Plural regulation of shebeens (informal drinking places)

Laura Drivdala1 and Mary Lawhonb

a Centre of Criminology, University of Cape Town, Private Bag X3, Rondebosch, 7701 Cape Town, African Centre for Cities ,b

African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town, Private Bag X3, Rondebosch, 7701 Cape Town

The regulation of space is understood to extend beyondthe state to include decentralised, diffuse non-stateactors. In South Africa, the regulation of shebeens haslong been considered a means for state regulation ofbehavior, controlling crime and disorder and generatingstate income. The post-apartheid state has sought todistance itself from old patterns, but struggles torespond to the problems associated with alcoholconsumption. Non-state actors have sought to intervenein this gap. We examine how diverse actors contributeto the regulation of drinking and drinking spaceswithin informal settlements in Cape Town. Throughapplying a plural perspective on regulation, weidentify and discuss strategies through whichresidents, shebeen owners and community leadersregulate the flow of alcohol and shebeen practises. Wefind some synergies between different actors’ ideasregarding how shebeen practices should be regulated,however, we also see that while the current policeregulation focuses on confiscation and arrest, actorswithin the settlements prefer softer that takes intoaccount the actual situation at hand. By displayingconflicts and intersections between formal and informalregulations of shebeens, we hope to inspire moreresearch on plural, decentralized, and everydayregulations of alcohol and in the complex spaces ofinformality in the urban South.

Keywords: plural regulation; shebeens; alcohol; informal settlements; governance; Cape Town

7576

1 Corresponding author. Email: Laura.drivdal@uct.ac.za

1. Introduction The production, sale and consumption of alcohol have long beentargets of regulation at diverse scales and from differentauthorities. Since the emergence of the nation-state, top-downregulation through licensing and law-enforcement has been thedominant regulatory method. Even under such circumstances,however, the state is not the sole regulator; non-state actorsincluding religious organizations, NGOs and self-help groupslike Alcoholics Anonymous also intervene (Valverde 1998). Theimportantly different context for regulation in the South-including the limited capacity of states and the critical roleof non-state actors in shaping drinking practices- creates aneed to understand the diverse, situated and often unofficialmechanisms through which alcohol is regulated. This issignificant as alcohol sales, consumption and alcohol relatedharm are claimed to be a growing problem in the global South(WHO 2010).

Geographers in South Africa have long recognized theimportance of alcohol in shaping urban space (Rogerson 1986,Rogerson and Hart 1986). More recently, international scholarshave also examined how alcohol shapes social and economicurban life, the use of space and sense of place (Latham 2003,Jayne et al. 2011). There remains however a critical gap inour understanding of the operation of alcohol regulation ofparticular places, and specifically in sites in the globalSouth. Attending to regulation in these diverse spaces, wesuggest, can enhance our understanding of how pluralregulation operates in cities in the South. It calls ourattention to situated forms of regulation, specifically, theways in which regulation is highly subject to place andrelationships with state and non-state actors.

In South Africa, national, provincial and local statelegislation has attempted to intervene in the sale andconsumption of alcohol, but the impact of liquor control ininformal settlements is unknown. Despite their illegal status,shebeens2 continue be common in informal settlements3. These2 A ‘shebeen’ an informal, unlicensed drinking space. This contrasts with a‘tavern’, a term more commonly used to for a licensed establishment.3 In Cape Town, a number of approximately 285 informal settlements were estimated in 2007 (see www.capetown.gov.za/en/stats/Documents/Informal%20Settlements%20Count.mht, accessed 20. June 2013). Most- if not all-

policies have been examined primarily by researchers from thebroad field of public health, with particular emphasis ontheir effectiveness regarding health outcomes (May et al.2007; Parry and Bennett 1998; Parry 2010). While such workprovides valuable insights, we suggest that this lens provideslimited insight into how alcohol regulation actually occurs insites where the state has limited impact. We suggest the lensof plural regulation, which calls attention to the range ofactors involved in forms of regulation beyond the state, canhelp us to better understand alcohol consumption andregulation as well as to inform interventions to reducealcohol related harm.

This paper contributes to a broader research effort to improveour understanding of the relationships between alcohol,alcohol control, poverty and development in Cape Town. Here,we focus not on understanding policies, NGOs, or broaderscales of governance but seek to address a gap in theliterature by focusing on articulating everyday lifestrategies used to regulate formally illegal alcohol outletsin informal settlements as reported by individuals living inthe settlements. In the following section, we review theliterature on plural regulation. After a brief note on contextand methods in Section 3 and 4, in section 5 we identify someof the key concerns of residents living near shebeens. Insection 6, we articulate four different sets of actors whoregulate shebeens in the study sites: neighbours, shebeenowners4, the police, and community leaders. In Section 7, weidentify challenges associated with these forms of regulationand some means of collaboration and competition betweenregulators. We argue that in the case of shebeens in informalsettlements, coordination and collaboration between regulatorsis necessary but raises questions regarding legitimacy,effectiveness, and the negotiation of values.

2. Theorizing regulationLaw-making and regulation have long been considered the mostbasic of state responsibilities, as evident in Weber'scommonly used definition of the state as the entity that

have several shebeens.4 In our research, shebeens were reportedly operated by the owners, although anecdotes suggest this is not always the case

successfully monopolizes the legitimate use of violencethrough legal-rational dominance. Further, related to Hobbesidea of ‘the social contact’, state law has been assumed to bethe main regulator. The regulation of alcohol in South Africahas largely been examined starting from such assumptions.Since the 1980s, however, empirical insights which conflictwith assumptions of state hegemony have emerged. This has ledto a reconsideration of the role of the state and interest indecentralized forms of regulation, a shift represented as amove from government to governance (Rhodes 1996, Kooiman2003). State centred analyses of 'command and control’government regulation has largely given way to research thatexplores networks, the role of non-state actors, and self-regulation. Therefore, governance has been noted to accordwith neoliberal “hollowing out of the state” and is notwithout critics (Rhodes 2007). Rather than engage in thisnormative debate, we examine plural regulation as a particularaspect of governance. Additionally, as the context isparticularly complex, we wish to engage a more descriptive andexplorative account on actual strategies rather than a deeper,interpretive Foucaultian discussion of governmentality, suchas Valverde’s (1998) research on discourses of alcohol.Specifically, we are interested in the mechanisms throughwhich actors regulate, how effective these alternativemechanisms are, and how they work in collaboration or conflictwith state regulation.

2.1 Theorising Plural RegulationWhile governance is a broad term including activities ofproviding, distributing and regulating, the concept ofregulation points us more narrowly to real-world acts ofguiding change (Braithwaite et al. 2007). According to Black(2008, p. 139), regulation entails “sustained and focusedattempts to change the behaviour of others in order to addressa collective problem or attain an identified end or ends,usually through a combination of rules or norms and some meansfor their implementation and enforcement, which can be legalor non-legal.” This definition is connected to the ‘newgeneration' of regulatory theories, including the approach ofplural regulation, which takes us outside the traditionalbinary of state versus marked regulation and instead looks atregulation by diverse actors (Ayers and Braithwaite 1992).

Plural regulation considers hybrid or indirect strategies ofregulation in which the state is one of many actors and statelaw one of many mechanisms. Good policy analysis, in thisframing seeks to understand the interplay and relation betweenpublic and private regulation (Ayers and Braithwaite 1992).Therefore, studying regulation in the age of governancerequires us to look beyond the centrality of state law, tonon-state regulation and the wider range of norms andmechanisms though which control is asserted (Scott 2004).Similarly, Black (2002) promotes taking seriously the notionof a ‘regulative society’ when analyzing decentralizedregulation.

Examining regulation through this lens provides a more nuancedunderstanding and better representation of how regulationactually works in practice. In South Africa, decentralizedregulation has been examined in relation to legal pluralism(Schärf and Nina 2001) and the governance of security (Burriset al 2005, Froestad and Shearing 2012) The role of thegovernment within these regulation mechanisms varies, as manyof them are developed in the private sphere and within civilsociety. Importantly, scholars note that plural regulationscan at times create conflict, as different orders ofregulation may undermine each other (Sachs 2001), and asregulatory actors need to respond to multiple and oftenconflicting legitimacy claims (Black 2008). 2.2 Theorising regulatory pluralism in South AfricaPlural regulation can be analysed at different levels,including macro (global), national and micro (community)scales. Our focus here is a micro scale, as we discuss thevariety of actors involved in shaping regulative systems inSouth African informal settlements, while recognizing thatregulation occurs within a larger context. In South Africa,engagement the theory of regulatory pluralism has led to thedevelopment of the concepts of popular/community justice(Schärf and Nina 2001, Schärf 2001) and ‘nodal governance’(Shearing 2001, Burris et al. 2005). Common in theseliteratures is the assumption that the South African state isunable to singularly provide security. The former is moredescriptive while the latter seeks to derive strategies formore successful plural regulation.

Accounts on popular justice examine how communities regulateor govern internal security matters outside of law or policeregulation. While the police presence was strong in SouthAfrican townships during apartheid, it was largely consideredhostile as it was primarily concerned with regulating liquoroutlets for economic reasons (and not for community safety)and carrying out or pass raids (Seekings 2001). In response tothe state's lack of engagement with the kinds of everydaycrime that concerned the residents, such as violence withinthe community, petty theft and robbery, residents felt thatthey had to take matters in own hands, forming neighbourhoodwatches, community policing groups or community courts(Seekings 2001, Schärf 2001). This underlines that SouthAfricans are not passive victims of the regulatory system, butare involved in popular informal or extra-state forms ofsettling disputes and policing. Such forms of regulatingsecurity continued in the post-apartheid era and are stillactive in townships. Efforts have been made to blend communitypolicing initiatives with formal State regulation, and indeedcommunity policing forums are now mandated in South Africa(Steinberg 2011). However, while many appear supportive ofsuch efforts, community policing then and now is notunproblematic and can be interpreted as vigilantism and mobjustice (Buur and Jensen 2004).

The nodal governance approach is more in line with ideas of‘restorative justice’, and argues that a better understandingof how complex systems of actors (networks) produce order isneeded to improve security governance (Burris et.al 2005). Oneof the main contributions is a methodological approach touncover varieties of ‘nodes’ as sites of knowledge, capacitiesand resources that function as governance auspices orproviders (Wood and Shearing 2007). The concept of nodalgovernance was developed through a case study of securitygovernance the township in of Zwelethemba and describes ‘peacecommittees’ with locally evolved peace-building mechanisms asgoverning nodes (Shearing 2001, Froestad and Shearing 2012).These are argued to be effective nodes in part because ofwell-functioning connections to the district council and thepolice.

Applying plural regulation theorizations to informalsettlements is particularly interesting due to theirfundamental difference from formal, legal settlements,including townships. They are, by definition, illegal andunplanned as they have emerged outside the regulative arm ofthe state (Huchzermeyer 2004). In such informal spaces,community capacities are fragile and fragmented and publicintervention can lead to community division (Bénit 2002,Oldfield 2002). Further, informal settlements differ in theircapacities and regulative strategies, as residents draw onlinkages and external resources which are highly situated(Oldfield 2000).However, researchers have described the formation ofsupportive communities despite their heterogeneous populations(Smit 2006). Further, a general longing for order and decencyhas been indicated in anthropological accounts on informalsettlements such as Ross (2005, 2010). She suggests theimportance of the norms of ordentlikheid, meaningrespectability or decency. Ross’s work details numerousexamples of small actions- turning of a cap, tidying of thefront lawn, hiding of a beer bottle. Not all residents adoptthis attitude towards each other nor seek to identify with it,but Ross’s articulation suggests that this provides anormative framing which shapes everyday life. Ordentlikheid isoften contrasted with drinking, which is seen to representspontaneity and carefreeness (Ross 2010). Notably, althoughthis concept was identified among Afrikaans speaking informalsettlement dwellers, similar concerns about decency have alsobeen documented in Xhosa dominated informal settlements,described also as the stigma of living in a ‘bad area’ (Brayand Brandt 2007, Meth 2013). Norms of decency can also belinked to community policing, which has been justified asbeing a way of teaching criminals appropriate codes andcorrecting immoral behaviour (Buur and Jensen 2004).

Given its significance to everyday life in places likeinformal settlements and the limitations of state regulation,we believe that an examination of alcohol through the lens ofplural regulation can add to the study of alcohol in SouthAfrica. We have chosen regulation instead of governance as arefocusing the actual ‘everyday regulation’ of shebeens inparticular spaces of Cape Town rather than how boarder

policies are shaped. It helps us displays how shebeens, asplaces connected to wider concerns of informal settlementdwellers, are surrounded by regulative attempts based on bothformal state laws and more informal norms, indicatingdifferences and possible intersections.

3. Alcohol and shebeen regulation in South AfricaThe South African state has been engaged in top-downregulation of alcohol since the 1900s, including the legalestablishment of a state monopoly on the sale of traditionalsorghum beer (Rogerson 1986, Rogerson and Hart 1986). Theenforcement of alcohol legislation was and continues to be oneof the main means through which black urban residentsexperience the intervention of the state (Crush and Ambler1992, Bundy 2000). Importantly, these regulations were not aresponse to the preferences of township residents nor aimed toreduce harm related to alcohol consumption, but largelyfocused on protecting state income, white business andcontrolling the sites of consumption (Mager 2010). Alcoholplayed a complex role in the antiapartheid struggle in thetownships. Shebeens were a key site for resistance movements,but were also targets of student protests in the 1970s asalcohol consumption was seen as a distraction from politicalcauses and an apolitical means through which to quellfrustrations (Mager 2010). Economic protests against alcoholregulation also occurred, including protest by women againstpolice raids and municipal brewing monopolies (Bundy 2000).Post-apartheid, shebeens have been targets of state actionthrough police raids, liquor confiscation and, most recently,policies of “formalization” (see Lawhon and Herrick in press;Lawhon 2013). These diverse responses illustrate a remainingambivalence regarding the role of alcohol in the townships.

This history and its continued relevance to practice suggeststhe importance of considering the interaction between stateand community regulation, but provides no easy answersregarding the regulation of alcohol. Debates over regulationmay simply contrast a need for state regulation with acommunity right to liberty, yet versions highlighting shebeenssolely as sites of resistance have been critiqued forromanticising this history. They ignore the pervasive andpersistent social problems related to alcohol, including

crime, deepening of poverty through addiction, and violenceagainst children and women (Sittert, 1995). Other accounts,particularly from the health literature, emphasize thenegative impacts of alcohol. Representative of this is Parry's(2005) account titled “South Africa: alcohol today” whichnotes various problems- including alcohol related mortality,trauma, foetal alcohol syndrome- but glosses over possiblepositive social and economic impacts.

We seek avoid such polarizations by applying a plural anddecentralised perspective on regulation without judging themeans or extent to which alcohol should be regulated. In otherwords, rather than position ourselves normatively, we seek toidentify the networks and mechanisms behind their regulationas articulated by local residents. Although contemporarydebates within government (as best can be determined) and thepublic (represented through the press) over alcohol in theWestern Cape have largely centred on new means for increasingregulation (Lawhon and Herrick in press), we seek to shift thedebate away from questions of access and towards ways throughwhich to reduce harm. Additionally, much of the contemporaryresearch on alcohol in South Africa focuses on questions ofpolicy and governance. While recognizing the importance ofsuch work, we seek to respond to a gap in the literature byfocusing on a more localised scale.

4. MethodsThis paper emerged out of empirical fieldwork on the topic ofcommunity governance in informal settlements Cape Town. Forthis paper, seven informal settlements were re-visited. Thesettlements selected include notable differences regardingpopulation size, location on public and private land, andcultural composition, although there were no clear trendsbetween type of settlement and the responses of interviewees.Semi-structured interviews specifically on the topic ofshebeens were conducted with actors living in the settlements:ten community leaders (activists within the settlement,identified by other residents as leaders)5, eight neighbours5 These leaders and the ‘community committees’ they are part of usually emerge informally and are not part of the local government system (local government, subcouncils and ward councils), but usually have varying connections to these multi-scaled institutions and to actors such as NGOs and social movements. Different leaders engage in different activities, and

(residents living next to shebeens), three formerneighbourhood-watch members and seven shebeen owners. Theinterviewees were engaged with the help of research assistantswhile walking around in the settlement. There was a fairlyequal representation of men and women as well as youth andolder residents. Six settlements were dominated by Xhosaspeaking residents, and one by Afrikaans speaking residents.Most interviews were in English, and when translations wereneeded, a resident was asked to assist. Minor adjustments havebeen made to quotations to improve readability. Additionally,three residents who we have worked with in other projectsinterviewed eight shebeen owners operating in their area.Lastly, an evening of ‘participant observation’ at severalshebeens was carried out by one of the researchers. The interviews were particularly challenging given thecontroversial nature of the topic. For some interviewees, ourquestions raised emotionally challenging subjects asrespondents associate alcohol with family problems andeconomic challenges. Additionally, some shebeen owners hadconcerns regarding confidentiality (despite the researcher'sassurances), and feared that their comments and identity wouldbe given to the police and have negative impacts on theirbusiness. Such fears and associations resulted in someindividuals being unwilling to engage with the research andothers gave responses which appeared contradictory (see Lawhonet al, this volume). In selecting stories to report below, wechose those that represent common phenomena repeated bydifferent kinds of interviewees. We suggest the results belowmay be indicative of broader patterns, however, furtherresearch is needed to understand the generalizability of ourfindings.

5. Residents’ concerns with shebeensHere we discuss the key problems identified by respondentsregarding shebeens in their community. A variety of shebeenscan be found in informal settlements such as those examined inthis research6. We found some large shebeens, built up oversome- as in any position- can abuse their position. There are usually several and sometimes rivalling community leaders within informal settlements.6 For an illustrative presentation of shebeens’ appearance see http://emergentcity.co.za/index2.html [Accessed 12. July 2013]

time with income generated from the business. Such sitesinclude benches for customers, loud music and pool tables orother games. The owners may own a bakkie (truck) used to buystock for themselves as well as to sell within the settlement.Other outlets are smaller, with limited space and few or nochairs such that customers typically stand and drink. They maylook like any other shack, making it difficult for an outsiderto distinguish between a shebeen and a private party. Anothertype of shebeen caters for off-site drinking. Such variationleads to diverse public consequences, social relations, andregulatory strategies and underscores the importance ofconsidering shebeens in context.

Alcohol consumption, particularly at shebeens, has beenassociated with a range of problems by both the academicliterature and local residents. While health concerns form thebasis of a number of academic works, we instead highlight thekey concerns raised by respondents themselves: noise; hygiene;security; and family issues. For neighbours (residents livingnext to shebeens), a key problem of living next to a shebeenis noise, as it disturbs the night sleep for working adultsand children attending school. Hygiene is another commonconcern as shebeen guests often urinate next to or onto theirshacks, causing unpleasant smells and occasionally involvingexposure to women and children. Family disruptions related toalcohol, including domestic violence, the exacerbation ofpoverty, youth drinking and setting a poor example for youthwere also emphasized.

Residents were particularly concerned with the harm tochildren of both shebeen clients and owners, as for instancedescribed by one resident:

The shebeens give the mother and the father credit on wine, butwhen the children come they don’t get credit on food… They (theshebeen owners) live in a small room in the shebeen and kidsgrow up there. (resident 6, settlement 2)

This concern was supported by observations; in the threeshebeens visited, there were both children and mothers withtheir babies present. Lastly, many residents were worried about crime and safety,and linked this to shebeens that ‘are open all night’. Some

argued that people from other areas drinking in shebeens ininformal settlements largely contribute to crime, because theoutsiders ‘think they can do what they want’. The extent towhich these assertions are true is outside the scope of theresearch, and likely differs from settlement to settlement,but is raised here to indicate perceptions of the manifoldconcerns associated with drinkers and drinking spaces.

6. Regulative actors and strategiesIn this section, we describe common responses of residents,shebeen owners, police and community leaders to the problemsdescribed above. We focus on the mechanisms used to show howdifferent actors participate in plural regulation. In thesubsequent section, we turn to the challenges associated withthese mechanisms.

6.1 Residents living next to shebeens: Enrolling other actors Residents living next to shebeens are affected by the noise,hygiene, and security concerns. These residents reportedlyrespond in one or more ways: talking to the shebeen owners orguests, contacting the police, contacting community leaders.

In one instance, a family living next to four shebeens triedto tell the owners and the guests not to urinate onto theirhome:

When the people finish dancing they come out... and then theypee at my fence, and it stinks. This child [pointing at her sixyear old daughter sitting next to her] had to tell them lastweek that ‘you cannot pee here’... they don’t mind how theystand when they pee, so the children can see everything.(Neighbour 3, settlement 2)

Typically, respondents reported that complaining directly haslittle impact. One community leader noted that if residentscomplain, they can be accused of being ‘jealous’ of thebusiness. Further, some reported fearing direct confrontationbecause drinkers can be aggressive. Consequently, given theinefficacy and fears associated with direct confrontation,neighbours typically seek regulation mediated via otheractors.

Respondents reported that the police were very rarelycontacted to mediate conflict in the study site. One of thekey reasons is a fear of repercussions:

We do not call the police… people who own other shebeens, theyask who reported, and they can come and shoot you. So if youwant to report you have to go come together as a group, toreport together.(Neighbour 4, settlement 6)

Another resident added that if you go to the police stationwith complaints, they send you away again and tell you tofirst talk to the community leaders. We return to this below.

6.2 Self-regulation by shebeen ownersThere are many constraints on shebeen owners’ ability to dealwith concerns. For example, close proximity and the use oflight construction materials make it difficult to limit noise.Access to toilets is a pervasive matter in informalsettlements generally, not just as regards drinking spaces.Despite these limitations, shebeen owners respond to differentkinds of issues, including: adjusting the rules; adjusting thebehaviour and type of patrons; and/or getting help from familymembers.

Different types of respondents typically agreed that closingearly can help reduce fights and violence. Nine o’clock wasoften suggested to be a reasonable time, or a bit later onweekends. Some shebeen owners who supported such regulation,however, admitted that it is difficult to uphold these rulesas they are dependent on the associated income.

Many shebeen owners interviewed emphasized the rules at theirdrinking spaces, and in one sheebeen in settlement 3, ruleswere written on the wall:

Beer 12.50 on credit and 10 R cash, crackling 45 credit 35 cash.On Sundays no credit. You must not come here on Sundays if youdon’t come on Friday. Because you disturb those who drink hereevery day. We close at 9:00.(Shebeen 12, settlement 3)

Toilets are generally limited in informal settlements andpublic urination is ubiquitous. People often fear usingestablished toilets at night because they are dark and faraway. Some owners acknowledge the problem and dig holes in theground for the guests to use, or encourage guests to urinateinside in a bucket which is emptied in the morning. Theseactions are intended to limit the impact of public urination,although not all shebeens offer this and not all guests makeuse of the available facilities.

Other owners reasoned that keeping difficult customers awaywould reduce harm. For example, a significant strategy is tonot play loud music, as respondents suggested that thisattracted both the under-aged and criminals. A communityleader commented, “There are some shebeens that are nice,only big men who sit and talk nicely go there, but some playloud music and criminals go there” (leader 4, settlement 3).In settlement 4, an owner claimed that since she stoppedplaying music, there was less fighting.

Finally, since shebeens typically do not have bouncers and donot call the police for assistance, they have to apply othermechanisms to ensure the security of the shebeen and itsguests. There were no ‘guards’ in any of the places visited inthis study, but guests or family were noted to be the firstpoint of assistance when there is trouble. For example, afemale shebeen owner’s husband assisted her by throwing outpeople who fight.

6.3 Police and law enforcement regulationPolice carry out direct top-down regulation by enforcing law.The sale of alcohol is illegal without a license, and shebeensby definition lack this permit. We focus here on how thepolice seek to regulate the consumption of alcohol byenforcing existing regulations, either by arresting the ownersor closing shebeens and confiscating their stock. Steinberg(2011, p. 357) describes that “patrons customarily attackpolice who attempt to close down a drinking establishment; asa result, police seldom embark upon this work in teams of lessthan 30,” although such numbers were not reported in ourinterviews.

Police may decide to arrest the owners of shebeens, and thisstrategy may be repeated over time. One shebeen owner claimedto have been arrested seven times (shebeen owner 13,settlement 3). Arrests may be in response to complaints fromcommunity leaders or neighbours:

We called the police, but when they came he was fighting withthem. The sector manager came but the guy beat him. So thepolice had to call more people and they sprayed him with sprayguns and they managed to arrest him. He came back from jail now,but the case is still on, because he assaulted a police officer.(leader 8, settlement 5)

Many respondents reported that shebeens are regularly closeddown by the police, but that this has only a short term impactas they are simply opened again. The threat of closure may besomewhat of a deterrent, but confiscation is reportedly thegreater fear. One owner closes “at nine, because of thepolice. They come here, and when they come they take my stuffand sometimes they break it” (Shebeen owner 14, settlement 3).

6.4 Community leaders: Banning and regulating shebeensCommunity leaders are frequently called upon by residents whooften are afraid to intervene themselves. Such practises arelinked to the popular justice practises that emerged intownships during the apartheid era when formal state policingof crime was limited (Schärf, 2001). As one neighboursuggested, “If someone doesn’t like the noise, they go to thecommittee to report. The committee then calls the communityleaders to discuss. The community leader decides” how torespond (Neighbour 4, settlement 6). Some respondents perceivethemselves as moral leaders and believe that they themselvesshould abstain from drinking to set a positive example. “Youcannot sit in a shebeen and be drunk, we cannot show in publicthat we are drunk. If we drink we go to another place (othersettlement) and come back sober” (leader 4, settlement 3).This relates to the norms of ‘ordentlikheid’ (Ross 2010), andwas repeated in multiple incidents.

Importantly, it is difficult to understand to what extentcommunity leaders are actually able to intervene. Twostrategies were identified which can be used at least with

some degree of success: the ability to provide or denypermission for shebeens and the establishment and enforcementof rules. Sometimes, community leaders attempt to forbid thebuilding of shebeens. One leader claimed, “We don’t beg them,we just give them orders. If they don’t do as we say he mustleave” (leader 4, settlement 3). Being forced to leave on badterms is problematic, for different kinds of non-stateregulations apply to moving into a new informal settlement.Recommendation letters are often required when resettling, andit was argued that one way in which community leaders canpunish shebeen owners is by not providing a recommendationletter.

Both community leaders and residents suggest that their firstpriority is to prevent or limit the number of shebeens intheir area. Failing this, they concede that they would atleast like to attempt to enforce a closing time and restrictentrance of under-age drinkers. These strategies may includefines for offences. As one community leader notes, “We wouldgive them fines if they had children there...we would use thismoney to buy chips for the children because their fathers andmothers drink all the money there” (leader 2, settlement 2).

7. Challenges of sector-based shebeen regulation Having introduced the different strategies for regulation,here we reflect on key challenges of regulation by owners, thepolice and community leaders. Our aim is not to define themost appropriate strategy for regulation, but to tease outsome of the tensions between the different forms.

7.1 Challenges of state regulationFormal state regulation based on the illegality of shebeenspresents many challenges. The same shebeen owner describedabove who had been arrested seven times continued, “Every timeyou are arrested the court does not find you guilty. If youcan’t pay the fine, you stay at the police station over theweekend. The court doesn’t find you guilty because you don’thave any job” (shebeen owner 13, settlement 3). An alternativestory is presented by a shebeen owner who claimed to bribeofficials to avoid arrest: “If we have 150 Rand (about $15) wegive it to them because you are afraid of being arrested”(shebeen owner 12, settlement 3). While there are competing

narratives regarding the impact of arrests and how to avoidbeing arrested, this strategy appears to have relativelylimited impact on the sale of alcohol.

Shebeen owners have also developed strategies to reduce therisk associated with confiscation of stock. To avoid losingall their stock at once (as well as mask the fact that theyactually are a shebeen), several owners explained that theyhide the alcohol. For example, they might hide six of theseven cases of beer in a neighbour’s shacks. This willingnessof neighbours to help the owners indicates a generalscepticism if not disapproval of the actions of the police.This lack of effective intervention has opened the space otherregulative actors and alternative mechanisms.

7.2 Challenges of owner regulationShebeen owners themselves typically live in impoverishedsituations. Despite awareness of the problems associated withdrinking in their communities, they engage in thisentrepreneurial activity to generate a basic income. There aremotivations for self-regulation, including keeping peacefulrelations with neighbours. Nevertheless, shebeen owners oftenbreak rules they would prefer to keep because of economicpressures. One owner admits, “We don’t have a specific closingtime. If people want to stay then we keep open.” (shebeenowner 15, settlement 4).

Other owners admitted that despite their desire to regulatethe behaviour of guests, it is difficult: “There are manychallenges when people are drunk; they get out of control”(Shebeen owner 2, settlement 7). In some shebeens, ownersthemselves do not mingle in the drinking-room but sell beerout of a hole in the wall, and cannot oversee everything thatis going on. Another related problem is that shebeens are someof the only public places that offer entertainment, so youthmay come to play pool or socialize. One owner noted thatchildren come during the day time, and that he tries to chasethem away in the evening. This lack of alternative spacesmeans that youth get habituated to drinking culture early.Economic pressures to sell alcohol combined with limitedalternatives spaces for socialization therefore make it

difficult for shebeen owners to regulate their own spacesdespite often sharing the concerns of their community.

7.3 Challenges of community leader regulationAs with police and self-regulation, community leaders facenumerous challenges in their regulative attempts. Asillustrated in Oldfield (2000), communities’ capacities differand they have different networks and resources on which todraw. Our study confirms this with regards to the capacitiesof the community leaders to regulate alcohol. In settlements 1and 4 and 6 and 7, leaders had some success in regulatingshebeens. For a period, some managed to forbid theestablishments of shebeens, but bans have proven difficult touphold over time, as this quote from settlement 1, which hadsuch a ban until 2007 but has now two shebeens indicates:

What happened when we started living here is that we had anagreement that there must be no shebeens here because we have notoilets and it would make the place more dirty. We, thecommittee, came up with the agreement [but] we could not controlpeople that are unemployed... we managed to close some... Weended up letting them sell. (leader 1, settlement 1)

Similar processes have happened in other informal settlements.A key reason for the breakdown of the ban on shebeens is thatpeople simply need an income. Almost all of the communityleaders interviewed have identified poverty and lack of jobsas the underlying problem regarding shebeens, and most showsome sympathy for the shebeen owners' position. Leaders andneighbours thus came to agreements with owners on rules thatare informally enforced.

Examples from settlement 1 and 5 illustrate that popularjustice is hard to uphold when it counters state legislation.In settlement 5, the community leader structure came to amajor breakdown after the leaders were arrested for punishinga resident deemed to be criminal by the community. As aconsequence, community leaders lost control:

There was one incident where they destroyed one person’s shackwho was criminal, but then they [the other community leaders]got arrested... So now we let people do what they want.

(leader 8, settlement 5)

So although community leaders usually have some sort ofpopular legitimacy, they do not have the formal authority tocarrying out policing.

Another reason for the breakdown of the ban of shebeens isthat community organizations are not stable structures(Oldfield 2002). In settlement 2, a change in regulationoccurred as the established leadership was challenged by a newleadership committee. Residents explain that before 2008 therewere fewer, more regulated shebeens:

When I moved here, when a person wanted to build a shebeen theyasked the committee for permission. But today, since 2008everything became lawless because we used to patrol the place.There were a few shebeens but they had rules. They closed in theweek at nine and in weekends at twelve. And they had age limits.Now, even small children are there.(Resident 1, settlement 2)

Some residents argue that the new leaders allowed moreshebeens because they are owners themselves; certainly itwould be naïve to disregard the possibility that leaders mayuse their position for economic gain. Accusations have alsobeen made that leaders in other settlements own shebeens andprioritize their own incomes over the interests of thecommunity.

It must be underlined that not all leaders are capable orwilling to of intervene. In addition to issues mentionedabove, conflicts around shebeens happen at night, when mostresidents intend to be sleeping. Finally, leaders are in somecases afraid of intervening; as a frustrated community leadernoted, “if I go out of here they throw the bombs of the mouth[swear] at me” (leader 2, settlement 2).

7.4 Challenges of collaborative regulationDespite the ineffectiveness and concerns with corruption,respondents report both a need and a desire for improvedcollaboration with state mechanisms. Even though most shebeenowners dislike police practice, some pointed out thedesirability of collaboration. Informal settlements are

pervaded by illegality, and shebeens engage in illegalpractises in illegal settlements. Some owners are interestedin legalization; one explained he wanted to upgrade the placein order to get a license. He thought that this license wouldmake it easier for him to enforce rules as he would get ‘morerespect’ from the guests:

Also after improving the looks of this place we would like tohave a license. Then we would also get more respect with thepeople. We would have strict closing times because the licensewould state that. Because when you don’t have a license peoplecome and knock any time. (Shebeen owner 15, settlement 4)

Another described how a license would change his relationshipwith the police. “I would love to see the police making roundsif I have a licence but unfortunately we are not allowedlicences in the informal settlements” (Shebeen owner 1,settlement 1). Yet, getting a license is very difficult, assome of the owners have experienced:

Too much stuff is needed so it is difficult to get the license.And there is an inspector that would come around and check….Thesystem was supposed to be helping us, but they take our beerinstead of helping us get a license. (Shebeen owner 15, settlement 4)

These last claims indicate that some shebeen owners wouldprefer to be part of the ‘formal economy’ and follow stateregulation, but certainly in a different form than today.Instead of working against them, they often suggest that thepolice should support them in improving the regulatory andself-regulatory mechanisms explored in this paper.

One attempt at combining the benefits of police and communityregulation is the establishment of neighbourhood watches. Insettlement 3, a neighbourhood watch was established as aninteraction between State and community policing. One of themain tasks was to close the shebeens in the evening, regulatethe music, under-age drinking, and occasionally help guestshome. One volunteer reports, “We closed the shebeens atnights, and helped drunk people to get home… it was very

difficult, sometimes they [the guests] threw stones at us”(Neighbourhood-watch volunteer 3).

This neighbourhood watch lasted from around 2007 to 2009, butwas dismantled. Reasons for the breakdown of this structureinclude volunteers dropping out because they were not paid andbecause the organization lacked resources. It should not comeas a surprise that people who live in poverty have limitedmeans to volunteer and would rather be in paid employment.However, despite the unwillingness to volunteer, severalneighbours expressed regret over the loss of the neighbourhoodwatch, as the settlement conditions had worsened. They calledfor a return to the system and extra police resources. Insettlement 2, a neighbourhood watch also existed for a limitedperiod, but was dismantled for similar reasons in addition toproblems between community leaders who initiated theneighbourhood watch process and the police.

These comments suggest some of the challenges for engagementsbetween communities, community leaders, shebeens owners andpolice. Importantly given the broad and investigatory scope ofour research, we are unable to precisely explain the dynamicsof these changes. Certainly personal interest can createconflict within all of these organizations, but there is alsothe potential for constructive engagement. We suggest thatunderstanding in more detail when and why success occurs, andwhat creates positive and negative change to capacity andcollaboration, are important points for further research.

8. ConclusionDebates on drinking in South Africa have largely been shaped in terms of polarizations: a history of ‘civil society’ versusthe state and the state versus shebeens. We suggest that it isimportant to overcome these bifurcations in order to more effectively and ethically redress the persistent problems associated with alcohol and develop collaborative regulatory processes. Looking beyond state law when analysing regulation (Black 2002, Scott 2004) has proved useful for displaying contrasts and possible synergies between formal government regulation and more informal everyday regulative practises at the community level. While much of the literature on alcohol focuses on the impact of alcohol on individuals, the plural

regulation framework indicates the complexity of meaning that places of alcohol have in the neighbourhood they are situated within.

In the sites studies, the current top-down regulation ofalcohol by the state has, thus far, had limited impact on thepractices of shebeens, their owners and patrons. A key reasonis that the regulatory mandate of the police is not based onneeds or norms of the community, but on legislation whichmakes shebeens illegal. In the very particular spaces ofinformal settlements, the informal economy of shebeening hascertain consequences on its surroundings, but is caughtbetween norms of order and the need for individual economicsurvival, and in between ideals of strict regulation and ahistorically grounded resistance to top-down policeenforcement. With this convolution, regulation of shebeens mayencounter ‘conflicting legitimacy claims’ or legitimacydilemmas (Black 2008), and simple top-down regulation istherefore be problematic. Indeed, the more mundane regulationsthat most residents request, like making sure that shebeensclose early and that children are not served there, are notprioritized by the state. Thus while the state may have somebroad level of legitimacy, the actions of the state throughpolice actions are often experienced as more or lessillegitimate impositions. Equally if not more importantly forcommunity members, state action is seen as ineffective atreducing alcohol related harm. Even when individuals arecaught, the punishments are not seen as deterrents andallegedly do not change behaviours. Despite the ‘sphere of illegality’ surrounding shebeens ininformal settlements and the lack of effective formalregulation, internal norms form self-regulatory and communityregulatory processes. By considering a decentred regulationframework (Black 2002, 2008) and drawing on insights fromSouth African plural regulation scholars (Shearing 2001,Schärf and Nina 2001), we have illustrated that sites ofalcohol consumption in informal settlements do not necessarilyoperate anarchically. Instead, a range of actors apply varyingmechanisms to regulate shebeen practises, enhance communitysafety and well-being and resolve disputes. The multiplestrategies of regulation may not be effective in the long run

nor supplant the need for a police presence, but they go someway to creating tacit control in a situation where policeenforcement is either heavy-handed or absent. This also pointsto the under-explored idea that shebeen owners and theircommunities sometimes share similar concerns, rather than theformer only causing problems for the latter. Some shebeenowners thus seek to regulate their practices according tonorms in their communities and to rules made by themselves andin cooperation with, or under the threat of punishment from,community leaders. Our case studies highlight that the amountof effort, type of regulation, and degree of success, however,varies significantly across communities.

For such processes to be effective there need not only to becapacity within the community, but also improved support fromoutside actors, including the police. As the instances ofneighbourhood watches indicate, despite the illegality ofinformal settlements and shebeens, sometimes regulation ofshebeen practises occurs through collaboration where thepolice are involved in supporting community efforts. Althoughwe note the constraints of the blurring of community policingand vigilantism (Buur and Jensen 2004) and the difficultrelation between police and residents in South Africa(Steinberg 2011), it seems that formal-informal interaction tosome degree is necessary (Seekings 2001). This links back toAyers and Braithwaite’s (1992) argument that research intoplural forms of regulation is not about the contrast betweenstate and non-state regulation. Instead, we need to look atinter-linkages, cross-overs and grey areas between the two.This study illustrates that norms in informal settlements maynot necessarily conflict with the intentions of a regulatorystate. These norms, related to what Ross (2010) describes as‘ordentlikheid’, may be a reason why many of the respondentssuggest that shebeens need not necessarily be eliminated, butthat the existing systems of formal and informal regulationneed to be better brought together and enforced to improvecommunity welfare and reduce alcohol-related harms. However,we acknowledge that understanding the complexity of legitimacyand norms in informal settlements requires more extensiveethnographic work.

We see our work as but an initial inquiry into the importanttopic of the regulation of spaces of alcohol consumption inSouth Africa, and we hope that our case inspires others tobuild on these findings. Specifically, we have widened therange of actors considered through plural regulation theory toinclude residents, community members, business owners andinformal leaders, and suggest that future studies of pluralregulation may also draw attention to everyday forms ofregulation in cities.  Such work, we suggest can contribute toa broader understanding of conflicts and collaborations thatshape urban space. We also hope that our work helps to providea platform for a wider understanding of alcohol, itsconsumption and regulation, as well as to provoke more carefulreflection and thoughtful interventions which help reducealcohol-related harm.

References:

Ayers, I., and Braithwaite, J. 1992. Responsive regulation: transcending the deregulation debate. Oxford University Press,New York.

Bénit, C. 2002. The rise and fall of the ‘community’? Post-apartheid housing policy in Diepslot, Johannesburg. Urban Forum 13(2), 47-66.

Black, J. 2008. Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes. Regulation &Governance 2, 137–164.

Braithwaite, J., Coglianese C., and Levi-Faur D. 2007. Can regulation and governance make a difference? Regulation and Governance 1(1), 1-7.

Bundy, C. 2000. Survival and Resistance: Township organizations and non-violent direct action in twentieth century South Africa. In G. Adler and J. Steinberg (eds), From

comrades to citizens: the South African civics movement and the transition to democracy, Macmillan Press Ltd, London.

Burris, S., Drahos, P. and Shearing C. 2005. Nodal governance.Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 30, 30-58.

Buur, L. and Jensen, S. 2004. Introduction: vigilantism and the policing of everyday life in South Africa. African Studies63(2), 139-152.

Bray, R. and Brandt, R. 2007. Child care and poverty in South Africa. Journal of Children and Poverty, 13(1), 1-19.

Crush J. and Ambler, C. 1992. Liquor and Labour in Southern Africa. University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg.

Froestad, J. and Shearing. Security Governance, Policing, and Local Capacity. CRC Press, London.

Huchzermeyer, M. 2004. Unlawful Occupation. Informal Settlements and Urban Policy in South Africa and Brazil. Africa World Press, Inc., Trenton.

Jayne M., Valentine, G. and Holloway, S. 2011. Alcohol, Drinking, Drunkenness: (Dis)Orderly Spaces. Ashgate, Chichester.

Kooiman, J. 2003 Governing as Governance. SAGE Publications, London

Latham, A. 2003. Urbanity, lifestyle and making sense of the new urban cultural economy: notes from Auckland, New Zealand. Urban Studies 40(9), 1699-1724.

Lawhon, M. and Herrick, C. (In press). Shebeens in the news: contesting alcohol control policies in the Western Cape, SouthAfrica. Journal of Health Policy, Politics and Law.

Lawhon, M, Herrick, C., and Daya, S. (this issue) Researching Sensitive Topics in African Cities: Reflections on Alcohol Research in Cape Town. South African Geographical Journal.

Lawhon, M. (2013). Flows, friction and the sociomaterial metabolization of alcohol. Antipode 45(3), 681-701.

Mager, A. 2010. Beer, Sociability, and Masculinity and South Africa. Indiana University Press, Bloomington.

May, P. A., Gossage, J.P., Marais, A.S., Adnams, C.M., Hoyme,H.E., Jones, K.L., Robinson, L.K., Khaole, N.C.O., Snell, C.,Kalberg, W. O., Hendricks, L., Brooke, L., Stellavato, C., Viljoen, D.L. 2007. The epidemiology of foetal alcohol syndrome and partial FAS in a South African community. Drug and Alcohol Dependence 88 (2-3), 259-271.

Meth, P. 2013. I don’t like my children to grow up in this badarea: Parental anxieties about living in informal settlements.International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 37(2), 537-555

Oldfield, S. 2000. The centrality of community capacity in low-income housing provision in Cape Town, South Africa. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24, 858-872.

Oldfield, S. 2002. Partial formalization and its implications for community governance in an informal settlement. Urban Forum 13(2), 102 – 115.

Parry, C.D.H. 2005. South Africa: alcohol today. Addiction 100(4), 426-429.

Parry, C. D. H. 2010. Alcohol policy in South Africa: a reviewof policy development processes between 1994 and 2009. Addiction 105(8), 1340-1345.

Parry, C. D. H. and Bennetts, A.L. 1998. Alcohol Policy and Public Health in South Africa. Oxford University Press, Cape Town.

Rhodes, R.A.W. 1996. The new governance: Governing without government. Political Studies XLIV, 652-667.

Rhodes, R.A.W. 2007. Understanding Governance: Ten years on. Organization Studies 28, 1243-1264.

Rogerson, C.M. 1986. A strange case of beer: The state and sorghum beer manufacture in South Africa. Area 18(1), 15-24.

Rogerson, C.M., and Hart, D.M. 1986. The survival of the 'informal sector': The shebeens of black Johannesburg. GeoJournal 12(2), 153-166.

Ross, F.C. 2005. Model communities and respectable residents? Home and housing in a low-income residential estate in the Western Cape, South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies 31(3), 631-648.

Ross, F. 2010. Raw Life, New Hope: Decency, Housing and Everyday Life in a Post-apartheid Community. UCT Press, Cape Town.

Sachs, A. 2001. Foreword. In W. Schärf, and D. Nina (eds), Theother Law. Non State Ordering in South Africa. JUTA Law, Cape Town, v-vi.

Schärf, W and Nina, D (eds) 2001. The other Law. Non State Ordering in South Africa. Cape Town: JUTA Law, Cape Town.

Schärf, W. 2001. Policy options on community justice. In W. Schärf, and D. Nina (eds), The other Law. Non State Ordering in South Africa. JUTA Law, Cape Town, 39-70.

Scott, C. 2004. Regulation in the age of governance: the rise of the post-regulatory state. In Jordana, J and Levi-Faur, D (eds). The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and RegulatoryReforms for the Age of Governance. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham.

Seekings, J. 2001. Social ordering and control in the African townships of South Africa: an historical overview of extra-State initiatives from the 1940s to the 1990s. In W. Schärf, and D. Nina (eds), The other Law. Non State Ordering in South Africa. JUTA Law, Cape Town, 71-97.

Shearing, C. 2001. Transforming security: A South African Experiment. In H. Strang and J. Braithwaite (eds), RestorativeJustice and Civil Society. Cambridge University Press, 14-34.

Sittert, L. van. 1995. Review: [untitled]. Journal of SouthernAfrican Studies 21(3), 535-537.

Smit, W. 2006. Understanding the complexities of informal settlements: Insights from Cape Town. In M. Huchzermeyer and A. Karam 2006 (eds), Informal Settlements: A Perpetual Challenge? UCT Press, 103-126.

Steinberg, J. 2011. Crime prevention goes abroad: Policy transfer and policing in post-apartheid South Africa. Theoretical Criminology 15(4), 349-364.

Valverde, M. 1998. Diseases of the will. Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

World Health Organisation, 2010. Global Strategy to Reduce theHarmful Use of Alcohol. WHO, Geneva.

Wood, J. and Shearing, C. 2007. Imagining security. Willan Publishing, Portland.