Germany’s New Africa Policy: Time for a Change?

L E I P Z I G E R U N I V E R S I T Ä T S V E R L A G 2 0 1 6

SourceS and MethodS for african hiStory and culture

eSSayS in honour of adaM JoneS

edited by Geert castryck, Silke Strickrodt

and Katja Werthmann

SONDERDRUCK

Bibliografische information der deutschen nationalbibliothekdie deutsche nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der deutschen nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische daten sind im internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.

das Werk einschließlich aller seiner teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen.

umschlagabbildungen:vorn: „The market of Moshi“ (Photographer unknown, Moshi, tanzania, ca. 1900–14), ev.-luth. Missionswerk leipzig, druckvorlagenmusterbuch, iXe 314hinten: feldskizze Georg Schweinfurth, Sammlung Perthes archiv Gotha: SPaarch 547_111781361

© leipziger universitätsverlag 2016Satz: Sabine ufer, leipzigGesamtherstellung: ufer Verlagsherstellung, leipzig

iSBn 978-3-86583-926-8

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Geert castryck, Silke Strickrodt, Katja WerthmannPrelude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

oral tradition and itS MethodoloGy

John thorntonBridging the Gap between oral and Written Sources: The Kingdom of Kongo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

robin lawa neglected Source for the traditional history of Ọyọ, L’ âme nègre by Jean hess (1898) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

claude-hélène PerrotSept questions pour un récit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

david henigeoral tradition and the Scientific Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Written and Material SourceS for the Pre-colonial hiStory of coaStal WeSt africa

Peter Mark‘first the documents, then the art.’ objects as historical Sources for the Pre-colonial history of the upper Guinea coast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Gérard l. chouina 1647 french travel account of West africa Published in La Gazette 101

natalie everts‘Because I am an Uitlander’. West india company Servant Willem huydecoper’s clash with his colleagues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

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MaPS and PhotoGraPhS aS hiStorical SourceS

Karsten Jahn und ute WardengaWie afrika auf die Karte kommt: das Beispiel Georg Schweinfurth . . . . . . . . 137

Michaela unterholznerdetaillierte Betrachtungen eines Massen mediums: Zur Verwendung historischer fotografien als Quellen zur Geschichte afrikas . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

umma aliyu MusaVisual images and fashion Memories: Muslim hausa Women in Photography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

african encounterS With chriStian MiSSionS

Karolin Wetjenabdrucken, Verändern, auslassen: das Stationstagebuch der Station Mamba im Missionsblatt der leipziger Missionsgesellschaft um 1900 . . . . . . 201

anne Beutter Was auf dem anderen Blatt steht: die chronik von nkoransa (1911–1920) als dokument lokaler Gemeinde-Praxis der Basler Mission und der Perspektive ihrer afrikanischen Mitarbeiter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

Paul JenkinsBamum 1906–1915: a royal architect, his Missionary Builder and a historical relationship in need of a Substantial Present-day re-assessment . . . . . . . . 239

Philipp Seitzdas herz aller dinge: die Missionierung afrikas als transkulturationsprozess – kulturphilosophisch betrachtet . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

lize Krielopen-access Memory? african interlocutors’ reflective nostalgia for a Precolonial Past as digitised in the hoffmann collection of cultural Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

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neW PerSPectiVeS on eaSt africa’S early colonial PaSt

felix Brahmarmed with an umbrella: alexander Mackay and the emerging criticism of the east african arms trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

hatice ugurit took longer to arrive than to Stay: an ottoman envoy’s Visit to Zanzibar in october 1888 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305

Geert castryck‘My Slave Sold all of Kigoma’. Power relations, Property rights and the historian’s Quest for understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

Manuela Bauchedoing research with colonial Sources: deconstructing categories in German east africa’s Medical reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337

interPretinG african ‘VoiceS’ in WeSt african PreSS, PetitionS and PerforManceS

odile GoergMarrying Well in freetown Society: a View from the Press, 1870s to the early 1900s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359

andreas eckertPetitions, Politics, and urban transformations: duala Petitions, 1860s to 1930s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377

Katja Werthmanndie tanzende Sonne: frauenlieder in Westafrika . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393

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reconStructinG careerS in tWentieth-century africa

Joël Glasmanrethinking colonial intermediaries: on the use of career records as a Source for african history – a Sample from togo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413

dmitri van den Bersselaarlooking Back on a career: unpacking african Middle-class life histories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431

Bernhard StreckBruno Gutmann (1876–1966) als ethnographischer expressionist . . . . . . . . 449

entanGleMentS of african hiStory and euroPe’S tWentieth century

holger StoeckerHuman Remains als historische Quellen zur namibisch-deutschen Geschichte: ergebnisse und erfahrungen aus einem interdisziplinären forschungsprojekt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469

Katja Geisenhainererika Sulzmann und die „Stammeskarte von afrika“: ein Beitrag zur ethnologie im nationalsozialismus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493

Jochen lingelbachPolish refugees in colonial eastern africa (1942–50): The use of european diaspora Sources for the Writing of african colonial history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 523

Sara Pugachafrican Students in cold War leipzig: using university archives to recover a forgotten history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541

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cultureS of MeMory and PoliticS of hiStory

tina Kramerdas rätsel um den Geburtsort Guinea-Bissaus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565

Peter lambertzGardening the Past: ancestors, Soil and territorial attouchment among Spiritualists in Kinshasa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 577

Beatrix heintzeKollektive identitäten: Zum Spannungs verhältnis zwischen kulturellem Gedächtnis und Geschichtsforschung. Mit Beispielen aus angola und israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595

Joram tarusarirarevisiting Zimbabwe’s celebratory Political history in Pursuit of healing and reconciliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 613

MeaSureS for african econoMieS

robert KappelGermany’s new africa Policy: time for a change? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 629

helmut aschedown to earth again: The Third Stage of african Growth Perceptions . . . . . . 651

ute rietdorfnot yet development: The use of GdP to construct african economies . . . . 671

finale

ulf engel und robert Kappelrückblick: „afrika 2000“ – die 17. Vad-Konferenz in leipzig . . . . . . . . . . 691

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Germany’s New Africa Policy: Time for a Change?

Robert Kappel

There has been much talk about the African miracle. Various newspapers, consultancy firms, and lobby groups have all reported that Africa is on the move, while others have claimed that Africa is on the rise; even the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has stated that ‘Africa is a continent of opportunities’ (BMZ 2014).

What does the rise of Africa mean for Germany’s Africa policy? How should Ger-many act? How should German policy deal with aid fatigue and the lack of success of development aid? How should Germany evaluate the rise of China and India in Africa, as well as that of other middle powers, like Turkey, Korea, and Brazil? How much is Germany in need of a new Africa policy?

The paper will attempt to appraise Germany’s changing Africa policy by examining, on the one hand, German ministries’ documents regarding German Africa policy and foreign policy and, on the other hand, the latest research documents that analyze and evaluate the political and economic changes going on in Africa, in African subregions, and in individual African countries. These findings will then be compared with actual decisions made by the German government and various ministries. The paper will also try to identify main approaches for a new German Africa policy.

The German debate on a new African policy is currently in a period of reorienta-tion. On the one hand, German business sees the African continent as growing indus-trially and as having vast potential. On the other hand, only a few German companies are presently investing in Africa due to the fragile and volatile situations in many of the countries there. German development aid is of major importance. Germany contributes USD 1.2 billion in development aid and employs about 2,000 experts in 32 sub-Saha-ran African countries (BMZ 2014), making it one of the leading economic partners of many African countries. In addition, the German government maintains economic and political ties with numerous nations and recently published its new Africa policy guide-lines – a document that is very much in line with traditional concepts of development cooperation (Federal Government 2014; AA 2011; BMZ 2014). Meanwhile, German troops are actively participating in UN missions, and many German universities and research institutes continue to cooperate with African institutions. In the following I am going to summarize the main arguments of the German government’s Africa policy

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Measures for African Economies

documents and attempt to show how they reflect Africa’s economic realities. This paper will continue as follows: Section 2 evaluates the ‘Africa on the rise’ hypothesis. Section 3 examines German interests in Africa and Germany’s Africa policy, analyzing some of the major documents – especially the new ‘Federal Government Policy Guidelines for Africa’ (‘Afrikapolitische Leitlinien der Bundesregierung’). Section 4 questions Germa-ny’s Africa policy, while section 5 looks at the degree to which Germany’s Africa policy is embedded in its new foreign policy agenda. Section 6 formulates some hypotheses to account for why Germany’s Africa policy lacks coherency and only partly reflects the entire range of Africa’s political and economic dynamics.

Africa May Be Rising, but Some African Countries Remain Hemmed In

Countless newspapers and journals have aggrandized the rise of Africa, reporting that the continent is currently experiencing a growth dynamic that gives reason to hope. Consultancy firms and rating agencies extol the huge potential of Africa and have styled the continent as the region of the future in terms of growth. There are nine basic arguments commonly employed to evince the rise of Africa. (Kappel 2014; Wohlmuth 2014) 1) The average rates of sub-Saharan gross domestic profit (GDP) growth have been high for the last 8 to 10 years and have even surpassed the average GDP growth rates of many Asian countries. 2) Export growth is sharply increasing, making sub-Sa-haran Africa the new ‘export world champion.’ 3) Per capita income has increased, and poverty has decreased – leading to the emergence of middle classes. 4) Africa has expe-rienced an Internet revolution. 5) Industrialization has begun, and production has be-come more strongly diversified. 6) Foreign direct investment (FDI) is increasing, which will lead to more technology transfer. 7) The agricultural sector has been reinvigorated. 8) The continent’s youth and natural resources represent its potential, which must only be realized. 9) Trust in institutions has grown.

Many sub-Saharan countries are in fact demonstrating positive growth rates and friendlier business climates after many decades of crises. The continent is gaining more at-tention from international investors. The efforts some countries have made in terms of eco-nomic policy (e. g., striving toward macroeconomic stability, creating incentive programs for investment, changing tax policies, limiting debt and displaying budget discipline) are showing improved results. It would, however, be unwise to be uncritically optimistic.

First and foremost, the following aspects must be taken into account in this review:1

1 The documents of the African Development Bank, the OECD, and the World Bank, as well as many research papers, demonstrate in detail how much many African countries are ‘hemmed in’. For the majority of countries it will take a long time to catch up. See AfDB 2014; OECD 2015; World Bank

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ROBERT KAPPEL | Germany’s New Africa Policy: Time for a Change?

African markets are very volatile. Fluctuations in demand and prices directly affect investment, foreign trade, domestic markets, and income levels. Because of this, it is essential to track long-term trends and to resist the urge to either proclaim that Africa is rising or to spin a tale about the big crisis around the corner with every slight change in the market. The decline of oil prices clearly shows how much African oil producers are affected by these fluctuations. The Nigerian example makes it clear how much eco-nomic development is driven by the oil and gas economy, where low oil prices lead to a sharp decline in fiscal revenues.

History. Each country in sub-Saharan Africa has its own unique history in which specific political and economic values and goals have evolved. Economic points of de-parture vary drastically from country to country – for example, between coastal and landlocked countries, or between countries rich in natural resources and those with hardly any. The key factor by which to rate a country’s performance is whether and when it introduced economic reforms. Countries that have implemented substantial reforms (e. g., Ghana, Ethiopia, and Tanzania) are not only distinct from one another, they are also clearly different from reform-resistant countries (e. g., Eritrea, Zimbabwe, and Congo). There are many states that have been stable over a long period of time (e. g., Tanzania and Ghana), and others that still remain fragile (e. g., South Sudan, So-malia, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Chad, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Liberia, and Sierra Leone). Some countries demonstrate high levels of urbani-zation (e. g., Nigeria and South Africa), with more than 60 percent of the population living in cities, whereas others consist of overwhelmingly rural populations (e. g., Kenya and Uganda). Thus data on African averages provide a skewed picture of the reality in individual states.

Low-income countries (LICs) and middle-income countries differ. Although African LICs had been able to register short-term growth in real GDP, this proved to be un-sustainable. These countries have been unable to catch up to date. The term ‘catching up’ is understood to mean that poor countries with low levels of labour productivity can increase these levels by importing capital from countries with higher capital per worker ratios and higher levels of labour productivity, which then enables them to achieve higher rates of GDP growth. Although being behind in terms of productivity levels en-tails a potential for rapid modernization (Abramovitz 1986), LICs have not been able to exploit such potential (Rodrik 2014). Many African countries are failed states, suf-fering from political unrest, environmental degradation, and high unemployment. In the majority of African countries there is no demographic transition and there has been no transformation to industrialized economies. In the crucial sectors of agriculture

2015; Asche 2012 and 2015; de Vries, Timmer, de Vries 2013; Kappel 2014; Pohl, Kappel 2012; Rod-rik 2014; Wohlmuth 2014, McMillan, Harttgen 2014; McMillan, Rodrik 2014.

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and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), there is no clearly recognizable do-mestic market. With the exception of exporting natural resources, sub-Saharan Africa plays virtually no role in the global economy. Huge differences exist not only between middle-income countries (e. g., South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, and the Seychelles) and LICs, but also among LICs. There are the poorest countries comprising Malawi, Burundi, The Gambia, Central African Republic, and Chad, as well as those post-con-flict countries such as Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Congo. Most LICs are landlocked countries, and many have very low population densities. The over-whelming majority of LICs have small markets. Out of 48 LICs, 29 have a population of under 10 million inhabitants. In terms of real GDP, the economic power of many LICs is less than one-third that of Cape Town. In general, African LICs have experienced sig-nificant changes that have often gone unnoticed: increases in life expectancy, decreases in child mortality, and increases in literacy, but inasmuch as this data may show a rise in the Human Development Index, there are still decisive aspects of the performance of LIC that need to be acknowledged.

Economic growth and development. The factors influencing economic growth and development have been well studied. Every country has its own unique situation where very different combinations of factors and economic policies led to varying growth results. The majority of LICs continue to perform poorly in terms of per capita GDP growth rates, investment rates, adaptability to foreign competition, human capital re-sources, infrastructure and telecommunications systems, transport costs, external fac-tors (contagion effects through neighbouring countries, terms-of-trade shocks), and openness. Africa is at the very top as far as political conflict indicators (e. g., number of military coups, external conflicts in the region, and political instability) are concerned.

GDP growth over the past decade. Economic growth varies from country to country. Compared to MIC Africa’s fragile states (approximately 25 percent of African coun-tries) and LIC have a growth rate of less than 4 percent. Based on the growth accelera-tion criteria laid out by Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005), fragile countries and LICs (50 % of all African countries) did not establish accelerated growth.

International competition. Often, data on the development of African states is pre-sented as if these states operate outside the boundaries of international competition. However, to capture the success and rise, or crisis and fall, of a given country, it is neces-sary to compare it with countries on other continents and with other individual African states over a long period of time. Comparative studies based on long-term observations illustrate that most African countries’ competitiveness lags behind the world average (de Vries, Timmer, and de Vries 2013; Kappel, Pfeiffer 2013).

Increase and Diversification of Export. Many sub-Saharan countries have realized high rates of export growth, sometimes even surpassing the worldwide average. A sig-nificant number have taken advantage of the price increases in natural resources and the rising demand for both natural resources and energy on the part of India and China.

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China’s increased demand for natural resources from Africa accounted for 4 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s total export growth; the corresponding figure for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states stands at 1 percent. The particular trade dynamics between sub-Saharan African countries and the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have led to the former remaining largely oriented to-ward the export of natural resources and agricultural products.

Per Capita Income, Poverty. Today, large sections of the continent’s population enjoy a slightly higher standard of living than they did 10 years ago. Due to the high rate of population growth, the increases in per capita income are significantly lower than GDP growth rates. The average gross national income in sub-Saharan Africa is USD 1,350 per year; however, there are huge differences between countries such as the Seychelles (USD 12,000), South Africa (USD 7,600) and Botswana (USD 7,500), Sierra Leone (USD 580), Burundi (USD 240), and many other countries where the gross national income is less than USD 500. The proportion of the poor relative to the total population has fallen from 56.5 percent (1990) to 48.5 percent (2010). Despite the fairly high rate of economic growth, the percentage of poor people who earn less than USD 1.25 per day has risen from 376 million (1999) to approximately 420 million (2010). Some 70 per-cent of the continent’s population is forced to survive on less than USD 2 a day. Today, every other African lives in extreme poverty. Optimists speculate that relative poverty will drop down to 30 percent by 2030. What is undisputed is that in the year 2030, most of the world’s poor will live in Africa. High population growth rates are undoing the progress in productivity and contributing to the perpetual poverty (AfDB 2014).

Industrialization. Numerous countries on the continent could solidify their posi-tions in the international natural resources markets if their proportion of trade in man-ufactured goods – a share that has actually decreased over the last 30 years, from 1.6 percent in 1980, to 0.8 percent in 2010 – was not so low. Most sub-Saharan countries have not been able to further industrialize, which is partly due to high trading and transaction costs as well as insufficient state incentive schemes. In fact, Africa is the continent with the lowest level of industrialization. Small clusters and zones of industry have certainly developed in the cities, but these are dominated by microbusinesses in the informal sector and SMEs. In those cases where growth can be seen, it is primar-ily in businesses that are integrated into the global supply chain. Despite the amount of growth that is needed for technology transfer being very small, most sub-Saharan countries are still far from being able to make structural changes. Agriculture, the in-formal sector, and natural resources continue to dominate the economies of Africa, es-sentially leading to growth without development or employment (Rodrik 2014). Only a few countries have been able to absorb labor. Mauritius, for instance, managed to grow its tertiary sector based on high productivity activities that were able to absorb signifi-cant amounts of labor. In Nigeria, structural change has played a positive but much less significant role in increasing economy-wide productivity (the changes in employment

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shares in Nigeria are tiny compared to those in Mauritius). The main driver of Nigeria’s structural change has been the movement of labor out of agriculture and into services and manufacturing. Still, due to the high degree of informality in all sectors of the econ-omy, the differences in productivity across these three sectors are not that large.2

Foreign Direct Investment. The increased levels of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa can probably be attributed to the heightened importance of the region in the global econ-omy, even though the proportion of global investment is still quite low (2 percent in the 1990s, and 3 percent over the past decade). FDI has been concentrated in specific, resource-rich countries and focused on resource extraction. The ‘trend’ regarding in-dustrial investment is at best rudimentary.

Agriculture. Agriculture has also played only a small role in the growth boom of the past decade. Since the mid-1990s, productivity has stagnated at a low level. As a con-sequence, the productivity gap between sub-Saharan Africa and other world regions is increasing.

Youth Prospects. Africa is often viewed as the ‘continent of the future’ because its mean population is quite young. The potential of the youth can only be realized, how-ever, if there are enough jobs for them. Approximately two-thirds of Africa’s total pop-ulation is under 24 years old; most of them are underemployed. African countries will need to generate about eight million jobs annually to accommodate the high rate of population growth. It is unlikely that sub-Saharan countries will be able to keep up, especially because of high population growth.

Improved Institutions. According to the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business (EDB) Index, the situation in some countries truly has improved due to institutional reforms and a decrease in political risks on previous years. Trust in institutions has also been strengthened in many countries. The region’s high growth rates over the last several years are a result, as well, of improved institutions and the enhancements made to mac-roeconomic policies since the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, numerous studies show that institutions in the majority of countries continue to display significant weaknesses (Rodrik 2014).

How well do sub-Saharan African economies perform? Will the growth of the last several years prove sustainable? The points below indicate that sub-Saharan Africa has some way to go in that regard.

In terms of the catching-up process, most African countries are starting out at a very low standard of living. Even given the increasing per capita incomes in Africa, sub-Saharan countries will only be able to close the income gap very gradually. In order to double the current average per capita income of USD 1,350 per year by 2025, an

2 See de Vries, Timmer, and de Vries 2013; McMillan and Rodrik 2014; Rodrik 2014; McMillan and Harttgen 2014; Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik 2005; and Bass 1997.

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annual growth rate of 6 percent is required – though much longer will be needed for the poorer sub-Saharan states. For example, although it would take an average sub-Sa-haran country about ten years to reach the Philippines’ relatively low annual per capita income of approximately USD 2,500, it would take Sierra Leone about 25 years to do so. Even the most successful sub-Saharan countries are actually much poorer than the poorest countries in other world regions. It should be fairly clear that the majority of these states will not be able to make this leap.

In most countries the growth process has been triggered by an increased demand for natural resources and agricultural products. The countries that possess such re-sources can profit from them as long as they engineer a structural change toward indus-trialization. Although they have access to the resources they need in order to diversify, only a certain few countries (e. g., Botswana) have actually used their resources toward that end; most states find themselves stuck in a ‘resource trap,’ whereby agriculture and industrial development are being neglected and production is thus not being diversi-fied. In many resource-rich African countries (such as Angola, Nigeria, and Cameroon) the overemphasis on natural-resource production is compounded by institutional weaknesses. The reality is that growth in resource-rich countries is in a permanent state of peril. In only a few countries do the paths to growth appear sustainable, while only a handful of nations have experienced a spillover effect. Even South Africa, which boasts the best current account in sub-Saharan Africa, has had tremendous problems generat-ing inclusive growth.

In the most crucial sectors (agriculture and SMEs) a clearly recognizable domes-tic market cannot yet be spoken of. SMEs have demonstrated very marginal growth, whereas almost no growth in productivity has been recorded in the agriculture sector. Increasing productivity represents an important requirement for readiness to compete on a global level and for sustainable growth.

With the exception of exporting natural resources, sub-Saharan Africa plays almost no role in the global economy. This marginalization limits opportunities for broad-er-based foreign trade. Stronger integration into global supply chains would heighten the demand for African labor and create new opportunities for local businesses. When and even if international investors will begin to turn to Africa in larger numbers in order to bypass wage increases in China, India, Brazil, or Vietnam cannot be predicted. One barrier to that might be high unit labor costs in Africa.

In most sub-Saharan African countries, the infrastructure is insufficient even though slight improvements have been made during the last several years (e. g., in in-ternet access). Poor physical infrastructure (streets, ports, railways, and electricity) has limited the development of domestic markets and of imports and exports and is thus a substantial obstacle to sustainable high rates of growth. The situation for landlocked countries is particularly precarious, where geographical isolation, institutional weak-nesses, and the high cost of trade have a compound effect.

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Institutional conditions have improved in many countries, and the political risks are often not as great as they were in previous years. Nevertheless, extreme political tensions still occasionally surface – as has occurred in South Sudan, South Africa, Mali, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia, Nigeria, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, and Kenya. Like the institutional conditions, the busi-ness climate in some sub-Saharan countries has also improved.

Although sub-Saharan Africa has made some progress in terms of productivity, this only holds true for a small number of countries; in fact, some have actually suffered a drop in productivity. In contrast to China and other emerging countries, sub-Saharan African states have not even been able to begin catching up. Efforts to bolster industri-alization and to improve the technological equipment and qualifications of the labor force and businesses alike have so far been grossly unsuccessful. Due to the low inflow of FDI in the processing and technology-intensive sectors, almost no technology trans-fer has taken place; this has contributed to an overwhelming number of African states lagging behind the emerging countries technologically.

In their study on the performance of African countries, Kappel and Pfeiffer (2013) sought to carry out a comprehensive assessment with as small a number of individual indicators as possible. To that end, six dimensions were selected for an indicator cata-log that covered fundamental aspects of the definition of ‘competitiveness,’ such as eco-nomic development, level of financial development, infrastructure, institutional frame-work, level of education, and market openness. For years, the Seychelles and Mauritius have been way ahead of most developing countries and, accordingly, have performed the best in the index. South Africa, Botswana, Cape Verde, and Namibia also rank high, while heavily populated Nigeria is somewhere in the middle. Landlocked, poor, and fragile states rank, on average, worse than coastal countries and those with natural re-sources, and thus find themselves at the bottom of the rankings. Most of these states are also characterized by civil war. Only countries with a high per capita income are capa-ble of seriously pursuing goals that would allow them to catch up to other countries – something most sub-Saharan states do not possess.

A comparison of 106 developing nations demonstrates that the majority of African countries fall somewhere between rank 70 and 106, meaning that the majority of Afri-can countries are not currently experiencing a ‘rise’ but have instead remained below the level of most other developing countries. Other ranking systems have reported sim-ilar results.

To conclude: if the global economy continues to develop, then growth rates may re-main stable at the high level of previous years. If the race for natural resources continues its trend, then the export revenue of sub-Saharan resource-exporting countries will rise. If the aforementioned trends continue, then states could gain the additional resources needed to promote structural changes. Africa is tasked with industrializing, which re-quires that direct investment flows with increasing intensity into industry. Only in this

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way can sustainable growth characterized by the parallel and combined development of agriculture, agro-industry, light industry, industrial zones, and SMEs occur. Only then will the requisite number of jobs be created for the large number of young people on the continent, which will ultimately lead to a reduction in poverty. Important to this are the further opening of markets, the safeguarding of property rights, the improvement of infrastructure, the reduction of trading costs, and greater administrative efficiency. The basic requirements, however, are macroeconomic and political stability – criteria that have not been met in over a quarter of all African countries. One determining factor is the readiness of governments and economic elites to modernize economies, to pro-mote much overdue structural changes, and to foster trust – all of which would provide greater incentive for local and foreign businesses to invest in Africa.

German Interest in Africa

Germany has been a major international player in Africa ever since its readmission into international politics after 1955. Throughout the 1990s, Germany was the second or third most important bilateral donor in sub-Saharan Africa. On average, Germany has been the second-most important trading partner in the region and one of the five most important sources of FDI in Africa. At the end of the Cold War, Germany maintained a dense diplo-matic network in sub-Saharan Africa, with 40 fully fledged diplomatic missions.

Germany’s Africa policy up to the 1990s has been described as reactive in nature and as lacking political vision. Save for some rare instances, it was the domain of bu-reaucrats. It has also been described as ‘apolitical,’ which was attributed to a lack of ‘hard’ interests in Africa (Engel and Kappel 2005).

The documents listed below were published by different ministries and formulate different approaches toward African countries and African institutions.3 In fact, five major Africa policy documents have been published since 2011: one by the Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt 2011), one by the federal government (2014), two by

3 Since the 1990s more than 20 documents have been published by various ministries, including the BMZ (see Molt 2014 and Engel et al. 2002). The older documents (a) are very much oriented toward development cooperation; (b) emphasize the need for aid that will contribute to poverty reduction and stimulate growth of small and medium enterprises and farmers; (c) support improving govern-ance; and (d) set in place projects and programs that enable local development (BMZ 2014; for a crit-ical evaluation, see Molt 2014). German interests were not identified (for a very competent identifica-tion of German interest, see Mair 1996 and Mair and Tull 2009). The recent documents emphasized German interests and clearly expressed the perspective that the charity character of development aid is inadequate and problematic (for a detailed critique and broader presentation of Germany’s inter-ests in Africa, see Engel and Kappel 2002); instead, they stress that the focus should be on security, peace, stability, migration, the climate, research, and sustainability.

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the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (BMZ 2014, 2015), and one by the Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF 2014). We will deal with the federal government’s 2014 document, which is in fact based on the documents written by the BMZ (2015, 2014, 2013).

The German government has formulated five main interests:4

– Economic interests: African markets are developing dynamically and – beyond the extractive industries – will be of growing interest to German business due to rising purchasing power, the demand for quality German products, and technical expertise.

– Strategic interests: According to these guidelines, Germany has ‘a strategic in-terest in further developing Europe’s credibility and influence on that conti-nent.’

– Security interests: According to the documents, ‘Internal and security policy cooperation with Africa is in our own national interest. In an interconnected and globalised world, in a Europe without borders, security in Germany can only be guaranteed if we help develop rule of law structures and functioning security entities in other regions.’

– Value Interests: Emphasis is placed on democracy, human rights, and freedom. – Responsibility: Germany has to assume responsibilities in order to reduce dan-

gers like state decay, displacement, and migration. The fragility of African states remains an issue that has a considerable impact on Europe. The states in Africa most affected by these dangers are those marked by weak institutions and state structures. Basic risk factors are the lack of good governance as well as conflicts over resources and the distribution thereof among groups living under differ-ent social conditions. In many states there are major and often uncontrolled stockpiles of small arms. Fragile state structures provide ideal conditions for organized crime and both national and international terrorism, whose impact is not limited to Africa. This is a topic of extreme relevance for Europe and the rest of the world.

The Federal Governments Africa policy guidelines (2014) formulate Germany’s 16 pri-ority areas in Africa.

4 See Federal Government 2014 and BMZ 2014.

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Table 1: Germany’s priority areas in Africa

Strengthening regional integration

Aim: to promote political and economic cooperation, defuse tensions, integrate fragile states into communities founded on shared responsibility, create larger markets with freedom of movement for labour and capital, remove trade barriers and thus make states more attractive for domestic and for-eign investors. … to consolidate institutions, which monitor compliance in Africa with good governance and human rights standards, incl. AU (African Union), ECOWAS (Eco-nomic Community of West African States), and EAC (East African Community), SADC (Southern African Develop-ment Community), IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Horn of Africa) and ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States), ICGLR (Interna-tional Conference on the Great Lakes Region).

Promoting peace and security, sup-porting the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

Germany wants to help enable African partners to imple-ment their own responses to crises.

Reducing fragility, defusing conflicts and violence, preventing human rights violations

… to prevent crises in good time, try to avert states from failing and to ensure that there is no negative impact on neighbouring regions or on Europe. … develop cooperation with fragile states and … address young people’s prospects for the future (income, employment, education). … bring about security sector reform and the development of the rule of law. In post-conflict countries: … increase our engagement for the reintegration of refugees and the internally displaced as well as for economic reconstruction with the active par-ticipation of women.

Combating poverty and hunger, securing food, promoting agriculture and rural development as well as sustaina-ble urbanization

Agriculture is key to the development of African economies. Special attention: … small farmers and family businesses, …secure access to land and water, adequate access to pro-duction means and, in particular, credit, access to markets, advice and, above all, to adapted innovations and technol-ogy. … The development of value chains as well as support for cooperation among companies are especially important.

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Promoting the rule of law and good governance, combat-ing corruption

Aim: consolidate the basic conditions for the creation of effec-tive state structures, an open society and further economic de-velopment. …better conditions for civil society players … im-prove the still inadequate human rights situation.

Realising people’s rights and their social protection, fostering a sustain-able employment policy

To implement and apply the Global Jobs Pact of the Interna-tional Labour Organisation (ILO) and the ILO’s core labour standards as well as to develop basic social protection sys-tems (the United Nations Social Protection Floor Initiative).

Reducing the causes of flight, better protecting refugees, shaping migra-tion policy geared towards prevention and development and preventing abuse.

Aim:.. to tackle the causes of involuntary and irregular migration[…] to help improve security and the provision of basic supplies for people in their countries of origin and to create life chances through employment and sources of income for people locally. …Migration issues should be anchored more firmly and concretely in development policy cooperation with African states.

Championing responsible use of raw materials as a means of promoting stability and eco-nomic development, preserving living environments

Commitment to the preservation of biodiversity as well as to the protection of natural resources and their sustainable management.

Supporting economic growth, trade and investment.

Aim: to raise employment levels and generate sustainable economic growth by creating added-value in African coun-tries. … Particular emphasis: …promoting start-up busi-nesses, SMEs with innovative potential, funding options for microenterprises and targeted support for women.

Tapping into the potential of African markets for German business

Aim: to improve the overall regulatory framework and in-vestment climate in African partner countries … benefits the local population and boosts investment possibilities, incl. for German companies, in particular SMEs. …more efficient use of our instruments to promote foreign trade and investment.

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Facilitating educa-tion on all levels, intensifying cooper-ation in academia and research.

Education is the key […] Education for all – not only for elites – counters problems which hamper development, such as corruption and the unequal distribution of wealth. Aim: universal access to education. … improving basic education as well as developing and expanding vocational education and qualification frameworks geared to the labour market, including vocational training in the field of agriculture.

Working together to curb climate change and to facilitate the adaptation to climate change

intensify our cooperation in the fields of climate protection, assistance in developing climate-compatible energy systems and adapting to the consequences of climate change.

Enhancing cultural cooperation

Objective: raise people’s awareness of their own cultural roots and … to strengthen resistance to extremist ideologies. Preserving cultural and natural heritage as well as intereth-nic and interfaith dialogue.

Involving important African stakeholders frequently and in a visible manner

Goal: to help improve understanding about important Afri-can and global issues, including handling crisis prevention and response. Through existing formats (e. g. German-South African and German-Nigerian Binational Commissions, intergovernmental negotiations on development cooper-ation) … to conduct more in-depth and frequent political discussions with these and other partners.

Stronger collabora-tion with strategic partners on Africa

Aim: to convince partners to engage constructively in rein-forcing stability and integration. Therefore we want Africa to receive more attention in our and the EU’s dialogue with China, India, Brazil, Turkey, the United States […] New formats of dialogue should be further developed, such as Germany-East Africa-China-India within the framework of dialogue on the Indian Ocean.

Source: Federal Government 2014

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Querying German Africa Policy

Although the documents raise very important questions, they fail to carefully consider important aspects and lack focus both topic-wise and country-wise.5 Below are a num-ber of issues that should be taken into account:

(a) Which economic policy do China, India and emerging middle powers follow, and what is their interest in the area? In the case of China, for instance we can see the interest in raw materials, infrastructure, and African markets, and also China’s nonintervention in internal affairs (excluding South Sudan). A very im-portant question is how rising imports from China change the economic struc-ture and consumer behaviour. Imports from China (mainly consumer goods, but also cheap capital goods) have made it possible for the continent to catch up technologically. These imports have led to diversification of production and made local development easier (e. g., the import of cheap solar panels for local electricity production). China’s engagement has fostered modernization in Africa, Chinese economic engagement has transformed African economies, and Chinese entrepreneurs are actors of transformation.6 How does Chinese raw material exploitation hinder structural transformation? How much does Chinese foreign direct investment foster industrialization, modernization, and inclusive growth in the region? What does this all mean for a German/Euro-pean agenda? Is there a need for a new model of cooperation between African countries and Germany, focusing on diversification and an increase in produc-tivity? What are the appropriate instruments? (Promotion of economic devel-opment? SME support? Facilitation of integration in global or regional value chains? Technological and economic partnership agreements? Intensification of student exchange or even military cooperation?)

(b) What does it mean for German-African cooperation that African economies have different speeds? Some lack economic growth and are witnessing rising poverty, whereas others have had very high rates of growth rates over the last decade. Fragile states in particular are suffering. Some countries are middle-in-come countries, though most are not. Some countries have modernized their agriculture sector or undergone a fairly successful economic transformation, though most have not. African structural transformation differs from the Chi-

5 Compare the many critical evaluations of Germany’s Africa and development policy since the 1990s: Engel and Kappel 2005; Molt 2014; Köhler 2002; DIE 2001; Engel et al. 2002; Kappel 2014; Leininger 2014; Bley and Tetzlaff 1978; Mair and Tull 2009; Oehm 2014; Vorrath and Hellwig-Bötte 2014; and Asche 2015.

6 For very enlightened papers on this issue, see Marfaing 2015; Marfaing and Thiel 2013; and Giese 2013.

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nese model. The African model is characterized by push-and-pull factors that lead rural populations to leave the countryside and migrate to urban centers, either in Africa, or further off. It reflects the process of moving from the agri-cultural sector (unlimited rural supply of labor) to the urban informal sector (unlimited urban supply of labor) (Rodrik 2014). Structural transformation from low-level productivity to urban high productivity sectors is hemmed in.

(c) African countries do perform very differently. What does this mean for a co-herent Africa policy? Should Germany focus its cooperation efforts toward better-performing countries like Cape Verde, Mauritius, Botswana, and South Africa? Or should it target those countries that face huge social problems?

(d) To what extent does Germany want to be engaged in wars, peace missions, and the war on terror? Terrorist groups like Boko Haram, Al Shabab, etc. are destabilizing parts of the continent. Many African countries are very fragile or have failed, leaving room for dictators to step up. Today there are at least 15 long-serving dictators and several aspiring dictators in Africa (e. g., in Angola, Togo, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Eritrea, Leso-tho, inter alia). Does Germany have a role to play in combating authoritarian-ism? If so, what is it? Should it spend more money on education, employment, better institutions, or military engagement? Recent debates in Germany make it clear that Germany is willing to be engaged more actively and that it wants to increase its involvement in Africa, possibly also militarily. There are various mo-tives for this, but so far there is no concrete strategy. The deployment of German troops abroad remains a controversial national issue. Germany’s European allies have also repeatedly criticized it in the past. Under the former German foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, German foreign policy was characterized by strict military restraint: it supported its allies, but stopped short of intervening mili-tarily. Germany’s abstention from the UN Security Council vote on intervention in Libya particularly annoyed its Western allies. During the last five years Ger-man soldiers have been deployed in and around Africa supporting the European Union anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa, contributing military observ-ers and liaison officers in Sudan, Congo, and the Western Sahara, and helping to train Malian security forces.

Africa Policy Embedded in Foreign Policy

Let me say a few words about German foreign policy in general, because Africa policy is embedded in foreign policy. The power of nations no longer depends solely on their economic and military strength, but rather on their ability and will to exercise their influence. Germany has proven its skill as a civil, economic, and networking power;

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this should also remain the basis of German foreign policy. In the future, however, Ger-many’s foreign policy should entail far more content, and a reliable agenda. Germany’s government should live up to its role as a peaceful international broker, ideally together with critical civil society organizations, cultural institutions, the academic world, and the private business sector.

What does this mean?Militarily, Germany should take part in operations only in exceptional cases and

only within the framework of UN mandates and NATO. Germany should contribute far more to building up regional security structures than it has so far. Taking on responsi-bility means (a) strengthening regional and UN security structures and (b) entrenching the concept of civil power. German foreign policy must often respond to calls from the UN or NATO to take part in military operations or emergency relief operations. In order to get itself out of this reactive mode, German foreign policy needs to develop a culture of crisis anticipation and crisis de-escalation measures, and it needs a fixed radius of action.

In addition to its cooperation with the BRICS group, Germany should also strengthen its ties with medium-sized powers, including African countries – that is, with those countries that are growing economically and developing technologically. The ‘middle level’ of the international community will become a more significant part-ner for Germany than it has been to date. Cooperation with medium-sized powers is not a matter of a third way, a new constellation between the West and the East, between market-economies and moderated capitalist countries. On the contrary, Germany must regard the European Union and the OECD as the basis for its actions. Germany should overcome its wait-and-see attitude and look to form partnerships and shape global pol-icy with medium-sized powers.

Germany does not currently maintain any learning communities with medi-um-sized powers in Africa; it should, however, seek to establish them. A number of democratic partner countries could be identified. Strategies to resolve global issues could be sought together. It is vital here that Germany behaves pro-actively.

German Africa Policy: 10 Hypotheses

Based on an evaluation of cooperation experiences of the last decade, and new eco-nomic and political challenges, I have formulated ten hypotheses. They underline the fact that Germany’s Africa policy is ripe for a change and a repositioning:1. Germany should no longer focus on development cooperation. It no longer ade-

quately addresses the trends, speeds, and dynamics in Africa. Africa should not be reduced to a site for charity activities: it is a strategically important continent. A new German policy on Africa should create reasonable consistency between

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new programs and key content in German policy per se, as well as with normative agreements with European or multilateral institutions. Such a policy should offer a practicable coherence between the traditional spheres of development, foreign and security policy, economic and trade policy, and domestic (migration) and environ-mental policy. Consistency between national goals and international agreements will reinforce the reliability of German policy.

2. For different countries, different approaches and measures must be identified. Spe-cial emphasis should be given to democratic middle powers. Democratic middle powers are middle-income countries with growing middle classes and rising mar-ket sizes. They radiate in their respective regions (economic activities, governance), are attractive to neighboring countries and citizens, can export a successful model, and support growth and export growth. Cooperating with these countries will also help to transfer peace and stability. Middle powers with a democratic record are South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and Tanzania. Authoritarian middle powers like Ethiopia, Cameroon, and Angola should not be Germany’s main partners in Africa.

3. Fragile states, very small states, and LICs are in need of a separate agenda that would entail the strengthening of institutions, reducing fragility, support for SMEs, and an employment agenda. In this regard, development cooperation plays a signif-icant role. This is also reflected in Germany’s policy agenda (BMZ 2014 and 2015; Federal Government 2014).

4. The huge differences between Europe and Africa with regard to income, educa-tion standards, job perspectives, health care, and future options – especially for the youth – will exist for a very long time; they will continue to push Africans to mi-grate. For African countries, creating stable states and improving job prospects, for example, are of course key tasks. It will not, however, reduce migration. On the contrary, more Africans will look to leave their countries in order raise their in-come and enhance their prospects. This should be reflected in a German coopera-tion agenda. What is needed is a long-term strategy that is in line with those studies that focus on structural change, fostering industrialization, and higher productivity in agriculture. Rural–urban migration without employment prospects will create unrest and social and political instability. The rise of the informal sector in urban areas is not the solution for African urban poverty. Petty trade and services are a result of change without modernization and industrialization. Most informal sector enterprises do not grow. Supporting the integration of African SMEs into global and regional value chains is one of the activities that might help African enterprises to grow and offer more employment opportunities.

5. While the demographic dividend can be seen to be potentially large, it can only be achieved if the burgeoning working-age population is gainfully employed and if the predicted boost in savings (and thus investment) is realized. However, meeting

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these two conditions is not a trivial matter and will require sound policies that sup-port human capital accumulation and maintain stable and enabling political and economic environments. Given sub-Saharan Africa’s relatively high unemployment rates, there is substantial scope for further growth by engaging the unemployed and underemployed.

6. Germany has economic interests and should therefore concentrate its agenda on the most important democratic middle powers – let us say South Africa, Nigeria, and some states in East Africa. In order to deepen cooperation with these states, it should look to establish strategic partnership agreements on industrialization, raw materials, trade, technology, student exchange, and sustainability.

7. There is a dire need for security cooperation. Germany has no security interests of its own in Africa, but it has an interest in peace and stability. This means no adhoc-ism regarding military intervention, but instead, long-term support for an African security agenda developed by the African countries themselves (AA 2011).

8. The Federal Foreign Office is the main actor in Germany’s Africa cooperation and is tasked with leading and developing a more coherent agenda. Increased coherence between departments and institutions will improve both the efficiency of resource use and the credibility of Germany’s Africa policy, which has tended to feature too many voices and to sometimes go so far as to function as an ancillary foreign policy.

9. African countries are in need of new cooperation formats (e. g., on technology, edu-cation, research cooperation, security, culture, energy, employment, and industrial development). Germany’s actors – namely, the state, NGOs, business, and cultural institutions, inter alia – should engage at different levels with African partners.

10. Germany’s Africa policy should not get caught in a geostrategic trap – that is, a new scramble for Africa with China, India, the United States, and the European Union. This should be avoided by adequate means (Kappel 2014b), such as strengthening African institutions, participation, and democracy, and supporting all activities that avoid war and state decay. If German policy on Africa intends to create a successful symbiosis to the advantage of both sides, then universal values such as freedom, solidarity, justice, human rights, the rule of law, and democracy should converge with the mutual and reciprocal interests of Germany and its African partner coun-tries. Only a genuine declaration of motives and political and economic interests will foster trust and create a resilient basis on which international cooperation can be developed between Germany and its potential African partners.

A partnership with Africa that is characterized by symmetry and equality, rather than the conventional donor–recipient logic, requires that African states and players take ex-plicit responsibility for their political actions.

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Germany’s New Africa Policy: Time for a Change?