1

Manuel Schramm

Motorization and Nationalization. Small cars in Western Europe, 1950-70

The motorization of Western European societies is a key dimension in what is commonly

described as the breakthrough of mass consumption after World War II. The acquisition and

use of cars by private consumers profoundly changed Western European societies, as it had

changed the US before. It altered patterns of mobility, accelerated the process of sub-

urbanization and diminished the contrast between town and country by turning rural villages

into residential areas of urban employees. Moreover, motorization depended on the spread of

an appropriate infrastructure like roads, petrol stations or motorways. As a result, the car

changed the physical appearance of earth’s surface and created a number of environmental

problems in its wake.1 The car’s significance for the history of consumption and

consumerism, however, is due to the fact that the car represented one of the most, if not the

most, coveted long-lived consumer goods for large parts of Western Europeans who

experienced the boom years between World War II and the early seventies. For many of them,

car ownership came into reach for the first time, turning the car from a luxury good into an

object of mass consumption. While it is true that car ownership had already spread in the

interwar years, particularly in Great Britain and France, it had still remained confined to a

relatively small part of the population as compared to the USA.2

As the processes and results of motorization were basically similar everywhere, they are

regarded as examples of mass consumption, in the sense of the spread of standardized, mass-

produced consumer goods to large parts of the population. Most historians assume that the

rise of mass consumption after World War II led to a gradual decline or even disappearance of

national differences. The resulting consumer society (or society of mass consumption)

apparently displayed the same features everywhere.3 Therefore, one might assume that there

is no connection, or only a negative one, between the processes of motorization and

nationalization. Nationalization of consumption refers to processes in which particular

1 Cf. John R. MacNeill, Something New Under the Sun. An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World, New York 2000; Tom McCarthy, Auto Mania. Cars, Consumers, and the Environment, NewHaven 2007.2 Christoph Merki, Der holprige Siegeszug des Automobils 1895 – 1930. Zur Motorisierung desStrassenverkehrs in Frankreich, Deutschland und der Schweiz, Wien 2002; Heidrun Edelmann, Vom Luxusgutzum Gebrauchsgegenstand: die Geschichte der Verbreitung von Personenkraftwagen in Deutschland, Frankfurt1989.3 Cf. Wolfgang König, Geschichte der Konsumgesellschaft, Stuttgart 2000; Heinz-Gerhard Haupt,Konsum und Handel. Europa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2003; Christian Kleinschmidt,Konsumgesellschaft, Göttingen 2008; Peter Stearns, Consumerism in World History. The Global Transformationof Desire, 2nd ed. New York 2006.

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consumer goods or practices become associated with the national community, serving as

symbols of the nation, independent (though not completely) of the fact of actual use of this

particular good.4 However, cars are even today the subject of national stereotypes, like in

well-known advertisements by European producers such as Fiat or Renault.5 Further, popular

myths link cars to stories of national recovery, like the VW (“beetle”) as a symbol for the

“economic miracle” in West Germany. There is a certain grain of truth in this myth, because

while neither motorization nor the economic boom were particular to Germany, the markets

for cars in the fifties, to a lesser degree even in the sixties, were still national markets, i.e. they

were dominated by producers from the respective home country. This applies to the countries

under consideration which were the most important European car-producing nations at the

time, whereas other countries without a substantial auto industry imported their cars, of

course.

The example of the VW is therefore not unique. Other European countries produced small

cars as well, which achieved a certain prominence in the home market and abroad, for

example the Fiat 500 in Italy, the Morris Mini in Great Britain or the 2CV in France. This

essay asks if, and how, small cars were nationalized in the sense of being a symbol for the

national community. Who were the most relevant actors of nationalization processes? What

role did advertising play? And what do we know about the consumers’ perceptions? The

automobile industry and motorization are in general well-researched topics, at least on a

national level. However, there is a lack of comparative studies, so the conclusions presented

here can only be tentative.6 The following sections look at motorization in four Western

countries (France, Great Britain, Italy, West Germany) in general (1) and then at the role of

particular car models in this process (2). The meaning of cars is analyzed by looking at

advertising (3), politics (4) and the consumers’ viewpoints (5).

1. Motorization in Comparison

Motorization shall be defined here as the process in which a majority of households came to

own a private car. While it is true that “motorization” is sometimes understood in a broader

4 Hannes Siegrist/Manuel Schramm, Einleitung: Die Regionalisierung der Konsumkultur in Europa, in:Hannes Siegrist/Manuel Schramm, Hg., Regionalisierung europäischer Konsumkulturen im 20. Jahrhundert,Leipzig 2003, 9-33.5 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jrcAuoMNAHY (29.04.2011);http://www.handelsblatt.com/auto/nachrichten/italiener-kauft-italienisch/2501748.html (29.04.2011).6 An exception to this lack is Merki, Siegeszug, but unfortunately his book ends with World War II.

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sense encompassing also motor cycles and scooters, this article only looks at cars, because for

the history of consumption the emergence of cars as consumer goods appears to be the more

important development. Even so, this process had obviously begun before World War II, and

it is a matter of dispute if and where a threshold can be fixed for the attainment of mass

motorization. If we were to follow a German study of 1961, “real popularity” of cars would

be attained at a level of 35-40 cars per 1,000 people.7 This level was reached in France and

Great Britain in 1938, as figure 1 demonstrates, but not in Germany and Italy, despite

motorization efforts by their respective regimes.

Figure 1: Cars/1,000 Inhabitants8

After the war, in 1950, car ownership figures resemble those of 1938, with the exception of

Germany where they were even lower than before the war due to war damages. However, the

real expansion in car ownership took place in the 20 years after 1950. If we define as

7 Josef W. Schödermeier, Die Entwicklung und Zusammensetzung des Personenkraftwagenbestandes inWesteuropa, Köln 1961, 49.8 Sources: Thomas Südbeck, Motorisierung, Verkehrsentwicklung und Verkehrspolitik in derBundesrepublik Deutschland der 1950er Jahre, Wiesbaden 1994; Schödermeier, Entwicklung, 20.

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threshold a level where a majority of the population has access to a car9, which would mean

somewhere between 100 and 125 cars per 1,000 people, this threshold was crossed in all the

four countries only in the sixties. As figure 1 demonstrates, France and Great Britain started

from a higher level, but the “latecomers” Germany and Italy achieved higher growth rates.

Whereas in 1960 Germany had almost caught up with Great Britain, in 1970 she was a close

second after France. Italy, while continually the country with the smallest car density

throughout the period 1950-70, diminished the gap to France from 84 % in 1950 to a mere 18

% in 1970. Growth rates were highest in Germany in the fifties and Italy in the sixties.

But growth rates as such can be deceptive as an indicator for consumer preferences. The most

important factor in the prediction of car ownership levels was still the income level of a

society. According to a study published in 1961 which compared car ownership in 15 West

European countries, some countries had a higher level of car ownership than could be

expected from their economic level, notably Italy and Austria, and also France to a lesser

degree. Great Britain and Germany showed more or less expected levels, whereas the Swiss

population owned less cars than their incomes would have suggested.10 The author tried to

explain these differences by pointing to differences in climate (people in southern countries

had to spend less on heating and light) and mentality.

Another factor which has to be taken into account is, of course, the impact of policy. The

national governments both supported and delayed motorization through their respective

policies of road construction, traffic regulation and, perhaps most important, taxation.

Glancing through any European car magazine, one gets the impression that in all countries

governments were opposed to motorization, leading one to wonder how it was achieved at all.

This is obviously due to the ample space devoted to calls for lower taxes and more and better

roads, which were a common feature of these magazines. Actually, however, there were

differences between the countries under review here.

It is difficult to judge how prices and maintenance costs differed between European countries,

because each country had its own tax regulations and import restrictions. However, estimates

were made by contemporaries, like a German car magazine in 1950 that estimated the retail

prices for an 1,100 ccm car (like a VW) as follows: in Germany 3,408 Swiss Francs, in France

4,100, in Britain 4,480 and in Italy 8,070. More important were the maintenance costs which

were estimated for a driving distance of 15,000 km per year as follows (also in Swiss Francs):

in Germany 900, in France 1,490, in Britain 780, in Italy 2,340.11 According to this estimate,

9 Cf. König, Konsumgesellschaft, 8.10 Schödermeier, Entwicklung, 43 p.11 Auto, Motor und Sport (1950), 248.

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car driving was cheapest in Britain and Germany, dearer in France and dearest in Italy. But it

has to be kept in mind that in these comparisons the size of the car made a big difference.

A comparison of car taxes in 1960 showed this clearly. While for a small car (600 ccm) taxes

in Italy and France were lowest, followed by Germany and then Great Britain, for a medium

sized car (1,200 ccm) the order was different: It was taxed least in France, followed by Great

Britain, and most in Italy and Germany.12 Part of the difference is due to the fact that taxes in

Great Britain were not differentiated according to car size which made small cars there

comparatively expensive and larger cars rather cheap in maintenance. In a way, this reflects

the structure of the British car industry which specialised more in medium sized cars, whereas

in France and Italy small cars dominated. This issue is explored in more detail in the next

section.

2. Small cars in Western Europe

This section looks at motorization from a different perspective. The question here is not how

many but which cars people bought and drove in the fifties and sixties, and why. To be sure,

small cars played a decisive role in motorization, because especially in the fifties, to a lesser

degree in the sixties, cars were still expensive items both in terms of acquisition and

maintenance. As mentioned before, markets in the fifties were still dominated by national

producers, so one would expect home-produced small or middle-sized cars taking a lead in

registration figures. This could lead to a nationalization of cars simply through the common

use of a limited number of models in one country opposed to other models in other countries.

Imports were rising due to the Roman treaties from the late fifties on, but generally remained

rather low until 1970. In 1950, import penetration hardly exceeded 5 % in any country

discussed here, whereas in 1970 imports accounted for 10-27 % of the markets, which still

left between three quarters and nine tenths to domestic producers.13

The obvious example of this development would seem to be provided by VW in Germany, the

“people’s car”. It was without doubt the most successful German car of the period, both at

home and abroad. In 1955, VW celebrated the production of its millionth car, 400,000 of

which had been exported, which still left an impressive 600,000 to the home market.14

12 Schödermeier, Entwicklung, 26.13 James Foreman-Peck/Sue Bowden/Alan McKinlay, The British Motor Industry, Manchester 1995, 161.14 Spiegel 33 (1955).

6

Contemporary observers agreed that the VW dominated the streets. Its market share in the

fifties was about 30 %15, a high share considering the one-model policy of VW. However, by

German standards the VW was not a small car, but belonged in the lower middle (or compact)

class. It comes as no surprise that it was certainly not the cheapest car in the market. Indeed,

during the fifties VW was criticised for not producing a “real” people’s car, for being too

expensive.16 However, it dominated its class with a share of at least 75 % in the fifties.17

Smaller cars like the Lloyd 300 which were available, never gained much popularity. To

many, the VW was the smallest “real car” available.18 In its own class, the VW was only

challenged from the late fifties onwards, first by the imported Renault Dauphine, in the sixties

by the Opel Kadett.19

In Italy, Fiat dominated the market to an even greater degree. Its share of the home market

showed a downward trend due to a rise of imports, but was nevertheless impressive: 88 % in

1958, 74 % in 1966, and still 70 % in 1970.20 Here small cars dominated: nearly two thirds

were under 1,000 ccm in 1964 and still 58 % under 1,050 ccm in 1970.21 Basically, Fiat

motorized Italy with three models: the 1100, introduced in 1953, the 600 (1955), and the 500,

of which a new version was presented in 1957. The old Fiat 500 which came to be called

“Topolino” (little mouse), had already been introduced under Mussolini and was part of the

fascist regime’s project of motorization, similar to the VW (KdF-Wagen) in Germany. In

1958, there were still more than 330,000 old Fiat 500 in use.22 Indeed, the 500 has become

something of a legend and was regarded as the Italian Volkswagen abroad.23 But it has to be

kept in mind that the 500 was not a single model, but rather two different cars, the old

“Topolino” and the “Nuova 500”. Moreover, the new 500 is more famous than the 600, but it

lagged behind in sales.24 Its breakthrough came only in the mid-60s, and production reached

its peak in 1970, five years before it was ended in 1975.25 The main reason for its popularity

was apparently neither any particular technical detail nor the patriotism of Italian consumers,

but rather that it was the cheapest car in the Italian market, both in terms of acquisition and

15 Auto, Motor und Sport (1960), no. 8, 30; cf. Südbeck, Motorisierung.16 Auto, Motor und Sport (1960), no. 2, 18 p.; Das Auto 5 (1950), 178.17 Südbeck, Motorisierung, 33.18 Das Auto 5 (1950), 283.19 Willi Bongard, Fetische des Konsums, Hamburg 1964, 91.20 Federico Paolini, Un paese a quattro ruote, Venezia 2005, 116.21 Paolini, Paese, 115.22 Paolini, Paese, 120.23 For example Das Auto 5 (1950), 178.24 Stefan Heins, Fiat. 100 Jahre Automobile aus Turin, Königswinter 1999, 51.25 Alessandro Sannia, Fiat 500, Stuttgart 2007.

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maintenance.26 Surveys in the late fifties showed that Italian car drivers imagined their ideal

car as middle class.27

In France, four big companies dominated the market: Citroën, Peugeot, Renault and Simca. In

the fifties, there was a certain division of the market: Renault and Citroën competed in the

small car market, Peugeot concentrated on the middle class, and Simca and Citroën offered

cars for the upper end of the market.28 Two small cars dominated the streets in the fifties and

played a special role in motorizing the French: the Renault 4CV, more than 1.1 million of

which were produced from 1945 to 1961, and the famous Citroën 2CV the production figures

of which reached more than 5 million between 1948 and 1990.29 At first, however, the 4CV

was more successful, and it was only in 1957 that the 2CV overtook it in numbers produced.30

These two models were seen as contenders for the title of “people’s car” in France, although

German journalists noticed the difference in size compared to the German “people´s car”,

given that they were quite a bit smaller than the VW.31

The 2CV, which later became an object of admiration among students and left-wing

intellectuals, was first designed for the rural French population. At the same time, it was to be

as cheap as possible, undercutting the Renault 4CV by 50,000 Francs in 1950.32 However,

because of its design and its weak engine power opinions were divided in the beginning, and

mass production did not begin before the mid-fifties. Whether it ever achieved its aim of

motorizing the masses is doubtful in spite of impressive production figures. In 1960 it was

estimated that it was a second car already for 40 % of its buyers and a business car for the

rest.33 In the mid-50s, it accounted for ca. 10 % of the French market, similar to the Renault

4CV.34

The successful Renault 4CV had reached its zenith in 1955. Thereafter sales declined. It was

partly replaced by the Dauphine, launched in 1956 but aiming more at a lower middle-class

market.35 In 1961, the follow-up model Renault 4 was launched which was attacked by

Citroën as a copy of its successful 2CV.36 However, 9 million of these car were produced in

26 Quattroruote Junior (1968), no. 6, 2.27 Paolini, Paese, 126.28 Jean-Louis Loubet, Histoire de l´automobile française, Paris 2001, 283-286.29 Halwart Schrader/Dominique Pascal, Renault. Vom R4 zum Kangoo, Stuttgart 1999, 12; James Taylor,Der Citroën 2CV, Königswinter 1992; Ingo Meier, Citroën 2 CV. Die Geschichte eines Autos namens Ente,Braunschweig 2005.30 Loubet, Histoire, 284.31 Das Auto 5 (1950), 697, 819, Auto, Motor und Sport (1960), no. 2, 18 p.; ADAC Motorwelt (1950),no. 11, 14.32 Das Auto 5 (1950), 697.33 Loubet, Histoire, 287.34 Loubet, Histoire, 284, 293.35 Loubet, Histoire, 287.36 Loubet, Histoire, 336.

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three decades.37 In the mid-60s Renault was the largest French producer and accounted for 38

% of the French production.38

It is difficult to find prominent small cars in Great Britain before the late fifties. Britain was

the largest European car-producing nation at the beginning of the fifties before she was

overtaken by both West Germany and France.39 However, the British car industry specialized

in middle-class cars and regarded small cars as a “marginal market”.40 As a whole, British car

production (excluding utility vehicles) rose from about half a million in 1950 to 1.19 million

in 1960, more than 90 % of which were produced by five companies: the British Motor

Corporation, formed in 1952, Ford Britain, Rootes, Vauxhall and Standard.41 BMC merged in

1966 with Jaguar under the name of British Motor Holding (BMH), and in 1968 with Leyland

to become the British Leyland Corporation (later Rover Group). The mergers resulted from

economic difficulties which were part of the much-discussed decline of the British car

industry.42 As for car size, about 80 % of registrations in the 1950 were in the small and lower

middle class, whereas in the sixties the market shifted to middle-class cars.43

Due to the bewildering variety of brands and the large number of producers, there was no

single model dominating the market as VW did in Germany. Indeed, in the British small and

lower middle-class market (up to 1000 and 1500 ccm respectively) of the mid-50s there were

16 different models on offer, eight of which were built by BMC alone.44 Most of them

appeared rather dated compared to continental small cars in the mid-fifties.45 However, in the

lower middle or compact class, one of the most successful models was the Morris Minor (part

of BMC since 1952), of which 1.6 million were built from 1948 to 1971. In 1960, the British

journal “Autocar” still regarded it as a strong contender for the title “best small car in the

market”.46

One of its competitors in the British market was the Ford Anglia which was produced in

different versions between 1939 and 1968, sales reaching 1.6 million cars altogether. In 1959,

BMC launched a new successful small car, the (Morris) Mini which was also sold as Austin 7.

It received a warm welcome by the British motor press, and was also a commercial success.

37 Schrader/Pascal, Renault, 6.38 Schrader/Pascal, Renault, 55.39 Loubet, Histoire, 277.40 The Autocar 96 (1951), 1022.41 The Autocar (1960), 758-760.42 Cf. Timothy Whisler, The British Motor Industry. A Case Study in Industrial Decline, Oxford 1999;Roy Church, The Rise and Decline of the British Motor Industry, Cambridge 1995; Foreman-Peck/Bowden/McKinlay, Motor Industry.43 Whisler, Motor Industry, 286, 290.44 Whisler, Motor Industry, 286.45 Whisler, Motor Industry, 311.46 The Autocar (1960), 1004.

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Until 1970, 2 million were sold, 43 % of which were exported. It was the first British car to

reach the 1 million export mark. Until 2000, 5.4 million were produced. It sold well until at

least 1980; thereafter it catered for a special market.47 Together with its other models (1100,

1300, 1800, Maxi), British Leyland still held a 40 % share of the British market in 1970, as

BMC had in 1960.48 However, its market share declined rapidly in the early seventies due to

rising imports. Whereas in 1965 the most popular BMC models, the Mini and the middle-

class 1100/1300 had a combined market share of 24 %, in 1974 it had declined to under 8 %.

Most of the decline was due to the decreasing sales of the 1100/1300 model, whereas the Mini

managed to more or less maintain its position. At its peak, the Mini reached a share of about

10 % of all new registrations.49

Looking at motor journals the reader gets the impression that there may not have been a

British Volkswagen, but still a consciousness of the distinctive qualities of British cars in

general. This might refer to quality (“feel of the car on the road”50), but also to design, at least

in the early fifties when British producers eschewed new design trends.51 The particular

British design in the fifties resulted from its protected home market and was blamed for

export difficulties.52 Also, what British historian Timothy Whisler has called the “myth of

engineering excellence” resurfaced in specialized car journals as well as in the general press

until the end of the sixties. “The Times” proclaimed in 1965 that the British motor industry

was the “world’s pace setter” in car design, and “Autocar” praised the engineering

capabilities of BMH in 1967.53

The British example is instructive in another sense, with regard to American competition, the

so-called “American challenge”. There is not much talk about an American challenge, at least

until the late sixties. In 1970, the chairman of British Leyland, Lord Stokes, suggested that the

European producers should cooperate against the American and Japanese competition.54 But

earlier, the German, French and Italian car industries had been regarded as competitors in

export markets. On the other hand, the daughters of American companies producing in Britain

like Ford and Vauxhall were regarded as British firms, and not as foreigners. The same is true

for other countries like Germany and France. That is not surprising, because until the late

sixties the multi-nationals like Ford did not pursue a common strategy, but Ford Britain and

47 Graham Robson, Mini. Eine Hommage an die Kleinwagen-Legende, Königswinter 2007.48 Robson, Mini; Whisler, Motor Industry, 6.49 Foreman-Peck/Bowden/McKinlay, Motor Industry, 141.50 The Autocar 96 (1951), 1022.51 The Autocar 96 (1951), 913.52 Whisler, Motor Industry, 282.53 Whisler, Motor Industry, 167, 161.54 Auto, Motor und Sport (1970), no. 4, 48 p., 66.

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Ford Germany developed their own models – until the arrival of Ford Escort in Germany in

1969.55

So was there a nationalization of cars, especially small cars, through everyday use? First of

all, it has to be said that car markets were still national markets in the fifties. Subsidiaries of

foreign firms like Ford were autonomous and generally not regarded as foreign. Admittedly,

that has changed a little since the late 1950s due to the European Economic Community, but

the best selling cars still came from home producers, like VW in Germany, Fiat in Italy,

Renault and Citroën in France, and BMC in Britain. On the other hand, national markets did

not always lead to a predominance of a single firm or even a single model. Closest to a

national car in this respect was maybe VW in Germany, but even its dominance did not go

unchallenged. In Italy, Fiat dominated the market, but with three different models, giving the

consumer a certain choice according to his or her means. In France, the mass market was

divided between Citroën and Renault, and in Britain many firms competed in the middle

class, but, at least until the late fifties, none produced a small car for the mass market.

Because of the multiplicity of firms and models, it is difficult to assign any distinctive

qualities to cars of a particular nation even in this period, before widespread

internationalization of production set in. What has already been mentioned was the particular

design of British cars in the early fifties. What is more controversial is the issue of quality.

For example, Kurt Möser claims that German producers in the sixties like VW and Mercedes

specialized in quality production.56 But in reality, matters were more complicated. A Swedish

survey in 1970, which investigated cars that had been used for three years, produced the

following results57: VW, Mercedes and Volvo had the fewest repairs, whereas Renault,

Simca, and Porsche had most. Other German producers like Opel were somewhere in

between. However, there seems to have been persistent problems in British car production

which contributed to its decline in the seventies.58

3. Advertising the small car

Advertising small and compact cars seems a fairly straightforward matter. Most

advertisements emphasize the obvious strength of these cars compared to bigger ones, that is

55 Auto, Motor und Sport (1970), no. 8, 28-33.56 Kurt Möser, Geschichte des Autos. Frankfurt a. M./New York 2002, 66 p.57 L’auto-journal (1970), no. 1, 68 p.58 Whisler, Motor Industry, 327-359.

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their use value. In principle, there is less need to persuade the consumer of the value of such a

car. However, fears of consumers that the car may be too small or otherwise unsuited to their

needs have to be overcome. As this sort of cars is not normally suitable as a status symbol,

symbolic values are not as often employed as in advertisements for luxury cars. Also, certain

reservations about the effectiveness of car advertisements have to be made. Even to

contemporaries, car advertising often bordered on the absurd. A German motor journal in

1960, for instance, remarked ironically that, according to advertising, owners of wrought-iron

castle gates seem to have a predilection for small cars with two-stroke engines.59

It is not mere coincidence that critical reports about advertising were published in 1960. From

the late fifties on, advertising for cars was on the rise. Indeed, the fifties car markets were

sellers’ markets, and advertising was barely necessary. Many producers could not deliver as

many cars as they could have sold, and customers had to wait many months before receiving

their cars, for example 11 months for a VW in 1959.60 This was especially true for popular

small and compact cars which were without real competitors, like the VW in Germany and

the 2CV in France. The latter was, according to a magazine, the only car brand without any

advertising whatsoever.61 In the fifties, many producers wanted to give themselves and their

brands an international image, pointing like VW or Renault to world-wide sales. That does

not mean that national meanings of cars did not feature in advertising. But they have to be

assessed in their proper context.

VW invested little in advertising in the fifties. An advertising department was created in

1948, but it comprised no more than five employees. The few advertisements emphasized

either production numbers or sales abroad, especially in the USA.62 Obviously, this should

signify to consumers that the car must have a good quality if it is so popular, even in such a

difficult market as the USA. But these advertisements could also be read in another way,

signifying renewed pride in German products which peacefully conquered the entire globe. A

print advertisement of 1950 shows the VW factory and a globe over which the VW cars are

distributed. The slogan reads: “Company and car - the great success!”. Another print

advertisement in a similar vein was titled “America says yes to Volkswagen” and shows the

VW in front of a typical American skyline.63

//Satzhinweis: Figure 2: Silvester advertising, 1951 (Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft).//

59 Auto, Motor und Sport (1960), no. 8, 20 p.; cf. Auto, Motor und Sport (1960), no. 13, 37-39.60 Auto, Motor und Sport (1960), no. 2, 10.61 Der Spiegel 41 (1952), 20 p.62 Jürgen Schlegelmilch, VW. Er läuft und läuft und läuft… Vier Jahrzehnte VW-Werbung, Königswinter2006, 12, 18 p.63 Both advertisements are reproduced in Schlegelmilch, VW, 13 and 19.

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In the early sixties advertising was professionalized and also internationally standardized.64

During this period, up to the early seventies, many famous advertisements were created, most

of them emphasizing use value like reliability or economy with a humorous touch.65 Famous

slogans were for example: “Some shapes cannot be improved” (showing the design of a VW

drawn on an egg) or “It runs and runs and runs...” (showing a series of photographs with a

VW slowly moving out of sight).66

Similar trends can be observed for French or Italian brands like Fiat or Citroën. In both cases

advertisements became more important from the late fifties on and, accordingly, there was a

certain degree of professionalization, although international standardization did not reach the

same degree as at VW.67 Also, there was a tendency to connect the small car to everyday

situations and to demonstrate its feasibility for transport.68 To emphasize this trend, lavishly

coloured illustrations gave way to more realistic photos.

Citroën did not produce many advertisements for the 2CV in the beginning. As far as they

did, they stressed use values like comfort and space, addressing fears of the consumer that it

was not a ´real´ car. In the late 50s the slogan “It conquers the whole world” was meant to

demonstrate its feasibility for long-distance tours. A real break came in the beginning of the

sixties. The more intense competition gave a boost to advertising. Likewise, the company felt

the need to address younger people. A new brochure under the title “La liberté en 2CV” set

the tone. The emphasis was more on a particular lifestyle than on specific features. The

advertisements continued to show how many persons or items could fit into the car, but they

did so in a humorous way. For example, one advertisement showed one child and six young

adults in a 2CV shouting “la liberté”.69 These advertisements stressed reliability, thrift, but

also liberty and adventure. Incidentally, the central term “liberté” is obviously connected to

one of the central aims of the French Revolution and therefore also has got a national

connotation, even though this is hardly made explicit. This sort of advertisements was

published until the end of the sixties.

//Satzhinweis: Figure 3: Freedom in a 2CV, early 1960s (Citroën Communication / Delpire).//

64 Marko Minucci, Automobilwerbung in Italien und Deutschland, Wilhelmsfeld 2008, 258.65 Schlegelmilch, VW, 23 pp.66 Schlegelmilch, VW, 23, 25.67 Minucci, Automobilwerbung, 266, 466 p.68 Minucci, Automobilwerbung, 234; Jacques Séguéla, 80 ans de publicité Citroën et toujours 20 ans,Paris 1999, 98-102.69 Séguéla, Publicité, 98.

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Similar to the 2CV, Fiat presented their products as family cars. Slogans were kept to a

minimum. Instead, the advertisements showed either young couples or families with their cars

in a beautiful surrounding, for example at a picnic. Especially for the smaller models (500 and

600), advertisements also showed them in the company of women in an attempt to attract

women drivers.70 In the fifties, Fiat advertising stressed the importance of mass motorization

and tried to incite a passion for cars in the masses.71 In the thirties, advertising for the Fiat 500

had been more explicitly national, showing the car with the Roman wolf (“lupa romana”) of

ancient Roman mythology.72 Later, in the sixties, Fiat tried to demonstrate its capacity to

fulfil the wishes of different consumer groups with its variety of models.73

In Britain, marketing for the Mini was more diffuse. In the beginning, it was sold under two

different brand names (Austin Seven and Morris Minor Mini), which made a coherent

marketing strategy difficult.74 At its official presentation in 1959, an attempt was made to

demonstrate its spaciousness. Later, the advertisements were similar to the ones used by Fiat,

showing either families on holiday trips or women as drivers.75 Another important marketing

strategy was the launch of the Mini Cooper in 1961 and its racing activities. In 1964, a Mini

won the Rally Monte Carlo.76 Further, the launch of special models for celebrities contributed

to the car’s popularity, beginning in 1963 with a car for the famous actor Peter Sellers.77 It

was only later in the sixties, and presumably as result of these strategies, that the Mini

acquired a distinctive British image. In 1967, a Mini with a Union Jack was sent to the

Montreal World Fair.78 In the British gangster film „The Italian Job“ of 1969 it also served as

symbol of Britishness.79

In advertisements, explicit references to national origin showed up only rarely. In the late

fifties, Citroën claimed that the 2CV embodies the French national spirit, being like

“Descartes in bolts (Descartes en boulons)”.80 Also, Renault advertised the 4CV with the

slogan: “Yes, France that’s the Côte d´Azur, but it’s also Renault”81. In Italy, Alfa Romeo

urged Italian consumers in 1968 to buy home-made rather than foreign cars.82 But these

70 Paolini, Paese, 163; Minucci, Automobilwerbung, 237-239.71 Ferdinand Fasce, Voglia di automobile, in: Contemporanea 4 (2001), no. 2, 205-223.72 Minucci, Automobilwerbung, 227.73 Quattroruote 14 (1969), no. 161, 24 p.74 Robson, Mini, 29.75 Johannes Hübner, The Big Mini Book, Bideford 1992, 23, 40, 63.76 Robson, Mini, 50, 58 p.77 Hübner, Mini Book, 28.78 Hübner, Mini Book, 27.79 Iris-Aya Laemmerhirt, Mini Conquers Hollywood. Der Imagewandel des Minis im Film, in: JürgenKramer/Anette Pakratz/Claus-Ulrich Viol, eds., Mini & Mini. Ikonen der Popkultur zwischen Dekonstruktionund Rekonstruktion, Bielefeld 2009, 89-102, 94.80 Séguéla, Publicité, 101.81 Séguéla, Publicité, 93.82 Quattroruote 14 (1969), no. 161, 22.

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tended to be exceptions in the home markets. There was, of course, more mention of origin in

export advertising, like in a slogan employed by Rootes 1960: “English cars conquer German

streets”83. However, producers were often reluctant to stress patriotism or the country of

origin too much. In a time when markets were still predominantly national, there was little

need for that. When advertising became more professional and foreign competition grew in

the sixties, it seemed more expedient to stress use value factors for small cars.

4. History and politics

Small cars could come to symbolize the nation because they embodied its history. Also,

political actors demonstrated an affinity to popular small cars to increase their own

popularity. But the role of politicians was not limited to representation. Some of the leading

European car companies maintained strong links to their governments.

The most pertinent example would be the Volkswagen which had been a political project

from the beginning. Adolf Hitler urged industrial leaders in March 1934 to construct a

“people’s car” (Volkswagen). The term had been around for some years, however. The

construction of the Volkswagen was part of the regime’s motorization programme. Its motives

were manifold: cars were seen as an expression of a nation’s level of culture, the regime

sought popular acceptance, military considerations played a certain (though not predominant)

role, and purchasing power could be channelled away from the strained food market.84 As it

is well known, the Volkswagen was never produced for the civilian market during the period

of National Socialism. Had it been, it would not have been a people’s car, but rather a middle-

class one, because it would still have been too expensive for workers.85

After the war, it was still a state-owned corporation, even if it acted largely autonomously

under the direction of Heinz Nordhoff.86 With its roots in National Socialism and its famous

economical success after the war, the Volkswagen perfectly embodied recent German history.

However, Nordhoff was eager to disassociate himself and his company from the Nazi past,

not only for image reasons. Another factor was a legal dispute with those disappointed

consumers who had been saving for a VW since the thirties but never actually received a car.

83 Auto, Motor und Sport (1960), no. 2, 5.84 Wolfgang König, Volkswagen, Volksempfänger, Volksgemeinschaft. "Volksprodukte" im DrittenReich, Paderborn 2004, 152, 155, 160, 187.85 König, Volkswagen, 180 p.86 Officially, the owner of Volkswagen until 1960 was the Deutsche Arbeitsfront, a national socialistorganization which had been abolished in 1945.

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In a rather curious twist of argument, Nordhoff blamed them for supporting the Nazi regime

with their savings and maintained that VW was not obliged to deliver cars to those people.87

Post-war governments were eager to exploit the success of Volkswagen, too. In spring 1955,

the German chancellor Konrad Adenauer visited the VW factory in Wolfsburg. In August,

when VW had reached the 1,000,000 mark of produced cars, director Heinz Nordhoff was

awarded the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesverdienstkreuz).88

In Italy, the Fiat 500 (“Topolino”) had a similar history. Just as Hitler had intervened in the

construction and design of the Volkswagen, so did Mussolini with Fiat. The difference, of

course, was that the Fiat 500 really came to the market in 1936, but with its price set at 8,900

Lire, it was too expensive for the working class.89 Already in 1932, Fiat had introduced a

lower middle-class model that was named after the fascist youth organization: “Balilla” (508),

precursor of the Fiat 1100.90 The enterprise kept close links to the government also in the

post-war period. Before the new 500 was introduced in 1957, Italy’s Prime Minister Adone

Zoli was allowed to undertake a private test drive in Rome.91

In France, the 2CV also has a pre-war history. Its first prototype was developed in 1937, but

its serial production didn’t begin until in 1948. In this year it was introduced to the public at

the Paris Motor Show in the presence of President Vincent Auriol who allegedly was as

sceptical as most observers at the time, including the press.92 Of course, Citroën had been and

remained a private company whereas Renault had been nationalized in 1945 because of its

collaboration with National Socialist Germany.93 In the post-war era, Renault publicly

committed itself to mass motorization, even at the expense of profits which were seen as

secondary to the general interest of the country.94 Yet the business prospered, unlike that of its

English rivals.

In Britain, the government remained aloof from car production for quite some time. It was

only when domestic producers ran into serious difficulties in the late sixties that the

government intervened and effectively sponsored the merger between the British Motor

Holding and Leyland in 1968. Full nationalization came in 1975 after continuing difficulties.

The company was not allowed to go bankrupt, declared Prime Minister Harold Wilson,

87 Time Magazine 15.2.1954.88 Heidrun Edelmann, Heinz Nordhoff und Volkswagen. Ein deutscher Unternehmer im amerikanischenJahrhundert, Göttingen 2003, 170, 180; cf. Spiegel 33 (1955), 17.89 Sannia, Fiat 500.90 Paolini, Paese, 118.91 Sannia, Fiat 500.92 Taylor, 2CV.93 Loubet, Histoire, 200.94 Loubet, Histoire, 281.

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because it formed an “essential part of the United Kingdom economic base”95. Similar to

Renault, Lord Stokes, chairman of the British Leyland Motor Corporation, accepted the social

responsibility of a “national champion” and tried to defend the British market share,

ultimately unsuccessfully.96 In Britain, particular models were not seen as embodying part of

the nation’s history. However, at least according to motor journalists in 1960, the motor car as

such was “part of the British way of life”97. Also, in the sixties and seventies, the decline of

the British car industry became a symbol for the relative decline of the British economy as a

whole.

History and politics were important to nationalizing small cars. That is not surprising, given

the fact that car producers like Volkswagen, Fiat, Renault or BLMC maintained strong links

to their governments or were state-owned. Also, some cars like the Volkswagen or the Fiat

500 could be seen to represent the nation’s history, for better or for worse.

5. The consumers’ view

It is important, though not always easy, to reconstruct the consumers’ view. How important

were political and historical considerations, or the suggestions made by advertisements, for

purchasing decisions? Certainly, the meanings given to cars in the public opinion would not

go unnoticed, but the way it influenced consumers is far from clear.

Fortunately, we have a few hints from contemporary surveys. For example, it can be shown

that for German VW customers it was not national pride or the difficult history that were

decisive factors, but economy and reliability. In 1958, for 42 % of the interviewees economy

was the prevalent motive, technology only for 27.5 % and aesthetics mattered only to 8.5 %.98

In general, a recommendation by an acquaintance was trusted more than advertising, and for

small cars economy was the dominant motive. In comparison to Great Britain, German

consumers regarded economy as more important, and both aesthetics and a “stable

construction” as less important.99 These surveys, of course, do not present the whole story. It

can be assumed, for example, that rational motivations are over-represented, because many

people would not admit to be guided by irrational motives.

95 Church, Rise, 104; Whisler, Motor Industry, 119.96 Whisler, Motor Industry, 111.97 The Autocar (1960), 758-760.98 Schödermeier, Entwicklung, 135.99 Schödermeier, Entwicklung, 133.

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As especially VW had to learn in the fifties, history could also be a burden. A group of

consumers who had been saving for a Volkswagen before and during the war sued the

company for a return of their deposits. That is but one reason why Heinrich Nordhoff, the

company’s director, tried to distance himself from the recent past. Another reason was that the

connection with National Socialism was not particularly helpful in foreign markets. The

French magazine “L`auto-journal”, for example, liked to remind its readers even in 1959 that

the VW was the ex-car of the German people.100

In Italy, as we have seen, Fiat was the most popular brand. That was also true in 2003 when 3

of the 5 most popular cars in Italy came from Fiat. But at the same time, surveys about car

images suggest that the cars Italians most liked were BMW, Mercedes and Audi. What people

buy is not always what they like most. That phenomenon, however, is easy to explain.

German cars have a good reputation in Italy, but are considered to be too dear.101

In France, one of the most popular cars, the 2CV, aimed already in the fifties at a particular

market: the rural population. Apparently, there existed a certain market segmentation:

Peugeot for the middle classes, Renault for workers and teachers, and Citroën for the rural

population.102 This may be oversimplified, but market segmentation certainly became more

prominent since the late fifties and made a people’s car, as a car for everybody, more and

more difficult. As noted above, by 1960 the 2CV was for most consumers a second car or a

business car.103

Still, as we learn from an English source, despite all use value orientation and market

segmentation, there was a certain feeling that it was a patriotic duty to buy a car from one’s

own country. A consumer writing to the motor journal “Autocar” in 1970 considered himself

“a good British patriot”, but confessed to have bought a Renault 6, because a comparable car

was not offered by British producers.104 This echoes the feelings of two motorists in 1951

who shared a preference for the marine, the English countryside and 1 ¼ litre M.G.s.105

It is remarkable that still in 1970 consumers felt they had to justify their decision to buy a

foreign car, and it is maybe no mere coincidence that this was the case in Britain. It was only

there that consumers had to face the choice between patriotic ideals and economic

considerations. In Germany, France and Italy the domestic industry was strong enough to

keep the home market even without explicit appeals to patriotism. Foreign cars were often

more expensive and not necessarily better value for money than domestic products.

100 L'auto-journal 31.12.1959; Le salon de l´automobile 1959, 77.101 Minucci, Automobilwerbung, 24, 34-36.102 Loubet, Histoire, 280.103 Loubet, Histoire, 287.104 The Autocar 132 (1970), no. 3870, 55.105 The Autocar (1951), 913.

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6. Conclusion

The results can be summarized in four points. First, the markets in the fifties, to a lesser

degree in the sixties, were dominated by national firms. Thus, competition existed

predominantly between producers within one country, not so much with foreigners. In the

fifties, the car markets were actually sellers’ markets, i.e. the most important problem for

producers was production capacity and not so much competition and marketing. That changed

after the late fifties, but still advertising with national traits or clichés was not as prominent as

it seems to have become in the last few years. So it seems that the more international the

markets, the more national the advertising, a trend which would make sense, given that

national characteristics do not distinguish producers on national markets.

Second, the nationalization of small cars was more a matter of history and politics than of

business strategies. Cars like the German Volkswagen or the Italian Fiat 500 came to embody

the nation’s history: a problematic past before the war, but also a quick rise to glory after

1945. Already in the 1950s, and much more so in retrospect, there was a need to symbolize

the “trente glorieuses” or the “miracolo economico”, and what better symbol for motorization

and the incipient consumer society could there be than a popular car? The obvious exception

here would be Great Britain, for whom the fifties and sixties were a period of relative

industrial decline (despite continuing absolute growth rates) – symbolized by the decline of

the automobile industry. However, it has to be kept in mind that this symbolic connection did

not emerge spontaneously. Rather, it was made by the press or “public opinion”, both the

general press like “Der Spiegel” or “Time Magazine” and the more specialized magazines

like “Auto, Motor und Sport”, “The Autocar” or “L´auto-journal”. We do not know exactly

what consumers thought at the time, but for most the purchase of a car was a matter of

economy more than a matter of patriotism. In fact, until the late sixties there was no need to

choose between economy and patriotism, because the car markets were largely national

anyway which meant that foreign cars were harder to get and also more difficult to maintain,

given the initial lack of adequate service facilities. It was only in Britain in the sixties that

consumers were beginning to be torn between what they perceived as their patriotic duty (to

buy British cars) and economic considerations. Then, however, many opted for the latter.

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Third, it has to be kept in mind that national images are formed through the interplay of auto-

and hetero-stereotypes. Often, as in the case of VW, the connection between Volkswagen and

“Wirtschaftswunder” was first forged in the foreign press and then reported back at home. It

was the Time Magazine which featured a report on the “faboulous recovery” of the German

economy in 1954 with a picture of Heinz Nordhoff on the cover. The article inside presented

VW as a prime example for the success of a free market economy.106

In many other cases car magazines, as well as the general press, were full of national

stereotypes, especially when reporting from abroad or about foreign cars. Some of their

claims, however, bordered on the absurd. To quote a few examples: The German magazine

“Spiegel” discussed the Citroën 2CV in 1952, calling it “the ugliest car in Europe”. Yet it

allegedly suited the “French national character”, because it offered comfort without luxury.107

It may be interesting to note that the French “Auto-journal” did not agree: The 2CV, it

argued, was better suited to underdeveloped countries.108 The British magazine “Autocar”

claimed that the successful VW was better suited to continental tastes than British cars

because Europeans like noise, whereas the British consumer prefers silence.109 In a similar

vein, the German “ADAC Motorwelt” of 1950 contrasted German and Italian driving habits.

To Germans, the author claimed, a car was just a means of transport whereas to Italians it was

an expression of passion.110 “Das Auto” concurred: Italians want a car that is fun to drive,

with a vivacious engine.111 The same journal claimed in 1960 that “Latin nations” see no

problem in over-loading their cars.112 The French “Auto-journal” stressed technical

differences and praised especially the front-wheel drive as typically French.113 According to a

British observer, it was the law of the jungle that prevailed on German roads.114

Fourth, we cannot assume that these national stereotypes were always shared by consumers.

So methodologically speaking, it is essential to look for utterances of consumers, however

filtered or distorted they might be. The purchase of a “national” car made economic sense in

many respects, especially regarding provision of service, but also cost and availability. But

then again, there was a clear idea that it was more patriotic to buy a car form one’s own

country, and consumers who bought foreign cars felt the need to explain their decision and

justify themselves. That is remarkable because nowadays consumers buy products from many

106 Time Magazine 15.2.1954.107 Der Spiegel 41 (1952), 21.108 L'auto-journal 31.12.1959; Le salon de l´automobile 1959, 12 p.109 The Autocar (1955), no. 3086, 65.110 ADAC Motorwelt (1950), no. 10, 19.111 Das Auto (1950), 387.112 Auto, Motor & Sport (1960), no. 12, 58 p.113 L'auto-journal (1970), no. 2, 30.114 Quattroruote 14 (1969), no. 161, 185.

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countries without thinking much about it. Indeed, the availability of a global range of goods

can be seen as an important feature of modern consumer society. But the production of cars

was seen as a key industry at the time, and the decline of the British car industry was (and still

is) regarded as a major disaster, although economically Great Britain is not worse off without

it than her continental partners. The point is that the car was not just like any commodity, but

rather a key commodity in the breakthrough of mass consumption.