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It takes two to tango: studying howstudents constitute political subjects indiscourses on sustainable developmentIann Lundegård a & Per-Olof Wickman aa Department of Mathematics and Science Education, StockholmUniversity, Stockholm, Sweden
Available online: 24 Jun 2011
To cite this article: Iann Lundegård & Per-Olof Wickman (2012): It takes two to tango: studyinghow students constitute political subjects in discourses on sustainable development, EnvironmentalEducation Research, 18:2, 153-169
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It takes two to tango: studying how students constitute politicalsubjects in discourses on sustainable development
Iann Lundegård* and Per-Olof Wickman
Department of Mathematics and Science Education, Stockholm University, Stockholm,Sweden
(Received 11 February 2008; final version received 17 May 2011)
A great deal of the ongoing discussion about environmental education and edu-cation for sustainable development has to do with democracy and deliberation.Here, for example, the normative approach has been challenged. As an alterna-tive, there is sometimes a call for a curriculum and education that is character-ized by democracy, participation, and pluralism. According to this call, it is stillfar from clear what it actually means to create education in terms of democracy.While the debate is lively, it is not always anchored in empirical research. Inthis study, three students in a classroom situation talk about resources and soli-darity. Using analytical tools developed from a pragmatic base, the study tries tofind a methodology to reveal how people create political subjects while engagedin such a discourse. This is associated with the discussion about democracy ineducation, and the consequences these findings may have in respect of how edu-cation on environment and sustainable development can be staged in terms offreedom and pluralism.
Keywords: education for sustainable development; values; pluralism; democracy;pragmatism.
Introduction
Policy or experimentalism?
A lively debate has been in progress in recent years as to how education for sus-tainable development, or ESD, should be developed (cf. Scott and Gough 2004).The discussion about research in this field has, to a great extent, also become a nor-mative policy discussion. It has certainly led to a number of critical and construc-tive suggestions for new approaches to the field, but besides having a policydiscussion on the subject, we also need to make use of functional tools in researchto formulate realistic and constructive ideas. In this study, we take a methodologicaland analytical point of departure from Dewey’s experimentalism (1930/1984),which is a method that seeks guidance for practice, without the intention to identifyeternal truths and values. Dewey’s pragmatic perspective (1929/1958) is describedby Howe (2005, 308) as ‘expansive and variegated in its conception of scientificmethod’ and points to how experience, both in everyday situations and in research,constantly is changing as it encounters the rich and complex world. Issues that
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
Environmental Education ResearchVol. 18, No. 2, April 2012, 153–169
ISSN 1350-4622 print/ISSN 1469-5871 online� 2012 Taylor & Francishttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504622.2011.590895http://www.tandfonline.com
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traditionally have been resolved by rational arguments end up in a different lightwhen they are tried against everyday situations. This is also what we had in mindwhile we took help from analytic tools used in three similar previous studies on stu-dents’ meaning-making concerning sustainable development (Lundegård and Wick-man 2007; Lundegård 2008; Lundegård and Wickman 2009). In this particularstudy we present the development a method and analytical tools which can be usedto investigate how democratic deliberation in ESD can be described when it islooked upon as communicative action.
Background
ESD and democracy
ESD is increasingly discussed in relation to concepts like participation, democracy,and pluralism (Hart 2000; Simovska 2000; Jensen 2000; Öhman 2006). In this con-text education in democracy is defined as when students are given the opportunityto participate in deliberations on what they consider as a good life in a sustainablefuture (cf. Öhman 2006). ESD has been criticized for being normative and exploitedas a resource for attaining a certain societal structure (Jickling 2004; Sterling 2004;Bowers 2007). Such an educational approach, it has been suggested, counteracts thestudents’ freedom and their possibilities for critical thinking and actions, and thequestion arises of how education in a democratic society ought to be organized (Jic-kling 2004).
Democracy, consensus, and/or conflict?
According to the discussion above, it is still far from clear what it actually meansto create and organize education in terms of democracy. Jürgen Habermas (1983),for example, whose theoretical framework partly is built upon the work of Wittgen-stein (1953/1997, 1969), defined democratic deliberation as based on a performativeapproach, which:
[. . .] allows for a mutual orientation toward validity claims (such as truth, normativerightness, and sincerity) [. . .]. These claims are designed for critical assessment so thatan intersubjective recognition of a particular claim can serve as the basis for a ratio-nally motivated consensus. At the same time, by taking a performative attitude,speaker and hearer get involved in those functions that processes of communicationfulfill for the reproduction of the life-world both speaker and hearer share. (Habermas1983, 255, his emphasis)
The Habermas scholar Leslie Howe (2000) has summarized this view of Habermasas ‘A goal of discourse is agreement or, more accurately, consensus. Consensus istaken by Habermas to be necessary for justification of validity claims’ (2000, 39).As explained by Pleasant (1999, 156), Habermas’s consensus perspective in com-municative action requires ‘(. . .) a shared “taken for granted” background of tacitnorms, assumptions and expectations’ (1999, 156). Pleasant also addresses certaincritique to this by saying, ‘Thus the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousnessbecomes the “paradigm of the philosophy of tacit consciousness”’ (1999, 160).While certain philosophers, like Habermas, in this way wanted to emphasize theperspective of consensus in people’s transactions and deliberations, others have paid
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attention to conflicts and dissensus (Lyotard 1984; Lyotard and Thébaud 1985; Todd2010). Also agonists like, for instance, Laclau and Mouffe (2001), reject all claimsthat there is any final overarching purpose that aims to be reached by deliberation.Instead, they maintain that when, for example, Critical Theory, Marxism, and Liber-alism try to reach an ideal of final agreement – they are all utopian. The aim of theagonists is rather to point out that conflicts, oppression/resistance, particularity andpluralism are all continuous parts of an ever-ongoing human deliberation in a radi-cal democracy. Laclau and Mouffe (2001) claim that, when the purpose is toenhance people’s ability to become free, we must allow for the possibility that con-flict may appear and then provide a space where differences can be expressed andconfronted. This general suspicion against the consensus perspective has also beendiscussed by Lyotard (1984), who argues from the later Wittgenstein’s (1953/1997,1969) reasoning on language games. Lyotard claims that people who take part indifferent language games belong to, as he said, different islands of language, eachof them ruled by a different regime (Lyotard 1993). The only condition for thosepeople is to meet in conflicts, because ‘to speak is to fight, in the sense of playing,and speech acts fall within the domain of a general agonistics’ (Lyotard 1984, 10).He also stresses that the actual conflict is not primarily between humans or betweenentities, but rather results from language and phrases (Burbules 2000). Lyotard’sway to interpret Wittgenstein and his reasoning on language games has beencriticized later by, among others, Burbules (2000), who maintains that:
Like some other poststructuralist writers, Lyotard has a tendency to fetishize difference– as if this was the overarching principle of language. Yet sameness and difference,consensus and conflict, understanding and misunderstanding, are all twin principles oflanguage; neither makes sense without the other. (Burbules 2000, 46)
Thus, Burbules (2000) puts Lyotard’s reasoning into question and he also, with apoint of departure from Wittgenstein (1953/1997, 1969), reminds us that we, as amatter of fact, cannot doubt everything we encounter, nor can we be in conflict witheverything, especially not at the same time. If we want to put certain things intoquestion, it is a prerequisite that we hold other things stable and fixed, as hinges. Inthis way, Burbules (2000) claims that consensus, conflict, understanding, and mis-understanding cannot be understood as oppositions on a general level, but rather asdifferent parts of one, and the same continuity in a language game where peopleexchange meaning in their actual lives. Burbules (2000) claims that both those whoadvocate consensus, as for example Habermas (1983), as well as the spokesmen forconflicting perspectives, as for example Lyotard (1984) and Lyotard and Thébaud(1985), have missed the point here: ‘The issue is not with the nature or essence oflanguage, but with the practice of communication’ (Burbules 2000, 52). Hence, thefocus of this article is the practice of communication as it develops among threestudents in an educational setting concerning sustainable development.
Democracy for, through, or in education?
The formulation of education in terms of democracy depends, of course, not onlyon how a democratic deliberation can be defined, but also on how we choose tosketch the democratic subject. One description is the individualistic conception,where democracy is considered as an inherent attitude. This is a perspective that
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stems from the European enlightenment and philosophers like Kant, who focuseson individuals’ autonomy and their ability to make use of their own reason withoutdirection of other people. The subject is here a democratic person who can thinkfor himself, and make his own judgments without being led by others (Biesta 2006,127). This notion of democracy has been taken further by liberal democracies suchas those established by the American and French Revolutions, which ‘assume anisolated, atomistic individual born with innate free will, innate rationality, andinnate natural rights’ (Garrison 2008, 2). Within this interpretation, individuals’democratic attitudes and capacities can be created through knowledge which pre-pares them for future participation in democratic life. In this sense, one usually talksabout education for democracy.
Another way of looking at the democratic subject is the social conception. Fromthis perspective, the individual is not regarded as having been created in isolation,but instead existing in relation to ‘making something in common’ together with oth-ers. The subject is a shaper of the conditions, as the condition simultaneouslyshapes the subject. From such a perspective, an autonomous subject developsthrough participation in democratic life, and one talks about education throughdemocracy. Here, the student is an active participant in more or less staged pro-cesses that build on democracy’s forms. Students thus take part in events wheredemocracy is brought to life, and are expected to carry these experiences with theminto future situations. Education both for and through democracy can be describedas focusing on particular individuals and has been criticized for a more or less fos-tering approach, which is at a risk of leading to an unreflecting reproduction of thealready existing patterns (Biesta 2006).
The political subject (bringing new beginnings into the world)
A third alternative to the individualistic or social conceptions is the political con-ception, here based on Biesta’s (2006) interpretation of Arendt’s (1958/1977) dis-cussion of what it is to be regarded as a free human being (Biesta 2006, 83–89).Arendt (1958/1977) described a person as a ceaseless doer; an initiative-taker that,when (s)he takes his/her place on the stage among other people, constantly initiatesand creates new relations to the world:
The very fact of having been born means that every person is an initium, a beginningand a newcomer in the world, and can take initiatives, be instigators and set somethingnew in motion. (Arendt 1958/1977, 239)
In this way, Biesta (2006, 132–145) claims that the political perspective on democ-racy in education is relational, which means that the democratic, political subjectexists only in the particular mo(ve)ment of performance where people encountereach other and act together in plurality. It is only then, in this situated event, thatpeople exist in a free and unique relation. It is also only in this situation that wecan talk about plurality in education. Because such a situation cannot be predicted,this also means a relation that is free from any of the fixed goals. In opposition tothe social conception above, democracy is here understood as a situation in whichthe interlocutors also have the opportunity to become free subjects, that is, to actand, through their actions, ‘bring their beginnings into the world,’ and this is also
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the manifested difference between the individualistic, the social and the politicalconceptions of an education on democracy (Biesta 2006, 135).
In this political conception of democracy in education, the creation of a subjectis regarded as the result of a political encounter among different values. Therefore,it also implies that everyone who is involved is having an unpredictable relation toother free subjects, who in turn are also capable of authentic response. Because freehuman action takes place in the interactions among individuals, this becomes a con-tingent process where all situations, at least in some respects, are unique. This,therefore, also means that every political action can be a bit risky, and in educationthe people involved also have to take a step forward and declare ideas. Anyway, ifwe want to see people develop as free subjects, then there is a paradox veiled inthe above argument that we are forced to confront. At the same time, as peopleattain freedom and their actions become unique, they are forced to interact in closerelation with others, and in this definition, freedom only exists in reciprocal action.This perspective is also the one to which we want to pay attention within this stillsomewhat limited study.
The world in which we grow into becoming free individuals is a world of con-trasts and pluralities. We can only become unique creatures in a world that is inhab-ited by others that are not exactly like us. From this argument, we can only becomeunique individuals by respecting and taking responsibility for allowing other peo-ple’s unique aspects on, for example, rights and needs to have expression – or, toquote Garrison (2008), when he describes the connection between freedom anddependence:
[. . .] genuine freedom requires us to bind our body-minds to those persons, places,and things upon which we must rely because they are most conducive to our growth,and we to them. (Garrison 2008, 179)
In addition to this, and in similarity with the discussion above on conflict and/orconsensus in democratic deliberations, Arendt (1954/1977) claims that today, free-dom has come to be described as a state of being, rather than as a relation betweenpeople. She argues that there must be a sharp difference between freedom and sov-ereignty in the way that we only attain freedom when we act together with others.Freedom, and not sovereignty, rests on human interdependence.
Human conditions are determined by the fact that it is not only man but people thatlive together on earth. Under such conditions freedom and sovereignty are so far apartfrom each other that they can’t possibly exist at the same time. (Arendt 1954/1977,179)
That which is central to being human, Arendt says, is action, and action presup-poses, by definition, an interpersonal relationship. Being a free democratic subjectmeans (inter)acting with others. In simple terms, it means that I step into the worldand become someone in the very instant that I create a new relation to the world inothers’ response. Then, I exist in a relation, and I find my identity and freedomonly together with others.
All the arguments in the discussions above are brought mainly into focusthrough a rational discussion on democracy in general. The aim in this methodolog-ical study is to develop a way to examine how learning democracy could be
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described in an educational setting. With the help of analytical tools, custom-madefor this type of study, we want to make operational concepts to the line of argu-ments listed above and show how they may be adopted to analyze on a micro levelwhat happens when three students meet in school discussions concerning sustain-able development. In this study, we are especially interested in exploring how tomake democratic deliberation on the future and on sustainable development visible,and how the political subject is created in this particular context.
A study of language transaction
The research approach adopted in this study is pragmatic, which means that it seeksmethodological points of departure in a theory connected with people’s everydayactions. In this study, dealing with how people grow into the world in interactionwith each other, communication is considered as the most important action. There-fore, we do not make any distinctions between talk and other kinds of action.Accordingly, the analysis deals with people’s reciprocal actions through the spokenword. In this context, it is important not to become entangled in the philosophicaltraps of language (Wittgenstein 1953/1997). It is tempting to view language as amirror of an outside reality, but it is not a reflection of existence in essential terms.Linguistic generalizations and precisions should therefore be made in relation to theconsequences that occur at any particular moment in time.
In order to explore meaning-making as a dynamic process, without universalpretentions, in the text that follows the qualitative analysis takes its departure in theso-called practical epistemology analysis (PEA) described by Wickman and Östman(2002, cf. Wickman 2004). This theoretical stand departs from the later ideas ofWittgenstein (1953/1997); Wittgenstein (1969). With such a point of departure,meaning-making can be identified as a change in the meaning of a discourse, or‘language games’ in Wittgenstein’s parlance (1953/1997, 14). Language games thendescribes how the context is constantly changing when the participants construenew relations to that which ‘stands fast’ in the discussion (see below) and the con-tingent interplay that develops between the interlocutors. In this situated perspec-tive, it is neither interesting nor possible to try to penetrate someone’s mind to findout what thoughts (s)he is carrying. Instead, meaning-making is studied as the pro-cess of the transactions that take place between individuals that meet and how they,in this encounter, construe new relations and new meanings in terms of the purposeof the actual situation.
A methodological approach
What is in particular focus in this study is to develop a methodology to see howthe discourse develops and becomes jointly changed, and how those who areinvolved in it can be said to create democratic and political subjects. Rather thantrying to analyze the meaning-making of particular individuals, the emphasis is onthe transactions in the discourse. This means that the individuals’ comments becomeinteresting as parts of an ongoing relational process, rather than being isolated evi-dence of knowledge or attitudes. Later, in the concluding discussion, some tentativegeneral suggestions are also made as to how education in democracy and sustain-able development could be framed so that those involved have the opportunity toactually experience democracy. This consequently leads us into a short discussion
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about how to create an education in sustainable development that is connected todemocracy, a discussion that has to be carried forward by further research.
Analytical tools
If the discourse process is to be followed empirically, we need to introduce someanalytical tools. In this instance, they have been borrowed from the previous empir-ical studies (Lundegård 2008; Lundegård and Wickman 2007; Lundegård and Wick-man 2009) that were inspired by Wittgenstein’s (1953/1997, 1969) and Dewey’s(1929/1958) terminology and by PEA (Wickman and Östman 2002; Wickman2004). The tools are as follows:
� Continuity, standing fast, and transformation� Human conflicts of interests and DEQs (Deliberative Educational Questions)� Value relations and political subjects
The use of these tools is described in brief below:
Continuity, standing fast, and transformation
Within a pragmatic framework, a situation and an interaction are inseparable. Livingin the world is to live in a flow of transactions with the environment (Dewey 1938/1997, 208–247). In every new situation and new encounter between people, andbetween people and things in the world, the former history, and collective experi-ences are re-actualized. This can be described as a continuity in every human inter-action with the world. Continuity arises when people go from one situation toanother and when parts are carried forward from the previous encounters to the laterones, and in connection with this, when the world both remains the same andchanges.
A central concept in the PEA is the concept of stand fast (Wickman and Östman2002). In order to understand how continuity can be analyzed in a discussion, it isimportant to understand how this concept is used. When you indicate that somethingstands fast in the discourse, it simply means that a certain use of words has not beenquestioned and that they therefore constitute continuity to the conversation. What isimportant to note here is that which stands fast only does so at this moment and inthis specific context. The individuals involved in a discourse cannot challenge everyword, because this would mean that the conversation would break down and cometo a standstill (Wickman and Östman 2002). In retrospect, whatever stood fast canbe described as a prerequisite for the conversation proceeding the way it did. In thePEA, continuity becomes partly synonymous with what stands fast in the conversa-tion, but continuity never stands for exactly the same, and this is where transforma-tion comes in. Dewey (1938/1997) describes the process as follows:
The principle of continuity of experience means that every experience both takes upsomething from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the qualityof those which come after. (Dewey 1938/1997, 35)
In every new encounter between the individual and the surroundings, and everyevent, both the world and the individual are to some extent re-created, and in every
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individual encounter and action, experiences are taken from the past, changed, andcarried forward to future events. Situations are never the same; something, howeversmall, is always transformed. In this way, continuity always implies some kind oftransformation. The analysis of the discussion below shows how certain central con-cepts stand fast in the discourse, but it also illustrates how these concepts are trans-formed and acquire new meaning and bring new consequences in relation to theconstantly changing exchange of views.
Human conflicts of interests and DEQs
A previous article by Lundegård and Wickman (2007) indicates how people in dia-log about the environment and sustainable development together constitute the sub-ject content of the conversation. In the analysis, it becomes clear that humanconflicts of interest about values play an indispensable role in the discourse process.A potential dialectic contradiction occurs at the very moment when one of the dis-course partners makes a remark. This allows the other to act in at least two differentways. In other words, the person who has spoken enables the other to make achoice, either to agree or to disagree. A brief example of four students in a discus-sion on solidarity is described below. One of the students, Nils, makes a remark onwhich two of the others take a stand for and against:
Nils: . . . for me it feels much more natural to help . . . those countries when you havesomething in common. You have the same culture . . . you don’t perhaps speak thesame language, but like, it feels . . . it’s not like on the other side of the planet.
(. . .)
Jennifer: I think it is good that you can help everyone. . .
Peter: Yes.
Nils: Yeah, sure it is, it. . .
Jennifer: . . . or try . . . it does not matter where they come from.
In a dialog about sustainable development, these choices are mainly associated withmatters that can be traced to human conflicts of interest in a broader sense. Here,they are about solidarity. This article shows that these dialectic contradictions canbe formulated analytically into questions that can then be used to create new delib-erations about sustainable development. These are called Deliberative EducationalQuestions (DEQs).
Should people’s culture and nationality have any significance for whom we want tohelp, or should it not make any difference?
In the analysis of the extract (below), it becomes apparent how human conflicts ofinterest for analytical purposes can be reformulated into DEQs, which can be saidto give the participants in the dialog something to expand on and to force them intopolitical positions.
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Value relations and political subjects
The third analysis tool consists of the so-called value relations which are establishedin the development of a political subject.
The use of value relations can be described in the following way. A discussionprogresses at the same time as the conversers form relations to each other’s utter-ances, or to things in the world. As these relations are formed, the conversers arealso constantly creating new possible human conflicts of interest (Lundegård andWickman 2007). However, the world does not remain divided, because those whohave made the distinctions (conflicts of interest) also make personal links (choices)to the discordance that has occurred. They thus create a personal value relation tothe possible conflict (cf. Lundegård 2008). In the example above, we can see howthe student Nils creates a gap between ‘us and them’ and then relates himself to thisdivision by a value relation.
Nils: . . . for me . . . it feels much more natural to help . . . those countries when youhave something in common.
In the example, Nils divides the world into countries that he would rather or rathernot help, and at the same moment, he declares his belongings with the value rela-tion ‘feels more natural.’ Consequently, in the same instant that the person, in thisway, expresses a value or feeling, s(he) also positions herself/himself normativelyabout how to act in relation to a human conflict of interest (in this example, aboutsolidarity between people). In this way, (s)he creates meaning around her/himself asa political subject. Political is here defined as an action (communicative or other)tending to obtain the common good (cf. Russell 1947, 201). By suggesting howone should act in relation to the outlined human conflict of interest, the student thussteps forward as a political subject. The following excerpts will demonstrate thismore extensively.
An illustration from the classroom
In this section, we have chosen to give a brief example from the analysis of a dis-course among three students. The students are between 20 and 25 years of age andparticipate in an adult education science course at upper secondary school level at aSwedish folk high school.
Global allocation between rich and poor countries was the issue for the day.The students in the class were divided into six groups, and the group discussionlasted for approximately one hour. The task they brought with them to discuss wasthe unequal and unfair distribution of resources in the world, and the teacher hadformulated three questions for the discussion: (1) Why is it that two thirds of theworld’s population feed on a third of the available resources and vice versa? (2) Dowe want to do something about it? and (3) How are we to get people to act? In theexcerpts that follow, three male students, Nils, Peter, and Martin (aliases) wereinvolved in a conversation about what is meant by showing solidarity. Theseexcerpts are chosen particularly because they express in an illustrative way that thediscourse develops as a transaction. They show how the methodological tools canbe used within a real situation where people involved in deliberation neither alwaysstrives to reach consensus nor only articulate distinctions and conflicts. Thecomments among the three conversational turns indicate how the discussion creates
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continuity between the different statements, as well as how the discourse is trans-formed through the human conflicts of interest and DEQs that occur and the politi-cal subjects that are constituted via value relations. Bold type in the excerptsdenotes all the value relations.
Peter
At the time we enter the discussion, the students are talking about whether privateindividuals should make financial contributions to relief organizations. Peter pitchesin like this:
Peter: I think I . . . well, it’s perfectly correct to send money to the Red Cross . . .and large, serious organizations like Radiohjälpen (an aid organization) and the RedCross and such like. . .
In this context, and that of other students’ answers, this formulation can be inter-preted as the Red Cross becoming a symbol for the type of organization that Petercan imagine sending money to. Through the words ‘I think’ and ‘perfectly correct,’Peter connects himself to the context via a value relation and beats the drum forhumanitarian aid contributions. However, in the next breath, he shifts the discussionso that it also tackles the importance of acquiring knowledge about those countriesone contributes to. He uses the value relation ‘important’ to create an expectationabout this, on which he then expands:
Peter: . . .well, it could be important to find out . . . you know, get some knowledgeabout the country. What kinds of resources are there, what kind of power-related con-flicts do they have, what kind of agriculture is there and what are the problems withit? Is it that the farmers don’t understand – are they uneducated? Or is it that they areeducated but that the building of a dam has destroyed things for them? Or is it thecase that environmental catastrophes have wiped out the species of fish and this iswhy they have to flee? What kind of problems does that create? . . .. If there’s over-population and so on, and dirty water and no, no medi ... diseases and no medicine,then it’s very . . . after all, in the Third World they die from diseases that we havealready. . . that we, you know, don’t have any problems with. TB . . . and things likethat. . . It all hangs together and well, then you can, and it can . . . then it can be, kindof, very important to find out about it.
In his utterance, Peter first makes a distinction between contributing money to well-established organizations and acquiring knowledge about the area, a distinction thatcan also signal a human conflict of interest. At the end of his statement, Peterreconnects to the conflict he has discerned and the action he has chosen via thevalue relation ‘important.’
In and with his utterances, Peter has introduced a DEQ on which the others canexpand. This DEQ can be formulated as
Should we be content with giving money, or should we acquire knowledge about therecipients’ situation before we send money to relief organizations?
Peter’s initiative and the connected value relations have temporarily constituted apolitical subject, which indicates that ‘it is important to acquire as much knowledgeas we can before we act and make a financial contribution.’
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Nils
In this phase of the discussion, the next participant, Nils, latches onto the conflictand the dilemma that Peter has outlined. Nils begins his statement by saying ‘but,’thereby making a new distinction that is to do with what – if you take a little dis-tance – one can actually expect from people in general in Sweden. He differentiatesbetween what one ought to do (acquire knowledge) and what people in general canactually manage. By using the words ‘I don’t think that. . .’ Nils connects to whathe is going to say next with a value relation:
Nils: But, it . . . I mean, if you look at each, if you are to see . . . that is, if you lookat Sweden as a whole. I don’t think that . . . people aren’t able to . . . really. You readabout poverty in the newspapers and about, about, about those developing countriesand they, th . . . then I don’t know whether people mana . . . they, like . . . When I seethings like that . . . you know, it’s almost too much, seeing those starving kids and allthat stuff about environmental catastrophes, you can’t take it all in and, I don’t know.I absolutely agree with you when you say that we should find out as much as wecan, but I don’t think that. . . People just don’t have the energy. It’s much simpler tosend a couple of hundred kronor to the Red Cross so that you’ve at least done some-thing, and then you just have to hope that the money goes to the right place, kind of.
The Red Cross still stands fast as an example of an organization that representshumanitarian aid. This gives continuity to the discussion. However, through Nils,the Red Cross is transformed into an example of an association that illustrates peo-ple’s routine behavior. Through Nils, the conflict about whether or not to acquireknowledge is also maintained. Besides, in using the words ‘I absolutely agree withyou when you say that we should find out as much as we can,’ Nils is connectinghimself to the context of Peter’s statement via a value relation. However, instead ofassociating himself with something in Peter’s statement, Nils creates a new distinc-tion and a human conflict of interest that is concerned with what can be expectedfrom people in general. Nils’s remarks can now instead be formulated as a DEQ:
Should we expect people in general to get involved or be committed, or should we behappy that they make a routine contribution?
By using the words ‘I don’t think that. . .’ Nils links up with the context he outlinesvia a value relation. A political subject is thereby temporarily constituted, whichindicates that ‘we ought to be happy that people show their solidarity by makingroutine contributions.’
Martin
The third participant, Martin, who has been silent for a while, now re-enters the dis-cussion. With the words ‘everybody can’t help everyone, but everyone can helpsomebody,’ Martin takes the initiative and flags up another distinction, namely, get-ting involved in one particular situation or in several different ones.
Martin: Yes, but it is. . . But at the same time you have to remember that everybodycan’t help everyone, but everyone can help somebody. It’s as though, we need to . . .invest resources in Sweden as well in, er, let’s say, research, in medical research. Ihave personally been involved in . . . in the Children’s Cancer Society since ’95 and
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been an active member, and a youth leader and have helped to collect money, etc.And I feel that . . . this is . . . that’s my way of contributing. . .
Here, Martin has come to grips with the conflicts that Peter and Nils started toelaborate on, namely, those concerned with needing to and managing to keep up todate with what was going on in the different areas that we can support. By saying‘I feel that. . .’ he connects himself, via a value relation, to what he goes on to saynext. Martin continues
Martin: . . .I can’t work for the Red Cross, Unicef, er . . . the Children’s Cancer Soci-ety, the Cancer Society . . . without, well, I’m only one individual. I can’t clonemyself, nobody can, so I had to make a choice and that was to work for the Chil-dren’s Cancer Society, because that’s closest to my heart. And, I mean, I feel that. . .
The Red Cross is retained as an example of an organization that stands forhumanitarian relief. In this way, the symbol of the Red Cross stands fast in, andgives continuity to, the discussion. At the same time, however, it is transformed intoone of a number of associations that challenge us to make sacrifices. Here, Martinturns his past actions of his life into active choices in the conflicts the others haveoutlined. With the statements ‘that’s closest to my heart’ and ‘I feel that,’ he con-nects himself, via a value relation, to the actions he has suggested.
Rather than adopting a position to the alternatives in those conflicts that the oth-ers have outlined, Martin initiates a new distinction. His utterances create a newconflict; one that can be formulated as a question, or DEQ.
Should we get involved in several situations at the same time, or should we decide toput our personal resources into specific limited areas?
In the discussion, Martin has temporarily constituted a political subject, whichindicates that ‘It feels more important to get deeply/personally involved in one spe-cific area than superficially un-personal in a number of different ones.’
Some conclusions
Within this brief excerpt, we have been able to follow a small part of a processwhere the students could be said to experience a democratic deliberation in a schoolcontext. Of course, we may point to the limitations of this discussion as it is heldby white, western youth who has not been tried by the real efforts of life. Moreindulgently, we may also realize that this is what the actual discussion looks likefor these students in their school and in their actual situation. Anyway, the purposehere is not to evaluate these students’ particular values or standpoints. Rather, wetry to describe how this educational situation of communicative action and delibera-tion proceeds, a situation where the students together, in Arendt’s (1958/1977) par-lance are able to constitute free subjects in that each one is allowed to make hisown distinctions.
During the short sequences, the participants pointed to three human conflicts ofinterest (here, formulated as DEQs) and offered each other the opportunity to act aspolitical subjects in relation to them. The content of the process can be described asfollows:
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During the discussion (the language game), certain things stand fast and create conti-nuity between the conversers and carry the discourse forward.
As the discourse constantly creates new relations, some of the content is transformed.In the new utterances, the one that previously stood fast now assumes a different sig-nificance.
During the discourse, each of the participants has an opportunity to initiate distinc-tions. These distinctions deal with human conflicts of interest on the common goodand can be reformulated as DEQs to which the others can form a relation.
During the discourse, and via value relations, each participant has the possibility ofconnecting his ‘I-self’ to one of the actions in the distinctions that they or the othershave created.
As the conversers continually connect new relations to these actions, they are consti-tuted as political subjects during the discussion.
This study has been able to follow a process through discourse. It has developed amethodological framework and analytical tools to show how the continuous consti-tution of free political and democratic subjects can be made salient in an excerpt.Instead of the students involved in the deliberation necessarily trying to reach con-sensus, each person’s different utterances led to the other being challenged andafforded the respective person the opportunity to make new critical distinctions andtake new initiatives in the deliberation.
In each distinction and at each stage of the process, the other is challenged to alignor disagree with one of the alternatives that can be said to emerge during the actualconversation. Still, at least in this brief passage a person does not need to take a posi-tion in the conflict or to the questions posed by the other. Rather, the students respondby sketching new choices and, through values, connect themselves to one of the actionalternatives. In other words, in this process, when the participants are creating new,unique, critical political subjects, this always appears in relation to the actions andcontexts that were outlined before. Accordingly, in this actual situation, democracycannot be said to depend on either only on consensus or only on conflict (cf. Haber-mas 1983; Lyotard 1984; Lyotard and Thébaud 1985; Laclau and Mouffe 2001).
However, it is important to point out that we have also been able to demonstratethat, in this deliberation, the political subject does not just appear on its own.Instead, it constantly develops through the encounter between the students’ in reci-procal actions. Consequently, and as already stated on a theoretical level by, forexample. Arendt (1958/1977), Garrison (2008), and Biesta (2006), this methodolog-ical study points to the decisive significance of the other. Formulated in personalterms, the political subject emerging in the same moment as the other outlines ahuman conflict of interest for an individual to take a stand against. Then, ‘I amforced to either connect with one of the distinctions (s)he has made, or to create myown new distinctions.’
Discussion
Education has often been regarded as important in the struggle to assure the worldof a sustainable development. This is why there is a constant and lively debate as
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to how the teaching of issues concerning the future should be framed (cf. Jicklingand Wals 2008). For example, Jickling (2004) declares that
[. . .] the task is not to educate for sustainable development. In a rapidly changingworld, we must enable students to debate, evaluate, and judge for themselves the rela-tive merits of contesting positions. There is a world of difference between these two[normative and pluralistic] possibilities. The latter approach is about education; theformer is not. (Jickling 2004, 137, our comments appear in brackets)
Through this debate, concepts like pluralism and democracy have become criticalcatchwords (Hart 2000; Simovska 2000; Jensen 2000; Öhman 2006). According tothis discussion, we here have tried to develop a methodological framework wherewe can take help from a small number of students to illustrate what a democraticdeliberation in a school context might mean, thereby attempting to clarify what oneis actually talking about when one uses concepts like pluralism and freedom.
When it comes to trying to understand what democracy in education for sustain-able development actually means, an important discussion is how we understandthe relations and balance between on the one hand conflict and consensus and onthe other hand freedom and sovereignty. Arendt (1958/1977) pertinently points tothe differences between the latter relationships with the words: ‘If men want to befree, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounce’ (Arendt 1958/1977, 165). Also,Biesta (2006) indicates from a rational view how free initiative-taking is based on adependency among people:
We always begin our beginnings, [. . .], in a world populated by other beginners. Thismeans, however, that in order to pursue our own beginnings we always have to relyon the actions of other beginners. (Biesta 2006, 84)
If thereby we understand freedom as something that we can attain only by actingtogether with others, then freedom will always be regarded as an open public andpolitical phenomenon, rather than a private inner feeling.
It takes two to tango
In this study, we were able to follow how a pluralistic process can be shaped andtried to show how this connects with the argument that, for example, Arendt putsforward when talking about a political perspective on democracy. What this studyhas revealed empirically is also the one that is entailed in the following Arendt’s(Arendt 1954/1977, 179) suggestions to distinguish between the sovereignty andfreedom, and what it actually means to say is that a political subject does notappear in isolation.
Also, we have seen that the creation of the political subject in deliberation is tobe regarded as a mutual process. Accordingly, people do not enter the arena andtransform themselves through their own efforts, but rather in a transaction. In thisstudy, we have suggested a course where this occurs as a displacement in relationto what is unforeseen arising in the encounter and the space between ‘the other’and me. ‘“The other,” that just before I made my move, dared to stand nakedbefore me with her/his standpoint and indifference. It is therefore us together andnot me alone who creates me as a political subject.’
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What we also have recognized here is that a democratic deliberation on sustain-able development is neither best defined as a quest of consensus (cf. Habermas1983) nor founded merely on dissensus or conflicts (cf. Lyotard 1984), as suggestedin the philosophical debate on deliberation, democracy and education. In the trans-actions and utterances we have been following, both phenomena are potentiallypresent.
What we would also suggest (based on what we have shown here) is that educa-tion on sustainable development, rather than being a preparation for something tocome, could be a space in which people could meet, act, take initiatives, and havethe courage to step forward and create democratic political subjects in the actual sit-uation. Biesta (2006), who has already introduced this discussion, says:
The educational question is therefore no longer how to engender or ‘produce’ demo-cratic individuals. The key educational question is how individuals can be a subject,since we can only be a subject in action, that is, in our beginnings with others (Biesta2006, 137–138).
Here, a democracy in education, which means to be involved in a process of both‘bringing new beginnings into the world’ and taking part in what before ‘I tookthis step,’ has been constituted collectively. Metaphorically, this could bedescribed as being involved in a dance, like a tango, where the actual dance dem-onstrates a synthesis, the transaction, which would not be possible to accomplishon one’s own.
Notes on contributorsIann Lundegård is a senior lecturer in science education at the Department of Maths andScience Education, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden. Iann’s research interest islearning for sustainable development. Currently he is doing research on high school/collegestudents’ deliberations and meaning-making on their future and on sustainable development.He is a member of the Swedish Institute for Research in Education and SustainableDevelopment (IRESD). Iann educates teachers and teacher students on education forsustainable development and has written several text books in the field of environmentaleducation.
Per-Olof Wickman is a professor in science education at the Department of Maths andScience Education, Stockholm. His research interest is in classroom learning as holisticprocesses including cognitive, personal and cultural transformations. He is the author of thebook entitled Aesthetic Experience in Science education: Learning as Situated Talk andAction.
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