Political succession in Cuba

EDWARD GONZALEZ

Political Succession in Cuba *

Fidel Castro has been the central figure in Cuba’s political life for nearly two decades. During that time, he has presided over the most profound revolution that has yet taken place in Latin America, and he has dominated his country’s politics as has no other contemporary Latin American figure. Even today, after having suffered a major personal defeat in 1970, and despite the “ institutionalization of the revolution ” since then, Cuba’s lider tncixitno continues to occupy center stage, as evidenced by his dominating presence at the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba held in December 1975. A Cuba without its bearded, robust, charismatic leader thus seems almost inconceivable.

Still, recent revelations concerning earlier assassination plans by the CIA, along with the fact that Castro is now entering middle age (he will be fifty later this year), serve to remind us that Cuba may someday confront a succession problem. Were that to occur today, the regime is far better prepared than it was five or six years ago to absorb the loss of its leader, because the Cuban Revolution has undergone considerable institutional strengthening since 1970. Hence, the succession struggle and any jockeying for power most

* This article is a substantially revised as well as up-dated version of an earlier paper, “ Political Succession in Cuba: After Fidel. . .? ,” presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, September 4-8, 1973.

snJD1es IN COMP.4RA-nVE COMMUNISM VOL. IX. Nos. 1 & 2, SPRING/SUMMER 1976. SO-107

POLITICAL. SUCCESSION IN CUBA 81

probably would take place within institutional channels. But if Fidel Castro were to die unexpectedly, who would be his most likely successor? Would a post-Castro regime install some form of collective or oligarchical leadership following the pattern of other Com- munist states? Given the post-1970 process of institutionalization, would the newly strengthened Communist Party of Cuba or the Revolutionary Armed Forces emerge as the predominant or sovereign political institution? And in what other ways might the new regime ditfer from the present one?

As Myron Rush has pointed out, political succession in Com- munist regimes is generally a contingent, and at times is an unpredict- able, process. Regularized and accepted rules of political succession are usually absent from such regimes, and the relative power of individual contenders and competing institutions can vary dramatically over time.’ But, as I will argue below, predicting succession outcomes in Communist Cuba may be more problematic, owing to con- ditions peculiar to the fide&a regime, with the result that patterns of succession in other Communist states provide weaker analogues for the Cuban case. Despite these problems, I will nevertheless speculate on how the succession process might be played out in a post- Castro Cuba. I will do so in the second part of this paper by examining three different types of succession actors in Cuba-individual contenders, institutional forces, and elite groupings-and I will suggest how Soviet and U.S. policies might affect succession outcomes.

Problems of Predictability

Peculiarities of the Fide&a Regime Although the 1970s has seen the emergence of a more institutional-

ized political order, the Cuban regime has been distinguished above all by its charismatic origins and rule by a socialist cuudiflo.a The presence of such overriding personal leadership increases the uncertainties of predicting political succession in at least two ways. First, Fidel’s charismatic authority and caudillistic style of governing greatly impeded the institutional development of the new Communist

1. See Myron Rush, “Political Succession in Eastern Europe and the USSR after Stalin,” a paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, September 4-8, 1973.

2. For a fuller elaboration of this point, see Edward Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro: The Limits o/ Charisma (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), pp. 168- 189.

82 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

regime throughout the 1960s. It was only after 1970, following Fidel’s failure to achieve an historic ten-million-ton sugar harvest that year, along with the devastating effects of the harvest drive on the economy, that the process of institutionalizing the revolution could begin3 But in the meantime, fide&no had prevented the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), which had been formed in 1965, from functioning as an effective instrument of political rule. Indeed, the institutional retardation of the PCC stood in marked contrast to the institutional development of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR). In point of fact, the FAR was called upon in the late 1960s to supply the managerial expertise that the party lacked in the running of the sugar sector of the economy, and to serve as an organizational model for the PCC.4 Despite the growth and strengthening of the PCC in recent years, Cuba’s Communist Party conceivably will not play so decisive a role in the succession process as the party in other Com- munist regimes; it is likely to serve as only one of many power bases for political contenders.

Second, Fidel by the very centrality of his presence has eclipsed his lesser, relatively colorless lieutenants. Given the personalistic stamp of the fidelista regime, the problem arises of identifying those individuals within or outside the inner circle who possess a sufficiently independent power base to withstand the death of the lider mciximo and to assume power. As will be seen, the heir-designate at present continues to be Lieutenant General Raril Castro, with two others- President Osvaldo Dorticos and Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez-as possible contenders. Nevertheless, the political vacuum that would be created by Fidel’s departure, coupled with the still in- complete institutionalization of the regime, could make for a highly volatile succession situation in which other candidates could emerge and assert themselves.

Other factors than the original personalistic character of the Cuban regime complicate the problem of prediction. One of these is that Cuba still has a relatively young revolution that is undergoing flux and institutional transition. Thus, although Cuba is moving toward a steady-state political order, new structural and personal changes may

3. See ibid., pp. 190-236; and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 197Os- Pragmatism and Institutionalization (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), pp. l-106.

4. See the speeches made by Fidel Castro and Armando Hart in Granma (Daily), March 20, 1969, p. 2; Granma (Weekly Review), October 5, 1969, pp. 4-6; and ibid., November 16. 1969, pp. 2-4. Henceforth, all references to Granma, the official organ of the Communist Party of Cuba, will be to the Weekly Review edition unless otherwise noted.

POLITICAL SUCCESSION IN CUBA 83

yet occur unexpectedly in the future, with such developments perhaps having an unforeseen effect on the balance of political forces within the regime. The element of time, in turn, heightens the uncertainties of predicting succession outcomes in the ever-changing Cuban con- text. Thus, calculations made on the basis of developments in the late 1960s probably would have differed from those made in the early 197Os, as would the latter from those made on a reading of 1975 or 1976 developments. This point can be illustrated by briefly examining post-1970 developments.

Before 1970, few observers had foreseen the political ramifications of Fidel’s harvest defeat. It eroded his previously unchallengeable authority, and it weakened the political dominance of his @feWa followers, as exemplified by the rise to new prominence of old-line Communists drawn from the ranks of Cuba’s pre-1959 Communist Party. The rapidity with which the “ institutionalization of the revolution ” took place after 1970 has likewise been surprising. It entailed the depersonalization of governance, the appointment of new office- holders drawn from outside the ranks of Fidel’s personal coterie, and the reining-in of the decisionmaking authority of the lider mdximo in fields of economic planning and administration. Additionally, institutionalization meant the restructuring of the Cuban regime along the lines of a Soviet political order. Particularly after 1972, one observes the expansion and strengthening of the PCC in an effort to make it a truly governing party; the creation of new administrative units with greater autonomy than in the past, with the party being explicitly divorced from administration; and the adoption of new labor and economic policies modeled after those in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Finally, institutionalization has been capped by the convening of the First Party Congress in December 1975, and by the adoption of Cuba’s new “ socialist constitution,” which was approved by a national referendum in February 1976.5

In retrospect, therefore, the Cuban political system has undergone major institutional transformations from the fidelistu order of the 1960s. Even so, the changes that have occurred in the regime’s political leadership now appear to have been far fewer than was initially expected under a more institutionalized, Soviet-type political order. In fact, as will be seen shortly, the results of the PCC Con-

5. On these developments, see Mesa-Lago, lot. cit.; Leon Gourd and Morris Rothenberg, Soviet Penetration of Latin America (Coral Gables, Fla.: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1975), pp. 19-80; and Edward Gonzalez, “ Castro and Cuba’s New Orthodoxy,” Problems of Communism (January-February 1976), pp. 1-19.


gress point to the continued political dominance by Fidel and his followers over the party as well as the government. In short, political developments in Cuba continue to be characterized by considerable unpredictability even as the “ institutionalization of the revolution ” proceeds.

A final complicating factor is that Cuba’s internal politics cannot be isolated from international forces; much less can they be made impermeable to them. External linkages thus heighten the problematic and contingent aspects of Cuba’s succession problem. This is most evident with respect to Havana’s relationship with the Soviet Union, but future relations with the United States could also influence the outcome of political succession.

The importance of the Soviet Union in a post-Castro Cuba stems from its increased control of Cuban affairs since 1970. Cuba is economically tied to and dependent upon the Soviet Union, with Cuban indebtedness to the U.S.S.R. standing at an estimated $4.4 billion in 1974.6 In the meantime, a joint Soviet-Cuban Intergovern- mental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Co- operation was established in December 1970 with the aim of improving the island’s economic planning and coordinating the island’s economy with that of the U.S.5.R. To these ends, some 3000 Soviet civilian advisers and technicians are reported to be in Cuba, over- seeing or assisting in various aspects of administration.7 In mid-1972, Cuba also obtained full membership in COMECON; more recently, the Cuban and Soviet Five-Year Plans for 1976-1980 have been coordinated.s Additionally, Moscow has exercised considerable control over Cuba’s political, security, and military affairs. As indicated earlier, the “ institutionalization of the revolution ” has hewed closely to the Soviet format, a development that Leonid Brezhnev noted with satis- faction upon his arrival in Havana in early 1974.” Apart from

6. Central Intelligence Agency Handbook, Cuba: Foreign Trade, A (ER) 75-69, July 1915, p. 4.

7. Los Angeles -Times, May 21, 1975, pp. 15-17. 8. See the statement by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in New Times (h4ascow),

No. 1, January 1974, p. 13. 9. “Your society has reached a phase of development in which the inevit-

able and necessary state of breaking off with the old and searching for new ways marks the gradual transition into the phase of systematic, positive construction. The construction of the party, the state, and the economy is being effected with assurance and on the proven basis of socialism.” Grunmn, February 10, 1974, p. 4. Brezhnev’s trip marked the first time that the Secretary-General of the CPSU had visited Cuba, and it symbolized the extent to which the Castro regime had entered the fold of Soviet orthodoxy,


increased ties between the CPSU and the PCC, the Soviets also are reported to control the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) within the Ministry of Interior, which has responsibility for Cuba’s overseas intelligence operations. And Cuba’s armed forces have long had a close professional relationship with the Soviet military; most recently, the FAR dispatched an estimated 15,000 Cuban combat troops to Angola in an action closely coordinated with Soviet logistical support.

Given this apparent trend toward the “ Sovietization ” of Cuba, Moscow is bound to be a major factor in determining the outcome of political succession. But a number of questions remain unanswered. For example, would Moscow intervene politically or otherwise to assure an acceptable successor to Fidel? How might the Cuban regime itself react to such outside intermeddling? Conversely, might not the Soviets adopt a discreet posture toward the succession issue precisely to avoid stigmatizing their candidate as “Moscow’s man in Havana “? The very range of possible Soviet responses to political succession in Cuba thus heightens the problem of predictability.

Similarly, Cuba’s relations with the United States could influence succession outcomes, but there are imponderables with respect to future U.S. policies. Would Washington seize upon the succession crisis, for instance, as an opportunity to dislodge the post-Castro government and thereby rid Cuba of the Soviet presence?Or would it adopt accommodative policies that would seek to influence the succession outcome? As will be suggested later, any one of these alterna- tive policies could affect the orientation as well as the composition of a post-Castro government.

Cuba as a Deviant Case

Prediction is complicated by the questionable applicability in Cuba of historical analogues from other Communist states. The problem is that the origins and development of the Castro regime represent striking deviations from the Communist world. Indeed, in some instances they run directly counter to the prevailing pattern of political development associated with the majority of established Communist regimes-not only in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but also in China and Asia.

Despite the presence of such strong political personalities as a Tito, a Mao, or the late Ho Chi Minh, the Communist Party in their respective states serves as the backbone of the regime, if not as the sovereign decisionmaking institution. The party also provides these


regimes with the basis of their legitimacy in that it is the carrier and interpreter of the Marxist-Leninist faith. In turn, because of its pivotal political role, the party will be the principal institution or at least the key actor in the succession process of most Communist states. At the very least, therefore, the party would function as a counterweight against the government bureaucracy and military- security organs, and as a power base for personal accession by the party secretary; at most, the party would be sovereign, serving as the institution within which the power struggle would be played out and contained.

Until the mid-1970s little of the above would have applied to socialist Cuba. As a charismatic caudillo, Fidel exercised virtual personal sovereignty over Cuban affairs throughout the 1960s as a result of his revolutionary mystique, his loyal fidelista following within the regime, and his popular ties with the masses. Consequently, supreme political authority was vested in the person of Cuba’s lider mdxirno. He remained as Commander-in-Chief (from 1959) of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, Prime Minister (from 1959). and First- Secretary of the PCC (from 19651, to name his most important offices, all of which reflected the de facto power he enjoyed independently of his formal office. Additionally, it was Fidel personally rather than the party that served as the linchpin of the fidelisra regime, supplying the latter with its directive, unifying, and mobilizational impetus, and with its principal source of popular legitimacy. Cuba’s political order thus remained charismatic in its origins and processes. It was only after 1970. with the “ institutionalization of the revolution,” that Cuba began to conform to the Communist norm as the regime explicitly transferred Fidel’s erstwhile charisma to the party. On the twentieth anniversary of his July 26, 1953, attack on the Moncada barracks, therefore, it was Fidel himself who appropriated a Leninist- type dictum by asserting the preeminence of the PCC :

In the uncertain times of the 26th of July and in the early years of the Revolution, individuals played a decisive role, a role now carried out by the Party. Men die, buf the Party is immortal [emphasis added].lO

Cuba’s party stands in sharp contrast, however, to the ruling Communist parties of other states, on several counts. First, the PCC was not established until October 1965~that is, until fully six and a half years after the revolutionaries had seized political power. In

10. Ibid., August 5, 1973, p. 5.


part, the belated appearance of a ruling Communist Party was due to the difficulties in fusing together three separate organizations- Fidel’s July 26 Movement, the Moscow-oriented Popular Socialist Party (PSP) of Cuba, and the Students’ Revolutionary Directorate of March 13-into a single party organization. But it was also due to the personalistic as opposed to party origins of the fidelista revolutionary movement, and to the difficulties inherent in trying to combine party organization with Fidel’s charismatic authority and free- wheeling style of governance.” The fidelista regime thus constituted a historical anomaly in having come to power, and in later declaring itself “ socialist ” in 1961, without a Communist Party.

Second, even after establishing a ruling Communist Party and pro- claiming Marxism-Leninism as the formal ideology of the regime, the fidelistas remained basically committed to the “revolutionary movement ” and guerrilla legacy of the anti-Batista struggle. These, rather than Marxism-Leninism, provided the legitimizing mythology and the “ operational code ” for the Castro regime through the 196Os, imbuing it with a form of guerrilla radicalism. The latter, which was synony- mous with fidelismo, thus preceded and remained independent of Marxism-Leninism. l 1 Indeed, even with the adoption of Soviet-style orthodoxy in the 197Os, the fidelistas’ assault on the Moncada barracks on July 26, 1953, their disembarkation from the Granma on December 2, 1956, and their ultimate triumph over the Batista dictatorship on January 1, 1959, remain as the major commemorative events and as the indigenous sources of revolutionary legitimacy for Cuba’s Communist regime.13

Finally, from its inception the party leadership reflected Fidel’s personal stamp and gave way to his caudillistic rule, while the very size of the PCC was indicative of its secondary importance for the fidelista regime in the pre-1970 period. The eight-man Political Bureau was headed by Fidel and RatY as First- and Second-Secretary, respectively, and the remaining members were all former members of Fidel’s July 26 Movement, including four who were former com-

Il. See Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro, pp. 96-106, and 168-179; and And& Suirez, “ Leadership, Ideology, and Political Party,” in Carmelo Mesa- Lago (ed.), Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: University of Pitts- burg Press, 1971), pp. 3-22.

12. For a more detailed discussion of the dimensions of fidelismo, see Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro, pp. 83, 92-96, 106-110, 146-153, and 160-163.

13. Thus, following the adoption of Cuba’s first socialist constitution, the newly elected National Assembly will convene for the first time on December 2, 1976, which is the twentieth anniversary of the Granma landing.


rades-in-arms.l’ The seven-man Secretariat was more broadly based, admitting two former PSP leaders and one ex-leader from the Revolu- tionary Directorate; but the more important Organizational Secre- tariat was entrusted to one of Fidel’s most loyal lieutenants.‘5 The original loo-man Central Committee was also a fidelistu stronghold: 65 of its members held military titles, most of them coming from the ranks of the July 26 Movement; another 9 civilian members coming from Fidel’s movement; and only 22 members coming from the ranks of the PSP and 4 from the Revolutionary Directorate.“’ Despite the subsequent loss of 9 of its original members, moreover, no new members were added to the Central Committee; nor was the composition of the Political Bureau changed until the First Party Congress in December 1975. In the meantime, the Party’s stunted growth-as well as the low level of education of PCC members- made it ill-equipped to govern Cuba. The total number of party members and candidates stood at less than 50,000 in 1965, reaching only some 100,000 in 1970 out of a total population of 8.5 million.” Doubtless, the slow growth of the PCC reflected difficulties in recruiting exemplary or model personnel as party members.18 Still, it also reelected the problem of reconciling personalistic charismatic rule with a party organization, and the general disdain by the fide&us for a party apparatus: they, after all, had conquered and initially held power without a party organization.”

The 197Os, however, have seen the upgrading of the party along the lines of Soviet-style orthodoxy, with the December 1975 PCC Con- gress highlighting the heightened role of the party and its new leadership. According to Fidel’s report to the Congress, the ranks of the

14. These were Juan Almeida, Osvaldo Dorticds, Guillermo Garcia, Armando Hart, Ramiro ValdCs, and Sergio de1 Valle. Only Dorticds and Hart were not former guerrilla combatants.

15. Besides Fidel and Radl Castro, the members of the Secretariat included Dortic6s and Hart as Organizational Secretary, and three others from outside the ranks of the July 26 Movement-Bias Rota and Carlos Rafael Rodriauez. both from the PSP,*and Faure Chomdn from the Revolutionary Direct&ate:

16. The importance of an insurrectionist background as a criterion for membership in the original PCC Central Committee was stressed by Fidel himself when he announced the make-up of the Central Committee. See Cuba Socialista, November 1965, pp. 68-69.

17. The data on PCC membership are taken from Fidel’s speech to the First Party Congress, Granma, January 4, 1976, p. 9.

18. This point is developed by Jorge I. Domfnguez in his forthcoming book, Guverning Cuba, to be published by Harvard University Press in 1977.

19. This fidelistu-guevaristn thesis is expounded by Jules Rtgis Debray, Revolution in the Revohtion (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).


PCC had increased to 186,995 by 1974, and had reached 202,807 by September 1975, while some 6000 party cadres were undergoing instruction in 37 party schools in 1975.““ An expansion in the party’s leadership also occurred at the Congress. The eight-man Political Bureau was expanded to 13 members, as three “ old Communists ” from the ranks of the PSP finally gained admittance to the Party’s highest organ. These were Blas Rota, the former Secretary-General of the PSP; Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, one of the few ex-PSP leaders to have occupied top positions in the government during the 1960s; and Arnaldo Milian, a provincial PCC Secretary. Significantly, the original fineli.sfa and July 26 Movement core within the new Political Bureau has remained intact, while the addition of three ex-PSP leaders to the Political Bureau has been diluted by the addition of two new veteran fk!elistas and raulistas-Pedro Miret and JosC Ram6n Machado. The new nine-member Secretariat-which had been expanded to 11 members in 1973+&o shows the fidelistas and raulistas as the dominant coalition; Fidel, Rati, Miret, Jorge Risquet, Antonia Per&, and Rad Garcia. The ex-PSP members are limited to three slots (Rota, Rodriguez, and Isidoro Malmierca). Finally, the Central Committee was expanded from 91 to 112 members and 12 alternates, with former July 26 Movement members again outnumber- ing the “ old Communists ” among the new additions.21

In short, Cuba’s Communist Party has indeed been strengthened and expanded, but it remains firmly under the control of the two Castro brothers. Fidel and Rati were reelected as First- and Second- Secretary, respectively, by the Party Congress. Cuba’s new socialist constitution, enacted on February 24, 1976, provides for the election of a President of the Council of State who will also be Head of Government. This election is scheduled for late 1976. It seems virtually certain that the two brothers will be elected at that time to head both the Cuban state and the Cuban government simultaneously as President (Fidel) and First Vice-President (Ratil).“?

Given these latest developments in the “ institutionalization of the revolution,” therefore, who are the most likely successors to Fidel in a hypothetical post-Castro future ? I will employ three different

20. See Fidel’s speech in Granma, January 4, 1976, P. 9. 21. For an analysis concerning the outcome of the PCC Congress, see

Gonzalez, “ Castro and Cuba’s New Orthodoxv.” DD. 1-4. 14-19. 22. Cuba’s socialist constitution provides - for- - considerable overlap in

leadership: the President, the First Vice-President, and five Vice-Presidents will head both the 31-man Council of State, elected by the National Assembly, and the more pivotal Council of Ministers within the government. See Granma, March 7, 1976, Supplement.


approaches in the next section in an attempt to deal with this question and to speculate more broadly on a Cuban future without the lider m&imo. The first will look at specific persons within the present hierarchy who now loom as the strongest candidates by virtue of their official positions and power base. The second approach will focus on the strongest institutional actors within Cuba today as the major players in the succession process. Finally, the third approach will impute the probable dispositions of elite groupings in an attempt to predict some of the coalitional alignments possible under a future Cuban regime. While each approach must necessarily rest on soft and often inferred data, together they may prove suggestive of succession outcomes.

Three Perspectives on the Succession Problem

Individual Candidates No other leader within the Cuban regime today approaches Fidel’s

stature, political talents, and mass appeal. As an exceptional caudillo- type, therefore, he is probably irreplaceable. Still, despite their short- comings, three persons stand out as the most likely candidates to succeed Fidel-Lieutenant General Radl Castro, President Osvaldo Dortic6s, and Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.

Of the three, Ratil Castro is in by far the strongest position to succeed his brother. Named by Fidel to be his successor in 1959, Rat2 remains second-in-command and continues to enjoy his brother’s confidence by virtue of their early revolutionary as well as familial ties. From the standpoint of political succession, moreover, Ratil is strategically located in three power structures: he is Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR); First Deputy Prime Minister of the government, and probably First Vice-President of the Cuban state and government once the new constitution goes fully into effect; and Second-Secretary of the PCC with dual membership in the Political Bureau and Secretariat. Most critically, as head of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), he exercises direct control over the Cuban military; additionally, he has extended his influence over the Ministry of Interior (MIMNT) through its staffing by raulista officers from the MINFAR.23 Finally, he would presumably have Moscow’s endorsement, not only because he has proved to be

23. On the increased control over the MININT by both Rati and the Soviets, see Brian Crozier, “The Soviet Satellization of Cuba,” Co~lflic~ Studies, No. 35 (May 1973).


a competent organizer and disciplined Communist leader over the years, but also because he bears the Castro name.

In the wake of his brother’s personal defeat in 1970, Rati, in fact, assumed a more assertive and visible role in running Cuban affairs. Furthermore, his position over the long run has perhaps been strengthened by the appointment of several ruulistas and senior officers from the MrNFAR to high posts in the party and government during the 1970s. Thus, two raulistas were appointed to the expanded Secretariat in 1973 : Jorge Risquet, the former Minister of Labor who had earlier fought under Ratis guerrilla command: and Antonio Pirez, an ex-Vice Minister of the MINFAR. JosC Ramdn Machado, the Havana Provincial First Secretary, and for a long time Ratil’s personal physician, became one of the new members in the enlarged Political Bureau that was announced at the Party Congress in Decem- ber 1975. Major Generals Senen Casas and Julio Casas of the MIN- FAR were also newly appointed as regular and alternate members, respectively, of the new Central Committee. Among the senior military who assumed high governmental posts are Belarmino Castilla. an ex-Vice Minister of the MINFAR and a former head of one of Ratil’s guerrilla columns, who became Deputy Prime Minister of Education, Culture and Science in November 1972; and Diocles Torralba, who was also appointed as Deputy Prime Minister of the Sugar Harvest Sector following his stint as a Vice Minister in the MINFAR. Still other senior and middle-ranking officers were appointed to ministerial posts in the post-1970 period.

Despite his strong power base and high positions, however, it is possible that Ra61 may not be able to succeed to his brother’s position, or at least to assume full powers to the exclusion of others. As has happened in other Communist regimes, the heir-designate may not be able to consolidate his position once his patron dies. Such a situation might well prevail in Cuba, where the regime is passing through a transitional stage between personalistic and institutional rule and where Fidel still plays such a central role. Unlike his brother, Ratil has virtually no popular following of his own, and he lacks the personal magnetism to attract other revolutionary elites as well as public support. Hence, it may well be that the residues of charisma and caudillism will in themselves become obstacles to Ratil’s claim to leadership as the designated heir and younger brother of the lider mciximo. If so, Rati might have to share power under a form of collective leadership, although presumably he would initially have the strongest position within the new ruling oligarchy.

In this respect, there are two other candidates within the ruling circle who probably could not assume full powers by themselves, but


who might together prevent RaUs full consolidation of power. These are President Osvaldo Dorticos and Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, neither of whom has ties to the military but both of whom have backing within the government bureaucracy and technocratic circles. Rodriguez in particular appears to enjoy Soviet confidence as a veteran Communist leader from the PSP, while Dorticos may also be acceptable owing to his demonstrated administrative talents as President.?&

Appointed to the presidency in July 1959, Dorticos soon gamed a reputation as a loyal subordinate of the lider nzdsimo, and a capable administrator who managed day-to-day affairs. Subsequently, he was entrusted with additional posts as Minister of the Economy and Director of JUCEPLAN (the Central Planning Board) in 1964. A year later he also became a member of the Political Bureau and Secretariat of the new PCC. With the formation of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers under the government reorganization of late 1972, he assumed additional charge of the Ministries of Labor, Justice and Foreign Trade, and the National Bank of Cuba. Dorticos also has led a number of Cuban missions abroad, including negotiations with the Soviets on several occasions. At the Party Congress in December 1975, he was renamed to the Political Bureau but was dropped from the Secretariat, perhaps for reasons of health. Presumably, however, Dorticos will become one of five Vice Presidents under the New Cuban Constitution.

For his part, Rodriguez was the first ex-PSP leader to gain a high governmental post in the early 1960s. Thereafter he remained un- scathed by the fidelistu purges against old-guard Communist elements, while simultaneously maintaining ties to Moscow. Despite the latter’s backing and his economic competence, however, Rodriguez was unable to exercise decisive influence over economic matters, and he failed to prevail in the “ great debate ” with the guevaristas over the issue of material versus moral incentives in the mid-1960s. Thereafter, his influence diminished and he remained outside Fidel’s inner circle as the regime entered into its post-1966 period of extreme guerrilla radicalism in its policies toward the economy and society.25 Nonethe-

24. With respect to Rodriguez, another analyst has remarked: “In 1970 when the new state of the Revolution began, Rodrfguez combined two key attributes: he headed Cuba’s leading team of experts on central planning and computer techniques and-being a former member of the prerevolutionary PSP-had the confidence of the Soviets.” Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 197Os, pp. 30-31.

25. In early 1965, Rodriguez was replaced as President of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform by Fidel, and thereafter did not preside over


less, he retained his posts as Minister Without Portfolio, member of the Executive Committee of JUCEPLAN, and member of the PCC Secretariat.

After the 1970 harvest debacle, Rodriguez rapidly gained policy- making influence and consolidated his position among technocratic circles within the regime. In turn, his ascendancy appears to have been supported closely by the Soviets. Thus, in December 1970, he became Cuban chairman of the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation, which became the principal organ for integrating the Cuban and Soviet economies following the July 1972 announcement by Rodriguez in Moscow that Cuba had become a full member of COMECON. In November 1972, Rodriguez also became a member of the newly created Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers owing to his appointment as Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Cuba’s foreign economic as well as diplomatic atfairs. Finally, his ascendance was made complete at the Party Congress when he was named to the expanded Political Bureau of the PCC.

Like Radl, neither Dorticds nor Rodriguez has much of a popular following, although the Cuban President enjoys public visibility by virtue of his office. The present influence of both men lies instead in their ties to key domestic elites and, especially in the case of Rodri- guez, their backing from Moscow. Within the Cuban regime, both men represent important civilian elites who have come to exercise a more prominent role in recent years: Dorticos has long been associated with the governmental bureaucracy, which he has managed in his various official capacities; and Rodriguez has come to represent the more specialized technocratic or economic planning elements, while also retaining ties to the “old Communists” from the PSP of which he was a part. In turn, both the bureaucratic and the technocratic elites, along with ex-PSP leaders, have assumed greater influence within the regime in the post-1970 period. They have provided the skills needed to restore rationality to the Cuban economy and to re-order the government and party following the regime’s ruinous experiments with guerrilla radicalism. Most importantly, these elites enjoy additional leverage supplied by the Soviet Union as a result of the latter’s increased presence and economic stake in Cuba in the

any ministry or agency for the remainder of the 1960s. For a detailed analysis of the controversy with the guevaristus, see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, ‘I Ideological, Political, and Economic Factors in the Cuban Controversy on Material Versus Moral Incentives,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World A ffuirs (February 1972), pp. 49-l 11.


post-1970 period. As noted earlier, some 3000 Soviet advisers and technicians have been working with their Cuban counterparts to improve governmental efficiency and revitalize the economy. In the meantime, new long-term Soviet-Cuban economic agreements were signed in December 1972. Covering the period through 1986, these new agreements represented a substantial increase in the Soviet economic commitment to Cuba under generally favorable terms for the latter.20

The growing Soviet-Cuban integration has thus favored Dorticds and especially Rodriguez. Indeed, the governmental reorganization of November of 1972, whereby both leaders joined the new Executive Committee designed to run the economy, may well have been a Soviet precondition for the extension of the new economic agreements signed the following month. Soviet backing has aided Rodriguez most of all, however. From being a Minister Without Portfolio, the former PSP leader was named as Cuba’s chairman of the joint Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission in December 1970, then as Deputy Prime Minister in December 1972, and finally as member of the Political Bureau of the PCC in December 1975. While the meteoric rise of Rodriguez no doubt reflects his own considerable talents, it is in substantial measure a product of Soviet endorsement as well.

On balance, however, Ra&l is by far the most powerful of the three potential contenders. Apart from his high position in the party and government, he could count on the support of the Ministries of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) and Interior (MININT); the former, in particular, is certain to have a principal if not decisive voice in deciding the succession outcome. Still, Dorticos and Rodri- guez may possess sufficient internal and external leverage to form a blocking coalition within the Cuban regime, forcing Ra61 to share power under some form of collective leadership. Much will depend on how Moscow reads the Cuban situation, and whether it throws its weight behind civilian contenders or solely behind Ratil and his military supporters. In either eventuality, the Soviets will have to contend with two legacies from the fidelista era : the delayed develop-

26. For example, Cuba’s large debt to the U.S.S.R. was deferred to 1986, short-term credits were extended, and a higher price was provided for Cuban sugar. But in exchange for the greater Soviet economic commitment, as two observers noted, Moscow secured “a much profounder orientation of the Cuban economy toward the Soviet system than had hitherto been the case. Externally this means the linking of Cuban foreign trade and economic plan- ing on a long-term basis with the USSR and East European members of CEMA. . . . Domestically, it means the reorganization of the Cuban economy along orthodox lines.” Gourd and Rothenberg, op. cit., p. 53.


‘merit of an effective, ruling Communist Party in Cuba, and the institutional strength and civil-military role of the Cuban armed forces.

Institutional Actors: The PCC and the FAR Systematic efforts have been made by the Castro regime to

strengthen the Communist Party of Cuba in recent years. Were a succession crisis to occur within the near term, however, it is by no means certain that the PCC is as yet sufficiently developed and preeminent to contain the succession struggle within the party. On balance, the strongest institution within Cuba today still remains the FAR with its intrinsic legitimacy, organizational coherence and adaptability, and leadership cadres. Moreover, the strongest institutional linkages between Moscow and Havana involve their respective military establishments, which have developed a close professional relationship over the years, and which possess corporate identities separate from the CPSU and PCC. From Moscow’s vantage point, therefore, a succession crisis in Cuba could pose problems different from those in Eastern Europe, where a strong party apparatus emerged with the establishment of satellite regimes in the post-World War II period.

The First Party Congress in December 1975 marked a major advance in elevating the supremacy of the PCC and assigning to it the same type of role played by other parties in the Soviet bloc. In his main report to the Congress, Fidel affirmed the party’s legitimacy and right to rule on the basis of its nationalist and authentically Marxist-Leninist credentials. The Congress was also staged as a democratizing event, reversing the earlier elitist image of the PCC as a closed party. Thus, the Party Platform had been discussed islandwide by over four million citizens; PCC rank-and-file members had participated in the selection of their cadres and leaders through direct and indirect party elections; and the Central Committee and Political Bureau had been broadened to include new members. Finally, the Congress adopted a party platform to guide the PCC over the next five years, at which time a definitive program will be approved at the Second Party Congress; it also adopted Cuba’s Five-Year Plan for 1976-1980; and it approved Cuba’s new economic system, which is modeled after that in other socialist countries. In effect, at the Con- gress the PCC took on the trappings and functions of a genuine Leninist party.2’

27. For a fuller discussion of these and other aspects of the Congress, see Gonzalez, “ Castro and Cuba’s New Orthodoxy.”


Nonetheless, Cuba’s Communist Party falls somewhat short of functioning effectively as a truly “ sovereign ” institution. With only 202,000 members and candidates, the ranks of the PCC are still thin for a country whose population now numbers nine million. The party’s capacity for governing. moreover, is undermined by the low level of education of its members. According to Fidel’s main report to the Congress, the majority of the cadres still have only a sixth- or seventh-grade education, while 62 percent of the PCC members and candidates have a sixth-grade education or less.2s Both quantitatively and qualitatively, therefore, the PCC still remains underdeveloped, while its institutional preeminence goes back only to the post-1970 period.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces stand out in considerable contrast to the PCC. Six years before the emergence of the party, the FAR was established under Ratil’s leadership in October 1959, with guerrilla contingents from the anti-Batista struggle supplying the initial nucleus. With his brother and former rebel officers in charge, Fidel thus ensured that Cuba’s new armed forces remained loyal to him personally as well as supportive of the revolution.

Unlike other revolutionary organs, however, the FAR was trans- formed into an effective, institutionalized, and professionalized force. Ratil’s leadership facilitated institutionalization by shielding the FAR from his brother’s personal interventions, which were to become so disruptive to the development of civil institutions throughout the 1960s. Institutionalization was also externally promoted by the growing linkages between the Soviet and Cuban armed forces, with the U.S.S.R. supplying military equipment and assistance valued at $1.5 billion by 1970.?” Perhaps most important of all, the very survival of the revolutionary regime demanded the creation of an effective, modern military establishment to deter U.S. overt as well as covert aggression, made real by the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961, and to carry out counterinsurgency campaigns against anti-Castro elements in the early 1960s. .The high-threat perceptions of the Cuban regime thus gave an urgency to the institutional and professional development of the Cuban armed forces which was missing with the party, and which accordingly established the primacy of the FAR early on.30

28. Granma, January 4, 1976, p. 9. 29. According to Fidel’s speech of April 22, 1970, the Soviets had supplied

the $1.5 billion in military assistance on a gratuitous basis. 30. The best studies to date on the Cuban armed forces are by Jorge I.

Domfnguez. See his article, “The Civic Soldier in Cuba,” in Catherine M. Kelleher (ed.), Political-Military Systems : Comparatlve Perspectives (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974), pp. 209-239; and the updated, revised version,


At its peak, the Cuban armed forces stood at some 300,000 active duty and reserve personnel in the early 196Os, reflecting the period of highest external and internal threat. The total FAR personnel subsequently declined, stabilizing at around 280,000 by the end of the 1960s. By 1974, the FAR had been further leaned down to about 180,000 active-duty personnel and ready reservists with the creation in 1973 of a separate 100,000 Youth Labor Army for service in the economy. As a consequence, the lOO,OOO-man regular army was free to concentrate on its primary mission of national defense.

In the meantime, professionalism was promoted through the development of an integrated military school system during the 1960s. A general officers’ school was established in, 1961, followed two years later by the creation of a school for advanced military studies to train officers for the assumption of senior command posts. Also in 1963, Cuba’s new system of cadet schools was introduced islandwide. Addi- tionally, military schools at the junior and senior high levels were first established in 1966, as was a new Military Technological Institute for the training of armed forces’ technicians and engineers. According to Jorge I. Dominguez, this interlocking military school system resulted in a larger number of officers being recruited from the lower military schools. By 1975, for instance, ” 63 percent of the graduates of the Military Technological Institute, the artillery school, the Naval Academy, and the cadet school, were graduates of the military high schools.” 31 Furthermore, he notes that the newer ranks of the officer corps were receiving more extensive training : “ . . . the 1579 officers who were graduated in 1970 had attended officers’ school for no less than three years, and some for as many as five years.” 32 As a result, Cuba’s officer corps-numbering perhaps as high as 12,000 by the mid-1970s-had been increasingly socialized in military values as they rose through the school system, as well as increasingly professionalized by their training. In turn, the institutional coherence and sense of corporate identity of the FAR was strengthened far beyond that of the party or any other civil organ.

The FAR has thus emerged as the most autonomous, institutionalized force in Cuba. But, in addition, it has become the principal reservoir of professional leadership for the Castro regime, with the “ civic soldier ” being appointed to government posts and tapped for

“ Institutionalization and Civil-Military Relations,” in Cuban Studies/ Estudios Cubanos (January 1976), pp. 39-65. Henceforth, all references to Dominguez’s work will be to the latter article.

31. Ibid., p. 48. 32. Ibid.

CL-4


other than military roles.3s Army personnel supplanted those of the party in the drive for the lo-million-ton sugar harvest of 1970, for example, because the Pee had neither sufficient cadres nor the organizational and leadership skills to direct the harvest effort. Begin- ning in 1968, officers were placed in charge of the largest sugar centrales; additional supervisory personnel as well as manpower were funnelled into critical production areas in the provinces of Camaguey and Oriente; a mechanized army brigade was employed to clear scrub lands for agricultural purposes throughout the island; and military personnel organized part of the civilian labor force along paramilitary lines. In November 1969, Fidel explicitly called on the FAR to supply up to 10,000 armed forces personnel for the harvest, and to provide military “ organization ” and “ discipline ” to the vast undertaking, with the result that some 70,000 FAR personnel were finally diverted to the 1970 harvest.34 In the post-1970 period the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces supplied no fewer than nine senior and middle-ranking officers for high government posts as either Deputy Prime Ministers or Ministers, and one of the four PCC Secretaries added to the Secretariat in 1973.

In brief, the military’s long-standing prominence, its strong corporate identity and professionalism, and its civic roles in Cuban affairs all suggest that the FAR still rivals the party at present as the preeminent institution in Cuba. But what of the future, and the relationship of the FAR to the PCC in the event of a succession crisis? Given the strengthening of the party, are the Cuban armed forces likely to subordinate themselves to the PCC in a post-Castro future, or might tensions and conflict develop between the two institutions with respect to policies as well as succession outcomes? Here, one can extrapolate from current trends and developments in an effort to predict the future. The problem is, however, that such an extrapolation points to two different futures because of contradictory tendencies at work in the Cuba of the 1970s.

One tendency suggests that the Cuban regime is moving toward the Soviet model of civil-military relations in which the supremacy of

33. According to Dominguez, Cuba’s civic soldiers “have actually ruled over large sectors of civilian and military life,. . . have civilianized and politicized themselves by internalizing the norms and organization of the Communist Party, and have educated themselves to become professionals in military, political, managerial, engineering, economic, and educational affairs. Their civil and military lives have been fused.” Ibid., pp. 40-41.

34. For a vivid, critical account of the “ militarization ” of the agrarian economy, see RenC Dumont, Is Cuba SockrEst? (New York: Viking Press, 1974), pp. 96-100.


the party is recognized, and civilian control by the party is exercised over the armed forces. Party penetration of the FAR has been on the rise in recent years. Thus, the proportion of officers belonging to the PCC or its Communist Youth Union (UK) rose from 69.9 percent in the late 1960s to 85 percent by mid-1973; and since 1969. some 95 percent or more of the graduating cadets have been members of either the PCC or the UJ’C.55 In the December 1975 Party Con- gress, two Major Generals from the MINFAR were added as a member and an alternate member of the newly expanded Central Committee. As noted, the Congress was itself a major event in legitimizing the PCC and asserting its pre&inence as Cuba’s ruling organ. In the meantime, the “ institutionalization of the revolution ” has strengthened the civilian sector, enabling not only the party but the government as well to assume control over nonmilitary activities previously assigned to the armed forces. And, finally, Cuba’s military intervention in Angola, and the possibility of still other expeditions elsewhere, could further diminish the FAR’s civil role in Cuba’s internal affairs because of the army’s heightened preoccupation with its new external military mission.

The other tendency, however, suggests resistance to the Soviet model, pointing instead to the continuation of the FAR’s organizational autonomy and corporate identity, and to an institutional pre- Eminence rivaling that of the party. In the first place, civilian party penetration of and control over the armed forces appears considerably diluted as a result of military dominance of the party in the military. According to Dominguez, political discussions and indoctrination programs in the early 1970s were given low priority by military officers, resulting in the “ insufficient ” politicization of the armed forces. He further observes that because admission to party membership is far easier for officers than for non-corns and enlisted men, the officers have had “much power within the party in the military, accounting for 69 percent of the membership in 1970.” The result is that “ military chiefs not only monopolize debate in party discussions, but they use their military rank to gain party rank.” Additionally, he notes that the party in the military possesses autonomy from the civilian party in the 197Os, but within the armed forces the party-military has little autonomy from non-party military personnel who have the authority, in certain instances,” to tell party members what to do.” Finally, he points out that civilian party penetration is further weakened because the Communist Youth Union lacks autonomous methods for recruiting members within the mili-

35. Dominguez. op. cit., p. 56.


tary, with the UJC consequently serving only as a “ youth annex ” of the party in the milm~y.~~

In addition, the FAR’s level of professionalism and education g~~tiy surpasses that of the party, which may make it difhcult for the Cuban armed forces to accept the supremacy of the PCC in a post- Castro future. As recently as the late 1960s for example, Fidel and other leaders were exalting the professionalism of the FAR and pro- claiming it an organizational model to be emulated by the party, while simultaneously berating the incompetence, poor leadership, and inadequate skills of party cadres. Despite the qualitative improve.ment as well as growth of the PCC since 1970, moreover, the military is still capable of exercising inordinate influence within the party itself. Thus, the armed and security forces supplied 19 percent of the representatives to the PCC Congress, the composition of which was sup- posed to reflect the makeup of the party.” But the influence of the military within the party is greater still if one considers the higher level of education and training attained by FAR officers compared with the majority of party cadres, who have only a sixth- and seventh- grade education, and the 62 percent of ull party members (including the military) who average a sixth-grade education or less.

Furthermore, the higher echelons of the party itself have been considerably penetrated by the Cuban armed forces. Despite some dilution of their representation, for example, military officers still account for a sizable proportion of the newly expanded Central Com- mittee selected in December 1975. In the new 11Zman body, 23 of its members (or 20 percent) are military officers actively serving with the FAR and MINFAR; another 14 of its members (or 12.5 percent) are officers with former ties to the FAR who are now serving in the Ministry of Interior, or in high government and governmental posts.” Although made prior to the naming of the new Central Committee, therefore, the observation by Dominguez remains valid for Cuba today : “The Armed Forces still play a role within the central decisionmaking structures which is far greater than that played by their colleagues in other socialist countries.” 3Q

36. Ibid., pp. 54-55. 37. As reported by Fidel to the PCC Congress. See Granma, January 4,

1976, p. 9. 38. These figures are computed on the basis of the names supplied by ibid.,

D. 12. and the information contained in CIA. Directory of Personalities of he duban Government, Oficial Orgwlizationi and MI& .Organizations, A (CR) 74-7, March 1974.

39. Domfnguez, op. cit., p. 57.


Finally, just as the party and government have been strengthened in the civilian sector by institutionalization, so too has the FAR ex- hibited further institutional development in the 197Os-as Domfnguez also observes-by expanding its civil-military roles, promoting greater functional differentiation, and adapting itself to new tasks at home and abroad. Thus, in 1973, the FAR assumed command over the Army of Working Youth, which was previously under the control of the Communist Youth Union, with the new paramilitary lOO,OOO-man work force being employed in economic development tasks. The regular and reserve army forces, in turn, were freed to sharpen their level of military specialization and combat proficiency as increasingly complex military exercises were held in recent years. Consequently, not only has the FAR not relinquished its civic role within Cuba; it also has developed the institutional capacity to take on a new external military mission with Cuba’s Angolan venture. Indeed, the sweeping victory of Cuban combat units in the newly independent African state should enhance the status and influence of the armed forces, particularly the army, in Cuba’s internal affair~.‘~

Two other factors also suggest that the Cuban armed forces rather than the party would be the determining institution in deciding a succession outcome. First, it is the FAR and not the PCC that can lay exclusive claim to revolutionary legitimacy and nationalism- notwithstanding the assertions made at the Party Congress to the contrary-as a result of being the successor to Castro’s Rebel Army, and as a consequence of its role in actively defending Cuba against aggression in the post-1959 period. Second, the Cuban armed forces have long had professional and institutional linkages with the Soviet Union, which go back to the first extension of Soviet military aid in 1960. Since that time, the professional bonds between the FAR and the Soviet military appear to have solidified, and to have developed into a close working relationship, as evidenced by the joint involvement in Angola. Hence, the CubanSoviet military linkage as well as the FAR’s strong internal role may lead Moscow to favor the Cuban armed forces as the decisive player in a post-Castro future.

In any event, the institutional perspective also favors Raril Castro as Lieutenant General and head of the Revolutionary Armed Forces,

40. As will be discussed, however, other elements within the Castro regime are far less inclined toward Cuba’s new foreign policy strategy of rendering military assistance to other Third World states, and intervening militarily in the hemisphere or in other continents. For a full analysis of the various perspectives and forces at work in Cuba’s foreign policy, see Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, Post-Revolutionary Cuba in a Changing World (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, December 1975), R-1844-ISA.


with additional ties to the security forces, and as Second-Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba. Such an institutional perspective, however, glosses over internal differentiations within institutions; even more critically, it ignores the increasing complexity and heterogeneity of the Cuban regime since 1970. Before predicting whether Ralil would be able to pull together and maintain a winning civil-military coalition, therefore, one should also examine the Cuban leadership from the perspective of different elite groupings or tendencies which both are affiliated with and cut across institutions.

Elite Orientations alld Coalitions

The predominant role of Cuba’s lider mdxitno has tended to con- ceal the diverse, coalitional make-up of the Castro regime. Even in the 1960s. when personalistic-style government was at its height, Fidel ruled over an extended revolutionary family that included former guerrilla combatants, civilian members drawn from the ranks of the July 26 Movement, “old Communists” from the Popular Socialist Party, and student activists from the Revolutionary Directorate of March 13. Additionally, new actors entered the ranks of the revolutionary coalition in this period-among them, the younger officers from the FAR, the new generation of technocrats and administrators in the government, and the new Communist cadres of the PCC. As a result, the fidefista regime of the 1960s was by no means monolithic. On the contrary, different lines of cleavage could be detected as power struggles and policy disputes among political factions occasionally broke into public view.&l

As emphasized earlier, the post-1970 period of institutionalization has been accompanied by the broadening of this elite coalition. Pre- viously marginal actors-particularly the “ old Communists,” the technocratic and managerial elements, and the new PCC cadres- have now been given more meaningful participation in the regime, while many of their representatives have been entrusted with positions of high office in the government and party. Accordingly, the present

41. Thus, a major dispute broke out in the mid-1960s over the question of moral versus material incentives, with the guevoristm favoring the former against a coalition of ex-PSP and July 26 Movement elements. In 1964, the “ old Communists ” were under fire from former members of the Revolution- ary Directorate because of their complicity in the Marcos Rodriguez affair. And in early 1968, the so-called “ microfaction “-composed of dissident “ old Communists ” from the PSP-was exposed and sentenced to prison terms ranging from two to fifteen years. On these developments, see Gonzalez, ,Cuba Under Castro, esp. pp. 96-106 and 169-189.


regime in the mid-1970s has become considerably more diverse and complex internally than it was even a decade ago, and potentially more faction-ridden, With the demise of so central a figure as Fidel, therefore, the Cuban regime could be split along political cleavages that are based in contending succession candidates, competing institutions, and different policy orientations.

In identifying these cleavages, one must necessarily rely on “ soft ” data, and impute the policy dispositions of individual and collective actors in the present Cuban leadership. With this caveat in mind, several predominant elite tendencies can now be identified on the basis of their institutional and group amations, and their respective issue-orientations imputed according to the regime’s past and current policies. A hierarchical-cluster analysis, which measures the distance between these Cuban elites regarding their respective issue-orientations, can help to determine possible elite coalitions in a post-Castro future.42

Four elite tendencies outside the military form the civilian leadership of the regime:

1. The fide&a tendency. Composed of Fidel’s personal following, this grouping has been the most cohesive in the past and has regained much of its previous hegemony, as evidenced by the outcome of the PCC Congress. It is drawn mainly from the ranks of the original rebel combatants from the Moncada attack and ,Sierra Maestra guerrilla campaign; thus, it has been held together by its ties to the lider mriximo and by its common guerrilla experience. It has stood for “ permanent revolution ” at home and abroad, but it has also sought maximum autonomy from the Soviets without breaking the Havana:Moscow relationship or reverting to the U.S. camp. In the past, it tended to be isolated from other elite elements, with the excep- tion of the raulistas, because of its opposition to institutionalization and to the normalization of relations with the United States. Because group adhesion rests largely on a personalistic basis, the fide&a grouping could lose much of its cohesion as well as its dominance with the demise of its leader.

42. Such an elite study (unpublished) was carried out at Rand in May 1971 by Edward Gonzalez, Luigi Einaudi, Nathan Leites, Richard Maullin, and David Ronfeldt. Three of the study members first established the perceived disposition of four individual and six collective elite actors in the Cuban regime on thirty-five political-administrative, economic, and foreign policy issues according to a five-point scale. Using a computerized hierarchical- cluster analysis, Ronfeldt then averaged the numerical “ distance ” among actors with respect to the issues, and “ clustered ” the actors according to their similarities on given sets of issues. The following analysis draws on this earlier study.


2. The technocratic tendency led by Rodriguez. This grouping is composed of the new generation of planning and economic specialists to be found in such agencies as the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation, and JUCEPLAN; it may also include ex-PSP members who tend to follow Rodriguez’s lead. Reacting to the regime’s earlier guerrilla radicalism, this group stands for greater institutionalization and for rationality in the economy; hence, it supports the adoption of Soviet planning methods, managerial controls, and labor incentives. Domestically, this group emphasizes economic production over societal transformation and the creation of the “new man.” Abroad, it similarly supports the current moderation of Havana’s foreign policy toward Latin America, and the fashioning of governmental and economic linkages with a number of states in the hemisphere. Perhaps more than any other grouping, the technocratic elite also favor restoring economic and trade ties with the United States in order to import such items as agricultural and computer technology needed to accelerate Cuba’s economic development and to reduce Cuba’s dependence upon the Soviet bloc. At the same time, however, the technocrats stand for the continued maintenance of high levels of Soviet economic and technical assistance, which have both benefited Cuba and bolstered their position in recent years.d3

3. The bureaucratic tendency led by Dortic6s. This grouping contains remnants of the July 26 Movement-with which Dorticds was originally affiliated-who hold high-level posts in the government, and it draws more upon the less specialized administrative officers throughout the government than do the Rodriguez-led technocrats. Like the latter, it favors the continued “institutionalization of the revolution ” from which it has benefited, places a premium on economic development, and thus supports the new economic policy of the post-1970 ,period.d4 The bureaucratic tendency also coincides with the technocrats on such foreign policy issues as broader ties with Latin America and some form of rapprochement with the United States as a means of both improving Cuba’s economic position and lessening its dependence upon the Soviets while not breaking with the latter. More so than the technocrats, however, the former July 26

43. On the position of Rodriguez and the technocrats on a range of foreign policy issues, see Gonzalez and Ronfeldt, op. cit., pp. 32-78, pussim.

44. For example, see the thinly veiled criticism by Dorticb of fidelisto economic policies in his “ Control economico y perspectivas de1 desarrollo de la economia cubana,” Economia y Desarrollo, May-June 1972, pp. 30-31. The position of Dortic6s and the bureaucratic tendency is also described in Gonzalez and Ronfeldt, lot. cit.


Movement elements in particular might favor some liberalization of Cuba’s political as well as economic policies.

4. The party cadre tendency. While larger in membership than the other elite tendencies in the civilian sector, the new PCC cadres still represent a developing, vacillating tendency in the mid-1970s. The party is a creature of the post-revolutionary period, half of its membership having been recruited since 1970, while its ideological formation is still under way. In this respect, the new PCC cadres might display greater ideological ahinity with the “ old Communists ” from the PSP, as a result of increased indoctrination in orthodox Marxist-Leninist dogma. On the other hand, the PCC continues to be dominated by fidelistas and raulistas at the highest levels, with the end result that the new party cadres have yet to develop a truly cohesive tendency of their own. Still, they too favor the process of institutionalization which has enhanced the overall role of the party.

Raul Castro and the Cuban armed forces stand apart from the above groupings as a separate military tendency within the regime. While Cuba’s “ civic-soldier ” has tended to blur somewhat the distinction between the FAR’s civilian and military roles, the overall training and principal mission of the Cuban armed forces have increasingly concentrated on the military component in recent years. Indeed, as noted, the military stands out as the strongest elite tendency because of its greater professionalism and its developed sense of corporate identity.

What, then, is the issue orientation of the Cuban armed forces? As a whole, Ra61 and the military stand for greater administrative order, social discipline, and political conformity in Cuba’s domestic affairs. In general, they favor close ties with the Soviets as a deterrent to the United States and as assuring an indispensable supply of military material for Cuba; similarly, they continue to press for optimal combat preparedness against possible U.S. aggression. Indeed, the veteran raulistas share an aihnity with the fide&as in their international perspective, particularly with respect to Cuba’s con- frontation posture toward the United States.

On the other hand, cleavages could develop within the military between the veteran raulista leadership and younger officer ranks of the FAR. Because of their technical training, for instance, the younger military officers display a greater affinity with the Rodrfguez- technocratic tendency-with which they tend to agree strongly on such issues as the need for administrative reorganization and efficiency-than with the somewhat older raulistas who fought earlier in the guerrilla campaigns. Because of increased contacts with their


Latin American counterparts, such as the Peruvian and Mexican military, they may also be more supportive of a moderate stance toward Latin America. Perhaps most importantly, generational cleavages within the FAR could develop over the issue of Cuba’s client-state relationship with the Soviet Union, even though the Soviet connection is seen by all as vital to the Cuban regime’s survival. The Cuban armed forces, after all, remain the repository of a nationalism that dates back to Cuba’s independence struggle of the nineteenth century. This, together with increased professional ties with the nationalist Peruvian military and other Latin Americans, might well make the younger officers highly sensitive to increased Soviet control over Cuban affairs, particularly if they believe that the U.S. threat is receding. Similarly, a belief that Cuban combat troops were being deployed overseas less for Cuban than for Soviet objectives could well sharpen antagonisms between the younger officers and the senior raulista officers in the MINFAR.

It is clear from the foregoing that the technocratic and bureaucratic tendencies are the ones most likely to coalesce, in that they share broad areas of agreement on most domestic and foreign policy issues. The technocratic-bureaucratic coalition, in turn, could be broadened to include some military elements on the basis of afhnity on certain issues. But while the younger FAR officers incline toward the Rod- rlguez-led technocrats, especially on administrative and technical issues, their military ties to Rarll as Minister of the FAR might well prevent them from joining such a coalition independently of him. Additionally, civilian-military differences over defense spending and domestic priorities in an atmosphere of Cuban-U.S. confrontations might further impede development of the broader coalition unless the military itself assumed leadership. Finally, given their strong corporate identity, even the younger officer ranks are not likely to join with the technocrats and bureaucrats if it would split the armed forces, thereby rendering it susceptible to civilian manipulation. Hence, the very professionalism and institutional cohesion of the Cuban armed forces work in favor of Raul’s ascendance, with the military joining in a broader coalition with the technocratic, bureaucratic, and other civilian elites in support of, rather than in opposition to, Fidel’s younger brother.

The elite approach to the succession riddle thus reinforces the earlier conclusions attained by viewing individual and institutional actors: namely, that RatYil remains the strongest candidate, and that the military emerges as the pivotal element within the regime. The approach, however, also indicates a strong basis for stable elite coali-


tion-building across civilian and military groupings as a result of considerable consensus on most key issues among elite tendencies, although the jidelistas display the least aflinity with other groups. In this regard, there is broad agreement on the need for institutionalization, economic development, broader Latin American ties, and continued dependence upon the Soviets.

On the other hand, the elite approach suggests that much of the unity of a post-Castro regime would be contingent upon a continued high-threat perception with respect to the United States, and, corres- pondingly, upon the perceived need to remain a client-state of the U.S.S.R. in order to ensure the long-run survival of the Cuban Revo- lution. The diminution of that threat perception could thus have internal consequences in terms of coalition-building. It would strengthen the hand of both the technocrats and the bureacrats who favor renewed ties with the United States for reasons of economic development and easing Cuba’s dependence on the Soviets. Even more, it could introduce divisions within the armed forces regarding not only Cuba’s defense posture toward the United States, but also its subordinate ties to the Soviets. Were the threat-perception to shift from Washington to the question of rising Soviet control over Cuban alfairs, therefore, Ratil’s position might be weakened and a new civil-military coalition might emerge. The catalyst for the formation of a new military, technocratic, and bureaucratic coalition, however, would have to be provided by a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba. Such a policy shift by Washington has not been attempted in the past; it is not likely to occur in the immediate future, as evidenced by the renewed tension in U.S.-Cuban relations in the wake of.Cuba’s Angolan involvement.

Documents

Political succession in Cuba