RELIGION,TOLERATION,ANDFREEDOMOFCONSCIENCE.

Iscompleteseparationofreligionandstateaviablepropositionwithinaliberaldemocracy?

RobertOsborneINTS4525–ReligionandState

AbstractThisessayinvestigatestheroleofreligionandstaterelationswithinaliberaldemocraticsociety.

ItlooksattheUnitedStates’modelasthestrongestamongstmanyinmodernity,andinvestigatesthehistoricaldevelopment,aswellasthemodernculturewar.Itthentakesa

normativeapproachtoreligionandstaterelations,investigatingtheRawlsianmodelaswellasStepan’sTwinTolerations.

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Is the complete separation of religion and state a viable and ethical proposition within a

liberal democracy? The relationship between religion and the state has been a fundamental

component to government since humanity’s first civilization. During the Enlightenment, freedom

of conscience and the separation of religious institutions from state institutions in the form of

tolerance, became a dominant ideal within the newly emerging liberal democratic society. This

gave rise to the theory of modernization and the related secularization theory, which assumed

that as a nation modernizes, religious institutions and beliefs will diminish. In recent years, this

theory has been challenged, due in large part to the United States and the role of religion within

its political and cultural construct. As a result, it is necessary for political scientists to investigate

the role of religion in a liberal democratic society. The traditional nomenclature within the

United States is the “wall of separation” between church and state, but is this a viable and ethical

proposition? Institutionally, it is possible and prudent to construct a wall of separation between

religious institutions and governmental institutions. As for individualistic religion, it is unethical

and thus impossible to separate religion from the public realm.

Definitions:

To advance this discussion, it is necessary to introduce standard definitions of common terms

used within this essay – Religion and Secular. These two terms have undertaken multiple

academic and cultural connotations, and, without a clear and definitive explanation of their

meaning within the context of the text, it is impossible to engage in a discussion and critique of

the material.

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Religion:

Religion means different things to different people. Far from having a straightforward and

monolithic conception, “religion” is a broad, generalize term used to understand complex social

and cultural interactions. To understand its implications within the study of political science and

international relations, it is important to clarify its meaning. According to Jonathan Z. Smith, the

term religion has three possible etymological origins. Out of these, the most probable source is

the Roman and early Christian Latin religio(n), religiones(n), religiosus(v), & religiose(ad)

which were considered “cultic terms referring primarily to the careful performance of ritual

obligations”.i Smith also provides his academic interpretation of the term: “religion” is an

anthropological not a theological category… It describes human thought and action, most

frequently in terms of belief and norms of behavior”.ii

While Smith’s definition provides an accurate example of an academic conception, it ignores

a fundamental component of the cultural understanding of religion. The relationship of religion

to the supernatural world. Rodney Stark addressed this concept in his sociological description of

religion in One True God:

“All religions involve conceptions of the supernatural… notice that I have not

suggested that all religions are based on belief in supernatural beings. They are

not… In some religions the supernatural is conceived of as an omnipresent essence

or principle governing all life, but as impersonal, remote, and definitely not a

being”.iii

Stark furthers this discussion by offering a definition of religion contrasted to a definition of

theology: “[Religion], which I define as consisting of explanations of the meaning of existence

based on supernatural assumptions and including statements about the nature of the

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supernatural” and “[The] aspect of religious thought is known as theology and consists of

explanations that justify and specify the terms of exchange with Gods, based on reasoning about

revelations which are communications believed to come from Gods” (italics are Stark’s).iv

The contrast between religion and theology, presented by both Smith and Stark, must be

considered throughout the course of this essay as they constitute a foundational component to

understanding the relationship between religion and politics. However, this essay builds upon

this distinction, and suggests that the term “religion” in the study of political science should to be

distinguished in two crucial ways: the first being institutional religion (anthropological

classification of religion) and the second being individualistic religion (theological

understanding of religion). The nature of religion is both institutional and individualistic.

Institutional religion should be recognized as the prevailing community, hierarchy, and rituals

relating to the relationship between the sacred (supernatural) world and the profane (material)

world.v Individualistic religion is best described as a personal (singular) experiences and

interactions between the sacred world and the profane world. These personal experiences cannot

be quantified, yet they formulate individual beliefs, ethics, and morality. It should be noted that

while it is often the case that institutionalized religion dictates, influences, and enhances the

individualistic religion, it is not always the case – hence the European phenomena that Grace

Davie labeled “believing without belonging”.vi Lastly, within the discussion of the culture wars,

there will be reference to the term religionist. While this term traditionally means “excessive

religious zeal”, this is not the implied definition within this discussion. Within this essay, this

term refers to those who believe in a less separation of religion and state.

This distinction (institutional religion and individualistic religion) is vitally important to a

comprehensive discussion of the intersection between religion and politics, yet it is often

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overlooked on both sides of the debate. This essay attempts to address this distinction in its

search of the ethical nature of the relationship between religion and political interaction within a

liberal democracy.

Secular:

Another important, yet complex, term within the discussion of religion and political

interaction is secular. To understand the modern interpretation of the term it is important to

understand its social development. The etymological roots of secular traces back to the Latin root

– saeculum – meaning century or age.vii According to Rethinking Secularism, by the Middle

Ages the term “secular referred to the affairs of a worldly existence” within the Christian

church.viii Clerical members who served outside of the church thus became known as secular.

This created the beginnings of a religious/secular dichotomy.ix Thus the term “secular” within

modernity has come to represent the separation of the worldly from the religious. It is interesting

to note that the religious/secular dichotomy is a construct of Western Christian influences and

this has implications for a modern understanding and implementation of the secular

terminology.x

By establishing the etymological and social roots of “secular”, it is possible to further

understand the terms relationship within political science. According to Jose Casanova, there are

multiple linguistic constructs “secular”, each representing a distinct concept within the social

sciences:

“I would like to begin, first, by introducing a basic analytical distinction between

‘the secular’ as a central modern epistemic category, ‘secularization’ as an

analytical conceptualization of modern world-historical processes, and

‘secularism’ as a worldview”.xi

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As Casanova points out, “secular” has multiple conceptualizations and they are relevant within

this discussion.

The first, secularization is understood by Casanova as: “…actual or alleged empirical-

historical patterns of transformation and differentiation of the institutional spheres of “the

religious” (ecclesiastical institutions and churches) and “the secular” (state, economy, [etc.])

from early modern to contemporary societies”.xii It is most often associated with the theory of

secularization, a sociological thesis which is “the understanding of secularization as a single

process of differentiation of the various institutional spheres or subsystems of modern societies,

understood as the paradigmatic and defining characteristic of processes of modernization”.xiii

While this thesis (theory of secularization) had been traditionally understood as an essential

component to the modernization, some scholars are beginning to question its viability as a

universal trait of modernization.xiv

The second concept of the secular, secularism, like any other –ism, is an ideological

approach to the secular. It shapes normative understandings of individuals and communities.

Casanova introduces the term as: “more broadly… a whole range of modern secular worldviews

and ideologies that may be consciously held and explicitly elaborated into philosophies of

history and normative-ideological state projects, into projects of modernity and cultural

programs. Or alternatively, it may be viewed as an epistemic knowledge regime that may be

unreflexively held and phenomenologically assumed as the taken-for-granted normal structure of

modern reality, as a modern doxa or as an “afterthought”.xv Related to secularism, this essay

will make use of the term secularists. This term references those who adhere to the worldview

described by Casanova. Essentially, the secularists ideological identity has been formulated by

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the perspective of a separation of religion from the public sphere. This is a general description,

and there is a wide range of beliefs within this ideological framework.

While these definitions are complex, they are fundamentally relevant to the discussion of

religion and politics. This debate typically takes on two sides, and without a full introduction into

the beliefs and understandings of both parties, it is impossible to have a factual and robust

discussion. For this essay, it is important to understand the institutional and ideological

distinction and framework of both religion and secular.

The United States Model of Religion/State Relations:

As described above, the secularization theory has been a dominate concept within the social

sciences for the past 150 years.xvi This theory was based on a “classical perspective” of the

religion/secular relationship which “assumed that European links between modernization and

secularization were the model for the rest of the world”.xvii This assumption assumes an organic

relationship rests between secularization and modernization, or put another way – that modern

society will only flourish with the decline of religiosity and a separation of religion from secular

institutions.xviii While this has been the classical assumption, it has undergone a series of scrutiny

and academic challenges since 1970.xix What has been the cause of the decline of this

assumption? To answer this question, it is necessary to look at the United States model of

religion and state interaction.

While relativelyxx applicable within the context of European modernity, the rise of the United

States as a modern industrial super power challenges the basic assumptions of the secularization

theory. Religion has been and is currently an intricate cultural component within the United

States, although the role of religion in the United States has been the subject of heated

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discussion, debate, and social conflict – often described as the culture wars.xxi It is this debate

which will be the focal point of this essay.xxii

Why focus on the United States model of religion and state relations?:

With empirical evidence undermining the legitimacy of the secularization theory as a

sociological construct, there has been considerable focus religion and state relations in recent

years. These studies have led to legitimate questions over the balance of religion and secular

society. The United States offers a fascinating study on this topic. For three specific reasons: The

first being that the United States is the only state with “absolute Separation of Religion and

State” according to Jonathan Fox’s empirical study on the topic.xxiii This is important as it

signifies that the United States’ model of religion within a liberal democracy is currently the

strongest ethical example. The second reason reinforces the first, and that is the religious

plurality within the United States. According to the PBS Documentary God in America the

United States is the “most religiously diverse nation on earth”.xxiv In light of Fox’s argument,

this empirical evidence suggests that the separation of religion and state within America is not

limiting the development and success of religious pluralism. Lastly, the current political culture

of the United States is polarized, and much of this tension derives from the relationship between

religious America and secular America. In 2006, then Senator Barack Obama described this

development as the: “mutual suspicion that sometimes exists between religious America and

secular America”.xxv Thus, while the United States is currently the strongest model of religion

and state relations, the current cultural and political debate over religion and state taking place

within the United States suggests that there can be improvements to consider. How did these

hostilities evolve, particularly in a pluralistic society that offers “absolute Separation of Religion

and State” and still offers the freedom for diverse, religious pluralism? Furthermore, what does

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this say about the United States model of religion and state relations? The answer to these

questions are directly related to Thomas Jefferson’s concept and Justice Hugo Black’s

interpretation of the “Wall of Separation” and its relationship within the culture wars.

The First Amendment & The “Culture Wars”:

To understand the current religion and state dynamic within the United States, it is important

to address the present-day religio-political climate, mentioned briefly above as the “culture war”.

Morris P. Fiorina identifies the culture war as: “a displacement of the classic economic conflicts

that animated twentieth-century politics in the advanced democracies by newly emergent moral

and religious ones”.xxvi How did moral and religious conflicts become a central theme in modern

United States political discourse and development? The truth is, religion and state relationships

has been apart of political discourse in the United States since its founding.xxvii That being said,

the modern culture war should be seen as a history of the evolution of political interpretation of

religion and state development. Steven Waldman’s book Founding Faith offers some interesting

insight and analysis into this discussion:

“We too often view our [United States’ religious] history through the lens, darkly,

of today’s culture wars… both sides follow a well-worn script: The “religious” side

wants less separation of church and state, and the “secularists” want more”xxviii

Waldman’s argument is that the culture wars of the modern United States have led to conflicting,

and factually biased interpretations of the religious history of United States politics, and this

distortion has taken place on both sides of the argument. Both sides are skeptical of the other,

and both sides believe the other is infringing on their inherent First Amendment rights. The

religionists believe that the secularists are trying to take away their individual religious liberty

and infringe on their freedom of conscience. The secularists believe that religionists are

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attempting to institutionalize their religion and infringe on their freedom of conscience.

Ironically, both have a valid argument. Due to this, it is necessary to accurately frame the debate.

In reality, the culture war is far more complex than activists on both sides of the debate will

admit and both sides have valid arguments. The issue of religion is addressed within the First

Amendment of the United States Bill of Rights, and it states: “Congress shall make no law

respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”.xxix Within legal

terms, this is known as the Establishment Clausexxx and the Free Exercise Clausexxxi. Herein lies

the conflicting interpretations of the culture war. The Establishment Clause protects against the

intrusion of institutional religion on government affairs, while creating an environment which

will allow for religious pluralism and protection of religious minorities. The Free Exercise

Clause protects from government intrusion on individualistic religion and gives the individual

the most important liberty within a democratic society – the Freedom of Conscience.xxxii The

irony is that the pluralistic opportunities for institutionalized religion has created multiple

conceptions individualized religions. This has created conflicting conceptions of conscience

(including but not limited to secularist philosophical identities) and different ideas for social and

political progress. It is this development which has led to the culture wars. These are the tensions

which must be addressed in order to further the discussion on religion and democratic society.

Tensions within the First Amendment:

The following section will focus on religious and political developments which has created

institutional tensions in the First Amendment.

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Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists:

Within the culture wars, one of the most recognizable colloquialisms is the Wall of

Separation between church and state. This term originates in a letter between Thomas Jefferson

and the Danbury Baptists. On January 2, 1802, President Thomas Jefferson wrote a letter to the

committee of Danbury Baptists in which he addressed the relationship of religion and the state.

Although only a paragraph in length, this letter redefined the direction of the United States in

matters of religion and the state. As Daniel L. Dreisbach explains: “Jefferson’s architectural

metaphor [Wall of Separation], in the course of time, has achieved virtual canonical status and

become more familiar to the American people than the actual text of the First Amendment”.xxxiii

The text of the letter is simple, yet addresses a complex issue:

Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his

God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the

legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & not opinions, I

contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people

which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building

a wall of separation between Church & State. Adhering to this expression of the

supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with

sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man

all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social

duties.xxxiv

Although often overlooked, within this paragraph, Jefferson has addressed the two critical

components of the United States model of religion and state relations. The Establishment Clause

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and institutional religion is apart of the often cited “building a wall of separation between

Church and State”. However, this is merely a small component of the letter. Jefferson also

recognizes individualized religion and the freedom of conscience. In this portion of the letter,

Jefferson recognizes “that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not

opinions”.

What are the modern ramifications of Jefferson’s letter? Dreisbach offers an interesting

opinion: “Whether Jefferson’s metaphor merely makes explicit that which is implicit in the

constitutional arrangement or whether it exceeds – and, indeed, reconceptualizes – the

constitutional mandate has sustained a lively debate since the mid-twentieth century”.xxxv If

taken out of context, without a full understanding of the First Amendment and the paragraph

itself, the Wall of Separation creates a significant barrier between religion and secular society.

However, within context of the full paragraph, it seems that Jefferson is reiterating the ideas of

the First Amendment. The “wall” reinforces the divide between institutional religion and secular

society, however Jefferson does not apply it individualized religion. “The powers of government

reach actions, not opinions”. In other terms, government cannot and should not become the

“thought police”. Individuals are free to their own conscience. This is a critical distinction,

particularly as it relates to modern United States. In 1947, the “Wall of Separation” enters the

United States judicial system.

Justice Hugo Black and the Precedent of the Wall of Separation:

The 1947 US Supreme Court Decision Everson vs. Board of Educationxxxvi has become a

landmark case in religion and state relations within the United States. The PBS documentary

God in America recognizes its influence and claims: “Everson is thus the foundation of modern

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church-state constitutional analysis, and it has been cited in nearly 80 Supreme Court

cases”.xxxvii Aside from setting precedent of the “wall of separation” within the statement: “In the

words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a

wall of separation between church and State”… That wall must be kept high and impregnable.

We could not approve the slightest breach”.xxxviii It also applied the Fourteenth Amendment to

matters relating to church and state relations: “The broad meaning given the [Fourteenth]

Amendment by these earlier cases has been accepted by this Court in its decisions concerning an

individual’s religious freedom rendered since the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to

make the prohibitions of the First applicable to state action abridging religious freedom. There

is every reason to give the same application and broad interpretation to the ‘establishment of

religion’ clause.”xxxix

Seen as a victory for secularists, the precedent created would only fuel the culture wars of the

twentieth and early twenty-first century. Religionists have come to see this as an overstep of

federal government and a violation of original intent. The application of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the First Amendment Establishment Clause combined with Jefferson’s “Wall of

Separation” has had a long term impact on religion and state relations. The most critical line in

this decision is “… That wall must be kept high and impregnable”. It created a precedent for

further federal involvement at the local and state level. For the most part, subsequent rulings

have erred on the side of caution in favor of the wall, and, with this as precedent, secularists have

limited the engagement of religion within the public community. For religionists, these rulings in

favor of the wall of separation appear to be an attack on their freedom of conscience and an

infringement on their religious liberty. Conversely, secularists believe the wall protects their

freedom from religion and the influence of institutional religion within the public sphere.

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Interestingly, as with the letter to the Danbury Baptists, Justice Black makes a distinction

between institutional religion and individual religion: “The structure of our government has, for

the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On

the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority”.xl It

should be noted, then, that Justice Black’s ruling was intended not only to protect the public from

institutional religion, but to protect religion from government intervention.

Given Justice Black’s intention, to solidify the First Amendment rights and promote the

ideals behind both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause by constructing the

“Wall of Separation” between the two, the results are a bit surprising. Institutional separation has

been perceived as an attack on religious liberty and freedom of conscience, as opposed to a

protective mechanism for religious liberty.

Freedom from Religion and the First Amendment:

Within the First Amendment there is an implicit freedom to consider that is a critical

component to the debates over the culture wars. This freedom, although it is not expressly stated,

is freedom from religion. This protected liberty should fit within the framework of Freedom of

Conscience protected under the Free Exercise Clause, although it is a debated component of the

culture wars. The controversy within modern United States political culture exists primarily

because of historical timing. In 1859, Charles Darwin’s released The Origin of Species and this

will indirectly redefine liberties under the Free Exercise Clause. According to Waldman, there is

an indirect relationship between Darwin’s work and the public acceptance of those who reject

religion while choosing science and rationality as their philosophical identity.xli Put another way,

Darwin’s theory refines the accepted conception of scientific and religious understanding.

Essentially, it was no longer irrational to conceive life without a creator. This presents a new

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argument, such as the origins of morality and civic ethics. While many began to reject religion as

mythological institutional construct, they do not loose their conceptions of morality and civic

engagement. As a result of these developments, the Free Exercise Clause should protect the

rights of those who choose NOT to engage in religious exercise.

This is a pertinent development within the narrative of the culture war. There are those within

the religionists side who argue for constitutional interpretation based on the originalist

perspectivexlii and dismiss freedom from religion as a protected First Amendment liberty. This

becomes an issue during discussion of the Constitution and the original intent of the framers. The

debate arises because Enlightenment authors such as Locke and Rousseau, as well as many of the

Constitutional frames, accepted some form of religious deity as fundamental to civic engagement

and dismissed atheists within their writings. However, this should be understood as pre-Darwin.

As discussed above, The Origin of Species alters the course of the relationship between religion

and science, creating a “new” philosophical category which should be protected under the

Freedom of Conscience debate. While an originalist interpretation stays true to this particular

perspective on constitutional interpretation, it ignores historical and cultural progression after

1789. As a result, it also undermines the same religious liberty and Freedom of Conscience that

many on religionists side of the argument seek to protect. Ironically, to dismiss the Freedom

from Religion as a protected liberty under the Free Exercise Clause, while granting the same

privilege to those who profess a religious identity would weaken the entire model of religion and

state relations within the United States.

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Religious Pluralism within Liberal Democracy:

According to Fox, the United States’ currently has the strongest model of religion and state

relations within democratic societiesxliii, however, evidence clearly shows tensions between

religionists and secularists. What, then, does the future hold for the relationship between religion

and a liberal democratic society?

Political Liberalism According to Rawls:

To begin this discussion, it would be prudent to address the writings of liberal political

philosopher John Rawls. The Rawlsian conception of religion within the public sphere can be

broken up into two categories: Early Rawls and Late Rawls. Constraints within this essay does

not offer the ability to address both of conceptualizations of his views on religion, so the

following analysis will focus on the topic from the Late Rawlsian perspective, primarily within

his addendum to Political Liberalism, titled The Idea of Public Reason Revisited and written in

1997. In this particular essay, Rawls is revisiting his original thesis and paid specific attention to

the role of religion within liberal democratic society.

What is a liberal democratic society according to Rawls? He points to two concepts which

are fundamental to a liberal democratic society: The first is understood as Public Reason:

“Central to the idea of public reason is that it neither criticizes nor attacks any

comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except insofar as that doctrine

is incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a democratic polity. The

basic requirement is that a reasonable doctrine accepts a constitutional democratic

regime and its companion idea of legitimate law”.xliv

Public Reason is necessary within a liberal democratic society, due in large part to the logic of

Reasonable Pluralism which is defined as: “The fact that a plurality of conflicting reasonable

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comprehensive doctrinesxlv, religious, philosophical, and moral, is the normal result of its culture

of free institutions”.xlvi Put another way, Rawls is making the claim that a liberal democratic

society results in multiple individualistic conceptions of morality. This creates the need for a

unified and reasonable understanding of policy and law outside of conceptions of morality.

Another Rawlsian conception which must be identified, particularly in relation to the ideal of

public reason and reasonable pluralism is the notion of criterion of reciprocity. The criterion of

reciprocity is understood as:

“…When those terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair

cooperation, those proposing them must also think it at least reasonable for others

to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or manipulated,

or under the pressures of an inferior political or social position”.xlvii

This is crucial in understanding the ethical role of religion in a liberal democratic society.

Ideally, according to Rawls: “Citizens will of course differ as to which conceptions of political

justice they think most reasonable, but they will agree that all are reasonable, even if barely

so.”xlviii In issues where comprehensive doctrines that make up reasonable pluralism are

incompatible with the ideals of public reason, the criterion of reciprocity ensures that all can

accept the decision of the public reason in some manner. Another way of understanding this

within the themes of this essay is, the criterion of reciprocity serves as the balancing counter

measure in instances of conflict between religion and the secular. In a sense, the criterion of

reciprocity is related to the concept of toleration.

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Toleration in a Pluralistic Liberal Democracy:

The concept of religious toleration has been apart of liberal democratic ideals since the time

of philosopher John Locke. His essay, A Letter Concerning Toleration, served as an inspiration

to many Enlightenment philosophers and provided a framework for the Constitutional Framers of

the United States. On the topic of toleration Locke claims: “It is not the diversity of Opinions,

(which cannot be avoided) but the refusal of Toleration to those that are of different Opinions,

(which might have been granted) that has produced all the Bustles and Wars, that have been in

the Christian World, upon account of Religion” [sic].xlix While this quote from Locke is framed

within the context of his own time, it is applicable to a modern understanding of liberal

democratic ideals. Locke’s argument is that pluralism of ideologies does not create social

conflict (particularly in regards to religion), but instead staunch adherence of ideological

positions and dismissal of differing ideas which brings about social and political strife. This is

the essence of the philosophical roots of toleration within a modern liberal democratic society.

Rawls expands on the concept of toleration. In his conception of an ideal liberal democratic

society, Rawls argues: “The principles of toleration and liberty of conscience must have an

essential place in any constitutional democratic conception”.l He expands on this by offering two

ideas of toleration. li The first “is purely political, being expressed in terms of the rights and

duties protecting religious liberty in accordance with a reasonable political conception of

justice”. lii The second “is not purely political but expressed from within a religious or

nonreligious doctrine, as when, for example, it was said that such are the limits God sets on our

liberty”. liii Within the Rawlsian conception of toleration, there are two specific ideals which

must be protected. The first is the protection of religious liberty within the political ideals of

justice - including protecting the freedom from religion described above, while the second idea

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of toleration relates to the protection of multiple religious’ identities within society. Essentially,

this is the foundational principles of religion and state relations set out within the First

Amendment.

Ideologues & Political Liberalism:

The Rawlsian approach to toleration rests upon the United States’ model of the

Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause; however, the inherent tension of the culture

wars still within United States’ society still manifests itself within Rawls model of a liberal

democratic society. What is the ethical manner to address both religious and secular ideologues

within the Rawlsian construct? All too often, citizens on both sides of the religion and secular

debate dogmatically adhere to their positions. Rawls does address this by stating:

“Those who reject constitutional democracy with its criterion of reciprocity will of

course reject the very idea of public reason. For them the political relation may be

that of friend or foe… Political liberalism does not engage those who think this

way. The zeal to embody the whole truth in politics is incompatible with an idea of

public reason that belongs with democratic citizenship”.liv

Rawls would claim that within his structure of liberal democratic society, there is a simple truth

as it relates to public reason

and political justice: “Political

values are not moral

doctrines”lv. In theory, this an

ethical truth. In practice, this

is an ideal which has yet to

materialize in modernity. As a

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result of this development, we should investigate how political values materialize as political

participation. Table 1 represents a model of political participation in the logical progression of

Rawlsian thought. Morality through religion, philosophy and personal experiences create

comprehensive doctrines. Comprehensive doctrines influence worldviews. Worldviews create a

normative perspective on society. Building on this, normative perspectives creates political

ideologies. In a liberal democracy, political ideologies influence political participation.

Morality is the fundamental component of political participation in a liberal democracy, whether

secular morality or religious morality.

Although Rawls has based his ideas of religion and liberal democratic society within the

framework of the United States’ model, the Rawlsian approach to liberal democratic society is

idealistic. It creates a model of religion and liberal democratic society which contains basic

assumptions such as the reasonable citizenlvi and burdens of judgment.lvii The assumption that the

reasonable citizen accepts the burden of judgment in a liberal democratic society does not

accurately portray the reality of a liberal democracy. Rawls does acknowledge the tension when

he proposes a hypothetical question on the relationship between morality and political liberalism:

Question: “How is it possible – or is it – for those of faith, as well as the

nonreligious (secular), to endorse a constitutional regime even when their

comprehensive doctrines may not prosper under it, and indeed may

decline?”lviii

Answer: “Here the answer lies in the religious or nonreligious doctrine’s

understanding and accepting that, except by endorsing a reasonable constitutional

democracy, there is no other way fairly to ensure the liberty of its adherents

consistent with the equal liberties of other reasonable free and equal citizens”.lix

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In his answer, Rawls revisits his assumptions of the reasonable citizen and the burden of

judgment. He does not offer an ethical solution. While it is true that ideologues who refuse to

give up their conception of morality within the political arena are not adhering to principles of

liberal democracy, is it ethical to dismiss them as not being apart of the political liberalism? This

creates a paradox within Rawlsian thought. Those who do not subscribe to the fundamental

tenants of political liberalism are still active members of the liberal democratic society. It is not

ethical to merely dismiss these groups from participating within the democratic process, as it

undermines some of the core principles of liberalism. These assumptions can be seen in the 2006

speech on religion and liberal democracy given by then Senator Barack Obama: “Democracy

demands that the religiously motivated translate their concerns into universal, rather than

religion-specific, values. It requires that their proposals be subject to argument, and amendable

to reason”.lx Then Sen. Obama’s remarks ring true within the Rawlsian framework of an

idealistic form of democratic, but is it logical or ethical to assume that all members of a society

have this understanding of the democratic process? The idealism of Rawls is something to strive

for as a society, but its basic assumptions limit its applicability within the confines of modern

society.

What Should Be Considered the Limits to Toleration:

As discussed above, the idealism of Rawls creates a paradox within a “real world” scenario.

It is not ethical, nor logical for that matter, to assume that political participation be devoid of

moral influences, while ideological positions are formed from a position of morality. In an

idealistic world, where everyone accepts the assumptions of the rational citizen and the burden of

Osborne 21

judgment, the Rawlsian approach could work. However, this is unrealistic. As is such, it is

important to look at the religion and state relationship from another perspective.

Twin Tolerations:

Alfred Stepan expands on the Rawlsian conception of toleration and creates the twin

tolerations model of religion and state relations in his essay “The World’s Religious Systems and

Democracy: Crafting the ‘Twin Tolerations”. While Rawls presents an idealistic harmonious

relationship between religion and state, Stepan inquires on the “threshold approach to

democracy”. He asks: “What are the necessary boundaries of freedom for elected governments

from religious groups, and for religious individuals and groups from government”.lxi Stepan’s

idea of twin toleration rests upon the conceptualization of autonomy between institutional

religion and democratic institutions (green highlight), as well as within the relationship between

individualistic religion, secular philosophy, and democratic processes (blue highlight):

“The key area of autonomy that must be established for democratic institutions is

that the institutions that emanate from democratic procedures should be able, within

the bounds of the constitution and human rights, to generate policies. Religious

institutions should not have constitutionally privileged prerogatives which allow

them authoritatively to mandate public policy to democratically elected

governments. The key area of autonomy – from the government or even from other

religions – that must be established for religious freedom is that individuals and

religious communities, consistent with our core institutional definition of

democracy, must have complete freedom to worship privately. More: as individuals

and groups, they should be able to publicly advance their values in civil society,

and to sponsor organizations and movements in political society, as long as their

Osborne 22

public advancement of these beliefs does not impinge negatively on the liberties of

other citizens, or violate democracy and the law, by violence.”lxii

By shifting the narrative from individual centered argument, to a more reasonable institutional

centered approach, Stepan came to his twin tolerations model. By focusing on the autonomy of

institutions and individuals, the twin tolerations model accounts for the paradox within the

Rawlsian argument. It does so by eliminating the basic assumptions flaw of Rawls, and creates a

political market place for ideas to prosper. Within the framework of the twin tolerations model,

institutional religion does not directly interfere with public institutions, but individualistic

religion and freedom of conscience is allowed to flourish on the open political market. Russell

Moore, an outspoken leader of the religionist movement and columnist for the Washington Post

said: “Arguably, the First Amendment has created an unrestricted market which allowed a

multiplicity of religions to flourish – creating the most religiously pluralistic society in the

modern era.”lxiii

Stepan’s twin tolerations allow for religious liberty and freedom of conscience, but what are

the limitations to religious toleration, i.e. how does society protect freedom from religion?

Stepan addressed this within his essay (yellow highlight). The protection of freedom from

religion and the limit to toleration of religious liberty extends as far as the civil rights of others

are protected, as the preference of the state towards one person’s religious liberty over another’s

civil liberties would constitute a violation of the establishment of religion clause.

Conclusions:

The relationship between religion and state within a liberal democratic society has become

very relevant within the study of political science and international relations. Prior to 1970, the

Osborne 23

secularization theory of modernity assumed that as states modernize, then religion would lose its

influence. In recent years, evidence suggests that this theory should be debunked. As a result of

this development, it is necessary to rethink the religion-state relationship within liberal

democratic societies.

One theory that has arisen in the aftermath of the downfall of the secularization theory is that

of multiple modernities. This theory speculates that there are multiple methods of modernization,

and that religion can be active within all of them. Ahmet Kuru identifies three models, the United

States, France and Turkey.lxiv In Fox’s analysis, the United States offers the only model that sees

complete separation of religion and state. This is the most compelling reason to study the role of

religion in the United States.

Religion has become an active component of the United States political process, much to the

dismay of secularists. The relationship between religionists and secularists has created what has

been labeled the culture war, and suggests that although the United States’ model of religion and

state relations is something to strive towards, it is in no way perfect. This essay then digs into a

normative approach to religions and state relations, asking is it possible to have a true separation

of religion and state within a liberal democracy, and if not, what are the limitations to tolerance

between the two.

The first part of the normative approach investigates the Rawlsian construct. Although

idealistic, this position offered interesting insight into how religion influences political

participation. For a more “real world” analysis, Stepan’s model of twin tolerations provides an

excellent construct for the future of religion and state within a liberal democracy. It does not

begin with an idealized assumption of individual participation, and instead formulates a model

on institutional behavior. The critical element to Stepan’s model is autonomy. Religious

Osborne 24

institutions and governmental institutions should be kept separate within a liberal democratic

society. Similarly, government should not interfere with an individual’s freedom of conscience.

The political market place should be open to all ideas on morality and values within society, and

no one should be stifled (this does not mean that these ideas will be chosen). All this being said,

there are ethical limits to the twin tolerations. Religious liberty should not infringe on the rights

of another citizen within a liberal democratic society. This would be an excellent topic for a

future study, in that the relationship between religious liberty and civil rights manifests itself

considerably within the discussion of the culture wars in the United States.

In conclusion, the evidence suggests that while institutional separation of religion and state is

possible and recommended within a liberal democratic society. Conversely, evidence suggests

that it is idealistic to truly divorce individualistic religion from the political process. In the same

manner, it would also be unethical to do so, as this limits an individual’s freedom of conscience

(a fundamental liberty within a liberal democracy) and relegates the government into the role of

“thought police”.

Osborne 25

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i Smith 1998. p. 269. ii Ibd. iii Stark 2001. p. 9. iv Ibd. p. 15. v Eliade 1987. vi Berger, Davie and Fokas. 2008. p. 39 vii Calhoun, Juergensmeyer and van Antwerpen. 2011. p. 8 viii ibd. ix Ibd. x Taylor, Forward: What is Secularism 2008; Calhoun, et al. 2011. xi Casanova, The Secular and Secularisms, 2009. p. 1049. xii Ibd. p. 1050 xiii ibd. p. 1050 xiv Berger, et al. 2008; Calhoun, et al. 2011; Stepan, 2011. xv Casanova, The Secular and Secularisms, 2009. p. 1051. xvi Berger, Davie and Fokas, 2008. p. 2 xvii Ibd. xviii Ibd. xix Ibd. xx The term “relatively” in this sentence refers to the argument of Berger which presents multiple examples of how European secularism is not a monolithic concept, and argues that religion influences European modernity in a relevant, although different fashion. Ibd. xxi Further discussion of the culture wars will take place in later sections. Waldman 2009; Fiorina, et al. 2011; Kreeft 2002.

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xxii In recent years, a response to the empirical evidence against the secularization theory has arisen in the forms of a concept called “multiple modernities”. By dismissing the link between secularization and modernity, this theory assumes that religion and state relations is not a singular model within modernity. Berger, et al. 2008; Eisenstadt 2000. xxiii Fox, Do Democracies Have Separation of Religion and State. 2007. p. 6. xxiv Daniel and Mellows, 2010. p. 30. xxv Obama, 2006. p. 2 xxvi Culture War? rejects the legitimacy of an actual cultural conflict within the United States, claiming that it is a myth of political, religious, and media elites and does not resonate with the general populace. Fiorina, et al. 2011. p. 2. Although a valid argument, within the context of the current 2016 Presidential election, religion has played a major role in the discussion and debate on both sides. From Bernie Sanders becoming the first Jewish candidate to win primary delegates to the controversy of Donald Trump becoming a favorite of evangelicals Chozick, 2016; Zoll and Federman, 2016; Moore, 2016; Burke, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2016. xxvii Waldman, 2009. xxviii Ibd. p. x xxix US Constitution, 2012 p. 816-19 xxx Make no law respecting an establishment of. xxxi Or prohibiting free exercise of. xxxii Waldman, 2009. p. x. xxxiii Dreisbach, 2002. p. 3. xxxiv Jefferson, 1998. xxxv Dreisbach, 2002. p. 2. xxxvi Daniel and Mellows, 2010. p. 9. xxxvii Driessen, 2010. p. 120. xxxviii Black, 1947. p. 7-8. xxxix Ibd. p. 6-7 xl Ibd. p. 7 xli Waldman, 2009. p. 190. xlii According to the Heritage Foundation the Originalist Perspective or written constitutionalism “implies that those who make, interpret, and enforce the law ought to be guided by the meaning of the United States Constitution—the supreme law of the land—as it was originally written. This view came to be seriously eroded over the course of the last century with the rise of the theory of the Constitution as a "living document" with no fixed meaning, subject to changing interpretations according to the spirit of the times.” Forte, 2012. xliii Fox, 2007. xliv Rawls, 2005. p. 301 xlv Comprehensive doctrine refers to individual conceptions of morality created and defined outside of the public reason (religious, philosophical, etc). Wenar, 2013. p. 6. xlvi Rawls, 2005. p. 301. xlvii Ibd. p. 303. xlviii Ibd. xlix Locke, 1983. p. 55. l Rawls, 2005. p. 311 li Ibd. lii Ibd. liii Ibd. liv Ibd. p. 301 lv Ibd. p. 307 lvi The Reasonable citizen “wants to live in a society in which they can cooperate with their fellow citizens on terms that are acceptable to all. They are willing to propose and abide by mutually acceptable rules, given the assurance that others will also do so; and they will honor these rules even when this means some sacrifice to their own interests”. Wenar, 2013. p. 6. lvii “Reasonable citizens accept the burdens of judgment. The deepest questions of religion, philosophy, and morality are very difficult even for conscientious people to think through, and people will answer these questions in different ways because their own particular life experiences” Ibd. lviii Rawls, 2005. p. 309. lix Ibd. p. 311.

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lx Obama, 2006. p. 7. lxi Stepan, 2001. p. 216. lxii Ibd. p. 217. lxiii “The development of relatively free market conditions vis-à-vis religion results in the emergence of pluralism”. Stark, 2001. p. 96. lxiv Kuru, 2009.