Politics and media in Italy: still a Polarized Pluralist country? (by A. Sergio La Rosa)

Introduction

In modern societies, media play a central role: they influence public sphere and, at the same time, they

mediate between citizens and political institutions; they shape public issues, impact on public opinion and

affects public policies. Moreover, for these reasons, analyzing media is fundamental also if we want to

understand modern democracies.

Italy, naturally, is not immune from media studies: several scholars analyzed Italian newspapers, radios,

televisions and new media. In particular, in 2004, Hallin and Mancini, after taking into account several

indicators in media, political, and social fields, defined Italy as a “Polarized Pluralist” country.

The aim of this paper is to retrace the two authors’ analyisis, to deepen some of the outlined Italian media

characteristics and try to understand which of these aspects changed and which have not. The purpose is

answering to the following question: after ten years by Hallin and Mancini’s study, is Italy still a Polarized

Pluralist country?

The paper can be divided in three parts: the first chapter will explore Hallin and Mancini’s basic framework

looking at the elements, variables and models considered. The second part will implement the dimensions

previously analyzed into the Italian media and political context, looking for a correspondence between

theoretical framework and everyday practices and events. In the latter part, I will aim for outlining the aspects

that seem to be changed in the last decades and years, trying to point out the effects they are having on the

model defined by the two authors.

Models of media and political variables

If we want to know more about media systems, it is important to consider Siebert, Peterson and Schramm’s

viewpoint: “press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it

operates.” (1963: 1). Indeed, there is no possibility to understand media systems if we do not analyze the social

and political context in which they develop. At this regard, it can be useful to look at the four-dimension

framework elaborated by Hallin and Mancini (2004): the two authors outline the development of media market,

the level of political parallelism, the grade of journalistic professionalism and the role of the state as important

aspects to be taken in consideration. Approaching media studies through these four dimensions makes possible

to understand “why is the press as this? Why does it apparently serve different purposes and appear in widely

different forms in different countries?” (Siebert et al. 1963: 1).

Hallin and Mancini’s four dimensions permit the two authors to propose a comparative analysis of eighteen

western democracies’ media, outlining the differences and the common characteristics among them. In the

light of this, it is possible to define three models (Hallin and Mancini 2004): the Polarized Pluralist one -

France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain –, the Democratic Corporatist one – Austria, Belgium, Denmark,

Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland – and the Liberal one – Britain, Canada,

Ireland and United States.

Going back to the four dimensions, we can start focusing on press market. Democratic Corporatist and

Liberal countries are characterized by strong mass press that involves big readerships, meanwhile, in Southern

European countries, press is considered as a mean for elitarian debate, and electronic media play a more

important role. In the latter case – and in Europe in general - party press is widespread and coexists with

commercial papers (ibid.). The strong presence of press partisanship in Polarized Pluralist model represents a

significant indicator of high level of political parallelism, which is “the degree and nature of the links between

the media and political parties or, more broadly, the extent to which the media system reflects the major

political divisions in society” (ibid.: 21). These countries - and Central/Northern ones to some extent - are also

characterized by external pluralism – meant as political heterogeneity in the whole media system – and relevant

ties with social and political organizations (ibid.). On the contrary, in Liberal countries political parallelism is

generally low and media system follows commercial and market logic. Indeed, as Hallin and Mancini (ibid.)

sustain, in analyzed countries a neat difference between news reporting and commentary is present: the latter

is generally placed just in editorial pages; meanwhile most of European countries’ journalists mix news and

opinions, especially in Mediterranean press.

The journalistic professionalization paths influence media as well. Professionalism is highly considered in

Democratic Corporist countries where journalists’ unions and organizations strongly developed - also because

“public service” assumption in news reporting is considered extremely important (ibid.). Differently from

those countries, Liberal model is not marked by a relevant amount of organizations - but professionalism is

strongly based on informal relations – and Polarized Pluralist countries face a low level of professionalization

because of a relevant lack of autonomy. Moreover, political parties, social movements and other relevant social

organizations - that aim to influence public opinion and policy-making processes (La Rosa, 2013) - often

instrumentalize Mediterranean media (Hallin and Mancini 2004).

Finally, media systems are also affected by the states’ policies and choices. All the countries have their own

public broadcasting - but in Europe they are more relevant – and in Democratic Corporatist and Polarized

Pluralist models, the state supports actively media (ibid.). Nevertheless, Traquina (1995) notices that in some

Mediterranean countries a “savage deregulation” favored a strong development of media conglomeration.

These dimensions, actually, are not enough. Indeed, several political and social aspects need to be

considered. In one of his studies, Lijphart analyzes western democracies wondering “who will do the governing

and to whose interests should be the government be responsive when people are in disagreement and have

divergent preferences?” (1999: 1). In the light of this question, the scholar outlines two democracy models: the

majoritian model where the majority of the people decides, and the consensus model where “as many people

as possible” (ibid.) decides. The former is characterised by a two-party system where winning party dominates,

the latter is based in a multiparty system where power is shared between several political forces. The majoritian

system is characterized by “catchall” parties, and, in the light of this, media tend to apply the same logic and

leave partisanship; in consensus democracies, instead, power is shared, and policy-making involves several

political forces and, consequently, media take part in a bargaining process amongst politicians and other

stakeholers (Hallin and Mancini 2004).

Media partisanship is also influenced by the country’s grade of political pluralism. Sartori (1976)

distinguishes between polarized pluralism countries, where ideological differences amongst political parties

are strongly marked - and party system is highly fragmented - and moderate pluralism countries, where party

fragmentation is low and political scene is characterized by discussion and cooperation between political forces

- which tend to center area. In the first case, media systems are characterized by external pluralism and relevant

levels of partisanship, on the contrary, in the second case, media are characterized by low levels of political

parallelism (Hallin and Mancini 2004).

Finally, one phenomenon to take into account for our further analysis is clientelism, a form of political

organization “in which formal rules are less important relative to personal connections or, in later form of

clientelism, connections [are] mediated through political parties, the Church, and other organizations” (ibid.:

58). Clientelism is marked in Southern European countries where it undermines journalist professionalism

development and strengthens media instrumentalization cases (ibid.).

Italy as Polarized Pluralist country

“The history of the Italian public sphere is that of a polarized-pluralist public sphere […] The

roots of this symbolic polarization are to be found in the past history of the country and, of

course, in its both old and more recent economic and social cleavages” (Mancini 2013: 336).

Italy can be considered one of the western democracies with the strongest political cleavages and the most

polarized system (Sartori 2011 [2005]). Italy is a good example because of its political history - as it had a

fascist dictatorship and a strong communist party, and, in general, Italian political scene is characterized by

several antisystem political parties (ibid.). Indeed, Italy is marked by a general inclination to refuse a common

agreement amongst parties about the shape of the state (Hallin and Mancini 2004). The history of Italy is

marked by continues contrasts, as Mancini (2013: 336) asserts:

“One can go back to Capuleti and Montecchi, to Guelfi and Ghibellini and, closer to us, to

fascisti and antifascisti; and even closer, one can refer to the 1948 political elections and the

opposition between comunisti and anticomunisti”.

Press development is also influenced by cleavages: Italy, as most of Southern European countries, had a

weak bourgeoise class and, consequently, press evolved relying mainly on aristocratic and clerical sphere

(Hallin and Mancini 2004). The result of this is, as we have already seen, is the establishment of an “elitarian

press” and a limited development of commercial press. On the other hand, the persistence of an aristocratic

class brought to the development of Italian political and social cleavages, where the sharp contrast between

conservative aristocratic area and anarchist labors’ wing established and marked strongly the Italian political

history throughout the twentieth century (ibid.).

Limited press market and strong political divisions characterized the Italian diffusion of party press and, in

general, a high level of political parallelism: the Italian Communist Party (PCI) founded its own journal

l’Unità, which played an important role in constructing communist and alternative subcultures, as Christian

Democrats (DC) party had Il Popolo, Italian Socialist Party (PSI) established l’Avanti and Il Secolo d’Italia

had been affiliated to right-wing Italian Social Movement (MSI) party (Mancini 2002). But even commercial

papers followed this path: for example, Berlusconi’s Il Giornale and Libero by The Angelucci family, whose

former MP Antonio Angelucci was elected within Berlusconi’s party, are characterized by a clear right-wing

inclination; la Repubblica, founded by Eugenio Scalfari, tends to represent center-left political area (Hallin

and Mancini 2004) and Il Manifesto relies on leftish one. Indeed, Italian press proposes the perfect example of

external pluralism, a concept considered fundamental also by the Italian Constitutional Court that - judging

Italian broadcasting system in 1988 – outlined “the necessity of guaranteeing, in private broadcasting field, a

level of external pluralism as high as possible, in order to satisfy the citizens’ right to be informed through a

plurality of positions”1.

The high level of political parallelism is also demonstrated by the widespread use of commentary in news

reporting. Italian press is known for pastone, an article mixing the political news and opinions by journalists

(Dardano 1976; Hallin and Mancini 2004). Moreover, the inclination for commentary – and even high-pitched

language - has raised in the last two decades when Italian public sphere got more polarized because of the

Berlusconi’s entry into politics (Mancini 2013). Since 1994, the struggle between berlusconiani and

antiberlusconiani involved also press: for example, in 2009 Berlusconi declared that “communist and catholic-

communist minority […] owns ninety per cent of newspapers” and filed a complaint against la Repubblica and

l’Unità (Anon. 2009); moreover, in 2001, Berlusconi accused some of the foreign newspapers – that criticized

his government - of having strategic “alliance” with leftish political area represented by la Repubblica and

l’Espresso (Anon. 2001). On the other side, Italian media also joint the struggle: during sex scandals involving

Berlusconi2, “la Repubblica investigated tenaciously linking news reporting to severe editorial articles that

condemned Prime Minister behaviour” (Gundle 2010). One of the most significant event in berlusconiani-

antiberlusconiani struggle is the one occurring for wiretap bill3 - proposed by Berlusconi majority – which

caused a journalists’ strike (Anon. 2010) and huge newpapers’ protests; in particular, on 11 June 2010 - the

day after the first parliamentary approval - three papers opposing Berlusconi - la Repubblica, il Fatto

Quotidiano and l’Unità - went on sale respectively with a blank page (Figure 1a), with the logo went in black

(Figure 1b) and with the title in fascist font style (Figure 1c). On the same day, Peter Gomez, editor of il Fatto

Quotidiano, wrote: “Henceforth we engage in breaking the law with acts of civil disobedience”; on the other

1 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza n. 826/1988. 2 Further information: “The Berlusconi sex scandal explained” by Messia (2011). 3 From 2008 until 2011 Berlusconi government tried in vain to approve a law regulating judges’ wiretapping and restricting journalists’ freedom in reporting wiretaps.

side, Alessandro Sallusti, vice-editor of Berlusconi’s Il Giornale, defended the bill and attacked judges and

journalists’ protests (Rispoli 2010).

Figure 1a (above): la Repubblica blank front page with a post it on (“The gag bill denies citizens’ right of being informed”) – issue 11 June 2010.

Figure 1b (above): il Fatto Quotidiano logo goes to black against wiretap bill – issue 11 June 2010.

figure 1c (above): “Gag bill approved” in fascist font in l’Unità front page – issue 11 June 2010.

Italian press is also political active in mobilizing its readerships, especially promoting petitions; for

instance, recently il Fatto Quotidiano launched an online petition against Renzi’s government reforms

(“against authoritarism, for participatory democracy”) (Travaglio 2014). Finally, another element outlining the

high grade of political parallelism is represented undoubtedly by the huge amount of journalists running for

elections (Hallin and Mancini 2004). The recent European elections in Italy are a clear example of this

tendency, as four Italian journalists decided to stand for elections (Ventura 2014) and, in 2013 general national

elections, about a dozen journalists ran for a seat in Italian Parliament because it is considered a more profitable

position (Dumont 2013). Moreover,

“a journalist registered at the journalists’ order can work for a media and, at the same time, join

press agency for corporations or politicians. There is not any sort of incompatibility according

to journalists’ order commission” (ibid.).

The low grade of press circulation in Southern European went against journalism development as a full-

time job and brought journalists looking for ties with political parties, and even with other social and economic

forces that try to use media as means for influencing opinion-building4 and policymaking processes (Hallin

and Mancini 2004). This phenomenon is relevant in Italy: some of the most relevant economic groups owns

the most important Italian newspaper; at this regard, a series of investigative reports by Caldarelli analysed

newspapers ownerships and demonstrated that Il Corriere della Sera (RCS) is owned by Mediobanca –

controlled by most of the important Italian banks – and several relevant Italian entrepreneurs (Caldarelli

2012a); la Repubblica and l’Espresso are controlled by De Benedetti (Caldarelli 2012b) who is well-known

for his judicial struggles with Silvio Berlusconi for the ownership of Mondadori. The third most important

national paper, La Stampa, is controlled by Agnelli’s FIAT (Caldarelli 2012c) - which is also shareholder in

Corriere della Sera’s RCS (Caldarelli 2012a). In addition to Il Giornale, Berlusconi owns also Mondadori,

the most important Italian book publisher that controls even Panorama and more than other 40 newspapers

(Caldarelli 2012d). In broadcasting field, Berlusconi also owns Mediaset, which is the only one broadcasting

company – along with public broadcasting RAI – that reaches 98% of Italian population (Mele 2005); this

created a broadcasting duopoly that is hugely debated in Italy and sees struggles between berlusconiani and

antiberlusconiani.

The RAI-Mediaset duopoly was established thanks to a “savage deregulation” phenomenon: RAI monopoly

lasted until 1976, when Italian Constitutional Court decided to authorize commercial broadcasting.

Nevertheless, Government and Parliament did not regulate private broadcasting system until 1990 (Hallin and

Mancini 2005).

Aside the Italian television “savage deregulation” case, we can say that Italian state plays a very active role

in regulating and supporting media: in the first years of 2000s Italian subsides to press were the highest in

Europe (ibid.) and the state also granted a reduced VAT on newspaper sales. Moreover, Italy strictly regulates

political communication through “par condicio act” which, thirty days before election day, prohibits the

entertainment media to host candidates or report political news and limits electoral spots in specific

broadcasting programme that do not interfere with regular programmes. Finally, it obliges media to reserve

the same attention to all parties and candidates and prohibits the diffusion of any electoral polls 15 days before

election day (Grandi and Vaccari 2013). The act delegates the Communication Agency (AGCOM) – for private

broadcasting – and the Parliamentary Vigilance Commission – for RAI – to define the parties and cadidates’

standards of access to media before any election (Campus and Ciaglia 2013). A complex mechanism that,

during regional elections campaign in 2010, brought RAI journalists’ hosting political programs to stop

transmissions for protesting against the too strict rules approved by Parliamentary Commission (ibid.).

The programmes’ black out case reported above outlines the high level of control by the Italian state on

public broadcasting. RAI is managed by the state through the representative principle (Hallin and Mancini

2004) a scheme that Humphreys (1996) defines as “parliamentary” or “representative” model. The company

board is formed by nine members – seven appointed by the Parliamentary Vigilance Commission and two by

the Minister for Economy and Finances. But the most particular aspect in Italian public broadcasting is the

4 Nowadays, the struggle between political, social and economic forces for influencing public opinion is very relevant. Public opinion in modern societies is a fundamental mean for affecting public policies and media play a fundamental role in this process (Grossi 2004; La Rosa 2013; Mazzoleni 2004).

lottizzazione meant as a phenomenon of “media sharing” (Hallin and Mancini 2004): in 1970s the three

channels owned by RAI were divided amongst the main political parties; the Christian Democrats took the

control of RAI1, the Communist opposition controlled RAI3 and other secularized parties, especially PSI, had

RAI2. In this way, parties appointed media personnel and each channel represented a specific political area.

Nowadays the difference between channels are not as neat as some decades ago, nevertheless clientelism

practice in RAI is still present: parties still influence appointments and personnel selection (ibid.).

The dependence from political forces, the instrumentalization of the media and, in general, the high level

of political parallelism affects journalistic profession: in this respect, Pansa (1977) deals with the concept of

“cut in half journalism” (giornalismo dimezzato) meaning the partial autonomy of journalists who are strongly

linked to politics and economic forces.

“That system wanted newspapers being controlled and paid by cars, construction, oil, sugar,

chemistry industries, being object and mean of bargains between economy and politics […].

The newspapers’ revenues were not the ones coming by sales and advertising. The revenue was

underhand dealing […].” (Agostini 2006: 209-10).

In these terms, professionalization in Italy is very weak. Although the presence of an important “Order of

Journalists” recognized by the Italian state and a journalists union (FNSI), Italian journalists do not share

common professional conduct standards and those organization are not fully able in cultivating them (Hallin

and Mancini 2004).

In the light of all the issues analysed throughout the chapter, we can say openly that most of Italian media

and politics characteristics make Italy fit in the Hallin and Mancini’s Polarized Pluralist model. Nevertheless,

in the next chapters we will take into account some of the recent trends that show that Italian case, maybe, is

changing path in some ways.

Current trends in Italian media and political systems

The aspects characterizing countries do not last forever, naturally. They develop continuously and make

the Hallin and Mancini’s three models to face several trends. For example, it is possible to notice that,

according to Hallin and Mancini (2004), countries are facing a process of homogenization.

“The Liberal Model has clearly become increasingly dominant across Europe as well as North

America – as it has, no doubt, across much of the world – its structures, practices, and values

displacing, to a substantial degree […] in general, it is reasonable to summarize the changes in

European media systems as a shift toward Liberal Model.” (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 251-2).

Aside the debate between scholars about the definition of homogenization as an “americanization”

phenomenon or a process of convergence amongst several models, it is more useful for our purposes to focus

on some of the recent Italian homogenization trends. At first, we have to outline the raising commercialization

of media: during 1970s commercial papers got popular and after an Constitutional Court sentence, private

radio and televisions raised hugely (Cordoni et al. 2006; Hallin and Mancini 2004). In this context, party press

is recently facing a profound crisis:

“In all market economies, firms are subjected to the law of supply and demand. Firms close

down and establish, prosper or fail, depend on the tastes of consumers and the competitiveness

of the product, on the competition logic. These criteria, unavoidable, do not escape the

publishing companies as l’Unità, because the "markets" do not respond to the feelings, even the

most noble ones. It does not matter how much history there is behind it if sales fall and there is

no balance between revenue and expenditure.” (Buttaroni 2014).

L’Unità, stopped publications on the 1 August 2014 (Anon. 2014) and it is not the only party newspaper

facing economic crisis; Liberazione, newspaper by Partito della Rifondazione Comunista (Communist Re

foundation Party) closed down already at the beginning of 2012 (Anon. 2011a), Europa, linked to Democratic

Party, survived to the fail recently (Menichini 2014) and La Padania by Lega Nord (Northern League) party

stopped publications in 1 December 2014 (Brusini 2014). Party press is not considered profitable anymore

and, at the same time, Italian state is substantially reducing press subsides over the recent years (Anon. 2008;

Anon. 2011b; Lancari 2014) and the reduced VAT on newspapers has been abolished in 2010. In Italy the

subsidies to press is considered a fundamental issue because strictly linked to pluralism; indeed, the President

of Italian Republic, Napolitano, in 2011 stood up against cuts to press declaring that "I agree […] the concern

about the risks that could result at the expense of pluralism. And I will express my viewpoint to the

government" (Anon. 2011b). Nevertheless, it is necessary to outline that press subsidies is nowadays a central

matter in Italian public sphere: some criticizes this mechanism and ask for a pure press market free from the

state intervention. Some recently founded newspapers like il Fatto Quotidiano and Pagina 99 followed this

trend and proudly declare of being subsidy free: the former also put in its logo (figure 1b) “does not receive

any public fundings”.

The other issue causing the party press crisis is represented by the process of political secularization: likely

most of western democracies, during the last decades, in Italy ties to ideologies are getting weaker. This process

seems to be confirmed by several studies analizing the rising figure of floating voter, meant as voter “who

change his vote from one election to another, choosing then to disavow the choice made during the previous

election” (De Sio 2006: 393) and the increasing phenomenon of electoral abstention (Cuturi et al. 2000).

Secularization process also influences political system: “catchall” parties as center-left Democratic Party (PD)

and, until november 2013, center-right People of Freedom (PDL) represent the attempt by politics to simplify

political scene and look with favour to a majoritian model. Nevertheless, in recent years several anti-system

parties built a strong consensus amongst Italian people: the anti-party Five Star Movements (M5S) by

comedian Grillo is a clear example: founded in 2009 it reached the 25% of votes in 2013 general elections.

M5S is the cause of lively debates in Italy between grillini and antigrillini and Beppe Grillo often attacks

journalists who are accused of attending upon parties. Northern Legue represents also a popular anti-system

party: founded as a secessionist movement, it proposes anti-Europe and anti-immigration policies and,

according to several polls, nowadays can count on more of 10% of Italians’ consensus (Maggi 2014).

In the light of this, Italy can be considered still far from moderate pluralist model. Nevertheless, some other

elements seem to aim to a homogenization process: for instance, Berlusconi’s entry into politics officially

sanctioned the use of marketing techniques into political field - supported by highly specialized personnel -

and also political personification is a widespread phenomenon (Grandi and Vaccari 2013; Hallin and Mancini

2004; Rodriguez 2001). At this regard, there is no doubt that commercialization of media has a huge effect on

diffusion of “politainment”:

“Politicians are more and more involved in show dimension; they are tv stars, and also

protagonists of lifestyle and folkloristic reports. Like other celebrities, their private life is

continuously analyzed by gossip newspapers and entertainment programs […] This

phenomenon happens not because politicians’ private life is a public affair, but because citizen-

viewer is interested in it. In sum, politicians’ private life […] is just show and it attracts

audience” (Ciaglia and Mazzoni 2012: 442).

In Italy the “pop politics” phenomenon - as defined by Mazzoleni and Sfardini (2009) – is incredibly

widespread and politicians also use gossip newspapers to increase their popularity amongst segments of

population that could not be reached through formal political communication mediums. Moreover, Candida

Morvillo, editor of gossip newspaper Novella 2000, interviewed by Ciaglia and Mazzoni (2012) states that

some Italian politicians call paparazzi for arranging some shots.

The pop politics phenomenon is mainly represented in television programs: the “commercial deluge”

described by Hallin and Mancini (2004) has profoundly marked Italian television. At this regard, it is possible

to outline that some television contents have the function of activating a bottom-up process of communication

from citizens towards politics (Mazzoleni and Sfardini 2009), a role that Southern European elitarian press has

never played, and some of these programs, indeed, also played a watchdog and investigative journalism (ibid.).

It is significant to say, however, that part of personnel working at these programs had past experiences in

media, but are not inscribed in Journalists’ Order – and officially cannot be defined as “journalists”.

The investigative practice in Italian journalism is hugely debated: according to popular beliefs, this practice

has never been strongly used and nowadays it is getting more and more weak, but some journalists sustain that

it is still used but dramatically changed paths - looking more at judicial and “satirical” reporting - (Bellu 2005)

or it is just unable to impose its issues into the public sphere and political agenda (Anon. 2005). Both the

authors sustain that a greater collaboration between journalists is necessary:

“The journalists’ order should organize mandatory meeting between long career journalists and

training ones. […] The young journalist demanding is a recall to our responsibilities as

journalists and also, above all, as citizens” (Bellu 2005: 145).

In these terms, journalistic professionalization seems unable to achieve important improvements, although

a raising general sentiment of opposition to state interventions and political interferences. The establishment

of journals as il Fatto quotidiano and Pagina 99 represents the proof of this inclination, and also the Murdoch’s

all-news channel SkyTG24 is a – successful - attempt to bring “objective” approach in Italian journalistic field.

Nevertheless, those examples are not enough to outline a clear change in favour of professionalism.

Especially if we think about media ownership matter, explained in the previous chapter, and the still high level

of media instrumentalization. At this regard, Lizzi and Pritoni (2014) analysed four of the most important

Italian newspapers – Il Corriere della Sera, la Repubblica, La Stampa and Il Sole 24 Ore - and demonstrated

that Italian main papers give major prominence to labour unions and business groups at the expense of other

relevant social bodies like public interest groups (Figure 2).

In the light of all these characteristics and trends, it is useful to draw some conclusions.

Conclusion

Italian case shows a persistence of most of Pluralized Pluralist model’s characteristics, but even some trends

brought by the homogenization process.

Press - although the diffusion of commercial newspapers - still has low diffusion rates and the elitarian

press described by Hallin and Mancini is present. Nevertheless, the “commercial deluge” has deeply influenced

television, which aims at entertainment contents and favours the personification of political communication.

Ideological ties are getting weaker because of secularization process and party press is facing a deep crisis,

also because of the state subsidies’ cuts. Nevertheless, Italy society is characterized by a strong inclination to

polarization, as recent berlusconiani and antiberlusconiani and, even more recent, grillini and antigrillini

divisions demonstrate. Another element characterising polarized pluralism is the presence of anti-system

Figure 2: News coverage on Labour unions, Business gropus, Public interest groups, Groups of Institutions and Other sectional groups in the four most important newspapers. (Lizzi and Pritoni 2014: 302).

parties like, for example, Five Star Movement and Northern League, although several attempts to build a

bipolar political system and a moderate pluralism system.

Italian polarized pluralism is linked to external pluralism guaranteed by party press – especially in the past

– and also commercial newspapers that, in general, demonstrate to support some political interests. As result

of that, commentary-oriented journalism and high-pitched language are widely used, newspapers and

journalists participate actively into political scene and, consequently, political parallelism is very high, as

demonstrated throughout the previous chapters. Moreover, entrepreneurs’ interests influence media as well: as

we have seen, the high level of instrumentalization of media is demonstrated by big companies’ ownerships in

papers and televisions, which are intended as means to impact and construct bargaining process with politics.

In this context, journalism professionalism is evidently undeveloped: “half-in-cut journalist” lacks of

autonomy because of clientelism phenomenon and interferences by politics and private interests. The presence

of a strong Journalists’ Order and FNSI union is useful to cultivate a high quality of journalism, but the two

organizations are totally absent in the definition of common journalistic rules and standards.

Finally, Italian state - except for “savage deregulation” phenomenon occurred in broadcasting system -

plays a relevant role in media market: it owns RAI, provides subsidies and regulates political communication.

Nevertheless, as we have seen before, the increasing commercial logic and a recent opposition to clientelism

and lottizzazione call the state’s interventions into question.

In sum, all the characteristics outlined by Hallin and Mancini in 2004 are, to some extent, present nowadays.

However, it is important to notice that several changes are occurring but more time should go by - and further

analysis would be necessary – before understanding which ones are going to establish, how they will develop

and what effects they will bring into Italian politics, society and media system.

Finally, it is useful to mark a matter: this analysis should be integrated with further studies about new media.

Indeed, as several studies demonstrated, Innovation and Communication Technologies (ICTs) affected - and

are still affecting – the people’s habits in getting informed and, consequently, the media market as well. At the

same time, they have introduced innovative changes to political communication and political system in general.

Taking in consideration newest media it is not just useful to understand better recent developments, but

necessary because of the increasing importance they have in modern societies.

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