Improving Resilience of Critical Human Systems in CBRN-Emergencies: Challenges for First Responders

■ Research Paper

Improving Resilience of Critical HumanSystems in CBRN Emergencies:Challenges for First RespondersGerhard Chroust1*, Karin Rainer2, Nadine Sturm3, Markus Roth4

and Peter Ziehesberger51 Johannes Kepler University Linz, 4040 Linz, Austria2Research Institute of the Red Cross Austria, 1030 Wien, Austria3Research Institute of the Red Cross Austria, 1030 Wien, Austria4Creative Bits, 4050 Traun, Austria5Ziehesberger Elektronik, 4501 Neuhofen/Krems, Austria

Today’s catastrophes (many of them man-made or at least triggered by human activities)frequently endanger a growing number of humans and larger areas in numerous differentways, calling for more attention concerning dependability and resilience of our environ-ment. Experience tells us that no matter what precautions and quality approaches we take,we will always encounter systems that initially were dependable and ‘suddenly’ becomeuntrustworthy because of some unexpected, unknown cause. A system that in itself is un-able to re-establish its dependability, that is, is not resilient (any more), needs an externalintervention: For human beings, a physician acts as an intervening system for re-establishingdependability. A complex system can be made resilient by the addition of an InterventionSystem that intervenes in the case of loss of dependability. In this paper, we investigate therole of First Responders (i.e. fire brigade, ambulance services and police forces) as interven-ing systems in the case of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear) incidents,aimed at providing resilience. Taking a process view of these interventions, we analyse keyprocesses especially with respect to supporting them by Information and CommunicationTechnologies (ICT).We identify properties of CBRN incidents and their implications for the ac-tivities of First Responders both in training and real assignments. The paper is based on thefollowing study: Chroust et al. “Improving resilience of critical human systems in CBRN-emergencies: challenges for first responders”. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Keywords intervention system; SIMRAD; process modelling; simulation; dependability

MOTIVATION

Natural and man-made catastrophes have alwaysthreatened people. In the last decades, awareness,

*Correspondence to: Gerhard Chroust, Johannes Kepler UniversityLinz, 4040 Linz, Austria.E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Systems Research and Behavioral ScienceSyst. Res. 28, 476–490 (2011)Published online 25 October 2011 in Wiley Online Library(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/sres.1113

concern and the occurrence of actual catastrophes(many of them man-made or at least triggered byhuman activities) have grown.There are numerous reasons as a cause: Land has

become more densely populated; as a consequence,people also live in areas in which centuries ago no-body would have considered/dared to live. Today’scatastrophes frequently endanger a growing numberof humans and larger areas in diverse ways. Humaninterference with nature weakens and/or eliminatesnature’s safety provisions and natural buffermechanisms (e.g. land for inundation and protectiveforests). Failures of technical artefacts cause severecatastrophes (Chernobyl in 1986, an exploding oilrig in the Mexican gulf in 2010, failing atomic reac-tors in 2011 in Japan, . . .). Many of our technical‘achievements’ often provide higher efficiency atthe cost of reduced robustness (e.g. computer chipsaffected by solar eruptions . . .). Global interconnec-tion and dependencies increase the impact of origin-ally local disturbances (volcanic ash disrupting airtraffic in 2010). The advances of ICT (Informationand Communication Technologies) have created alarge number of complex critical embedded systems.The need for dependability of such systems increasesrapidly in our days.The media magnify the catastrophes to a certain

extent by reporting with sensational information(‘bad news are good news’). The immediate avail-ability of information across space and time andwith considerable visual detail increases awarenessand often causes undue reactions of humans.Computer support on the one hand enhances the

dependability of critical systems supporting andaugmenting human capabilities and by eliminatinghuman shortcomings but on the other hand threat-ens dependability by eliminating human commonsense factors in case of crisis.

DEPENDABILITY, RESILIENCE ANDSYSTEMIC INTERVENTIONS

Dependability

In general, we want to be able to ‘rely on’ the sys-tems in our environment to function in predictableand acceptable manners. We notice that Mother

Nature is usually very good at maintaining long-term dependability of ecosystems.

Dependability is a complex property. As a com-pound term ‘dependability’ it is defined (Chroustand Schoitsch, 2008) to comprise availability, reli-ability, safety, security (confidentiality, integrityand authenticity), survivability, andmaintainability(Figure 1). The exact semantics of some of theseterms is still under discussion (Laprie et al., 1992;Schoitsch, 2008, 2009).

Many of the problems with dependability resultfrom the complexity of the involved systems, alsocharacterized as wicked systems (Kopetz, 1997) orcritical systems (Cooper, 2003; Jackson, 2003). Experi-ence tells us that no matter what precautions andquality approaches we select, we will always en-counter systems that initially and hitherto were de-pendable and ‘suddenly’ become untrustworthybecause of some unexpected, unknown cause.

One reason often is emergence (Brunner, 2002;Emmeche et al., 1997). Emergence is an elusive no-tion. It denotes properties that are not present inany of the system’s subsystems and only appearbecause of some specific structural properties of asystem (Baas and Emmeche, 1997; Pessa, 1998).We define (Chroust, 2002, 2004) it as follows: Anemergent property of a system is a property which isnot determined solely by the properties of the system’scomponents, but which is additionally determined bythe system’s structure (i.e. by the way, the parts areconnected to form the system). In other words, someexternal or internal disturbance causes a (sup-posedly) dependable system to go into an errorstate in which it does not fulfil the expecteddependability criteria.

Resilient Systems—a Systemic View

In the encyclopedia of Francois (2004, p. 504) wefind the following definition of resilience: ‘The ca-pacity of an adapting and/or evolving system tobounce back to dynamic stability after a distur-bance. In a more general meaning, resilienceincludes the system’s ability to create new condi-tions of fitness for itself whenever necessary’.And further on, he cites Holling (1986): ‘The sizeof the stability domain of residence, the strengthof repulsive forces at the boundary, and the

Syst. Res. RESEARCH PAPER

Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Syst. Res. 28, 476–490 (2011)DOI: 10.1002/sres

Improving Resilience—Challenges for First Responders 477

resistance of the domain to contractions are all dis-tinct measures of resilience. . . .[A system has] theability. . . to absorb changes of state variables, driv-ing variables, and parameters, and still persist’.

A resilient system is expected to be able to survivean external disturbance and remain in a dependablecondition. The concept of resilience is related to theconcept of autopoiesis (Maturana, 1981; Maturanaand Varela, 1980) and usually involves strong cyber-netic properties (feedback loops!).

Establishing Resilience via anIntervention System

If a system on its own is unable to re-establish its de-pendability (i.e. that the external or internal distur-bances go beyond its stability boundary), anexternal intervention is necessary. Typically, a humanbeing falling ill goes to aphysician inorder tobegivensomemedicine and/or treatment. Thus, thephysicianacts as an external system for re-establishingdependability. A system can be made resilient bycombining it with a Compensation System, whichintervenes in the case of loss of dependability of theoriginal (sub)system and ensures that the systemremains dependable (Figure 2). If the systemboundary is extended to include the CompensationSystem, the system can handle the dependencyproblem internally and present itself as depend-able to the outside world. In systemic terms, theCompensating System provides the necessaryrequisite variety (Ashby, 1956) for the total systemto remain dependable.

A closer investigation of actual emergencysituations in our civilization shows that it is ofadvantage to split the Compensation Systems intotwo systems (Figure 2): the Intervention Systemfor quick first responses (e.g. ‘First Responders’)and the Restoration System for long-term resto-ration of the original system.

The tasks for these two types of systemsdiffer con-siderably. They have different aims, purposes and, asa consequence, time and efficiency requirements. Insystemic terms, in order to (re)establish short-termdependability, we introduce the Intervention Systemresponsible for immediate, quick response (Chroustet al., 2009a). In addition, we foresee a RestorationSystem, which is charged with transforming thesystem into a more acceptable state, which promiseslong-term dependability. The Restoration Systemdoes not have the burden of providing a speedyreaction. Here, efficacy, efficiency and long-termconsiderations take priority, and the members ofthese systems will be specialists, whereas theactors in the Intervention System will usually begeneralists. Similarly, in Austria, a difference is madebetween emergency surgeries and planned, foreseenoperations.

As a consequence, systemically seen, the totalsystem is dependable before and after an incident(if the Intervention System is successful) with acertain transition period in which dependabilityis not guaranteed.

Very early in human history, it was recognizedthat specialized organizations were needed asIntervention System. As early as 23 BC the Roman

Figure 1 Dependability

RESEARCH PAPER Syst. Res.


478 Gerhard Chroust et al.

Emperor Augustus established an organizationof full-time, professional firefighters (vigiles).

CBRN INCIDENTS

Characteristics of CBRN Incidents

CBRN incidents, i.e. incidents with chemical,biological, radioactive or nuclear causes oftenhave considerably differing features as comparedwith other incidents (Chroust et al., 2008). As aconsequence, the Intervention Systemsmight needa completely different approach from classic inter-ventions and incidents.Some of the properties that have to be considered

are as follows (Chroust et al., 2008):

• The immediately apparent symptoms willoften not be indicative; some of the symptomswill emerge seemingly spontaneously withoutany forewarning.

• The dangerousmaterial is inmost cases a pollutant(Wikipedia-English, 2009, keyword=hazardousmaterials). It is usually kept in a container andmore or less secured against spilling, evasion orharming the outside world.

• Involved materials are often highly toxic. Theyoften gravely endanger the rescuers, especiallytheFirst Responders who might be ignorant

of the true cause and type of emergency(Figure 3).

• Some substances are prone to be distributed bymeteorological/geologic events or agents (e.g.wind, water and weather).

• Sometimes, emergencies are the result of a care-less, negligent or overconfident action (e.g.Chernobyl, 1986).

• They could also be the result of malicious (e.g.terrorist) action in which the source of the inci-dent is hidden, camouflaged and the like.

• Many incidents arise from semi-automatic ortotally automatic plants (e.g. a chemical plant),in which case, human minds do not interfereearly enough or where the speed of the devel-opment overwhelms humans.

• The critical incident could cause contamin-ation of other persons and objects who/whichthemselves could become carriers of the samedanger (Figure 3).

• Some of these emergencies endanger largeareas and large populations with the dangerof long-lasting consequences.

Many situations leading to an emergency can bedescribed as follows (Schoitsch, 1988) (Figure 4):

TriggerSome internal or external event (human, nature,chance . . .) causes a fault with respect to the pol-lutant’s container.

Dependable: fully

Failing system

Dependable: fully.Dependable: fully

Dependable:NO!

Dependable:partially!

Intervention system Restoration system

Compensation system

Figure 2 Creating a resilient system by a Intervention and a Restoration System




FaultThe fault is the actual cause for the container to gointo an error state. The fault could be a latent fault(very often due to software) or a newly emergingfault (e.g. the container is damaged by an earth-quake, becomes overheated . . .)

Error stateThe error (state) is the state of the container thatwill cause a failure. In this case, there is nearly al-ways a pollutant (be it radiation, a bacterium orvirus, or an aggressive toxic chemical substance)emanating into the environment. It causes risk/danger/damage to persons (‘victims’, FirstResponders) and/or objects.

FailureA failure occurs when the container deviates fromits specification or expected behavior. The fault hasobviously triggered a change in the state of thecontainer (i.e. has transferred it to the error state,has caused a chemical reaction, has raised radi-ation beyond an acceptable level, etc.)Note that the failure must cause an external

effect, for example, disperse radioactive water tothe environment and/or leak chemicals into the

Figure 3 Testing contamination

Figure 4 First Responders




environment.Wedo not speak of a failure if no exter-nally noticeable change happens.From a systems point of view, the identification of

a failure is dependent on the boundary definition of thecontainer.

Time Evolution of CBRN Incidents(Catastrophe Archetypes)

A very important aspect of catastrophes is theirprogression and evolution over time (Figure 5).The time dimension plays a key role in analysing,evaluating and responding to incidents. Mrotzek(2009) and Mrotzek and Ossimitz (2008) define acatastrophe as any event and development duringwhich the system radically leaves the domain ofexpected behavior, that is, the domain of its de-pendability (grey zones in Figure 5), be it tempor-arily or permanently. He speaks of archetypes ofcatastrophes.Figure 5 shows several typical progressions of

catastrophes:

CurveAdisplays a reversible catastrophe that canhappenperiodically, for example, a tree that shedsits leaves in the autumn every year is temporarilyincapacitated. In Curve B, a parameter suddenlydramatically exceeds the normal values (the

catastrophe) and takes a long time to return tonormal, for example, like in the explosion of anatomic reactor (e.g. Chernobyl). Curve C repre-sents the gradual growth of a certain ‘indicatorparameter’, indicating a pending catastrophe,as in the case of the global warming. CurveD shows a gradual and irreversible catastro-phe, as was the case for the age-long deforest-ation of the Easter Islands by the Polynesians(Diamond, 2005). Curve E depicts a stable sys-tem in which, due to a catastrophe, the systemcollapses irreversibly and completely, for ex-ample, a bridge that collapses as a result of oldage. Curve F illustrates an overshoot and col-lapse behavior. A system has grown beyondits carrying capacity, and the resulting overcap-acity destroys the recovery potential of the sys-tem (the global financial system in 2008/09).

FIRST RESPONDERS AS INTERVENTIONSYSTEM FOR CBRN INCIDENTS

In the case of an incident, First Responders willbe the first ones to reach the location in whichthe symptoms appear. It must be born in mindthat this is not necessarily the location wherethe incident was triggered (cf. Figure 4), nor the

System State System State

Time TimeBA

System StateSystem State

Time TimeDD

System State System State

Time Time

FE F

C

Figure 5 Archetypes of Catastrophes (Mrotzek and Ossimitz, 2008)




location in which the most effective interventionaction could be taken.

With respect to the First Responders, we canobserve (Chroust et al., 2008)

• Humans do not posses any inborn, naturalsensors to recognize CBRN dangers earlyenough. They are not equipped with natural,semi-autonomous reaction patterns.

• They need to be equipped with special tools torecognize/distinguish the dangers and thereal sources (Figure 3). Special training isneeded in order to operate these tools appro-priately.

• Hazardousmaterialmust be recognized (ability tounderstand labels and markings!).

• Well trained and experienced emergencypersonnel are a key for a successful intervention.

• CBRN incidents often show surprising imma-nent dynamic behavior, which is not easilyand naturally recognized correctly by humans(e.g. exponential growth as in a chain reaction).

• Many of these systems show time-critical be-havior. Therefore, correct tactical and strategicdecisions have to be made based on availablematerial, tools and best practices, often undertime pressure.

• Catastrophes of this sort have to be contemplatedand approached considering many intertwinedfactors and subsystems.

Considering a broader perspective, we canmake additional observations:

• More effective methods are needed as counter-measures; also, the interplay of several organiza-tions of the so-called First Responders, that is,fire brigade, ambulance services, and policeforces, become more important.

• A holistic, systemic approach to interventionsis needed if we want to avoid additional dan-gers to life and property and a long-term de-terioration of the environment.

• The basic objective of an intervention by theFirst Responders is to avoid complete loss ofcontrol of the system, that is, to contain the sys-tem’s behavior and parameters within reason-able, acceptable boundaries so that with thehelp of a Restoration System, the system canbe made resilient to an acceptable status.

PROCESS VIEW OF INTERVENTIONS

In the case of an intervention,many activities are per-formed. For analysis, improvement and training, aclear identification of the individual processes andtheir interaction are of key importance, especiallywith respect to the key processes (Chroust et al.,2008; Tierney et al., 2001). A process view facilitatespreparation before an intervention, the enactmentof the intervention during a real assignment andthenecessary activities after an intervention. It allowsa detailed identification, analysis and evaluation ofkey processes and, as a consequence, focused train-ing possibilities (Chroust et al., 2008; Tierney et al.,2001).

The application of this approach for interventionsallows interesting and useful observations and con-clusions, especially when considering ICT support.Based on Figure 2, the interventions of the FirstResponders can be viewedas a network of processes,some serialized, some interdependent and some par-allel to one another.

In analogy to (ISO/IEC, 2007), we can identifythree classes of processes: primary processes,supporting processes and organizational pro-cesses. Each of these process classes comprisesseveral processes that in themselves compriseseveral subprocesses (Table 1).

In more detail, the processes are discussed inthe following sections.

Primary Processes

The processes are the key to an intervention andcomprise all ‘essential activities’ that are com-monly expected to be performed during an inter-vention, often under time pressure.

Reaction to an alarm. This is the actual start ofthe intervention. One of the key issues is theamount of information the caller is able/willingto provide. How is it possible to solicit more accur-ate information? Are there caller-independentsources of information (position of caller via GPS,position of telephone booth) and the like?

Essential subactivities are as follows:Acceptance of an emergency call, decision on

trustworthiness and reliability of the caller,avoidance of hoaxes, mobilization of appropriateFirst Responder units and coordination withother First Responder units.




In situ analysis. A serious problem in CBRNemergencies is the lack of ‘inborn’ human sensorsconcerning these dangers. Even classifying an in-cident as a CBRN emergency might at timesprove difficult.Essential subactivities are as follows:Recognition of hazardous material, localization of

hazardousmaterial, analysis of container ofmaterial,identification of the error state of container, analysisof the global situation, estimation of risks and recog-nition of secondary and/or emergent dangers.Evaluation of situation, model creation and simula-

tion. Models derived from the identified facts andobservations are built, heavily relying on ICT.Based on these models computer simulationscan be performed in order to gain insight intopossible evolutions and possible alternativeapproaches for the intervention (see Modellingand Simulation section).Essential subactivities are as follows:Identification of key parameters and their

interaction, creation and ‘programming’ a model,execution of the model with appropriate data,verification and validation.Tactical and strategic decisions. Having acquired

a certain amount of knowledge of the situa-tion, its possible progression, and the resulting

consequences (from experience, supported bysimulation), it is necessary to decide on theappropriate best practices of intervention, bothfor short-time immediate tactics and for longer-term strategies.

Essential subactivities are as follows:Causal analysis, risk assessment, choice between

alternative approaches, choice of equipment, con-sideration of emergent and secondary effects.

Actual intervention. Probably the most obviousneed is to understand and learn the best practicesfor ‘technically’ handling the individual emer-gency situations. This means mostly technicalknowledge of how to behave and to act.

Essential subactivities are as follows:Detection, location, help and treatment of vic-

tims, protection and safeguarding of objects, se-curing objects, handling secondary effects of theemergency, securing safety and security of FirstResponders, termination of Intervention andhandover to specialists (e.g. Restoration Team).

Supporting Processes

Besides the key processes described previously,which depend on one another and have to be per-formed in a certain sequence (but with iterations

Table 1 SIMRAD Process Tree

Process class Processes

Primary processes Reaction to an alarmIn situ analysisEvaluation of situation, modellingSimulationTactical and strategic decisionsActual intervention

Supporting processes Communication processesAccess to and use of external knowledge databasesUse of electronic decision supportManagement and coordinationAccounting for human reactionProvide psychological supportConsidering organizational and cultural differences

Organizational processes TrainingReportingHuman resource developmentFailure preventionProcess optimizationAssessment of intervention processes




and refinement steps), there are global subpro-cesses that are performed during the completeprocess.

Essential subactivities are as follows:Communication (see also section Communica-

tion), access to and use of knowledge databases,use of electronic decision support, considerationof human reaction, providing psychological sup-port, management and coordination, consider-ation of organizational and cultural differences.

Organizational Processes

Organizational processes are usually used out-side the realm of a single intervention. They areconcerned with long-term considerations. Theyconsist of processes used by an organization to es-tablish, implement and improve the infrastructure.

Essential subprocesses are as follows:Reporting and recording, training, human re-

source development, failure prevention, processassessment, process optimization, and others.

The process view is a sound basis for theunderstanding, analysis and modification of in-dividual processes within a complex activity. Afurther advantage is the possibility of assessmentand comparison of the quality of alternative inter-vention processes (Chroust et al., 2009a) and theuse of these data as the basis for process improve-ments (Humphrey, 1989).

SPECIFIC INTERVENTION PROCESSES

In this section, we will discuss some of these pro-cesses in more detail, especially those that arespecific to interventions by the First Respondersin CBRN situations and/or in which the use ofmodern ICT is especially helpful.

In situ Analysis

Figure 4 shows the progression from the actualtrigger of the incident to the actual interventionscaused by apparent symptoms of a failure. Obvi-ously, the identification of the cause of the dis-turbance (the fault) and its localization are ofhigh importance.

Visualisation

Given the usual invisibility of CBRN threats, it isessential to give the First Responders possiblemeans of still ‘seeing’ them. Figure 6 shows thewhole continuum from the unchanged real envi-ronment, various forms of enhanced environ-ments, to the completely abstracted (virtual)representation (Chroust et al., 2009a) as providedby modern ICT.

We distinguish between the following:

• real-world environment (non enhanced)• real-world environment extended by physical

objects, for example, added markers and signs(e.g. road signs, flags, and warning icons)

• Augmented Reality (Azuma, 1976, 2004), alsocalled Mixed Reality. It is characterized by

• the combination of real and virtual images,• being interactive in real-time and• being registered in three dimensions.

We can distinguish three subcategories (Chroustet al., 2009b):

Type 1: The information is generated at the view-er’s location and is electronically attached(projected) on the real-world object and thuscan be seen from everywhere, at any angleand so on. . . . It does not need a specific outfitof the viewer.

Real world Complete virtuality

Realenvironment

Real environment

with real add-on

Augmented RealityMixed Reality

Virtual Reality

Abstractedreality

Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 CAVE Display

Figure 6 Continuum from real world to full virtuality




Type 2: A computer-generated image is locallysuperimposed (e.g. on glasses of the viewer)partially covering the distant object. This is usu-ally achieved by appropriate semi-transparentglasses (Figure 7). In the simple case, the picturein the glasses is NOT correlated to the positionof the object. It is useful to provide general infor-mation without the need of being directly linkedto the object.

Type 3: A computer-generated image is superim-posed (e.g. on glasses of the viewer) and alignedwith view of the real object. This more useful,sophisticated and expensive version needs infor-mation concerning the relative position, viewingdirection and the like of the user with respectto the real objects and has to reflect changesin position of both the object and the user(cf. Figure 7).

• Virtual Reality: a locally created image on anappropriate presentation means without anycorrelation to the outside real world.

• Abstracted Reality: a complexmathematical simu-lation model, providing an abstraction with noresemblance to the visual reality by using math-ematical models, e.g. System Dynamics Models(Cooper-03; Mrotzek-09) as in Figure 8.

For the purpose of the First Responders in thefield, the various forms of Augmented Reality seemto bemost useful. Obviously, Augmented Reality oftype 3 offers the greatest computational challenges.AugmentedReality Systemsneed tohave subsystemsfor pattern recognition, image recognition, recognitionof features, enhancements of light (infrared, nightviews), and the like.

Modelling and Simulation

The process view makes it possible to create pre-cise descriptions of the individual steps necessaryin an intervention together with their sequencingand interdependency constraints. This providesthe basis for static analysis (e.g. walk-through ofthe process model), for theoretical considerationsand for dynamic enactment (simulation) of theseindividual steps.

A key to a process view is the creation ofmodelsof the processes in sufficient detail in a formalway (see Scheer, 1998; Humphrey-89). Scientifically,a model is defined as an object that enables draw-ing of analogue conclusions about another object,the original (Hilty, 1989). Everymodel is an abstrac-tion (Luft, 1984), which usually describes in a sim-plified form certain properties of the original,considered to be relevant. The chosen form ofdescription has considerable influence on the use-fulness of a model.

Simulation can be defined as the reproduction ofthe dynamic behavior of a real system using a (real)model to arrive at conclusions that are applicable tothe real world (Pichler and Schwärtzel, 1992,p. 239). Dynamically enacting certain processes and(in many cases) interacting with the model areproven methods for training and planning (e.g.flight simulators). Simulations have many advan-tages. Being dynamic, they provide an illustra-tive view of how a process proceeds, oftenallowing the detection of incompatibilities and ir-regularities in a process description that are notobvious in a static analysis of the process model.Simulations can be repeated with different

Figure 7 Augmented Reality—adding information in glasses




parameters and influence factors, are controllableand allow recording of the individual steps, repeti-tion of certain sequences, evaluation and so on(Chroust et al., 2009b; Rainer et al., 2009; Sturmet al., 2009).

Depending on the type ofmodel, different varia-tions of simulation can be performed, rangingfrom abstract mathematical equations to views asprovided by Virtual and Mixed Realities (Azuma,2004), the latter allowing the combination withthe real environment (see section Visualisation).

In order to quantitatively understand the effectof the enactment of a process, various mathemat-ical dynamic modelling tools exist. SystemDynamics (Coooper-03; Mrotzek-09; Pfahl, 2005)is a discrete approach to dynamic modelling. Itmodels the movement of elements through thesystem, typically in the case of a factory. Numericalvalues (duration, size . . .) characterize the behaviorof the elements in the system and the changes

applied to them. Examples could be the number ofFirst Responders, their time consumption for vari-ous activities (e.g. helping an injured person). Basedon a system run, the throughput of a system can beevaluated (e.g. the number of victims treated andthe number of First Responders in a certain loca-tion). Powerful simulation tools are ARENA(Kelton et al., 2007), POWERSIM, VENSIM and soon. Figure 8 shows (an abstract model) how thevarious external influences impact the abilities ofFirst Responders during performance of anintervention.

Access to Information Repositories

First Responders must have available personalknowledge in order to evaluate the applicabilityof the appropriate best practices. In addition, theymust be able to request ad hoc and just-in-time

Figure 8 Dynamic Model for the psychology of First Responders




additional information on the specific situation(Figure 9). Basically, the information can be avail-able in several forms:

• internalized personal know-how of FirstResponders (implies training before theintervention!),

• communication with other First Responders,commanders, officers-in-charge and the like,

• communication with stakeholders and victims,• access to external (back-up) know-how (e.g. man-

uals, if they can they be used in the circumstances)or wireless communication with databases.

Communication

A key to a successful intervention is obviouslythe communication between different First Res-ponders, with their common command groupeven across organizational boundaries. Coordi-nation and teamwork cannot be achieved withoutcommunication.In many cases, direct communication might be

hampered or obstructed by physical (noise, smokeand visibility), physiological gaps (hard hearing . . .)or cultural barriers (language, taboos . . .). Figure 10sketches many different influences, which potentially

create gaps in communication. A fuller discus-sion can be found in Chroust (2008).

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING OF FIRSTRESPONDERS—THE SIMRAD PROJECTS

In the case of a CBRN intervention, professionalemergency response groups (e.g. fire brigades)and rescue units (e.g. Red Cross), together withappropriate security organizations (police, mili-tary), specialists (e.g. laboratory personnel) andalso voluntary helpers, take charge of handlingthe emergency situation, undertaking and execut-ing appropriate rescue actions and trying tominimize the negative effects (Tierney et al., 2001).

A serious problem with respect to these dan-gers is that usually we do not have any inborn,natural sensors with which to recognize them,let alone natural, semi-autonomous reactions. Inorder to use available state-of-the-art tools, ad-equate training is of high importance in order tooperate the equipment, to make the correct inter-pretations of the results, to draw the correct con-clusions and to initiate the appropriate reactions.

It is necessary to obtain the required practice inhandling tools, setting correct measures andassessing the situation and its potential dangers.Identification, design, validity and the trainingof appropriate behavior must be identified so as

Figure 9 First Responders’ information need




to counteract the dangers of the emergency andthe intervention. These best practices might becounter-intuitive and, if not well chosen, mightnegatively interfere with one another (again anarea for validation).

Modern ICT can today provide training envi-ronments with simulated and mixed scenarios(Augmented Reality), which are flexible andcost-effective (Chroust et al., 2008). Simulation isa highly useful training methodology especiallywhen the training cannot be performed in realenvironments, which is true for most CBRN inci-dents (Chroust et al., 2009b; Rainer et al., 2009;Sturm et al., 2009). Virtual Reality andAugmentedReality are two of the key means to achieve

training success. It is the objective of the SIMRADprojects (Chroust et al. 2008) to use the moderntechnologies to a level of internal sophisticationoffering simple handling externally so that itbecomes available to all First Responders. A spe-cial advantage is the near-reality hands-on experi-ence, which is a key to sustainable learning.

One of the helpful concepts (Figure 11) is thesubstitution of certain processes of an interventionby simulated ones, whereas others are executed inthe real environment. Useful applications are thereplacement of a dangerous source of contami-nation by a harmless one, for example, an ultra-sonic generator, or the real body of a victim by aprojected image, virtual images of colleagues in a

Figure 11 Substituting real-world processes by simulated ones

Figure 10 Dimension of gaps in communication (Chroust, 2008)




field exercise, and so on. This permits, amongstother advantages, a wide range of scalability fortraining situations.Many of the simulation tools can also be used dur-

ing a real assignment, for example, for planning thenext steps, for the assessment of the situations andthe effectiveness of different measures taken, byprovision of what-if-analysis, time-series-estimates,sandbox-like support, and so on.The SimRad.NBC (Simulation and Information

System to manage Rescue units—with focus onCBRN threats) aims at creating the foundationsfor satisfying the current user needs for practice-oriented simulation and a communication frame-work for First Responders in CBRN emergencyscenarios (Chroust et al., 2008, 2009b).

SUMMARYAND OUTLOOK

Information and communication technology hasbrought numerous advantages to humankind, butat the same time, it has increased the danger ofcatastrophes due to the international globalizationand the often uncontrollable rapid execution of pro-cesses, which cannot be controlled mentally byhuman beings. We believe that intensive use ofICT can support and improve training. Many ofthe training tools are also useful in the case of realassignments. At the same time, ICT allows predic-tive and operational support so as to avoid and/or mitigate the effects of certain catastrophes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper is based on the finding of the project‘KIRAS PL 2:SimRad.NBC’, project no. 813798(2007–2009), and funded by the successor project‘KIRAS PL3-1: SimRad.COMP—Simulations- undInformationssystem zum Administrieren vonHilfseinheiten bei Katastrophen—Erforschungvon Systemkomponenten zur Überprüfung derEinsatztauglichkeit der SimRad Technologie’,project no. 818784 (2009–2011), both under the‘Sicherheitsforschungs-Förderprogramm KIRAS’of the Austrian Federal Ministry for Transport,Innovation and Technology (BMVIT).

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Improving Resilience of Critical Human Systems in CBRN-Emergencies: Challenges for First Responders