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Candidate no. W03463

Module Title: Independent Research Project

Module Code: (e.g. 5AABC123 ) 6AAT5000

Assignment: (may be abbreviated)

Conceptualising Daesh within a New Religious Framework. How does Daesh recruit members?

Assignment tutor/group: Dr.Marat Shterin

Deadline: 29/3/16

Date Submitted: 29/3/16

Word Count: 8384 (including foonotes)

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Conceptualising Daesh within a New Religious Framework. How does Daesh recruit members?

Table of contents

1. Introduction (p3-4)

2. Defining NRMs (p4)

3. Daesh & Salafism (p5-8)

4. Grounded Religious Protest (p8-9)

5. Appeal of Salafism (p9-11)

6. NRM Models for Conversion (p11-14)

7. Creating a Profile (p14-17)

8. Social Media Technology (p17-20)

9. Daesh Propaganda Pulls (p20-25)

10. The Need for Ethnography (p25-26)

11. Conclusion (p27)

Keywords: NRMS, Daesh, Conversion, Recruitment, Social Media.

Abstract

In this thesis, I have attempted to contribute to contemporary discourse on Daesh and around Islamic

radicalisation. Through sociological understandings of New Religious Movements (NRMs), I hope to

offer an alternative sociological lens through which to analyse such a controversial militant jihadi group.

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1. Introduction

In this dissertation, I will be investigating whether some useful academic lessons may be learnt from the

study of New Religious Movements in application to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), or

Daesh group, operating in the Middle East and transnationally. Specifically, I will be focusing on the

recruitment methods that Daesh employ through the use of social media technology. The purpose of this

thesis is to derive sociological understandings of New Religious Movements (NRMs hereafter) and the

relevant areas of recruitment, conversion and brainwashing in order to examine issues around

radicalisation within the Daesh group.

Observing how conversion and recruitment may be performed over social media is not only a

contemporary angle through which to observe theories from the studies of NRM, it is also a phenomenon

much discussed by mainstream and political media outlets.

Studies of conversion can provide useful insights into why individual foreign recruits join armed

groups such as Daesh, commonly referred to as radicalisation or recruitment. In turn, this may have

practical utility for developing ‘deradicalisation’ programmes. It is my belief that this angle will enrich

the investigation being made into ascertaining both how and why Daesh recruits foreign members from

across the world. I will be focusing on the complex sociological interactions and socialisation that may

motivate an individual to join Daesh, while providing possible insight from the study of NRMs.

Although Daesh is not an NRM of sorts considering that its Muslim members would not regard

themselves as New Muslims as part of a NRM, only insights and concepts from NRM studies may inform

my research on Daesh, immediate parallels cannot be made. I will nonetheless be utilising academic

research on NRMs in order to gain a more informed sociological understanding of conversion to Daesh.

Through elaborating on NRM methodological approaches, I hope to factor societal, individual and

religious tensions involved in a radicalisation or socialisation process. Ethnographic studies may reveal

similarities between NRMs and Daesh on the dynamics of recruitment and conversion. This may help

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shift research agendas from the ‘prism of security studies’1 to more research-based and broad academic

understandings of the social dynamics of religiously motivated radicalisation on individual and group

levels.

2. Defining NRMs

There is much academic discussion over what constitutes a New Religious Movement. The notion

of NRMs was offered as a more neutral alternative to the derogatory or sensationalist label of ‘cult’ or

cultic fringe. A cultic fringe is understood as a deviant cultural sphere on the fringe of society where a

‘heterogeneous assortment of cultural items can be regarded, despite its diversity, as one entity’.2 I would

define an NRM to be an alternative and nascent form of religious institution in a contemporary society.

Stark & Bainbridge reduce ‘cults’ to an economic level by describing them as ‘social enterprises engaged

in the production and exchange of novel and exotic compensators and rewards, not all of which are

religious’.3 I agree that, eschatologically, NRMs tend to offer ‘surer, shorter, swifter, clearer way’4 to

salvation. These definitions show us the variety involved in NRMs and subsequently the danger of

reducing Daesh to a NRM.

However, I would agree with Lorne Dawson’s observation that NRMs may act as ‘sites of

spiritual, social and cultural experimentation and innovation’5 that represent the ‘changing and continued

dialectical adaptation of religion to society and society to religion’.6 The continued dialectical adaptation

of religion to society and society to religion has created and accommodated certain appealing facets of

Daesh, as a nascent form of religious institution, to certain areas of society.

                                                                                                               1 R.Meijer,(2009)‘Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement’, (Columbia University Press. p.2) 2 R.Wallis, ‘Ideology, Authority and Development of Cultic movements’ (p.299) 3 R.Stark & W.Bainbridge (1985) ‘The Future of Religion’(University of California Press, p.172) 4 B.Wilson (1982) The New Religions, (New York: Edwin Mellen p.16-31)  5 L.Dawson(1998) Cults in Context, (p.180) 6 ibid (p.182)

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3. Daesh & Salafism

David Bromley argues that NRMs are often ‘alienated both socially and culturally from a dominant

religious milieu.’7 Equally, the extreme form of Salafi Islam that Daesh propagates is a controversial and

alternative form of Islam, though dominant in some contexts, it is alienated from more mainstream forms

of Islam and society. Daesh, within a typology of Salafism, must be understood as a radical and militant

yet marginal and reformist group which can be categorised as being ‘Jihadi-Salafi’.

Though Daesh claim to constitute an Islamic state or caliphate, I regard them as a political Islamist group

due to their tenuous and controversial claims to religious statehood. Daesh is an Islamic term for ISIL or

the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which is a Jihadist militant group seeking to establish a

transnational Sunni Muslim caliphate in opposition to the existing political orders. In June 2014, the

group proclaimed itself to be a worldwide Muslim caliphate with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as leader or

caliph. However, as well as widespread disapproval from Western media and politics, a great majority of

Muslims refuse to acknowledge Daesh’s religious, political and moral authority over all Muslims

worldwide, in the form of a caliphate. Many believe they have misunderstood the truths, virtues and

teachings of Islam and have been instead resorting to gratuitous violence and arguably populist politics.

This is why many Muslims prefer the Islamic term of Daesh- a more derogatory acronym in Arabic for

the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; phonetically Daesh is similar to Daes meaning ‘one who crushes

something under foot’ rather than the self-ascribed acronym of ISIL.

Daesh represents a new generation of global Islamist formation that combines a militant version

of Salafist ideology, sophisticated public relations, extensive media networks and guerilla warfare with

utopian visions of Islamic society and state building. The extreme form of Salafi Islam that Daesh

propagates is a very radical and controversial interpretation of Islam. Contemporary usage of the term

Salafist Islam is often considered as mirroring Saudi-originated untamed militant Wahhabism and it has

                                                                                                               7 D.G. Bromley (2004) ‘Perspectives’ Nova Religio 8 (p.91)  

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flourished in the Middle East where increasingly little state repression exists allowing such movements to

progress.8 However, despite similar cultural origins between Salafism and Wahhabism they are indeed

contrary. Wahhabism is a state religion of Saudi Arabia that is conservative and traditional in nature,

while Salafism is a global movement of Islam.

Salafism delineates a far broader culturally Islamic milieu that traditionally refers to those

adherents of Islam who sought to copy and emulate the first three generations of pure Muslims (al-salaf

al-salih) under the guidance of Muhammad as a blueprint of Islamic life. On the face of it, Salafism

focuses on eliminating idolatry (shirk) and affirming God’s Oneness (tawhid).9 However, Salafism is also

an increasingly heterogeneous term and is often appropriated due to its textually rigorous focus on the

fundamental Qu’ranic sources, hadith and Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad.

Thomas Hegghammer argues the label ‘Salafi’ carries with it a certain sense of ‘authenticity’10

that demarcates itself from other Muslims as apostates or takfiri. Bernard Haykel argues that the term is

associated with democratic and political non-violence and Salafis are ‘first and foremost religious and

social reformers engaged in creating and reproducing particular forms of authority and identity [and] a

distinct Muslim subjectivity with profound social and political implications’.11 Haykel also comments that

Salafis are predominately concerned with ‘continuous boundary defence’,12 which limits the community

of authentic and pure believers as opposed to those who are theologically corrupted. We can hypothesise

that it is this Muslim subjectivity and authenticity that is implied in Salafi discourse that might prove

appealing to potential members of Daesh. This creation of a religiously defined global identity is rooted

in the particularity of Daesh as the religion of Islam that has universal significance in justifying political

actions.

                                                                                                               8 J  Kenney, J.T. (2015) ‘Islamic State: World Religions and Spirituality Project’, University of Virginia, found at http://wrldrels.org/profiles/IslamicState.htm; (Accessed: 11th February 2016.) 9 R.Meijer, ‘Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement’ (p.4) 10 T.Hegghammer, Jihadi-Salafi or Revolutionaries, from R.Meijer ‘Global Salafism’(p.249) 11 B.Haykel, ‘On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action’ from R.Meijer, ‘Global Salafism’ (p.35) 12 ibid, (p.41)

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Daesh would disagree with Nasir al-din al-Albani’s view on the correct manhaj (path or method of living

life) that is to shun political affiliation and groupings.13 Daesh are likely to reason that engaging in

political activism, rather than create disunity, is essential for the purpose of maintaining God’s rule. Such

use of historical and theological precedent in affirming the first 3 generations of Islam may be a

motivation for political activism in Daesh.

This political activism is mediated through extracting and choosing certain confrontational

theological justifications, which may be Wahhabist in nature, for Daesh motives of a more political

nature. For example, those who do not agree theologically with Daesh are considered kufr meaning

unbelievers or heretics, specifically non-Muslims. This delineation of boundaries legitimises the use of

violence through conceiving jihad as a religious duty to enact armed struggle against perceived non-

Muslim individuals or entities(takfiris). In this manner, Daesh appropriates more activist, rather than

quietist, interpretations of Salafism through advocating extreme militant activity against Shia Islam in

Iraq, as well as all heretical religions and even Muslim regimes that do not rule by Sharia law. This

approach is part of a greater plan of purification of Islamic society as Daesh’s possible priority before

international motives may take precedence.

One can argue that Daesh, and the transnational Jihadist movement have nativist millennial hopes.

This means that as a movement, they are in opposition to colonising Western or un-Islamic influences

tainting society with their millennial hope grounded in an idealised Islamic Golden Age. Perhaps these

millennial hopes provide a focal point of religious commitment; at the least they provide a theological

justification for their transformative but destructive societal aspirations. This would, for the sake of

categorisation, make Daesh a militant ‘Jihadi-Salafi’ group. Daesh are more than willing to evoke

defensive and offensive jihad in order to defend and extend their proclaimed caliphate. Further to this,

they are willing to ‘prioritize the promotion of an unforgiving strain of Salafi thought’14 that is extremely

                                                                                                               13 ibid (p.47)  14 C.Bunzel (2015) ‘The Ideology of the Islamic State’ (p.10)

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strict on doctrine, law and scripture. I will now explore how these specific Jihadi-Salafist doctrines, often

misconstrued and misrepresented, that Daesh offers, may appeal to possible recruits.

4. Grounded  Religious  Protest    

NRMs have often been considered as barometers of the larger social transformation occurring in

society and this social dynamic of religious protest may aid us in researching Daesh. I would regard

Daesh as a radical religious response to changing political and social circumstances allowing the

individual to enact social change with a sacred significance. Daesh’s ideology is concerned with a return

to the more glorious days of early Golden Age Islam grounded in the Salafi ideal of a revival of life under

the guidance of Muhammad, as a blueprint of Islamic life. Much of the religious protest involved in such

a group as Daesh is enacted in disdain of Western values, heretical religions and sects, secular Arab

society and ignorant society or jahiliyya.

Daesh are clearly a reactionary and distinctly radical ‘Jihadi-Salafi’ movement at tension with the current

state of Islam within society, not just nationally but internationally. Daesh identify religious, social as

well as cultural defects with how Islam is practised and the impersonal anonymity of modern society has

provided gaps for Daesh to grow.

If we observe a similar case study we may derive useful lessons of social dynamics in application

to the context of Daesh. Following much social displacement and economic stagnation, as was the case

observed by M. Shterin in Kabardino-Balkaria,15 young disillusioned Muslims appeared to desire local

social transformation with transnational aspirations. Disappointed with the options available to them in

society, young Muslims created a kind of Salafi movement they thought was specifically suited their

desires and aspirations. We can learn from this example, a common motif of religious agency within

specific social circumstances. In the same way that young Muslims in Kabardino-Balkaria created

                                                                                                               15 M.Shterin M. & A.Yarlykapov (2011) ‘Reconsidering Radicalisation and Terrorism: the New Muslims Movement in Kabardino-Balkaria and its Path to Violence, (p.303-325)  

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conditions and relationships that helped them deal with their grievances, it is possible to hypothesise that

we may find contextual grievances with Daesh members. Such a case study may provide some insights

into how to explore the reasons for Daesh’s search for an alternative social and political paradigm and for

its appeal to some young Muslims in the Middle East and beyond. On a more individual level, this study

will help us look closer at how individuals create a religious or political outlet for themselves in order to

acclimatise to social and economic instability. However, the origins of this form of Salafi thought may

materialise in many different ways. I argue that Daesh’s specific interpretation of Salafism, may appeal to

potential Daesh recruits or converts in a particular way.

5. Appeal of Salafism

It is worth considering whether Salafism, as a religiously empowering identity, is a ‘pull’ for

potential Daesh members. Daesh, in the Salafist nature, place an overwhelming emphasis on textual

legitimation. However, they place a greater emphasis on authoritative yet minoritarian interpretations of

the Qur’an, Hadith and Sunna. This appeal to a grounded and accessible truth is arguably a major pull for

the Daesh movement in attracting Islamic religious seekers of clarity and certainty. Haykel argues that

Salafism appeals as a result of its clear emphasis on textual authority, as well as its ‘pared down version

of legal interpretation’.16 Through appeal to unconditionally authoritative texts, there exist unlimited

possibilities for Daesh to offer religious and moral certainty to those who need it most. One can argue that

the Salafism we find in Daesh democratises the access to religious knowledge for all, and it is this

acquisition that ‘is a personally empowering and salvific process’.17 This may be conceptualised as an

example of the inextricable link between consumption of a religious product and identity. Through

offering a packaged, easily accessible and self-reinforcing Muslim identity replete with theological

justifications, Daesh, may appeal to many Muslims looking for certainty and purpose in the modern

                                                                                                               16 B.Haykel, On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action’ from R.Meijer, ‘Global Salafism’ (p25) 17 ibid (p.25)

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world. A Salafi individual’s ability to ‘stage his own faith’18 and establish not only identity, but clarity

and structure may well also be very empowering and appeal to many religious seekers.

However, this appeal to scriptural legitimation also means that it’s interpretative defence of

extreme violence is often considered a difficulty amongst many Muslims. For example, the appeal to the

Sunna as legitimising the execution of a Jordanian pilot shot down by Daesh or an appeal to scripture to

legitimise genocide against Shia Muslims in Iraq for example. Here we see how Daesh appropriate

relevant aspects of Salafism through scriptural authority for more activist and often violent consequences.

Another possible ‘pull’ of Daesh is its pre-modern theological solution to revive a critique of

modern socio-political orders as offered by popular Muslim Brotherhood intellectuals such as Qutb and

Mawdudi. According to Mawdudi, modern society is succumbing to jahilliyya meaning ignorance and

sinfulness and what is required is a safe haven from this modern crises in the form of an Islamic state.

Qutb reinterpreted jahilliya in a Western context, arguing revolution is necessary against ‘ignorant’

Western states with flawed moral values. This contrasts with the equal need to reform non-Muslims living

in jahilliya as they are ‘in need of purification in both belief and practice’.19 Qutb proposed a re-

establishment of an Islamic caliphate of the past, enforced through Sharia Islamic law and God’s

sovereignty imposed. A similar sort of Jihadi-Salafi ideology, influenced, and was radicalised through

Daesh’s jihad.

Jihad itself holds a significant propaganda value amongst prevalent ‘Jihadi-Salafi’ networks. As Oliver

Roy argues, Salafism’s popularity stems from its appeal to isolated and de-territorialised Muslims across

a globalised world.20 This geographical Islamic State is not only an attractive pull for those suffering in

jahilliya amongst perceived apostates, but according to Dabiq, it is the obligation of all Muslims in this

situation to move to the Islamic State, submit authority to the caliph and wage jihad for this reason.21 The

                                                                                                               18 O.Roy, (2004 )‘Globalised Islam: Search for a new Ummah’ (Columbia University Press; p.267)  19 B.Haykel, ‘On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action.’(p 37) from R.Meijer,) ‘Global Salafism’. 20 O.Roy (2004) ‘Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah’ 21 Dabiq, as cited in https://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq (accessed 14th February, 2016)

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proclamation of such a caliphate can also be considered as a tangible rejection of Western political

divisions established in the Sykes-Picot agreement. This anti-Western Salafist rhetoric of Jihad, so

influenced by Qutb, combined with the proclamation of an actual Caliphate may well be effective pulls

for ‘religious seekers’ of purpose and identity, if not at least for its political saliency worldwide.

Salafist Islam has often been noted for its utility in accommodating many ‘local

circumstances…local concerns and issues, providing bases for personal piety, communal living and

political action.’22 Daesh offers a focused Jihadi-Salafi Muslim identity, applicable anywhere, which

reinforces the self through rhetoric of self-purity and by placing the ‘locus of religious authority’23 within

the individual.

Equally, though Daesh provides a very radical interpretation of Salafi Muslim identity, this form

of religiously defined global identity may be interpreted as the most internationally politically expedient

or locally relevant and accommodating for example. Though the prospect of Salafism, as appropriated by

potential Daesh members, may prove appealing we must be ‘careful not to conflate theological

orientations and social movements’24 in associations of Salafis with political and religious violence and

extremism.

6. New Religious Movement Models for Conversion

Meredith McGuire aptly defines the process of conversion as the ‘transformation of one’s self

concurrent with a transformation of one’s basic meaning system.’25 I believe that a complex variety of

choice and ‘pulls’ are important catalysts in this transformation in application to Daesh.

It is often claimed that members of extremist Islamist groups, or other such deviant groups

or NRMs, have undergone the illusion of choice through a suspension of their free will by brainwashing,

during their conversion or radicalisation process. The target of brainwashing is often considered to be a

                                                                                                               22 M. Shterin & A.Yarlykapov,(2012) ‘Caliphate in the Minds and Practices of Young Muslims, (p.257) 23 J.Birt (2005), ‘Wahhabism in the UK’ found in Al-Rasheed ed.2005. Transnatioanl Connections and the Arab Gulf, p.178-179) 24 T.Hegghammer, ‘Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries?’ (p244) from Global Salafism by Roel Meijer (2009) 25 M.McGuire,(2001) ‘Religion: The Social Context’(p.73)

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naïve, troubled or mentally vulnerable individual. However, the brainwashing thesis, similar to the

Islamic radicalisation rhetoric we find in the media, has been widely discredited by sociologists.

The ethnographic study of the Unification Church by Eileen Barker empirically undermined the

brainwashing thesis, by arguing for the importance of positive choice and agency on a more individual

level. Barker’s study26 explained how a combination of ‘pushes’ towards religious alternatives, including

boredom, helplessness and disillusionment, provided a foundation from which the Unification Church

could ‘pull’ in members. Choice is evidently grounded in man’s rational capacity to imagine possible

futures and recount the past. Barker argues that potential converts often face a number of choices or

‘suggestions’ in the process of joining a movement, like Daesh for example. She concludes that through

promises of utopia for example, ‘most recruits make their affiliative decision voluntarily’27 rather than

through processes of brainwashing or indoctrination.

I will now investigate as to the sort of recruits that Daesh enlists by utilising and elaborating on

sociological models such as the Lofland-Stark model as well as ideas of relative deprivation and Rational

Choice theory in order to enrich the earlier investigation of the intellectual and politico-religious appeal of

Salafism. The Lofland-Stark model of conversion-commitment processes may provide some insights into

the dynamics of conversion. Individual grievances such as acute livelihood tension are ameliorated

through bonds of affection and brotherhood involving often-intensive interaction within the movement

resulting in the reduction of ‘extra-cult’ attachment. These acute and persistent individual tensions can be

considered as problems solved through a religious lens as a ‘religious seeker’. In fact, the Lofland-Stark

model’s final stage is that following intensive interaction in the group, the religious seeker ‘ultimately

becomes the group’s deployable agent’28 and this positively correlates with many defection narratives of

                                                                                                               26 E.Barker(1984) ‘The Making of a Moonie: Choice or Brainwashing’ (Blackwell p.210-231) 27 T.Robbins, (1988) ‘Cults, Converts, Charisma, (p.78)  28 R.Stark & J.Lofland, (1965) ‘Becoming a World-Saver’(p.862-875).

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Daesh members.29 This model observes possibly useful conditions or motifs that we may find during an

ongoing process of Daesh conversion.

Glock’s theory on relative deprivation may also be useful in identifying individual motivations,

born out of deprivation, for Daesh recruitment. Relative deprivation theory suggests that causes of

relative deprivation may ’pull’ people into NRMs. Deprivation may involve a void of not just economic

power but also social mobility, organismic, psychic and ethical values within the individual, which we

can conceive as a whole as social rewards30. The disparity of social rewards between what an individual

feels entitled to and what they are actually receiving may be an ‘incentive to launch or join a movement

that promises change or compensation.’31 I believe this theory to be too reductionist in that it simplifies

possible religious or political motivations for conversion, into strictly economic terms. Nevertheless an

awareness of relative deprivation may be useful in conjunction with the Lofland Stark model in

identifying, with access to evidence, reasons underlying the contentious process and issue of

radicalisation and conversion.

Both models can be further understood when we observe how, according to Ianaccone, ‘people switch

denominations in ways that preserves the value of their religious human capital’32 in a similar way that

religious intermarriage seeks the same outcome. For the possible recruit, it is this appeal to religious

human capital that Daesh may attempt to maximise. Rational Choice Theory suggests that the religious

organisations, which compete on a religious marketplace, will seek to maximise their market share

through providing relevant religious products in exchange for time, money and commitment, forming a

crucial backdrop to any conversion process.

                                                                                                               29 P.Neumann(2015) ‘Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors’ (p.6) 30 C.Y.Glock & R.Stark, (1965) ‘On the Origin and Evolution of Religious Groups’ (Chicago) 31 L.Dawson (2006)’Comprehending Cults’ (Toronto: OUP), (p.73) 32 L.Ianannocone (1990) ‘Religious Practice: a Human Capital approach’ (p.313)  

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On a more individual level, the benefits involved in the choice of joining Daesh may well

outweigh the relative deprivations of not doing so. The cost-benefits of promises of utopia, material

wealth, religious duty, identity in the form of Jihadi-Salafism and the appeal of group brotherhood are all

possible motivations, as observed later in Daesh propaganda, or ‘pulls’ during an ongoing conversion

process. Through a maximisation of what Daesh can offer a potential recruit in terms of religious human

capital, as well as material capital, Daesh offer a number of motivations or ‘pulls’.

The Lofland-Stark model and the process of identity and choice decision making, derived from a

sociological imagination, are interesting and necessary but not sufficient explanations for recruitment to

Daesh. More closely, it may well be that intra-group mutual support and outer-group networking that may

facilitate a conversion to Daesh. ‘Social bonds are the critical element in this process’33 and these

connections have expanded and diversified as a result of the globalised prowess of social media

networking. The 58 defectors in the ICSR dataset were permanent residents or citizens of 17 different

countries.34

I will now explore, with reference to evidence, what these motivations may be including the

disparity between what Daesh portrays to offer a religious seeker and what they actually offer. We must

first speculate as to which kind of person joins Daesh before we engage with evidence of recruitment

narratives.

7. The Conversion Process & Creating a Profile

Barker presents a convincing analysis of conversion in her ethnography of the Moonies,35 in

which she argues for a predominant membership profile as exhibiting certain characteristics. Converts

often come from relatively economically stable, and often socially liberal, families, in her case study. It is

wrong to assume uniform economic deprivation in the study of NRMs and conversion, as the                                                                                                                33 M.Sageman , Understanding Terror Networks, (p.135) 34 P.R. Neumann, (2015), Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors, (p.7) 35 E.Barker,,(1984) ‘The Making of a Moonie: Choice or Brainwashing?’ (Oxford: Blackwell)  

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experimentation, engagement and entertaining of alternate and world-transforming ways of living,

‘requires the relative luxury of having the means, time, and intellectual inclination and preparation to do

so.’36 In a similar manner, it is expensive and extremely time consuming to join a movement such as

Daesh, not only as a life-changing political or religious commitment, but also perhaps geographically if

one chooses to become a foreign fighter. Seemingly, commitment to Daesh entails relatively high barriers

to entry, and on cost-benefit analysis, the cost of joining Daesh, with all entailed illegality, should not be

underestimated.

S. Levine argues that in a high-risk conversion, often a ‘radical departure’,37 takes place in an

individual, during the transition from young adulthood into independent life in society. It is certainly

possible to speculate that individual tensions with this transition might leave a space, which Daesh might

look to fill with purpose and identity. Issues with self-identity and purpose may be a decisive factor that

motivates a re-socialisation into a NRM or equally a possible ‘radical departure’ from Western society to

Iraq & Syria.

While it is nearly impossible to configure a framework whereby we create an ideal profile of those who

convert to Daesh, it is possible to speculate. Lessons can be learnt from past ethnographic studies of

conversion, and though they cannot be directly applied to Daesh as a NRM, they may inform our

sociological imagination of the interactions and exchanges involved in Daesh recruitment. It can certainly

be argued that those with weaker social ties are more structurally available to leave fewer friends and

family they have behind to join Daesh as foreign fighters in the Middle East. However, as Wicktoriwcz

argues in his study of the Islamist organisation Al-Muhajiroun, interviewed activists ‘frequently sacrifice

work, friends, family and leisure time.’38 Other comparative data, as referred to by Dawson39, shows that

approximately 50% of European home grown radicalised terrorists were married and 25% had children.

                                                                                                               36 L.Dawson,(2009) ‘The study of NRMs and Radicalization of Home-Grown Terrorists, (p.17) 37 S. V. Levine,(1984) ‘Radical Departure: Desperate Detours to Growing Up ‘(New York)  38 Q.Wicktoricz, (2005) Radical Islam Rising, (p.47) 39 L.Dawson , ‘Trying to Make Sense of Home-Grown Radicalisation; from Bramadat & Dawson ‘Religious Radicalization Securitization in Canada’ (p.77)

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Equally, the extent of their ‘radical departure’ is relatively great so the relative willingness for such

sacrifice in joining Daesh should also be noted.

As well as this, there is evidence that suggests potential Daesh recruits are also likely to be young.

German security authorities recently published a study that show that the mean age of Jihadist departees

from Germany to Syria and Iraq is 23.7.40 Equally, recruits may well be upper/middle class, perhaps, for

example, in the bracket of dissatisfied students or graduates. Those who are technologically-able have

equally been encouraged to join.

Further suppositions can be drawn from studies of NRMs in attempting to understand what kind of

profile joins Daesh. As a wider movement, Daesh ‘encompasses a global network of scholars, websites,

media outlets, and most recently, countless supporters on social media.’41As Dawson argues from an

overview of NRM research, recruitment is a process that relies on pre-existing “social networks, affective

ties, and intensive interaction in turning a potential convert into an actual member.’42 The social nature of

this recruitment or conversion process is emphasised and potential Daesh converts should be considered

as active human participants in a process of socialisation. Snow43and Volinn44 both utilise the term of

‘structural availability’ towards recruitment and socialisation through social networks. For example, those

who are free from occupational commitments or family relationships are more ‘structurally available’ for

socialisation through the mediums of social networks and pre-existing social bonds. This argument,

though useful, is too reductionist, because despite ‘structural availability’, potential converts will require

further motivations or pulls to progress a socialisation process.

During interactions with Daesh recruiters, a potential Daesh convert may well evaluate the sort of

relative deprivations and internal tensions that are being addressed to. Perhaps the recruiter presents a

more religious problem-solving framework of interaction to address religious, political, social and

                                                                                                               40 D.H.Heinke, (2016) German Jihadists in Syria and Iraq, ICSR. 41 C.Bunzel (2015) ‘The Ideology of the Islamic State’ (p.10) 42 L.Dawson, (2009) The study of NRMs and Radicalization of Home-Grown Terrorists (p.6) 43 Snow et al, 1980:794 44 Volinn, 1985  

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personal concerns and conflicts. A negotiation may take place in ensuring that the potential Daesh recruit

will either have his grievances addressed, new and exotic social ties confirmed, religious human capital

maximized and extra-group social attachments minimized. However, a mutually positive relationship

must be established. A positive, often gradual and ongoing, negotiation between recruiter and potential

convert, is crucial in explaining how people may eventually socialize into a group such as Daesh. I argue

that much of this positive negotiation and socialisation may occur through social media technology, in its

many forms.

8. Social Media Technology

“In the future it may be that religious practices are best understood in terms of a network of interactions rather than through formal communities, as traditional relationships, structures and patterns of belief become more malleable, global and interconnected.” 45

- H. Campbell

The rapid proliferation and amelioration of technology, an important facet of globalisation, is

possibly a salient cause for religious evolution of NRMs. Campbell sees the Internet being used as a form

of spiritual network, or a potential place of worship, as well as a missionary tool and a platform through

which to create and maintain a religious identity.46 The ability of social media technology for NRM

conversion cannot be underestimated in that it constitutes a public sphere free form reprisal, law and guilt.

A modern NRM is able to reach a worldwide audience using telecommunication services such as radio,

television and most importantly the Internet. Facegloria47, an Evangelical Christian alternative to social

media networking site, Facebook, has attracted 100,000 members in its first month of launch in Brazil.

Communication technologies have allowed, in a globalised world, for transnational/global churches to

                                                                                                               45 H.Campbell,(2010) ‘When Religion Meets New Media’ (p193) 46 ibid (p198) 47The Telegraph; found http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/brazil/11718235/Brazilian-Evangelicals-set-up-a-sin-free-version-of-Facebook.html (accessed July 2015)

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dominate and new religions to appear in an already condensed spiritual supermarket. Social media and

other online communication technologies have allowed individuals and organisations to setup and

disseminate religious worldviews expansively and anonymously and with minimal budget.

Technology has caused a definite impact on the global culture of religion. G.R.Bunt, on the

accessibility of Islam on the Internet, argues that “the notion of a globalised single umma…is for some

now becoming a digital possibility.”48 Paul Bramadat agrees by describing how “de-spatialized ubiquity

of the Internet fundamentally changes the way we might understand religious radicalisation.’49 Daesh

itself, as an independent formation, has made great progress in using media technology to progress its

ambitions and global appeal. Social media technology has been used by Daesh to convert, socialise and

raise funds and support. Online one can find the ISIL Al-Naba news reports as well as Dabiq, a Daesh

multi-language magazine. One can also find potentially dangerous content including Daesh’s how-to

guide known as ‘How to Survive in the West’ as preparation guidelines for potential recruits.

One can also stream and share video footage from Daesh’s stronghold in Raqqa onto platforms

such as Facebook and Youtube. The Al-Itisam establishment for Media Production and Al-Hayat media

centre are hubs for spreading Daesh propaganda across the Internet and social networks. There also exists

an official Daesh mobile app called ‘Dawn of Glad Tidings’ allowing members to keep up with latest

news. This app is also linked to the Twitter social network where it programs Twitter accounts to send out

to disseminate Daesh propaganda at rapid and uncontrolled rates.

Daesh has used Twitter extensively and effectively by spreading information in a flow from

official accounts through to insurgent fighters and to Western followers50. On June 28th 2014, robot

Twitter accounts made by these hubs were responsible for a ‘Twitter Storm’ involving rapid and

automated widespread messages of support, creating a chance for online spotlight and recruitment. Daesh

have used ‘Hashtag campaigns’ to raise awareness of the movement and spread a sense of solidarity

                                                                                                               48 G.R.Bunt ‘Surfing Islam, from ‘Religion On the Internet’ Cowan & Haddon  49 P.Bramadat, ‘The Public, the Political, the Possible’ from ‘Religious Radicalization & Securitization in Canada & Beyond’ (p.19) 50 J.Klausen, (2014)‘Tweeting the Jihad’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism(p.19)

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amongst members of Daesh.51 The speed with which Daesh affiliated media can be disseminated and

reciprocated over Twitter, through target-specific messaging and hashtag publicity, has proved difficult to

control. As Jytte Klausen argues, Daesh’s use of Twitter has shown that ‘it serves the same essential

purposes for terrorist organisation that bookstore and Internet forums played52’ in that it constitutes the

possibility of a public sphere of Jihadi-Salafi networking.

Recently, in the UK media news, there has been a focus on how Daesh have used such online

networks in recruiting or even further, indoctrinating and radicalisation. A BBC News report told how the

brother of a British Daesh member revealed ‘tactics similar to those employees by groups who seek to

normalise anorexia and self-harm’.53 In this example, the defected member managed to connect Daesh

accounts on Twitter who attempted to woo him supportively, feeding him constant religious propaganda.

He became an insider in a ‘delusional but self-supporting community54’ online into which he was, to an

extent love-bombed, through interaction via private message services. This example of private messaging

has been used by Daesh to communicate with potential recruits and sleeper cells via WhatsApp,

SureSpot, KIK & Telegram online messenger services due to the applications’ sophisticated encryption

methods. It is the nature of this relationship; that is to say a one-on-one and intensive interaction between

Daesh recruiters and potential members that may prove appealing and possibly effective.

Often conversion to a NRM is denigrated by an appeal to the brainwashing thesis. Similarly, it is

a popular stereotype to characterise young, naïve outcasts as those who vulnerable to the loving outreach

of online Islamic radicalisation. Those part of anti-cult movements argue that everybody is vulnerable to

the processes of brainwashing and increasingly recruitment over the internet.55 Debunking the

                                                                                                               51 J.M. Berger (2014) ‘How ISIS games Twitter’ found http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856 (accessed October 2015) 52 J.Klausen, (2014)‘Tweeting the Jihad’ (p.20) 53 E.Campbell, ‘Are IS Recruitment Tactics more subtle than we think?’,found http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33645685 (accessed December 2015) 54 ibid 55 M.Singer (1995) ‘Cults in Our Midst’.(Jossey-Bass)

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brainwashing theory, Barker concludes in her investigation of the Unification Church that converts were

“idealistic people with happy families’.56

However, clearly there are far more complex

processes at work. The intellectual process of conversion will involve an “individual who privately

investigates the possibility of ‘new grounds of being’,57 perhaps through contact with specific media such

as books, magazines, lectures, pamphlets and increasingly online propaganda, forums and social

networks. There is little social pressure involved and usually a pre-existing interest in conversion, which

I argue may be tangible for Daesh in the form of Jihadi-Salafi identity. Equally, Dawson highlights the

importance of face-to-face interaction as a grounding for online recruitment. She argues that off-line

interaction is necessary ‘for the relationship to flourish into one of recruitment.58

However, I believe the role of social media has been crucial in simply socialising, through online

relationships and interactions, those who have made online connections and interactions with a Salafi

milieu in the form of jihadist social networks. I argue that a prior interest or involvement in Salafi-Jihad

ideology and identity may be necessary for an effective socialisation through social media networking

and technology to take place. Daesh has a particular message that it proposes to stimulate this interest or

involvement.

9. Daesh Propaganda Pulls

Daesh have demonstrated adeptness at weaving together rational and identity-choice decisions in

their messaging. Daesh has a clear message it wishes to spread transnationally, both offline and online,

and it is arguably concerned with its provision of Jihadi-Salafi identity discussed earlier. The message

attempts to draw in potentials sympathisers through a propaganda narrative with a variety of ‘pulls’

interlinked with a portrayal of Daesh as guardians of a Jihadi-Salafi identity. Through assimilating                                                                                                                56 E.Barker,(1984)’The Making of a Moonie’, (p.210-216) 57 T.Robbins(1988) ‘Cults, Converts, Charisma’ ( p.67)  58 L.Dawson, (2000) ‘Researching Religion in Cyberspace’ from Religion On The Internet edited by Cowan & Haddon (p.43)

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narratives of utopic society, economic prosperity, justice and victimhood, and military strength,

sympathisers may be ‘pulled’ into considering joining.

Many propaganda narratives exalt Daesh as a religious solution with a shared Islamic heritage and basis

of morality and community. Through a greater understanding of Daesh propaganda available over social

media and other communication technologies we can further our conception of Daesh’s motivations and

‘pulls’ in attempting to radicalise and recruit. Evidence from the ICSR report on Daesh defection

narratives,59 shows that many of the recruitment narratives explain how it is individual grievances, beliefs

and social dynamics, which are tailored to in the recruitment process. It is an essential piece of evidence

in that it shows us the real human motivations of real people, whether material, political or spiritual, in

joining Daesh. However, Daesh also recruit through provocative ‘push’ reactions to the atrocities in Syria

through video propaganda of the conflict aiming to foster a shared Salafi identity as well as a religious

and humanitarian obligation for jihad. This conflation of and appeal to rational choice and identity choice

may well exhibit parallel motifs to Daesh propaganda.

Charlie Winter60 reports, having analysed vast dataset of Daesh propaganda over a month that topics such

as religion, social life as well as local services and prosperous economic activity in the caliphate are

promoted. Such propaganda output of videos and media are common examples of the innovative

‘blending of the mundane and the murderous, of worldly and millennial expectations, that infuses IS

propaganda.’61 I believe that there exists 4 distinct ‘pulls’ or narratives that may be discernable in Daesh

propaganda; these narrative pulls concern identity, society, military and victimhood and I believe these

areas to be realistic attractions amongst potential Daesh members. I will take each of these propositions in

turn.

                                                                                                               59 R. Neumann, (2015), Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors, ICSR (p.9)  60  C.Winter, (2015) ‘Documenting the Virtual Caliphate’, Quilliam Foundation  61 J.T. Kenney (2015) ‘Islamic State: World Religions and Spirituality Project’, found at http://wrldrels.org/profiles/IslamicState.htm;

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Identity

Bryan Wilson posits that one of five sociological indicia62 of a sect is that they are a primary

source of identity. Such a focus on identity may provide a fruitful approach in analysis of Daesh’s

message. Equally, Dawson argues that identity issues may explain why ‘children of the Muslim diaspora

are drawn to groups offering what is supposed to be a purer expression of Islam’63 in her investigation

linking NRMs and terrorism. A certain expression of Islam is manifest in Daesh’s provision of specific

religious identity. Daesh’s message draws on perceptual factors that are engineered to present Daesh as

the champion of Sunni Salafi identity and it’s enemies as ‘the Other’ as responsible for the jahiliyya crises

in society. Thus, in their media output, Daesh present themselves as the bearer of solutions to such a

crises in the form of a caliphate.

Daesh appear to respond to possible crises of identity through propaganda that appeals to, and

offers, an alternative Jihadi-Salafi religious alternative, in a backdrop of political and social concerns.

Evidence from the ICSR study of German Jihadists suggests that 82.4% of departees belonged to migrant

families64. This may be explained by the greater national identity crisis occurring across Europe as a

result of politics of austerity and migration. It can be argued that in this context, a global Salafi identity

may help the individual ‘transcend both the culture of their elders and that of the host country’.65

Evidence from the aforementioned ICSR report on German Jihadism suggests at least 81% of

German foreign fighters were considered Salafi and 68% as having had contact with supra-regional

extreme Salafi groups.66 Clearly, the proliferation and accessibility of Salafi social links and networks

have a role in the process of recruitment. Through what we can infer from studies of NRMs, one can

speculate the possibility that the recruiter, once a link has been established, may attempt to socialise and

present Daesh as provisional of such a Salafi religious and political identity. One must not ignore the

possibility of religious frameworks for identity in cases of ‘ethical deprivation’ or social distance from

                                                                                                               62 B.Wilson (1990), ‘The Social Dimensions of Sectarianism, (Clarendon Press) 63 L. Dawson (2009) The study of NRMs and Radicalization of Home-Grown Terrorists, (p.8)  64 D.H Heinke,(2016) German Jihadists in Syria and Iraq, ICSR. 65 A.Inge,(2014) ‘The Making of a Salafi Woman’, PhD Kings College (p44) 66 D.Heinke, German Jihadists in Syria and Iraq,.

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society bringing purpose and motivation. Much of Daesh’s message of identity, as discernable in

Winter’s propaganda dataset, is concerned with the narrative of victimhood.

Victimhood

This often-prevalent victimised ideology is used as a background narrative to possibly attract

individuals with political grievances and identity concerns. For example, according to the aforementioned

ICSR dataset, many join Daesh as opposition to the ‘Alawite regime’ in Syria. Such propaganda involves

video reports of Syrian government, as well anti-IS, coalition airstrikes, for example, to act as a raison

d’etre for Daesh’s self-proclaimed caliphate and jihad. These sorts of images serve to reinforce, not only

theological doctrine, but also humanitarian concern for Sunni peoples and propagate a fear of ‘existential

threat 67’. Their fear of a Shia Islamic crescent spreading from Iran, Lebanon and Syria is tangible in their

media output. This form of political concern, as manifested in propaganda, involves also, for example, the

leveraged myth that the US delivered Iraq into the hands of Iran during the 2003 war. The USA’s nuclear

deal with Iran contributes to this propaganda.68 Daesh appear to be heavily concerned with the existential

threat of expansionist Shi’a aims. As ‘champions’ of the Sunni Salafi identity they therefore may seek to

provide a solution to these narratives of religious victimhood and political grievance.

Caliphate Society

I argue people can be won over, or certainly pacified, with Daesh’s promised provision of basic

human services and an orderly and scheduled, though possibly repressive, daily life in Daesh society. A

large variety of videos that have been released by Daesh observe booming agriculture and industry in the

caliphate.69 The appeal of economic prosperity and utopian society is honed in on with these more

quotidian propaganda videos. Likewise, Marc Sageman argued in his testimony before the U.S. Senate

                                                                                                               67  D.Malet, Foreign Fighters, (OUP 2014) 68 C.Bunzel, ‘The Ideology of the Islamic State’ (p.70) 69 C.Winter, ‘Documenting the Virtual Caliphate’, Quilliam Foundation, (p.39)

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that potential Al-Qaeda ‘terrorists are idealistic young people, who seek glory and thrills by trying to

build a utopia.’70 Such demographics are targeted in this utopic propaganda.

Through formation of a caliphate, Daesh has attempted to change the structural reality of global

salafism by subsequently creating an image of an alternative and thriving Islamic society with a true

Islamic basis, under the protection of an emir and Islamic Sharia law. In a majority of Daesh propaganda

it is civilian life in the ‘utopia that was being stressed - social justice, economy, religious purity and the

constant expansion of the caliphate’.71 Through media outreach, potential recruits are encouraged to enter

into a new spiritual life with material benefits. One can argue here that Daesh promises a form of

eschatological way out, whether that involves a new well-paid and adventurous job or eternal life in

Heaven as a spiritual reward. Propaganda images of people street cleaning, opening medical colleges,

repairing damages, caring for orphans and distributing charity (zakat) are available to potential members.

According to Daesh defector narratives in an ICSR report,72 an appeal to faith and ideology is also

made in Daesh recruitment narratives influenced by ideals of a perfect Islamic utopia. The establishment

of the Daesh caliphate is sold as a package to potential recruits where ‘the economy flourishes, Islam is

implemented, wildlife thrives, rule of law prevails and the government governs.’73 However, such utopian

ideals have never been exclusive to jihadist milieus or Daesh, they are rather popular. In fact, the ideal of

an Islamic caliphate as an ‘Islamic polity has for centuries been present in the popular memory and

imagination’74 of many Muslims. It is commonly thought that military propaganda dominates Daesh

media outreach yet seemingly utopian idealist motifs of the caliphate are presented extensively too.

                                                                                                               70 M.Sageman, (2007) Radicalization of Global Islamist Terrorists’ US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, June 27th.  71 C.Winter, Fishing and Ultraviolence, found http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-88492697-b674-4c69-8426-3edd17b7daed, (Accessed November 2015) 72 P.R. Neumann, (2015), Victims, Perpetrators, Assets:, (p.9) 73 C.Winter, ‘Documenting the Virtual Caliphate’(p.41) 74M.Shterin & Yarlykapov, Demystifying the Caliphate (p.249)  

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Strength & Momentum

Military propaganda of course heavily features as well. Progress and apocalyptic momentum

appear to be key narratives in earlier propaganda output, according to the Quilliam Foundation report75.

This is backed up David-Gartenstein’s report on Islamic State’s propaganda media output, arguing that

Daesh’s ‘messaging depends on the group projecting an image of strength and momentum.’76 Narratives

may involve video propaganda aired on the Internet of scenes of brutality and violence to reinforce

military support against the Assad Regime, as well as to intimidate enemies in the West. Similarly, videos

and images of torture, amputations and stonings have been prevalent across not only social media, but

Arabic satellite TV, as well as some Western news network, in order to appeal to those seeking extreme

interpretations of Islamic law and order. The main function of such military propaganda however may

well be to provide certainty and fervour in the face of political unrest or disillusion as well as feelings of

victimisation also inherent in Daesh media propaganda.

Videos and footage of military action and violence in Syria is contrasted with footage of economic

prosperity in the Caliphate. This combination of propaganda that explores utopian Islam in society

alongside military feats is also often underpinned by common undertones of victimhood, related to

identity. Such flexibility in Daesh media propaganda output can accommodate and suit a variety of wants,

grievances, needs and motivations in possible recruits. Through a greater understanding of these

grievances and motivations we may be able to delineate what turns non-member into a member.

10. The Need for Ethnography

I certainly encountered difficulties in finding ethnographical research on a group such as Daesh.

This is of course to be expected due to the difficulty and controversial nature of such an affiliation. It is

important to realise that most evidence on Daesh relies almost entirely on media accounts and secondary

sources. If one factors in Daesh’s hostile and confrontational relationship with Western society, this may

                                                                                                               75 C.Winter, ‘Documenting the Virtual Caliphate’(p38) 76 D.G Ross, ‘The Winner’s Messaging Strategy of IS, Wikistrat(p7)  

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compromise interpretations of religious motivations and generalize individual motivations and ‘pulls’ in

joining Daesh.

James Beckford’s investigation in the 1990s of ISCKON’s relationship with ‘mass

media’ reveals a distanced perception of the ISCKON NRM as ‘Other’.77 Media sources thrive on issues

of conflict and secrecy, even more so when NRMs are involved. I believe a similar, and further

dramatised, media relationship with Islamic Extremism and Islam exists today. Daesh has been ‘othered’

and radically outcasted by a majority of, certainly British, but overwhelmingly Western, news networks

through the continuing narrative of a ‘Negative Summary Event’.

However, I hope my exercise of informed sociological imagination

may help further inform preliminary ethnographic research on Daesh. More ethnographic research and

evidence on such movements is completely necessary, if possible. In order to understand processes of

radicalisation or socialisation, we need ethnographic evidence of ‘various identifiable sub-processes, and

the numerous contingencies that condition its nature and course of development’.78 This may involve an

observation of the dynamics of social media in friendship network creation so important to conversion

and commitment.

I believe by demythologizing the Daesh foreign fighter narratives, policy makers may well make

Daesh less appealing as a radical religious solution to a number of background political and social

tensions in society. Evidence of Daesh defection narratives may be used in achieving this with its claims

of Daesh brutality, corruption and infighting79. More primary and personal accounts of Daesh are needed

and this may be done through what David Kilcullen regards as ’conflict ethnography’.80

                                                                                                               77 J.A.Beckford,(1994) ‘NRMs and the Mass Media, ICJ. 78 L.Dawson,(2009) The Study of NRMs and Radicalisation of Home-Grown Terrorists, (p18) 79 P.R. Neumann, (2015), Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: (p.10-12) 80 D.Kilcullen (2007). "Religion and Insurgency" (accessed December 2015)  

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11. Conclusion

I think it is important to exercise an informed sociological imagination in trying to understand how

potential members of Daesh may behave depending on their social and cultural contexts and local

environments. Considering it is not the role of the social scientist to assess the validity of a theological

argument, it is only possible to consider what other factors may appeal to potential recruits to Daesh. I

argue that some crucial lessons may be learnt from studies of NRMs that may help inform a sociological

imagination in explaining further the ‘conversion’ or socialisation process from non-member to member

of Daesh.

For example, Daesh’s ideology and recruitment narratives appear to address political grievances

as well as more individual issues of identity, society and victimisation. From evidence, we can concur that

these micro-political and macro-political concerns often frame Daesh recruitment narratives as well

Daesh propaganda. An elaboration of the relevant sociological theories and models may help explain why

certain factors or ‘pulls’ may progress the socialisation process from non-member to member of Daesh.

Observations of social dynamics and studies of conversion may reveal the underlying processes.

Social Media networks may not explain the entirety of the

recruitment processes involved but I do believe they act as an important catalyst in the grander process of

socialisation in a modern movement like Daesh. Social Media and other media technologies may be

providing a public sphere in which potential jihadists are accommodated into socially contextual Jihadi-

Salafi milieus through Twitter, online forums and individual interactions over private messaging. The

proliferation of Daesh online media output also appears to play an important role in the socialisation

process.

Through an observation of relevant sociological understanding of NRMs, I hope certain areas such

as religious identity, social media technology, and conversion may contribute to discussions around

religiously motivated radicalisation and possibly inform necessary and preliminary ethnographic studies

of Daesh.

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