Case # 28 – Icasiano vs. Icasiano

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE. CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee, vs.NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.

Notes: (from business dictionary)  

Definition of duplicate copy

The two classifications are: (1) copies producedfor information purposes only and which may be destroyed afteruse, and (2) copies that have administrative, fiscal, legal,or historical value.

Definition of duplicate original

A copy that has all the essential aspects of the original,including signatures.

Notes

A duplicate original of a letter may be created and sent bydifferent routes to increase the likelihood that at least oneoriginal copy arrives to the addressee.

FACTS:

1. JosefaVillacorta executed her last will and testament induplicate on June 2, 1956 and she died on Sept. 12, 1958. Thewill was:

* attested by three instrumental witnesses- Justo TorresJr., Jose Natividad and VinicioDy

* acknowledged by the testatrix and the three instrumentalwitnesses on the same date before Atty. Ong, Notary Public

* the will was actually prepared by Atty. Samson who waspresent during the execution and signing of the decedent’s lastwill and testament.

* pages of the original and duplicate were duly numbered

* the attestation clause contains all the facts required bylaw to be recited therein and signed by the attesting witnesses

* will is written in the language known to and spoken by thetestatrix (Tagalog)

* will was executed in one single occasion in duplicatecopies

* both original and duplicate copies were duly acknowledgedbefore the Notary Public on the same date.

2. The will consisted of five pages and while signed at the endand in every page, it does not contain the signature of one ofthe attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose Natividad on page 3 thereof;but the duplicate copy attached was signed by the testatrix andthe three attesting witnesses in each and every page.

ISSUE: Does the failure of one of the attesting witnesses tosign on one page of the original invalidate the will, and hence,denial of the probate?

HELD: NO.

1. The inadvertent failure of one of the witnesses to affix hissignature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneouslifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per sesufficient to justify the denial of the probate. Theimpossibility of substituting this page is cured since thetestatrix and two other witnesses signed the defective page, andthat the document bears the imprint of the seal of the notarypublic before whom the testament was ratified by the testatrixand all three witnesses.

2. The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted asto penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of asingle witness over whose conduct she has no control, where thepurpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament andits component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional ordeliberate deviation existence, and the evidence on recordattests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.

3. Despite the literal tenor of the law, the Court has held thatin other cases that;

a. a testament with the only page signed at its foot by thetestator and witnesses but not in the left margin could beprobated(Abangan vs. Abangan)

b. despite the requirement of correlative lettering of the pagesof a will, the failure to make the first page either by lettersor numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro).

These precedents exemplify the Court’s policy to requiresatisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard againstfraud and bad faith, but without undue or unnecessary curtailmentof the testamentary privilege.

4. The appellants also argued that since the original of thewill is in existence and available, the duplicate is not entitledto probate. Since they opposed the probate of the originalbecause of the lacking signature on page 3, it is easilydiscerned that the oppositors-appellants run into a dilemma. Ifthe original is defective and invalid, then in the law, there isno other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate, and the sameis probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated,then the objection to the signed duplicate need not beconsidered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, saidduplicate, serves to prove that the omission of one signature inthe third page of the original testament was inadvertent and notintentional.

Case # 29 - Cruz vs. Villasor

AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner, vs.

HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.

Civil Code Provisions:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must besubscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by thetestator's name written by some other person in his presence, andby his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three ormore credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and ofone another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name andthe instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, asaforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on theleft margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively inletters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon whichthe will is written, and the fact that the testator signed thewill and every page thereof, or caused some other person to writehis name, under his express direction, in the presence of theinstrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signedthe will and all the pages thereof in the presence of thetestator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to thewitnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n)

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary publicby the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not berequired to retain a copy of the will, or file another with theOffice of the Clerk of Court

FACTS:

1. The only question presented for determination, on which thedecision of this case hinges, is whether the supposed Last Willand Testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Cruz) was executed inaccordance with:

Art. 805- which states at at least three credible witnessesmust attest and subscribe to the will and

Art. 806- requiring the testator and the witnesses toacknowledge the will before a notary public.

2. Of the three instrumental witnesses on the supposed Last Willand Testament of Cruz, one of them, Atty. Angel Teves (Teves),acted also as the notary public before whom the will was supposedto have been acknowledged. The petitioner argues that as a resultthereof, the will has only two witnesses who appeared before thenotary public to acknowledge the will.

3. The respondent, Lugay, who is supposed to execute the will,stated that there was substantial compliance with the legalrequirement of three attesting witnesses, even if one of themacted as a notary public based on American jurisprudence.

ISSUE: Can the notary public be considered as the thirdattesting witness?

HELD: No. The probate of the Last will and Testament of Cruz isdeclared not valid and set aside.

1. The notary public cannot acknowledge before himself hishaving signed the will. If the third witness is the notarypublic himself, he would have to avow, assent or admit ashis having signed the will in front of himself. This cannotbe done because he cannot split his personality into two sothat one will appear before the other to acknowledge hisparticipation in the making of the will.

2. The function of a notary public is to guard against anyillegal or immoral arrangements. That would be defeated ifhe was also the attesting witness. He would be interestedin sustaining the validity of the will, as it directlyinvolves himself and the validity of his own act. It wouldplace him in an inconsistent position and the very purposeof the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.

3. American jurisprudence cannot be used here for we are inPhilippine jurisdiction. In the U.S., the notary public andwitnesses referred to in several jurisprudence merely acted

as instrumental, subscribing or attesting witnesses and notas acknowledging witnesses. Here, the notary public actednot only as attesting witness but also as acknowledgingwitness.

4. In allowing the notary public to act as third witness, orone of the attesting and acknowledging witness, would havethe effect of only two attesting witnesses to the will whichis violative of Art. 805 requiring at least 3 witnesses andArt. 806 which requires the testator and the required numberof witnesses to appear before the notary public toacknowledge the will.

Case # 49 – Roberts v. Leonidas

ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS V. HON. LEONIDAS, MAXINE TATE-GRIMM ET AL, 129 SCRA 33 (1984)

FACTS: Edward Grimm was an American residing in Manila until his death in 1977. He was survived by his 2nd wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children from a 1st

marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended in divorce

1. Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, CA in January1959. One will disposed of his Philippine estate describedas conjugal property of himself and his 2nd wife. The secondwill disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.

2. The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate inUtah by Maxine in March 1978. Maxine admitted that shereceived notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila byEthel in January 1978. Subsequently, the Utah court admittedthe two wills and a codicil for probate in April 1978, andwas issued upon consideration of the stipulation between thelawyers fro Maxine and Ethel

3. In April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of theintestate proceeding in Manila, entered into an agreement inUtah regarding the estate. The agreement provided thatMaxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personalrepresentatives (administrators) of Grimm’s Philippineestate and that Maxine’s ½ conjugal share in the estateshould be reserved for her which would not be less than $1.5million plus the homes in Utah and Sta. Mesa.

4. Manila Intestate Proceedings: Maxine filed an opposition andmotion to dismiss the intestate proceeding in Manila on theground of pendency of the Utah probate proceedings.However, pursuant to the compromise agreement, Maxinewithdrew the opposition and motion to dismiss. The courtignored the will found in the record. The estate waspartitioned.

5. In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate ofthe two wills (which was already probated in Utah), that thepartition approved by the intestate court be set aside, andthat Maxine be named executrix, and Ethel be ordered toaccount for the properties received by them and return thesame to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were defrauded dueto the machinations of the Ethel, that the compromiseagreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding was voidbecause Grimm died testate so the partition was contrary tothe decedent’s wills.

6. Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which wasdenied by respondent Judge for lack of merit

ISSUE: WON respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss

HELD: No. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and “no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed.”

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled through an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

ROBERTS v LEONIDAS

No. L-55509, 27 April 1984

129 SCRA 33

Probate of a will is mandatory in order that the said will maypass property. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that "it isanomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settledin an intestate proceeding." Accordingly, the Court ordered theconsolidation of the testate and intestate proceedings, and for thejudge hearing the testate case to continue hearing the consolidatedcases.

In de Borja v vda de Borja, infra, the Supreme Court allowed and infact enforced the compromise agreement between a stepson and hisstepmother, despite the fact that the tenor of the compromise agreementis not consistent with the tenor of the will of the testator. It isimportant to distinguish the variance between the ruling in de Borja andthe ruling in Roberts. Based on the dictum of the Supreme Court in thesetwo cases, is it lawful for the heirs to divide the estate in accordance

with a freely negotiated compromise agreement and in the processdisregard the terms of the will? Or will such a compromise agreementresult in an "anomalous" situation deplored by the Supreme Court inRoberts?

Aquino, J.:

x x x

Antecedents - Edward M. Grimm, an American resident of Manila,died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He wassurvived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm, and their two children,named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm, and by JuanitaGrimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by afirst marriage which ended in divorce.

He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco,California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which hedescribed as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. Thesecond will deposed of his estate outside the Philippines.

In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. Thetwo children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in thewill disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the willdealing with his property outside this country, the testator said:

I purposely have made no provision in this will for mydaughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter Elsa Grimm McFadden(Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for each of them ina separate will disposing of my Philippine property.

The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by MaxineTate Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of theThird Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. uanita Grimm

Morris of Cupertino, California, and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. BenitezStreet, Horseshoe Village, Quezon city were notified of the probateproceedings.

Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petitionfiled in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. In its order dated April 10,1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate the twowills and the codicil. It was issued upon consideration of thestipulation dated April 14, 1978 "by and between the attorneys forMaxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate,Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel GrimmRoberts.

Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her twochildren, Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita GrimmMorris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm, as the second parties,without knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into acompromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. x x x.

Intestate Proceeding No. 113024 - At this juncture, it should bestated that forty-three days after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978,his daughters of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyersDeogracias T. Reyes and Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of theManila Court of First Instance intestate proceedings no. 113024 for thesettlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix.

On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara LawOffice, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestateproceeding on the ground of the pendency in Utah of a proceeding for theprobate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed specialadministratrix. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's willdisposing of his Philippine estate. x x x.

The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted thatMaxine, through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B.Macaraeg), withdrew the opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the

behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators.Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromiseagreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record.

x x x

Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signedand filed by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and hertwo children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979adjudicated to Maxine one-half (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estateand one eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12 1/2%. No mentionat all was made of the will in that order.

Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two childrenreplaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their lawyer, who on August9, moved to defer approval of the project of partition. The courtconsidered the motion moot and academic considering that it had alreadyapproved the declaration of heirs and project of partition.

x x x

After November 1979, or a period of more than five months, therewas no movement or activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980,Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion foraccounting "so that the Estate properties can be partitioned among theheirs and the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine'slawyer, was notified of that motion.

x x x

Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding no. 134559 - OnSeptember 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara Law Firm, in behalfof Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a

petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probatedin Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be setaside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine beappointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered toaccount for the properties received by them and to return the same toMaxine.

Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they weredefrauded due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding isvoid because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary tothe decedent's wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidasdenied it for lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel thenfiled a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying thatthe testate proceeding be dismissed, or alternatively, that the twoproceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matterof annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to thepetition for probate.

Ruling - We hold that respondent judge did not commit any graveabuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denyingEthel's motion to dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm diedwith two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal propertyunless it is proved and allowed."

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that theestate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestateproceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated withthe testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceedingshould continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality ofthis judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless sheconsiders her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for thepurpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, shouldbe served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testatecase.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The temporary restrainingorder is dissolved. No Costs.

Makasiar (Chairman), Guerrero and de Castro, JJ., concur.Concepcion, Jr. and Abad Santos, JJ., no part. Escolin, J., in theresult.

Case # 50 – Nepomuceno v. CA

NEPOMUCENO V. CA, 139 SCRA 206 (1985)

DOCTRINE: While the general rule is that the probate court's areaof inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will, practical considerations may compel the probate court to pass upon matters of intrinsic validity. In particular, where a testamentary provision is void on its face, a probate court, in accordance with the ruling in Nuguid v Nuguid, pass upon such provision for the purpose of declaring its nullity

FACTS: In the last will and testament of Martin Jugo, he named and appointed the petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner.

1. The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the Will,but the legal wife and children filed an opposition.

2. The lower court denied the probate of the will on the groundthat the testator admitted to cohabiting with Nepomuceno.The will’s admission to probate was deemed an idle exercisesince based on the face of the will, the invalidity of theinstrinsic provisions is evident.

3. The appellate court, however, declared the will to be validexcept that the devise in favour of the petitioner is nulland void. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,but such was denied.

ISSUES:

1. WON the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdictionwhen after declaring the last will and testament of thetestator validly drawn, it went on to pass upon theintrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor ofherein petitioner.

2. Is the disposition in favor of the petitioner valid?

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: The court acted within its jurisdiction

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s areaof inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given the exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity even before its formal validity has been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremonyif on its face, it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

SECOND ISSUE: Validity of the disposition to the petitioner:

Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:

The following donations shall be void:

(1) Those made between persons who were guilty ofadultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;

(2) Those made between persons found guilty of thesame criminal offense, in consideration thereof;

(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife,descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.

In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:

The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations   inter vivos   shall apply to testamentary provisions.

The records of the case do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith on the part of Nepomuceno:

a. The last will and testament itself expressly admits itsindubitably on its face the meretricious relationshipbetween the testator and petitioner, the devisee

b. Petitioner herself, initiated the presentation ofevidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civilstatus of the testator, which led private respondents topresent contrary evidence. In short, the partiesthemselves duelled on the intrinsic validity of thelegacy given in the will to petitioner by the testator atthe start of the proceedings.

Whether or not petitioner knew that the testator, Jugo, the man she had lived with as a husband, was already married was important . When the court ruled that Jugo and the petitioner were guilty of adultery and concubinage, it was a finding that the petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended to be.

The prohibition in Art. 739 is against the making a donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It isthe donation which becomes void. The giver cannot given even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

Case # 51 – Pascual v. De La Cruz

PASCUAL V. DELA CRUZ, 28 SCRA 421 (1969)

DOCTRINE: Undue and improper pressure and influence as well as fraud are grounds to disallow a will. These twin grounds were invoked in this case. While the Court considered only the issue ofimproper influence and pressure, and summarized the rulings thereon, it is equally important to consider the effect of alleging undue influence and pressure simultaneously with fraud.

FACTS: On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or ascendant, died at the age of 89 in her residence at San Roque, Navotas, Rizal. On 14 January 1960, apetition for the probate of her alleged will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Andres Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the decedent.

1. Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the lateCatalina de la Cruz contested the validity of the will on thegrounds that the formalities required by law were notcomplied with; that the testatrix was mentally incapable ofdisposing of her properties by will at the time of itsexecution; that the will was procured by undue and improperpressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; andthat the signature of the testatrix was obtained throughfraud.

ISSUE: WON under the circumstances, undue and improper pressure and influence as well as fraud are grounds to disallow a will.

HELD: No.

Petitioner, Andres Pascual, although not related by blood to the deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to thelatter for she considered him as her own son. As a matter of factit was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and cared for AndresPascual but also her sisters held him with affection so much so that Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also her sole heir to her property in her will without any objection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz.

The basic principles of undue pressure and influence as laid down by the jurisprudence on this Court: that to be sufficient to avoida will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowersand subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own (Coso v Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil 596); Icasiano v Icasiano, L-18979, 30 June 1964.

The circumstances marshaled by the contestants certainly fail to establish actual undue influence and improper pressure exercised on the testatrix by the proponent. Their main reliance is on the assertion of the latter, in the course of his testimony, that the deceased "did not like to sign anything unless I knew it," which does not amount to proof that she would sign anything that proponent desired. On the contrary, the evidence of contestants-appellants, that proponent purchased a building in Manila for the testatrix, placed the title in his name, but caused the name "Catalina de la Cruz" to be painted therein in bold letters to mislead the deceased, even if true, demonstrates that proponent's influence was not such as to overpower and destroy the free will of the testatrix. Because if the mind of the latter were really subjugated by him to the extent pictured by the contestants, then proponent had no need to recourse to the deception averred.

Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the testatrix who asked Dr. Sanchez to be one of the instrumental witnesses evidenceof such undue influence, for the reason that the rheumatism of thetestatrix made it difficult for her to look for all the witnesses.That she did not resort to relative or friend is, likewise, explainable: it would have meant the disclosure of the terms of her will to those interested in her succession but who were not favored by her, thereby exposing her to unpleasant importunity andrecrimination that an aged person would naturally seek to avoid. The natural desire to keep the making of a will secret can, likewise, account for the failure to probate the testament during her lifetime.

Pedro de la cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late catalina de la cruzfell short of establishing actual exercise of improper pressure or influence. Considering that the testatrix considered proponent as her own son, to the extent that she expressed no objection to his being made sole heir of her sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her own rights, we find nothing abnormal in her instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary.

The probate of the will was allowed.

Case # 56 – Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, vs.ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.33 SCRA 554 (1970)

The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give toevery expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of

the expressions inoperative. Of the two projects of partition submittedby the contending parties, that project which will give the greatesteffect to the testamentary disposition should be adopted. Thus, wherethe testatrix enumerated the specific properties to be given to eachcompulsory heir and the testatrix repeatedly used the words "I bequeath"was interpreted to mean a partition of the estate by an act mortis causa,rather than as an attempt on her part to give such properties as devisesto the designated beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific propertiesassigned to each compulsory heir were deemed to be in full or partialpayment of legitime, rather than a distribution in the nature ofdevises.

The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note theprovision of Article 886 which reads: "Legitime is that part of thetestator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law hasreserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsoryheirs." Article 886 is couched upon a negative prohibition "cannotdispose of". In the will under consideration, the testatrix disposed ofpractically her entire estate by designating a beneficiary for eachproperty. Necessarily, the testamentary dispositions included thatportion of the estate called "legitime." It is thus imperative toreconcile the tenor of Article 1080 (which is the basis of the followingdecision) with Article 886.

FACTS: In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by sevencompulsory heirs: 6 legitimate children and 1 legitimate granddaughter.Marina is the appellee while the others were the appellants

1. Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written inPampango. The beneficiaries were the 7 compulsory heirs andsix grandchildren

2. In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of herproperties (assessed at P1.8 million) which included real andpersonal properties and shares of stocks at Pampanga SugarCentral Devt Co

3. During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was namethe executor of the deceased’s estate

4. In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided inaccordance with her testamentary disposition where she

devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprisingalmost her entire estate among her heirs. Based on thepartition, Marina and Tomas were to receive more than theother heirs

5. Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partitionadjudicating the estate as follows:a. the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was

P129,254.96, which was comprised of cash and/or propertiesspecifically given to them based on the will

b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that theyreceived in the will less the cash/properties to completetheir respective legitime

6. The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the estate where Marina and Tomas were toreceive considerably less

7. The lower court approved the executor’s project of partitionciting that Art 906 and 907 NCC specifically provide thatwhen the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shallbe completed. The court cited that if the proposition of theoppositors was upheld, it will substantially result in adistribution of intestacy which is a violation of Art 791 NCC

ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controllingin this case

HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentarydisposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, thatinterpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall bepreferred" and "The words of a will are to receive an interpretationwhich will give to every expression some effect, rather than one whichwill render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes ofinterpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will preventintestacy." In Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held that "the intentions andwishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitutethe fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial,relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordancetherewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator'swords, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principallaw in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision ofthe Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed clearly and precisely in hislast will, amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively befaithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and deviseesand legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts maysubstitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Thus, theoppositors’ proposition for partition cannot be given effect.

ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in thenature of a partition. In her will, the decedent noted that aftercommanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as theexpenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for theprobate of her last will and for the administration of her property inaccordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wishand I command that my property be divided" in accordance with thedispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specifiedeach real property in her estate and designated the particular heiramong her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whomshe bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, ascontemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC,providing that "Should a person make a partition of his estate by an actinter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as itdoes not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."

CAB: This was properly complied with in the executor’s project ofpartition as the oppositors were adjudicated the properties respectivelydistributed and assigned to them by the decedent in her will and thedifferential to complete their legitimes were taken from the cash and/orproperties of Marina and Tomas, who were obviously favored by thedecedent in her will.

Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisionssupport the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by thelower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed byoppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentarydisposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the

same, which they would consider as mere devises and legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the otherhalf of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsoryheirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distributionby intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to Art 791 NCC.

EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon each heirthe exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him", from thedeath of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter,and, she cannot be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methodsprovided for by law

DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will ofspecific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises,for it clearly appears from the whole context of the will and thedispositions by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some smallproperties of little value already noted at the beginning of thisopinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estatethrough her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that hertestamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to thebeneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that saiddispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes ofthe compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph ofher will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in thethird paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in caseany of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall diebefore I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of mydeath shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased."

COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because here,distribution and partition of the entire estate was made by thetestatrix, without her having made any previous donations during herlifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of eachheir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call forthe application of Art 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation.

CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR LEGITIME? No. Their right wasmerely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of theCivil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project ofpartition, and they can no longer demand a further share from theremaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by thetestatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.

Case # 57 – De Roma v. CA

G.R. No. L-46903               July 23, 1987

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.

FACTS:

1. Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in the Courtof First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as guardianof Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included.1

2. The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited suchcollation and the donation was not officious.

The two articles provide as follows:

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account ofthe partition.

Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.

3. The trial court resolved the issue in favor of the petitioner. The donation did not impair the legitimes of the two adopted daughters and such donation was imputed to the free portion of Candelaria’s estate. The CA reversed the decision holding that the deed of donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Art. 1962. It ordered the collation and the equal division of the net estate of the decedent, including the donated property between Buhay and Rosalinda.

4. The deed of donation stated:

“ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA,sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa aysiya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;

IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aarisa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion.”

ISSUE: WON there was an express prohibition to collate

HELD: No express prohibition to collate.

1. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and equivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Art. 1962. Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Art. 1062. The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free portionof the decedent’s estate merits little consideration. Imputationis not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious.

2. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Art.1061. We surmise that We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court

correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation.6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.

3. We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "freeportion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.

4. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of thatintention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto,with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Case # 60 – Aznar v. Duncan

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD CHRISTENSEN, ADOLFO AZNAR (EXECUTOR) V. LUCY DUNCAN AND HELEN CHRISTENSEN, 17 SCRA 590 (1966)

DOCTRINE: The concept of total omission from the hereditary estate isfurther explained in this case. While the traditional concept ofomission, based on Roman Law, means that the compulsory heir was notinstituted as an heir, the same was abandoned so that if a compulsoryheir were given a legacy by the testator in the will (withoutinstituting him or her as an heir), the said compulsory heir can nolonger claim the benefit of Article 854.

One point deserves some consideration. Admittedly, the testatorwas a citizen of the State of California. Under the present Civil Code,"testate and intestate succession, both with respect to the order ofsuccession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsicvalidity of testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the nationallaw of the person whose succession is under consideration." (Article 16,Civil Code) In the foregoing case, the estate of the testator wasdistributed in accordance with Philippine law, taking into account thefact that Article 854 was made to apply. This point needs clarification.

FACTS: Edward Christensen was a citizen of California and was domiciled in the Philippines. When he died he left a will which alleged that he had only one child (Lucy Duncan), and that he wasgiving a devise of P3,600 to Helen Christensen (whom he alleged was not related to him).

1. In the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Helen was anatural child of the deceased and that the properties of thedecedent are to be divided equally between Helen and Lucypursuant to the project of partition submitted by theadministrator.

2. Lucy argued that this is not a case of preterition, but isgoverned by Art 906 NCC which states that: “Any compulsoryheir to whom the testator has left by any title less thanthe legitime belonging to him may demand that the same maybe fully satisfied.” Moreover, considering the provisions ofthe will whereby the testator expressly denied hisrelationship with Helen, but left her to a legacy althoughless than the amount of her legitime, she was in effectdefectively disinherited within the meaning of Art 918 NCC.Thus, under Arts 906 and 918, Helen is only entitled to herlegitime, and not to a share equal to that of Lucy

ISSUE: Whether the estate should be divided equally among the twochildren (Art 854) OR whether Lucy’s share should just be reducedto meet the legitime of Helen (Art 906)

HELD: Helen should only be given her legitime since there was no preterition. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir of the will, either by not naming him at all, or while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, not assigning to him some part of the properties.

The decision in Neri v. Akutin is not applicable, because it referred to a will where "the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, and (that)without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left nothing to them, or at least, some of them." In the case at bar the testator did not entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a legacy of P3,600.00.

Case # 61 – Nuguid v. Nuguid

NUGUID V. NUGUID, 17 SCRA 449 (1966)

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the area of inquiry of a probate court is limited to the testamentary capacity of the testator and the due execution of the will. However, if it should appear on the face of the will that the sole disposition is intrinsically invalidity, and that nothing is gained from an inquiry into extrinsic validity, then a probe into the testamentary disposition, and the consequential invalidation thereof is justified for practical considerations. While Article 854 annuls merely the institution of heir, the court is justified in declaring the entire will void if the only testamentary disposition in the questioned will is the institution of the universal heir. In such a case, the effect of the nullification of the testamentary disposition would be the same as the nullification of the will itself.

FACTS: Rosario Nuguid died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitime or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz SalongaNuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

1. On May 18, 1963, petitioner RemediosNuguid filed in the Courtof First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedlyexecuted by Rosario Nuguidsome 11 years before her demise.Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate andthat letters of administration with the will annexed beissued to her.

2. On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz SalongaNuguid,concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceasedRosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate ofher will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by theinstitution of petitioner RemediosNuguid as universal heir ofthe deceased, oppositors - who are compulsory heirs of thedeceased in the direct ascending line - were illegallypreterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

3. On August, 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petitionfor probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved todismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.

4. On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition tothe motion to dismiss.

5. The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will inquestion is a complete nullity and will perforce createintestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" anddismissed the petition without cost.

ISSUE: WON the will is a complete nullity.

HELD: Yes.

Reproduced hereunder is the will:

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister RemediosNuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventeenth day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

Sgd. (Illegible)

T/ ROSARIO NUGUID

The statute we are called upon to apply is Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whetherliving at the time of the execution of the will or bornafter the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. x xx

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. (Citations omitted.)

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line - her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz SalongaNuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them. They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anularasiempre la institucion de heredero, dandocaracterabsoluto a esteordenamiento,"referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir - nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that the court says that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:

The statement in Article 854 that, annulment notwithstanding, 'thedevices and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Legacies and devices merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will.

As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether.Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition

The disputed order declares the will in question "a complete nullity." Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir." Considering, however, that the will provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.

Case # 62 – Reyes v. Barreto-Datu

REYES V. BARRETTO-DATU, 19 SCRA 85 (1967)

DOCTRINE: Preterition is the omission of one, some or all compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the death of the testator, or born subsequent thereto. Among other things, Reyes holds that omission from the inheritance, as an element of preterition, must be a total omission, such that ifa compulsory heir in the direct line received something from the testator under the terms of the will, such heir cannot be considered preterited

FACTS: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan.

1. When BibianoBarretto died on February 18, 1936, in the Cityof Manila, he left his share of these properties in a willto SaludBarretto (Salud), mother of plaintiff's wards, andLucia Milagros Barretto (Milagros) and a small portion aslegacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and FelisaBarrettoand his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of the fishpondsituated in barrio San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was reserved for his widow, MariaGerard. In the meantime, Maria Gerardo was appointedadministratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a project ofpartition, which was signed by her in her own behalf and asguardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project ofpartition was approved by the Court of First Instance ofManila. The distribution of the estate and the delivery ofthe shares of the heirs followed. As a consequence,SaludBarretto took immediate possession of her share andsecured the cancellation of the original certificates oftitle and the issuance of new titles in her own name.

2. Maria Gerardo died and upon her death, it was discoveredthat she executed two will. In the first will, sheinstituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs. In the secondwill, she revoked the same and left all her properties infavour of Milagros alone. The later will was allowed andthe first rejected.

3. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes,husband of the deceasedSalud, as guardian of the children,it was determined by the lower court that Salud was not achild of Maria Gerardo and her husband, Bibiano. Thisruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed thesame.

4. Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate ofMaria Gerardo as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo,plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate ofthe deceased BibianoBarretto, which was given in usufruct tohis widow Maria Gerardo (fishpond property). Hence, thisaction for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.

5. Milagros then moved to declare the project of partitionsubmitted in the proceedings for the settlement of theestate of Bibiano to be null and void ab initio because the

Distributee, SaludBarretto, was not a daughter of the Sps.The nullity of the project was based on Art. 1081 of theCivil Code of 1889 which provided that :

“A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been been included, shall be null and void.”

The Court ordered the plaintiff to return the properties received under the project

of partition.

ISSUE: WON the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and that Salud did not acquire title thereto

HELD: NO

1. SaludBarretto admittedly had been instituted as an heir inthe late BibianoBarretto's last will and testament togetherwith defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had betweenthem could not be one such had with a party who was believedto be an heir without really being one, and was not null andvoid under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081)does not speak of children, or descendants, but ofheirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary orintestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to bea daughter of the testator does not preclude her being oneof the heirs expressly named in his testament; forBibianoBarretto was at liberty to assign the free portion ofhis estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½)assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros,Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentaryheir of BibianoBarretto.

2. Where the testator allotted in his will to his legitimatedaughter a share less than her legitime, such circumstancewould not invalidate the institution of a stranger as anheir, since there was no preterition or total omission ofthe forced heir.

3. Where a partition was made between two persons instituted asheirs in the will, and one of them was found out later notto be the testator’s daughter, while the other was reallyhis daughter, it cannot be said that the partition was avoid compromise on the civil status of the person who wasnot the testator’s daughter. At the time of the partition,the civil status of that person was not being questioned.There can be no compromise on a matter that was not anissue. While the law outlaws a compromise over civilstatus, it does not forbid a settlement by the partiesregarding the share that should correspond to the claimantto the hereditary estate.

4. A project of partition is merely a proposal for thedistribution of the hereditary estate, which the court mayaccept or reject. It is the court alone that makes thedistribution of the estate and determines the personsentitled thereto. It is the final judicial decree ofdistribution that vests title in the distributees. If thedecree was erroneous, it should have been corrected by anopportune appeal; but once it had become final, its bindingeffect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unlessproperly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Wherethe court has validly issued a decree of distribution andthe same has become final, the validity or invalidity of theproject of partition becomes irrelevant.

5. A distribution in the decedent’s will, made according to hiswill should be respected. The fact that one of thedistributees was a minor (Milagros) at the time the courtissued the decree of distribution does not imply that thecourt had no jurisdiction to enter the decree ofdistribution. The proceeding for the settlement of adecedent’s estate is a proceeding in rem. It is binding onthe distributee who was represented by her mother asguardian.

6. Where in a partition between two instituted heirs, one ofthem did not know that she was not really the child of thetestator, it cannot be said that she defrauded the otherheir who was the testator’s daughter. At any rate, reliefon the ground of fraud must be obtained within 4 years from

its discovery. When Milagros was 16 years old in 1939, whenthe fraud was allegedly perpetrated and she became of age in1944, and became award of the fraud in 1946, her action in1956 to set aside the partition was clearly barred.

Case # 64 – Balanay v. Martinez

BALANAY, JR. V. MARTINEZ, 64 SCRA 454 (1975)

DOCTRINE: Balanay stresses the jurisdiction of the probate court.Unless the nullity of the will is patent on its face, the probatecourt should first pass upon the extrinsic validity of the will before passing upon its substantive validity. Hence, the distinction between this case and Nuguid

Upon the other hand, while the court correctly modified the husband's right to waive his hereditary right with respect to the estate of the deceased spouse, and his right to waive his half share in the conjugal estate, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code, the court was silent on the validity of the husband's conformity to the distribution of the conjugal estate in accordance with the terms of the will of the wife. Obviously, the court assumed the validity of the renunciation of the husband of his share in the conjugal estate. Such waiver, however, may fall into one of two possible categories, i.e., inter vivos or mortis causa. If it was a waiver effective inter vivos, then it would have amounted to a donation to inter vivos to the wife. That would have been illegal under existing laws. On the other hand, if it was a waiver mortis causa, then the formalities of a will should have been observed, failing which, the waiver would be void. Furthermore, the waiver mortis causa wouldhave required the wife to survive the husband. In either case, the

alleged waiver by the husband of his half share in the conjugal estate resulted in a transmission of property to the wife. And consequently, a characterization of such waiver along the parameters mentioned above is necessary and inescapable. The fundamental question, therefore, that demands an answer is whetheror not a husband or wife could waive his or her share in the conjugal estate in favor of the other by an act inter vivos. We exclude, however, a waiver resulting from a successful petition for separation of property, and the liquidation of the conjugal partnership (or for that matter, the absolute community of property) resulting from the issuance of a decree of annulment or a decree of nullity.

It may be surmised that the validity of the waiver had to be assumed, properly or improperly, otherwise the case will fall under the provision of Article 784 which categorically states thatthe making of a will is strictly a personal act, and that the exercise of testamentary discretion cannot be delegated by a person to another. In any case, Balanay leaves many questions unanswered. Let alone the fact that the decision did not discuss why the husband was not preterited within the meaning of Article 854.

FACTS: Felix Balanay Jr. Appelaed the order of the CFI, declaringillegal and void the will of his mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors

1. Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta Maria, Ilocos Sur, died onFebruary 12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of sixty-seven.She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and bytheir six legitimate children, namely, Felix Balanay, Jr.,

Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob,Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

2. Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition.forthe probate of his mother's notarial will.

3. In paragraph V of the will she stated that after herhusband's death (he was eighty-two years old in 1973) herparaphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which shedescribed as "my properties") should be divided anddistributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will.She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if theywere all owned by her. She disposed of in the will herhusband's one-half share of the conjugal assets.

4. Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probateof the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity,undue influence, preterition of the husband and allegedimproper partition of the conjugal estate.

5. Felix Balanay, Jr. attached an affidavit of Felix Balanay,Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his oppositionto the probate of the will and affirmed that he wasinterested in its probate. On the same date Felix Balanay,Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) ofDivision and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein hemanifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waivedand renounced" his hereditary rights in her estate in favorof their six children.

6. Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contendedthat the affidavit and "conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr.were void. The lower court in its order of June 18, 1973"denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate ofthe will. It gave effect to the affidavit and conformity ofFelix Balanay, Sr.

7. Another lawyer appeared in the case, Atty. David O. Montana,claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr.filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of courtto withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian andrequesting authority to proceed by intestate estateproceeding." Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, thorughAtty. Jose B. Guyo, manifested their conformity with themotion for the issuance of a notice to the creditor.

8. The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montana andAtty. Guyo assumed that the issuance of a notice to creditorswas in order. It adopted the view of Attys. Montana and Guyothat the will was void. It dismissed the petition for probateand converted the testate proceeding into an intestateproceeding.

9. Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M.Sarenas, in a verified motion dated April 15, 1974, asked forthe reconsideration of the lower court's order of February28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montana had no authority towithdraw the petition for the allowance of the will.

ISSUE: WON the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring the will void.

HELD:

The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of thewill be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

But the probate court erred in declaring in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 it gave effect to the survivinghusband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the otherdispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where someof the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries"

The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half" of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she wasa co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and pro indiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code). But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will.

Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership (Art. 179(1) and 1041, Civil Code), but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1050(1), Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.

The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the

legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.

It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.

Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of the will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention." Under article 930 of the Civil Code, "the legacy of devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."

In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming

that the will may be probated. In the instant case, the preteritedheir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights.

It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973.

Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So compellingis the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect.

Case # 66 – Acain v. CA

CONSTANTINO ACAIN V. IAC, VIRGINIA FERNANDEZ AND ROSA DIONGSON, 155 SCRA 100 (1983)

DOCTRINE: Acain resolved once and for all the issue as to whether ornot a surviving spouse could be preterited. This issue was notdefinitively answered in Balanay. In addition, Acain resolved that anadopted child may be preterited. This issue was not resolved inManinang. The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court did not explain thereason why an adopted child (while given the same rights and obligationsas a legitimate child under the provisions of P.D. 603) could bepreterited. It must be noted that given the said provisions, the adoptedchild is not entitled to the right of representation, which is availableto a legitimate child. It would seem, however, that with the provisionsof the Family Code, specifically on the status of an adopted child, thepreterition of an adopted child finds greater support.

FACTS: In May 1984, petitioner Acain filed with RTC Cebu a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain based on the premise that the decedent Nemesio left a will in which petitioner and his siblings were instituted as heirs.

1. The will was allegedly executed by Nemesio in February 1960which was written in Bisaya and was not opposed by privaterespondents

2. In the will, Nemesio bequeathed all his properties to hisbrother Segundo on the condition that if Segundo predeceasesNemesio, said properties will be given to Segundo’s children(herein petitioner)

3. Segundo predeceased before Nemesio. Thus, it is the childrenof Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino aspetitioner

4. Private respondents, Virigina (legally adopted daughter ofthe decedent) and Rosa (decedent’s spouse) filed a motion todismiss on the following grounds:a. The petitioner had no legal capacity to institute said

proceedingsb. Petitioner is merely a universal heirc. The widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited

5. Said motion was denied by the trial judge.6. On appeal, IAC granted private respondents’ petition and

ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probateof the will of Nemesio

7. Petitioner argues that:a. The authority of the probate court is limited only to

inquiring into the intrinsic validity of the will soughtto be probated, and it cannot pass upon the intrinsicvalidity therof before it is admitted to probate

b. The preterition mentioned in Art 854 NCC refers topreterition of “compulsory heirs in the direct line” anddoes not apply to private respondents who are notcompulsory heirs in the direct line. Thus, their omissionshall not annul the institution of heirs

ISSUE: WON private respondents have been preterited

HELD: Yes. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator'swill of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they arenot mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither

instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited Insofar as the widow is concerned, Art 854 NCC may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance for she is not in the direct line. However, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Under Art 39 of P.D. No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), adoption gives to the adopted person the samerights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopted and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widowwere deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be deniedthat they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throwsopen to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado, mejora o donacion" The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothersand sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at

all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation.No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the wholeproperty of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.

ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT

The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Courthas declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said courtat this state of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on theintrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted asuniversal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. The trial court have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved

Case # 67 – Edroso v. Sabalan

EDROSO VS. SABLAN (1913)Marcelina Edroso, petitioner-appellant,vs.Pablo and Basilio Sablan, opponents-appelleesDOCTRINE: A reservor's right to the reservable property is notjust usufructuary in nature. The reservor, having inherited thereservable property from the prepositus, acquires ownership thereof,subject to a resolutory condition. Thus, a reservor has aregistrable title to the property, and may institute landregistration proceedings in the appropriate case.

It must be noted, however, that during the registrationproceedings, the reservees should intervene solely for the purposeof ensuring that the reservable nature of the property is properlyinscribed in the title. Otherwise, a clean title issued pursuantto a decree of registration, may in the proper case extinguish thereserva.

Mariano Ma. Rita

Victoriano Marcelina

Pedro

FACTS: Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had ason named, Pedro who inherited two parcels of land upon thedeath of his father.

1. Subsequently, Pedro died,unmarried and without issue, thetwo parcels of land passed through inheritance tohismother. Hence the hereditary title whereupon isbased the application for registration of herownership.

2. The two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio Sablan(legitimate brothers of Victoriano) opposed the registrationclaiming that either the registration be denied or ifgranted to her, the right reserved by law to them berecorded in the registration of each parcel.

3. The Court of Land Registration denied the registrationholding that the land in question partake of the nature ofproperty required by law to be reserved and that insuch a case application could only be presentedjointly in the names of the mother and the said twouncles. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property in question is inthe nature of a reservable property.

HELD:

A very definite conclusion of law is that the hereditary title isone without a valuable consideration (gratuitous title), and it isso characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who

acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what hereceives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that theuncles are within the third degree of blood relationship.

Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from himthese two parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuableconsideration - that is, by inheritance from another ascendant,his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law,she is obligated to reserve them intact for the claimants, who areuncles or relatives within the third degree and belong to the lineof Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the landsproceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of thenature of property required by law to be reserved is therefore inaccordance with the law.

The person required by article 811 to reserve the right, has,beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has,moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion,although under a condition subsequent. Clearly, he has, under anexpress provision of the law, the right to dispose of the propertyreserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under acondition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the onewho possesses or should possess it and have title to it, althougha limited and recoverable one. In a word, the legal title anddominion, even though under a condition reside in him while helives. After the right required by law to be reserved has beenassured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hadn’t, the relatives within the third degree inwhose favor of the rightis reserved cannot dispose of theproperty, first because it is no way, either actuallyorconstructively or formally, in their possession; and moreover,because they haveno title of ownership or of the fee simple whichthey can transmit to another, on thehypothesis that only when theperson who must reserve the right should die beforethem will theyacquire it.

The SC reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereofdecide and declare that the applicant is entitled to register in

her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matterof the application, recording in the registration the rightrequired by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of theopponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they surviveher.

Case # 68 – Seines v. Esparcia

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellee

Doctrine:

The reserva creates a double resolutory condition: (1) thedeath of the reservor, and (2) the survival of the reservee atthe time of the death of the reservor. While the decision refersto the first as a resolutory condition, it would seem more likelythat the same is a term. In any event, the case confirms thateither the reservor or any of the reservees may alienate thereservable property, and the final outcome of the sales will bedetermined by the timeliness or untimeliness of the death of theseller. It is important to distinguish the sales referred toherein from the concept of a double sale which is regulated inArticle 1544 of the Civil Code.

The subject matter of the two sales referred to herein mustbe clarified. It would seem fairly clear that the reservor soldthe reservable land in question, since at the time of the saidsale, she was the registered owner of the property and in fact inpossession thereof. The sale executed by the reservees may beviewed from a different perspective. Since the reservor wasstill alive at the time of the said sale, it would seem that thereservees could not have validly sold the same parcel of land,which obviously was not theirs. If the said sale were to refer tothe parcel of land, then the sale should properly be construed asa conditional sale - the condition being the survival of theseller-reservees upon the death of the reservor. Upon the otherhand, it is also possible to construed this sale of the reserveesas a sale of their inchoate right to acquire the property. Hencethe subject matter of the sale would not be the reservable land,but the rights of the reservees thereto, which is conditional.

Teresa Saturnino Andrea Sps. Sienes

Agaton Francisco Fernando

PaulinaSps. Esparcia Cipriana

FACTS:

1. Lot 3368 originally belonged to SaturninoYaeso (origin).With his first wife, Teresa Reales, he had 4 children, namedAgaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana.

2. With his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son namedFrancisco (propositus).

3. Upon Yaeso’s death, said lot was left to Francisco and titlewas issued in his name. Because Francisco was then a minor, hismother administered the property for him and declared it in hername for taxation purposes.

4. When Francisco died, single and without any descendant, hismother, Andrea Gutang (reservista) as sole heir, executed anextrajudicial settlement and sale of the property in favor of theSps. ConstancioSienes and GenovevaSilay (Sps. Sienes).

5. Thereafter, the Sps. Sienes demanded from Paulina Yaeso andher husband, Jose Esparcia, the surrender of the originalcertificate of title (which was in their possession). The latterrefused.

6. Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso (reservatorios), the survivinghalf-sisters of Francisco as such, declared the property in theirname and subsequently executed a deed of sale in favor of theSps. Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Sps. Esparcia), who inturn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereaftersecured title in their name.

7. ConstancioSienes then filed an action asking for thenullification of the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana, thereconveyance of the lot and damages and cost of suit.

8. Fidel Esparcia countered that they did not know anyinformation regarding the sale by Andrea Gutang in favor of theSps. Sienes, and that if such sale was made, the same was voidsince Andrea had no right to dispose of the property.

9. The trial court declared that the sale of Andrea Gutang toSps. Sienes was void and that the sale by Paulina andCiprianaYaeso to the Sps. Esparcia was also void. The land in

question was reservable property and therefore, the reservistaAndrea Gutang, was under obligation to reserve it for the benefitof relatives within the third degree belonging to the line fromwhich said property came, if any, survived her.

10. The records show that the lone reserve surviving wasCiprianaYaeso.

ISSUE:

WON the lot in question is reservable property and if so, whetherthe reservoir or the reserve can alienate the same

HELD: Yes, the lot is reservable property.

1. On Francisco’s death, unmarried and without descendants, theproperty was inherited by his mother, Andrea Gutang, who wasunder obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relativeswithin the third degree belonging to the line from which saidproperty came, if any, survived her.

2. Being reservable property, the reserve creates two resolutoryconditions:

a. the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and

b. the survival, at the time of his death, of relativeswithin the third degree belonging to the line from which theproperty came.

In connection with this, the court has held that the reservista(reservor) has the legal title and dominion to the reservableproperty but subject to a resolutory condition. Hence, he mayalienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienationtransmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of thereservista, the right acquired by the transferee being revoked orresolved by the survival of reservatorios (reserves) at the timeof the death of the reservista .

3. In the present case, inasmuch as when the reservista, AndreaGutang died, CiprianaYaeso was still alive, the conclusionbecomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former infavor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservableproperty passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.

4. On the other hand, the sale executed by the sisters, Paulinaand CiprianaYaeso, in favor of the Sps. Esparcia was subject to asimilar resolutory condition. While it may be true that the salewas made by Cipriana and her sister prior to the death of Andrea,it became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutorycondition.

Case # 69 – Florentino v. Florentino

ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FLORENTINO v FLORENTINO G.R. No. L-14856            November 15,1919

Doctrine:

Florentino settles a number of issues. First, with respectto the right of representation accorded the reservee, the samemay be exercised only by such person seeking to represent if hehimself is a relative within the third degree of the prepositus.Second, Florentino rejected the theory that if the reservableproperty does not fall into the hands of strangers, then thereserva is not applicable. Thus, whether or not the reservableproperty was devised or willed by the reservor to a relative ofthe prepositus coming from the same line as the origin, thereservable nature of the property is not lost. From thisprinciple arises an inference that the reservable property is notpart of the estate of the reservor upon his demise. Third, thereis an affirmation that the title of the reservor to thereservable property is not in the nature of full dominion, byreason of the reservation provided by law. However, there isserious doubt as to the validity of this proposition in the lightof the more recent pronouncements of the Court. That the reservoris a mere usufructuary (as intimated in Florentino), iscontradicted by later decisions characterizing the title of thereservor to the reservable property as absolute but possessedwith a resolutory condition.

Notice, however, that the court, in the dispositive portionof this decision, committed an error in the distribution of thereservable property. Antonia Apolonio II

Severina

+Jose MercedesRamon Apolonio IIIMiguelVictorinoAntonioRosario

Juan +Maria

Encarnacion +Isabel +Espirita

Emilia

JesusLourdesCaridadDolores

Gabriel +Pedro

JoseAsunsion

Magdalena

FACTS:

1. ApolonioIsabeloFlorentino II married Antonia Faz, with whomhe had 9 children. When his wife died, Apolonio marriedSeverina, with whom he had 2 children- Mercedes and Apolonio III.

2. Apolonio II died and was survived by his second wife and theten children, Apolonio III, being born after Apolonio II died.

3. He was able to execute a will instituting as universal heirshis 10 children, the posthumous Apolonio III and his widow,Severina, and declaring that all of his property should bedivided among all of his children in both marriages.

4. In the partition of his estate, Apolonio III was given 6parcels of land and some personal property of Apolonio II.

5. Apolonio III later died and his mother, Severina, succeededto all these properties. She subsequently died, leaving a willinstituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter,Mercedes.

6. As such heir, Mercedes took possession of all the propertyleft at the death of her mother, including the property inheritedby Severina from Apolonio III, which is said to be reservableproperty. Accordingly, Mercedes had been gathering the fruits ofthe parcels of land.

7. The children of Apolonio II by his first wife, as well as hisgrandchildren by the first marriage, instituted an action forrecovery of their share of the reservable property. Thedefendants contend that no property can be reserved for the

plaintiffs inasmuch as there is a forced heiress and theobligation to reserve is secondary to the duty to respect thelegitime.

8. Also, the danger that the property coming from the same linemight fall into the hands of strangers has been avoided.

ISSUE:

WON the property is subject to reserve troncal or not

HELD: Yes, it is subject to reserve troncal

1. Even if Severina left in her will said property to her onlydaughter and forced heiress, nevertheless, this property has notlost its reservable nature. The posthumous son, Apolonio III,acquired the property by lucrative title or by inheritance fromhis legitimate father.

2. Although such property was inherited by Severina,nevertheless, she was duty bound to reserve the property thusacquired for the benefit of the relatives within the third degreeof the line from which such property came. Ascendants do notinherit the reservable property, but its enjoyment , use andtrust merely for the reason that the law imposes the obligationto reserve and preserve the same for certain designated persons,who on the death of said ascendants- reservoir, acquire theownership of said property in fact and operation of law in thesame manner as forced heirs.

3. There are then 7 reservees entitled to the reservableproperty left at the death of Apolonio III, to wit:

a. Apolonio II’s 3 children from his first marriage

b. The children of Apolonio II’s deceased children, 12 inall

c. Mercedes, Apolonio III’s sister.

All of the plaintiffs are relatives of the posthumous son withinthe third degree (four as half-siblings and 12 as his nephewsand nieces). As the first four are his relatives within the

third degree in their own right and the others by right ofrepresentation, all are entitled as reservees.

4. The properties in question came from the common ancestor,Apolonio II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III withoutissue, the same passed by operation of law into the hands of hislegitimate mother, Severina; it became reservable property withthe object that the same should not fall into the possession ofpersons other than those comprehended within the order ofsuccession traced by the law from Apolonio II, the origin of theproperty.

5. Severina could have disposed in her will all her own propertyin favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes, as forced heir.But the provision concerning the reservable property reducing therights of the other reserves is null and void inasmuch as saidproperty is not her own and she has only the right of usufruct orof fiduciary, with the right to deliver the same to the reserves.

6. Reservable property neither comes nor falls under theabsolute dominion of the ascendant who inherits and receives thesame from his descendant, therefore, it does not form part of hisproperty nor become the legitimeof his forced heirs. It becomeshis own property only in case all the relatives of his descendantdied, in which case, the said reservable property loses suchcharacter.

Case # 70 – Padura v. Baldovino

PADURA vs. BALDOVINONo. L-11960December 27, 1958

DOCTRINE: The division of the reservable property among the reservees isthe subject matter of the following decision. The court rejected thetheory of reserva integral espoused by Spanish commentators such asScaevola, and categorically adopted the theory of delayed intestacy. Thereason for rejecting the first theory is clearly discussed below.

Gervacia Agustin Benita

Manuel Fortunato Candelaria

Dionisia Cristeta Felisa

Melania Flora Anicia Cornelio Pablo

Francisco Juana

Severino

FACTS: The lower court rendered judgment declaring all thereservees (without distinction) “co-owners, pro-indiviso, inequal shares of the parcel of land” subject matter of the suit.

ISSUE: In a case of reserve troncal where the only reservatorios(reserves) surviving the reservista and belonging to the line oforigin, are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephewsof the whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportionedamong them equally or should the nephews of the whole blood takea share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?

HELD: The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative inview of the New Civil Code’s hostility to successional reservasand reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reservevindal and the reversion legalof the Code of 1889 (Arts. 812 and 968-980).

There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even duringthe reservista’s lifetime, the reservatarios, who are ultimateacquirers of the property, can already assert the right toprevent thereservista from doing anything that might frustratetheir reversionary right; and for this purpose they can compelthe annotation of their right in the Registry of Property evenwhile the reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultamar, Arts.168, 199: Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295). This right isincompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to thenatural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise clear that thereservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista,who may not dispose of them by will, so long as there arereservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). Thelatter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but fromthe descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are theheirs mortis causa, subject of the condition that they mustsurvive the reservista (Sanchez Roman, Vol. Tomo 2, p. 286:Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp274, 310). Had thenephews of whole and half blood succeeded the prepositusdirectly, those of full- blood would undoubtedly receive a doubleshare compared to those of half blood (Arts. 1008 and 1006, jamcit.), why then should the latter receive equal shares simplybecause the transmission of the property was delayed byinterregnum of the reserve? The decedent (causante), the heirsand their relationship being the same, there is no cogent reasonwhy the hereditary portions should vary.

It should be stated, in justice to the trial court, that itsopinion is supported by distinguished commentators of the CivilCode of 1889, among them Sanchez Roman (Estudios, Vol. 6, Tomo 2,p.1008) and MuciusScaevola (Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, p.342). Thereason given by these authors is that the reservatarios arecalled by law to take the reservable property because they belongto the line of origin; and not because of their relationship.But the argument, if logically pursued, would lead to theconclusion that the property should pass to any and allreservatarios, as a class and in equal shares, regardless of lineand degrees. In truth, such as the theory of reserve integral(14 Scaevola, Cod. Civ., p. 332 et seq.). But as we have seen,the Supreme Court of Spain and of the Philippines have rejectedthat view, and consider that the reservable property should besucceeded to by the reservatario who is nearest in degree,according to the basic rules of intestacy.

Case # 71 – Chua v. CFI

Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, petitioners,vs.The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V andSusana De La Torre, in her capacity as Administratrix of theIntestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre

DOCTRINE: The gratuitous acquisition of the reservable property bythe prepositus from the origin of the reservable property wasinterpreted in this case. Even if the prepositus had to pay acertain amount to a third party for the purpose of acquiring thereservable property, if such payment obligation was not imposed bythe origin, the acquisition by the latter is still gratuitous innature.

Patricia Jose Consolacion

Ignacio Juanito Lorenzo Manuel

FACTS: Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio sired threechildren, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel. WhenPatricia died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage withConsolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name ofJuanita Frias Chua.

1. Manuel died without leaving any issue.2. Then in 1929, Jose died intestate leaving his widow

Consolacion and his son Juanito of the second marriage andsons Ignacio and Lorenzo of his first marriage.

3. In the Intestate Proceeding, the lower court issued anorder adjudicating, among others, the one-half portion ofLot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose's

widow, Consolacion, the other half of Lot No. 399 infavor of Juanito; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenzo; andP1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio. By virtue of saidadjudication, a TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds inthe names of Consolacion and Juanito.

4. On Feb.27, 1952, Juanito died intestate without any issue.After his death, his mother Consolacion succeeded to hispro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time,Consolacion executed a declaration of heirshipadjudicating in her favor the pro- indiviso share of herson Juanito as a result of which a TCT covering the wholelot was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966,Consolacion died intestate leaving no direct heir eitherin the descending or ascending line except her brother andsisters.

5. In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", thepetitioners herein, Ignacio, of the first marriage andDominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimatechildren of the deceased Lorenzo Chua, also of the firstmarriage filed the complaint before the respondent CFI ofNegros Occidental, praying that the one-half portion of LotNo. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito but which passedto Consolacion upon the latter's death, be declared as areservable property for the reason that the lot in questionwas subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 ofthe NCC.

6. The respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing thecomplaint of petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether the property in question as acquired by JuanitoFrias Chua from his father, Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not,in relation to first requisite of reserve troncal

HELD: YesThe transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when therecipient does not give anything in return." It mattersnot whether the property transmitted be or be not subjectto any prior charges; what is essential is that thetransmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere

liberality of theperson making it, without imposing anyobligation on the part of the recipient; and that the personreceiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, asably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, "the essentialthing is that the person who transmits it does sogratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring fromthe transferee any prestation." It is evident from the recordthat the transmission of the property in question to JuanitoFrias Chua upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was bymeans of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.

In order that a property may be impressed with a reservablecharacter the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) thatthe property was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant orfrom a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that saiddescendant died without an issue; (3) that the property isinherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) thatthere are relatives within the third degree belonging to the linefrom which said property came.

In the case at bar, all of the requisites are present: JuanitoFrias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he diedwithout leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No.399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre, byoperation of law. When Consolacion de la Torre died, Juanito FriasChua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree.These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua andRemedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceasedLorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.

It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be notsubject to any prior charges; what is essential is that thetransmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberalityof the person making it, without imposing any obligation on thepart of the recipient; and that the person receiving the propertygives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminentFilipino commentator, "the essential thing is that the person whotransmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, withoutrequiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from

the record that the transmission of the property in question toJuanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of hisfather Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession andtherefore gratuitous

The obligation of paying the Standard is imposed upon Consolacionand Juanito not personally by the deceased Jose in his last willand testament but by an order of the court. As long as thetransmission of the property to the heirs is free from anycondition imposed by the deceased himself and the property isgiven out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. The order of thecourt does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmissionof the property to him. As far as the deceased Jose is concernedthe transmission of the property to his heirs is gratuitous. Thisbeing the case the lot in question is subject to reserva troncalunder Art. 891.

Case # 72 – Gonzales vs. CFI

BEATRIZ GONZALES V. CFI MANILA, 104 SCRA 481 (1981)

DOCTRINE: Gonzales gives an extended discussion on the nature andeffects of reserva troncal. Among other things, it stresses that thereservable property does not form part of the estate of thereservor, if upon his or her death he or she is survived byqualified reservees. As such, the reservor cannot will or bequeaththe reservable property in his or her will, nor can the reservorchoose who or discriminate among the reservees should get theproperty. The reservees inherit the reservable property not fromthe reservor, but from the prepositus. Thus, Gonzales affirms theruling in Padura v Baldovino and follows the theory of delayedintestacy in the matter of distributing the reservable propertyamong the reservees. It should be noted that the Court reliedheavily on the ruling in Florentino and quotes substantially fromthe text of the said decision. However, there is a failure to notethe oversight committed by the Court when it failed to distinguishbetween full-blood brothers from half-blood brothers. Theopportunity to rectify an error was lost.

Benito Legarda Tuason

ConsueloRita+Benito Legarda de la Paz Filomena Roces

BeatrizRosarioTeresa+FilomenaBenito Carmen Legarda y FernandezAlejandro Ramon Legarda y HernandezJose Filomena Legarda y Lobregat

Jaime Legarda y LobregatCelso Legarda y LobregatAlejandro Legarda y LobregatMa. Teresa Legarda y LobregatMa. Antonia Legarda y LobregatJose Legarda y LobregatRosario Legarda y LobregatBenito Legarda y LobregatEduardo Legarda y LobregatTrinidad Legarda

FACTS: Benito Legarda y dela Paz (Benito II), son of BenitoLegarda y Tuazon (Benito I), died and was survived by his widow,Filomena and their 7 children. The real properties left by hisdeceased father, Benito I, were partitioned in 3 equal parts byBenito II’s sisters and his heirs pro-indiviso. One of hisdaughters, Filomena, died without issue and her sole heiress washer mother, Filomena vda de Legarda

1. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating to herselfthe properties she inherited from her daughter as a resultof which she succeeded her deceased owner as co-owner of theproperties held pro-indiviso by her other 6 children. Later,Mrs. Legarda executed 2 handwritten documents disposing ofthe properties which she inherited from her daughter infavor of her 16 grandchildren (the children of her sons).

Eventually, Mrs. Legarda and her 6 surviving childrenpartitioned the co-owned property

2. Mrs. Legarda died and in the testate proceeding of herestate, Beatriz Gonzales, one of her daughters, filed amotion to exclude in the inventory of the propertiesinherited from Filomena, the deceased daughter, on theground that said properties were reservable and should beinherited by Filomena’s 3 sisters and 3 brothers, not by the16 grandchildren of Mrs. Legarda, or Filomena’s nephews andnieces. She also filed an action securing a declaration thatthe properties are reservable which Mrs. Legarda could notbequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to theexclusion of her 6 chidlren

3. It is contended here than the properties in question are notreservable properties because only relatives within thethird paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legardawilled the properties to her grandchildren, who are thirddegree relatives of Filomena and who belong to the paternalline, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied:“to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by somespecial accident of life, property that should otherwisehave remained therein.”

ISSUE: WON the properties could be conveyed by will to the 16grandchildren (reservees within the third degree) to theexclusion of the 6 children (reservees within the second degree)

HELD: No. Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic willto her 16 grandchildren the reservable properties she inheritedfrom her daughter because the reservable properties did not formpart of her estate. The reservoir cannot make a dispositionmortis causa of the reservable properties as long as thereservees survived the reservoir.

Art 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties shouldbe inherited by all the nearest within the third degree fromprepositus who in this case are the 6 children of Mrs. Legarda.She could not select the reservees to whom to the reservableproperties should be given and deprive the other reservees of

their shares therein. To allow the reservoir to make atestamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favorthe reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignorethe reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violationof Art 891, this cannot be allowed.

Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of the properties in question inher will even if the disposition is in favor of relatives withinthe third degree from Filomena. The said properties, by operationof Art 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda’s 6 children as reserveeswithin the second degree from Filomena. Reservees do not inheritfrom the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reserveesare the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that theymust survive the reservor.

The reservation could be extinguished only by the absence ofreservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda’s death. Since at the timeof her death, there were reservees belonging to the second andthird degrees, the disputed properties did not lose theirreservable character. The disposition of the properties should bemade in accordance with Art 891 and in accordance with thereservor’s holographic will.

Case # 73 – De Papa v. Camacho

DE PAPA v CAMACHONo. L-28032, 24 September 1986144 SCRA 281

DOCTRINE: Between two groups of reservatarios: (a) uncles and auntsof the prepositus, and (b) a niece of the prepositus, the latter ispreferred to the exclusion of the former in the distribution ofthe reversionary estate. This is pursuant to the application ofthe ordinary rules of intestate succession which govern thedistribution of the reversionary estate. Please note thatbrothers, sisters, nephews and nieces rank fourth in the order ofintestate succession to a legitimate person. Upon the other hand,the uncles and aunts (collectively referred to as collateralrelatives within the fifth civil degree) rank fifth in the order

of intestate succession to a legitimate person. Thus, followingthe order of preference, those who rank fourth will exclude allthose relatives who rank fifth. Again, this is a reaffirmation ofthe theory of delayed intestacy first initiated in Padura.

Marciana Balbino . . . . . Romana

Francisca Manuel Nicolas

Eustacio Toribia

Faustino Trinidad

Dalisay

Narvasa, J.:

This case, which involves the application of Article 891 ofthe Civil Code on reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment inthe lower court by all the parties on the following "Stipulationof Facts and Partial Compromise:"

FACTS:

1. The defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffsFrancisca Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco arelegitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant'sgrandaunt and granduncles.

2. Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho have as acommon ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister bythe name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and greatgrandfather of defendant. The family relationship of the

parties is shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex "A"and made an integral part of this stipulation.

3. Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four(4)parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sisterof plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently coveredby Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which areattached to this stipulation as Annexes "B", "B-1", and "B-2."

4. Toribia Tioco died intestate in 1915, survived by herhusband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children,Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendantDalisay D. Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the aforementionedfour (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said twochildren in equal pro-indiviso shares.

5. In 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by hislegitimate children and by his wife Marciana Felix (amongthem plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizonand Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3)parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of TitleNos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila,copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes "C' and "C-1"were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late ToribiaTioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco,the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her twolegitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon inequal pro-indiviso shares.

6. In 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and withoutissue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in theseven (7) parcels of land abovementioned to his father,Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received thesaid property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequentlyannotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes "B","B-1", "C" and "C-1."

7. In 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rightsand interests in the parcels of land above-mentioned wereinherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D.Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of hersurviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.

8. On June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived byhis only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.

9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camachonow owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of landabovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, TrinidadDizon-Tongko.

10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legaladvice, the other half of the said seven parcels of landabovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereonupon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the law onintestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legaladvice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in saidparcel of land, which interest was inherited by EustacioDizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the saidparcels ofland, by virtue of their being also third degreerelatives of Faustino Dizon.

11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determinationin this case the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D.Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7)parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, asthird degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios(together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indivisoshare therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from hisson Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) ofsaid one-half pro-indiviso share, or three-eights (3/8) of saidseven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights(3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected bydefendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho from the tenants of said

parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxescorresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

12. In view of the fact that the parties are close bloodrelatives and have acted upon legal advice in pursuing theirrespective claims, and in order to restore and preserveharmony in their family relations, they hereby waive alltheir claims against each other for damages (other than legalinterest on plaintiffs' share in the rentals which thisHonorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney's feesand expenses of litigation which shall be borne by therespective parties.

ISSUE:

The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower court, all relatives of theprepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeedwithout distinction to the reservable property upon the death ofthe reservista.

HELD:

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession,when there are relatives of the descendant within the thirddegree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, overthe property which the reservista (person holding it subject toreservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one moreremote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when theone claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property isnot among the relatives within the third degree belonging to theline from which such property came, inasmuch as the right grantedby the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degreepersonal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons whoare within the third degree of the person from whom thereservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and

succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, sincethe law does not recognize them as such.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right ofrepresentation on the part of one alleging his rights asreservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship,nevertheless there is right of representation on the part ofreservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, asin the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom thereservable property came. x x x

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basicprinciples of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule thatwhole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share doublethat of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in determining therights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the rightof representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule ofdouble share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood shouldlikewise be operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group ofrelatives (reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned;but within that group, the individual right to the propertyshould be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestatesuccession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. x x x

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the ruleson intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be heldwithout any right thereto because, as aunts and uncles,respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the prepositus), they are excludedfrom the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant,although they are related to him within the same degree as thelatter. x x x

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings alreadycited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitledto the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion ofthe plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower court isreversed and set aside, and the complaint is dismissed with costsagainst plaintiffs-appellees.

Case # 76 – Austria v. Reyes

AUSTRIA V. REYES, 31 SCRA 754 (1970)

DOCTRINE: The statement of a false cause in the institution ofheirs shall be disregarded, unless it is proved that the testatorwould not have made such institution had he been properlyappraised of the truth. Aside from the fact that the false causemust be stated in the will, the opponents of the will are likewisemandated to prove by substantial evidence that the testator wouldnot have made such a disposition had he known the true state of

affairs. Therefore, inferences and conjectures are not sufficientto invalidate a provision which is challenged as one made on thebasis of a false cause.

Please note that the false cause which led the testator tomake a particular testamentary disposition is treated in the sameway as a mistake, which in contract law, vitiates consent.

FACTS: On July 7, Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFIof Rizal a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will andtestament. The probate was opposed by the petitioners, RubenAustria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo and stillothers who, like petitioner are nephew and nieces of Basilia. Theopposition was dismissed and the probate of the will allowed afterdue hearing.

1. The bulk of the estate of Basilia, was destined under thewill to pass on to respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz – Salonga,all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as herown legally adopted children.

2. April 23, 1959 – two years after the probate was allowedBasilia died. Perfecto Cruz was appointed as executor withoutbond in accordance with the provisions of the decedent’swill.

3. November 5, 1959 – Petitioner filed in the same proceedings apetition in intervention for partition alleging in substancethat they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that thefive respondents, Perfecto Cruz, et.al, had not fact beenadopted by the decedent in accordance with law. The courtthen allowed the said intervention by petitioners which thecourt delimited to the properties of the deceased which werenot disposed of in the will and disregarded the matter ofthe genuineness of adoption.

4. Upon denial of two motions for reconsiderations, thepetitioners filed before the Supreme Court a petition forcertiorari praying for the annulment of the lower court’sorders restricting their intervention.

ISSUE: WON the institution of heirs would retain efficacy in theevent there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs bythe decedent is false.

HELD: NoArticle 850 of the Civil Code provides:

The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heirshall be considered as not written, unless it appears fromthe will that the testator would not have made suchinstitution if he had known the falsity of such cause.

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850of the Civil Code, the following requisites:

1. The cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in thewill

2. The cause must be shown to be false3. It must appear from the face of the will that the testator

would not have made such institution if he had known thefalsity of the cause

Even if Basilia have used the terms “sapilitang mana” andsapilitang tagapagmana” there is no indication that had she knownthat the respondents were not her adopted disposition of the freeportion was largely at Basilia’s discretion and she had given alarge part to the respondents while giving a relatively smalllegacy in favor of the petitioners. The decedent’s will does notstate in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for suchinstitution of heirs. The Court cannot annul the same on the basisof guesswork or uncertain implications.

Article 850 of the Civil Code is positive injunction to ignorewhatever false cause the testator may have written in his will forthe institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled onlywhen one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that thetestator clearly would not have made the institution of he hadknown the cause for it to be false.

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side,especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the

testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. Moreover, socompelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided andthe wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could evenvary the language of the will for the purpose of giving iteffect.

The legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrixcan be assailed only in a separate action brought for thatpurpose and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.

Case # 78 – Palacios v. Ramirez

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, vs.MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE andROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.

DOCTRINE: Some commentators of the Civil Code have expressed theopinion that a fideicommissary substitution is in fact adisguised case of successive institutions. This is because boththe first and the second heirs inherit from the testator and notfrom one another. The beneficial use and possession of the

inheritance are first given to the first heir for a lifetime atmost, and thereafter transferred to the second heir. The lawrequires that the first and second heirs must be “one degreeapart” from each other. This limitation became the objective oftwo divergent views. One view holds that the “one degree” apartrule refers to one transfer. Ramirez settled the controversy byholding the more restrictive view.

In an obiter, the Court opined that the constitutionalprohibition against alien ownership of land does not permit analien to acquire the same by testamentary succession. Would sucha ruling apply to a case where the foreign beneficiary is both atestamentary and a compulsory heir?

FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spainon December 11, 1964, with only a widow as compulsory heir. Hiswill was admitted to probate by the CFI of Manila

1. The widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while thecompanion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain

2. The administratrix submitted a project of partition asfollows: the property of the deceased is to be divided intotwo parts. One part shall go to the widow ‘en pleno dominio”in satisfaction of her legitimee; the other part or “freeportion” shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez “en nudapropriedad.” Furthermore, 1/3 of the free portion is chargedwith the widow’s usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with ausufruct in favor of Wanda.

3. Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on theground that the fideicommissary substitutions are invalidbecause the first heirs are not related to the second heirsor substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Art.863 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: WON the fideicommissary substitutions are invalid.

HELD: Yes, the appellants are correct in their claim that it isvoid. The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) arenot related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of

the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution “providedsuch substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heiroriginally instituted.”

The word “degree was construed as generation and thisinterpretation has been followed in the present Code, byproviding that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree“from the heir originally instituted.” The Code this clearlyindicates that the second heir must be related to and be onegeneration from the first heir. It follows that thefideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of thefirst heir. These are the only relatives who are one generationor degree from the fiduciary.

There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit theusufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 ofthe Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits “that the testatorcontradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitutionwhen he permits the properties of the subject of the usufruct tobe sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the nakedowners.

The Court ordered to distribute the estate of Jose EugenioRamirez as follows:½ thereof to his widow as her legitime;½ thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirezin naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with asimple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and HoraceV. Ramirez.

Case # 77 – Crisologo vs. Singson

CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO V. MANUEL SINGSON, 4 SCRA 491(1962)

DOCTRINE: Crisologo stresses that the essence of a fideicommissarysubstitution is the imposition of an obligation on the part of thefirst heir to preserve and to transmit the property to the secondheir upon the former's death or upon the happening of a particularevent. The obligation to preserve and transmit must be done in anexpressed manner either by calling the substitutionfideicommissary, or by imposing upon the first heir the absoluteobligation to preserve and deliver the inheritance to the secondheir. In the absence of either, the substitution would at best beconsidered simple or vulgar.

Two points raised in the decision should be noted. First, itinferred that if Consolacion were instituted subject to afideicommissary substitution, her rights would be limited to thatof a usufructuary. This is error, because the first heir in afideicommissary substitution acquires title to the property,subject merely to the resolutory term of the substitution. Second,while the court ruled that the substitution is simple, it statedin the penultimate paragraph that the substitution shall takeplace whether the death of Consolacion takes place before or afterthe death of the testatrix. There seems to be something wrongwith the statement. Substitution was premised precisely upon thedeath of Consolacion, and for no other cause. Therefore, ifConsolacion survives the testatrix, as in fact she did survive,then the substitution becomes academic. To allow the substitutioneven if Consolacion were to survive the testatrix would be to giveeffect to a fideicommissary substitution, which the same courtoverturned. The resulting conclusion would be in contradictionwith the finding that no fideicommissary substitution was intendedby the testatrix.

FACTS: Dona Leona Singson died testate, leaving a property inIlocos Sur to her brothers (Evaristo, Manuel and DionisioCrisologo) and her niece, petitioner Consolacion Florentino.

1. Petitioners filed an action for partition againstrespondent Manuel Singson in connection with a propertylocated in Ilocos Sur. They alleged that the subjectproperty was co-owned in ½ share by both parties(Consolacion and Manuel) by virtue of the probated will ofthe testator Dona Leona Singson.

2. Singson, on the other hand, contended that Consolacion was amere usufructuary and not a co-owner of the property, andhence, was not entitled to demand partition

ISSUE: WON the testamentary disposition in the testator’s willprovided for sustitucion vulgar (vulgar substitution) or for asustitucion fideicomisaria (fideicommissary substitution)

HELD: The last will of the decedent established a mere vulgarsubstitution, the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the

brothers of the testatrix to be effective upon the death ofConsolacion, whether it happens before or after that of thetestatrix.

A careful perusal of the testamentary clause shows that thesubstitution is not expressly made of the fideicommissary kind,nor does not contain a clear statement that Consolacion, duringher lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over theproperty bequeathed to her, since naked ownership was vested tothe brothers of the testatrix. The provision in question merelyprovides that upon Consolacion’s death, whether this happensbefore or after that of the testatrix, her share shall belong tothe brothers of the testatrix.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN VULGAR SUBSTITUTION AND FIDEICOMMISSARYSUBSTITUTIONIf the clause in the will created a vulgar substitution, theresult would be that Consolacion, upon the death of thetestatrix, becomes the owner of the undivided ½ of the property.But if the clause provided for a fideicommissary substitution,Consolacion acquires only usufructuary rights over the pro-indiviso share.In fideicommissary substitution, the fiduciary does not acquirefull ownership of the property bequeathed by the will, but mereusufructuary rights thereon until the time came for him todeliver said property to the fideicommissary; it is obvious thatthe nude ownership is passed to another person other than thefideicommissary.

To constitute fideicommissary substitution, there must be anobligation imposed on the first heir (fiduciary heir) to preserveand transmit to another (fideicommissary heir) the whole or partof the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon thehappening of a particular event. For this reason, Art 785 OldCivil Code provides that a fideicommissary substitution shallhave no effect unless it is made expressly either by giving itsuch name, or by imposing upon the first heir the absoluteobligation to deliver the inheritance to a substitute or secondheir.

Case # 83 – De Los Santos v. De La Cruz

DELOS SANTOS V. DELA CRUZ, 37 SCRA 555(1971)

DOCTRINE: De los Santos illustrates the rule of proximity; i.e.,the nearer relatives exclude the more remote ones, except if theright of representation is applicable. Thus, in intestatesuccession, the nephews and nieces shall exclude the grandniece,who in the specific instance, is barred from exercising the rightof representation.

FACTS: Gertrude de los Santos for specific performance againstMaximino de la Cruz, alleging that she and several co-heirs,

including defendant, executed an extrajudicial partitionagreement over a portion of land and that the parties agreed toadjudicate 3 lots to the defendant in addition to his share, onthe condition that the defendant would undertake the developmentof the estate, all expenses shall be defrayed from the proceedsof the sale of the 3 lots.

1. Defendant asserts that plaintiff had no cause of actionagainst him because the agreement was void with respect toher, since the plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de laCruz, deceased owner of the property, and was included inthe extrajudicial partition agreement by mistake.

2. Defendant’s counterclaim alleged that since the plaintiffhad sold her share in the estate and that extrajudicialpartition agreement being void as to the latter, he isentitled to ¼ of the proceeds as his share by way ofreversion.

3. The court held that the defendant, being a party to theextrajudicial partition agreement, was stopped from raisingin issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from thedecedent Pelagia de la Cruz; hence he must abide by theterms of the agreement.

4. The parties admit that the owner of the subject matter ofthe extrajudicial agreement was Pelagia de la Cruz, who diedinstestate on October 16, 1962; that defendant is a nephewof the said decedent; that plaintiff is a grandniece ofPelagia de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, beingniece of the decedent. Plaintiff’s mother died on September22, 1935, thus predeceasing the decedent; and that thepurpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was todivide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagiade la Cruz.

ISSUE: WON plaintiff-apellee Gertrude de los Santos is a heir ofthe decedent.

HELD: No, plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagiade la Cruz, she could not inherit from the latter by right of

representation, much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in herown right.

Applying Art. 972 and Art. 962 of the Civil Code, the Court inLinarty y Pavia vs. Ugarte y Itturalde said:

In and intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased andcannot participate with a niece in the inheritance, becausethe latter being a nearer relative, the more distantgrandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right ofrepresentation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters ofthe brothers and sisters.

In the case at bar, the relatives “nearest in degree” to Pelagiade la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is thedefendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, agrandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.

The legal effect of plaintiff-appellee inclusion andparticipation in the extrajudicial partition agreement insofar asher right to bring the present action did not confer upon her theright to institute this action. The express purpose of theextrajudicial partition agreement, as admitted by the parties inthe stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among theheirs of Pelagia de la Cruz and in the said agreement itselfstates that plaintiff-appellee was participating inrepresentation of her deceased mother.

It is apparent therefore that the parties were laboring under theerroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee was one of the legalheirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being suchheir, the partition is void with respect to her, pursuant toArticle 1105 of the Civil Code.

Partition of property affected between a person entitled toinherit from the deceased owner and another person who thought hewas an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to theprejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law tosucceed the deceased, is null and void. A fortiori, plaintiff-appelee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to haveits terms enforced.

The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect toplaintiff-appellee, she may not be heard to assert estoppelsagainst defendant-appellant. Estoppels cannot be predicated on avoid contract, or on acts which are prohibited by law or areagainst public policy.

Case # 85 – Diaz v. IAC

DIAZ V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 150 SCRA 645 (1987)

DOCTRINE: This case illustrates the harsh effects of Article 992.As will be noted, the legitimate collateral relative of theintestate was preferred over the illegitimate descendants. Therewas no showing that between the grandmother and her illegitimate

grandchildren, there was animosity. It must likewise be noted thatthe deceased grandmother did not have any other descendants otherthan the illegitimate children who were excluded from herinheritance.

FACTS: The case is a review of the decision declaring FelisaPamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestateestate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. The presentcontroversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of SimonaPamuti Vda. de Santero.

1. Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. deSantero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were theonly legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti andPetronila Asuncion.

2. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union wereborn Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy

3. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of PascualSantero and the mother of Pablo Santero

4. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parentsPascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero

5. Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 andSimona Santero in 1976

6. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by hismother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children towit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minorchildren with Felixberta Pacursa.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of PabloSantero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, byright of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is alegitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

HELD: NoThe right of representation is not available to illegitimatedescendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of alegitimate grandparent.

Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rightsof  illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their

descendants upon their death. The descendants (of theseillegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right ofrepresentation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatevermanner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to berepresented are themselves  illegitimate. 

The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and otherdescendants shall inherit by right of representation and inArticle 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... aretransmitted upon their death to their descendants, whetherlegitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed byArticle 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right toinherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives ofhis father or mother."

"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or ironcurtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession abintestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimatechildren and relatives of the father or mother of saidillegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, butthis is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992.Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family thereis presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by thelegitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by theillegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged conditionof the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived;the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing butthe product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken inlife; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoidingfurther ground of resentment."

While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights toillegitimate children, those articles, however, in conjunctionwith Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from beingexercised where the person to be represented is a legitimatechild. Needless to say, the determining factor is the legitimacyor illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person tobe represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants,

whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however,if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimatedescendants cannot represent him because the law provides thatonly his legitimate descendants may exercise the right ofrepresentation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code thatthe phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father ormother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word"relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of theperson spoken of. In the case at bar, the only parties whoclaimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural orillegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners hereinare barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondentIntermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holdingFelisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to theintestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

The Court view that the word "relatives" should be construed inits general acceptation. According to Prof. Balane, to interpretthe term  relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the lawintends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifiesthe term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009of the New Civil Code. Thus, the word "relatives" is a generalterm and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateralrelatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of,unless the context indicates that it was used in a morerestrictive or limited sense.

Case # 86 & 92– Abellana-Bocayo v. Ferraris-Borromeo

ABELLANA-BACAYO V. FERRARIS-BORROMEO, 14 SCRA 986 (1965)

DOCTRINE: As an exception to the general rule that the right ofrepresentation is available only in the descending line, Art. 975of the Civil Code permits representation in the collateral line(but only in intestate succession) insofar as nephews and niecesof the decedent are concerned. When such nephews and niecesinherit by representation, they succeed to that portion whichtheir predeceased or incapacitated father or mother would haveotherwise been entitled to inherit. By right of representation,these nephews and nieces shall be deemed to be two degrees remotefrom the decedent. However, the prerequisite for the exercise ofthe right of representation is that the nephews and nieces mustconcur with at least one uncle or aunt. Otherwise, nephews andnieces will inherit in their own right as third degree relativesof the decedent.

It must also be noted that even when they inherit in theirown right as third degree relatives, nephews and nieces arepreferred over the uncles and aunts of the decedent (who arelikewise relatives within the third degree of the decedent). Thisis because of the order of intestate succession which ranksbrothers, sisters, nephews and nieces fourth in the order ofsuccession, whereas other collateral relatives, including unclesand aunts of the deceased, are ranked fifth. Finally, the exerciseof the right of representation is subject to the barrier betweenthe legitimate and illegitimate families under Article 992.

In the more recent case of Delgado vda. de la Rosa v Heirs ofMarciana Rustia vda. de Damian [G.R. No. 155733, 27 January 2006(480 SCRA 334)], the Supreme Court through Justice Corona ruledthat “(u)nder Article 972 of the New Civil Code, the right ofrepresentation in the collateral line takes place only in favor ofchildren of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces),Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews andgrandnieces.”

Likewise, in the case of Bagugu v Piedad, Justice Vitug

clarified that the right of representation is generally availableonly in the descending line, never in the ascending. In thecollateral line, the right is limited to children of brothers andsisters who concur with uncles and/or aunts. No other collateralrelative can benefit from the right of representation.

FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to haveresided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to thefiling on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summarysettlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and herwhereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years havingelapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she wasdeclared presumptively dead for purposes of opening hersuccession and distributing her estate among her heirs.

1. The deceased Melodia Feraris was survived only by collateralrelatives, namely Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt andhalf-sister of decedent’s father, Anacleto Ferraris; and byGaudencia, Catalina,Conchita, and Juanito, all surnameFerraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children ofMelodia’s only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, whopredeceased the decedent.

2. The trial court ruled that the children of the onlypredeceased brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt of thesame decedent for the reason that the former are nearer indegree (2 degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephewssucceed by right of representation, while the aunt is 3degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateralrelatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children ofbrothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance witharticle 1009 of the New Civil Code.

3. Petitioner-appellant contends that she is of equal degree ofrelationship as the oppositors (3 degrees removed from thedecedent) and that under 975 of the New Civil Code, no rightof representation could take place when the nieces andnephew of the decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt,but rather the former succeed in their own right.

ISSUE: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceasedperson when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives,to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased himor her?

HELD: The Court held that as an aunt of the deceased she is asfar distant as the nephews from the decedent (3 degrees) since inthe collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belongdegrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor andhen descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Also, nephewsand nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e..per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of thedeceased, as provided by Art. 975.

The Court held that in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces ofthe de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunt and uncles, firstcousins, etc.) from the succession. Under Art. 1009, the absenceof brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is aprecondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.)being called to the succession.

Tolentino expressly states:

Other collaterals. — The last of the relatives of the decedentto succeed in intestate succession are the collaterals otherthan brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters. They are,however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree.Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly any affectionto merit the succession of collaterals. Under the law,therefore, relatives beyond the fifth degree are no longerconsidered as relatives, for successional purposes.

Article 1009 does not state any order of preference.However, this article should be understood in connectionwith the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude thefarther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equalparts, there being no right of representation. They succeed

without distinction of lines or preference among them onaccount of the whole blood relationship. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court ruled that under the laws of succession, a decedent’suncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestate so long as nephews andnieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified tosucceed.

Case # 87-88 – Corpus v. Corpus

TOMAS CORPUS V. ADMINISTRATOR/EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF TEODOROYANGCO, 85 SCRA 567 (1978)

DOCTRINE: Corpus illustrates an instance where a legitimate child isexcluded from the inheritance of an illegitimate relative.

FACTS: Teodoro Yangco died with a will. He left no forced heirs.At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were: (a) hishalf-brother Luis Yangco; (b) half-sister Paz Yangco and wife ofMiguel Osorio; (c) children of his half-brother Ramon Corpus; and(d) Juanita Corpus; daughter of his half-brother Jose Corpus

1. Teodoro was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and RamonaArguelles (widow of Tomas Corpus). Before her marriage withLuis Rafael, Ramona had 5 children with Tomas, 2 of whichwere Pablo and Jose.

2. Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project ofpartition was submitted but this was opposed.

3. From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro, JuanitaCorpus and the estate of Luis R. Yangco appealed. Acompromise agreement was entered into thereafter

4. Based on the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed areceipt acknowledging that he received from the Yangcoestate P2,000.

5. Tomas, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an actionto recover the supposed share in Yangco’s intestate estate.He alleged that the dispositions in Yangco’s will imposing

perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it voidunder Art 785 Old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition isinvalid and as such, the estate should be distributedaccording to the rules of intestacy

ISSUE: WON Juanita Corpus, mother of Tomas, was a legal heir ofYangco

HELD: No.To determine Juanita’s right to inherit, it is necessaryto ascertain Yangco’s filiation. Luis Rafael’s will states thatTeodoro was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimatechild. On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles andTomas Corpus are presumed to be legitimate following theprinciple of simper preasumitur pro matrimonio, “that a man anda woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed tohave entered into a lawful marriage.”

Since Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child (illegitimate)and Juanita was the legitimate child of Ramona Arguelles andTomas Corpus, petitioner-appellant Tomas has no cause of actionfor the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his motherin Yangco’s estate. Juanita was not a legal heir of Yangcobecause there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate andillegitimate relatives.

Art 992 NCC provides that “an illegitimate child has no right toinherit ab intestate from the legitimate children or relatives ofhis father or mother; nor shall such children or relativesinherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.” Thisrule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child isdisgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while thelegitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child.The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoidfurther grounds of resentment.

Following the rule in Art 992, it was held that:

a. Legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed herillegitimate child

b. The natural child cannot represent his natural father in thesuccession to the estate of the legitimate grandfather

c. The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of herdeceased uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural mother.

Case # 89 – Leonardo v. CA

CRESENCIANO LEONARDO V. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA CAILLES, 120SCRA 890 (1983)

DOCTRINE: The filiation of a person may be looked into for the purposeof determining his qualification to inherit from a deceased person. InLeonardo, the Court found after looking into the birth certificate ofthe petitioner, that he is an illegitimate child and hence barred byArticle 992 to claim a share in the inheritance of his greatgrandmother.

FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate in 1963. She was survivedby 2 daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson,Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter Pascuala who predeceasedher. Sotero died in 1944 while Silvestra died in 1949.

1. Petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son ofSotero, filed a complaint seeking to:a. Be declared one of the lawful heirs of deceased

Francisca, entitled to ½ share in the estate of thedeceased jointly with defendant Maria

b. Have the estate of Francisca partitioned between him andMaria

2. Respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership overthe subject properties and alleged that petitioner is anillegitimate child who cannot succeed by right ofrepresentation

3. The trial court held in favor of petitioner. On appeal, CAreversed the trial court decision and dismissed thecomplaint

ISSUE: WON petitioner has legal right to inherit byrepresentation to Francisca’s estate

HELD: No.

To determine petitioner’s successional rights to the decedent’sestate, his filiation must first be ascertained. Petitionerfailed to prove his filiation; the name of the child described inthe birth certificate presented as evidence, is not that of theplaintiff but a certain “Alfredo Leonardo” who was born onSeptember 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Soccoro Timbol. Otherthan his bare allegations, plaintiff did not submit any durableevidence showing that “Alfredo Leonardo” mentioned in the birthcertificate is no other than he himself.

Even if it is true that petitioner is a child of Sotero, he stillcannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estateleft by the deceased Francisca considering that he was bornoutside of wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born,his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married; andhis alleged father’s first marriage was still subsisting. Assuch, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no rightto inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children andrelatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca.

Case # 90 – Santillon v. Mirandan

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON V.PERFECTA MIRANDA, 14 SCRA 563 (1965)

DOCTRINE: Santillon resolved the dispute regarding the intestateshares of a surviving spouse concurring with one legitimate child.In addition to the arguments clearly stated in the text of thedecision, it may be stressed at this point that commentators whoinsist on a 3/4 - 1/4 sharing in favor of the legitimate childadhere to the theory of preference. In short, there the order ofintestate succession listed the legitimate children as havingfirst priority in the intestate estate of the deceased parent, andthe spouse as fourth, then the law must be interpreted as havinggiven a preference to the legitimate child or children withrespect to the hereditary estate, after the legitime of all other

compulsory heirs shall have been paid. Obviously, Santillon rejected the theory of preference and adopted the theory ofconcurrence. Accordingly, heirs who do not mutually exclude eachother shall ratably share the inheritance. Since preference is notinferred from the order of intestate succession, then the freedisposal (after payment of legitime to the compulsory heirs) mustbe distributed in a manner that would result in the leastdisproportion between or among the respective shares of theconcurring intestate heirs.

Two other theories in relation to the disposition of the freedisposal might be mentioned. Under the theory of equality, thefree disposal is divided equally among the concurring intestateheirs, regardless of the order of intestate succession. Anothertheory advanced by other commentators is that the free disposalmust be proportionately distributed among the concurring intestateheirs based on their respective legitime.

FACTS: Pedro Santillon died intestate, leaving one son, Claro andhis wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, pedro acquiredseveral parcels of land

1. After his death, Claro Santillon filed petition for lettersof administration. His mother, Perfecta and spouses BenitoMiranda opposed the petition on the following grounds:a. Properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal,

except for 3 parcels which Perfecta claims to be herexclusive property

b. Perfecta conveyed ¾ of her undivided share in most of theproperties to spouses Miranda

c. Perfecta should be appointed administrator over herspouse’s estate

2. Thereafter, Claro filed a motion to “declare shares ofheirs” and resolve the conflicting claims of the partieswith respect to their rights in the estate. Invoking Art892, Claro insisted that after deducting Perfecta’s ½ sharefrom the conjugal property, the remaining property shall bedivided as: ¼ for Perfecta and ¾ for him

3. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed that she was entitledunder Art 996 to another ½ of the remaining half

4. The trial court held in favor of Perfecta, declaring thatthe surviving spouse Perfecta is entitled to ½ of Pedro’sestate and the remaining ½ is given to Claro

ISSUE: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate bedivided when the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimatechild?

HELD: Half and half pursuant to Art 996 NCC.

Art 892 NCC falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession,whereas Art 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or IntestateSuccession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannotrely on Art 892 to support his claim to ¾ of his father’s share.Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession.While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to theideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when theyconcur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares thatsuch child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Assuch, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shallyapply, i.e. Art 996.

In his commentary, JBL Reyes, noted that: if there is only onelegitimate child surviving with the spouse, since they shareequally, ½ of the estate goes to the child and the other halfgoes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to“children or descendants,” the rule in statutory constructionthat the plural can be understood to include the singular in thiscase.

The theory of commentator’s sharing Claro’s position are premisedon the following arguments:

a. Art 996 speaks of “children” therefore it does not applywhen there is only one “child” and as such Art 892 should beapplied through a process of judicial construction andanalogy

b. Art 996 is unfair because in intestate succession, the widowgets only ¼ while in testacy, she would get ½ shares

It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in pluralinclude the singular. As such, “children” in Art 996 also refersto a “child.”

The equal shares theory seems to be a logical inference from thecircumstance whereas Art 834 Spanish Civil Code, from which Art996 was taken, contained 2 paragraphs governing twocontingencies: (a) where the widow or widower survives withlegitimate children; and (b) where the widow or widower surviveswith only one child. Since Art 996 NCC omitted to provide for thesecond situation, it can be deemed that the legislator’s intentwas to promulgate only one general rule applicable to bothsituations.