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Francophone Africa: The rise of‘pluralist authoritarian’ media systems?Marie-Soleil Frèrea

a Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium.Published online: 12 Mar 2015.

To cite this article: Marie-Soleil Frère (2015) Francophone Africa: The rise of ‘pluralistauthoritarian’ media systems?, African Journalism Studies, 36:1, 103-112, DOI:10.1080/23743670.2015.1008176

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African Journalism StudiesVolume 36 | Number 1 | 2015pp. 103–112

DOI: 10.1080/23743670.2015.1008176Print ISSN 2374-3670 | Online 2374-3689

© 2015 iMasa

FRANCOPHONE AFRICA: THE RISE OF ‘PLURALIST AUTHORITARIAN’ MEDIA SYSTEMS?

Marie-Soleil FrèreUniversité Libre de Bruxelles, Belgiummsfrere@ulb.ac.be

How can the media landscape of Francophone sub-Saharan Africa be qualified? Are there any shared trends that could lead to a common label for the media systems of Cameroon, Burundi, Chad and Guinea? When evoking ‘media systems’, one cannot help but refer to the classic book by Hallin and Mancini (2004), which proposes three models for describing the media landscapes in 18 European and North American countries.1 In a later, edited book in which Hallin and Mancini (2012) try to expand on these reflections, Beyond the Western world, a chapter focuses on Africa. Mainly based on South Africa’s situation, that chapter suggests that elements such as ethnicity, religion, migration or pan-Africanism have to be taken into account if one wants to elaborate ‘an African-based model or models’ (Hadland 2012, 116–117). The plural would probably be more appropriate, as the ‘models’ are diverse on the African continent, and one of the aims of this journal is to bridge the gap that sometimes persists (mainly for linguistic reasons) between Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone scholars.2

I want to emphasise some common trends that seem to emerge from the diversity of local situations. ‘Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa’ is an expression usually used for encompassing 17 countries on the African continent, that have kept French as their (or one of their) official language(s).3 Of course, this vast area, with a population of more than 300 million people, includes local situations that vary widely. Nevertheless, these countries also show some common characteristics, which can justify a comparative approach between them and differentiate them from their English or Portuguese-speaking neighbours. Indeed, all the countries in sub-Saharan Francophone Africa experienced French or Belgian rule during the colonial period (which is also when the press was born), and they still belong to the Francophone political sphere, organised for instance around the OIF (Organisation internationale de la Francophonie/International Organisation of Francophone Countries). Their media systems and journalistic production are generally

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enclosed in the ‘French’ tradition of the press. Their institutions and legal framework are generally inspired by the patterns of their former coloniser, and French is the language predominantly used by the press – sometimes also by the broadcast media.

These countries do, however, also share another characteristic: similar political patterns have led most of them to face problems with what can be called the ‘democratic consolidation process’. Indeed, all of them except for one (Senegal, and to a lesser extent and for a shorter period, Burkina Faso, formerly Haute-Volta), have been through a lengthy period of single-party rule and state monopoly over the media, from independence in 1960 until the beginning of the 1990s, when they opened up to a multiparty system, created democratic institutions, organised competitive elections and allowed a free press to develop. Nevertheless, since that democratic opening, all these countries except for two (Benin and Senegal) have faced either a military coup, armed conflict, or a situation where the head of state manipulated the constitution in order not to have to leave his seat at the end of his regular mandate. Therefore, the majority of these 17 states can be qualified as ‘semi-authoritarian’ regimes (Ottaway 2004), ‘illiberal democracies’ (Zacharia 1997), ‘electoral authoritarianisms’ (Schedler 2006) or ‘hybrid regimes’ (Diamond 2002). All these terms are used to name similar phenomena: regimes that have the outside aspect of a democracy (participatory institutions, elections regularly organised, recognised political opposition and a free press), but that do not, behind that facade, operate as democracies. Marina Ottaway (2004, 3) defines semi-authoritarian regimes as ‘ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits’. In these regimes, there is indeed a pluralist civil society, private media do operate, multiparty elections are organised, and institutions are established, supposedly representing the interest of the various categories of the population. But, at the same time, characteristics of dictatorial rule remain, such as the violation of human rights in a context of impunity, a strong intolerance (on the behalf of those in power) for the expression of dissenting views, electoral manipulation aiming at preventing any change (of party or individual) in the governing of the state.

By allowing a certain level of political and media freedom, these regimes give the illusion of democracy, yet at the same time they ensure that these freedoms will not lead to any real change, often by using hidden control or pressure mechanisms. Ottaway (ibid, 9) insists that semi-authoritarian regimes are not ‘in transition’, not ‘emerging democracies’ evolving towards ‘democratic consolidation’ but are ‘are semi-authoritarian by design, not by default. They are successful semi-authoritarian regimes rather than failed democracies.’ Moreover, all of them present a different mixture of democratic and authoritarian features.4 ‘Media systems’ in Francophone Africa share common trends because they are precisely entrenched in states with semi-authoritarian tendencies. Therefore, they present the same paradoxical face, mixing liberal traits with authoritarian characteristics. Freedom of the press is proclaimed, guaranteed by the

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constitution, regularly exhibited by the public authorities in order to demonstrate their democratic commitment, and it is indeed a reality, to a certain extent. There is a pluralist media, with a vibrant private press and multiple broadcasters, sometimes sharply criticising the government. But, at the same time, informal measures are put in place to guarantee that such freedom of expression will not destabilise those in power. Besides a very liberal legal framework, and sometimes a very good ranking in international press freedom charts,5 informal strategies are developed to limit the potential ‘watch dog’ role of the media, and especially to reduce their capacity to criticise any shortcomings in the management of public affairs and to make other perspectives than the official views available to the citizens (Frère 2014a).

As Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (2004) puts it, such regimes are characterised by a double speak: on the one hand public norms, and constitutional and institutional apparatus constitute a ‘formal language’; on the other hand there are practical arrangements, unexpressed codes of daily life and ‘informal language’. The media are often at the centre of that ‘double speak’. Indeed, as Ottaway (2004, 17) underlines, semi-authoritarian regimes are successfully established thanks to the manipulation of democratic institutions on the one hand, but also because the regime is accepted by large portions of the citizenry – support that cannot be achieved without the media’s involvement.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ‘PLURALIST-AUTHORITARIAN’ MEDIA SYSTEMS To analyse the mechanisms and strategies used to do so, we will go back to Hallin and Mancini (2004, 21) who built their categories on four dimensions of the media landscape: the development of media markets, the degree of political parallelism (the extent to which media are linked to political parties), the level of journalistic professionalism, and the degree and nature of state intervention in the media system.

The level of market development The media market in Francophone Africa is undeniably narrow and precarious, due to low literacy rates, the high price of newspaper, scarce advertisements and structural obstacles to dissemination outside the capital city. Most newspapers in Francophone Africa have very low circulation figures. In countries such as Cameroon or Côte d’Ivoire (both with around 22 million people), with probably the most enabling environment for the press, the circulation of the main private newspapers does not even reach 10 000 copies. In the most populated Francophone country, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with its 72 million inhabitants, the main newspapers circulate only in the capital and never exceed 2 500 copies. Production costs are so high and advertising revenue is so low that newspapers are sold at a price that is often not affordable, even amongst the

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educated elite. In Niger and Mali, the price of a newspaper (between 300 and 500 CFA francs) equals that of a meal.

In semi-authoritarian regimes, the public authorities, despite pretending to promote an enabling environment in which a plurality of media outlets can develop, can weigh on the market through informal means, such as pressuring advertisers to boycott certain papers, burdening targeted media outlets’ budgets with huge taxes, or limiting the expansion of the scope of certain media. For instance, in Rwanda, advertisements from public institutions or private companies with links to the regime are systematically directed towards those media that support the current government. For years now, a section of the private press has been complaining about these economic boycotts (Frère et al. 2014b). In the DRC, community radio stations, which clearly play an important role in circulating local information, are overburdened with taxes, which limits their potential for development. In Burundi, Radio Publique Africaine (RPA), which calls itself ‘The voice of the voiceless’, had to wait for months before signing an agreement and obtaining a frequency (in 2006) to establish another station in Ngozi. A few months after broadcasting commenced it was closed down by the government (officially, for administrative reasons). In May 2014, in the Republic of Congo, the press group Talassa, which had just expressed concern about the fairness of the electoral process, was suspended, officially because Congolese law forbids press concentration, but other press groups close to the current governing party were not targeted.

Therefore, behind official statements about the ‘liberal’ character of the media landscape, the market is not as free as governments pretend, and those media that do not show support for the people in office are often trapped in politically manipulated economic difficulties.

The degree and level of state intervention in the mediaA central element of media–state relations in ‘semi-authoritarian states’ is state intervention in the media sector. Obvious authoritarian traits do remain in many countries where newspapers or broadcasters can be suspended, and journalists can be sued or jailed. During the past ten years, journalists have been jailed in all of the 17 countries under study, most of them allegedly for publishing information ‘threatening’ state security.6 Direct censorship has even been re-established in a few isolated cases, and often in specific circumstances linked to a conflict or a particular event, within a limited time frame. For instance, in Chad, in 2005, private newspapers were forced to submit their content to a censorship commission prior to publication. In Burundi, in September 2011, after a massacre was committed in Gatumba, with over 40 dead, the Ministry of Information forbade the media from publishing, commenting or analysing any information related to the massacre, invoking ‘national security’. In Rwanda, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire, the French international broadcaster, RFI (Radio France Internationale), has been suspended for months, as the respective governments were not

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satisfied with the radio’s coverage of their internal politics. Most countries have also experienced some suspension of local newspapers or radio stations.

Meanwhile, all Francophone countries have established media regulatory institutions that are supposed to organise the media landscape democratically, and to defend press freedom. Nevertheless, relations between these institutions and the private media are generally terrible, as media regulators often prove to be political tools used by government to silence any unfriendly media (De la Brosse and Frère 2012).

Although the legal framework is very liberal in most countries, the main concern today is not the law itself, but the way in which it can be interpreted by a judicial system that lacks independence. The very broad terminology used in press laws, such as ‘insult to the president’ or ‘attempt to undermine state security’ can be applied to any paper or news item which merely criticises the head of state or government. Therefore, in semi-authoritarian states, even though the legal context may appear very liberal, journalists are still regularly unfairly judged, convicted, jailed or threatened. This has two consequences: first, such threats have driven Africa to become the continent with the most journalists in exile (Frère 2014a). Second, for those who stay, ‘self-censorship’ often becomes a habit. ‘Self-censorship’ is convenient for semi-authoritarian states, as constraints and barriers are appropriated and established inside the minds of journalists: encouraging self-censorship around delicate issues is the best way to operate the most discreet form of prior control. As Ottaway (2004, 163) puts it, in such an environment, ‘a degree of self-censorship allows independent newspapers to exist, but also limits their role’.

Therefore, in these contexts, public authorities can claim to be supporting press freedom by officially lifting any obstacles to the development of private media, but they may use other means (some visible, some hidden) to neutralise the media’s potential to make changes happen within society. This kind of ‘double speak’ might see a government setting up special funds for providing public support for private media (Adjovi 2012), or parliament passing a new press law which removes jail terms for journalists guilty of press offences, while at the same time financially harassing the media or sending journalists to prison for other offences (e.g., related to the Penal Code). An enlightening example is that of the Central African Republic, where the press law was reformed in 2005, suppressing any jail terms for press offences, but where journalists were still regularly jailed afterwards.

The degree of political parallelismThe type and strength of the links between the media and political parties define the nature of media systems. In semi-authoritarian regimes, the ruling party, supporting the president, is often in a dominant position, to the extent where, despite mutipartyism, some countries almost resemble one-party regimes. In some cases, a plethora of smaller parties may be virtually unable to exercise any consistent activity between elections,

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while those in power develop strategies to weaken any possible political opposition (Ottaway 2004, 150–152).

In most Francophone African countries, the press reflects a situation of politically unbalanced pluralism, with the media being highly politicised. In Cote d’Ivoire, newspapers are close to the main political parties (the FPI, RDR, PDCI), while in the DRC the media are often the property of individual political stakeholders. As a result, the media are often politically committed, leaving little room for internal pluralism: newspapers and broadcasters will just not give the microphone to the ‘other side’. In the Republic of Congo and Chad, allegedly private newspapers (Les Dépêches, Le Progrès) are closely linked to Sassou and Deby’s regimes respectively, thus enjoying many benefits which other newspapers will never receive. These privileged links between media practitioners and politicians do not exist everywhere: in Burkina Faso or Burundi, despite a minority of ‘politically committed’ outlets, most of the main private media do not have obvious links to the political sphere, and some can even be labeled as ‘independent’.

A common characteristic of Francophone African countries, as far as political parallelism in concerned, is the high degree of control the government maintains over so-called ‘public’ media. In fact, several countries have recently adopted reforms openly devoted to giving greater administrative and financial autonomy to the state broadcaster and newspaper (Tozo 2005). But, to date, the public media have remained the mouthpiece of government, giving the regime extensive and favourable coverage, while being reluctant to open up to positions other than those of the ruling party. Even in Senegal, a country generally presented as among the most advanced on the ‘democratic path’ in Francophone Africa,7 it has been demonstrated that the evening news focuses mainly on the activities of the president and his wife (ibid.). During elections, monitoring of public media coverage shows that the public media are constantly unfair and biased, with a lot more time devoted to the incumbent, and a reduction and distortion of the coverage of opposition parties, while official regulation generally imposes equal access.8 As underlined by an IDEA (Adejumobi 2007, 41) report on political parties in West Africa, ‘there is usually no equal access to the media for the political parties. Ruling parties in most countries often deploy the power of incumbency to gain undue advantage in access to the media.’

The unfair commitment of the public media has an important impact – despite media pluralism, the public broadcaster generally wields the widest coverage. In countries such as Burundi, Burkina Faso and Chad, there are indeed several private radio stations, but none of them broadcast widely across the territory. In many parts of these countries, the national broadcaster remains the only one available to listeners. Controlling the public media therefore allows government to use them as a propaganda tool, especially in areas where citizens do not have access to alternative sources of information. An audience study implemented in the Great Lakes region (Burundi, Rwanda and Eastern Congo) in 2011–2012 shows that even though they did not trust the programmes broadcast

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by the national broadcasters, listeners remained faithful to them, because they could access information that was not available on local private radio stations (Frère 2015, forthcoming).

In semi-authoritarian states, the competition is thus generally unfair between a public broadcaster devoted to government propaganda and private outlets that are close to opposition parties or aiming for ‘independence’, but struggling to survive and having a more limited scope.

The degree of development of journalistic professionalismIs there a specific way to practise journalism in semi-authoritarian states? On that issue, if we can find common characteristics pertaining to how journalism is practised in the countries under study, it seems difficult to link them systematically to the nature of the political regime. Some shared characteristics of journalism in Francophone countries include an ‘opinion-oriented’ style that mixes comments with facts – a legacy of French journalism. References to French newspapers are explicit in editorial and format options, for instance in Cameroon (Atenga 2012, 15) and Senegal (Kassé 2015, forthcoming).

Upon closer inspection, some traits of journalistic trends appear to be related to a ‘semi-authoritarian’ environment. Journalism can provide a form of sly ‘resistance’ against oppressive regimes. In Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire or Cameroon, some satirical newspapers have a big circulation (Le Journal du Jeudi, Gbich!, Le Popoli) – the satirical style allows some type of statements that would not be tolerated in other formats.

The content disseminated by the media also reflects a major problem with access to information. Even in countries where specific legislation has been adopted (in Rwanda, for instance9), the general policy of public institutions is to withhold information from the media. Therefore, journalists often complain that they are forced into trusting rumours, given the lack of clear public data available. In Cameroon, President Paul Biya (in office since 1982) has never granted an interview to any local journalist (yet he occasionally speaks to foreign reporters).

A third element related to media content and professionalism is the significant influence of international media (such as Radio France Internationale [RFI] or the BBC) on local media. The popularity of RFI among journalists and citizens in Francophone Africa demonstrates that the local media cannot access all the information or dare to say everything they wish to. Therefore, international broadcasting remains a main source of information, reminiscent of the role it played during the former period of authoritarian rule and state monopoly of the media (Vittin 2002).

A fourth characteristic of media practices is the phenomenon, in all 17 Francophone countries of Africa, of ‘paid-for journalism’ and advertorials. Even if the practice of receiving ‘brown envelopes’ is primarily linked to economic rather than political constraints, political regimes derive huge benefits from the fact that so many journalists are ready to write positive reports on the government’s achievements, for only a few thousands CFA francs. Money is certainly key to the fact that the tone of so many

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journalists has become consensual, to the extent that many countries (Togo and the DRC, for instance) now witness pluralism (of media outlets) without diversity.

These features (satirical content, rumour-based information, paid-for coverage) also sometimes lead to irresponsible journalism, which provides semi-authoritarian regimes with plenty of excuses for initiating lawsuits or suspending critical media. Journalistic practices which are marked by opinion-oriented media, a lack of access to local information and the impact of ‘paid-for journalism’ raise questions about professional training, which is overall lacking in the region. Journalism schools have been established, but they often lack proper funding and staff. Within the public higher education system, quality training in journalism is not a priority. In semi-authoritarian regimes, higher education in general is often not valued. The former president of the CAR, François Bozizé, for instance, used to claim that he did not appreciate intellectuals, since they were always synonymous with trouble.

CONCLUSIONThe media systems of the countries in Francophone Africa are diverse and defy any categorisation or typology. Some elements are shared, but different dimensions manifest in each system. Despite vocal claims about the ‘democratic’ character of their media sector, most regimes do not provide the enabling environments which would allow the free press to expand.

From the beginning of the process of opening up in the early 1990s, to the start of the 2000s, Francophone countries in Africa have been seen as ‘in transition’, ‘emerging democracies’ or ‘undergoing democratic consolidation’. Their media were analysed through the lens of the ‘transition’ paradigm (De la Brosse 1999; Frère 2000; Perret 2005). But these regimes are not ‘on their way to democracy’: they are meant to remain as they are, mixing democratic features and authoritarian traits. Their media landscape reflects this situation, showing both characteristics of a democratic media system and some authoritarian features, generally in hidden form.

These media systems can therefore be labeled ‘pluralist authoritarian’, which seems to be a contradiction at first glance, until a distinction is made between the facade and what lies beneath. In the facade we see a pluralist media landscape, a market open to private initiatives, an absence of a priori control over media content, a diversity of political parties able to interact with media outlets, and journalists who have gained autonomy through the establishment of their own principles of conduct, professional organisations and self-regulatory bodies. But behind the façade, media outlets have to face maneuvering from those in power who wish to control the flow of information through direct political pressure, indirect economic obstacles, dominance on the public media, and manipulation of the legal framework and judicial system. Analysing the media systems of Francophone countries in Africa in the light of the ‘semi-authoritarian’ paradigm, and not as ‘consolidating democratic media sectors’ or ‘emerging liberal

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media markets’, gives a clearer perspective on the issues at stake right now in that part of the continent, and should be a challenge for future researchers publishing in this journal.

ENDNOTES1 The three proposed models are: the Polarised Pluralist (Southern Europe), the Democratic Corporatist

(North and Central Europe) and the Liberal (North America). 2 Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies 33(3)2012 aimed precisely to draw attention to the

peculiarities of the media in Francophone Africa, and to underline the distinction between journalism as practised in Francophone and Anglophone countries in Africa. The introduction to the issue underlined the gap between research dealing with media in Francophone and Anglophone Africa, and advocated the building of further connections between these two main geographical areas of the continent.

3 The17 countries are mainly located in West and Central Africa, plus Djibouti (East Africa) and islands in the Indian Ocean. They include Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea, Mali, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Gabon, Burundi, Rwanda, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo. In this article, we do not take into account Francophone countries in North Africa.

4 Ottaway mainly distinguishes between three types of semi-authoritarian regimes: those in equilibrium, those in decay, and those experiencing dynamic change. In this short essay, we will not go so far as to apply the classification to African Francophone countries.

5 It has been demonstrated that these charts (from Reporters without Borders or Freedom House) fail to grasp the complexity of local situations around the world. One reason is that they build their categories on the experience of Western media and do not take into account local peculiarities that can sometimes be ‘hidden’ to the eyes of the observer (Frère 2014a).

6 See the annual census of Reporters without Borders (www.rsf.org) and the Committee to Protect Journalists (www.cpj.org)

7 Not the case with Marina Ottaway, who takes Senegal as an example of a ‘semi-authoritarian’ regime.8 See, e.g., reports published by EUOM (European Union Observatory Mission) in Burundi (2005,

2010), the DRC (2006, 2011), Rwanda (2002, 2007). 9 In 2013 Rwanda adopted a law on access to information that requires all administrative services to

have a communication service or communication officer, in order to communicate all relevant data to the press, as necessary.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTEMarie-Soleil Frère is Director of the Research Centre in Information and Communication at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium.

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