71ST CONGREB82d Session I SENATE

LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

ABSTRACT OF TESTIMONY ON CERTAIN

SALIENT QUESTIONS OF THE LONDON

NAVAL TREATY GIVEN BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS

OF THE SENATE

MAY 14 TO 29, 1930

PRESENTED BY MR. 11ALM

JUNE 25, 1980.-Ordered to be printed

UNITED STATESGOVERNMEN4T PRINTING OFFICN

WASHINGTON 1930

S D-71-2-VOL 23-no5

(DOCUMENTI No. 197

LONDON NAVAL TREATY, 1930

The Senate Naval Affairs Colmmittee has liold hearings extendingover the period from May. 14 to May 29.

Tlie6 purpose of those hearings was to bring out for theiruse of theSemite and for tho int6rmation of tho country thoe effect of thae Lonldontreaty on the national defense of the country, and the reasons formaking thli radical change in ouir naval policy involve(d in the treaty.The testimony taken, comprising some 1500 pages, is now available

in printed form.Tlhe following 25 Wistneisses appeared before the committee and are

liste(d below il alphabetical order for ready reference:Adaons, I-Ion. Charles F.: Secretary of the Navy.Bristol, Rear Admiral Mark'L.: Chhairmani of tho executive committee

of the General Board since March, 1930. Commander in chief,Asiatic Fleet September, 1927, to September, 1929. Commandednaval forces in Near East and high commissioner to Turkey Jatu-ary, 1919, to May,' 1927.

Chase, Roar Adnii'al Johlu V.: Member of General Board. Assignedas next conlmanf(ler in chief of United StatosFleot. CommandedBattleshlip Division Foum, September, 1926, to *July, 1928.

Colo, A(dmiral Willianm C.: Commander Scoutting Fleet. Comm an(ledBattleship Division Foulr Jufly, 1928, to May, 1,929, Cbhief of Staff,IJnited States Fleet, Auiguist, 1923, to Octol)er, 1925.

Coontz, Rear, Admiral Robort E. (rtirod): Tro(lni(val exlport generalati Washiington conference, Former commander ill chief UnitedStates Fleet Auigust, 1,923, to October, 1925. Chief of NavalOperations October, 1919, to July, 1923.

D)ay, Rear Admiral Georgo C.: Meml)or of General Board; since Sep-tombor 13, 1929. Conimandlod submarine divisionn, Pacific, Sop-teinber, 1023, to July, 1925. Commanded light. Cruiiser DivisionJuneo, 1.927, to July, 1929,epbul)llrn, Rear Admiral Arthlr J.: Chiief of Stall', United States Fleet.Assigned to Naval Walr Collegeo. Director Naval Intolligence0 July,1926, to September, 1927. Naval adviser Geneva conference, 1927.Member naval technical staff at Londlon conference.

Iouglh, Rear Admiral H1e0nry 1.: Member General Board sinceMarch, 1928. ComiimandcdI Yan1gts(l IPatrol October, 1925, toDecember, 1927. Director Naval Intelligence December, 1923, toSeptember, 1925,

H-uiighes, Adimiral Charles F.: Chief of Naval Operations and thorobyox oflicio president of General Board since November, 1927.Commannnder in Clhief United States Fleet, Septemniber, 1926; toNovember, 1927. Colnidler in clief Battle Fleet, October,1925, to September, 1926. Director Fleet Training July, 1924, toOctober, 1925.

2LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

Jones, Rear Admiral (retired) Hilary P.: Naval adviser at LondonConference. Delegate to Geneva Conference of 1927. Navala(Iviser at Geneva Preparatory Disarmament Commission sinceits inception in 1926 with exception of the fourth session, to whichthe United States (lid not send the regular delegation. Formercommander in chief of United States Fleet.

Lenhy, Rear Admiral William D.: Chief of Bureau of Ordnance sinceOctober, 1927. Commanded battleship New Mexico June, 1926,to October, 1927.

McLefin, Rear Admiral Ridley: Budget Officer Navy Departmentsince August, 1929. Commander submarine divisions, BattleFleet, June, 1927, to June, 1929. Director Naval CommunicationsApril, 1924, to June, 1927.

Moffett, Rear Admiral William A.: Chief of Bureau of Aeronauticssince July, 1921, Member technical staff at London Conference,Member Technical Staff at Washington Conference.

Ntulton, Rear Admiral L. M.: Commander in chief Battle Fleet sinceMay, 1929. Commander Battleship Divisions, Battle Fleet, Jino,1928, to May, 1929. Commander Battleship Division Three, June,1923, to Jatnuary, 1925.

Pratt, Admiral William V.: Commander in chief United StatesFleet. Assigned as next Chief of Naval Operations. TechnicalExport-General at Washington Conference. Naval adviser atLondon Conference, President Naval War College, 1925-1927.

Pringle, Roar Admiral J. R.: President of Naval War College,Recently assigned command Battleship Division Three. Chief ofstaff Batdleshiip Divisions, Battle Fleet, and chief of staff BattleFleet, October, 1925, to September, 1927. Member technicalstaff at London Conferenco.

Reeves, Rear Admiral J. M.: Member of General Board since June,1929. Command aircraft squladrons, Battle Fleet, October, 1925,to May, 1929. Duty Naval War College August, 1923, to May,1925. Naval adviser Geneva Conference of'1927.

Robison, Rear Admiral Samuel Shelburne: Superintendent NavalAcademy since June, 1928. Commander in chief United StatesFleet October, 1925, to Sopteombr, 1926. Commander in chiefBattle Fleet Junol 1923, to October, 1925.

Rodgers, Rear Admiral (retired) William L.: Member Advisory Com-mittoo at Washington Conference, Commander in chief AsiatioFleet Iecember, 1918, to September, 1919.

Smyth, Capt. W. W.: Assistant to Chief of Bureau of Ordnance,Naval ad visor Geneva Conference of 1,927. Member naval tech-nical staff at Washington Conference.

Standloly, Roar Admiral William HI.: Assistant Chief of Naval Opera-tions since May, 1928. Director foot training November, 1927,to May, 1928, Command of U. S. S. Oaiifornia February, 1926,to October, 1927. Director war l)lans July, 1923, to February, 1926.

Taylor, Rear Admiral M. M,: Director War Plans since July, 1929.'olnlnior Scouting Fleet July, 1928, to June, 1929. Commander

Battleship Division Throo June, 1927, to June, 1928. Directorfloot training Septeml)er, 1925, to May, 1927. Commander controlforce May, 1923, to Soptoenbor, 1925.

2

LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930 3

Train, Commander Harold C,: On duty with General Board. Navaladviser at Geneva Conference. Member naval technical staff atLondon Conference. Technical expert at Geneva Preparatory Dis-armament Commission at third, fifth, and sixth sessions 1927, 1928,and 1929.

Wiley, Roar Admiral (retired) H. A.: Former commander in chiefUnited States Fleet November, 1927, to May, 1929. Duty withGeneral Board October, 1925, to November, 1927. Commandedbattleship divisions Battle Fleet May, 1923, to October, 1925.

Yarnell, Rear Admiral H. E.: Chief of Bureau of Engineering. Com-mand aircraft Squadrons Scouting Fleet April, 1924, to September,1926. Staff Naval War College September, 1926, to July, 1927.Command of UJ. S. S. Saratoga November, 1927, to September, 1928.Member of naval technical staff at London Conference.The testimony gathered from the above 25 witnesses covers some

600 printed pages which is now available for the use of the Senate andthe 1p)iblic. The following shows the gist of the naval testimony oncertain salient questions which arise in connection with the treaty.

OBJECTIVE OF LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS

Rear Admiral JONES: In approaching the subject of. reduction andlimitation of naval armaments, there are two fundamental objectives:

1. Peace objective: Reducing the probability of war and therebyhelping to promote universal peace.

2. Economic objective: Materially reducing the burden of taxation.Secretary ADAMS: The prime objectives of the United States dele-

gation to the London conference:1, To cooperate with other delegations in terminating naval

competition by limiting all classes of warships.2. To assure equality of combatant naval strength for the United

States with Great Britain.3, To arrange a satisfactory relation between ouir Navy and that

of the Japanese.4. To bring about reduction in tonnage wherever practicable.Admiral PRATr: The Lonrdon treaty should be judged on three

governing factors:1. Good will.2. Naval effectiveness.3. Costs.

The weights to be given the three factors depend upon-(a) Whether a country is faced with immediate need for preparing

for war.(6) Whether a country is in a state of pefaee, with a hope of con-

tinuling this state of penep

BASIS FOR DETERMINING PARITY

PARITY MEANS PARITY IN COMBATANTNAVAL STRENGTH

Subscribed to by-Secretary Adams.Admiral Pratt states this

and carries it further.Real Admiral Jones agrees

to this but brings in otherelements.

ARGUMENTS

Secretary A.DAMS: Combatantnaval strength sons to be theonly means of comparison, Ifyou go outside this an(l take intoaccount such national assets asInmrcainllft marine or military b)asos;sluel otlher l)alaCinlg assets afsfuel, popuflationi, wealth, assuredfood supl)l)les, an (i raw materialsforl colstruotioll must be coil-si(lere(d, au(l a meaolisurO of agroo-mnolnt, to stop) coill)otitjive buildinggwould never be roachled. Parityis equal fighting force in all Casesand cani not include the abovewithout, giving Great Britaini theright to oonsidor mlany things onlol11' )111st.'T'O Cour1se of tra(le ill time ofwall cn llnot b¢ foretold. Ilowsupplies alo to reach this countryin time of wal will be a ma1ttetr tobe arranged in som1(e watys whichllareo nlot strictly naval ways. 01urslhipPig will prol)alaly be largelyturln(l over to neutrals. Thedirection of shlippilig r1oultes asthey exist to-dlay may not b)C

4

IN DETERMINING PARITY, COMBATANT1STRENGTH ALONE SHOULD NOT BECONSIDERED

Subscribed to by-Rear Admiral Jones.Rear Admiral Coontz.Realr Admiral Pringle.Admiral Hugheis.Vice Admiral Colo.Rear Admiral Standley.Rear Admiral Taylor.Admiral Nulton.Rear Admiral Chase.Rear Admiral Bristol.

ARGUMENTS

Rear Admiral JONES: UnitedStates must have, equality ofop)1)0prtunity in areas vital to itsl)hysical and economics life. In,seeking equality of opportunitywhere its. trade lines anT interestslie, United States needs certaintyypes of units b)ecausO of geo,graphical position oIr lack of bases.Theso factors necessitate carryingOut unit OpJerations in distantareas, nild operations at long dis-tances from own bases and nearthose of possible enemies, Inseokinlg pai'ity these factors miustbe considered.Rear Admiral COONTZ:. CO11-,

batant strength flone is not allthat shoulld, e considleredl. Shouldi1)0 Carotid to gOt all we need oult-sidle the Combatant fleet. Should)build shiJ)s we call u1se, not oillywith the battlee fleet, blut for otherneeds;, such as defenldingi com11-moer(c and keeping op0)r lines ofcOlmllmlulnication.

R1eatr Admiral PRINGLE: Cruis-ers are needed outside the battle

9.869604064

Table: BASIS FOR DETERMINING PARITY

460406968.9

LONDON' NAVAL'!TRBATY OF 1n930

ARGUMENTS

necessary in war. The problemgoes beyond naval knowledge andinto other problems.i .Admiial PRATTF Supported ithe

view of Socretary Adams andfurther stated that in effectingactual parity and 'in securingdesirable ratios in' combatantships the problem can 'be: lookedat from two viewpoints: (a) "" N-aval sea strength in the broad",(b) "fleet combat, strength..'.'Naval sea strenigth in the'ibroadis not permissible, a more ire-stricted iew mtist be taken, andwre must view our problem fromthe anglo of floetaombat 4stenkth,which is a definite measurablequantity. Naval-se strength'inthe broad introduces 4 intangiblbquantities the insertion of whichothies *ill easily class as suJyerior-ity, and *vhich in' truth cani neverbe meioasuired accurately.

IfHdurlng peacb we inject thequestion 'of trade routes, either ofthle oneiny to be biokew down, idrouir own to'boe I)rotoctodj can wehope to secure parity in naval

combatant types which 'are thesubjects of limitation? The argu-monts which can 'be advanced byon( set of. claimants, ill oppositionto the views of' another, are somany 'that the problein' becomestoo coml)licatod for solution andamicable agreement.,! An agroe-nient talong these lines, may be

forced, but will lrOlbably notbetamicable,

1h'onmenasure of'^ fleet' cohibatstrength' 'is a tangible tl.hig; it

canll ) made with reasonableaccullacy) andl in the endleavor toattain pairity' botweeni nationg~iinalval streingth, it offeois'prolablythe best road along *which' linita-tion canl travel and atrriveY , atagrroement. -t wa.AS t~hd bstinatoof fleet Comblat strengths, whicihwas~used inl ottempting '.to arrive

ARGUMENTS

fleetfor,0iorcise idf control, of-s6&communications -by,! dispersedoperations, Ii Pegard! to. bakingequality with Greit' Britain3 ncombatant eqiiality of. tho flcete,thc nmostiifnportant, issue ist thatthetifted Stbtes prkefetve to heroself the right'to bbuild 'within theimposed.limits the ships best suitedothi r own 'Ieeds and 'necessities,and that each nation should havethe right to 'dolthe same. In aTriv-ing atiparity uvdshobld consult ouruiil itaryt heeds.'Admiral 'UtlGHrnS: Only atim' of

the 'United Staties "should not' beto reach- comb at' equality, but wehaVer to protect our commerce andnmhintain ourselvest ait sea. 'Theships;; so 'requried '4ae combatships -but -not battle line or fliotships Uhite'd states should buildas she chooses within allowed ton-nage limitations aind other na-tions should be allowed the same

privileges.Vice Admniral CoyB: Combat

larity l)etween the fleets alone is.not all that is essential to parity.Bases in amore of operation areimportant. Nations should b1permitted to buiild as they see fitwithin the tonnage limitations.

Rear Admniral STANDLEY: Pro-tection of commeroce and inter-ests should enter into considera-tions as woll as combat forcewhen seeking parity. A war inaybe settled without aly battle offleets. During entire life of a warour comieorce and trade rolatesmust 1)0 protected and war mak.ing material brought into the:Country. rJhljs requires not Onlya cornb)at force which muist b)ready at all times, but anll l(di-tionatil force to )atrol ouir traderoutes,'T'ho naval strength of a

countryy is madci up of coml)ntship, merc00hant manfirine and bases.Parity in combat units does not

5

LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

ARGUMENTS

at agreement through the instru-ment of this treaty.The purpose of thie Navy in time

of peace is to train for war. OurNavy is one of the best guaranteesof peace that we have. Thepurpose of the Navy in time ofwar is to destroy the enemy's seapower. If that is accomplishedyou can maintain your will onthe seas.The cruisers of the United

States should not be scattered,but the whole fleet should beconcentrated as a combatant unit.

Rear Admiral JONES: Parity inactual combatant tonnage is theonly practical basis for agree-ment. This has always been theattitude of the United States inall conferences between two coun-tries. (See opposite column.)

ARGUMENTS

give parity in sea power. Parityin merchant marine does not giveparity in bases. Parity in every-thing is essential, Combat par-ity alone can not bring real parityas far as the domination of thesea is.concerned.

Rear Admiral TAYLOR: Parityin sea power can not be acquiredby limitation in but one categoryof sea power. Sea power ismade up of navy merchant ma-rine, and bases. In London treatyparity was based on combatparity and no attention paid tothe task thrown on the navy bylack of bases and merchant ma-rine, and need for the protectionof trade. Each nation shouldbuild as it sees fit within the settonnage limits.Admiral NULTON: Combat

parity in the combat fleet aloneshould not be the basis in eek-ing parity. Ultuinate determina-tion is combined resources,Large proportion of war activitiesare mn protection of commerce,destruction of enemy commerce,protection of own lines of com-munication, scouting, etc. Eachnation should have the right tobuild as it sees fit. within thetonnage limitations allotted.

Real Admiral CHAsE: Duplica-tion of ships to obtain parity isfundamentally unsounid. Iden-tical ships do not fill the navalneeds of two nations equallywell on account of differentconditions under which they op-erate, Fighting strength or navalstrength is not susceptible ofexact computation. Only equi-table means of establishing parityare: (1) Each nation should beallowed equal amounts of tonnagefrom which to construct its eata-tory of ships under consideration;{2? Each nation must be free toutilize its tonnage allotted in themanner it deems will bost meot its

6

LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930 7

ARGUMENTS ARGUMENTS

particular needs. This does notprevent imposition of limits as tomaximum size of unit or maxi-mum gun caliber.

Rear Admiral BRISTOL: COm-bat parity between the two fleetsis not the only basis necessary forparity. Our commerce earnedin neutral bottoms would requirethat our cruisers be at differentplaces to see that no advantagewas being taken to interfere withour trade in neutral bottoms with-in the limits established by inter-national law.

DOES THE TREATY GIVE PARITY BY THE END OF 1936?

THE TREATY GIVES IARTY WITH GREATBRITAIN

Subscribed to by-,;Secretary. Adams,Admiral Praftt.,Rear Admiral Yarnell.Rear Admiral Moffett.

ARGUMENTS

Secretary ADAMS: The treatygives parity with the. fleet ofGreat Britain in every category,Under the treaty we canl getparity if wo want to. We havesecure(l parity in fighting strength.It is possible that we havo notcreated a Navy so satisfactory tous as the Navy might be if it hasa larger number of 8-inch guncruisors. Effort was mn1ade toget twenty-one 8-illnh-obun cruis-ers. United StatOs defeogates be-lieved it advantageous to post-I)OflO Coml)letion of two 8-inchgun 10,000-ton crulisrs until aftor1930 in order to l)rofit by experli-lCO gailled ill building the pr-

cedling 16 and got boieter ships.])clay in laying (lown the last8-illenl-gull crullisers was of interestto Great Bi'itain, l)ut sho did notinsist llpo it. It was agreed as acolilplroliSo to Japallnas Japanwas insisting onl a 10 :7 ratio,British claims were based partlyon thei eed of hlavinlg Cru1lisersill various parts of the world, far-flung possessions, naval bases,and probably that they lhave aInerchllant m1arie6. Ultillmately

8

THE TREATY DOES NOT GIVE PARITY WITHGREAT BRITAIN

Subscribed to by-Rear Admiral Hepburn.Admiral Hughes.Rear Admiral Reeves.Rear Admiral Hough.Rear Admiral Day.Vice Admiral Cole.Rear Admiral Standley.Rear Admiral Wiley.Rear Admiral Bristol.

ARGUMENTS

Rear Admiral HEPBURN:Treaty does not give us parity bythe end of 1936.

Admiral HUGHES: If theUnited States elects to buildeighteen 8-inch gun ships she willnot have parity in tonnage.

Rear Admiral REEVES: DuriIngthe life of the treaty Great Britaincanl have 19 subeategory (a)cruisers to 16 for the UnitedStates. The treaty gives GreatBritain a superiority in 6-inchgun cruisers. At the expirationof the treaty Groat Britain canhave 425,350 tons of cruisersbuilt and building; the UnitedStates 337,000 tons; Groat Brit-ain having a superiority of 87,750tons. This is arrived at by con-sidloring that tho tonnage forwhich replacements are being builtis not scraped at that dtito,Tho United S-ates will be in aninferior position. Groat Britainhas superiority in battleships.Our only chance for superioritysinco Washington Treaty is byreplacement of new ships for oldonos. Placing more armor ondocks of Colorado, West Virginia,

9.869604064

Table: DOES THE TREATY GIVE PARITY BY THE END OF 1936?

460406968.9

'LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

ARGUM ENTS

the United States Will have' supe-rioritv over,! Great, Britain bythree 8-inch-gun ckuisors>,Admiral PRATT: If it were not

for the fact that two of the 8-iich-gun cruisers cannot be completeduntil after 1936, the United Stateswould have better than 10 :10: 7at the expiration .of the treaty. IfUnited States Navy were equal,ton for ton; to the Britishiwewould haveequal combat Str~ngthso far as it is humanly possible. toobtain it. If it be granted thatthe total figures reached in thetreaty meai p'arity,'in 1936 weare one year shy onr one 8-inch-gun cruiser and'two years shycdnanother 8-inch-gun cruiser of totalconipletion- but both havoc beenstarted. The 8-inch-gun ship isbetter than the 6inoh-gun" ship,but if we build all 8-inch-guhships and the British all 6-inch-gun ships, we would have supori-ority, while wo sook parity.- Thetreaty docs not' reduce the ton-nago of a single shipie1o hapnever agreed to a 7,000-ton ship.To got an option to take 339,O00tons of cruisers, which is absoluteequality of tonnage, and neverreduce the size of a single shipbeloW 10,000 tons, is a better bar-gain than the General Board'sproposition.

1tear Admiral YARNELL: Bystrengthening the dOcks on theWest Virgiia, Golorado, andaryilaml thoe capital sfhip fleet of

the United States will b)0 aboutequal to the B3ritish. If thosedeks were strengtheneA and webuilt a IRodicy, we would besuperior.We have l)aritY under the

treaty. We aire Nlowled to buildtip by thoncid of 1936. Buildingtip along the lines taken by GroatBritain is the plriCO of parlit.y.Rear Admiral M OFFETT:. IOI-

don treaty gives us substantial

ARGUMENTS

and Maryland would be a patchjob; and would not 'bring themto equal the' Rodney and elson.This treaty brings us nearerparity.

!Rear Admiral HOUGH: Treatydoes not'give parity. In: capitalships we have inferior tonnage-and are left with one lone 12-inchgun ship which has no place in afighting line composed of 14-inchand 16-inch gun ships. In cruis-ers we can not obtain parity dur-ing the life of the treaty becausewe can complete but sixteen8-inch gun ships. If we shouldbuild fifteen 8-mhch gun ships wecould got parity in tonnage but wewould also have a lot of shipswhich we do not consider bestsuited to our needs and wouldnot have the sonse of nationalsecurity, and therefore, not parity.This would also be true if wewere allowed to build eighteen8-inch gun cruisers before the endof the treaty. The treaty methodof scrapping battleships brings usnear parity.

Rear Admiral DAY: Treatydoes not give parity with GreatBritain. Battleship situation isnear parity. We have not parityin cruisers, but could got a ton-for-ton parity in ships we do not need,

Vice Admiral COLB: The treatynrrngemofnt does not give parity})y ondl( of 1936,RoarAdmiral STANDLJEY: Under

the treaty, England remains inis-tress of the sOas. In the matterof battleships wo have not parity.Tlho four battleships scrapped byGroat Britain had a speed of 21knots. The speed of a fleet is thesp1dod of the slowest unit, there-fore the speed of the British fleetis now 23 knots. Our fleet speedis not altered. Speed is a do-cidled tactical advantage, nlnd theBritish immediately gani an ad-vantage of 2 knots. Speed per-

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LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

ARGUMENTS

parity with Great Britain. Bothlimitation and reduction are ac-complished. United States wouldnot get parity until 1942, whilethis treaty gives parity in battle-ships as soon as the designatedbattleships are scrapped.

ARGUMENTSmits the fast fleet to decide wheth-er it will accept battle, and to aVcept battle only on terms advan-tageous to itself.Rear Admiral WILEY:; The

t. naty does not in any sense givetlWe United States parity withGreat Britain. Great Britainscrapping 5 capital ships and theUnited States 3 does not giveparity. The slowest Britishbattleship now has 23 knots, andour fleet speed is, 21 knots. Wehave one lone 12-inch-gun ship.Rear Admiral BRISTOL: We do

not get parity with Great Britain;if it were only a question of adifference of a few tons, a fewcruisers one way or the other, andnot a question of establishing aprecedent in regard to the defni-tion of parity, it amounts to little,In battleships we have practicalparity, although we are left withone lone 12-inch-gun ship. Onthe theory that we can have 17cruisers on January 1, 1937,Great Britain can, on the sametheory, have 86,000 tons of extracruisers.

10

WHAT IS THE RELATIVE VALUE. OF THE FNCH AND THE 8-INCH-GUNCRUISER TO THE UNITE!) STATES

GENERAL STATEMENT OF ThE SITUATION BY SECRETARY ADAM

There has been a diversity of naval opinion as to the relative meritsof the 6-inch and 8-inch-gun cruisers. The 30,000 tons involved is lessthan 10 per cent of the cruiser fleet allowed by the treaty, and lessthan 3 per cent of the total fleet allowed by the treaty. The questionis one of expert opinion where there is real doubt. It is -wrong to saythat the 6-inch-gun ship is not a ship we desire. Naval opinion sup-ports the belief that for many fleet purposes the 0-inch-gun ship ishighly desirable. The advantage of the 8-inch-gun ship is possiblyfor detached duty. The 8-inch-gun ship has not.been tried in battle.It has a frail hull not armored in any sense. 'She is subject to damageby fire from all sorts of guns. The latest design of 8-inch ship hasquite an element of armor. It is difficult to evaluate properly betweenthe 6-inch and 8-inch-gun ships. At every different rahge and con-dition of visibility the prob em changes. To-day when differentarmaments are likely to be faced a 6-inch gun is better than an8-inch gun. The 6-inch gun can be got on the mark quicker, canfire twice as fast as an 8-inch, and is more effective. For many pur-poses the 6-inch-gun ship is superior. The General Board recognizesthe advantage of the 6-inch-gun ship over the 8-inch-gun ship forcertain purposes. Inside of 10,000 yards the 6-inch-giun ship is betterthan the 8-inch on account of rapidity of fire and other reasons. Atlonger ranges the situation is reversed,

FAVORING THE 6-INCH-GUN SHIP

Subscribed to by-Admiral Pratt.Rear Admiral Yamell.Rear Admiral Hepburn.Rear Adniiral Moffett.

FAVORING THE 8-INCH-GUN SHIP

Subscribed to by-Rear Admiral Jones,Rear Admiral Pringle.Captain Smyth.Commander Train.Rear Admiral Chase.Rear Admiral Bristol.Admiral Hughes.Rear Admiral 0eeves.Rear Admiral Hough.Rear Admiral Day.Rear Admiral leahy.Vice Admiral Cole.Rear Admiral Standley.Rear Admiral McLean.Rear Admiral Wiley.Roar Admiral Taylor.Rear Admiral Coontz,Admiral Nulton.Rear Admiral Robison.

11

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LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

ARGUMENTS

Admiral PRATT: Is not againstthe 8-inch-gun ship. The 8-inchguin is a better shooting gun thanthe 6-inch. Would like to have a'number of 8-inch-gun ships The8-inch gun is no more useful innight attack than a '12-inch' giin;8-inch gun not as fast shooting asthe 6-inch, Must have 8-inch-gulln cruisers to selid off long dis-tances, but the 6-inch-gun cruis-ers are needed for night situa-tions and to defend the fleqt in abody. In case of a raid the screen-ing ships must fire rapidly. The8-inclh-ships can not do it, hutmust be protected like a battle-ship. It is not self-protecting.In a long range action between the6-inch and thel 8-inch gunl Ship,the 8-inch would defeat the 6-inch; but at light the resultwould go the other way on ac-Count of the rapid fire of the6-inch. The 6-inch-guni ship issuperior to the 8-inichl-gun shipclose in and at long rango. If6-inch guns are mounted in tur-rets, as should be done, tlhe 6-

illC gun1 will fire twice as fast asthe 8-inch. The reason is be-cause the 6-inclh gun, is handloaded. The 6-inch-gun 'cruiseris preferred close iln to the fleet.

Rear Admiral YAR]NELIL: Isaware of the fact that the depart-muent hns a design for puttingb)etor armlor onl our 8-inich-guncruiisers; unfortunately, we haveeight ships TnOt so armored, andwhich could be (10featOed i close

action by ships with 65-inch gumls.The l)pr( sont 8-inch-gun Shil)shIave lraroftically no ftrinor, whilo,alt1h1ough1 thOe 6,-inch shiIp Couldnot 1)0 aro11r1(ed agah9tist them,wouIld ha1ve thle a(danitrage ofvolume of fire, especially ait nlighItOI' inl m11isty Nweathor. The 8-in01h-gunl ship \Woul(l 1)0 iuporidr1 at

ranges over 18,000 yards. The

ARGUMENTS--

Rear Admiral JONES: Consid-ering the necessity of UnitedStates to operate units at lodistances' 'from' home' :bses thiscouxntri riqiiired vessels of greatsea endurance, offensive power,and as, much protection as possi-ble., The conyoy. system. willprobably be necessary in wvar,,The escort of a convoy. cap notrun away. ,Sh must fight in ,orrder to allow the convoy toscattoand oesnaipe, therotorer thei, uniitmust be powerful enough to meetwhatever will be brought againsther, with some hope of ssuccess,Besides the material, we rIustgive the meo on those 'ship's afair chance.; In case of a' war inthe western Pacific our 114ies Qfcommunication west of -Ii -iimust be kept open for 6,000 milesto the Philippines. This requiredthe strongest units we are alloweOl.to build tinder the Washingtontreaty. Eight-inch-gun shipshave the greatest power o, sir-vival, larticlIlarly ill working indistant areas, Tboe use of 60inlh-.guln Cruisers is in the lprotectivescreen for antidestroyor, nnd sub-marine attack, in close range,where rapi(lity of fiire conts;A. 'The'8-inch-gun 10,000-ton cruiser isfar supe'rior to the 6-inch-guincruiser Wheoe',you have to opor-ate in distn~nt ar6an4, 1be alone, es-cort conlvoys through infestedareas.Rear Admiral PRINGIJE: The

cruiser with the battle fleet is in..tended to back ulp your own do-stroyers going ill to attack enemybattle fleet, and to break up at-tacks l)y enemy destroyers onyour own l)attle fleet. Must bearmue(1 to (loive, a rapid and wN'ell-lirectedi fire. Sholuld carry at guna little in oxcess of that

.

carriedl)y thle destroyer. Should carrytwelve 0-inch gums, and( should be

12

TJoNDOli xNAAtVL' TR~tAqYo OP t1(9 30 '

ARGUMENT

6-inct gun 'is8 aOeffe'edtikithi18,000 yards leas the '8-inch gun'against an'tun momrd, ghip, -b4tweiare to piut moe'g armor bntoutfuture 8-inch;Lguni Ahip8,; 'iRear Admirtl HftiBdR14: Thv

injection of `the'8-in4h-gkift' coiseiinto the aitmhme&t4 of the worldis to theo distinct`didai vantkge- oftthe United Sttbs! JWe wOuld' b6much better off if there-wer' A68-inch-gtinl ships 'fihexieten,06,, 'tIfwe had gottoii rid' of thet 6-ineh4gun cruissts,, the Uflted Statesshould have all! 8-ineh-guh 'crtiswers, but since thoie aro' both, ourinterests 1ie ii elimina'tingb th'8-inch-gun hip. The 8Lijhj-gun'cruiser is goodf6r'only oiie'i&uk,-pose that the 6if'dhcruise;r is Aob,and that i'to fight! k 6-inchs.guncruiser o het ow'n trm As rojgards range 'and ~vi ibiblity,' H Th6only reasons for 8-inach~giinh druimersis that' -otherb haelttvemni., l glieves that the Britishl 'ce that the8-inch-gunh critisor'is a dlfadvaiPtfige to -thei."'t The ,6inch-guncruiser c&ii fight)Ah 8-inoh-gguiOrulisdi if it gets within'range. fidis1)rs d'6perationgs !:the' 8-lnchlgun cruiser is 'a 'disadvtntagO' tous, Character -of 'ophatidns 'invar is' such- that the, 84inch-guncruiser is at a disdavantge.

IRear Adhnithtd Mon'.FFt: Qudes-tion of 8-inlchiand 0-inch gun 'riiis'e1s was decided at a timie whenaviation whs'niot 0onxsider0d 4brymuch, Unde' mnny :circl1iustances thi 88inch tun clruisor 'isl)etterl than;thodidhitglnlbrulisr.We alwtvys try toA'ur3 ' thbheavier gun, but lO6g-range shootLing is dependentt o6 ali'Oi-aft spot-ting. - The !Vallto of tho long-ranige ')ig gll iq "lnot a! reat! ait waIs. Placing' landing ceoks 'on6-inch-gan aoruisors& will makethoeml i(qual or stiporiOl, "to any'8"ilich-glin 'croigorr !without lan&i(Iing decks. '.4Phe, designed" 1o,oo0-

hh'dy' shisgofi'iabout 30 iknots-

"iruisers which' act' i,' groups orgifigl awayr from ithe, fleot.shouldlbe;.1O,0004tonit8-inchL-gun '.shlpdilThey will meet 84inchogun'shiPs!of other nations. They shouldhave high speed to escape frombattle cruisers and speed to over-haul and run down smaller shipswith less speed. After satisfyingthe need of the battle fleet, everyton should be worked into 8-inch-gun cruisers for dispersed opera-tions. Eight-inch-gun cruiserscan better perform the dutieswith the fleet than 6-inch cruiserscan perform the duties of 8-inchcruisers in dispersed operations.In dispersed operations the valueof the 6-inch-gun cruiser is no-where nearly commensurate withthe value of the 8-inch-guncruiser,

Captain SMYTrHr: Profors 8-inchgun cruisers. The cruiser we des-Ignate as a fleet cruiser is the onewhich normally operates where itcan drop back on the battleshipforce if it needs superior power.In a fleet action its normal oppo-nont is a vessel of equal typo or adestroyer. Under this conditionsuperiority of gunfire considerablyovercomes deficiency in caliber,A 6-inch gun can deliver moreshots J)or gun per minute thanthe 8-inch gun. At low ranges,4,000 to 6,000 yards, tho 6-inclhgun will probably penetrate thearmor of any ship which wouldbe the normal target for a lightcruiser. Outside that range youontor onO where the 8-inch gunwill pollotrato and the 6-inch gulnwill not. In tho zone 4,000 to10,000 yards tho ponotrationct areabout, equal. At tho longerranges, outsiidl of 16,000 yards,the 6-inch gun is inferior to the8-inch gun, because tho 6-inchsplash can not be seen from the

13'.

1LONDON NAVAL S&IMTY 0P 19 8 0

ARaUMZN19ton 6-inch-gun cruiser has betterdefense than present 6-inchguncruisers. The design is merely ablue print at present, but thinksthat our 8-inch-gun cruisers havelittle protection.

ASPUMENDN

ship while the 8-inch can. It batcomes a matter of fire control andthe 8-inch gun ship can see where.its shots are falling and the 6-inchgun ship can not, and can not;control its fire, thus gving the8-inch gun ship a 100 per centadvantage. The 6-inch gun shiploses the effectiveness of its firecontrol at over about 16 000 yardswhile the 8-inch gun Are'eontrotremains effective for about 5,QOOyards more. At short ranges, atdawn or dusk, the 6-inch guncruiser has the advantage of vol-ume of fire. In a close attackthrough fog or at night, the 6-inchgun hip might deliver such a hailof shot as to get in a lucky shotand put the 8-inch gun ship outof commission, but Captain Smythprefers the 8-inch gun ship. Thathas been obviatedin the new de-sign of 8-inch gun cruiser wherethe armor protection has been in-creased. The damage effect ofthe 8-inch and 6-inch shells afterpenetrating the armor is in prosportion to the weights of theshells,--or about 24 to 1. Preferthe 8-inch gun cruiser for all op-erations where the cruisr is notable to fall back on a strongervessel if the cruiser meets astronger opponent.Commander TRAIN: Prefers the

8-inch Sun cruiser to the 6-inchgun cruiser.Read Admiral CHAEAs. Under

the guns of the fleet the 6-inch.gun cruiser may supply the'needsof the fleet a little bettor than the8-inch-gun cruiser. Would notbuild 6-inch-gun cruisers if wewere unlimited because he doesnot believe in two classes of ves-sels. Would have all 8-inch-guncruisers, Fleet work is the onlyduty a 6-inch-gut cruiser can per.form with any great degree ofofficione The 6-inch-gun cruis-er would bedefeated by the8-incla4

14

LONDONi NAVAEJ TREATY OF 1980:

GUMNTB ARGU

gun cruiser in dispersed opera-tions. Lessons of war show thatthe larger gun has always won.If a 6-inch-gun ship escorting aconvoy met an 8-inch-gun shipthe former would be at a greatdisadvantage; while if the escortship were an 8-inch-gun shipshe could fight with equal chances.The 6-inch-gun ship can noteffectively control the fire of herguns at ranges beyond 16,000yards, while the 8-inch-gun cruisercould control at least 6,000 to8,000 yards beyond that. The8-inch gun's splash can be seenfarther than the 6-inch can beseen. With the new design of8-inch-gun cruiser, the 6-inch guawill not be as effective as the 8-inch gun under 16,000 yardsrange. If the outer line of thefleet screen were composed of8-inch-gun cruisers, enemy de-stroyers could not break throughcome up to the destroyers, andbreak through their line. Thereis always one thing that mustredound to the advantage of the8-inch-gun cruiser-if she sightsan enemy she knows that she hasa chance. The 6-inch-gun cruiserhas not that assurance.Rear Admiral BRISTOL: Does

not believe in any 6-inch-guncruisers. Would be better off tohave all 8-inch-gun cruisers sothat they can be interchanged andsent from one duty to another,with the fleet or in distant opera-tions. Knows of no study at thepresent time which justifies the6-inch-gun cruiser, During warhe woiild use only 8-Hi efh-guncruisers for convoy duty.

Admiral HUGHiES: In dispersedcruiser operations the 8-inch-guncruiser has the advantage over the6-inch-gun cruiser. In such opera-tions the cruiser must be capableof meeting any ship of her owntype coming against her, and the

S ID-71-2--vOT, 23-GO

1'6

16 LoON NAVAL TREATY OF 19 3 0

ARGUMXNTS ARGUMENTS,,

8-inch-gun cruiser is the only onethat can do it. For dispersedcruiser operations in the westernPacific the 6-inch-gun cruiserwould be of little use. She couldnot get out and get back. Theywould be of value going out withthe battleship fleet, for protectivescreening. The scout should bethe 8-inch-gun cruiser well ahead.The 6-inch-gun cruiser unattachedis of little use, for she may meetan 8-inch-gun cruiser. Unat-tached ships must be strongenough to meet anything sentagainst thein except battleshipsthen they can run. On detachedduty the 6-inch-gun ship is a sortof toy ship. In a night attack theranges are less and the value of the6-inch-gun cruiser increases, alsoin fog. That is a special circum-stance. A 6-inch-gun cruiserwould probably be a little moreefficient against light ships. On adark night it might be clear andstar shell would do away with lowvisibility. AnI 8-inch-gun cruisercan do everything that the 6-inch-gun cruiser can do, but the 0-inch-gun cruiser can not (lo everythingthat the8-inch-gun cruiser can do.There are circumstances wherethe 6-inch-guln cruiser can do bet-tor than the 8-inch-gfun cruiserwith the fleet, but not enough towarrant building many of them.

Rear Admiral RFi.vES: Com-Cmorco call bO and it always hasbeen adeq imately protected onlyby ships that carry guns slpoeriorinI power taid size to the gulns ofthos- -in ) ireading commerce.The 8 -gun cruiser, and notthe 6-inch, is the only type thatcan effectively1rotect commercein distant areas where it is funda-mentally a single unit operation.If we build only 6-inclh-gun cruis-cr's, the value of the merchant1hil) Carrying 6-inch g .Ins, in-creases automatically. Tho strik-

LONDODN NAVAL TRBATY OF 19301

ARGUMENTS ARGM(lENXrS

ing force of a 6-inch gun fired froma merchant ship is the same asthat fired from a cruiser. An un-proteet-ed 6-inch-gun cruiser canbe sunk by a merchant shipcarrying 6-inch guns. It is im-possible for us to build specialtypes of ships to meet specialsituations. We would have nu-merous types. It is uneconomical,and there is no assurance that thespecial type would be presentwhen you want it. Fog mightoecur when the "fog cruiser"might not be present. We mustbuid to meet the general situationand the 8-inch-gun cruiser meetsthe situation. It is effective atnight, in fleet action, in repellingdestroyer attacks. Our 8-inch-gun cruisers will carry nine 8-illehguns and eight 5-inch guns. The5-inch gun is as destructive againstthe destroyer as the 6-inch gun.The 8-inch-gun cruiser can offerin a destroyer attack nine 8-inchguns and eight 5-inch guns, whilethe 6-inclh-guiin cruiser has 6-inchguns and a smaller number of5-inch guns. In a fleet action thedestroyers occupy attack positionsin the advance of the fleet and onthe engaged bow. The 8-inch-guncruisers will cause the destroyersto occupy a more remote attackposition than will the 6-inch-guncruisers. Therefore as the de-stroyers come in to attack theymust traverse a greater distanceand be longer under fire beforethey reach the point to fire theirtorpedoes. Only the 8-inch-guncruiser can form an efficient escortfor the aircraft carriers as thecarrier must be protected againstdestroyers and cruisers. Sincethe battle cruisers were given upat the Washington Conference,the 8-inch-gun cruiser becomesmore important. Keeping uip aline of communication is a de-tached operation, and only 8-inch-

17

LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

ARGUMENTS ARGrUMENTS

tin cruisers can perform Buchduties.Rear Admiral HOUGH: A 6-inch-

gun cruiser on commercial lanesmay be able to give a good ac-count of herself if she moots a6-inch-guin ship, but if she meetsan 8-inch-gun cruiser she is out-classed. The 8-inch-gun cruisercan perform all the functions ofthe 6-inch-gun cruiser, but the6-inch-gun cruiser can not per-form all the functions of the8-inch-gun cruiser. He wouldrecommend all 8-inch-gun cruisers-.The 6-inch-guln cruisers at veryclose range has the advantage ofrapidity of fire because it hashand loaded guins, but when youmount them in turrets tho rateof loading slows up. But the8-inch gun is so far superior inother respects that it is preferable.The 8-inch-gun cruisers also carry6-inch guns which can be used atshort ranges.

Roar Admiral DAY: The 8-inch-gun cruiser with its 5 -inch guanscan1do floot work. So can the6-inch-gun cruiser at less (cost.An 8-inch-gun cruiser would havea decisive advantage over a 6-inch-gun cruiser of the Omahatype. It would be impossible toarmor a shi) of the Omahatonnage to resist 8-iich-gun. cruis-ors and have it retain its speed.And if an Omahla cot'lld be pro-tected with the same armor as an8-inch-gun cruiser the 8-inch-gurncruiser would tear her to p)ioeswhile a 6-inch gutn could notpierce the vitals of the 8-inch-gunship. Outside of 12,000 yardsthe 8-inch-gun ship would besafe. Inside of that an 8-inchshell would go through anythingon the 8-inch ship, but it wouldgo through the 6-inch-gun shipat any range. This is if the 8-inch Ship i's armored as our lastones will be, Does not believe

18

LONDON WAVAL TMEATT OF %I 9 8 0

AGUMrFNTS AROUMENTS

that in fog or low visibility the6-inch-gun ship with its high rateof fire would destroy the 8-inch-gun cruisers. The 6-inch-guncruisers during the battle andduring the night following theJutland action did nothing.

Rear Admiral LEAHY: There isa band of about 13 000 yardswhere an 8-inch gun wifi penetrate4 inches of vertical armor and a6-inch gun will not, There is aband of about 4,400 yards wherean 8-inch gun will penetrate3 inches of horizontal armor andthe 6-inch gun will not. The8-inch-gun ship can take a rangeof 15 000 to 20,000 yards from the6-inch-gun ship and the lattercould not penetrate the armor ofthe former. The 6-inch gun firewould be difficult to controlbecause of the size of the splash.In future all 6-inch guns will bemounted in turrets. The 6-inchshell weighs 105 pounds and hasfrom 2} to 6% pounds of highexplosive. Tlhe 8-inch shellweighs 260 I)ollnds and has from6 to 11 pounds of high explosive.The 8-inch gun range is 7,000yards greater than that of the6-inch. The mninzze velocity ofthe 6-inch and 8-inch gun is thesame. The striking energy of the8-inch gun is about three timesthat of the 6-inch gun. In lowvisibility whoer the 6-inch guncruiser could get within) 10-000yards of the 8-inch-gun cruiser,she would have a good chance.Is not convinced that a 6-inch-guncruiser is superior to an 8-inch-guncruiser at short range because ofthe greater destructive effect ofthe 8-inch shell. At a rangewhere the 6-inch shells can pene-trate the armor of the 8-inch-gunship, she has a greater advantagethan at any other range, and if shehas sufficient guns she might beequal to and even superior to the

1,9

LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

ARGUMENTS ARGUMENTS

8-inch-gun cruiser, in the particu-.lar situation. This would be anunlikely happening in dispersecruiser operation. It could hap-pOln in floot action or attack ondestroyer screen. Can visualizea situation where the 6-inch guncruiser might be as good as the8-inch-gun cruiser, but thinkfj itunlikely to occur, andt under anycircumstances would prefer tohave the 8-inch-gun cruiser. TheBureau of Ordnance expects toget 4 shots per gun per minutefrom the 3-inch-gun turrets. At-long i'anges where the roll of theship must b1 given consideration,r,he fire may be slowed to 3 shotsper gunll .per minute, Six-incllguns in the open fire about eighttimes per minute, and in turretsabout six times per minullte. Atshort ranges the ratio of the fireof the 6-inch guin to the rate offire of the 8-inch gaun is 2 to 1; atlong 1'flranges it is l)ollt 1% to 1,

Vice Admiral Coj,>w: Wants8-inclh-gun cruiser for all aroun(lworlk. Argumniots for smashingofloct of the 6-inch-glln cruiseronder condlitions of reduced visi-

b)ility is a s1)ecial ileal(ling, inas-mnuchi as it provides for thoseparti cilar cases. The 8-inch-guncruliXsOr cann do the floot work.They would alone form ans offec-tivo defense if the enemy attackeddhe destroyerr screen, In a flootaction the 8-inch-guni cruiserscould take care of themselves and)revenlt oeoney destroyers frombreaking through thei screen.The 8-inch -gun cruiser is superiorto the 6-inch-pmin cruiser forlisplerse(l Operations.Roar Admniral STAND1413Y: With-

out any limit Placed onl cost ortonnage, would build all 8-inich-guin cruisers. 'rhl 8-inch-Vtincruiser canl do every possiblething that the 6-inc11-guln cruisercou do arid do it bottv. The 8-

20

LONDON WAVAL TREATY OF. 1930

ARGUM"T8 ARGUMENTS

inch-gun cruiser can do things the6-inch cruiser can not do. The6-ilnch-gun cruiser can not operatein the outer screen because shewill have to fight 8-inch-guncruisers, for this same reason shecan not operate oIn trade routes orprotect convoys. Six-inch-guncruisers are of no use except underthe big guns of the fleet. Hasconversed with many naval offi-cers and all favor the 8-inch-gunship. Tile smaller cruisers shouldbe used with the fleet, becausethey are of no use against 8-inch-gun cruisers unless they are underthe protection of heavier guns.A 6-inch-gun cruiser against a 6-inch-gun cruiser has an equalchance. If you are operating inan area where the enemy has 8-inch-gun cruisers, 8-inch-guncruisers are necessary. If enemy8-inch-gun cruisers come out, the6-inch-gun cruisers will be sunk ormust be driven back under theheavy guns again. Eight-inch-gun cruisers are always useful be-caulse that is the l)iggest cruiserexcept l)attle cruisers. The 8-inch-gun cruisers will operate onlines of communication and ontrade routes. 'There is no quies-tion as to the 8-inch-gun cruiserbeing able to take care of herselfagainst the 6-incli-'nn cruiser.Rear Admira MCLEAN:

Strongly favors the 8-inch-guncruiser. There is no doubt butthat the 8-inch-gun cruiser candefeat thoe 6-inch-gun cruiser. Itis sound that some 6-inch-guncruisers are needed with the fleetfor work in tho destroyer screenwhere they :' o trader the guns ofthe fleet. The 8-inch-gun cruiserescorting a convoy could keep offa 6-inch-gun cruiser. One 8-inch-gun cruiser might take care of her-self against two 6-inch-gun cruis-ers. At 15,000 to 20,000 yardsthe 6-inch gun is hard to control

,21

22 LONDON JAVAL TRHATY OF 1930

ARGUMENTS ARGUMENTS

because of the small splash, whileat that rango the 13-inch splash isvisible.

Rear Admiral WILEY: The 6-inch gun fires twico as fast as the8-inch gun, but the 8-inch shell isheavier, and the gun has a greaterrange. Control of fire dependsupon ability to spot the fall ofshot. If you can not spot thefall of shot you can not. telUwhether you are hitting, and youcan not see the splash of a 6-inch-gun salvo to sp)ot is accuratelyover 16,000 yards, while an 8-inch-gun salvo can be spottedaccurately at at least 20,000yards. Airpl'1)la 51pot improvesall spotting. 113 in favor of 8-inclh-gun cruiser fo(r all purposes, be-cause combatatnit ships are builtto be effective under all condi-tions under which they will op-erate in war. The 8-inch-gtncruiser can perform efficiently allthe duty that can be assigned toa 6-inch-gun cruiser, but a 6inch-guin cruiser call niot plerformefficiently nll the duties whichmay be required of an 8-inch-guln cruiser. 'Phis is true in thedostroye' screein, The mororapidc fire of the 6-illch gun1 inthe destroyer screen (1oes not

iako it more valuable than the8-inch gun. Does not considerthat the 6-inch-prrn cruiser is anybetter oras efficient as the 8-inch-gun cruiser under any cricum-stances. They fire more rapidlybut have greater dispersion. No6-inch guin is as effective as thomodern 8-inch gun, No improvo-ment can ho made in the 6-inchguin which eftn not bo made in the8-inch gun. The statement thata 6-inch-gun crusier would "eatuip" an 8-ilch-gun cruiser if itmet it about (lark or coming outof at fog sounds very alluring, butyou want comal)t ships to fighlun(ler normal conditions and you

LONDON NAVAL TREATY' O 1930 2

ARGUMENTS ARGUMENTNS

take your chances if you have notnormal conditions. 'No one but aweak enemy seeks night action.Tho 8-inch-gun ship and the 6-inch-gun ship inay be complnredwith a maln with a rifle and onearmed with two revolvers. Hemay shoot his revolvers from thehip, but if he can not reach themail with the rifle, he is throwinghisllammunition away. On thecommerce lanes the 6-inch-guncruiser would be destroyed bythe 8-inch-gun cruiser,

Rear Admiral TAYLOR: The 8-inch-gun cruiser is needed to pro-tect commerce. The 6-inch-guncruiser for that work would bewasted. Our cruisers to protectour commerce have to operate along ways from base, which re-quires very large radius of action.She has to have defensive andoffensive power to fight and defeathar enemy without suffering dam-age to herself that will force herto come home. If a 6-inch-guncruiser moets a merchant vesselarmed with 6-inch guns, the 6-inch-gun cruiser will win, butwith equal l)attories the cruiserwill Sustain soiImuchr damage thatshe will have to come home,With anll 8-inch-gun cruiser thatwill not be the case,Rear Admiral CooNTZ: Wants

all of the 8-inch gun cruisers wecan got. We need, 8-inch guncruisers even if we do not usethem in the fleot, on our lines ofcommunication. We want 8-inchgunl cruisers for scouts, steadyplatforms, long range, and ondur-anco. Io have long range guns,the ability to 'lio on station twoor three weeks and do whateverdamage is necessary, then rejointhe main body and go to fuelingstation), is a big asset. The 6-inch glin has not developed anyeffectiveness over the 8-inch. The8-inch gun can be developed as

23

LONIOOX NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

ARGUMENTS ARGUMENTS

much as the 6-inch gun. Wantsthc 8-inch gtun cruiser for dis-persod cruiser operations. If al-Io~ve(l full liberty of action wouldbuild all 8-inch gun cruisers. In-stead of the treaty allowance ofcruisers, prefers the provisions ofthe fifteen-cruiser bill for twenty-three 8-inch 5un cruisers. '

Roar Admiral NULTON: Secur-ity abroad requires vessels with along cruising radius, and consid-erable offense and defense, andfrom the point of national de-fenso the 8-inch gun 10 000-toncruisers are better suited to thenoods of the Navy. If therewere no limit, would want some6-inch gun cruisers, but if limited,would take all 8-inch Gun cruiserbecause of their suitability for in-torchangeability of duty. Everymerchant vessel is a l)otential6-inch glIn cruiser. The more wecome (10own to the 6-inch gunbasis the less advantageous it isto this country. lThere are cor-tainalpases of PGet, work for whichthe 6-inch guIn cruisers are suited,b1)t if the total numl)er of cruisersis to bo limited, the 8-inch guincruiisor is preferable. T'he 8-inchgln 10,000-toll (crllisor is the shipfor 1disJ)ersed operations. Trllerehas been nothing in the fleetoperations to load hiin to believethart small crlisers are bettorthan large ones,. Practically nIOnaval opinion favors the smallcruiser,Rear Admiral Ro)1so0N: The

high rate of fire of the 6-inch gunsis at short, ranges only, firing OJIegun at a time, and not in con-trolled salvo firig or firing fromturrets. Tho 6-ilichs gulls of theOina/la class flre twice as fast asthe 8-inch gumns of the aircraftcarriers. The rates of fire ap-proachl equality as the range in-creases until they are nearly equalat 12,000 yards, due to the time

24

LONDON) NAVAL` TIEATY OF 1030 25AUGUMINT5 ARdUMH~to

of flight of the projectile. Youcan not control a shot until youknow where the previous one hasgone; and if it takes 20 secondsfor the shot to travel from gUIn totarget, you can not fire fasterthan :3 shots per minute. At therange at whic'lh the two gunlls havee(uality in rate of fire, thle 6-inchguln will l)iorco less than) half theareimor 1)ierced by thie 8-inlch gun.Trliis (liscrel)ancy increases as therange decreases. It decreases asthe ra wgo is lengthened. At 6,000yards tho 8-incch guin pierces near-ly 10 inches of armor, and the6-inch gun about 4 inches. At12,000 yards the chances of hit-ting wiith an 8-inch gun and a6incll gnI are about as 7 to 4 infavor of the 8-inch grun. Thedamage duje to exl)loslon of theshell varies ioearly as their weights.Tho only place a 6-inch-gun shiphas thoe (lvalltago over an 8-inch-gun ship) is in a surprise attackwhere thle 6-inch gun can firefaster, TPlho 5-inlch antiaircraftgunals of thoe cruliser's are effectiveagainst (lestroyer attack. Atnight, l)y using star' sholls, tile8-mch gu1n is more effective thantile 6-inch guln. A liberal allow-once for action in a fog is 5 percent, We can not afford to buildships for suchl encounters. A10,000-ton cruiser can be armoreolagainst 6-inch gun fire withoutgreat re1lluction in speed, butIleither it nor one of lesser tonnawocall be armore(l against 8-iclli-gun fire without reduction ofspe)(l. T'1here is no ship in exist-once that caln bring as MIany6-illch rlllls to bear as thae SaltLake Oity canl bring 8-inch guns.In a floet action against fast wilngtactics the 6-inch-gun cruiser isIelpless, but thle 8-inclh gull) villpieirce tile armor belt of anyI)attle cruiser at 11,0(0 yards aindall other armor on the, battle

LONDOW WAVAL TREATY OF 1930

AIIGUME~TS ARGUMENTS

cruiser up to 15,000 yards.Neither the Japanese nor theBritish agree with statementsthat 6-inch-gun cruisers are tobe preferred to 8-inch-gun cruis-ers, or they would not have takenCare to prevent the United Statesfrom building the 8-inch-guncruisers provided by Congress,The 8-inch-gun cruiser can takecare of a destroyer attack at-temipting to break through thescreen as well as a 6-inch-guncruiser can, For dispersed opera-tions you must have a cruiserthat no other cruiser can drive in,You must l)e able to meet onequal terms anything that cancome after you. The 8-inch-guncruiser is the ship for dispersedcruiser operations.

CAN A 10,000-TON SHIP ARMED WITH 6-INCH GUNS EQUAL A 10,000-TONSHIP WITH 8-INCH GUNS?

TIE 6-INCH-GUN SHIP WILL EQUAL THE8-INCH-GUN SHIP

Subscribed to by-Roar Admiral Yarnell.Roar Admiral Hepburn.

ARGUMENTS

Rear Admiral YARNELL: 'YOUcan put more 6-inch guns than8-inch guns on the samne tonnage.On a 10,000-ton ship you could1)robably put twelve 6-inch gunsand protection against 6-inchshells, which is more protectionthan the 8-inch-gun cruiser hasto-d(ay. The 6-inch gun is aseffective as are 8-inch guns againstunarmored ships %within 18,000yards range.

1Rear Admiral IIEI1-BV13URN: In-trinsically Oil a 10,000-ton dis-llacomont a ship can be (designedwith 6-inch guins that is intrinsi-cally better than an 8-inch gun

insor.

THE 6-INCH-GUN SHIP WILL NOT EQUALTHE S-INCH-GUN SHIP

Subscribed to byRear Admiral Jones,Rear Admiral Pringle.Rear Admiral Day.Rear Admiral Leahy.Rear Admiral Standley.Rear Admiral Coontz.Rear Admiral Robison.

ARGUMENTS

Rear Admiral JONES: The 10,-000-ton cruiser armed with 6-inchguns is not equal to the 10,000-ton cruiser armed with 8-inchguns.Rear Admiral PRINGLE: If YOU

assume a 10,000-ton cruiser armedwith 6-inch guns and one armedwith 8-inch guns and both havingthe same protection, then as faras fighntng value goes, the 6-inch-guIn cruisler has n10 chance withthe 8-inch-r tin cruiser.Rear A(miiral DAY: 'rhere is

no advantage in building a 6-inch-gun cruiser of 9,000 or 10,000tons displacomeont. They couldnot operate effectively against8-inch-gun cruisers. They couldcarry the same armor, but withtheir 6-inch guns would have nochance against 8-inch guns.Roar Admiral LEAHY: It would

be exceedingly difficult to builda 6-inch-gun cruiser that wouldhave the same speed, superiorarmor protection, and more gunsin sufficient mounts, to make itequal to the 8-inch-gun cruiser.Roar Admiral STANDLEY: A

6-inch-gun cruiser with 9,000 or10,000 tons displacement could

211

9.869604064

Table: CAN A 10,000-TON SHIP ARMED WITH 6-INCH GUNS EQUAL A 10,000-TON SHIP WITH 8-INCH GUNS?

460406968.9

LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

AJRGUMEJNTS ARGUMENTS

not be )built which would holdher own against an 8-inch-guincruiiser under any but very special.situations. At close rangoe shsmight, have the a(lvantage ofrapidity of fire. For generalwork yo1 cann not conceive of ^vessel of that typo which couldcoI)e with the 8-inch-gun cruiser,The striking force of the 6-inchguns wou.d be less than the, 8-inchguns and the 8-inch-gun cruiserwould have the advantage.Rear Admiral COONTZ: The

fact that her guns are inferior tothe guns of an 8-inch-gun cruiserwould make less effective a 9,000or 10,000 ton cruiser with 6-inchguns.

Rear. Admiral ROBISoN. If6-inch guns are placed on ships of9,000 or 10,000 tons displacementyou could put so much armor onthat neither a 6-inch guin nor fn8-inch gun could pierce her, butshe would be uiseless for any pur4pose. If 6-inch guns were mounted on a ship of exactly the samotype, arnmor, anl (ldisplacement ofan 8-inch-gutn ship, she could notcompete with the 8-inch-.gun ship.

28

IDIVISION OF CRUISER INTO CATEGORIESSecretary ADAMB: There is oni5 category of cruisers divided into

two parts. Tho two parts are: With guns 'of tore than 6.1-inch;with guns of 6.1inch or less. P::The naval policy of the United States, submitted to ind 'appr6Ned

by PresidenC Harding in, 1922, and practically the sam6 policyapproved by PresidQnt Coolidge in' 1928, provides under "Buildingand Inaintenance policy" ,

Cruisers: To protect the fleet andprotect oui coimmrce, replace all odruir'with modernacruisotsiof 10,000 8tanidard tons dispIlaemenit carrying'8-inchgun" santi, in addition, to build cruisers at a rate that will maintain effective tonnagein confornilty, W'ith thq capital ship ratios as established byi the Washington.treaty limiting 44 larmanent, .I.Small crulsr& id gunboats: To build no sthal Cis to build rplacernent

gunboats as required.;The o6E;3t~~tl' idsuiied that, tfliro has been a departure fromit

policy. Trhe delegation found, upon its arrival in England, everynation; e;copt' Italy,' *rIhk di' hot expx'ess an opinion, desiring,'tqdivide the crniioi< atd 6ry, -separating 8-inlh-guns from 6-inch-ships, not 'eof utibut by tonhae. This was'resispd1) thb I Viatsdolaglon.The n cruiser ofaYout 6,000' tons. Mohhd to'nko a compromise. Thinks tl)at t"ie'naval opinion supports thb'b lieo that for many purposes a 6-inch-gimnship is higlily desirable. Th ro was 'an Yattompt made to secure.twelnty-ond '8-ifbh-fiOii &ruiscbs. B}oth Groat Britain and Japgnobjected. P1rh"'` tlioy had nI1 right to bltt the'tdelegation wa"trying to roach t fhtadrmdr ngenlemit,'nAn hobdiiqevi s thnt 'thoy6 avaRear AdnmirallJoN's:' The cutiis6 of thoe falure of tie Goeneva cone

forolice in 1927 was, geuorally Sp'elkinq, large fltiure" proposed by, tieBritish as thoW minhmim hecessities, and their desire to stindaridizoill tho typo of cruiier'imost' suitabJlo't er condition dcl lfastSitilAeto ours. They insilsftp' oxi limitig do'wii t'o ,a yor low limit lrt vo3ewe consi(lored mniost suitable 'or our n'eodb, but to place ,alIe limiton othor-iihits Which We'cd*idniot accept. Great Britainha shidn-tained thiis view conslstin'tly and ou'r view has boon maintainedconsistontlir"aThe'po`ltiofi Unf1thi6 iited Stntes doftthWt

durill 'the period 'ondihg On Dbcomber 31, 1936,we would requirefull liiIerty of action to build 10,000-ton cruiser up to.a total of260,000 tons, recogizing at 'the shime' timne the full right of otherpowers t6 build 6rufiser df 'simiiilai; chara t*ristics up tonnagos inaccordance with' thie riniHAjes of the Washington Tr6ty. ,We donot see ally ronsoun fr 1uiintihg the Wnlibbr of gun in tho smialler clafof criuisors to anything difforemt from that in the larger class.

Whelon at"Uieovath' cjitoh of tlo small cruiser 'came up, th9British spok6 of tho lO4OO-ton 8-hh giln cruiser fls boing osontiallyan offonlsivO *eapon,0amid'of the hilmaller cruiser as being essentiallya defensive weapon. We maintained our stand that' we would not

29

0LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930.

consent to any tonnage of the smaller cruiser which would not permitof the mounting of an efficient 8-inch battery. The Japanese sup-ported us, that there was no reason for dividing the cruiser categoryinto two types by the size of the guns, although they did state that itwas not t heir intention at that time to build more than their an-nounced program of 8-inch gun cruisers.Our stand has always been that within the total tonnage in each

category, each nation should be allowed to build as her needs dic-tate.

Dividing of the cruiser category into subcategories is a misnomer,in that you can hardly consider them subcategories. They are typeswithin a category, but not really or rigidly subcategories. If they,are subcategories, then that is contrary to all' of the stand that wehave been taking consistently up to this time.Rear Admriral CHASE: One of the principles for obtaining parity is

that each nation should be allowed to use its allotted tonnage as itdeems will best meet its particular needs, This conception of parity,absolutely forbids the subdivision of categories into c asses of arma-mnent, size speed, or other characteristics, but in no wny prevents theLimposition of limits as to maximum size of unit or maximum caliberof gun.Rear Admiral BRISTOL: We should be given a certain number of tons

of cruisers, and make that a parity with Great Britain, Then weshould be allowed to build that in any way we please, either as8-inch gun cruisers or as 6-inch gun cruisers. That policy which woestablished and which we are willing to abide by also is based on,allowing England to do exactly the same thing,Rear Admiral MOFFETT: Sorry that there has been a change of

principle we have always followed that there should not be categorieswithin category. Does not believe that there could have been anagreement unless we did as we did do. If you decide that there aroto be both 8-inch-gun cruisers and 6-inch-gun cruisers, it makes nodifference whether you call 'it two categories or one category. ThQ,United States should have the right to do anything it pleases with itstonnage, but there would not havo been an agi'eeim1eint. Unless thQ'number of 8-inch and. 6-inch-gun-cruisors by tho ond of 1930was definitely stated, wo would Iot have gottOn an ngre:3not:v;*Rear Admilal. REim vE: Trle London treaty eliminates tho funda.,

mental recommendations of the Gonoral Board: The right to de ideourselves internally tho type of shh) that best moets our noods; and,that categories should not be subdivi(led. The London conferencesubdivided tho cruiser category into large and small types to tho,great disadvantage of the United States,

In the letter of the General Board of September 11, 1929, the boarddid not, intend to subscribe to a division in the category. TheGeneral Board explicitly stated in that letter that they adhered tothe principle of no subdivision of categories, an(l repeated and re-iterated that opinion and principle.Roar Admiral COONTZ: It is a mistake to change our position and

give uip the right to build the kind of ships we want in the cruiser,category. Wo will not be able to got away from tho division ofcategories in another conference.

30

WHAT IS THE RATIO WITH JAPAN AND IS IT SATISFACTORY?RATIO 1 SATISFACTORY

Subscribed to by-Secretary Adains.Admiral Pratt.Admiral Moffett.Admiral Hepburn.

ARGUMBNTS

Secretary ADAMS: Ti' '-inchcruisers,, 6-incih cruisers, Japanhas a groat superiority on ver sideill ships built Iand building.Japan lias steadily built de-stroyers and her fleet is far moremodern. than ours. Otur Ostroyorsare on the whIole probably nmorevalual)le than hers, but are not

Pnoughl to offset her superiorityin cruisers. Japan's. subiniarnesare newer than ours. With anauxiliary fleet of the same or r-haps less value than theirs we hadto ask them to stop buil log,jettheir floet deteriorate, Mndpermitus to build to relation of 10tP 7.Under the circumstances we

made a. fair compromise; 10 t 7

in destroyers; 180,000' to. 108,400in 6-inch-gun cruisers; aboit' iO to

S D-7t1-2-vo. 23-07

RATIO' IS NCO SATISFACTORYSubscribed to by-

Admiral Jones.;Admiril Pringle,:Admiral Yarnell.Admiral Chas'.Admiral-3ristol.Admiral Hughes.Adiiral: Reeves.Admiral Hough.Admital' Day.Admiral Cole.Admital Standley.Admiral McLean.Admiral Wiley.Admiral Ttylor.Admiral Coontz.Adiniral Nulton.Admiral Robison.Captain Smyth.Commnander Train.

ARIGJMENT8

Admiral JoNE.S: In 1027 in,.formed the Japanese that. it washiis firm conv'ietion that 5: 3 tendertlle existing conditions was illreality a '5:fi plus.. At presentthe 5: 3'ratio is in reality a 5: 5

*Ou' lack of bases in the westernPacific gives tle Japanasean ad-vantago in strengtth ovor' u, InoperatliIg thbro we would have tohave at, lest 2%4 to 3 linits ofa.rui Ito keejI on operating inthat area,

Adimiirnl PRINQA : Cai notslubscribe to inwoasing the ratiowith Japain to anything above5: W.V ith the 5: 3 -atiQ wewouldd have a chance of condle't-ng a successflit campaign, but ifthe ratio is altered m favor of thec

31

9.869604064

Table: WHAT IS THE RATIO WITH JAPAN AND IS IT SATISFACTORY?

460406968.9

LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

ARGUMENTS

6.5, with the final decision post-ponfle until 1936. In submarinesthere was a compromise. Wewanted chiefly low tonnage fornaval reasons, We got a reduc-tion of 13,390 tQns in her fleetbuilt; 5,000 tons built and build-ing. We could have gotten supe-riority of tonnage at a higher totalfigure but deemed this settlementbetter. On the whole the treatyis just and it offers parity withEngland and a fair relation withJapan.Japan is a little strengthened in

capital ships.Even though we have agreed to

a 10 :10 ratio with Japan in thesubmarine category we may beable to cut it down at a futuretime.Admiral PRA'TT: Tn battleships

the numbers have been reduced tothe proportion 15:9. The ton-nage proportions in this class areas equitable as it is possible tomake them. Destroyer tonnagehas not been reduced below asafe margin. Its proportions are10: 10: 7. It is a type easilybuilt at reasonably shot noticeand it is a type which in war wewroiuld hardly have 'enough iof.The concession of 10 io : 7 in thistype does not matoiiially affectfleet combat strength in time ofwar, In submarines the propor-tions in tonnage are 10:10:10,but by this concossion'total ton-nage is reduced. Total abolitionof submarines would be an' excl-lent thing for the Unfited Satit'esnaval policy,' but failing thfis'sthetonnage figure set at 52,700'tonsis not below our irreducible needin case the sbibmarine is notabolished,

In 8-inch crulserk 'the propor-tions are 10: 6. In the 6-inch typethe proportions are 10: 7. Frpm.the viewpoint "of' fleet combat

ARGUMENTS

Japanese our chances are reducedthereby and become less thanwhat you could possibly call aneven chance. This is because ofour Jnecessity of 'proj'tifih ouroperations, across the. Pacificocon.' Any raising of the 5:3ratio in favor of Japan operatesto our disadvantage. In the ten-tative proposal the suggestionwas made we should have, 60,000tons of submarines to the' Japa-nese 40,000 tons. That wouldnot have been to our disadvan-tage. It is to our advantage tohold the Japanese to as low asubmarine tonnage as possible.

Because a nation is 3,000 milesfrom the seat of war is no reasonfor giving that nation a lesserratio than it had in reference tobattleships, but rather to give ita larger proportion in cruisers.Admiral YARNELL: Japan en-

tered the conference with a supe-riority in submarines so it wasfutile to talk to her about a re-duction to 5: 3 when she hadthese ships: and we did not.

If she has parity with us in anytype of vessel she is liable to claimit in the next conference, and thechances are if she has a'6ti4aleqtuality is tonnage she Will gbtit. It is difficult to establish''nyother ratio than that' whioh ac.tually xist6 in tonnage builtiidbuilding. She will not W&it" alesser 'ratio at the next conlfd6ticethah'she got at this cofe&ibYee.She will claim -the ratio 's'hiac-tually has in 4ipts built d-biibIld-ink as Ahe did in this conferex6ic.If re Want any 4ssurrn" 'fgoing to' the PhiIippin`0S' in tlneof war With a reasonable '6a04 ofsuccess, w; need to't'ild' jd-dqc1~s and 'a base in th6 Philip-pines and proper fottiftcetioi~is,anndneed d fleet perhaps 2 to 1with togard to Japan.

32

LONDON NAiTA TofTY OF 193 0

;ARGtUMINTS

strength the treaty is mok satis-ffactory,The Japanese stated that if we

could give them 70,000 tons wecould take anything we liked.The United States was lucky to

come out 10:7 by-yielding on somethings,,Admiral MoiFmivr: Utider the

circumstances, to get agreement,is willing, to give up the Jppaneseratio of 5:3. The treaty dqs notsacrifice our safety or security,.

If we went to tar with Japan,in order to have: a reasonablechance of sUiCes8 on the outbreakof war, we should have twice asmuch sea power as Japan, Doesnot tbink that 5:3 wouldgive usa protective ratio, Whlen weraise the ratios t9 .5: 3 rwe are nothelping. ourselves. J-pan omayask in future for a ratio of: 10;7or 10: 8, The fact thatmwe havegiven in in this ease will ,encour-age Japap, to increase her de-mands at the n t col2.ferenclThinks the treaty tses care of

our interests. It. is important toget Japan stopped.The treaty gives Japan a ratio

of slightly more than 5:3 insome categories. d .The r greemenit as9 fldQ does

not in any way Jeo dizei thesafety and seciqrity of thq nivtdStates. In case of trouble ii thePacific we are not far kelow theratio we are supposed .to have inaircraft camrrera with J4ap.iAdmir~ HNPBUnN: We have

5:3 ratio withJ.#p' . if we h4ve18 cruisers.. Japan Werved, noticebefore she Went to tM 99ferepcethat she was not going to take ,:3.We have not a 5:3 ratio Awth

Ja kan'. ...we8 could. "ator4 to giyepapan, a

better ratio than. 5:3; in sub-marines, depending on hlow for

ARUUMEM

lIt order to reach parity withJapan the United -States fleetshould be about 2 to 1.:

Captain SMYTR: The Londontreaty raises the ratio with Japanbeyond the ageed ratio in theWashington treaty. This is a dimadvantage to the United States.

C:omma~nder STRAIN: An -in-orease over the 5:3 ratio is to themilitary disadvantage of theUnited States,.Adriral CHASB: The.ratio with

Japan oni the 31st of Decembor,1936k provided the United Stateswill .build eighthen 8-inch-guncruisers, WiMl be as follows:Total iet__ _6 - 5 to 3.44Deetroyers. - 5 to 3I5Submarines-_ 5 to AAircraft carriers-6 to 3Total in the foregoing auxil-

iary class - to 3. 45Capital ships- 5to 2.9Grand total of all categories. 6 to 3. 26The Washington treaty ratio of

5:5:3 is maintained exactly onlyin the aircraft carrier category.In the capital ship category theUnited States is slightly abovethe ratio. In all other categoriesthe United States is below theratio.Although by actual tonnage the

Japanese are a little below the5:3 ratio, Admiral Chase believesthey fully have their 5:3.

Nothing new has come up tojustify an increase of the cruiserratio for Japan since the Wash-ington treaty. If the battleshipratio is 5:3 the cruiser ratioshould be the same. Any in-crease or decrease is an advantageor a disadvantage to the nationreceiving the increase or decrease.If we were allowed to developour naval bases in the Pacificour ratio would be increased. Ifthe bases are given up and theratio of a possible enemy in-

83

LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF. 1930

ARGUMENTS

down she was willing to put thetotal tonnage.Not satisfied with the ratio,

practically 10:7, in destroyersThe treaty does not give us a

ratio of 5:3 with Japan, but itincreases our relative status as itexists now and it has existed for a

long time, and it is the best thatwe could get. We i'could notask or expect Japan. to agree todo anything more than to! stopwhere she is. Due to the factthat we' have raised Japan'sratio at the present time; in thefuture she will probably ask; formore. Does not think that weshould ask her to go below.whatwe have given her at this con-ference.

ARtMIES

creased,'Xwe accentuate itn twoways the advantage which thatnation has.The ratio of 5:3 with Japan "if

operations -are carried on in, thewestern Pacific would nbt amountto equality for the United States.Increasing the 5:3 ratio for JapanAdds thAt much more to hersuperiority. We are not onequality with Japan, consideringthe ratio that has been. reached inthis treatyy'The ziiost' objectionable clause

in the Washington treaty is theone relating to the United Statesgiving up the right to fortify herbases in the western Pacificl.AdInralBRIsToL :Withoutques.

tion our agreeing not to fortifyour islands in the Pacific was thereason for the Japanese acceptinga 5:3 ratio.;We 'gae uip our soverign bights

when Wb agreed not to fortify thePhilippines or to increase Ratyfacilities in Guam and in itsislands, And for that reason weare 'hatnpered n' the Orient.'

For operations in the Orlentour ratiolwlth Japan, coWideringfortifications and naval basesshould be in order to give us eqiuaistrength;'5:3.Ud the provisions of the

Loidopi Treaty the ratio has been

Submarines for the UhitedStaes Are la defensive weapon,not ohly f6r our interests at homnethe Panama Canal iZbnie andHawaii, btit fdr the PhilippineIslandsf;'if we reduce the numberrof subma'rihes we' have g0t' tosubstitiite Other ships/ for, thedefense of those places'. That is,you not only reduce the subma-rines but You reduce your fi htingforce to take the placeE O sub-marli~es. a;We should have maintained

the ratio of vessels on the prin-

34

LONDON NAVAL TRLDATY OF'19 3 0

ARGUMENTS ARGUIN

ciple that at the time of theWashington Treaty we establishedthose ratios. Japan agreed thatthey were fair. Since that timenothing has occurred which wouldwarrant a change of those ratios.The security of Japan is notdisturbed.On account of the Kellogg

pact any reduction that is madeshould be proportional. TheLondon treaty changes the ratiowith Japan. Japan did not giveus anything in concession for ourrelinquishing the 5:3 ratio underthis treaty. Due to the change ofratio the United States will notbe in as good a position hereafteras we would have been if the ratioshad been maintained and thegood-feeling and mutual respectresulting therefrom had been con-tinued.Once having changed the ratio

you have started the ball rollingand it is probable that the Japan-ese will demand more in the nextconference.

It would be much better forthe good feeling between the twocountries to maintain that whichwe had agreed to in the Washing-ton Treaty, unless some decidedreason to change the agreement.

Admiral HUGHES. The Wash-ington Treaty established theratio we should have with Japanas 5:3. We are not nowgoing tohave it. We are going to haveequality in submarines, and some-thing higher than 3 in cruisersand in destroyers. In battleshipswe come near to 5:3 and in air-craft carriers we have 5:3.For operations in the Pacific our

relative strength compared withthat of Japan to put them on anequal footing is 5:3; 5:3 willabout make up for our lack ofbases and a long distance fromour country. Even if we had theright to fortify our bases in the

35

*36 LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

ARGUMENTS ARGUMENTS

Pacific, 5:3 would have beenabout a fair basis. When wegave up the right to fortify ourbases we gave up more than a5:3 basis.

Admiral REEVES: Ratio withJapan in cruisers during the lifeof the treaty is 5:3.44. Theratio with Japan at the conclusionof the treaty in cruisers built andbuilding is 5:3.3 plus.The ratio in submarines is

parity, 5:5. This increase in theratio with Japan imperils our in-terests in the Pacific and the FarEast. With the sacrifice of thedefense of our possessions in theFar East our ratio should be 10:5,or two to one. The ratio 5 :3gives us a bare chance of success.The advent of aircraft gives

Japan an advantage in the de-fensive position which she occu-pies in the Far East. Because innaval warfare she will be able tobring into that warfare in certainareas shore based aircraft, whichprivilege is denied.us. Aviationgives Japan an advantage, and,as affecting the 5:3 ratio, thatratio should be reduced to lessthan 5:3 to offset it.Admiral HOUGH: The 5:3 ratio

with Japan would give us a fairchance during war for operationsin the Far East.

It would not give us more thanan even chance because we haveto operate long distances fromour home ports and home bases,and we have only in the Philip-pines the base at Manila. Wewould be at a great disadvantageon account of our lack of bases.It was a decided detriment for usto give up our bases, and thequestion of bases is related to the5 :3 ratio. Japan was made toaccept the 5:3 ratio at Washing-ton by our promise not to extendour fortifications in the Pacific.Japan at the London Conference

LONDON NAVALJ ThK&X, ot 1XOa0 37ARQUALENTS ARGUMENTS

has been claiming a much greaterratio but nothing was said as faras he knows as to repealing ormodifying the clause in the Wash-ington Treaty as to our bases.The Japanese apparently have

the 80 per cent ratio and besidesthat have the restriction on ourbases.

In the final outcome, Japangets practically a 10:7 ratio be-.cause she has parity in subma-rines; 5:3.44 in cruisers; 5:3.5 indestroyers; 5:3 in aircraft carriers;total auxiliary 5:3.45; capitalships 5:2,9; grand total, 5 for theUnited States and 3:26 for Japan.

Admiral DAY: The distance oursubmarines would have to oper-ate from base in a war withJapan gives Japan enormous su-periority. The proximity of herbases to the operating area is ofgreat value to her, and she couldhave many more submarines inthe operating area than we could.It is advisable to have Japan'ssubmarine tonnage as low as pos-sible, but not to the point ofhaving equality with us. Thepresent arrangement of 5:5 ratioin submarines is not satisfactory.

Admiral COLE: If hostilitiesare to be carried on in the FarEast, in order to have a fair chancewith Japan, the United Statesratio to Japan should be 5:3 inall categories.The ratio has been raised for

Japan and this is disadvantageousto us.

If speaking of work for theUnited States Fleet in the westernPacific, it is deplorable to freezeus into a situation where we startwith a handicap even on 5:3basis,Admiral STANDLEY: The ratio

with Japan should be at least10:5 or 2:1.The lack of undefended bases in

the Far East puts us at a disad-

LCNDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

ARGWMENT AIRGUMENTS

vantage. We are practically help.less to defend our policies andcommerce in the Far East.

Anything we do to allow theJapanese Navy to increase at theexpense of our own will cause ourinfluence in the Far East' togradually disappear.

Admiral McLEAN: Our Philip-pine possessions are within 300miles of one of Japan's bases andwithin 1,500 miles of all of them,whereas their possessions are 4,000miles from our nearest real base atHonolulu and 6,000 miles fromour west coast. Our small base inthe Philippines is inadequate tocare for a large submarine force inwar, even if Manila did not fall tothe enemy. This condition is adirect result of the WashingtonConference, whereby we are stop-ped from increasing our militaryfacilities at Manila, which was theprice we paid for the 5:3 ratio withJapan. It is important that wehave a 5:3 ratio in submarinesbecause they must operate from abase. In case of a large submarineforce operating in Asiatic waters,they would have to do major over-haul at Pearl Harbor, while theenemy would be operating from anear-by base. The Japanese couldbring their whole 52,700 tons ofsubmarines against our fleet.Considering the other points atwhich we would have to put sub-marines, it is doubtful if we couldoperate half of our 52,700 tons inAsiatic waters.The Japanese could operate all

of their submarines against oursurface fleet and keep their capi-tal ships in the inland sea.The 5:3 ratio should extend to

submarines. If the tonnage werecut to 25,000 we might acceptparityAdmiral WILEY: Japan accept-

ed 5:3 on condition we would not

38

LONDON NAVAL TRBATY OF 1930 3

ARGUJlNTS ARGUMIrNTS

further improve our fortificationsbeyond Honolulu.The ratio has been increased.

Japan should have not more than5:3 ratio. It would give us noadvantage, and an increase givesJapan an advantage.The defense of the Philippines

should be by submarines.We should have at least 5:3

ratio in every class of combatantships.The price paid in 1922 for a 5:3

ratio was too high, and the pres-ent ratio makes it worse.

Admiral TAYLOR: On a 5:3 ra-tio with Japan we have a sportingchance.Any raising of that ratio puts us

in a bad position. We have got-ten nothing for increasing theJapanese ratio above 5: 3.

In giving Japan parity to gether tonnage down, we paid toohigh a price. --

Would not have been willing togive parity to Japan on basis of25,000 tons. The ratio should be5:3.That should be the ratio in all

types.Admiral CooNTz: Ratio with

Japan should be 5:3. Takinginto consideration our lack of for-tified bases we would have justabout an equal chance.An increase in the ratio places

us at a disadvantage in the FarEast.

In submarines the ratio shouldbe 5:3 with 90,000 tons for us.Admiral NULTON: In order to

operate in the Far East the ratiowith Japan should be 5:3. Thisgives us no advantage, due to ourlack of bases.An increase in the ratio acts to

our disadvantage. It is againstour interests to maintain the pro-vision that we will not fortify ourbases.

Ratio in submarines should beat least 60:40.

:39

40 LONDON NAVAL TRIEATY OF 1930

ARGUMENTS ARGUMENTS

Admiral ROBISON: Under theLondon treaty, in total cruisertonnage, the United States cannot get a 5:3 ratio with Japan,We can get 5:3 in 6-inch-guncruisers, provided we accept 5:4 in8-inch-gun cruisers.The ratio in destroyers is 5:3.5.

This gives Japan ten 1,500-ton ortwelve 1,200-ton destroyers overthe 5: 3 ratio.We have abandoned the 5:3

ratio with Japan in all classes ofships except battleships (and air-craft carriers) but no change hasbeen made whereby we agree totake no measure to increase facili-ties for repair and maintenance ofnaval forces in the Far East.Japan did not give Up her sec-ondary bases in daroline and Mar-shall Islands, stretching morethan half the distance from thePhilippines to Hawaii. Japan'sminimum gain over the 5:3 ratiois two 8,000-ton cruisers, twelve1,200-ton destroyers, and twenty1,000-ton submarines. We holdthe Philippines on suffrance as theresult of these concessions.

If we build eighteen 8-inch-guncruisers, Japan will be in excessof the 5: 3 ration at the end of1936, four 8-000-ton cruisers, andin 1938, two.

Japan having authority to have62,700 tons of submarines builtat end of 1936, and 12,000 tonsnearly completed, has an advan-tage,Japan hopes that we will

never build beyond fifteen 8-inchcruisers, which will give her 80per cent instead of 70 per cent.With 5:3 ratio we are about

on a par. -To get Japan to 52,700 tons

in submarines is not sufficientreason to surrender the 5:3ratio.The 5: 3 ratio for Japan is very

liberal.We can not afford to be below

the 5:3 basis.

IS IT TO THEs INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO GRANT PARITYIN SUBMARINE TONNAGE TO JAPAN IN ORDER TO DECREASE HERSUBMARINE TONNAGE? .

IT IS TO THE ADVTAGE OF tHE UNITED IT IS NOT tO THE ADVANTAGE OP THESTATES TO GRANT SUBMARINE PARITY UNITE STATES TO QRANT SUBMARNEWITH JAPAN, PARITY WITH JAPAN

Subscribedto by- Subsenibed to$y-Secretary idam'. Rear Admiral JonesbAdmir4,41Prat. Rear, AdimiaJ single.Rear Admiral. Mofftet. Rear Admira McLean,

Roar Admairal Da'ay,Rear Admiral Wiley.Rear Admriral Nulton.Roar Admiral Coontz.Rear Admiral Bristol.Rear Admiral Standly.Rear Admiral RAbison.Rear Admiral Reeves.Rear Admiral ColO.Rear Admiral XYirmell.Admiral Hughhep.Rear Admiral Hough.Captain Smyth.Cqplmander Train,

ARGUMENT5.

Secretary ADAMA stated: "Insubmarines there wis alio' a com-promis6. ,We wanted chiefly lowtO1)i11g0- !for )aIal ireah'ons¢! Wegot a redulctoh of. l'00 tVons inher fledt built and '6,OO 1ii builtand buildings; We could have gotsuperiority of tbxifage at a highertotal fle, but believed thissettlement Vbetter."Admiral PRATT stated concern-

ing the siubmarie..,ratio' withJapan: "The pr6porpofios in ton-nage are 10:10iiOQ; but by this con-cession/ total '-tdnnagb is reduced.The total abolit6n' of submarixieswould be .ani excellentthi- g fornaval poli'6, but failihigthis thetonnateflgtrf het at 52 700 i8 notbelow our irr-eduuitle Minimum' in

ARGUMENTS

Admiral MOrrETT stated his be-lief th'at th6' progressissf tidnand in devices' fP' locating 'lubbmarines had greatly reduc'dtheirvalue s' a weapon'; that' the c'n-cession made enabled a'n agree-ment'dn .a' tfonniage.maerially Issthan 'tha't-now in thepossession ofthe countrie' concerned, h'd thfAtthe ieediictio' in Japtanqes spi>-marine ' tonnage compe'nsaes.i"tfor the 10 iw he' relative ratio.

Adiiiial J6Nin stated (in hismeniornduin~i of -Febr&'y13,1930, priced in thehearings) thIktgenerally speaking1 a lowvtonnA~elimit on. subrtharu~et will b~ts6ve the interests of the UnitedStates, providing it is not belowthe tomage necessary-to provide

41

9.869604064

Table: IS IT TO THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO GRANT PARITY IN SUBMARINE TONNAGE TO JAPAN IN ORDER TO DECREASE HER SUBMARINE TONNAGE?

460406968.9

LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

ARGUMENTS

case the submarine is not abol-ished." A.dmiral Pratt stated hehad changed his mind in the lastfew years on the question of theminimum

- submarine tonnagenecessary for:' the United 'Sttes,the question of the abolition ofthe submarine, and the questionof the necessity of maintainfihgthe.5 :3 ratio in submarine tonnagewith Japan, due to-the develop-ment of aviation. He has con-cluded that it Would be' to ourbest interests to have no sub-marines in the probable theater ofoperations as we arec' going tohave many more tons of, com-batant vessels insutich areas alub-ject to enemy submarine/attackthan we can use our submarinesagainst, Failingg She total aboli-tion of submarines he believes itis to our best interes'ts;to reducetheir numbers providing; We donot go. below our irreducible mini-mum.; When he favored.'80,O00tons as an irreducible ininimum itincluded a large tonnage for pro-tection of our coast 'and lc-oastalshipping lanes, the'Pahliam Canal,and island possessions. Thiswork cay better be performed byair power and our uWaribne;ton-nage requirements haves been, re-duced by, the amount of .sub-marine tonnage formerly requiredfor protection, of coastal Ianes,the Panama Canal, "c,. Thesubmarine tonnage u,we, are ufingnow and would ulse,would'be usedaggressively. He stated that wecould have-had the ratio on ahigher total,tonnage. basis, 1. e.'"* * * the eJapanese naval offi-cers came and salid:, 'If you cansee your Way clar, to giving us70,000 tons we doii't care whatyou take. Take 7Q,000 801000,or 90,000 tons, so asto' e60p theratio. The;, ratio6'i's fancy, pieceof paper. It don't mouint'6o 2cents because we haven't. ay-

ARGUMENTS

a sufficient number of submarinesof the size necessary for the,United States to operate in theareas in which they would becalled upqni to operate. .The.ton-'nage reqi4ired- to cover'out',critic'aareas; that is,' the Phiippihes,Hawaii 'the' Panama -Canail,fiandthe Caribbean, he put'at 60,00'0tons. He stated his convictionthat allottmg Japan 36,000 tonson this basis, in the ratio of5:3 gives the advantage to Japian.Nevertheless' as 'a concession -wemight admit, an 1llotmentt to herof 42,000 tons which' is in theratio 10:7.

Admiral PRINGLE stated thatin his opinion any alteration ofthe 5:3 ratio in favor of Japanoperates to our disadvantage;that a slight alteration of thesubmarine ratio, as suggested inone of the tentative proposalswhereby the United States wouldhave had 90,000 tons to Japan's60,000 tons, or 60,000 tons toJapan's 40,000 tons, of minorimportance. He agrees that it isto our advantage to hold Japanto as low a submarine tonnage aspossible, btut'does not believe it isto our advantage to, gangA, horsubmnarinie parity. sunless by sodoir ,'g.bye coud', persiad,,h'or toreducelto a very lo, figure, some-where Around -25,000 tons.,Admiral, 'McLElAN, startedc his

lbohaef 'tha~'t~thtotal abolition pisiibmarines, wQUld ,be advapta-geous to the Unfted States, becausein event of war we have a verylarge, surface Navy which wewould;'qrry,into waters, whqrethey would, be, exposed to ;uk-marine attack. For examipl'e' inevent yf war with J)pa~m it, wouldbe possible f -r her to conduct sub-marine warfare. against our Aeetand,J.Xeep their. surface, 6espelsunexposed. He does. now, however, believe that failing , bolition

42

LONDON NAVAL, TREATY OP 1930

ARGUMENTS

thing- to use our-. subniarinesagainst; aggressively, and- theyiihave lots of .tonxha gel to !use ,it.against." Hee stated that, he hadtried to brink submarines into' "a;fleet action, but outside of the bigV-boats he never 'could do it.-

ARGUMENTS

of submarines that we shouldgrant .her parity unless we can byso doing reduce her tonnage toabout 25,000 tons, because inevent of war with Japan she couldbring 52,700 tons to operateagainst our fleet from near-bybases, whereas due to our require-inents for defense of Pearl Har-bor, Canal Zone, etc., we couldnot bring over half of our sub-marines to operate in the probabletheater of operations and theywould be dependent for repairs ona base 4,000 miles away.Admiral DAY said that sub-

marines are necessary for defenseof Hawaii, the Philippines, and theCanal Zone, for coast defense andto act as distant scouts. Hebelieves that it is advisable tohave Japan's submarine tonnageas low as possible, but does notbelieve it should be at the ex-pense of granting her parity inorder to attain such a reduction.He thinks the treaty arrangementis unsatisfactory. And does notbelieve the general abolition ofsubmarines advantageous to theUnited States.

Admiral WILEY favors aboli-tion of submarines providin all

nations agree, but does not be ieveit to our advantage to grantparity to Japan in order to get herto reduce to 52,700 tons.Admiral NULTON favors aboli-

tion of submarines providing allnations agree, but believes failingthis 5:3 ratio should be main-tained.Admiral COONTZ believes sub-

marines are needed for defense ofPanama Canal, Hawaii, and Phil-ippines and that 5:3 ratio shouldbe maintained.Admiral BRISTOL believes sub-

marines are needed for defense ofPanama Canal, Hawaii, and the-Philippines, an(l that 5:3 ratioshouldbe maintained.

43

44 LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 19 30

ARGUMENTS RIUMXNTS

Admiral STANDLEY believes sub-marines are needed for defense? ofPanama Canal, Hawaii, etc., andthat when these requirements aremet very few will be left for otherpurposes.

Admiral ROBISON does not be-lieve it is to our advantage togrant Japan submarine parityeven if by so doing Japan wouldconsent to reduce to 25,000 tons.He does not believe it to our ad-vantage to abolish the submarineeven though all nations agreed.He believes submarines are re-quired for defense of PanamaCanal, Hawaii, and the Philip-pines.

Admiral REEVES stated thatthe increase in Japan's cruiser andsubmarine ratio imperils our in-terests in the Pacific and FarEast.Admiral COLE did not com-

ment directly on this subject, butthinks to have a fair chance inevent of hostilities in the Far Eastwe need a 5:3 ratio in all cate-gories.

Admiral YARNELL did not com-ment directly oin this subject, butbelieves treaty as a whole will be asplendid thing for the UnitedStates Navy. "Japan enteredthe conference with a superiorityof submarines, so that it wasrather futile to talk to her about areduction to 5:3 when she hadthese ships and we did not."Admiral HUGHES,. Admiral

HOUGH, Captain SMYTH, andCommander TRAIN did not touchon this subject directly, but be-lieved any increase of the 5:3ratio in favor of Japan operated toour disadvantage.

DOES ARTICLE XXI 'KOWN AS THE ESCAuTOk OR ESCAPE' CTAUSE ALLOW THEUNITED STATES rO BUILD AN EQUAL TONNAGE OF 8-INCH-GUN CRUISERS IN CASEGREAT BRITAIN TAKES ADVANTAGE OF THIS CLAUSE TO BUILD 6INCH-GUN CRUISERS

Secretary ADAMS. "I understand categories allows the UnitedStates to build an 8-inch gun ship even. if Qreat jBritain builds, a6-iuch-gun ship." Admiral Jones subscribed to this view.Admiral PRATT interpreted t~hs claup to mean that in case Groat

Britain builds 6-inch-gun cruisers thereunder we were restricted tobuilding an equal tonnage; of 6-inch-gun --ruisers. Captain Smythand Commander Train subscribed to this view.Tonnages and ratios on December S1, 1936, on assumption that the United States

will build eighteen 8-inch cruisers

Tons built, December, 1938 Ratlos

United reatD United Gr:aat JapaStates. Britain States Britain

Cruisers.....-.......... ... 13: 5Q000 ,80 C 6.68 3.44DAstroyers.--.--------000,I160, 0- 10500 5 6 3.6

Submarines-62, 700 65700 62, 700 6 6 6Aircraft carriers-- 135, 000 135, 000 81,000 6 r) 3

Total auxiliaries-041, 200 676, 700 448, 0,50 66.28 3.46Capital ships-. 3 463,000 3472,650 200,070 6 62 2.0

Grand total------------------ 1,09,700 1, 149,260 714, 120 [ | 2 3.26

I This Includes only 160,000 tous of 8-Inoh-gun cruisers, as under the terms of the London treaty 20,000tons of theseo cruilsors can not be completed before the (late of its termination Dec. 31, 1936,

I These figures exclude the projected modernization of 3 United States battleships and 2 of Great britain

Cruisers December 31, 1929

Subcategory (a)..Subeategory (b).

'Total

United States

Tow10,00070,600

80,600

Build-ing

Tont120,000

120,000

Total

Tons,130, 00070,600

20, 600

Great Britain

Built

Tons149 426

177 616

327,

Build-Ing

Tons30, 800

36,........

se, 8oo

Total

Tone186 220177, 06

83, 911

Japan

Built

.Tons88,40098, 416

100,816

Build-Ing

Tons40,000

40, 000

Total

Toni109,40098,416

200,816

Ratio#

Ships built Ships built and building

United Great United GreatStates Britain Japan States Britain Japan

Subcategory ..-6 ,74.7 34. 2 6 7.16 4. 19Subcategory (b)..---------- 6 12. 6 9 6 12 6 6.98

Totalcategory_-_20.-3 0.3 9.07 ,10.

45

9.869604064

Table: Tonnages and ratios on December 31, 1936, on assumption that the United States will build eighteen 8-inch cruisers

Table: Cruisers December 31, 1929

Table: Ratios

460406968.9

46 LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

Destroyers (less than 16 years of age) December 31, 1929

United States Great Britain Japan

Built Total Built Building Total Built Buildidg Total

Tone Toma Toni Tonm Tons Tons Ton ToneDestroyers- 1226,313 1 226,313 2157,685 26,786 184,371 107, 276 15,300 122, 675Ratio-.--- '6 _ 3.45- 4. 07 2. 37-2.7

1 Excludes 61 destroyers of 63,991 tons on disposal list.2 Excludes destroyers listed for disposal.

Submarines (less than 13 years of age) December 31, 1929

United States Oreat Britain Japan

Built Build- Total Built Build- Total Built Build- Totaling tug ~~~~~~~~~~~Ing

TonJ Tons Tons TPone Tons Tons Tons Tonm ToneSubmarines -... 1 59, 400 5,460 64,860 ' 45, 34 14, 750 60, 284 66,068 11,774 77, 842Ratio- 5 6 3.8 ------- 4.6 56.65

I Excludes 16,120 tons listed for disposal, but includes experimental hulk 8-4, of 790 tons.I Excludes boats on disposal list and those converted to target use.

Cruisers May 21, 1930[Same as on Dec. 31, 1929, except that United States has completed sinoe that date one 10,000-ton subeate.

gory (a) cruIser]

Ratios of ships built now

United Great JapanStates Britain an

Subcategory ()- ------------------6------------------------b 37.35 17.1Subcategory (b)-6-----------------------------------------------------6 13.6 6.9

Total category-6 18.0 9.2

Destroyers (less than 16 years of age) May 21, 1980

United States Great Britain Japan

Built Total Built Building Total Built Building Total

Destroyers ,,- . 1 226, 313 1 226, 313 167, 685 26, 786 184, 371 107,275 22, 100 129, 376Ratios-5.--- 6 3.45...6- -.... 4. 07 2. 37 ..- - . 86

-~~~~~~~~I

I Excludes 61 destroyers of 63,991 tons on disposal list.

Suibnarines (less than 13 years of age) May 21, 1930, same as December31, 1929, except that United states had laid down one additional of about 1,550stan(IaDrd tons.

Guns on United States and British capital ships

Size of gun

16-inch - - - - - - - -

14-inch ------------------- -----------------12-inch -------------------------------

0

United States

Numberof ships

3

111

Totalguns

24

12412

Great Britain

Numberof ships

213

.---- -

. .... .

Totalguns

18100

....---

I_

9.869604064

Table: Destroyers (less than 16 years of age) December 31, 1929

Table: Submarines (less than 13 years of age) December 31, 1929

Table: Cruisers May 21, 1930

Table: Destroyers (less than 16 years of age) May 21, 1930

Table: Guns on United States and British capital ships

460406968.9