143© The Author(s) 2016A. Douai, M. Ben Moussa (eds.), Mediated Identities and New Journalism in the Arab World, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-58141-9_8

CHAPTER 8

INTRODUCTION Research shows that news reportage in democratic contexts can both affect public attitudes and opinion (Burnett & Kogan, 2015 ) and refl ect government policy (Domke, 2004). Meanwhile, framing research sug-gests that the ways in which news (and other) messages are constructed—what information is highlighted, what words are used, and what sources are relied upon—can greatly impact the perceptions, attitudes, and evalu-ations of message recipients (Entman, 1993 ). The impact of news fram-ing is arguably more pronounced in authoritarian environments, where

Mapping the “Arab Autumn”: A Framing Analysis of CBC and Al-Nahar Networks’

Coverage of Egypt’s Military Coup

Mohamad   H.   Elmasry , Philip   J.   Auter , and  Heidi   Makady

M. H. Elmasry () The University of North Alabama, Florence , AL , USA The Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Doha , Qatar e-mail: mohamad.elmasry@dohainstitute.edu.qa

P. J. Auter The University of Louisiana at Lafayette, Lafayette , LA , USA

H. Makady Georgia State University, Atlanta , GA , USA

governments exert more direct control over media content and citizens do not have access to a diverse range of news sources.

Egypt’s cataclysmic 2013 provides an interesting stopping point for media scholars. Roughly two years removed from a popular uprising that led to the ouster of longtime dictator Hosni Mubarak, Egypt entered a period of unprecedented tension and division. On the one hand, Islamists led by the Muslim Brotherhood—who won several democratic elections after Mubarak was forced to step down—attempted to justify a series of political moves made during Egypt’s democratic transition. On the other hand, Egypt’s anti-Islamist opposition argued that the Brotherhood and their allies were in the process of turning Egypt into an Islamist dictatorship.

On July 3, 2013, a military coup deposed Egypt’s fi rst-ever demo-cratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, who hailed from the Brotherhood. During the period of political tension that preceded the coup, privately owned Egyptian news media outlets provided passion-ate support for the Egyptian military, while state-owned outlets were relatively supportive of the Brotherhood government (Elmasry & El-Nawawy, 2014 ). Coverage patterns before July 3, 2013, have been documented anecdotally by analysts and observers (El-Amin, 2013 ; Elmasry, 2013 ; Margolis, 2013 ), and empirically in at least one study (Elmasry & El-Nawawy, 2014 ). To date, however, no systematic studies have been done to examine Egyptian media coverage of the cataclysmic events of July 3, 2013. How did popular privately owned television news outlets—the only news outlets in Egypt that claim to provide objective and balanced reporting—cover the events? Given their relative opposi-tion to the Brotherhood in the period preceding the coup, it may be expected that many of Egypt’s independent news outlets supported the coup. However, what specifi c framing devices did they use, and did pri-vate news outlets attempt to justify clearly anti- democratic moves—the arrest of an elected president, violence by police, and the shutting down of media outlets—carried out on the day of the coup?

This chapter examines specifi c July 3, 2013, frames produced by two of Egypt’s most prominent television news magazine shows—Al-Nahar Network’s “Akher Al-Nahar” (“The End of the Day”), and CBC Network’s “Huna Al-‘Aasima” (“This is the Capital”). It looks at coverage of the July 3 protests and celebrations, attempting to unpack dominant frames of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian military, and violence. The research will attempt to trace the beginnings of a post-July 3 media environment

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that analysts say has demonized the Muslim Brotherhood and its followers and possibly contributed to public desire to eliminate the Brotherhood. Importantly, massive repression against supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood followed the military coup (Dunne & Williamson, 2014 ). Oppositional television networks were preemptively shut down on July 3, and in the weeks and months that followed the coup thousands of Egyptians were arrested for an assortment of political crimes. Security forces carried out a series of massacres against anti-coup protesters (Elmasry, 2014 ). According to Amnesty International ( 2014 ), the post-July 3 government-led crackdown has been highlighted by serious viola-tions against basic human rights and has been “reminiscent of the rule of [former dictator] Hosni Mubarak.”

FRAMING Framing describes a practice that may be intentional or unintentional but which packages messages so that particular perspectives on some issues are emphasized while others are deemphasized or ignored (Entman, 1993 ). The practice occurs at every stage of the process of message development (Entman, 1993 )—in the case of television, from selection of the stories to feature on a program to the investigative reporting techniques used, people interviewed or not interviewed, video and audio obtained, graphics utilized in the segment, fi nal edit of the story, and live anchor and reporter comments on the story.

Both quantitative and qualitative framing studies have been carried out to study media content—including news. Gitlin ( 1980 ) has defi ned frames as “devices that facilitate how journalists organize enormous amounts of information and package them effectively for their audiences” (p. 248). More recently, Tankard ( 2001 ) has suggested that studying news content with framing analysis is more precise than other approaches, because it accounts for the possibility that news organizations can frame an issue to favor one perspective even without showing apparent and explicit bias.

Researchers postulate that audiences are extremely susceptible to news frames because they often share the same frames themselves (Entman, 1993 ). In fact, in a media-saturated world, audiences can choose programs and networks based on a compatibility between the “stock of commonly invoked frames” (Entman, p. 53) and how closely they match the view-er’s framing of the same issues. Although audience frames can support or enhance media frames (Entman & Rojecki, 1993 ), they can also reduce

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the effects of media frames if the two do not match (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012 ; Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992 ).

FRAMING THEORY IN MIDDLE EAST COMMUNICATION In the Western media, framing theory has been used to study how the US news media have portrayed attempted terrorism on US soil. Powell ( 2011 ) studied the framing of 11 terrorist events that occurred in the USA between 2001 and 2010 and found that a “thematic pattern of terrorism coverage,” emerged which feeds “Orientalism.” Patterns emerged sug-gesting different reportorial approaches to international versus domestic terrorism. Key frames suggested that international terrorism was extremely problematic and that Muslims, Arabs, and Islamists were working in ter-rorist cells against “Christian America.” On the other hand, it was found that domestic terrorism was framed as less important by the media, and the result of isolated incidents by troubled individuals (Powell, 2011 ).

In 2012 , Barisione published a theoretical work with the goal of defi n-ing the concepts and tools needed to study framing as it relates to delib-erative democracy. The result is dubbed “Deliberative Frame Analysis” or DFA, a qualitative approach that looks at both primary and second-ary framing processes. The primary is a meta-frame; while the secondary (deliberative) focuses on specifi c issues within the deliberation. It is sug-gested that the introduction of “counterframes” focusing on alternative perspectives can help to avoid heavily biased messages.

Hamdy and Gomaa ( 2012 ) looked at how the January 2011 anti- Mubarak uprising was framed by the state-run media and social media. They found that the same events were presented by government-sponsored media within a “confl ict frame” as a conspiracy against the nation, while independent media were split between the “confl ict” and “human inter-est” frames. Social media overwhelmingly focused on the human inter-est aspect of the events. Bowe ( 2013 ) looked at the framing by political fi gures—as reported in the media—of religion and politics in post-9/11 mosque controversies in the US. He found that based on the framing of these stories, Islam is still framed as “foreign” in the US media and with the American public.

Also in 2013 , Azpiroz proposed a way to apply framing theory to per-form political discourse analysis. The particular study looked at President

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George W. Bush’s discourse in the early period of the “War on Terror.” A differentiation was made between actual public diplomacy and public diplomacy as framed by the media, or “mediated diplomacy.” A multistep process is recommended in order to assess the discourse. First, determine the political framing of the problem and remedy. Then assess what the dominant media frame is. The political frame would ideally be then com-pared to the dominant media frame.

Considering only social media, Meraz and Papacharissi ( 2013 ) found that patterns evolved in tweets surrounding the build up to events of January 2011. Their results suggest that prominent actors and frames were crowdsourced, resulting in ordinary users being elevated to promi-nence depending upon the content that was tweeted. Discourse analysis suggested that frames became fl uid and changed rapidly.

Recent Studies of Egyptian Press and Media

Perhaps due to the typical time horizon of academic research, recent research on the Egyptian media focuses on the pre-revolutionary days. Work pub-lished early in the last decade actually focused on gains being made in media representations by Christians (El Mohiebb, 2003 ) and women (Sakr, 2002 ) in the early twenty-fi rst century during the Mubarak regime. Interestingly, almost a decade before the revolution, Abd el Mohiebb pointed out that the media were reporting that “Muslim youth are adopting an extremely militant posture,” and that we should be “keeping an eye on Islamists” (p. 227).

Sakr ( 2010 ) revisited the issue of news coverage in Egypt in 2008. In this instance, she looked at how media censorship in the Mubarak dictator-ship restricted media more than appeared on the surface. Specifi cally, the problems with licensing media and journalists were examined. Elsasser also published a work in 2010 that looked at press liberalization and Muslim–Coptic relations. In it, he professed that press liberalizations beginning in the 1990s both aided Christian access to the media and reinforced old stereotypes and mistrust between Muslims and Coptic Christians.

In 2011 , Al-Najjar looked at patriotism and ethics in Arab media. Specifi cally, he found that “objectivity” was often swayed by patriotism for Arab journalists. Looking at a case study in Egypt, Al-Najjar found that the Egyptian journalists considered patriotism a virtue, not a fl aw—and that it colored the objectivity of their reporting.

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Iskander revisited the issue of Muslim–Christian relations and how they are portrayed in the media in 2012 . He analyzed the portrayal of these relationships in the Al-Ahrām newspaper between 2005 and 2010 and found three discourse approaches in these reports. Selective narratives of history were utilized to affect interpretation of the relationships. Blame for relational problems was displaced by interpreting interreligious confl ict as external, shifting the blame for confl ict to “outsiders.” Finally, extreme religious views were portrayed as extremist rather than moderate in the media.

Media Portrayals of Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Morsi, and Islamists

Media portrayals of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Morsi, and the Islamist party have varied, and in many cases in the West they have been seldom mentioned at all. In 2012 , Batrawy and Michael reported in the Christian Science Monitor (a non-religions news outlet), that thousands of anti-Islamists protested Morsi granting himself greater powers and even burned some offi ces of the Muslim Brotherhood. The article generally quotes anti-Morsi voices, although a few alternate viewpoints are included.

Anti-Morsi, Islamist, and Muslim Brotherhood reporting appears to increase in 2013. For example, in an editorial in January of that year, Ghitis ( 2013 ) painted Morsi as an anti-Semite—helping to add to a Western dislike of the elected president and de facto causing growth in support of the anti-Morsi protests. In early July of that same year, several articles were published in the Christian Science Monitor at the time that the head of Egypt’s armed forces, Abdel Fattah El Sisi, had suspended the constitution and announced that a new government would be installed. While individually imbalanced, articles featuring both sides tend to bal-ance out. Editorials, however, tend to be pro-coup (Chick, 2013a , July 3; Chick, 2013b, July 4; Editorial Board, 2013 ).

More recent reporting in January of 2014 has focused on the new military government branding the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist orga-nization and cracking down on Islamists nationwide (Malsin, 2014 ; Subramanian, 2014 ). Vick ( 2014 ) reported on public outrage against the Muslim Brotherhood after a car bombing, despite denials by the organization as to their responsibility for the act. Others have reported

148 M.H. ELMASRY ET AL.

that the Muslim Brotherhood has sought help outside Egypt, from the International Criminal Court (Kedmey, 2014 ).

More in-depth works have spent considerable detail discussing the failed situation in Egypt. De Smet ( 2014 ) postulated that revolution and counterrevolution are all part of a systemic process. Avni ( 2014 ) addressed how recent political change affects the relationship between the US and Egypt.

Based on this literature, this chapter presents and attempts to answer the following question: What were the dominant frames of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian military, and violence in Akher Al-Nahar and Huna Al-Aasima coverage of the July 3 protests and ouster of President Mohamed Morsi?

METHOD In order to examine the stated research question, a qualitative fram-ing analysis was performed on televised coverage of events in Egypt on July 3, 2013, by two of the most watched programs in Egypt, featuring prominent personalities. CBC Network’s “This is the Capital,” hosted by Lamees Al-Hadeedy, and Al-Nahar Network’s “The End of the Day,” hosted by Mahmoud Saad, were selected for analysis. Although we’ve only chosen to analyze two programs on two networks, observers have noted that many of Egypt’s privately owned television networks adopted a pro- military, anti-Brotherhood tone in the weeks and months that preceded and followed the coup (Abdel-Fadil, 2013 ; Wojcik, 2013 ; El-Amin, 2013 ; Elmasry, 2013 ; Khalifa, 2015 ; Margolis, 2013 ; McTighe, 2014 ), making it safe to assume that the general tone of coverage on other prominent privately owned television networks did not differ sharply from Al-Nahar and CBC. July 3 was chosen because it was a day of mass protest and the day on which Morsi was removed from power.

CBC TV was launched in July 2011 in the aftermath of the uprising that led to the ousting of former president Hosni Mubarak. The network is owned by businessman Mohamed Al-Amin and features both entertain-ment and news programming (Arab Media Outlook, 2011 ). According to some observers, during the Morsi presidency the network took on a decidedly anti-Morsi tone (Al-Ahram, 2013 ). Lamees Al-Hadeedy, one of Egypt’s most recognizable broadcast presenters, hosts “This is the Capital,” one of CBC’s feature news programs.

MAPPING THE “ARAB AUTUMN”: A FRAMING ANALYSIS OF CBC... 149

Al-Nahar Network was launched in June 2011, several months after Mubarak’s ouster. Like CBC, Al-Nahar is also owned by Al-Amin and features both entertainment and news programming. Mahmoud Saad, arguably Egypt’s best-known broadcast journalist, hosts “The End of the Day.”

Programming segments were obtained by accessing web archives of both shows. Approximately six hours of programming—three hours per show—was obtained and subject to review by research personnel fl uent in Egyptian Arabic.

Qualitative framing analysis was utilized to assess the broadcast because of its holistic and in-depth assessment of content. The method involves multiple and detailed assessments with the text, allowing for an over-all assessment to identify specifi c frames to see what patterns emerge in how stories are represented. This approach can allow for the identifi ca-tion of how groups, issues, and positions are promoted or disadvantaged (Connolly-Ahern & Broadway, 2008 ; Shugart, 2011 ). In doing so, qual-itative framing analysis can “reconstitute a sense of the whole” (Pauly, 1991 , p. 10).

In line with framing research, we paid attention to the specifi c topics chosen by the news programs, word choice, visual imagery, the degree to which varying perspectives were highlighted, and the time allot-ted to guests. Our goal was to assess the “moral evaluation” (Entman, 1993 , p.  52) of events of July 3, 2013, as portrayed by both of these key Egyptian news programs—and to identify their similarities and dif-ferences. An inductive approach to the analysis was taken. Categories and coding schemes were developed in a systematic way, allowing frames to emerge from the content (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002 ).

ANALYSIS

Akher Al-Nahar’s July 3, 2013, Episode

July 3, 2013, was the day on which Morsi was offi cially ousted as presi-dent of Egypt. The announcement of Morsi’s removal came about mid-way through Mahmoud Saad’s broadcast of Akher Al-Nahar. Saad and his guests seemed to spend the fi rst half of the show hopefully anticipating an expected announcement, and the last half of the show reacting to the announcement.

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Akher Al-Nahar’s July 3 episode featured a mix of jubilant celebra-tion and anti-Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric. Three dominant frames, and one counter-frame, emerged from an analysis of the coverage: (1) a “the nation” frame, (2) a “celebration” frame, (3) a “Muslim Brotherhood violence” frame, and (4) an “all Egyptian blood is sacred” frame, which ran counter to the three dominant frames.

The Nation. A “the nation” frame was prevalent in Al-Nahar’s July 3 coverage. The “the nation” frame suggested that true Egyptian citi-zens representing the overwhelming majority of Egyptians rose up in a “popular revolution” against a small, detested, and foreign group, the Muslim Brotherhood. The network framed the events of July 3 as a “pop-ular revolution” of “the (Egyptian) nation” and “the Egyptian people.” Conversely, the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters and sympathiz-ers were framed in a way that suggested they are few in number and not truly Egyptian.

Al-Nahar played nationalist songs while showing images of protests across Egypt, and claimed there were “millions” of people in the street protesting against Morsi and the Brotherhood. The protesting crowds were also described as “great crowds” and “wonderful crowds.” Show host Mahmoud Saad regularly referred to the anti-Morsi protesters as “the People” or “the citizens.” At one point—with images of anti-Morsi protests running on screen—Saad said, “these are the people.” Saad also claimed the Egyptian people were “united” and highlighted one of the chants of the protesters—“the people and the army are one hand.” He called on the military to issue a statement that “represents the Egyptian people,” with one of his guests saying that “the people” are in “every square of Egypt.”

Saad, meanwhile, othered the Brotherhood, who were framed as outcasts foreign to the Egyptian people and identity. He suggested the Brotherhood were in cahoots with “extremist groups” and referred to the group as “them.” Saad also claimed that Brotherhood protests were small—held on mere “street corners.” The claim that pro-Morsi protests were small was refl ected in the fact that Al-Nahar split the screen into nine separate shots of protests, with only one devoted to a pro-Morsi protest. Also, one of Saad’s guests referred to the Muslim Brotherhood as “our Brothers who lead people astray.” Saad repeated the phrase and said, “that is exactly right.” Another of Saad’s guests, a judge, said that Egypt had been “kidnapped” by the Brotherhood. He then praised God that “Egypt had been returned to the Egyptian people.” Movie director and political

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analyst Khaled Yousef, who was also interviewed by Saad, argued that it was “good that the Brotherhood came (to power) so that we can rid ourselves of them.” Saad agreed and said, “God willing.” Al-Nahar’s correspondent in Alexandria said that he hopes “that they (the Muslim Brotherhood) will return to the side of the Egyptian citizens.” In response, Saad says, “May Our Lord guide them.”

In describing a clash in the governorate of Domiat, an Al-Nahar cor-respondent said the “Muslim Brotherhood” was clashing with “families” in the area. The phrase “families” to describe anti-Brotherhood pro-testers arguably humanizes them and ties them to the larger Egyptian nation. Meanwhile, the individuals on the other side in the clash were described matter-of-factly as members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and not described as members of families.

In all, Saad interviewed eight guests who can be considered Brotherhood antagonists. He did not interview any Brotherhood members, representa-tives of the Morsi government, or anyone sympathetic to either Morsi or the Brotherhood.

A Celebration. A “celebration” frame also emerged in Al-Nahar’s July 3 coverage and became more prominent after the military’s announce-ment of Morsi’s removal than before. The broadcast often described the anti-Morsi protests as celebrations and discussed a general “celebratory mood.” Correspondents at Tahrir Square, in Luxor, and at the Presidential Palace all describe scenes of celebration in the streets, and after the offi cial announcement of Morsi’s removal the show went to several minutes of celebratory scenes, including fi reworks displays.

Saad refers to July 3 as “this beautiful and great day.” He also describes the day’s events as a “wonderful miracle” and at one point congratulates a caller on what has transpired. During an interview with a Tamorrod Movement spokesperson, Saad says, “praise God, praise God, praise God” and calls the events “an achievement.” At the end of the show, Saad calls Egyptians “people of miracles” and issues “congratulations” to the Egyptian people on having gotten rid of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Muslim Brotherhood Violence. A “Muslim Brotherhood Violence” frame fi gured prominently into Akher Al-Nahar’s July 3 broadcast. Signifi cantly, pro-Morsi protesters at Raba’a al-Adawiya and Al-Nahda squares were described as members of the Muslim Brotherhood, in spite of the fact that the crowds were diverse and clearly not fi lled exclusively with Brotherhood members. Also, there was little attempt to differentiate the Muslim Brotherhood from more conservative salafi s, or extremists.

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Saad usually asked Akher Al-Nahar’s correspondents whether there were Muslim Brotherhood members at or near protest/celebration sites, and also whether there were “extremist groups” affi liated with the Brotherhood present. Saad’s question to a correspondent in Ismailiya exemplifi ed his line of questioning: “Is there any news about gatherings of Muslim Brotherhood groups, extremist groups?” If correspondents said there was a Brotherhood presence, Saad usually asked if there was a police presence. The clear assumption was that the Brotherhood may instigate violence. Saad said that the Muslim Brotherhood’s history “is well known.”

Saad also cites a Muslim scholar who called upon pro-Morsi protest-ers to go home. He said that that was the kind of Muslim leadership that was needed, not leadership which “calls to bloodshed.” Saad juxtaposed the Muslim Scholar’s statement with a statement made by Sheikh Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, an Islamist and Morsi sympathizer. Saad claimed Ismail’s statement called on pro-Morsi protesters to hit the streets and “break stuff.” Ismail’s statement, in fact, made no calls for violence or vandalism. Saad also indicated that Morsi himself threatened “the people” and called to violence.

One of Saad’s guests, Egyptian intellectual Mustafa Higazi, said that Egypt was “capable of getting rid of extremism and terrorism,” an implicit accusation against the Brotherhood. Higazi also said that the Brotherhood was welcome to protest as long they could protest as “we” did—peacefully.

There were also reports of Muslim Brotherhood violence—in the form of damaging cars and windows—in Ismailiya. The report says that police are attempting to protect “the citizens” from groups the network sug-gested are affi liated with the Palestinian movement Hamas.

All Egyptian Blood is Sacred. One counter frame portraying the Muslim Brotherhood more sympathetically emerged in Akher Al-Nahar’s July 3 coverage: All Egyptian blood is sacred.

This frame suggested that Egyptians should not want to see Muslim Brotherhood members killed because, as Saad said, “All the blood of Egyptians is sacred.”

The frame seemed to contradict other messages refl ective of “the nation” frame (discussed earlier) when it suggested that the Brotherhood are Egyptians and should not be eliminated. Saad said that “we” do not want to fi nish off the Muslim Brotherhood, but, rather, only their rule. In the context of a slaughter that occurred on July 2, Saad said that the violence was “sad” and that “all are Egyptians regardless (of political affi li-

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ation).” Saad also said that the army is for all Egyptians, an implicit refer-ence to the Brotherhood and their supporters.

Huna Al-Aasima’s July 3, 2013, Episode

Huna Al-Aasima’s July 3, 2013, coverage framed events slightly differ-ently than Akher Al-Nahar. The coverage included (1) “the nation” and (2) “celebration” frames, but was also highlighted by (3) “revolution,” “(4) criminality,” and (5) “religious victory” frames. While the fi rst fi ve frames tended to portray the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohamed Morsi negatively, a sixth frame—(6) unifi cation—countered the dominant dis-courses by suggesting that the Brotherhood was a key part of the country.

The Nation. Like Akher Al-Nahar, Huna Al-Aasima, with its host Lamees Al-Hadeedy, framed the events of July 3 as a national uprising against a detested and disloyal minority.

Large protest crowds at Tahrir Square, in front of the Presidential Palace, and elsewhere in Egypt were described as “the people,” on-screen text read “the people have toppled the regime,” and Al-Hadeedy argued that Morsi’s supreme achievement was that he was able to unite the Egyptian police and “the people.” Also, Muslims and Christians were shown as having come together to depose of extremists. The program stated that the anti-Brotherhood protest movement represented “the unifi cation of the crescent and the cross.” Meanwhile, a photo showed Muslims and Christians standing together holding copies of the Qur’an, crosses, and photos of the Christian pope and the Sheikh of Al-Azhar University.

Al-Hadeedy claimed explicitly that the Muslim Brotherhood’s loyal-ties “are not to Egypt” and argued that they wanted to “change Egypt’s identity.” In this context, she said that the anti-Brotherhood protests rep-resented “the Egypt we knew” and showed that “Egypt is coming back to us.” One of her guests, the owner of CBC, the network on which Huna Al-Aasima is aired, stated that Egypt “has returned to us” and that “[c]ertainly, we are Egyptians.” Addressing her Egyptian audience, she also compared Brotherhood governance to foreign occupation, stating that “Neither the French, nor the English, nor the Israelis … nor the Muslim Brotherhood … can rape you.” Al-Hadeedy claimed that, under the Brotherhood, “the country was stolen” and that her own “life was stolen.”

Celebration . Also similar to Akher Al-Nahar, Huna Al-Aasima por-trayed the events of July 3 as a national celebration.

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The episode began with victory and nationalist songs playing for four minutes over shots of celebrations and fi reworks displays at Tahrir Square and the Presidential Palace. The show went into and came out of com-mercial breaks with songs and celebration shots.

Al-Hadeedy offered “congratulations to the entire Egyptian nation,” while a correspondent at Tahrir Square described “overwhelming jubi-lance.” Al-Hadeedy proclaimed, “The Eid (holiday) came before Ramadan (this year)” and thanked God. Al-Hadeedy congratulated her guests at the start of interviews, and they also congratulated her and Egyptians. One guest, political fi gure Mamdouh Hamza, said “humanity has never seen” a party like this. Another guest, a journalist reporting from London, said that Egyptians and Arabs in London were similarly jubilant. He said, “The Egyptians are very happy, and the Arab community is very happy … Everyone is happy.” Late in the show, a guest from Aswan said “I am very happy for Egypt.”

Revolution . Huna Al-Aasima’s coverage went to great length to argue against a narrative coming out of Western media, Al Jazeera, and the Brotherhood camp at Raba’a Al-Adawiya Square (where the Brotherhood and their supporters were staging a sit-in) that what was taking place was a military coup. Al-Hadeedy and her guests attacked this suggestion and emphasized that what was happening in Egypt was a “new revolution,” as Al-Hadeedy put it. Al-Hadeedy and one of her guests sharply criticized both Al Jazeera and CNN for their coverage. Al-Hadeedy said there are “big question marks” surrounding CNN’s coverage.

Al-Hadeedy criticized the Egyptian Presidency’s Facebook page, which called the events of July 3 a “military coup.” Al-Hadeedy responded by saying that the Brotherhood represented a small minority and that the peo-ple protesting in the streets were “millions.” She asked the Brotherhood rhetorically, “[H]ow many are you?”

One of Al-Hadeedy’s guests, newspaper owner and television talk show host Magdy Al-Gallad, said that there were 30 million people protest-ing in the streets against Morsi and that the military intervention repre-sented a response to a “command from the Egyptian people.” Another guest, Mohamed Esmat Anwar Al-Sadat, said that the army had nothing to do with the events of July 3 and that the events were the product of an Egyptian uprising.

Al-Hadeedy also interviewed multiple experts, including university professors, who argued that what was happening in Egypt was a revolu-tion and not a military coup. One expert said that the army was sim-

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ply playing its “national role” and responding to “public demands.” Al-Hadeedy asked another guest, a Professor of Constitutional Law at Cairo University, whether what was happening could be considered a military coup. The professor responded by saying no, and that, based on his understanding, what was occurring could only be described as a “revolution.” Two other professors were also asked about the arguments that was happening could be considered a military coup, and both offered resounding rejections of that suggestion. Another expert asked sarcasti-cally, “What kind of coup is this?”

Criminality . In another departure from Akher Al-Nahar’s cover-age, Huna Al-Aasima’s coverage framed the Brotherhood and Morsi as criminals. This went beyond the “Muslim Brotherhood violence” frame employed by Akher Al-Nahar to suggest that the Brotherhood were respon-sible for a host of serious crimes and deserving of strict legal punishment.

Al-Hadeedy covered a list of nearly 300 Islamist leaders who were reportedly issued travel bans on July 3. She discussed Brotherhood lead-ers explicitly in the context of an alleged 2011 prison break, during which hundreds of Egyptian prisoners broke out of jail when police services were suspended during anti-Mubarak protests. Later in the show, Al-Hadeedy came back to the alleged prison break and presented the issue to a legal expert. The expert argued that the prison break was the case that broke the back of the Morsi government, and said that new evidence would be presented implicating Morsi and Brotherhood leaders. Al-Hadeedy responded later, saying “We now know who opened the prisons. We know who invaded the prisons.” In a reference to the murder of protesters dur-ing the 2011 uprising against Mubarak, Al-Hadeedy said, “We now know who the sniper was … that was shooting at the protesters.” Al-Hadeedy also suggested that Morsi was guilty of “spying” on Egypt and that one of Morsi’s top assistants, Essam Al-Haddad, “should be tried for spying (on Egypt).”

The episode also discussed violence in Sinai and elsewhere in Egypt, and associated the Brotherhood with the violence and “terrorism.” Al-Hadeedy said, “terrorism will not govern us” and that the Brotherhood uses “thugs” for political purposes. In a reference to violent jihad, Al-Hadeedy said “We are not Syria.” Al-Hadeedy also suggested that the preemptive arrests of Brotherhood leaders would help “prevent chaos” and “violence.” One guest interviewed by Al-Hadeedy referred to the Brotherhood as “dogs,” while Al-Hadeedy thanked everyone who “protected” Egyptians from the Brotherhood.

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A police leader interviewed by Al-Hadeedy toward the end of the pro-gram appeared to attempt to prevent dissent from within the police ranks. He said that a message had been sent to all of Egypt’s police offi cers that “Anyone that shows any support for the deposed President will be met with decisiveness and fi rmness from his colleagues. Whoever claims to be a man of the police or a man of the army … and who tries to support (Morsi), we are perfectly willing, I swear to God, to shoot him with live fi re … I swear … If someone (from amongst the police) tries to divide the ranks, we will treat him with the utmost force.”

Religious Victory . Huna Al-Aasima also framed the events of July 3 as a religious victory, often putting political events in a religious context and using religious rhetoric. Al-Hadeedy repeatedly thanked God and proclaimed God’s greatness, as did her guests and correspondents. One correspondent reporting from Tahrir Square said, “God is Greater than the transgressors,” and Al-Hadeedy proclaimed “Your Power, O Lord.” Al-Hadeedy played up the role played by the Church and Al-Azhar University in bringing the Morsi government down. In this context, she praised God and was called one of the “mujahideen” (religious warriors) by one of her guests. One of Al-Hadeedy’s guests said that the “truth” must always win because God’s name (in the Qur’an) is “The Truth.” The same guest also argued that the Muslims and Christians of Egypt—excluding the Muslim Brotherhood—understand their religions “in the proper way.”

Unifi cation . One of Huna Al-Aasima’s frames, representing a counter- frame, portrayed the Muslim Brotherhood, and in particular their “youth,” more positively. The program suggested that the people of Egypt needed to unite and that Brotherhood are an important part of the country.

Al-Hadeedy said that the nation needed “forgiveness” and said that “we” want to work with the Brotherhood. She also said that the Brotherhood are an “important group” and, specifi cally addressing the Brotherhood’s younger members, said that Egyptians need to be “one hand.” Later in the broadcast, Al-Hadeedy said, “Listen to me, please. We need you, O Family. we want to go back to loving one another.”

At one point, Al-Hadeedy explicitly addresses the Brotherhood youth, saying “join us” and “this is not a time of division.” Also, Al-Hadeedy said the protesters at Raba’a Al-Adawiya Square are Egyptians.

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DISCUSSION Results from this analysis of Akher Al-Nahar and Huna Al-Aasima cover-age of Egypt’s July 3, 2013, mass protests and military coup suggest that anti-Mohamed Morsi and anti-Muslim Brotherhood narratives noticeable in late 2013 and through the fi rst part of 2014 fi gured prominently in Egyptian media as early as July 3, the day of the military coup.

The July 3 coverage on Akher Al-Nahar and Huna Al-Aasima framed gatherings at Tahrir Square and the Presidential Palace as celebrations of a popular revolution initiated by “the people,” and demonized the Muslim Brotherhood as a detested and small group that stood against “the (Egyptian) nation.” Specifi cally, the coverage “othered” the Brotherhood and framed them as violent, extreme, and disloyal to Egypt. Akher Al-Nahar said the Brotherhood had “kidnapped” the country, while Huna Al-Aasima claimed that Egypt had been “stolen” by the Muslim Brothers, who, the program claimed, do not respect the Egyptian identity or the Egyptian national borders. Huna Al-Aasima’s Al-Hadeedy framed the Brotherhood as criminals and Akher Al-Nahar’s Saad associated the group with extremists and terrorists. Both programs relied on a singular narra-tive and did not offer much in the way of critical voice. While many anti- Brotherhood fi gures were interviewed, not a single voice sympathetic to either the Brotherhood or the Morsi administration was interviewed. Both programs, but particularly Huna Al-Aasima, relied on religious language and religious framing to punctuate coverage. The programs offered up counter-frames—suggesting that the Brotherhood are Egyptians and that their blood, too, is sacred—but these frames were not nearly as dominant as frames suggesting the Brotherhood and their supporters are violent, criminal, and disloyal to Egypt.

Signifi cantly, the programs studied here employed a variety of framing devices to drive frames. The networks used visual images to solidify their “celebration” frames, and used selection, keywords, and sourcing to drive other frames. For example, in terms of selection, the networks selectively focused on violence allegedly carried out by supporters of the deposed president but did not highlight anti-Brotherhood violence. Also, the networks chose to focus almost exclusively on anti-Morsi protests, while almost completely ignoring pro-Morsi protests, which were staged at many places throughout the country, including at major sections of Cairo. Where pro-Morsi protests were mentioned, they were dismissed and dele-gitimated, often described as either small (held at “street corners”) or

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violent. The anti-Morsi protests, in contrast, were framed as massive and overwhelmingly peaceful and civilized. In contrast to Western news out-lets and human rights groups, the two Egyptian networks studied here ignored a documented string of violent crimes committed at anti- Morsi protests in Tahrir Square from June 30–July 3 (Burleigh, 2013 ; Human Rights Watch, 2013 ; Kingsley, 2013 ).

The programs also relied on keywords to drive frames. Signifi cantly, the show hosts chose to describe anti-Morsi protesters as “the nation,” “the people,” “citizens,” and “families,” while describing the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters as “them” and referring to them in the context of “Syria,” “the French,” “the British,” and “extremism” and “terrorism.” Huna Al-Aasima drove home the message of a “revolution” and objected strongly to the term “coup” as a description of what hap-pened on July 3 in Egypt.

The power and consistency of frames were aided by the fact that the networks relied on sources representing a singular political perspective. Although guests represented differing political groups, all of them were explicitly antagonistic to the Muslim Brotherhood. As Entman ( 1993 ) has noted, sourcing can play a key role in framing.

The results presented here—especially when taken in the context of summer 2013 political events in Egypt and the post-July 3 crackdown on Islamists—do not suggest a favorable outlook for at least some key parts of Egypt’s privately owned satellite news media. At a key moment of political upheaval characterized by deep political divisions, two key networks did not attempt to advance serious debate, sided with one side in a political dispute at the expense of another, and relied fundamentally on sensation-alism, rumor, and demonization. Egyptian media scholars and journal-ists should be concerned about the absence of balance on two prominent programs and the propagandist narratives presented on the shows. News media in Egypt should attempt to provide balance, interview a diverse array of sources, and avoid language that explicitly demonizes and crimi-nalizes individuals and groups, especially in the absence of conclusive evi-dence demonstrating complicity in crimes.

This chapter provides important insights into how two massively popu-lar nationally televised shows framed cataclysmic events but is also relatively limited in scope. This study is limited by the fact that it only examined July 3 coverage on two networks. More research is needed to examine other television news networks and Egyptian newspapers. Research should be done on the period immediately preceding July 3—to fi nd out whether

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the July 3 news frames identifi ed here represented an intensifi cation of anti-Brotherhood frames, or merely a continuation—and after July 3, to fi nd out how frames may have changed over time.

This chapter raises important questions about the impact of imbal-anced news coverage and government propaganda in authoritarian and quasi-authoritarian societies in general, and the Egyptian media environ-ment in particular. Were Egyptian news outlets infl uenced directly by the Egyptian military and other political power brokers, or did their news framing simply refl ect a dominant sentiment inside of Egyptian society? To what extent did Egyptians who supported Egypt’s military coup do so because of media coverage? This chapter may present more questions than it answers—but the results of this framing analysis do provide an impor-tant starting point for media scholars, especially those interested in Egypt.

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