Reconceptualising conditionals

Reconceptualising conditionals

Chi-He Elder

University of East Anglia

Linguistics SocietyUniversity of Cambridge

21 Jan 2016

Chi-He Elder (University of East Anglia) Reconceptualising conditionals [email protected] 1 / 48

What is a conditional?

Conditional sentences in English

‘If p, (then) q’

Example

(1) If you drop the vase, it will break



Conditional sentences in English

‘If p, (then) q’

Example



Truth conditions of conditionals I

Material implication (Grice 1967; Jackson 1979)

‘if p then q’ is false iff p is true and q is false

Problem of false antecedents


Truth conditions of conditionals I

Material implication (Grice 1967; Jackson 1979)

‘if p then q’ is false iff p is true and q is false

Problem of false antecedents


Truth conditions of conditionals II

Lewis (1973), Stalnaker (1975)

- Imagine the world as it is but where p is true

- Is q true in that world?


Conditional sentences in English discourse

In addition to the standard ‘conditional’ use, conditional sentences can beput to many other uses in English discourse

Example

(2) I would be grateful if you could open the window

(3) If possible, I’d like these done by Wednesday

(4) I want to buy her something really special, if you know what I mean

(5) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some

= ‘biscuit conditional’ (Austin 1961)




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Truth conditions of biscuit conditionals

Example


Eventuality of q is not contingent on that of p

I ‘if p, q’ is true iff q is true



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On the so-called biscuit conditional

‘Relevance’ conditionals

“the if -clause [...] specifies the circumstances in which the consequent isdiscourse-relevant, not the circumstances in which it is true” (Bhatt &Pancheva 2006: 671)

Austin (1961): Biscuit conditionals are not conditional

Predelli (2009): Antecedent of a biscuit conditional is‘truth-conditionally irrelevant’














Two types of conditional? (Quirk et al. 1985)

Standard ‘direct’ conditionals

Eventuality of q is contingent on that of p


Biscuit ‘indirect’ conditionals

Eventuality of q is not contingent on that of pI q is true whether or not p is true



























Assumptions

F Conditionals have truth conditions

F We want our semantics to reflect how we use and understandconditionals in everyday conversation


Assumptions

F Conditionals have truth conditions

F We want our semantics to reflect how we use and understandconditionals in everyday conversation


Objectives

I To show that to capture the intended meanings of conditionalsentences, we have to disassociate conditionality fromtruth-conditional content

I To show that by taking on a radical contextualist outlook, we canaccount for all these uses of conditional sentences in our semantics


Objectives

I To show that to capture the intended meanings of conditionalsentences, we have to disassociate conditionality fromtruth-conditional content

I To show that by taking on a radical contextualist outlook, we canaccount for all these uses of conditional sentences in our semantics


Outline of today’s talk

F Should we separate direct from indirect conditionals?

F Introducing ‘primary meanings’: representing conditionals in DefaultSemantics

F Conditionals as a conceptual category












Paul Grice (1975; 1978)

Example

A: Do you want to go to a party tonight?B: I have an exam tomorrow.

B’s meanings

Sentence meaning:

Speaker meaning:

The speaker has an exam tomorrow(what is said)The speaker does not want to go to the party(what is implicated)

Sentence meaning corresponds to what is said, i.e. the semantic,truth-conditional meaning

Two-tiered picture of meaning (in today’s terminology: semanticminimalism)


Paul Grice (1975; 1978)

Example


B’s meanings

Sentence meaning:

Speaker meaning:





Paul Grice (1975; 1978)

Example


B’s meanings

Sentence meaning:

Speaker meaning:





Paul Grice (1975; 1978)

Example


B’s meanings

Sentence meaning:

Speaker meaning:





Paul Grice (1975; 1978)

Example


B’s meanings

Sentence meaning:

Speaker meaning:





Post-Gricean pragmatics: Contextualism

According to semantic contextualism, the logical form of an utteredsentence can be enriched to determine truth-conditional content(e.g. Recanati 2010 among many others)

Example

(6) I haven’t had breakfast today / this morning

(7) Everyone went to the party

One sentence can be used to express different propositions in differentcontexts

Moving away from a strict, two-level picture of semantics andpragmatics




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(7) Everyone in my class / I know / who is worth knowing went to theparty






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From indirect to direct conditionals

Under contextualist assumptions, can enrich consequent of an indirectconditional to give a conditional relationship

Example


(5+) There are biscuits on the sideboard which you may have if youwant some

Indirect conditional at level of LF may be pragmatically interpreted asa direct conditional




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Questions

F How far can we legitimately enrich the consequent so that we have aconditional relationship between the antecedent and consequent?

F Will doing so give us the truth conditions we want?


Questions

F How far can we legitimately enrich the consequent so that we have aconditional relationship between the antecedent and consequent?

F Will doing so give us the truth conditions we want?


Conditional relationship; some enrichment required

Example

(8) If they ask you how old you are, you’re four (from Siegel 2006: 171)

(8′) If they ask you how old you are, say you’re four

I An indirect conditional can be used to express a (direct) conditionalmeaning



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(5′) Please help yourself to a biscuit

I An indirect conditional sentence is used to express a non-conditionalmeaning



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Conditional relationship; main message: q

Example

(9) If I remember rightly you had jaundice, didn’t you

(9+) If I remember rightly, I know that you had jaundice

(9′) You had jaundice, didn’t you?

I One intended consequent but not stated explicitly

I p hedges propositional content of q



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(3+) If possible, get these done by Wednesday

(3′) Get these done by Wednesday

I The speech act expressed in q is (arguably) contingent on p

I The role of p is to hedge the speech act expressed in q

Example

(10) I’m just going to top up my tea again if you don’t mind

(10′) I’m going to get some more tea



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No explicit conditional relationship

Example

(11) She was on the plump side, if I may respectfully say so

I q cannot be retracted; it is already ‘out there’

I p calls for hearer’s implicit acceptance of q

I p can hedge propositional or non-propositional content

Example


(4′) I want to buy her something really special



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No conditional relationship: no consequent!

Example

(12) If you’d like to put on your helmet

...that’d be great...you’ll be safer

...you won’t get caught

(12′) Please put on your helmet

I There need not be one single consequent recoverable from the context

I There may not be an intention of a consequent

I No ‘completion’ is required for meaning recovery



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Intermediary conclusions

F There are varying degrees to which we can legitimately enrich theconsequent of an indirect conditional

F The relationship between p and q of a conditional sentence does notalways correspond to the main intended meaning of the utterance


Intermediary conclusions

F There are varying degrees to which we can legitimately enrich theconsequent of an indirect conditional

F The relationship between p and q of a conditional sentence does notalways correspond to the main intended meaning of the utterance


Case study: ‘Polite directives’ I

Example


The main intended meaning can be recovered ‘automatically’ in virtueof the fact that this is how directives have come to be issued inEnglish (and other languages; see Evans 2007)

This use of ‘if’ has (arguably) becomeconventionalised/grammaticalised: a subordinate clause takes on therole of a main clause



Example






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Case study: ‘Polite directives’ II

But sometimes a consequent is overtly uttered, with the samepragmatic effect as an ‘incomplete’ polite directive

Examples


(2′) Please open the window




Examples






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Case study: ‘Polite directives’ III

There are also indirect conditionals with the same (directive)communicative intention

Example

(13) Now if you’d come round here, we have the Ottomans.

(13+) ?If you come round here you’ll see that we have the Ottomans.

(13′) Please come here. These are the Ottomans.

p expresses a polite directive

But q also expresses a proposition

I One sentence may be used to express two independent propositions




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‘Polite directives’: Conclusions

A ‘polite directive’ can be issued by a direct conditional, an indirectconditional, or even an incomplete conditional without an utteredconsequent

I Whether p is used as a directive or not cuts across the direct/indirectconditional divide


‘Polite directives’: Conclusions

A ‘polite directive’ can be issued by a direct conditional, an indirectconditional, or even an incomplete conditional without an utteredconsequent

I Whether p is used as a directive or not cuts across the direct/indirectconditional divide


Taking stock

Recoverability of a conditional relationship is independent of whetherthe conditional meaning is the primary meaning

There is no one-to-one correspondence between conditional sentencesand conditional thoughts

F The semantics of conditionals has to go beyond the form of theconditional sentence


Taking stock





Taking stock





Further evidence: conditionals without ‘if’

In addition to the standard ‘if p, q’ sentence form, conditionals can also beexpressed in other ways

Example

(14) Take one more step and I’ll shoot

(15) Your money or your life

(16) Are you hungry? Have some food




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The main claim

Proposal

F ‘Conditionality’ should be separated from truth-conditional content

Outstanding questions

I What are the truth conditions of conditional sentences?I What counts as a conditional?


The main claim

Proposal





The main claim

Proposal





Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, 2010)

A radical version of semantic contextualism in which the logical formof the utterance may be enriched or even overridden to give speaker’sintended meaning.

Truth-conditional unit pertains to the primary, intended content ofthe utterance


Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, 2010)

A radical version of semantic contextualism in which the logical formof the utterance may be enriched or even overridden to give speaker’sintended meaning.

Truth-conditional unit pertains to the primary, intended content ofthe utterance


Sources of information in DS

DS identifies 5 sources of information that interact to generate the PM:

- Word meaning and sentence structure (ws)

- Situation of discourse (sd)

- World knowledge (wk)

- Stereotypes about society and culture (sc)

- Properties of the human inferential system (is)

I Word meaning and sentence structure are not given any priority indetermining what is said

I In different contexts of utterance, different sources may takeprecedence over others






















Conditionals in Default Semantics

Example


I Conditional sentenceI Conditional primary meaning


I Conditional sentenceI Non-conditional primary meaningI Conditional secondary meaning


I Non-conditional sentenceI Conditional primary meaning



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Primary and secondary meanings

In traditional Gricean pragmatics, there are two layers of meaning:what is said + what is implicated

This corresponds to ‘literal’ explicit content, versus ‘non-literal’implicit content

In Default Semantics, the primary / secondary meaning divide cutsacross the explicit / implicit divide

Primary meanings take on the status of what is said which is thesemantic, truth-conditional content of the utterance

Secondary meanings roughly correspond to what is implicated(‘implicatures’)


The explicit content of a conditional sentence can take the role of asecondary meaning, while its primary meaning is non-conditional















































Representing conditionals in DS I

(17) If you’d come like to come next door we’ll just examine you

PM: Please come next door

∑

x e1 e2

the addressee (x)

e1: [speaker requests e2]scwd

e2: [x come next door]ws


Representing conditionals in DS II

(18) Very short skirt on if you don’t mind me saying

PM: Your skirt is too short

∑

x y e1 e2

the addressee (x)skirt (y)

e1: [speaker asserts e2]scwd

e2: [x’s y is too short]ws


Consequences for a theory of conditionals

The primary meaning of ‘if p, q’ may or may not correspond to the ‘ifp, q’ sentence form

There is no one-to-one correspondence between conditional sentencesusing ‘if’ and conditional thoughts

In Default Semantics, the truth-conditional (semantic) unit does nothave to map onto the syntactic form of the sentence

Suppositions can either be primary or secondary meanings

In other words, conditionality does not have to be tied totruth-conditional content































So in what sense is a sentence of the form ‘if p, q’ conditional, if itdoes not have a conditional primary meaning, and does not use the‘conditional’ truth conditions?

Require criteria that will capture conditional thought at all levels ofcommunication

- Conditional sentences with conditional primary meanings

- Conditional sentences with conditional secondary meanings

- Non-conditional sentences with conditional primary meanings






























Classifying conditionals: I




These truth conditions do not apply to the primary meanings of allconditional sentences

But these truth conditions aim to follow the pattern of ourconditional thought

We can apply these truth conditions to conditional thoughts

p and q arise at a conceptual level, not (necessarily) at the level ofthe sentence

They restrict our consideration of q to those situations where p holds

I All conditionals, whether they are syntactically realised as conditionalsentences, or as conditional thoughts via non-conditional sentences,impose a restriction





































































Criterion I

F p is a supposition

F q is restricted to those situations that p describes


Classifying conditionals: II

When we use the word ‘if’, we usually show that we don’t knowwhether p is certainly true or not

Because we used the word ‘if’, it implies that we weren’t in theposition to use ‘since’, which shows that we know that p is true

In other words, ‘if’ indicates that p is somehow remote from reality

But it is not only ‘if’ that can express a conditional

I We want to extend this rationale to other conditional utterances thatdo not use ‘if’































Criterion II

F p expresses remoteness from reality

F In a conditional, the speaker is not committed to the truth of p


Example 1/3

Example


Primary meaning: do p

p is a polite request for the hearer to do something described in p

p fulfils the two criteria for conditionality:

- The speaker does not assume that the hearer is able to do p(remoteness)

- The speaker’s gratitude is conditional on the performance of p(supposition)

This is a conventional use of ‘if’ used to indicate p is not assumed tobe true in order to politely request p

This use of ‘if’ does not always require q to be uttered


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Example 2/3

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Primary meaning: ‘do q’

p hedges the (indirect) request made in q


- p indicates that the speaker is not sure that q is possible- The request in q is restricted to the case where q is possible

p softens the force of the speaker’s speech act


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Example 3/3

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Primary meaning: ‘if p, q’

A non-conditional sentence form expressing a conditional meaning

p fulfils the two criteria for conditionaltiy:

- p is a polar (yes/no) question, so invokes the possibility of alternatives(does not assume that p is true)

- The assertion q is made on the assumption that p is true

A non-conditional sentence satisfies the criteria for expressing aconditional utterance, and hence conditional thought


Example 3/3

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Summary: I

I We cannot rely on the form of a conditional sentence alone tounderstand its meaning

I The logical form of a conditional sentence interacts with the contextof utterance to generate the primary intended meaning

I Suppositions can either be primary or secondary meanings


Summary: I





Summary: I





Summary: II

I Using pragmatic criteria for defining conditional utterances, we cansee how conditionals using ‘if’ fit into broader pragmatic category

I Then, the truth-conditional (semantic) unit of a conditional utterancedoes not have to map onto the syntactic form of the uttered sentence

I In other words, conditionality does not have to be tied totruth-conditional content

Conclusion

F When we separate truth-conditional content from the ‘literal’ contentof the sentence, we can account for the diversity of uses to whichconditional ‘if’ can be put in one semantic theory


Summary: II




Conclusion



Summary: II




Conclusion



Summary: II




Conclusion



Thank you!

[email protected]

www.chiheelder.com

uea.academia.edu/chiheelder


References

Austin, J. L. 1961. ‘Ifs and cans’. In Philosophical Papers, J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock, eds. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, pp. 153–180.

Bhatt, R. & R. Pancheva. 2006. ‘Conditionals’. In The Blackwell Companion to Syntax, M. Everaert & H. van Riemsdijk, eds.Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 638–687.

Evans, N. 2007. ‘Insubordination and its uses’. In Finiteness: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations, I. Nikolaeva, ed. Oxford:Oxford University Press, pp. 366–431.

Grice, P. 1967. ‘Indicative conditionals’. In Studies in the Way of Words, 1989. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp.58–85.

Grice, P. 1975. ‘Logic and conversation’. In Studies in the Way of Words, 1989. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp.22–40.

Grice, P. 1978. ‘Further notes on logic and conversation’. In Studies in the Way of Words, 1989. Cambridge MA: HarvardUniversity Press, pp. 41–57.

Jackson, F. 1979. ‘On assertion and indicative conditionals’. The Philosophical Review 88 (4), 565–589.

Jaszczolt, K. M. 2005. Default Semantics: Foundations of a Compositional Theory of Acts of Communication. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.

Jaszczolt, K. M. 2010. ‘Default Semantics’. In The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis, B. Heine & H. Narrog, eds. Oxford:Oxford University Press, pp. 193–221.

Lewis, D. 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Predelli, S. 2009. ‘Towards a semantics for biscuit conditionals’. Philosophical Studies 142 (3), 293–305.

Quirk, R., S. Greenbaum, G. Leech & J. Svartvik. 1985. A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language. London, NewYork: Longman.

Recanati, F. 2010. Truth Conditional Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Siegel, M. E. A. 2006. ‘Biscuit conditionals: Quantification over potential literal acts’. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (2),167–203.

Stalnaker, R. 1975. ‘Indicative conditionals’. In Context and Content, 1999. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 63–77.


Documents

Reconceptualising conditionals