and its

majority in the PdL appear to push for the establishment of a new regime built

around the de facto unrestrained power of the ‘charismatic leader’. Berlusconi’s

ideas of the new institutional order were clearly outlined in the constitutional

reform voted by the centre-right majority in 2005: a prime minister directly

elected by voters, with no requirement to pass a confidence vote in parliament,

with a permanent parliamentary majority, with de facto no chances to be voted

down by Parliament, with the power to call new elections, to hire and fire

ministers, and to determine the agenda of Parliament. In addition, the reform

also envisaged the reduction of powers for all the organs of guarantee, such as

the President of the Republic and the Constitutional Court. Indeed, this part of

the reform was strongly criticized by many authoritative experts who warned

that it would place Italy outside the family of western liberal democracies.8

Although that (failed) constitutional reform was then voted by AN and the

UdC too, in the new parliamentary term the only political force that is

prepared to back Berlusconi in his populist project – which now appears to take

the shape of a sui generis semi-presidential system – is the LN, obviously in

exchange for a federal reform.

The European election of 2009 and the regional elections of 2010

The 2009 European election in Italy represented an important test for the party

system and the political coalitions that emerged from the general election of

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2008. As European elections involve the whole national electorate, they are a

good barometer of the relative strength of national political parties both in the

competition between government and opposition, and within political

coalitions.

Berlusconi turned the election into a plebiscite on himself, a test on his new

party, the PdL, after the official merger between FI and AN, and an opinion

poll on the performance of the government in its first year. He had predicted a

landslide for the PdL which his polls indicated at 40 per cent and above. The

elections were also a critical test for other political parties. The PD sought a

comeback after the party had suffered heavy defeats in regional (Sardinian) and

local elections earlier that year, whereas the LN and the IdV aimed at

consolidating and hopefully increasing their political influence vis-a-vis major

parties in their respective coalitions. Finally, the (extraparliamentary) radical

left, which had failed to meet the required threshold in the general election of

2008, hoped to maintain some parliamentary representation in Brussels.

Yet, as shown in Table 1, while the governmental coalition managed to

maintain about the same vote share as in 2008, the election results showed a

redistribution of votes in favour of the LN and to the detriment of the PdL. In

absolute terms, the LN gained 100,000 more votes than in 2008, while the PdL

Table 1 June 2009 European Election results in Italy compared with the 2008General and the 2004 European Election results

2009Votes inthousands

2009%

Diff. 2008votes in

thousands

Diff.2008(%-%)

Diff. 2004votes in

thousands

Diff.2004(%-%)

Government 14,207 46.4 72,856 70.4 þ1,034 þ5.8PDL 10,779 35.3 72,850 72.1 7782(a) 70.4LN 3,124 10.2 þ100 þ1.9 þ1,512 þ5.2MpA 304 0.9 7106 70.2 / /Opposition 13,163 43.5 72,576 þ0.3 7243 þ2.1PD 7,989 26.6 74,106(b) 76.6(b) 72,088 73.5Radicals 740 2.4 / / þ12 þ0.2IdV 2,441 8.0 þ847 þ3.6 þ1,750 þ5.8UdC 1,993 6.5 757 þ0.9 þ83 þ0.6Extra-Parliamentary

Left1,987 6.5 þ863 þ3.4 71,559 72.0

RC-PdCI 1,035 3.4 / / / /SEL (Left Ecology

and Freedom)952 3.1 / / / /

Turnout 32,659 66.5% 75,215 714 72,539 76.6

Source: Re-elaborated by authors on the basis of data from Ministry of Interior

*The 2008 data refer to the election results in Italy (except Aosta Valley) for the Lower House.

(a) Difference with the sum of votes gained by FI, AN, Social Alternative, Sgarbi List and UDEUR.

(b) The figures do not take into consideration that the Radicals run within the PD list in 2008. Ifthe Radicals’ votes and vote share are counted, the difference is 73,366 thousands of votes and74.2 per cent.

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lost 2.8 million votes, mostly because of abstention (Corbetta et al. 2009).

Nonetheless, Berlusconi’s party was still the first political party in Italy with

35 per cent of the vote.

Across the political spectrum, the PD lost votes both towards other

opposition parties (primarily the IdV and the UdC) and, to a lesser extent,

parties of government (Corbetta et al. 2009). By contrast, the IdV was able to

double its electoral weight by presenting itself as the toughest opponent to

Berlusconi. Finally, whereas the UdC remained stable, the radical left failed

to meet the parliamentary threshold, thus continuing to be excluded from

parliament.

Nine months after the European election, in March 2010, Italy held regional

elections in thirteen regions (out of twenty). Before the elections, the centre-left

controlled eleven of the thirteen regions. Although the centre-left (which at

regional level often includes parties of the radical left) was able to retain the

governorship of seven regions, the centre-right (PdL and LN) gained the most

important regions of the north (Lombardy, Piedmont and Veneto), where the

alliance with the LN turned out to be once again crucial, and the regions of

Lazio (where Rome is), Campania and Calabria, which were previously

controlled by the centre-left. The UdC, albeit part of the opposition at national

level, supported centre-right candidates in Lazio, Campania and Calabria, while

its incompatibility with the LN led the party to support centre-left candidates in

the northern regions. In Apulia, the centre-left re-elected as governor a popular

figure of the radical-left, Nichi Vendola, after the national leadership of the PD

had tried to get rid of him in order to forge an electoral alliance with the UdC.

Vendola managed to reconfirm himself as the centre-left candidate and went on

to win. This personal victory also served to relaunch the radical left, now under

Vendola’s unquestioned leadership, in the polls at national level.

As shown in Table 2, the turnout was extremely low (63 per cent) and all

the main political parties, with the only remarkable exception of the LN, lost a

Table 2 Results of the 2010 Regional Elections compared with the 2009European, 2008 General and 2005 Regional Elections

Votes inthousands %

Diff. inthousandsEuro 2009

Diff.2009%-%

Diff. inthousandsGen. 2008

Diff.2008%-%

Diff. inthousandsReg. 2005

Diff.2005%-%

PDL 6,005 29.4 72,400 75.9 74,000 78.0 71,919 72.5LN 2,750 12.3 7195 þ2.1 7117 þ2.0 þ1,370 þ6.7PD 5,852 26.1 71,100 70.5 74,500 77.1 72,231 76.4IDV 1,565 7.0 7474 71.0 þ272 þ2.6 þ1,213 þ5.6UdC 1,249 5.6 7376 70.9 7350 þ0.0 7199 70.2E-P Left 1,404 6.2 7500 70.3 þ138 þ3.1 71,212 74.3Turnout 22,500 63.5 710,159 72.0 715,374 716.0 77,250 78.1

Source: Data by the Ministry of Interior and Istituto Cattaneo re-elaborated by authors.

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considerable amount of votes because of abstention. By contrast, the LN lost

only 117,000 votes relative to 2008 (195,000 relative to 2009), while it gained

1 million 380 thousands votes relative to 2005. Unlike the other political

parties, the LN was able to mobilize most of its electorate and increased its share

of the total vote from 10 per cent in 2009 to over 12 per cent in 2010. In

Veneto, the LN passed the PdL and became the first political party.

The impact of ‘mid-term’ elections on prospects for constitutional

reforms

Both the 2009 European election and the regional elections of 2010 reinforced

and possibly accelerated some of the political trends initiated by the 2008

general elections. After 2008, both political coalitions experienced a progressive

redistribution of votes in favour of radical parties, the LN and the IdV, and at

the expenses of major parties, the PdL and PD. As a result, both the LN and the

IdV have acquired more weight over the political agenda of their respective

coalitions. The rising political power of the LN and the IdV has also

exacerbated pre-existing tensions within the PdL and the PD, where more or

less important splits have either already matured or appear to be about to

mature.

Within the governing coalition, the election results show a loss of consensus

for the PdL (especially in the north) and confirm the increasing electoral and

political power of the LN. Whereas the PdL is internally divided, lacks deep

roots in the north and has to represent a broader array of interests across the

country, the LN is a cohesive party with strong ties to the territory. Thus, it can

convincingly present itself as the only reliable advocate of the northern

economic interests (Panebianco 2009a). Although during the legislature 2001–

2006, the LN proved to be a loyal political ally, Berlusconi fears its electoral

competition in the north, where the LN’s declared ambition is to become the

first political party.

After its striking electoral performances, the LN enhanced its capacity to

shape the government’s political agenda, especially on immigration and

institutional reforms. As far as the latter are concerned, in 2009, the LN

managed to impose its willing on the 2009 referendum on the election rule. To

be sure, the LN perceived the referendum as a serious threat to its own political

survival (Franco 2009). In fact, in case of a victory of the yes-front, the plurality

bonus would be attributed to the party – not the coalition – with the greatest

share of the vote, thus penalizing minor parties, such as the LN.

The political battle on the referendum revolved around whether to hold it

on the same day of the European election (which also coincided, in many parts

of Italy, with local elections). This option would have enhanced the turnout,

thus allowing the referendum to reach the 50 per cent quorum. The LN

conducted the game, making absolutely clear that a valid victory of the yes-

vote would have doomed the government. The LN’s Minister of Interior thus

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proposed to hold the referendum after the European elections – i.e. in between

the first and second round of the local elections.

Throughout the electoral campaign, Berlusconi ensured his personal support

to the referendum, although he never explicitly campaigned for it, in respect of

the LN’s opposition. Yet, on the night of the European elections, the LN

traded its support in the second round of the local elections with Berlusconi’s

opposition to the referendum. Thus, albeit the majority of voters (77 per cent)

favoured the referendum’s proposals, the voter turnout (only 23 per cent) was

insufficient to meet the necessary quorum (data Ministry of the Interior).

After its triumph in the 2010 regional elections, the LN was eager to take

control over the government’s agenda on constitutional reforms. Bossi’s party

drafted its own reform proposal and presented it to the President of the

Republic without consulting with PdL members (with the exception of

Berlusconi with whom the proposal was negotiated). The draft proposed the

adoption of a semi-presidential system shielded against cohabitation (i.e. in

which the president and the parliament are elected simultaneously). The

proposal was also to maintain unchanged the current voting system as opposed

to replacing it with a double-ballot system a la francaise (Torcino 2010). Along

with proposing a change in the form of government from parliamentarism to

semi-presidentialism, the LN made it clear that in case of a Berlusconi’s victory

in the 2013 presidential elections, it would claim the premiership for itself.

As former leader of AN and cofounder of the PdL, Fini has shown concern

for the Berlusconi–Bossi axis and the growing electoral and political power of

the LN. In several public occasions, he has criticized Berlusconi for being

overly compliant towards Bossi’s diktats, and for degrading the PdL’s platform

to a mere ‘photocopy’ of the LN’s. For Fini, the influence of the LN on the

governing coalition should be somewhat proportional to its share of the vote.

By contrast, although the LN has only one third of the votes of the PdL, it

manages to shape the government’s agenda, and to impose both electoral

alliances and political candidacies (e.g. the candidacy of a LN’s minister for the

governorship of Veneto).

Tensions within the PdL started to emerge during the campaign for the

2009 European election and reached a peak after the 2010 regional elections.

Fini’s criticism cost him isolation from the rest of the party. PdL’s executives

viewed him as a maverick able to challenge Berlusconi’s long-time uncontested

leadership and destabilize the right-wing coalition.9 Even most former AN’s

executives, who became members of Berlusconi’s fourth cabinet in 2008,

turned their back on him showing that their allegiance is to the Prime Minister.

After the regional elections, in an attempt to break the isolation in which the

Berlusconi–Bossi alliance had forced him, Fini announced plans for the

creation of an organized faction within the PdL. Not surprisingly, this intention

exacerbated the rivalry with Berlusconi. The showdown took place at the

party’s first governing assembly (direzione nazionale), where Fini publicly

criticized the lack of internal democracy in the PdL and its self-defeating

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dependency on the LN. Furthermore, almost breaking a taboo within the

party, Fini condemned Berlusconi’s conflict of interest and the laws ad personam

aimed at ensuring his judicial immunity (see Fini’s speech at the PdL governing

assembly, on 22 April, reported in www.Ffwebmagazine.it).

Berlusconi, from his part, accused Fini of moving too far towards the centre

(especially on immigration), defended the electoral success of the governing

coalition and the alliance with the LN, tried to ban the formation of organized

factions within the party, and approved a document that condemned the

behaviour of Fini and his fellow dissenters. The latter reacted, forming, in late

July, an autonomous parliamentary group called Future and Freedom for Italy

(FLI), which is now in the process of becoming an independent party (Corriere

della Sera 2010a). Although the exact number of FLI’s MPs is still subject to

change, the new parliamentary group includes forty-five MPs (mainly but not

exclusively from AN): thirty-five in the Lower House and ten Senators (data

from the official sites of the two Houses of Parliament, accessed 27 October

2010). The new group/party is, therefore, strong enough to block partisan

constitutional reforms in the Lower House. In addition, the creation of this

political force increases the relevance of other smaller parties, such as the MpA,

whose support, especially in the Senate, could become crucial too.

Not only does the split in the PdL make partisan constitutional reforms less

likely, but it also poses at risk the survival of the government and, perhaps, the

parliamentary term itself. Indeed, since its birth, FLI seems to be in a sort of

limbo between government and opposition. In late September, FLI, which still

has one minister and a few deputy ministers, supported the government in a

confidence vote proving to be determinant for its survival (Corriere della Sera

2010b). Yet, this vote did not solve the conflict within the governmental

majority. Interestingly enough, the main source of tension concerns exactly

constitutional reforms. The LN and Berlusconi’s PdL keep pushing respectively

on fiscal federalism and immunity for the highest charges of the state,

threatening early elections in case FLI would not support them. FLI, by

contrast, has declared its availability, in case of government crisis, to form an

alternative ‘technical’ executive with opposition parties, in order to avoid early

election and to reform the electoral system (La Repubblica 2010b).

Concerning the opposition, the bad results of the 2009 European election

forced Franceschini, the PD’s leader who had unsuccessfully followed the IdV

in its strong anti-Berlusconi rhetoric, to resign. The party was forced into a

new leadership contest and this time Pierluigi Bersani, a former PCI-PDS-DS

member (widely seen as a man of D’Alema), was elected leader.10 Since its

foundation, the PD (and before the PDS-DS) has been disrupted by internal

power struggles along the D’Alema–Veltroni axis. The party has changed three

leaders in three years, giving the impression of being in a permanent turmoil.

Although Bersani managed to survive the non-exciting results of the 2010

regional elections, the PD remained internally divided in, at least, two political

factions: the party’s majority, which supports Bersani’s leadership; and the

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minority, which clustered around former leader Veltroni. The main source of

disagreement keeps concerning two intertwined issues: coalition politics and

the reform of the electoral system. For the party’s majority, the PD should be

ready to support a ‘technical’ government with all the other opposition parties

and FLI in order to take care of the most urgent issues, such as the economic

crisis and the reform of the voting system, before the next general election. It is

not clear which electoral system would be adopted, but, given the crucial role

that the UdC and other smaller parties will have in the process, it is reasonable

to speculate that it would be a proportional one. The PD’s majority also

envisaged – though it is not clear whether depending on (or independently of)

which voting system will be in force for the next election – the creation of a

broad alliance of all ‘democratic’ forces, from the revived radical left to the

UdC and, possibly, with the FLI (La Repubblica 2010a). By contrast, the

adoption of a proportional electoral system is seen as a disgrace by the party’s

minority, which maintains that the PD should firmly pursue its ‘majoritarian

vocation’ instead of undertaking improbable alliances with parties that have

little in common apart from their anti-Berlusconi stance. In an attempt to

contrast the ‘confuse’ strategies of the current leadership, a subgroup of the

party’s minority, led by Veltroni, has recently authored a formal document,

signed by seventy-five PD MPs, of open critique towards the party’s agenda

(Corriere della Sera 2010c). It is, therefore, arguable that the creation of a

technical executive supported by the opposition parties and FLI would stress

the differences between the two wings of the PD, blocking the reform of the

voting system and exacerbating intra-party conflict with unpredictable

consequences. It is worth specifying that, while the PD’s minority would

perhaps remain isolated on the electoral reform, the party’s majority appears

rather isolated on the idea of forming a wide anti-Berlusconi electoral coalition.

All other parties have, indeed, remained rather sceptical, including the closest

ally, IdV (La Repubblica 2010a).

On all other constitutional issues, intraparty divisions in the PD are less

marked, with the exception of justice. Here, the differences are cross-cutting

rather than self-reinforcing. In both factions, there are politicians who lean

towards a more radical approach on justice (similar to the IdV’s uncompromis-

ing stance) and politicians who take a more moderate position and could even

consider the reintroduction of immunity for all MPs. This latter issue,

however, is unpopular among the electorate and would increase the IdV’s

capacity to attract voters from the PD.

On the reform of the constitution, the PD’s new leader, Bersani, has offered

to Berlusconi his willingness to discuss reform proposals in parliament.

However, the government has so far shown no interest in bringing

comprehensive projects for constitutional reforms in Parliament, nor to hold

previous discussions with the opposition. To be sure, until the justice issue

dominates the political debate, it is unlikely that the opposition will be able to

work with the government on a bipartisan reform of the constitution. The IdV,

Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy

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in fact, is against any project of reform that could deliver unbridled power to

Berlusconi and restrain the autonomy of the judiciary. Even only a narrow

reform of the constitution (limited to the reduction of the number of the MPs,

the end of the symmetric bicameralism, and the strengthening of the Prime

Minister’s powers) seems out of reach. Berlusconi’s attempt to trade his

immunity with the promise of a bipartisan, albeit narrow, reform of the

constitution has met the firm opposition of both the IdV and the PD.

Finally, on fiscal federalism, the opposition parties have taken very different

stances. The UdC, given its electoral strength in the South, has voted against

the original framework law. The PD, albeit in favour of decentralization,

decided to abstain, having no trust in the government’s capacity to draft

legilative decrees that will not penalize the south. The IdV, perhaps with the

aim of obtaining some political visibility, has unexpectedly voted along with

the government, on the grounds that fiscal federalism can entail a more

virtuous use of public resources. However, this reform remains very

controversial both within the government and the opposition.

Conclusions

Berlusconi remains the undisputed leader of the PdL and the most powerful

actor on the scene. The electoral losses of the party in the two ‘mid-term’

elections have been compensated by the gains of the government coalition as a

whole, for which Berlusconi has restlessly campaigned. Indeed, most of the

former AN’s establishment has remained with Berlusconi rather than following

Fini in his split. Berlusconi is, therefore, still in a position to lead the game.

However, his leadership has been substantively weakened by the birth of FLI,

the dominating role played by the LN within the governing coalition, and

Berlusconi’s own judicial problems.

As far as constitutional reforms are concerned, he seems unable to find a

widely agreed compromise. His preferences on the judiciary and, more

importantly, on the overall ‘checks and balance’ system place him well beyond

the ‘red lines’ of most other political forces and, definitely, beyond those of the

opposition parties. Therefore, the possibility of a ‘grand reform’ being pursued

consensually in this parliamentary term can be ruled out. This conclusion is in

line with previous predictions based on the analysis of both the party system

and the ideological positions of political actors (Massetti 2009; Newell 2009),

while other predictions based overwhelmingly on the analysis of the (reduced

format of the) party system had come to more optimistic conclusions (Carbone

and Newell 2008).

The alternative possible scenario is a partisan ‘grand reform.’ In this case

Berlusconi would only need to negotiate the support of the other government

forces, ignoring the opposition. Although this represents his preferred option,

important obstacles appear on the way. Leaving aside the risk of seeing the

reform rejected again by popular vote in a referendum, the Prime Minister

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might not even be strong enough to push it through the parliamentary vote.

Indeed, the new parliamentary group FLI seems to be strong enough to block a

populist reform. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that this route to a ‘grand

reform’ is closed too.

Other possible scenarios prefigure much narrower reforms. The first

concerns issues on which some consensus has already emerged (reduction of

number of MPs and end of ‘prefect bi-cameralism’) and Berlusconi’s most

important goal: immunity for himself, either in the form of immunity for all

MPs or just for the highest charges of the state. Given the unpopularity of the

latter provision, this narrow reform must be voted consensually (at least by

two-thirds of MPs in both Houses) to succeed. Otherwise, a popular

referendum would almost definitely reject it. A compromise with the

opposition needs, therefore, to be reached. With the IdV definitely against

and the UdC most probably in favour, the crucial factor would be the choice of

the PD. In this case, it is more difficult to come to a definitive conclusion.

Much will depend on the content of the reform: immunity for all MPs would

gather more support than immunity for only the highest charges of the state.

However, given the growth of support for the IdV and the losses of the PD in

the two mid-term elections, the former will be able to exercise an

extraordinary pull on the latter, making this third scenario very unlikely.

An equally prudent conclusion is required for those reforms that do not

need to pass through constitutional review, such as the new electoral system

and the implementation of regional fiscal autonomy, which can be carried out

by simple majorities. However, as far as the former is concerned, Berlusconi’s

and the LN’s preference for the current system makes its reform highly

unlikely. Even in the case of an attempt by the current opposition plus FLI to

co-operate to change the voting system, the variety and distance of positions

amongst the various parties (and, crucially, within the PD) would make a

compromise all but easy to reach.

As far as fiscal federalism is concerned, the level of isolation of the LN

depends on how far the party is prepared to compromise between its approach,

that is ‘the interests of the North first’, and the other parties’ approach, that is

‘the unity of the country first’. If the LN insists on its own preference, it will

find opposition also within the governmental forces, primarily from the MpA

and FLI. In addition, the economic downturn does not create a favourable

context for passing this reform, as in the short run additional costs would,

probably, be necessary. However, if the League manages to present the reform

as a way to more virtuous use of public resources or, even more, settles for a

facade reform, then it could find enough supporters to carry it through.

All in all, in spite of all the expectations raised after the 2008 general

election, this parliamentary term seems to be set to deliver little or nothing in

terms of constitutional reforms. The above analysis leads to excluding a ‘grand

reform’, and casts serious doubts on the perspectives for narrower

compromises, even in the case of reforms not requiring constitutional change.

Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy

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However, considering the constitutional preferences of the most powerful

actor, Berlusconi, from a normative (liberal-democratic) point of view, this

perspective would not necessarily represent a negative outcome.

Acknowledgements

We thank the anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions and

Mark Donovan for commenting on an early draft of our article. Emanuele

Massetti thanks also the British Economic and Social Research Council

(ESRC) for its support (Grant reference: PTA-026-27-2119). We remain

obviously solely responsible for mistakes, shortcomings and imprecision.

Notes

1 In this article the term ‘constitutional’ is used in a broad sense, which includes con-stitutionally relevant areas, even if they do not involve changes to constitutional text.

2 One-fifth of the Lower House MPs are sufficient to call for a popular referendum inorder to stop constitutional reforms (Italian Constitution, art. 138).

3 On the content and consequences of the 2005 electoral reform, see Massetti (2006)and Pasquino (2007).

4 On FI as a personal or charismatic party, see Calise (2000), Diamanti (1995), Hopkinand Paolucci (1999) and Raniolo (2006). As far as Berlusconi’s ideology isconcerned, the label ‘populist’ has been mainly used by the left-leaning press, butalso by academics. See, for instance, Musella (2010), Taggart (2000) and Tarchi(2008). On the ideological gap accumulated between Fini and its own party, seeIgnazi (1998).

5 Only the PdCI, which at that time was still represented in Parliament, voted against.Forza Italia, as a party, abstained, but Berlusconi voted in favour (http://www.affaritaliani.it/politica/violante-pd-riforme251109.html).

6 For a very succinct but clear account of Berlusconi’s judicial troubles, including thestill unfolding trials, see D’Avanzo (2009).

7 Its full name is still ‘Northern League for the Independence of Padania’, and‘independence’ is still its first objective as spelt out in its Party Statute (Lega Nord2002: 1)

8 Sixty constitutional experts expressed their preoccupations, primarily because of theexcessive powers attributed to the Prime Minister vis-a-vis other powers (Bassanini2004). Giovanni Sartori (2006: 31–32) labelled this envisaged regime as ‘primeministerial dictatorship’.

9 Especially after Fini publicly accused Berlusconi of behaving as an ‘absolutemonarch’ and disregarding the roles of other institutional authorities, such as theparliament, the judiciary, and the president of the republic (Corriere della Sera 2009).

10 Soon after Bersani’s election, some former Ma politicians led by PD co-founderFrancesco Rutelli left the PD and formed their own party, Alleanza Per L’Italia (API)with the intention of creating in the long run a new centrist coalition with the UdC.

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