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New Directions:Transportation Hub and Corridor

STEPHEN BLANK'

As the r99os came to an end, a "perfect storm'threatened to disruptthe course of North American economic integration that had intensi-fied during the previous two decades. In the r98os and 9os, key sec-tors of the Canadian, US, and Mexican economies were linked incross-border collaboration. Specialized production centres and distri-bution hubs networked across the continent, enabling firms to selectthe most favourable sites to enhance their productivity on a continen-tal and global scale. Effective freight transportation was essential tothese new systems and, during these years, North America's trains,trucks, and airlines moved growing volumes of goods with increasingefficiency. But by the end of the 9os the transportation system seemedon the edge of crisis. Many feared a shift back from more efficient,low-inventory "jusi in time" (1Ir) production toward inventory-heavy"just in case" systems.

wny? vHAT HAppENED?

The story begins in the early r98os with crashing oil prices on the onehand and deepening North American economic integration on the other.The collapse of oil prices in r98z dashed Ottawa's and Mexico City'splans to use the windfall profits from higher oil prices to distance theireconomies from the US. Facing soaring debt, Ottawa concluded (andsoon would Mexico Ciry) that the question was not whether therewould be a North American solution but what kind. Trudeau's govern-ment looked to rUTashington for a new trade accommodation, launching

rJ j New Directions: Transportation Hub and Corridor

a process that culminated in the Canada-United States Free TradeAgreement (currn) concluded by Brian Mulroney's ConservativeGovernment in r988.

Studies revealed that, in fact, economic nationalist policies in the r97oshad not slowed the growth of trade and investment linking the NorthAmerican economies. Instead, significant change in the structure of theNorth American economy had taken place. Against the background ofcRrt ffade liberalization, tougher international competition, and fallingprofit margins) many US (and foreign) firms rationalized their operations,reducing excess capacity tied up in Canadian and Mexican branch plants.They constructed integrated North American production, marketing, andsourcing networks - replicating developments since ry65 in the autoindustry. The result was much "deeper" integration, with much of thegrowth in cross-border trade in components, parts, and materials."

Key sectors of the North American economy were restructured withdeeply integrated systems of supply chains linking production centresand distribution hubs across the continent. These new production sys-tems enabled firms to link the most favourable sites for production anddistribution. This new model of decentralized corporate organization,spread along extended supply chains, was heavily dependent on efficientfreight transportation and logistic capacity. During the r98os and 9os,freight transportation efficiency improved substantially because of theexistence of excess capacity, new technology (unit trains, double stack-ing of containers, larger trucks), and policies of. privatization and dereg-ulation which led to consolidation in the trucking and rail industries.

The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement can thus be seen not as the firststep toward North American integration but rather as a response todevelopments already underway in the real economy. The agreementacknowledged the level of integration that now existed and reassuredinvestors that governments would no longer (in most sectors) seek toinhibit trade and investment relations.'!(hen Mexico City reached outfor a similar bilateral arrangement, Ottawa, fearing the creation of aUS-centred "hub and spoke" system, pushed for a three-way accord.

NAFTA negotiations dealt with freight transportation, focusing mainlyon regulatory harmonization. Several working groups, set up to con-tinue these discussions after uRrre was ratified, achieved some success.3But critical issues remained unresolved, including immigration restrictionsaffecting transportation workers, the harmonization of vehicle weightsand dimensions and similar standards applying to transport capital equip-ment, and full liberalization of investment restrictions on Nerra-basedinvestors in transportation operations. Some agreed-upon arrangements- Mexican trucking for example - remained unimplemented. Therewas no movement toward free trade in transportation services. The

r34 Stephen Blank

agreement removed the protection offered to trade in goods, but theprotection of domestic transportation markets remained unchanged.Nothing regarding infrastructure, including future requirements andmaintenance, appeared on the negotiators' agenda. The Nerre negotia-tions never strayed beyond the notion of three separate national trans-portation systems. The agreement provided no commitment to a "NorthAmerican freight transportation system" and created no institutionalarrangements to monitor transportation requirements, identify emerg-ing problems, and suggest possible ways of responding to them.+

In the Sos and 9os, these blank spaces did not seem urgent. FollowingNAFTA implementation, cross-border integration intensified, evidencedby the rapid increase in the movement of goods across North America'sinternal borders. The entire process ofrestructuring corporate organiza-tion in North America was very much bottom-up, driven largely by indi-vidual firms and market transactions rather than top-down governmentdecisions. Companies worked out their own strategies for building newcontinental systems, and transportation providers met rising demandsof users. These developments reflected the liberal milieu of the periodand the widespread view that NAFTA should not lead in a "European"direction. The counterpoint to NAFTA-r994 was Europe-r99z,the cre-ation of a single European market.5 What occurred in North Americaforms a stark contrast to the strategy of the European Commission - tobe sure, not always successful - to deliberately use freight transportationsystems to enhance integration.6

But by the late rggos,problems were beginning to brew. The rising flowof goods across North America's internal borders (now including rapidlygrowing Asian imports) was outrunning the capacity of transportationinfrastructure and border crossings. Congestion was increasing, escalatingfuel use and generating more pollution and emissions. The continued fail-ure to harmonize regulations, the accumulated weight of deferred mainte-nance, and the impact of post-9/r r measures on borders and ports strainedthe capacity of the North American freight transport system to serve theeconomic system that had emerged over the previous decades. A dozenreports on transportation infrastructure carried out in the early zooos byUS, Canadian, and Mexican research centres and government agencies allagreed on the impending infrastructure crisis.T The findings are wellsummed up in a report by the Rand Corporation: "Capacity is over-whelmed by supply chains, disruptions are increasing, the system is'brit-tle' with growing risk of continent wide economic damage."8

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

National governments were not unaware of these rising problems of con-gestion and infrastructure deterioration.e As early as r9gr, Washington

rj5 New Directions: Transportation Hub and Corridor

had laid out a program designed to overlay the 195os Interstate high-way system with a more coherent north-south network.to Impressivesums were spent on this and follow-on highway programs, and usefulresults were obtained. But the goal of developing more coherent north-south "corridors" was not achieved. One reason was the localization ofhighway spending. Congressional earmarks increased from ro in t98zto more than 6,3oo in zoo5.t' The sense of a coherent national, not tosay continental, plan evaporated as control of the authorization of high-way funds shifted from the Department of Transportation to Congress.

In Canada and Mexico, transport infrastructure spending was a casu-alty of deficit reduction strategies adopted by federal (and Canadianprovincial) governments in the early r99os. This resulted in delayingmany infrastructure construction and maintenance projects. In Canada,at a time when economic growth, urban concentration, and US bordertrade were all increasing, government's transport spending as a share ofcop fe l l f rom 2.9 percent in r99r-92 to r .7 percent in zooz-o3, open-ing a wide infrastructure gap." The Toronto Dominion Bank in zoo4underlined that "ongoing neglect of the nation's capital stock presentsone of the greatest risks to the country's overall quality of life."'lNonetheless, some gains were registered. The privatization of CanadianNational in 1995 allowed the company to grow rapidly to become acontinental NAFrA railroad with the acquisition of assets in the UnitedStates that extended from Canada into Mexico. The Mexican financialsituation was much more devastating, and infrastructure constructionand maintenance collapsed following the crisis of ry8l In the r99os,debt reduction drained funding from social and infrastructure programs.

Other transportation-infrastructure initiatives followed, but nonewas successful in creating a vision of a continentally integrated freighttransportation system, let alone building such a system. Indeed, the taskbecame more difficult: the need for a more efficient, better maintainedsystem in the r99os became a more efficient and secure system after

9/tt, and then morphed into a more efficient, secure, and sustainablesystem as concern over climate change rose.

The Security and Prosperity Partnership (srn) initiated by the threeNorth American leaders in zoo5 raised hopes for a revival of interestand enthusiasm on North American developments.'+ With regard totransportation, the spP program focused on air transport connectivityand safety planning, border infrastructure planning and coordination,rail safety, short sea shipping, and, once again, harmonizing regula-tions - though nothing was mentioned about coordinated highway andrail planning or free trade in transportation. Nonetheless, for a briefmoment, it looked as though some of the unfinished business of theNAFTA negotiations and other uncompleted tasks might be resumed.'5Lack of leadership, fears generated by the blowback from groups which

46 Stephen Blank

claimed that the spp was a step toward the dreaded North AmericanUnion, and the impact of the financial crisis left the partnership danglinguntil it finally disappeared in zoo9.'6

ln zooT,Ottawa and Mexico City both announced major new transpor-tation infrastructure development programs.'7 Both gave nods toward theincreasingly integrated North American production system and both con-tained major projects designed to create a new "land bridge" from expandedor newly constructed ports on the Pacific coast to North American mar-kets. Ottawa's long-term infrastructure program, the Building CanadaPlan, stated, "The focus of the Gateways and Border Crossings Fund willbe a limited number of national gateway strategies and key intermodallinkages that enhance Canada's trade competitiveness and the efficiency ofthe national transportation system. This fund will help support infrastruc-ture improvements at and leading to key locations, such as major bordercrossings between Canada and the US."8

Mexican President Calder6n unveiled a very ambitious zooT-zorzNational Infrastructure Program with a strong emphasis on highways,rail, ports, and air transportation. The program included plans for a newmultibillion-dollar deep sea port located r 5o miles south of the Tijuana-San Diego border which would, like Prince Rupert Port, create a new raillink to US markets in the Midwest and east coast.

The Canadian Gateways and Corridors project advanced moresuccessfully (at least the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor project'r)than the Mexican, which was soon mired in funding and coordinationproblems. W'hat is noteworthy in both cases, however, is their firmlynational structure. Neither project involved in-depth planning with USagencies on connections with US railroads and highways, enhanced cross-border connections, potential increases in congestion, or the impact onborder crossings.

The February zorr meeting of Prime Minister Harper and PresidentObama announced several reconditioned initiatives - a "Beyond theBorder'Working Group" would implement and oversee work on an "actionplan" to ease border flows (and perhaps create a continental securityperimeter) and a new US-Canada Regulatory Co-operation Council madeup of officials from both countries would seek to streamline regulationsgoverning product safety and quality. I7hile nothing was said regardingtransportation infrastructure, these initiatives could affect transportationflows - if, of course, they were actually advanced.

C O N C L U S I O N S

Despite congestion, decay, and thickened borders, the North Americanproduction system has continued to function. Companies learned to

r37 New Directions: Transportation Hub and Corridor

cope with these conditions, building delay and additional costs intotheir business calculations. Cross-border movement of goods has con-tinued to recover from the recession downturn. But this has been adefensive operation, and while transport users and suppliers have con-tinued to muddle through,little progress has been made even in thinkingabout what kind of freight transportation system will be required tomaintain North American competitiveness in the global economy in thenext decades.

Creating a North American freight transportation system remains morea dream than a realiry even as reality appears to demand such a system.Railway systems have become more North American, inter-modal link-ages have improved, and the volume of goods carried on North America'srailways has increased after the recession plunge. But there is little senseof what happens next, except the expectation that as the recession passes,key choke points will experience more congestion. Moreover, while rail-road performance has been greatly improved over the past two decades,particularly on major (Class r) lines, less has been done to prepare for thechanging demands (for example, changing economic geography and shift-ing production systems) of the twenty-first-century economy.'o Highwaysremain fragmented. What Susan Bradbury observed in zooz still largelystands: "Although the individual national fhighway] transportation sys-tems of the three countries are linked together, they are not truly inte-grated with each other."" There is little doubt that highway congestionwill intensify and, given cuts in spending, that maintenance problems willworsen. Successive biennial report cards on US infrastructure by theAmerican Society of Civil Engine€rs gave US roads and bridges no betterthan a D- and, in zoog,calculated a $55o billion shortfall in maintenanceinvestment over the past five years."

Even with increasing continental and global integration of produc-tion and distribution systems in many sectors of our economy, there isno evidence of planning for a North American transportation frame-work. Infrastructure programs enunciated by the three national gov-ernment show little sense of cross-border connectivity and reveal littlecollaborative North'American consultation behind them. Conceived asnational programs, they do not make up an interconnected continentalproject. Discussions continue among the three national transportationdepartments on a wide array of issues. But they focus overwhelminglyon regulations. No agency has been mandated to develop a vision of anefficient, secure, and sustainable North American freight transportationsystem for the twenty-first century. Our inability to develop and coor-dinate freight transportation planning in a continental perspectiveposes serious obstacles to the creation of more efficient, competitiveNorth American industries.

r38 Stephen Blank

Lack of coherence at a continental level reflects the lack of coherencein national transportation planning in each of the North Americannations. Transportation planning in all three countries is fragmentedamong an array of federal-executive and legislative agencies andbetween federal, state/provincial, and even municipal entities as well.Although the challenges differ in each country, neither the Canadian,the US, nor the Mexican federal government currently has the capacityto deal with infrastructure problems as they arise, or to develop com-plementary processes for facilitating the integration of national trans-portation systems where necessary to unplug major bottlenecks in eachcountry or at national borders.

The US experience strongly indicates that in the absence of a clearvision of a wider national-continental transportation infrastructure,local interests will play dominant roles in shaping policy outcomes, andthat this will produce fragmented outcomes. As we saw earlier, highwaylegislation in the r99os became a source of funds gifted by earmarksrather than a strategy for strengthening the US (not to mention theNorth American) economy. The same holds true for Canada and Mexico.

Even before the zoo8 crash, national programs all acknowledgedproblems of funding infrastructure construction. In fact, funding goalsseem unrealistic in light of estimated cosrs of providing needed newcapacity and dealing with the impact of delayed maintenance. Theamount of investment promised in the national infrastructure programsis dwarfed by an infrastructure funding gap reaching trillions of dol-lars.'3 As a funding "solution," the national programs all emphasizedthe need for new forms of "innovative financing" and for creating abroad array of private-public partnership programs - just as the worstfinancial crisis since the 193os was breaking. The most comprehensiveUS report on surface transportation concludes that underinvestment intransportation infrastructure will almost certainly continue.24

Meanwhile, the politicization of infrastructure spending in the USCongress (Is infrastructure a vital investment or discretionary spending?Should infrastructure planning be carried out at the national or statelevels? Is infrastructure a governmental or private sector responsibility?)has greatly slowed, if not halted, the process of infrastructure renewal inthe US.'r

LOOKING FORVARD

The transportation infrastructure crisis arrives at a moment full ofuncertainty arising from what scenario builders call "known unknowns"- that is, factors which are known to exist but whose impact cannot beestimated. For example, we assume that the "Great Recession" tracks

r j9 New Directions: Transportation Hub and Corridor

"normal" patterns and that economic activity is recovering (or willrecover in the near, certainly not distant, future). The crisis might repre-sent, however, emerging structural changes in the global economy andnormal patterns may not resume. Technology-driven changes in fuel,engines, and the design of ships, planes, trains, and trucks could altertransportation infrastructure requirements and patterns. Global pro-duction and trade patterns may change - perhaps with a crisis in China,less trans-Pacific trade. or more trade from Latin America. New envi-ronmental regulations already affect freight transportation costs, routes,and infrastructure needs and their impact is likely to increase in the nearfuture. The era of easy linear projections for transportation planning issurely over.

Meanwhile, mistrust has increased along the internal borders ofNorth America. Some Canadian leaders have backed away from trilat-eralism and press for bilateral deals. Immigration and drug-related vio-lence have coloured all else on the US-Mexico border and here, andbattles still rage over the implementation of the NAFrA trucking accord.

Economic slack should have provided the opportunity to launch sig-nificant maintenance and construction projects. In Canada, competitionbetween East-West national visions and North-South continental visionscontinues to create uncertainty about infrastructure planning. In the US,substantial stimulus funding was sprayed in this direction, but over-whelmingly it went to immediately available "shovel-ready" jobs andnot to longer-term strategic projects. Moreover, some US groups no lon-ger on the fringe of politics seem prepared to tear down governmentstructures, dump the Department of Transportation, and give up federalinvolvement in transportation.

Is there no good news? As noted above, cross.border supply chainshave continued to function. Companies have been able to manage bor-der constraints without collapsing JIr programs. Metropolitan leaderstogether with some state and provincial officials understand how cross-border ties create jobs and have continued to support cross-borderregional development efforts, although lack of funds is eroding some ofthis. Substantial efforts have been registered by trucking firms and rail-roads to improve efficiency and fuel performance. Despite frighteningviolence in several areas, some production may be relocating from Chinato Mexico. But these individual achievements, however worthy, do notadd up to a North American infrastructure program.

Some transportation observers believe that only when the crisis becomessevere enough will attention be focused on these issues. This does not, how-ever, seem a good plan for success. For the time being, we are destined atbest to muddle through, patching and mending as we go. More, of course,can be done. The smaller railroads can be much improved, following the

r4o Stephen Blank

lead of the Class r's, and some new routes can be explored (perhaps, forexample, a southward rail corridor from Halifax or a new intermodalexchange in southern Michigan). The highway system is the most seriousissue with vast maintenance and congestion problems. Congestion is notspread evenly, however, and a finite number of choke points can beimproved. Better border management - moving more of the security proce-dures away from the border itself, for example - would diminish conges-tion and pollution. Overcoming the regulatory inhibitions on short seashipping and reviving barge traffic on inland waterways should be a keytransport goal.'5 The danger, however, is that without a broader vision, vastsums can be spent on local and regional upgrades without advancingtoward a more integrated continental structure.

lVhat - ideally - is needed is to begin with alternative visions of anefficient, sustainable, and. secure North American freight transportationsystem for the next decades, starting as Roberto Newell puts it, with ablank sheet of paper and trying to relate the impact of new technologies,changes in global production and trade flows, and demographic pat-terns. This is what the European Community has tried to do over thepast decade.'7 The key is less what they have accomplished than theemergence of a vision as target and baseline for performance. The mostserious lack in North America is the kind of institutionalization of thesediscussions (and supporting research) that informs stakeholders andconstituencies and climbs beyond the repetitive ad hocism that charac-terizes our approach. The Europeans know well that it is a long wayfrom word to deed, and building policy consensus and financial resourcesis tough. But in Europe there is at least a process. The creation of a NorthAmerican Commission on Freight Transportation, not isolated like theCommission for Environmental Cooperation (cEc) and Commission forLabor Cooperation (clc), but with a more aggressive mandate anddeep ties to existing transportation research agencies, would be a use-ful start.

In the second decade of the twenty-first century, we understand thattransportation infrastructure will be a critical element in shaping ourcompetitiveness in the global arena. But it is also clear that in our nationaland the continental economies, North America continues to face signifi-cant transportation infrastructure deficits. We lack a vision of an efficient,sustainable, and secure North American freight transportation system forthe next decades and we have failed to create a mechanism to think about,to say nothing of putting in place, such a system. Recent Canadian effortsto push once again on regulatory harmonization would help, of course,but without similar efforts to collaborate on infrastructure planning andexecution, these partial initiatives cannot cure the comprehensive prob-lems that threaten our supply chain systems.

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r4r New Directions: Transportation Hub and Corridor

NOTES

Malcolm Cairns, Graham Parsons, Barry Prentice, Juan Carlos Villa, andI drafted several papers on North American freight transportation during thepast few years. This essay builds on our collaboration, though my colleaguesare not responsible for any errors found in this article. I am indebted toStephanie Golob for her advice on the paper.See Stephen Blank and Jerry Haar, Making NAFTA

'Work: U.S. Firms and the

New North American Business Enuironment (Published by Lynne Riennerfor the North-South Center, University of Miami, r998).See "Initial Five-Year Plan for Increased Cooperation in the Field of NorthAmerican Transportation Technologies" signed by Canada, Mexico and theUS on r z June r 9 9 8, http ://www.tc. gc.calpol/naft a- alenal enl plenaries/plenary -x 9 98/TCG4.htm.See Mary Brooks, "NAFTA and Transportation: A Canadian Scorecard," Centrefor International Business Development, Dalhousie University (Research Paper177, Ar;gust zooo), http://cibs.management.dal.calFiles /pdfo/"z7slDP-ry7.pdf .See Stephanie Golob, "Background: NAFTA as the Anti-Europe" in her casestudy "'Three Strikes and You're Out?'The Security and ProsperityPartnership of North America (srn) and the Future of North AmericanIntegration," Portal for North America (July zoo8), http://wwwportalfornor-thamerica. org/teaching-resou rces I %oEzo/" 8 o7o 9 Cthree-strikes-and-you %Ez"/"8oYo99re-o\to/oEzo/o8o7o9D-security-and-prosperity-partnership-and-future-nor,Directorate General for Energy and Transport, A Sustainable Future forTransport: Towards an Integrated,Technology-Led and User Friendly System(Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, zoogl,http:llec.europa.eu/transport/publications/doc/zoo9_future_of_transport_en.pdf.Guy Stanley, "Review of Recent Reports on North American TransportationInfrastructure," North Anrerican Transportation Competitiveness ResearchCouncil, Working Paper 3 (September zooT).David S. Ortiz, Brian'Weatherford, Henry H. lfillis, Myles Collins, NaveenMandava, Chris Ordwich, Increasing the Capacity of Freight Transportation- U.S. and Canadian Perspectiues, RAND Corporation, Conference Proceedings,(zoo7), http://www.rand.orglcontent/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proce edingslzooTlRAND_CFzz8.pdf.On national transportation infrastructure policies, see Stephen Blank, GrahamParsons, Juan Carlos Villa, "Freight Transportation Infrastructure Policies inCanada,Mexico & the US: An Overview and Analysis," North AmericanTransportation Competitiveness Research Council, riforking Paper No. 5(March zoo8).See "Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency A ct of rggr - Summarg"http://ntl. bts. gov/DOCS/ste.html.

I I

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r42 Stephen Blank

"Review of Congressional Earmarks within Dept of TransportationPrograms," US Department of Transportation, 9 Jtly zoo7, http://coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore id=8 5 o 49 t 4 5 -abfo- 4af9 - 8 7 c4-9 r 8 99 4 48o8f7 .See Western Provincial Transportation Ministers Council, Western CanadaTransportation Infrastructure Strategy for an Economic Network (Marchzoo5).TD Bank Financial Group, Mind the Gap, Finding the Money to UpgradeCanada's aging Public Infrastructure (Toronto, 2oo4).See Golob, "Background: NAFTA as the Anti-Europe."See Stephen Blank, Stephanie R. Golob, and Guy Stanley, "spp and the \Jfay

Forward for North American Integration" (zoo6l Facuhy Working Papers,http ://digitalcommons. pace. edr.r/lu binfaculty_workingp aper sl 5 7 .A remarkable uproar emerged over the so-called North American SuperHighwaS a fear-fantasy cobbled together from several different directions.See Jerome Corsi, "Bush Administration Quietly Plans Nerra Super Highway"( rz June zoo6), http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=r 5497.For more detail on these developments, see Blank, Parsons, and Villa, "FreightTransportation Infrastructure Policies in Canada."Canadian National Policy Framework for Strategic Gateways and TradeCorridors lzooTl, x4.

19 See the Gateway website at http://www.gateway-corridor.com/index.htm.zo See National Rail Freight Infrastructure Capacity and Investment StudS final

report, prepared for Association of American Railroads, preparedby Cambridge Systematics, Inc. (September zooT), http://www.aar.oryl-lmedtalaarlFiles/natl-freight-capacity-study.ashx and Association of AmericanRailroads, America Needs More Rail Capacity Now (March zorrl,http:llwww aar. org/I(eylssues/-/me dial aar lBackground-Papers/America-Needs-More-Rail-Capacity.ashx.

zr Susan Bradbury, "PlanningTransportation Corridors in Post-Nerre NorthAmeica," Journal of American Planning Association 68,no.z (Spring zooz)r 7.

zz American Society of Civil Engineers, Report Card, America's Infrastructure,http ://www.infrastructurereportcard. org/.

z3 "Future Highway and Public Transportation Finance; Phase I: CurrentOutlook and Short-Term Solutions" prepared for National ChamberFoundation, prepared by Cambridge Systematics, Inc (zoo5), r, http://www.camsys.com/pubs/ChamberStudy.pdf.

z4 For one example, see Final Report, National Surface Transportation Policyand Revenue Study Commission, "Transportation for Tomorrow" (DecemberzooT) r: 4, http://transportationfortomorrow.com/final_report/index.htm.

z5 Much of the debate in the winter of zoro-rr focused on high-speed rail whichis basically irrelevant to freight transportation and, some argue, may actuallydiminish investment funds for freight transporrarion.

r 3

r4r 5

r 6

r 7

r 8

z5

r43 New Directions: Transportation Hub and Corridor

See Mary Brooks, "NAFrA and Short Sea Shipping Corridors," etusCommentary (November zoo5 ), http://www.aims.calsite/media/aims/AtlanticaBrooks.pdf.Newell was the cco of the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness. In apersonal interview with the author. See "European transport policy forzoro: Time to Decide," http://ec.europa.eu./transport/strategies/doclzoor-white-paper/lb-com-zoor-o37o-en.pdf,and Commission of the EuropeanCommunities, "Towards a Better Integrated Transeuropean TransportNetwork at the Service of the Common Transport Policy" Green Paper:Ten-T A Policy Review (Brussels,4 February zoogl (httpzlleur-lex.europa.

eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do ?uri=COM: zo o9loo 4 4; FIN:EN:PDF).