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ORI GINA L A R TI C L E
Taxonomy: racism versus fiscal conservatism in votingon segregationist provisions in Alabama’s constitution
Michael Reksulak Æ William F. Shughart II
Published online: 15 January 2008
� Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007
Abstract On Election Day 2004, a razor-thin majority of Alabama’s voters
rejected a proposed amendment to remove overtly segregationist language from the
state constitution. Opponents had contended that approval would have opened the
legislative door to significantly higher taxes. We employ the results from two earlier
special elections to analyze the outcome. In 2000, voters supported repealing a
constitutional provision prohibiting interracial marriages. Three years later, Ala-
bamians were asked to reveal their preferences with respect to additional taxation.
The evidence suggests that opposition to higher taxes rather than bigotry was
decisive in the rejection of Amendment 2 in 2004.
Keywords Constitutional choice � Voting � Taxation
JEL Classification D72 � H4
The first and most important step to improve the educational conditions in
Alabama would be the convening of a Constitutional Convention to revise our
present antiquated fundamental law. (Governor Emmet O’Neal, 1914).1
M. Reksulak (&)
School of Economic Development, Georgia Southern University, P.O. Box 8152, Statesboro, GA
30460-8152, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
W. F. Shughart II
Department of Economics, University of Mississippi, University, MS 38677-1848, USA
1 Emmet O’Neal, Educational Reform and a New Constitution (Montgomery: Brown Printing Co., 1914),
pp. 5–6; quoted in Thomson (2003).
123
Constit Polit Econ (2008) 19:61–80
DOI 10.1007/s10602-007-9031-3
Can there be a loonier way to run state and local government? Can there be a
less efficient way to govern? Can there be any doubt Alabama needs a new
constitution? (Editorial in the Birmingham News, 2004).2
1 Introduction
The State of Alabama has had six constitutions in its 186-year history. The current
one, in force since 1901,3 has the dubious distinction of being the longest US state
constitution and—with 287 sections—one of the wordiest constitutions in the
western world. It has been amended more than 777 times (as of July 2007)4 and
counting—ballooning, by our reckoning, to more than 350,000 words.
The historical record suggests that the constitution of 1901 had two major
objectives: to deny the franchise to Alabama’s African-American citizens, rights
which had been guaranteed by the constitution adopted in 1868 while the state was
occupied by victorious Union troops and in the midst of post-Civil War
Reconstruction, and to curtail as much as possible governmental powers of
taxation.5 The 1875 constitution was a first step in this direction, providing for low
taxes, authorizing a minimum of government services and protecting the political
supremacy of Alabama’s property owners. In the opinion of the landowner class,
however, the constitution of 1875 did not go far enough in curtailing the rights of
black (and, in general, poor) voters. The 1901 constitution was a successful attempt
to remedy this situation. The state’s planters and merchants—the ‘‘Bourbon
Democrats’’ (McMillan 1955)—lobbied effectively for even stricter limits on
government’s power to tax and for the implementation of burdensome tests for
prospective voters, practically ensuring that black Alabamians would have no
further access to the ballot box.
Those favoring rewriting the 1875 document ‘‘asked for the disenfranchisement
of the Negro in the name of ‘white supremacy’ and an honest electorate’’ (ibid.,
p. 260). A majority of the 155 all-white and all-male delegates to the constitutional
convention exhibited considerable gusto in evaluating several alternative means
tests as well as educational requirements previously imposed in other Confederate
states that would assuredly disenfranchise blacks while not running afoul of legal
precedent and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They
2 Bob Blalock, ‘‘Blame Constitution for Much of what Ails State,’’ Birmingham News, Vol. 117, No. 211
(14 November 2004), p. 2C.3 The present Alabama document was preceded by the constitutions of 1819, 1861, 1865, 1868 and 1875.
See URL: http://www.legislature.state.al.us/misc/history/constitutions/constitutions.html4 See URL: http://www.legislature.state.al.us/CodeOfAlabama/Constitution/1901/Constitution1901_toc.htm5 This discussion is based in part on Malcolm Cook McMillan’s (1955) authoritative history of
Alabama’s constitutional development and on information provided by the Alabama Department of
Archives & History at the following URL: http://www.alabamamoments.state.al.us; accessed 04
September 2006.
62 M. Reksulak, W.F. Shughart II
123
finally proposed a constitution that seriously disadvantaged persons of low means
and limited education seeking to exercise their constitutional right to vote.6
The 1901 constitution was adopted after Alabama voters ratified it, with 108,613
voters reported to have voted ‘‘Yes’’, while 81,734 voted ‘‘No’’. Charges of vote-
rigging abounded and election returns in, especially, those ‘‘black belt’’ counties with
African-American majorities gave much credence to those accusations (Jackson
1994). Attempts to change the constitution once again commenced within a decade,
when it became clear to those in positions of political power that its restrictions on
governing, specifically fiscal ones, proved to be almost insurmountable.
Two avenues exist for those wanting to modify the basic law in Alabama. A
complete rewriting of the constitution requires approval by a majority of the voters,
following compliance with a plethora of executive and legislative requirements
contained in the 1901 constitution itself. Many attempts, the most recent one
initiated by Governor Robert R. Riley (R) in 2003, to draft a new state constitution
have failed for a variety of reasons. Another method is to change the constitution
incrementally, each requiring a vote by the legislature and ratification by the eligible
voters. Incremental revision has led to the aforementioned prevalence of amend-
ments in the Alabama Constitution.
The restrictions imposed by the 1901 document were, by and large, intended to
remove power from local governments and to concentrate it in the state’s capital at
Montgomery. In addition to its impact on voting rights—which has, in the
meantime, been superseded by federal court decisions—the constitution of 1901 has
had profound influence on the economic development of the state. Local pro-growth
initiatives can only be undertaken if constitutionally approved—i.e., by amendment.
Home rule by counties is verboten. Analyses by ‘‘Alabama Citizens for Constitu-
tional Reform’’ show that, as a consequence, approximately two-fifths of the bills
considered by the Alabama Legislature have local significance only, and more than
two-thirds of the amendments to the constitution apply to a single county or city.
Examples of the 1901 constitution’s narrowly tailored and often comical provisions
are plentiful and include ‘‘Amendment 520: Excavating Human Graves in Madison
County’’, ‘‘Amendment 601: Compensation of Judge of Probate of Barbour
County’’ and ‘‘Amendment 756: Enforcement of Traffic Laws in Shelby County’’.
6 John B. Knox of Calhoun County, elected President of the Constitutional Convention, chose to frame
the issue as follows on Wednesday, May 22, 1901, the second day of the convention:
It is contended in defense of this provision, that while, in effect, it will exclude the great mass of
ignorant negro voters it does not, in terms, exclude them, and applies generally to all classes of
voters, without reference to their race, color or previous condition of servitude; that all negroes
who were voters prior to January 1st, 1867, of whom, it is claimed, there were quite a number,
could vote, and the descendants, whether slaves or not, of these free negroes were entitled to vote,
and that these were quite numerous. And on the other hand, that white people born in other
countries—emigrants, who cannot read and write, could not vote, nor could white people who
were unable to vote in the State in which they lived prior to 1867, unless they were able to read
and write. If it be said that this exception permits many more white people to vote than negroes,
the answer was that this would be equally true of any proper qualifications which might be
proposed. It would be true of an educational qualification, and it would be true of a property
qualification, the validity of which has never been questioned. (Source: Alabama Legislature,
http://www.legislature.state.al.us/misc/history/constitutions/1901/proceedings/1901_proceedings_
vol1/day2.html; accessed 04 September 2006).
Racism versus fiscal conservatism 63
123
Certain changes in the Alabama tax code must be approved by constitutional
amendment as well. The upshot is one of the highest degrees of tax-earmarking in
the country, with approximately 87% of Alabama’s revenue being assigned to
specific purposes (Ormond 2004). Given the difficulties in adjusting the tax code,
Alabama has one of the lowest maximum tax rates on personal income in the nation
(see Table 1) and allows complete deduction of federal tax payments in computing
state taxable income, but also has the lowest threshold for income tax payments,
starting at $4,600 for a family of four. It is for these reasons that, after taking office
in 2003, Governor Riley felt compelled to propose an all-encompassing ‘‘Alabama
Table 1 State maximum tax rates on personal income as of January 1, 2006
State Maximum tax rate State Maximum tax rate
Alabama 5.0 Montanaa 6.9
Alaska No state income tax Nebraskaa 6.84
Arizona 5.04 Nevada No state income tax
Arkansasa 7.0 New Hampshire Only dividends and interest
income are taxed
Californiaa 9.3 New Jersey 8.97
Colorado 4.63 New Mexico 5.3
Connecticut 5.0 New York 6.85
Delaware 5.95 North Carolina 8.25
Florida No state income tax North Dakota 5.54
Georgia 6.0 Ohioa 7.185
Hawaii 8.25 Oklahoma 6.25
Idahoa 7.8 Oregona 9.0
Illinois 3.0 Pennsylvania 3.07
Indiana 3.4 Rhode Island 25% of federal tax liability
Iowaa 8.98 South Carolinaa 7.0
Kansas 6.45 South Dakota No state income tax
Kentucky 6.0 Tennessee Only dividends and interest
income are taxed
Louisiana 6.0 Texas No state income tax
Mainea 8.5 Utah 7.0
Maryland 4.75 Vermonta 9.5
Massachusettsa 5.3 Virginia 5.75
Michigana 3.9 Washington No state income tax
Minnesotaa 7.85 West Virginia 6.5
Mississippi 5.0 Wisconsin 6.75
Missouri 6.0 Wyoming No state income tax
a These 15 states have statutory provision for automatic adjustment of tax brackets, personal exemption
or standard deductions to the rate of inflation. Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska and Ohio index the
personal exemption amounts only
Source: Federation of Tax Administrators (http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/ind_inc.html)
64 M. Reksulak, W.F. Shughart II
123
Excellence Initiative Fund’’ in order to address a $675 million projected budget
deficit for fiscal year 2004.
It is the 2003 vote on the constitutional amendment to implement the Riley tax
plan as well as the result of an earlier referendum that enables us to analyze
questions surrounding Alabama’s narrow affirmation of segregationist constitutional
language in 2004. The earlier vote, in 2000, resulted in the removal of a section of
the constitution prohibiting interracial marriages.
Although the state constitution of 1901 is widely seen as both a nuisance to
politicians and citizens alike and an impediment to Alabama’s economic progress
(see Fig. 1), the frequency of its amendment turns out to be a treasure trove for
political economists. Astronomers and economists share the dubious distinction of
not being able to set up controlled scientific experiments on a large scale. In the case
of the economists it is ethical constraints as well as monetary ones that often prove
the most forbidding: they frequently are compelled to draw conclusions from the
data they have rather than the data they would wish for. Every once in a while,
however, it turns out that such experiments have, indeed, been conducted
unintentionally. The succession of votes on an unambiguously racially divisive
issue (2000) and on a straightforward fiscal matter (2003) permits us to address the
question whether or not the 2004 vote—rejecting the removal of segregationist
language from the Alabama constitution—should be taken as evidence for the
continued prevalence of bigotry among the state’s citizenry. The results of our
analysis suggest that economic considerations rather than racism were decisive in
the voter’s rejection of Amendment 2 in 2004.
Section 2 recounts the histories of the proposed constitutional amendments in
2000, 2003 and 2004. We discuss our empirical models and data sources in Sect. 3.
Section 4 presents the regression results for the three referendums; Sect. 5
concludes.
Fig. 1 The burden imposed by Alabama’s 1901 constitution. Note: Courtesy of The Mobile Register2000� All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission
Racism versus fiscal conservatism 65
123
2 Proposed constitutional amendments
House Bill 587 was first read in the Alabama legislature on April 13, 2003. It was
proposed by Representative James E. Buskey (D) and co-sponsored by Represen-
tative Ken Guin (D), currently the House Majority Leader. The bill passed
the House with 91 ‘‘Yea’’ votes (out of a possible 105) on May 14 and it passed the
Senate with 29 ‘‘Yea’’ votes (out of 35) on the 16th of June. The amendment to the
constitution authorized by the bill and put before the voters on Election Day 2004
read as follows:
Shall the following Amendment be adopted to the Constitution of Alabama?
Proposed Statewide Amendment No. 2
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, to repeal
portions of Section 256 and Amendment 111 relating to separation of schools
by race and repeal portions of Amendment 111 concerning constitutional
construction against the right to education, and to repeal Section 259,
Amendment 90, and Amendment 109 relating to the poll tax. (Proposed by
Act 2003–203).7
Specifically, the amendment would remove, among other language, the following
sentence from Alabama’s constitution: ‘‘Separate schools shall be provided for
white and colored children, and no child of either race shall be permitted to attend a
school of the other race.’’ Importantly, the authors of the bill also proposed
eliminating a half-sentence disputing a constitutional right to education: ‘‘but
nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to as creating or recognizing any right
to education or training at public expense, nor as limiting the authority and duty of
the legislature, in furthering or providing for education, to require and impose
conditions or procedures deemed necessary to the preservation of peace and order.’’
Another section of the proposed amendment would repeal the poll tax exemption for
veterans of foreign wars. The poll tax itself had been one building block in earlier
attempts to deter individuals of insufficient means from voting.
Opponents of the amendment quickly seized the ‘‘right to education’’ language to
vigorously campaign against it. They asserted that approval would implicitly
recognize such a right and, as a result, would lead to major tax increases in order to
finance public education in Alabama. The amendment’s proponents argued that this
conclusion was nonsensical given the existing constitutional limitations on
government’s taxing powers. After the defeat of the amendment by the electorate
(Table 2 lists the electoral outcomes for all three amendments discussed here; Fig. 2
provides a graphical representation), the soul-searching started in newspaper
editorials and everyday discussions across the state. The ‘‘Old South’’ label was
attached to Alabama anew. Questions were raised as to how bigotry could still be so
prevalent at the beginning of the 21st century and what that would augur for the
future. Others pointed to the possible tax consequences identified by the
amendment’s opponents and dismissed the inference of racial bias.
7 Election Division, Office of the Secretary of State, State of Alabama, http://www.sos.state.al.us/
Elections/2004/2004ProposedAmendmts.aspx; accessed 08 December 2007.
66 M. Reksulak, W.F. Shughart II
123
Table 2 County voting results for three proposed constitutional amendments
County 2000 2003 2004
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Autauga 7,463 6,440 5,146 8,451 6,972 8,228
Baldwin 27,285 19,449 14,283 29,675 29,209 23,819
Barbour 1,640 1,107 4,079 4,029 3,340 3,044
Bibb 2,551 3,597 1,547 4,078 2,081 4,145
Blount 6,353 8,373 2,289 12,948 5,504 11,633
Bullock 1,284 963 2,024 1,582 1,292 932
Butler 2,990 2,736 2,515 3,865 2,994 2,737
Calhoun 17,389 13,267 10,075 20,937 16,276 18,557
Chambers 4,609 4,336 4,802 4,006 4,652 3,846
Cherokee 2,534 3,250 1,605 4,939 2,333 3,860
Chilton 5,160 7,738 2,599 9,112 4,928 7,921
Choctaw 2,283 2,694 1,875 3,713 2,255 2,213
Clarke 4,103 3,917 2,713 5,940 4,011 3,168
Clay 1,650 3,077 1,593 3,440 1,728 2,989
Cleburne 1,377 2,583 1,100 2,754 1,630 2,055
Coffee 6,909 5,165 3,251 8,432 6,422 5,931
Colbert 8,640 7,804 4,661 12,245 7,831 7,880
Conecuh 2,133 1,719 1,950 2,620 1,992 1,476
Coosa 1,688 1,734 1,146 2,789 1,522 2,090
Covington 4,372 5,510 3,517 6,740 4,886 4,748
Crenshaw 1,749 1,684 1,594 2,647 1,679 1,751
Cullman 11,358 12,879 3,697 21,334 9,687 18,104
Dale 7,202 5,552 3,636 7,957 6,193 7,321
Dallas 8,964 4,585 7,244 6,750 6,047 5,725
DeKalb 6,548 7,918 3,299 12,866 5,582 8,723
Elmore 10,287 9,577 6,984 12,660 9,537 12,274
Escambia 3,973 4,309 2,836 5,848 3,626 3,475
Etowah 16,331 15,589 6,854 24,607 12,794 20,151
Fayette 2,357 3,808 1,401 4,954 1,913 4,170
Franklin 3,058 4,742 1,919 7,040 2,821 4,971
Geneva 3,203 4,071 1,554 5,733 2,930 3,961
Greene 2,896 716 1,982 1,532 2,277 922
Hale 2,547 2,030 2,886 2,844 2,392 2,860
Henry 2,639 2,224 1,774 3,429 2,161 2,283
Houston 15,119 11,651 7,121 15,896 12,274 13,646
Jackson 5,296 6,698 2,941 10,216 5,487 6,696
Jefferson 172,646 78,415 64,325 129,003 138,740 99,916
Lamar 1,736 3,324 687 4,628 1,660 2,685
Lauderdale 13,141 11,423 8,030 18,145 12,281 12,898
Lawrence 4,655 5,085 1,905 8,930 3,763 5,743
Racism versus fiscal conservatism 67
123
We will utilize the votes on two earlier constitutional amendments to clarify the
impact, if any, of anti-tax preferences on voters’ rejection of Amendment 2 in 2004.
Only one year prior to this vote, Governor Riley had risked—and lost—political
capital from his 2002 election victory to propose an unprecedented change in
Alabama’s tax code. Shrugging off his ‘‘Reaganite’’ credentials, Riley championed
a wide-ranging program of worker training projects, increased educational funding
and additional taxes, which gained considerable support in the Democrat-controlled
state legislature. Through a combination of higher income and property taxes, the
governor’s ‘‘Alabama Excellence Initiative Fund’’ was projected to raise almost
Table 2 continued
County 2000 2003 2004
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Lee 22,227 9,646 14,338 11,435 22,487 11,540
Limestone 10,329 8,877 4,891 16,569 7,418 15,695
Lowndes 2,432 1,099 2,385 1,816 2,229 1,514
Macon 5,686 1,142 3,657 2,261 4,512 1,927
Madison 70,068 25,645 30,230 55,199 58,199 42,508
Marengo 3,960 2,956 3,489 4,441 3,362 3,131
Marion 3,450 5,599 1,746 8,272 2,790 6,446
Marshall 11,531 10,285 4,925 18,382 8,839 14,440
Mobile 60,451 37,928 29,964 71,241 50,557 46,498
Monroe 3,644 2,782 2,673 4,668 2,913 2,548
Montgomery 44,880 17,822 33,595 29,522 33,723 25,008
Morgan 19,691 15,275 8,201 26,404 14,969 20,667
Perry 2,690 1,093 2,954 1,594 2,422 1,518
Pickens 3,261 3,611 2,045 4,638 2,934 3,562
Pike 4,912 3,373 3,193 4,880 3,931 3,975
Randolph 2,515 3,353 2,253 4,008 2,550 2,895
Russell 6,207 3,819 3,491 5,272 5,841 4,504
St. Clair 9,704 11,177 3,595 17,013 8,476 15,511
Shelby 36,499 18,844 14,521 35,283 33,903 31,641
Sumter 3,648 1,014 2,877 1,640 2,350 1,345
Talladega 11,588 9,466 5,419 15,942 11,081 12,815
Tallapoosa 6,557 5,913 5,228 7,782 6,398 5,992
Tuscaloosa 31,134 21,499 18,117 27,310 28,169 27,625
Walker 8,859 12,991 3,335 18,058 6,609 16,636
Washington 2,630 3,235 1,280 5,034 1,899 3,759
Wilcox 2,451 1,125 2,694 1,826 2,216 1,498
Winston 2,603 4,625 1,186 7,056 2,051 5,631
Sum 801,725 545,933 417,721 866,860 688,530 690,376
59.49% 40.51% 32.52% 67.48% 49.93% 50.07%
Source: Alabama Secretary of State
68 M. Reksulak, W.F. Shughart II
123
Fig. 2 Voting patterns on three constitutional amendments in Alabama’s 67 counties
Racism versus fiscal conservatism 69
123
$600 million more than necessary to close a projected $675 million budget gap for
fiscal year 2004. Timber companies and large landowners would have seen their
property taxes increase manifold.
Riley also proposed to raise, from a national record low of $4,600 for a family of
four, the threshold for payment of income taxes to $20,000 over 4 years. The voters
were asked to approve the following text of the amendment in a special election
held on September 9, 2003:
Shall the following Amendment be adopted to the Constitution of Alabama?
Proposed Statewide Amendment Number One (1)
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, establishing
the Alabama Excellence Initiative Fund which may be used to fund programs
including, but not limited to, the furtherance of excellence in public education,
college scholarships, health care benefits for senior citizens and job training
programs to attract new high paying jobs and otherwise provide for distributing
state tax revenues; to adjust income and property taxes; to establish the General
Fund Rainy Day Account; to provide for the replenishment of the General Fund
Rainy Day Account and the Education Trust Fund Rainy Day Account.
(Proposed by Act No. 2003–78).8
Although property taxes would have increased substantially, it was estimated at
the time that almost 67% of all families in Alabama would either have seen their tax
bills fall or remain unchanged if the amendment was adopted (Webster and Webster
2004). The electorate nevertheless soundly rejected the constitutional amendment,
with only 32.5% of those voting favoring Governor Riley’s plan. In the sequel,
general fund expenditures were cut by 5.3% across the board in 2004, and most
programs saw budget reductions of about 18% (Ormond 2004). If nothing else,
Alabamians had demonstrated a significant aversion to higher taxes, notwithstand-
ing the myriad pro-growth arguments made in favor of it.
Measuring preferences for racial bias is difficult to do, mainly because perceived
or actual peer pressure will often lead to disingenuous replies when the issue is
assessed by surveys or opinion polls. The legislators of the State of Alabama,
however, conducted an experiment of their own, when they asked the people to vote
8 Source: Election Division, Office of the Secretary of State, State of Alabama, http://www.sos.state.al.us/
Elections/2003/SCAElection.aspx; accessed 08 December 2007. The governor’s package consisted of
numerous legislatively approved changes to existing constitutional language relating to taxes and public
education. The relevant provisions were: 101—To limit credits allowed insurance companies; 102—Toclarify the definition of taxable income; 103—Relating to the Teacher Tenure Act; 105—Board ofEducation to create program for payments to teachers and for scholarships; 106—Relating to the FairDismissal Act; 107—To increase the rates of mortgage and deed recording taxes; 108—To increase ratesof the utility gross receipts & utility service use taxes; 109—To increase the tax on cigarettes; 110—Stateto pay tuition of any qualified student for higher and postsecondary education; 111—Pertaining toFoundation Program of public schools to update funding formulas/disbursement; 112—To amend Tea-cher Accountability Act; 113—To prohibit public funds from being passed through from one entity toanother by Legislature; 114—School Fiscal Management and Responsibility Act; 115—To repeal thededuction for federal income taxes; 116—Relating to individual and corporate income tax to providefunding for public education; 117—To provide for sharing the cost of health insurance premiums by stateemployees and retirees; 118—To eliminate the lubricating oil tax and exemption from sales and use tax;
and 119—To update the method of determining current use valuation of property.
70 M. Reksulak, W.F. Shughart II
123
on an amendment to the constitution which would remove an ‘‘anti-miscegenation’’
section from it. That vote is even more significant for the purpose of measuring
racial prejudice per se, because it was apparent that its approval would have no
impact in terms of the level of taxation—or any other measurable economic effect.
The amendment put before Alabama’s voters on Election Day 2000 read:
Shall the following Amendment be adopted to the Constitution of Alabama?
Proposed Statewide Amendment Number 2
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, to abolish
the prohibition of interracial marriages. (Proposed by Act No. 1999–321).9
If approved by the voters, the amendment would strike from Section 102 of the
constitution’s text language consisting of a glaring expression of racism, namely,
‘‘The legislature shall never pass any law to authorize or legalize any marriage
between any white person and a negro, or descendant of a negro.’’ However, the
change to the constitution proposed in 2000 was evidently little more than a gesture
that would not have affected the status quo. All miscegenation laws had been
rendered void by the Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).10 It was, therefore, considered by many to be a symbolic act (Knigge and
Moody 2003). Nearly 60% of those voting (59.5%, to be precise) approved of the
amendment. The general outcome was hailed throughout the state as a sign of
Alabama shedding its stained image, personified by the infamous picture of
Governor George Wallace blocking two African-American students from entering
the University of Alabama and by the scenes of peaceful civil rights marchers being
bloodied by state troopers on Selma’s Edmund Pettus Bridge on March 7, 1965.
Some commentators questioned that rosy conclusion by pointing to the 40% of
voters who had marked their ballots in favor of continuing to outlaw interracial
marriages (Altman and Klinkner 2005).
The referendums on the constitutional amendments in 2000 and 2003 provide us
with the tools to dissect the vote in 2004. In the next section, we will use the
information supplied by the outcomes of those earlier ballots to scrutinize more
carefully the result of the 2004 referendum, in which Alabamians narrowly voted
not to rescind segregationist language calling for separate public schools for the
state’s black and white children.
3 Empirical model and data
We analyze the three different votes across the 67 counties in Alabama. The results
of the constitutional referendums were obtained from the Secretary of State’s office.
We measure the outcomes as the percentage of voters selecting ‘‘No’’ on each of the
9 Source: Election Division, Office of the Secretary of State, State of Alabama, http://www.sos.state.al.us/
Elections/2000/2000PropStateAmendmts.aspx; accessed 08 December 2007.10 The unanimous majority opinion delivered by Chief Justice Earl Warren held that the Commonwealth
of Virginia’s statute prohibiting marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications
violated both the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Source: Find
Law at URL: http://laws.findlaw.com/us/388/1.html; accessed 04 September 2006.
Racism versus fiscal conservatism 71
123
ballots. The variables are labeled V2000NOPERC, V2003NOPERC and
V2004NOPERC, respectively. We also collected data on socioeconomic variables
that have been shown to impact voters’ choices. These include the percentage of the
county population that is African-American (BLACKPERC), the fraction of the
population over 25 with at least a bachelor’s degree (BAPERC25PLUS), county
income per capita in 1999 (PCAPITAINCOME99) and the percentage of the
population above the age of 55 (PERCABOVE55). Moreover, given the education
and timber-related debates surrounding, specifically, the 2003 and 2004 votes, we
also utilize the per capita employment in education per county (PERCAPITAEM-
PLOYEDUC) as well as a variable measuring the economic dependence of a given
county on industries directly connected to timber (TIMBERDEPPERC). The
observations on variables other than the election results were collected from the
2000 US Census. The timber variable was calculated using a methodology described
in a recent analysis of timber dependency in Alabama (Howze et al. 2003).
Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in Table 3 and correlation
coefficients among them are shown in Table 4.
With respect to the 2000 and the 2004 votes, it is likely a priori that the larger the
percentage of African-American voters in a given county, the greater the support
will be for the removal of racist constitutional language. As members of the group
that is most directly affected by such provisions, they would have a strong incentive
to vote for repeal. The effect of this variable on the 2003 vote, the tax vote, is
somewhat ambiguous but also likely to raise the odds of approval. According to
census statistics—and borne out by our data for the State of Alabama—poverty is
still correlated with one’s race in the ‘‘Old South’’. Thus, since the governor’s
proposal had promised additional funding for worker-training and other social
programs, we expect a negative correlation between BLACKPERC and the fraction
of no votes on that amendment.
The percentage of people age 25 and above with at least a bachelor’s degree
should have a strongly negative effect on the number of no votes on all three
amendments. In instances of officially endorsed racism, the literature has shown a
pattern such that more educated members of the populace—independent of
geographic area—are more inclined to favor repealing remnants of the Confederacy
Table 3 Descriptive statistics for Alabama’s 67 counties
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
V2004NOPERC 0.5268 0.5137 0.7330 0.2882 0.1005
V2003NOPERC 0.6607 0.6834 0.8707 0.3504 0.1353
V2000NOPERC 0.4642 0.4714 0.6569 0.1672 0.1129
BAPERC25PLUS 0.1348 0.1101 0.3680 0.0710 0.0631
BLACKPERC 0.2825 0.2237 0.8467 0.0035 0.2217
PCAPITAINCOME99 15,833.82 15,365 27,176 10,163 2,780.18
PERCABOVE55 0.2371 0.2367 0.2883 0.1487 0.0276
PERCAPITAEMPLEDUC 0.0220 0.0215 0.0326 0.0174 0.0028
TIMBERDEPPERC 0.0655 0.0359 0.5401 0.0000 0.0880
72 M. Reksulak, W.F. Shughart II
123
Tab
le4
Corr
elat
ion
mat
rix
V2
00
4
NO
PE
RC
V2
00
3
NO
PE
RC
V2
00
0
NO
PE
RC
BA
PE
RC
25
PL
US
BL
AC
K
PE
RC
PC
AP
ITA
INC
OM
E9
9
PE
RC
AB
OV
E5
5P
ER
CA
PIT
A
EM
PL
ED
UC
TIM
BE
R
DE
PP
ER
C
V2
00
4N
OP
ER
C0
.844
0.8
34
-0
.38
6-
0.7
50
0.0
83
0.2
98
-0
.169
0.2
92
V2
00
3N
OP
ER
C0
.844
0.7
59
-0
.17
1-
0.8
66
0.3
59
0.2
97
0.0
54
0.1
46
V2
00
0N
OP
ER
C0
.834
0.7
59
-0
.55
9-
0.7
11
-0
.098
0.5
37
-0
.314
0.3
33
BA
PE
RC
25
PL
US
-0
.386
-0
.171
-0
.559
-0
.036
0.7
97
-0
.57
90
.583
-0
.33
6
BL
AC
KP
ER
C-
0.7
50
-0
.866
-0
.711
-0
.03
6-
0.5
09
-0
.21
8-
0.0
57
-0
.06
4
PC
AP
ITA
INC
OM
E9
90
.083
0.3
59
-0
.098
0.7
97
-0
.509
-0
.32
10
.555
-0
.24
3
PE
RC
AB
OV
E5
50
.298
0.2
97
0.5
37
-0
.57
9-
0.2
18
-0
.321
-0
.324
0.3
03
PE
RC
AP
ITA
EM
PL
ED
UC
-0
.169
0.0
54
-0
.314
0.5
83
-0
.057
0.5
55
-0
.32
4-
0.2
31
TIM
BE
RD
EP
PE
RC
0.2
92
0.1
46
0.3
33
-0
.33
6-
0.0
64
-0
.243
0.3
03
-0
.231
Racism versus fiscal conservatism 73
123
in state documents and state houses (as has been the case in votes on Confederate
flag symbols).11 Given the dire financial straits in which Alabama found itself in
2003, and considering that state employees tend to have more years of schooling
and were most likely to be affected personally by the looming spending cuts
required in case that the constitutional amendment were to fail, our a priori
expectation is that a higher level of education leads to fewer no votes, ceteris
paribus.
We include average income per capita in a county (PCAPITAINCOME99) for
two reasons. Such a variable, arguably, would not be indicative of racial bias (either
way). On the other hand, self-interest and self-conception will usually incline high-
income taxpayers to be more hostile to additional taxation, not the least because
those in this stratum of society already shoulder a disproportionate share of the tax
burden. High-income Alabamians almost surely would be opposed to the provision
contained in Governor Riley’s ‘‘Alabama Excellence Initiative Fund’’ that would
repeal the allowable state income tax deduction for federal tax payments. Similarly,
timber interests would have expected—as explained above—significant increases in
taxes and, hence, would also have been more likely to oppose the initiative. This
reasoning should permit us to distinguish, in the 2004 referendum, whether or not
economic considerations may have had a decisive effect.
Considering the consequences of the age of the electorate in the analysis of
voting decisions is a well-established practice. For the issue at hand, it is likely that
older constituents hold more traditional views of race relations. Conversely, being—
on average—more reliant on the state’s welfare system, the elderly are usually
disposed towards supporting additional funding for social services, even if that
includes a rise in general taxes. Thus, a priori, we expect more votes against
removing segregationist provisions from the constitution the older the population of
a county and fewer no votes on the tax amendment. This does, however, leave us
with no basis for predicting the influence of median age on the constitutional
questions that came before the voters in 2004, which raised both issues.
The relative importance of public education in a given county is measured by the
per capita employment in this sector. Taking into account the considerable potential
inflow of monies earmarked for education-related funding, a stronger impetus for not
rejecting the 2004 vote is a priori expected to be found with respect to this variable.
We hypothesize that the foregoing socioeconomic variables will contribute
explanatory power to the outcomes of each of the three amendments discussed here.
If, in addition, one conjectures that earlier referendum results (in 2000 and in 2003)
themselves have an impact on the 2004 vote, then the appropriate econometric
model is the one shown in Fig. 3a. Gujarati (1995: 680–682) and Kennedy (2004:
169) describe the characteristics of these so-called recursive systems. The seemingly
unrelated regression model illustrated in part b of Fig. 3, by contrast, does not
suggest such a direct link between 2004 and the previous votes. (X stands for the
matrix of independent variables in both panels).
In either case, however, only a unidirectional dependency exists. There are no
feedback loops either in our maintained hypotheses or in the econometric models
11 For a history of the controversy over the state flag in Mississippi, see Karahan and Shughart (2004).
74 M. Reksulak, W.F. Shughart II
123
estimated here. OLS techniques consequently are permissible under the customary
assumptions. Caution is nevertheless required in making sure that the three
disturbance terms (represented by the epsilons in Fig. 3) are contemporaneously
uncorrelated. In the results presented below, the residuals were checked for such
correlations. The indication was that this did not always hold. In order to report
unbiased standard errors, the Zellner (1962) SUR estimation technique was
therefore employed.
4 Empirical results
Our empirical estimates are presented in two steps. We first report, in Table 5, the
coefficients obtained from a recursive model as laid out in Fig. 3a. All estimated
coefficients, as well as their standard errors, have been computed with the Zellner
(1962) method, although the results using OLS do not significantly alter the
discussion below.12
Apart from the fact that in all cases the coefficients in Table 5 align with our
a priori expectations (although not necessarily always significantly so), the most
important results relate to the relative impacts of the 2000 and 2003 referenda on the
no votes cast in 2004. In this recursive econometric representation of the data, it
appears that—after accounting for other influences—the 2003 referendum exhibits a
stronger influence than does the one in 2000 on the results in 2004. Other things
equal, voter opposition to removing segregationist language from Alabama’s
constitution (and possibly creating a right to education) was not significantly greater
Fig. 3 Recursive econometric system (left) versus a seemingly unrelated regression model
12 We estimated alternative specifications of all our models, replacing the county-level percentages of no
votes cast on the three constitutional referendums at issue with the log-odds of voting no. These logit
transformations produced results qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in Tables 5
and 6.
Racism versus fiscal conservatism 75
123
in counties where more citizens had voted against removing the prohibition on
interracial marriages in 2000. In contrast, greater voter opposition to Governor
Riley’s proposed ‘‘reform’’ of the tax code in 2003 is associated with increases in
the proportion of no votes in 2004. Although the estimated coefficient on
V2003NOPERC is only marginally significant (at the 10% level), one interpretation
of this result is that economic considerations were more salient than matters of race
in defeating the 2004 amendment.
In order to explore this finding further, we posit an empirical model of the form
illustrated in Fig. 3b. Instead of having the matrix of independent variables transmit
its influence on the voting outcome in 2004 through prior votes, we estimate, in
Table 6, a system of equations in which the results of all three referendums are
determined by the socioeconomic variables alone.
Model 2 permits a more detailed assessment of the effects of tax preferences—
proxied by county income per capita in 1999 and timber dependency—on voters’
decisions to support or to oppose constitutional change. The explanatory variables
controlling for the level of education in a county and the fraction of a county’s
population that is black have the hypothesized negative signs and are highly
significant. Counties with populations that are older, on the average, were more
likely to vote no in the 2000 miscegenation vote. That same variable indicates a
lower likelihood of no votes in subsequent referendums, although PERCABOVE55
is insignificant in determining the outcomes of the other two votes. Nor, as in
Table 5 Results for the
recursive model
(V2004NOPERC is the
dependent variable)
Notes: Significance levels are
indicated as follows:
*** denotes the 1% level,
** denotes the 5% level and
* denotes the 10% level.
Standard errors are corrected for
heteroscedasticity; t-statistics
are shown in parentheses
Model 1
Constant 0.7485*** 0.7294***
(6.2627) (6.8582)
V2000NOPERC 0.0478
(0.6852)
V2003NOPERC 0.0875*
(1.7394)
BAPERC25PLUS -1.0061*** -0.9194***
(-4.1570) (-3.9927)
BLACKPERC -0.3023*** -0.2888***
(-5.7468) (-6.1891)
PCAPITAINCOME99 (in $1,000) 0.0082 5.65E-06
(1.4889) (1.0498)
PERCABOVE55 -0.7615*** -0.7304***
(-2.9197) (-2.9997)
PERCAPITAEMPLEDUC 0.7675 0.8487
(0.3135) (0.3715)
TIMBERDEPPERC 0.1559** 0.1565***
(2.3054) (2.4978)
Adjusted R2 0.7589 0.7732
76 M. Reksulak, W.F. Shughart II
123
Table 5, does employment in education seem to matter, even in 2003 when,
arguably, public school teachers and administrators stood to gain personally from
supporting the governor’s ‘‘Alabama Excellence Initiative Fund’’. Alabamians who
were more highly educated and black tended to vote in favor of all three proposed
constitutional amendments: the estimated coefficients on these two variables are
consistently negative and significant at the 1% level.
The most interesting estimation results again relate to income and timber
dependency. The level of a county’s income per capita is not a statistically significant
factor in explaining the fraction of votes cast against repealing the constitutional
prohibition on interracial marriages in 2000. That same variable enters with a positive
sign and is different from zero at the 1% level of significance in 2003, when Alabama’s
voters decisively rejected the governor’s tax package amendment. Other things being
equal, the higher the average per capita income in a given county, the greater the
percentage of votes cast against the Riley plan. Furthermore, this same relationship
appears to hold in 2004, although the marginal effect is weaker (p = 0.13), perhaps
because some voters did not believe that creating a constitutional right to education
would have adverse fiscal consequences, or because the amendment’s companion
proposal to remove segregationist language from the constitution clouded the issue. It
may also be the case that its impact is somewhat overshadowed by the influence of
timber dependency, which—in 2004—significantly increases the number of no votes.
In any case, both higher per capita incomes and timber dependency on the margin,
Table 6 Results for SUR model of all three referenda
Independent variables Model 2
V2000NOPERC V2003NOPERC V2004NOPERC
Constant 0.6634*** 0.5904*** 0.7722***
(7.0821) (4.4844) (6.7868)
BAPERC25PLUS -0.9118*** -1.4960*** -1.0430***
(-4.2717) (-5.3226) (-4.2785)
BLACKPERC -0.3778*** -0.3539*** -0.3258***
(-9.4783) (-6.3485) (-6.7590)
PCAPITAINCOME99 (in $1,000) -0.0020 0.0291*** 0.0078
(-0.3817) (4.3448) (1.3467)
PERCABOVE55 0.2628 -0.2409 -0.7255***
(1.0649) (-0.7661) (-2.6546)
PERCAPITAEMPLEDUC -1.5319 1.2445
(-0.5253) (0.5073)
TIMBERDEPPERC 0.0362 0.1216*
(0.4527) (7.8074)
Adjusted R2 0.8433 0.8226 0.7557
Note: See Table 5
Racism versus fiscal conservatism 77
123
once more, raise the percentage of no votes cast on an amendment that, at least in the
eyes of its detractors, foreshadowed higher taxes.
A question of magnitude remains: were economic considerations decisive in
rejecting the proposed 2004 amendment, or were the no votes motivated more by
racial bias? To address this issue, we turn to an assessment of the marginal effects of
the various socioeconomic variables included in the models reported in Table 6.
We calculate implied elasticities at the means of the independent variables as well
as, in parentheses, the corresponding effects on vote totals. Table 7 reports the
calculations.
In Table 2 we presented the overall results for the 2004 vote. Statewide, the
difference between rejection and acceptance of the amendment repealing a racially
divisive provision in the Alabama constitution was a mere 1,846 votes, or 0.07% of
the total ballots cast. As indicated by the elasticity calculations above, however, it is
apparent that the electorate’s preferences with regard to taxation were critical in
determining the outcome of the 2004 constitutional referendum. A county’s per
capita income exhibits a marginal effect that is substantially greater than that of race
in model 2. Although its coefficient is estimated with less precision than are those
on the other explanatory variables, counties with per capita incomes 1% ($158.34)
above the statewide mean returned more than enough no votes to tip the balance
between approval and rejection. Combined with the timber interests, opposition by
voters in relatively high-income counties was sufficient in a close vote to let the
constitution’s discriminatory language stand.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have exploited a natural experiment conducted in the State of
Alabama to analyze the rejection in 2004 of a proposed amendment that would have
removed segregationist language from the state constitution. Some contemporary
observers ascribed the referendum’s defeat, not to bigotry per se, but to a
combination of racism and fiscal conservatism. A succession of two prior votes
proposing constitutional change—on a purely racial matter in 2000 and on a
Table 7 Marginal effects for
the 2004 election in the SUR
model
Notes: As before, significance
levels for the underlying
coefficients are as denoted by
*** (1%) and * (10%)
Independent variables Model 2
V2004NOPERC
BAPERC25PLUS -0.15%***
(-1,896)
BLACKPERC -0.10%***
(-1,227)
PCAPITAINCOME99 1.24%
(+17,072)
TIMBERDEPPERC 0.01%*
(+169)
78 M. Reksulak, W.F. Shughart II
123
standalone tax matter in 2003—provided an opportunity to disentangle the influence
of these different factors in 2004.
A closer look at the 2000 decision illuminates the astonishing extent to which
racial bias is still prevalent in some areas of the state. After all, as Table 2
demonstrates, in 25 (or almost 40%) of Alabama’s 67 counties, popular majorities
then opposed repealing the state’s unenforceable constitutional ban on interracial
marriage. Our purpose here was to investigate whether such apparent racial
intolerance played a role in 2004. The evidence in this paper suggests that economic
considerations—specifically an aversion to higher taxes—were more important than
race in explaining why Alabama’s voters rejected Amendment 2.
The reasoning underlying this conclusion is as follows. Other things being the
same, the level of income per capita in a county is not a statistically significant
determinant of the fraction of votes cast against repealing a state constitutional
prohibition on interracial marriages in 2000. That same variable is positive and
significantly different from zero at the 1% level in 2003, when Alabama’s voters
decisively rejected a constitutional amendment to implement Governor Riley’s
‘‘Alabama Excellence Initiative Fund’’, a tax reform initiative intended to close a
looming state budget deficit. Other things being equal, the higher the average per
capita income in a given county, the greater the fraction of votes cast against the
Riley plan. What is more important, this same relationship holds in 2004, when
Alabama’s voters narrowly rejected an amendment that would have repealed
constitutional language providing for separate public schools for blacks and whites,
but at the same time also would have removed a provision denying a constitutional
right to education. The marginal effect of per capita income is weaker in 2004 than
in 2003, perhaps because some voters did not believe that creating a constitutional
right to education would have adverse fiscal consequences, or because the
amendment’s companion proposal to remove segregationist language from the
constitution clouded the issue. In any case, economic variables such as higher
income and timber dependency, raise the percentage of no votes cast on an
amendment that, at least in the eyes of its detractors, foreshadowed higher taxes.
There are two obvious lessons: When the objective is to sanitize a state
constitution of the remnants of Jim Crow, proponents of this course of action are put
on notice to carefully draft the remedy in such a way as to forestall arguments that
the change implies higher tax bills. Opponents of constitutional ethnic-cleansing
operations, on the other hand, now have a blueprint, grounded in the specter of tax
increases, for stopping similar amendments from succeeding. As demonstrated in
2000, Alabamians seem to be quite willing to purge their constitution of racist
provisions. They are also extremely hostile to higher taxes, as demonstrated in 2003.
Given the opportunity to vote on both issues simultaneously, fiscal conservatism
narrowly trumps racial conciliation.
Acknowledgements We benefited from comments on earlier drafts by Michael Belongia, Frank
Stephenson, and Lewis Smith. Seminar participants at the annual meeting of the Southern Economic
Association as well as at research seminars at the University of Mississippi and Georgia Southern
University also facilitated improvements to this paper. As is customary, however, the authors take full
responsibility for any and all errors.
Racism versus fiscal conservatism 79
123
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