Review no. 80

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Press Review 1—15 November 2014

Table of Contents Pages

Terrorism in Africa - Africa: Is ISIS allied to or influencing African Jihadi Groups? 3 - 32 Countries Where Global Warming Could Make Violence Worse 8 - Counter-Piracy at Sea Will Likely Fail 12

Burkina Faso - Blaise Compaoré ou la trahison des leaders Africains (libre opinion) 17

- Welcome to the age of the citizen uprising in Africa. 20

Egypt - Que signifie l'allégeance du principal groupe terroriste du pays à l'État islamique ? 23

Libya Saving Libya, Again 26

Mali - Situation nationale : Le Mali de nouveau dans l’œil du cyclone ? 29

Nigeria - LA MENACE DE BOKO HARAM 33 - A stable and secure Nigeria: An asset to America 43

Tunisia - THE CHALLENGES OF TUNISIAN DEMOCRACY: INSIGHTS FROM TURKEY AND EGYPT 48

Uganda - Are madrassas in Africa educating or indoctrinating? 52

Terrorism in the World - RADICALISM IS A POLITICAL PROBLEM, NOT AN ISLAMIC ONE 57

FRANCE - Le projet de loi sur la lutte contre le terrorisme définitivement adopté 60 - Terrorisme : trois projets d'attentats déjoués en France ces derniers mois 62

Iraq - The West’s failed counter-terrorism strategy requires a complete rethink 64

Syria - To end terrorism by Muslims, end wars on Muslims: 71 - Fighting ISIS (II): To work, this must be more than just a military operation 74

UAE - Is Islamic State Group Getting Into the Piracy Business? 76

UK - Is the NSA actually making us worse at fighting terrorism? 78

USA - Harper policies undermine deradicalization 82

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A ri a Is ISIS allied to or in uen ing A ri an i adi roups

03 November 2014

In August A ri a s spy ie s et in Nairobi as part o t e A ri an Union s Co i ee o Intelligen e and Se urity Ser i es o A ri a CISSA T ey e pressed deep on ern about t e gro ing t reat o t e Isla i State in Iraq and Syria ISIS and t e likeli ood t at t e radi al ou it ig t in uen e t e on nent s o n i adi groups Areas o on ern or t e ie s in luded an allian e being built by terror groups orld ide sop is ated sour es o unding and A ri a s porous borders

Africa News Update o ers news, background and feature ar cles from African sources two mes a week. The newsle er is free of charge and is edited by the Norwegian Council for Africa. Some of the ar cles may be shortened.

A major risk of ISIS establishing itself in Africa is through the con nent’s organized jihadi groups. This begs the ques on: Does ISIS has a rela onship with these groups?

Here is where major African groups stand:

Boko ara

This Nigerian group is currently the most lethal of all African terror groups. Known for its bombings, bank robberies and kidnappings, the group has in the last 2 months captured a large swathe of territory – a tac c that is said to have been in spired by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Abu Bakr Shekau, the then head of Boko Haram, boasted about the capture of Gwozo, calling it a state among the Islamic states.

In July, Shekau publicly declared support for ISIS. What is interes ng about his dec lara on is that Shekau thanked, prayed for, and equally praised three famous jihadi leaders: Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi (ISIS), Dr. Ayman al- awahiri (Al-Qaeda), and Mullah Omar of the Taliban.

A point worthy of further analysis is whether these three groups are perceived, by the group’s leadership, as having the same status as Boko Haram. Boko Haram however, seems to considers itself to be an independent jihadi group that shirks alliances and entanglements with global jihadi groups. The US State Department has ruled out any a lia on between Al-Qaeda central. Shekau’s public support for ISIS can also be e plained as simply being a demonstra on of this erra c gure’s penchant for self-promo on.

ISIS’s current priority is strengthening its posi ons on the Levant and defending it self against American-targeted airstrikes. For ISIS’s leadership, the only de facto caliphate that ma ers is its own. Thus, all e is ng jihadi groups–as well as the terri tories they control, fall under its jurisdic on. According to a statement by ISIS: The

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Terrorism in Africa

legality of all emirates, groups, states and organiza ons become null by the e pan sion of the khilafah’s caliphate’s authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.

A IM

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a branch of Al-Qaeda central under the leadership of Abdelmaled Droukdel and opera ng largely in Algeria and northern Mali, has rejected ISIS’s claim of being an Islamic caliphate. Last July, Droukdel em phasised that the group’s Bay’at (oath of allegiance) to awahiri s ll stands.

But several AQIM splinter groups have emerged lending their support to ISIS. AQIM’s former judge of its central region, Abu-Abdullah Othman al-Asemi, is one notable gure to have come out in support. Another group, naming itself Jund al-Khilafah (Soldiers of the Caliphate), split with AQIM and pledged support to ISIS.

For the me being, Al-Qaeda loyalists are reigning in the Maghreb countries, par c ularly in Algeria and Mali, but the equa on might change if ISIS e pands outside the Levant. AQIM under Droukdel is a self-su cient group and has, since 2003, amassed about 50M from kidnappings for ransom.

Tunisia

Tunisia has become an incubator for jihadists gh ng in Syria and Iraq. It is not en rely clear how many Tunisians are currently gh ng along with ISIS but Abdel Bari Atwan, former editor of London-based Al-Quds al-Arabi and an authority on Arab jihadi groups, es mates the number of Tunisian ghters in Syria and Iraq at about 5,000 and Algerians at 2,000. Of the ten countries that have sent the most ghters to Syria and Iraq, according to a chart compiled by the BBC, three (Tunisia, Moroc co, and Libya) are in North Africa, with Tunisia supplying around 3,000 men.

The la er is close to the conserva ve gure of 2,400 that Tunisia’s Interior Ministry has o cially declared. According to Al-Shorouk, a Tunisian newspaper, the majority of Tunisians are with ISIS, whereas Algerians and Moroccans ght with the Al-Nusrat Front (an Al-Qaeda a liate). The Tunisian government claims that 400 Tuni sian jihadists have now returned to the country. What is interes ng is that 9,000 young Tunisians have been prevented from going to Syria and Iraq by their govern ment.

Recently, there have been skirmishes between Tunisian jihadists who had fought with ISIS and those who fought with Al-Nusrat Front within the country. A splinter group of AQIM called Uqba Ibn Na Brigade has declared its support of ISIS. There are fears that these armed clashes might lead to a bloody war between these two jihadi wings, similar to the ba le brewing in Syria between ISIS and Al-Nusrat. This will place an e tra burden on Tunisia’s security services, which are already over stretched in preven ng unrest in Libya from spilling over into their country.

Libya

Thanks to Qatar’s massive funding of Libya’s jihadists and the militants’ inheritance

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of Qadda ’s huge weapons stockpile, Libyan ghters are ac ve in Syria and ght under the ISIS banner. What dis nguishes Libya from other North African jihadists is its hardware. According to a UN report released in March 2014, Libya has be come an important source of arms for the ghters in Syria. There are also reports that a Libyan mili a named al-Ba ar Brigade has returned from Syria and estab lished itself in Benghazi.

Al-S abaab

In August 2014, Abu al-Ayna al-Khorasani, an ISIS leader, publicly asked Al-Shabaab to join what he called the global ght against American interests. Surprisingly, Al-Shabaab’s leadership ignored the plea. The African ou it is an Al-Qaeda a liate and is unlikely to associate itself with ISIS’s caliphate in the foreseeable future. Un like Boko Haram and ISIS, Al-Shabaab does not call itself a caliphate but instead has used the term emirate’.

Ahmed Diriye Abu Ubaidah’ the new emir wasted no me a er his selec on last month in declaring his allegiance to awahiri. Moreover, Al-Shabaab has close es with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). While the rela onship between these two groups is not opera onal, it does involve consulta on, mutual moral support, and the transmi ng of vital informa on between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda central.

There are reports that some foreign jihadists have le , or a empted to leave, So malia to ght with ISIS. These jihadists became disenchanted with the Al-Shabaab leadership and have been hiding in Somalia for fear of being hunted by Ahmed Go dane, the group’s former emir. According to some sources, Kenya has arrested a small number of these foreign jihadists as they were leaving Somalia, but Nairobi has yet to issue a statement on this ma er.

There are documented cases of a small number of young Somalis, men and wom en, in North America and Europe who have joined ISIS. The phenomenon of Somali women in the west joining ISIS is new. Even at the height of Al-Shabaab’s recruit ment of Somalis in the west several years ago, no female recruits joined them. ISIS, however, targets these women from the West to marry its ghters. Al-Shabaab, on the other hand, prefers its female supporters in the West to raise funds for the group.

For now, it appears that ISIS has some support among smaller splinter groups of e is ng African jihadi groups, mostly in North Africa. If the fortunes of the militant group change and the group e pands, it might have serious repercussions for Afri ca. Several factors favor ISIS vis-à-vis Al-Qaeda central:

ISIS is no ordinary jihadi group. It has huge wealth at its disposal. An American in telligence o cial has told the Guardian that the radical group doubled its assets a er it captured Mosul from 875M to 2B, making it the wealthiest jihadi group in the world. For instance, ISIS controls 6 of Syria’s 10 oil elds, not to men on other

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oil elds in Iraq. ISIS is consequently capable of nancing Africa’s jihadi groups.

ISIS is wining its compe on with Al-Qaeda central. ISIS’s ability to lead a standing army, its panache in the social media and propaganda, and its cruelty in dealing with what it perceives as enemies of Islam are helping it to win followers. Para do ically, in comparison with ISIS, Al-Qaeda central now appears so . Furthermore, Al-Qaeda neither has nancial resources nor controls substan al territories. Worst of all, awahiri’s group has not carried out any spectacular terror act, in the eyes of global jihadists, since 2001.

Some of the Al-Qaeda a liate leaders in Africa such as Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Ab delmaek Droukdel, and Mohamed al- ahawi of Ansar ash-Sharia of Libya are veter ans of jihad who fought with Osama bin Laden. Their loyalty is with Al-Qaeda and their colleague awahiri. However, these leaders lead a younger genera on that has less a achment to awahiri, whom they see as not being inspira onal or char isma c like bin Laden. The young North African jihadists are itching for ac on and are less interested in watching video tapes of awahiri hiding in the con nes of Pa kistan’s tribal areas.

ISIS is preoccupied with the Levant now but has ambi ously vowed to e pand its caliphate to the rest of the world and certainly values the addi on of more African ghters to this end. Mohamed al-Aroui, the spokesman of Tunisia’s Ministry of the Interior, has lamented that the only way to deal with jihadists is with the s ck. Unfortunately, in their August mee ng, Africa’s spy chiefs missed the point when they failed to address the op ons of gh ng jihadists through social media, curtail ing government corrup on (a major recrui ng tool for jihadists) and dealing with the root causes of the aliena on of Africa’s youth.

Hassan M. Abukar is a poli cal analyst

h p: www.afrika.no

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3 Countries W ere lobal War ing Could Make Violen e Worse

A new report ranks the countries most vulnerable to climate conflicts and food inse-curity.

| Thu Oct. 30, 2014 11:56 AM EDT

A deadly bo b blast in entral Nigeria on May Diariocritico de Venezue-la/Flickr

Recently, the Pentagon released a disturbing report. Climate change, it warned, will e acerbate problems like terrorism and disease outbreaks, drain military resources, and create new enemies. The report said that the military's basic opera ons—everything from training to its supply chains and infrastructure—are now threat ened by rising temperatures and shi ing weather pa erns. It all points to one con clusion: Global warming is a na onal security issue.

Now a new analysis, released Wednesday, is naming 32 countries in which conflict and civil unrest could be worsened by the changing climate. The ndings are part of the seventh annual "Climate Change and Environmental Risk Atlas" from Maplecro —a rm that studies how vulnerable countries are to various risks. It concludes that climate change is already impac ng "food produc on, poverty, mi gra on and social stability—factors that signi cantly increase the risk of conflicts and instability in fragile and emerging states."

Those pressures could also "lead to disenfranchisement and drive support for radi cal groups."

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Maplecroft

Maplecro analyzed how e posed popula ons in these are countries are to climate impacts and assessed how well their governments will be able to adapt over the ne t 30 years. According to the report, the ve countries most vulnerable to cli mate-related conflict and food insecurity are Bangladesh, Sierra Leone, South Su dan, Nigeria, and Chad.

The report's authors highlight Nigeria ( ed for third the list), where "widespread drought and food insecurity helped create the socio-economic condi ons that led to the emergence of Boko Haram and the violent insurgency in the North East of the country."

Boko Haram is a militant Islamist group that the US Jus ce Department says has been responsible for 600 a acks on government, churches, mosques and schools. It has killed about 5,000 people since 2009 and displaced over 650,000. The group kidnapped more than 200 girls and young women in April. (The Nigerian govern ment says it has reached a cease re with the militants that would include the re lease of the girls, but according to the BBC the talks are s ll ongoing.)

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T e ountries t at Maple roft ound ere ost ulnerable to ood inse urity and li ate ange Maplecroft

A er visi ng Nigeria earlier this year, my Mother Jones colleague Erika Eichel bergerfound that drought, popula on e plosion, environmental degrada on, and povertyare all aggrava ng the country's armed conflicts. There are now more clash es between farmers and nomadic herders over ever-dwindling agricultural land, and economic hardships in the country are boos ng Boko Haram's recruitment e orts. Eichelberger quoted Oluwakemi Okenyodo, the e ecu ve director of CLEEN Founda on, a Nigerian security-focused nonpro t, as saying that when "young peo ple are pushed to the wall," there's a greater chance that they will be sucked into the growing Boko Haram insurgency. Eichelberger reported that "there's not enough hard evidence yet to implicate human-caused climate change in the bulk of the ecological disaster" in Nigeria—but that could change in the future as rising temperatures increasingly threaten agriculture in the region.

In a 2011 report, the United States Ins tute of Peace outlined a "basic causal mech anism" linking global warming to future conflict in Nigeria: Water and agricultural land shortages are followed by sickness, hunger, and joblessness. Governmental inac on on these issues in turn opens the door to conflict. "In the increasingly parched, violent northeast," writes the report's lead author Aaron Sayn, "members of groups like Boko Haram e plain their acts by voicing disgust with government."

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Lake C ad supports ast s at es o Nigerian ar ing and grazing land but it as lost ore t an 9 per ent o its original size Jacques Descloitres/NASA GSFC

Maplecro 's rankings lend even more weight to the growing body of research tying climate change to the poten al for more violence. Prior to the unrest that eventu ally e ploded into revolu on and armed conflict, Syria had e perienced an unprec edented drought that led to the internal displacement of thousands of people who had lost their livelihoods.

Natural resources were also at the heart of the Darfur crisis. "It is no accident that the violence in Darfur erupted during the drought," UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon wrote in a 2007Washington Post op-ed. "Amid the diverse social and poli cal causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change

h p: www.motherjones.com

Counter-Pira y at Sea Will Likely Fail November 11, 2014

by Brandon Prins, University of Tennessee In a recent report for the O ce of Naval Research in the United States, Brandon Prins e amines trends in mari me piracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using newly col lected and geo-coded data from the Mari me Piracy Event and Loca on Data Project (MPELD) Prins documents both the drivers of piracy in Sub-Saharan Africa and compares piracy to other forms of poli cal violence witnessed in this region. He notes that given the tremendous social and poli cal conflict occurring in many piracy prone countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, counter-piracy e orts at sea will likely fail. Table 1 below provides a short temporal window of piracy a acks in nine Sub-Saharan African countries. Clearly East Africa, speci cally Somalia and Tanzania,

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and West Africa, including Nigeria in par cular but other countries in the Gulf of Guinea as well, account for the vast majority of piracy observed. Table 1 also shows the drama c decrease in piracy o Somalia beginning in 2013 and the sizable increase in the Gulf of Guinea that began in 2012. Incidents as cribed to Togo may of course be Nigerian pirates a acking transport ships as they steam towards the oil elds and pla orms located in the Niger Delta. So far in 2014 there are twelve reported piracy incidents in Nigerian waters (but another 17 in the Greater Gulf of Guinea), which is slightly below the number of incidents reported in 2012 and 2013 for the same rst eight months of the year. Interes ngly, and perhaps worryingly, the number of incidents reported o of Somalia and Yemen in 2014 now stands at 9 (through September 17, 2014) with another 3 occurring in the Red Sea. This remains considerably fewer than the inci dents observed in 2012 o Somalia (and Yemen) but is more than the total num ber of incidents from all of 2013. So piracy may be increasing once again o So malia.

Table 1:Sub-Saharan African Maritime Piracy Counts by Year Many of the drivers of mari me piracy are strong in Sub-Saharan African coun tries. E tant research shows state fragility, economic depriva on, popula on, and geographic opportunity all related to the incidence of piracy in territorial waters. Similar to the growth of armed insurgencies, poli cal and economic condi ons help facilitate corrup on and criminality, both of which enable piracy. Indeed, countries that su er from piracy e perience much higher levels of poli cal fragility. The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) measures poli cal weakness us

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ing an ordinal scale ranging from one to twenty- ve, with higher values signifying increasingly fragile states (see Table 2). The average fragility score for the nine Sub-Saharan countries e amined in this report (averaged across the 2009-2013 me period) is 16.8, which is 2.5 mes higher than countries without piracy. The average fragility score for countries without piracy during the 2009-2013 me period is 6.6. Somalia, with an average score of 24, represents the closest thing to a failed state in the interna onal system. The poli cal improvement Somalia witnessed from 2011 to 2012 (and likely into 2013 although the data for 2013 are not yet available) appears to have helped counter-piracy e orts in the Greater Gulf of Aden. Given that trade in the greater Gulf of Aden is valued at nearly one trillion US dollars a year, it is clear why would-be pirates gravitate toward these waters. Further, Somalia despite having only ve deep-sea ports, sits only ve kilometers from where the Red Sea emp es into the Gulf of Aden, and appro imately twenty thousand ships transit through the Greater Gulf of Aden each year. These vessels represent in many cases easy targets for would-be pirates.

Table 2: Country-level Information Economic depriva on within countries also helps to facilitate piracy and illegal mar kets more generally. Unemployed youth (especially males) provide the foot soldiers both for insurgencies and pirate gangs. The average per capita gross domes c product for our nine Sub-Saharan African countries (averaged across the 2009-2013 me period) is only about 600 US dollars. The average value for countries without piracy is nearly 28 mes higher, at 17,753. As Table 2 demonstrates, some of the most piracy-prone countries remain some of the poorest places on Earth.

Somalia had an average per capita GDP in 2009-2013 of only 562. Nigeria was slightly higher at 1,013. Such entrenched and deep poverty poses signi cant challenges for any counter-piracy e orts. Convincing individual shers or farmers to forego the opportunity of a lucra ve payo (typically several thousand US dol lars) remains di cult when there are few employment alterna ves. And, monies from pirate opera ons tend to depress job growth in the legal economy. Prices rise with cash from piracy leading to the apprecia on in the value of the local currency, which tends to decrease primary commodity e ports (Oliver, Jabloski, and Has ngs 2013). E orts to increase wages and job growth in piracy-prone countries must be part of an e ec ve counter-piracy strategy. Many of the same drivers of mari me piracy also associate with other forms of violent conflict on land. The Armed Conflict Loca on and Event dataset (ACLED) as well as the Social Conflict in Africa database (SCAD) both record instances of poli cal and typically violent conflict occurring on the ground in Africa. The Global Terrorism database (GTD) collects informa on on transna onal and domes c ter ror a acks occurring in all countries around the world. As Figure 2 clearly shows, piracy represents only a small frac on of this violent poli cal conflict, but even these rela vely small numbers have costly consequenc es on interna onal trade. The Oceans Beyond Piracy Project es mated the costs of Somali piracy in 2012 alone to be around 6 billion dollars. Of course, the illicit gains from piracy also drive trade in narco cs, weapons, and human slavery. Comba ng these proscribed ac vi es reduces the public co ers of already poor countries and consequently prevents investments in other areas that might spur development, reduce poverty, and improve public health (all of which would like ly help drive piracy lower). Counter- tra cking programs seemingly cost billions of US dollars each year since the modest counter-piracy military opera ons in the Greater Gulf of Aden cost over 1 billion US dollars in 2012 (Oceans Beyond Piracy 2013). Although pirate a acks dropped drama cally o the coast of Somalia in 2013, they increased signi cantly in the Gulf of Guinea. Counter-piracy naval opera ons and improved security onboard ships likely contributed to the decline in the greater Gulf of Aden. Some strengthening in Somali governing ins tu ons also likely had an e ect even as armed conflict con nued to create di cul es for the new regime. In the Gulf of Guinea, a deteriora ng security environment and con nued fragility in many West African governments provided space for pirate groups to operate. In Nigeria, for e ample, the number of conflict events on land increased by over 200 percent from 2011 to 2013 and the number of terrorist a acks jumped by nearly 250 percent from 2011 to 2012. Poli cal violence was also on the rise in

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Togo, Ghana, the Ivory Coast and the DRC. Although West African leaders met dur ing the summer of 2013 to plan an assault on piracy and pirate groups, insu cient resources and too few naval patrol cra will likely hamper their e orts.

Figure 2: Comparing Piracy, Conflict, and Terrorism Events in 9 Sub-Saharan Afri-can Countries, 2004-2013 Permi ng foreign-armed guards on merchant vessels transi ng Nigerian waters may be a ne t step in countering this mari me threat. Clearly, though, condi ons on land must improve before the piracy threat will disappear. Weak states, job lessness, and abundant targets currently ensure that piracy will con nue. Brandon C. Prins is Professor of Poli cal Science at the University of Tennessee and Global Security Fellow at the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy. His research focuses on the causes and consequences of poli cal violence within and between na on-states. Much of his work has e amined how domes c poli cal in s tu ons influence leader decisions to use military force, par cularly in the United States. Currently Prins has three research projects that he is working on. One ad dresses the geo-spa al condi ons associated with modern mari me piracy. The second e plores the issue of territory and how it condi ons conflict escala on. The third project e plores the principal drivers of domes c terrorism in demo cra c states. Dr. Prins has been involved in research projects funded by O ce of Naval Research, Oak Ridge Na onal Laboratory, Y-12 Na onal Security Comple , and the Na onal Nuclear Security Administra on. He can be contacted at bprins@utk.edu. Source: pira y-studies org

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Blaise Co paoré ou la tra ison des leaders A ri ains libre opinion

12 - november - 2014

Après 27 ans de règne sans partage, Blaise Compaoré e président du Burkina Faso a rendu le pouvoir sous la pression de son peuple dont la maturité poli que est à saluer.

Ce e belle victoire est d’abord celle du peuple dans sa globalité qui a su montrer son audace, sa rage du changement mais aussi sa capacité à se ressembler autour des grandes causes.

De ce e victoire j’en re deu enseignements fondamentau à savoir : le principe de transmission du pouvoir n’est pas encore acquis ; la renaissance de l’espérance Africaine.

Le principe de transmission du pouvoir n’est pas encore acquis

Sur le con nent Africain, rares sont les présidents qui peuvent se targuer d’avoir transmis le pouvoir sans encombre. De nos indépendances à ce jour, aucun diri geant n’a eu ce e élégance d’esprit de rendre le pouvoir sans pression, sans e u sion de sang. Cela est inacceptable !

Burkina Faso

Les plus op mistes me citeront quelques cas tels que : le Sénégal où le président Senghor transme ra le pouvoir à son premier ministre d’alors Abdoul Diouf en respectant les règles cons tu onnelles mais aussi du Mali où le président Alpha Oumar Konaré qui era son fauteuil à la n de son second mandat cons tu onnel et en n le Cap vert qui depuis 1991 fait gure de pays démocra que au travers l’instaura on d’une culture d’alternance poli que.

Sur 54 Etats Africains, il est inadmissible de constater cet état de fait. Seulement trois transmissions volontaires. Il est du devoir de la jeunesse Africaine de s’organi ser en associa on citoyenne, de s’uni er a n de demander le respect des règles cons tu onnelles tout en associant les forces vives de la na on.

En e et, la quasi-totalité des dirigeants Africains ne préparent pas leur succession. A croire qu’une fois élus la no on du départ du pouvoir est ine istant. Pour preuve, les présidents Félix Houphouët-Boigny de la Côte d’Ivoire, Gnassingbé Eyadema du Togo, Lansana Conté de la Guinée, Hosni Moubarak de l’Egypte, Ben Ali de la Tuni sie, Blaise Compaoré du Burkina Faso ;

Après plus deu décennies au pouvoir, aucun de ses dirigeants n’a su préparer son pays à une alternance poli que. Pire, ils l’ont préparé néga vement avec ce slo gan « moi ou le chaos ». Certains sont morts au pouvoir et d’autres l’ont transmis par la pression de la rue.

L’Afrique est jeune et plein d’avenir car sa jeunesse à foi en ce con nent. Notre ré ussite sera possible que lorsque nous serons capables de nous regarder ensemble dans le même miroir c’est-à-dire accepter notre passé commun et regarder l’avenir ensemble.

La renaissan e de l espéran e A ri aine

La poli que c’est d’abord ce e no on d’espérance. Un leader poli que est celui qui est capable de donner de l’espoir à son peuple, d’uni er sa na on autour d’un pacte républicain dont le but ul me demeure l’améliora on des condi ons de vie des uns et des autres.

A parcourir l’ensemble des Etats Africains, on remarque ce e perte d’espérance au niveau de toutes les couches sociales des di érentes na ons.

En e et, le départ de Blaise Compaoré du pouvoir est le signe de l’e istence d’une jeunesse en quête de muta on perpétuelle mais aussi d’une jeunesse en phase avec son époque.

La jeunesse Africaine est plus que jamais instruite. A ce jour 40% des Africains ont suivi des études secondaires ou supérieures et plus de 65% de la popula on Afri caine ont moins de 35 ans. En 2020, ce e propor on va ne ement augmenter qua siment de la moi é.

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D’après l’UNICEF (fonds des na ons unies pour l’enfance), en 2050, 40% des en fants de moins de cinq ans seront Africains.

Quel bel espoir pour le con nent Africain ! C’est dire que l’avenir du monde se trouve en terre Africaine.

La prospérité Africaine sera réalité demain à condi on que les dirigeants actuels acceptent dès maintenant de miser sur ce e jeunesse innovatrice, compétente et surtout ambi euse.

Si hier la jeunesse Africaine se ba ait pour les indépendances, aujourd’hui ce e même jeunesse se bat pour une culture démocra que, une culture citoyenne d’une part et une Afrique uni ée autour des concepts d’intégra on d’autre part.

A travers le con nent, on constate une nouvelle forme d’organisa on sociale qui devient le porte-parole du peuple dans le but de défendre ses aspira ons. Ce la a été vrai avec le mouvement « Y’en a marre » au Sénégal, le « Balai citoyen» au Burkina Faso, les sociétés civiles en Guinée, au Ghana, etc.

La place qu’occupe ce conglomérat de personnalités non poli ques prouve à su sance la perte de con ance du peuple en ses dirigeants. En outre, ce e nouvelle forme d’organisa on bouscule nos dirigeants et les contraint à une muta on tant comportementale que poli que.

Le président Alpha Condé a prévenu ses pairs Africains sur la situa on de la jeu nesse Africaine : « Lorsque je dis au Chefs de l’Etat que nous sommes assis sur une bombe, on me demande qu’est-ce que tu racontes. Je réponds toujours qu’on a une popula on où plus 65% à moins de 35 ans. La jeunesse, si on ne résoud pas ses problèmes, on va sauter».

Ma oudou Mara

h p: guineema n.com ?p=6393

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Wel o e to t e age o t e i zen uprising in A ri a

3 November 2014

When, earlier this week, ambian President Michael Sata died in London aged 77 - making him the 11th serving African head of state to die since 2008 - an old ques on resurfaced in social media circles: Why do so many African leaders die in o ce?

Now, with the happenings in the landlocked West African na on of Burkina Faso, another ques on has emerged: Why do African leaders like clinging to power?

While "sit- gh sm" is not an e clusively African condi on, the list of longest-ruling heads of state is dominated by Africans: Cameroon's Paul Biya (39 years) followed closely by Angola and Equitorial Guinea and Angola (35), Robert Mugabe (34). Blaise Campaore, un l this week Burkina Faso's president, has ruled since 1987 (t ree-quarters o is people a e ne er kno n anot er leader).

A possible answer may be gleaned from a man who should know: former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, who tried, in the nal year of his presidency, to get the cons tu on changed so he could run for a third term, told t e BBC in that African leaders cling to power because of the "fear of the unknown".

Perks o po er

Poli cal power in Africa is generally characterised by the capacity to dispense pat ronage and sanc on without the interference of ins tu onal safeguards like an in dependent judiciary, and the fear of the loss of that power - its perks, and the abil

20

Instability has plagued the continent over the last five decades

21

ity to deter retribu on from opponents - is a strong one.

Burkina Faso: Coup or not a coup?

"If I try to e ercise about 40 per cent of the powers that I have, Nigerians will say I am a dictator. When African presidents try to use about 60 per cent of their pow ers, the whole world will complain that they are dictators," Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan said in a tele ised at it ournalists in May.

The a rac veness of the presiden al o ce should e plain much of the instability - coups and civil wars, all aimed at seizing power - that has plagued the con nent over the last ve decades. A ording to one study by the African Development Bank, there were more than 200 coup a empts in sub-Saharan Africa between 1960 and 2012. West Africa alone accounted for more than half of the a empts.

But, as that AfDB study also points out, coups have been going out of fashion in re cent years, for a number of reasons. Where once it was the armed forces or rebel groups that regularly sought to undermine governments, we are now more likely to see bands of ordinary ci zens entering the fray, and seeing results.

Since the beginnings of the Arab Spring - the unprecedented 2011 uprisings that brought down the governments of Ben Ali (Tunisia), Hosni Mubarak (Egypt) and Muammar Gadda (Libya), three of Africa's longest serving and most repressive heads of state - a culture of ci zen protests appears to be sweeping the con nent. Welcome to the age of the ci zen uprising.

The year 2012 opened with na onwide protests in Nigeria, on a scale not seen in at least two decades, against the removal of fuel subsidies. About the same me, tens of thousands of youths took to the streets in Senegal, to challenge President Abdoulaye Wade's bid to run for a third term, in de ance of cons tu onal limits. (He went ahead to run, losing in the run-o polls to opposi on candidate Micky Sall).

'Sudanese Spring'

In September 2013, Sudan, ruled by the same man since 1985, itnessed ten days o iolent protests. Triggered in part by a reduc on in fuel subsidies (but also the e ect of an accumula on of grievances against a dictatorial regime) they brought tens of thousands of young Sudanese onto the streets. The "Sudanese Spring" was eventually crushed, human rights groups put the ensuing death toll at more than 200.

Regardless of the ambi ons, or whether they end successful or not, this culture of mass protests suggest that ordinary Africans are increasing realising the power they have to mobilise against the e cesses of their governments.

In all of this, the e ect of modern communica on technologies has to be acknowl edged. The ubiquity of mobile phones and the Internet on the con nent (Africa is the world's fastest growing mobile phone market) has played a key role in raising

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levels of poli cal and civic awareness in recent years. By bringing Africans in con tact with the increasingly-prospering-and-poli cally-empowered rest-of-the-world, these mobile phones and internet connec ons serve to not only e acerbate age-old frustra ons (arising from persis ng unemployment and poverty), but also provide models for reac on.

A clear line of influence may indeed be drawn from the leveraging role of social me dia in Barack Obama's historic 2008 elec on to the e orts by young Nigerians to deploy social media in the 2011 general elec ons, and from Cairo's Tahrir Square to the Gani Fawehinmi Memorial Park in Lagos (where tens of thousands of Nigerians gathered daily for one week in January 2012, before the government deployed sol diers to take it over). And perhaps even from the shiny glass streets of Hong Kong, only recently emp ed of protesters, to the dusty ones of Ouagadougou.

The circumstances in each country will be di erent, as will the mo va ons for pro test. But underlying them all will be a desire by ci zens (mostly young) to register strident displeasure, in a con nent in which, un l fairly recently, it would have been unthinkable without joining the army or a mili a, or clamouring from the safety of e ile.

Un l Africa's leaders start to demonstrate respect for their ci zens by respec ng term limits, and refraining from manipula ng the electoral process, and showing greater accountability in the management of resources - the con nent will con n ue to dance on the edge of youth uprising.

This is not the rst me that Burkinabes will be taking to the streets against Cam paore; previous a empts were all put down. This eventual success will no doubt inspire others elsewhere to keep trying.

Tolu Ogunlesi is an award-winning poet and author. His fiction and poetry have been published in The London Magazine, Wasafiri, Farafina, PEN Anthology of New Nigerian Writing, Litro, Brand, Orbis, Nano2ales, Stimulus Respond, Sable, Magma, and Stanford's Black Arts Quarterly, among others.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

h p: www.aljazeera.com

gypte que signi e l'allégean e du prin ipal groupe terroriste du pays l' tat isla ique

10 11 2014

Des membres d'ABM en ao t 2014. Capture d'écran YouTube.

Le groupe terroriste le plus ac f en Égypte, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, vient de prêter allégeance à l'État islamique (Daesh). Une alliance qui est tout sauf anecdo que. Décryptage avec Agnès Levallois, consultante spécialiste du Moyen-Orient, et So phie Pommier, professeur à l'Ins tut d'études poli que de Paris et spécialiste de l’Égypte.

Le groupe est devenu en quelques mois, le principal acteur des nombreu a en tats qui visent les forces de sécurité en Égypte. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), les r n e r em on e m n r e n e omb n e islamique. "Nous annon ons prêter allégeance au calife Ibrahim Ibn Awad... pour écouter et obéir", e plique celui qui se présente comme "membre de la cellule d’informa on" de l’organisa on. Dans un enregistrement de 9 minutes posté sur un site jihadiste et relayé sur Twi er, il e plique se rallier à la cause de Daesh et appelle les islamistes modérés à "mourir avec honneur".

ue représente l'allégean e d'Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis pour aes

Ce e allégeance d’ABM représente le plus important ralliement depuis la procla ma on du Califat de l'État islamique le 29 juin 2014. Bien que de plus en plus puissant, Daesh a conscience que ses moyens sont limités et doit former des coa li ons pour con nuer son e pansion, mais "il y a une contradic on entre l'objec f de Daesh qui entend s'établir sur le territoire Syro-irakien et les groupes qui lui

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Egypt

font allégeance", précise Agnès Levallois.

Jusqu’à présent, ABM se revendiquait plutôt de la mouvance Al Qa da, organisa on or o ve e ro e r n e n e e e e e on est donc est de savoir si c'est Daesh qui a souhaité ce ralliement ou le groupe qui souhaite béné cier de "l'aura" dont béné cie Daesh aujourd'hui et qui par cipe à sa communica on", e plique la spécialiste.

Pourquoi aintenant

e or n e r n e r e e o on e mo vemen e r sente comme très ancré dans la réalité locale, composé de Bédouins. Là, il change de registre", souligne Sophie Pommier. Plus qu’un possible retour en Égypte de cer tains comba ants en territoire égyp en, "c’est très probablement l’intensi ca on de la campagne militaire et plus encore peut-être la créa on d’une zone tam pon dans le Sina qui ont emporté le morceau". La ques on de la notoriété semble également essen elle. "ABM entend lancer des opéra ons et veut béné cier de plus de 'publicité' gr ce à son allégeance à Daesh", précise Agnès Levallois.

Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis est-il un ou e ent i portant

Considéré comme l’un des groupes les plus nuisibles en Égypte, ABM est un groupe me m e o r e or enne e on e e e e on on en main", souligne Agnès Levallois. Il représente donc un dé colossal pour Al-Sissi qui a fondé toute sa popularité sur la stabilité et l’argument sécuritaire.

Prêter allégeance à Daesh, c'est aussi un moyen pour ABM de faire parler de lui, d'inquiéter.

Le groupe a revendiqué de nombreuses a aques contre les forces de sécurité égyp ennes en réponse à la répression dont les Frères musulmans font l’objet depuis la des tu on de Mohamed Morsi par l’armée. Il est notamment soup onné d'être l’auteur de l’a entat ayant couté la vie à 30 soldats égyp ens près de la fron ère avec la bande de Gaza il y a 10 jours. Cet été, il avait également bombardé les sièges de la police au Caire et à Mansoura, et tenté d'assassiner le ministre de l'intérieur, le général Mohamed Ibrahim. "L'allégeance à Daesh est donc importante pour ABM car c'est aussi un moyen pour ce groupe de faire parler de lui, d'inquiéter et d'ac cro tre sa capacité de nuisance au moins en termes de percep on", précise la spé cialiste.

Co ent l' tat égyp en répond la ul pli a on des a aques dans le Sina

Depuis plusieurs semaines, l’Égypte intensi e sa lu e contre le terrorisme et e hibe èrement les arresta ons et les e écu ons de terroristes dans la presse. "Le com bat contre le terrorisme sera long, douloureu et sanglant" a mis en garde le prési dent Al-Sissi. Un combat qui s’illustre "par la seule répression", e plique Sophie Pommier. "Pas de programme de développement à la clé, pas de solu on inclusive pour les popula ons locales", alors qu’une zone tampon et un couvre-feu viennent d’être mis en place dans le nord-Sina .

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Si ce e allégeance peut rendre di cile le recrutement sectaire dont ABM a l’habi tude, elle peut aussi encourager les sympathisants de Daesh en Égypte à intégrer de facto le groupe armé et devenir des comba ants ac fs. Dans son enregistre ment, ABM a d’ailleurs demandé au islamistes plus modérés, tels que les membres des Frères musulmans, "dé us par le processus démocra que" de re joindre le mouvement. "Il vaut mieu mourir avec honneur que de vivre dans l'hu milia on", e plique l'enregistrement.

uels sont les alliés de l' gypte a e la ena e i adiste dans le Sina

Si de nombreuses puissances occidentales, à l’image des États-Unis ou de la France ont apporté leur sou en à la lu e contre le terrorisme dans la péninsule, sur le ter rain, la lu e an -terroriste est une a aire na onale. Aucun accord de coali on n’est pour le moment envisagé dans ce e région. Mais ce e allégeance pourrait reba re les cartes. "Alors que les autorités égyp ennes ont refusé de s’impliquer dans la coali on an -Daesh, en dépit des appels pressants des Occidentau ., ce fait nouveau pourrait les faire changer d’avis. Le gain pour Daesh serait alors discu table", e plique Sophie Pommier.

Jeuneafrique.com

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Sa ing Libya Again

NOV. 11, 2014

HANOVER, N.H. — The 11 special envoys who met in Paris late last month to dis cuss the crisis in Libya issued a nal communiqué with predictably anodyne rec ommenda ons: support for the formal government, sugges ons for making it more inclusive, a call for the mili as to withdraw and a proposal that the United Na ons spearhead a comprehensive dialogue among the warring par es.

What Libya needs instead is a European peacekeeping force that would shield the fledgling government from the various armed groups currently contes ng its pow er, and one another, and allow it to rebuild state ins tu ons.

The security situa on in Libya deteriorated rapidly a er the ouster of Muammar el-Qadda in 2011. Some hope surrounded the July 2012 elec on of a rst parlia ment, called the General Na onal Congress, which propelled to power a coali on of liberal par es headed by Mahmoud Jibril, one of the leaders of the 2011 upris ing. But soon tensions rose between them and an alliance of Islamic par es, in cluding the Jus ce and Reconstruc on Party, and their a liated mili as, like Libya Dawn.

A fuel tank in Tripoli burning after being hit by militia rocket fire last Au-gust. CreditHani Amara/Reuters

When the Islamist par es fared poorly in the elec on in June for the G.N.C.’s suc cessor, the House of Representa ves, gh ng flared up in the western part of the

Libya

country. The Islamist mili as, emboldened by several military advances, including their overtaking the interna onal airport in Tripoli in August, have proclaimed that the G.N.C. would remain Libya’s righ ul legisla ve body.

The country is now divided between two compe ng governments: the old one in Tripoli, and the new one in Tobruk, in eastern Libya. Each side has its own prime minister, cabinet and legislature, and its own set of mili as.

The Central Bank is one of very few neutral ins tu ons le , and it, too, is in dan ger of falling to the Tripoli-based mili as. This would be hugely destabilizing. Irre spec ve of ideology, all the mili as currently receive e tensive state subsidies via disbursements from the Central Bank. The government in Tobruk funds even the Islamist mili as that are hell-bent on its destruc on: The buyouts are an a empt to rein in those groups, discourage them from overtaking the country’s oil elds — all the par es’ main source of revenue — and eventually destroy the Tobruk government. Were the G.N.C. in Tripoli to gain control of the Central Bank, it could disrupt this bizarre status quo, especially by hal ng the flow of funds to non-Islamist mili as, which would almost inevitably mean a ratche ng up of the gh ng.

Libya is on the edge of civil war, and the chaos there risks destabilizing the region by invi ng a war of pro ies inside the country. While Qatar has openly supported some Islamist mili as, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt have bombed several of their posi ons around Tripoli.

Dialogue is moribund, and no amount of diploma c cajoling can revive it. Several Western countries, including the United States, as well as the United Na ons Sup port Mission in Libya, which was established in 2011 to guide the country’s post-Qadda transi on, have made various e orts to bring the fac ons to talks. These have repeatedly failed, however, because no one can o er the mili as, which are flush with weapons and money, enough incen ve to cooperate.

Only the presence of an interna onal peacekeeping force can make a di erence today. The U.N. support mission was never meant to be such a force; it was de signed to help build ins tu ons of governance. And the United Na ons Security Council cannot e pand its mandate. Russia, which accused the West of wrongfully e tending the U.N. support mission’s ambit beyond the protec on of civilians during the 2011 conflict, would veto any resolu on calling for the mission’s trans forma on into an interven on force. The United States government, for its part, has no appe te for sending more American boots on the ground, par cularly as it pulls troops out of Afghanistan and struggles to forestall the advances of Sunni Islamists in Iraq.

The responsibility for crea ng a peacekeeping force for Libya falls squarely on Eu ropean states. Considering their longstanding economic and poli cal interests in North Africa and their concerns over immigra on, it is they, a er all, that have

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the most to lose from Libya’s collapse. Libya is part of theEuropean Union’s so underbelly.

Europeans were at the forefront of the interven on in 2011, with logis cal and intelligence support from the United States, and they must spearhead any ac on now. France’s president and defense minister have openly called for interna on al interven on, most recently in September. While I was tes fying before an Ital ian parliamentary commission on foreign a airs in Rome on Oct. 24, I was struck by how frankly some members were arguing that only a European-led force could provide a way out of the current impasse. The original no on some Euro pean poli cians held — that a beefed-up U.N. mission was needed — has lost its appeal.

The model for this interven on should be a version of the NATO-led Interna on al Security Assistance Force that was created to stem the Taliban in Afghanistan, supplemented with intelligence and logis cal support from the United States. Its ini al mandate would be to bu ress the interna onally recognized government in Tobruk by protec ng vital infrastructure and state ins tu ons, keeping mili as apart by preven ng them from traveling to rival territory and controlling the flow of arms. Although Libya’s territory is vast, most of the new force’s opera ons would be con ned to the coastal strip, where the main government ins tu ons are located, necessita ng only a few thousand soldiers.

Since the end of the 2011 conflict, the various Libyan governments have been reluctant to invite interna onal help. They thought they could manage on their own and feared that outside assistance would undermine their legi macy with the Libyan people. But recently the ground has shi ed drama cally. Members of both the House of Representa ves in Tobruk and the rump G.N.C. in Tripoli told me privately late this summer that the situa on is desperate, and that outside interven on may be the only way to keep Libya together as a single na on.

Establishing a peacekeeping force is a di cult undertaking for Europe — poli cally, nancially and economically. But the alterna ves are worse. Standing by or encouraging more fruitless talks would almost certainly mean a conflict of a ri on among Libya’s government and the mili as, destabiliza on in the Maghreb and the Sahel, massive smuggling and unchecked illegal immigra on toward Eu rope. For European governments the choice is stark: Move in decisively or deal with another failed Arab state on their doorstep.

http://www.nytimes.com/

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Situa on na onale Le Mali de nou eau dans l œil du y lone

: 11 Novembre 2014

Les ois se sui ent et se blent se resse bler pour le Mali E bourbé dans une rise ul di ensionnelle depuis le oup d Etat le plus absurde de l istoire on te poraine le pays est régulière ent se oué par des situa ons plus s anda leuses les unes les autres depuis e e a euse isite « au no de la Répu blique« que le Pre ier inistre e du gou erne ent Moussa Mara a ru de oir effe tuer Kidal ontre l a is de tous le 7 ai Les rapports de la Cour suprê e et du Bureau du Véri ateur général BV au su et des ar és sul ureu d a ats de l a ion présiden el d équipe ents et de ournitures di erses pour les or es ar ées de dé ense et de sé urité sont enus alourdir da antage un li at so iopoli que et sé uritaire dé la li ite du supportable pour l opinion publique

En e et, la conséquence a été la cinglante déb cle des forces armées na onales à l’issue d’une contre-o ensive mal préparée et inopportunément menée pour « laver l’a ront » subi lors de ce e visite du Premier ministre. Depuis lors, le Mali a perdu de facto sa souveraineté sur une bonne par e de son territoire et l’intégrité de son territoire n’est plus qu’aléatoire.

Le peuple et la communauté interna onale étaient en train de ruminer leur colère

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Mali

à la suite de la remise en cause totale de l’accord préliminaire de Ouagadougou et qui avait permis l’organisa on en 2013 des élec ons présiden elle et législa ves ayant valu au président de la République, Ibrahim Boubacar Kéita et son par , le Rassemblement pour le Mali (RPM) d’acquérir une majorité plus que confor table sur l’échiquier poli que na onal.

Le Mali revenait de très loin. Mais, tous les acquis de ce e période d’accalmie venaient d’être dangereusement compromis par l’ego démesuré d’un homme. Fallait-il pour autant lui en vouloir au-delà du raisonnable ? Visiblement non. Car, le Premier ministre Mara pouvait béné cier de circonstances a énuantes (e re on em r n e m e j re) n n v e r n e e périence connue de l’Etat et de la comple ité des rela ons interna onales et diploma ques. Alors, poussé probablement par sa fougue de jeune intellectuel et aidé en cela par ce e ine périence de la ges on des a aires au plus haut sommet de l’Etat, il s’est cru « tout permis » du plus audacieu au plus stupide.

On en était là lorsque survint l’a aire dite de « l’avion présiden el » dont le pri d’achat et l’opportunité d’acquisi on faisaient l’objet de vives cri ques, tant du côté de l’opposi on poli que que des partenaires nanciers du Mali, notamment le Fonds monétaire interna onal (FMI). L’une des conséquences immédiates a été la mo on de censure ini ée par l’opposi on parlementaire à l’Assemblée na onale.

Malgré les arguments à la faveur de cet e ercice démocra que dont la per nence ne pouvait objec vement être contestée, la mo on a été rejetée à une large ma jorité des élus dits de la na on. Dans son mémoire en défense lors de ce e séance d’interpella on devant les honorables députés, le Premier ministre, au lieu d’éclairer l’opinion sur le sujet, a en plutôt rajouté à la confusion.

La polémique s’est alors ampli ée, notamment au sujet du pri d’achat et des condi ons d’acquisi on du fameu avion présiden el. Tantôt, il a été acheté à 17 milliards, selon le président Ibrahim Boubacar Kéita (himself), tantôt il a co té un peu plus, environ 20 milliards de l’avis du Premier ministre, Moussa Mara devant l’Assemblée na onale. Entre-temps, d’autres sources contestent la sincérité de ces deu montants. Ce qui sera plus ou moins con rmé par les di érents rapports de contrôle et de véri ca on qui vont suivre.

Il a fallu l’injonc on du FMI pour que les autorités adme ent d’instruire la Cour suprême et le Bureau du Véri cateur général (BVG) au ns d’éclairer la lanterne de l’opinion publique na onale et interna onale sur ce qui prenait de plus en plus l’allure d’un vaste scandale nancier jamais égalé dans notre pays.

Le 11 octobre dernier, ce fut d’abord la Cour suprême, à travers un rapport pro duit par la Sec on des comptes, qui trouvait beaucoup de failles et d’insu sances dans le dossier de l’achat de l’avion présiden el. Mais dénon ait dans des termes beaucoup plus souples ce qui apparaissait comme une grosse arnaque en vue de

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soulager de fa on indue et frauduleuse les caisses de l’Etat. Le préjudice pour le Trésor public est ainsi es mé à plusieurs dizaines de milliards de FCFA.

Le 3 novembre, c’était le tour du BVG de rendre public son rapport de véri ca on sur la régularité des actes commis à la faveur des marchés passés de gré à gré, à des opérateurs qui n’en avaient ni la qualité, ni les compétences et encore moins les moyens. Puisqu’en amont, dans les deu cas (avion et fournitures militaires), il a fallu que l’Etat fasse des décaissements pour pré nancer certaines opéra ons, en plus de la garan e apportée à des banques de la place pour le nancement intégral des achats.

Depuis la publica on de ces deu rapports, l’on assiste à une levée de boucliers gé néralisée à tous les niveau de l’opinion. Dans les grins, les cafeterias, les bureau et autres lieu publics ainsi que sur les réseau sociau , la sub lité des pra ques u lisées pour détourner les deniers publics de l’Etat ; les voies et autres méthodes u lisées pour surfacturer au quintuple le pri normal de certains ar cles, le sujet est sur toutes les lèvres et alimente tous les débats.

Mais aussi curieu que parado al, au sommet de l’Etat, c’est le silence radio abso lue. Le premier interpelé par la situa on, notamment le président de la République, de par le contrat de con ance qui le lie au peuple, gr ce au su rage duquel il in carne aujourd’hui la première ins tu on du pays, contribue à en rajouter à l’incom préhension et au désespoir des popula ons. Ces sen ments se muent progressive ment en colère et amertume percep bles pour tout observateur aver .

Désabusée et complètement décontenancée, l’opinion publique fulmine sa colère de fa on intériorisée pour le moment. Mais pour combien temps faudra-t-il encore contenir ce e colère, si les plus hautes autorités ne réagissent pas immédiatement à travers des mesures administra ves, poli ques voire judiciaires pour que les sup posés auteurs de ces détournements et autres surfactura ons soient mis à la dispo si on de la jus ce pour répondre de leurs actes ?

C’est l’équa on à plusieurs inconnues qui taraude actuellement les esprits à Bama ko et partout au Mali. Aussi, faut-il rappeler que le délai, accordé par la communau té interna onale pour que des « sanc ons soient prises » à l’encontre des per sonnes citées ou impliquées dans ces malversa ons, s’égrène lentement mais ine orablement vers sa n ée au mois de décembre prochain !

Le président Ibrahim Boubacar Kéita a beau être un « encaisseur a tré » de coups, il lui semble de plus en plus di cile de tenir devant la forte pression de son opinion et des partenaires du Mali. C’est tout à son béné ce aujourd’hui que de taper fort et sans complaisance aucune à la faveur de ce e opportunité que lui o rent ces deu rapports, pour assainir un tant soit peu son écurie.

S’il ne le fait pas à temps, l’eau de la marmite bouillante risque de faire sauter le couvercle et l’éclabousser li éralement. A lui d’agir et vite ! Car, la pa ence des

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popula ons et des partenaires du Mali a des limites qu’il faut s’abstenir de franchir. Sinon, d’une situa on d’accalmie fragile, le pays pourrait entrer de nouveau en zones de turbulences que nul ne souhaite aujourd’hui.

h p: malijet.com

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LA MENACE E BOKO ARAM

Boko Haram : pas une journée ne passe sans que ce e mouvance islamiste ne fasse parler d’elle. Ses a entats meurtriers font la « une »  de  l’actualité  au  Ni geria  comme  ailleurs  et  ce,  malgré  les mesures prises par le gouvernement pour enrayer l’e tension de son emprise sur le territoire na onal.•1

La secte islamiste qui terrorise le pays s’est rendue coupable de la mort d’au moins 3 000 personnes•2 depuis sa muta on en mouvement d’insurrec on armée en 2003. Prônant un islam radical et rigoriste, l’idéologie •3 du  mouve ment  s’inspire  des  Talibans  d’Afghanistan, •4 rejetant la modernité et visant à instaurer la charia dans les 36 États du Nigeria pour y établir un État islamique.•5 Depuis  2010,  les  menaces  de  ce e  organisa on  prennent  des propor ons inquiétantes et la seule évoca on de son nom provoque des  mouvements  de  panique.  L’agressivité,  la  rhétorique  et  les tac ques de la secte semblent indiquer une transforma on importante de sa capacité de nuisance. Elle s’étend désormais bien au-delà de sa base  d’origine  au  Nord-Est  du  pays  jusqu’à  cons tuer  un  péril transna onal.  Et  ses  liens  avec  d’autres  groupes  terroristes  et e trémistes  violents  présents  en  Afrique  du  Nord,  en  Afrique  de l’Ouest et en  r e  e  E   o nen   e e mon e en  n e où  e   n er   e n   sur  les  intérêts  poli ques,  économiques  et sécuritaires des pays africains.

Face à ce e situa on, les autorités nigérianes peinent à contenir le déplacement  d’une  bonne  par e  de  la  popula on  qui  déserte  les régions à majorité musulmane. La terreur que suscite ce e « forma on djihadiste »•6 — tant pour le pays le plus riche et peuplé d’Afrique avec ses 177 millions d’habitants que pour  e    vo n  — no mène   no   o er  e r   e on :  o r o   e pays semble-t-il impuissant  dans  sa  lu e  contre  Boko  Haram ?  Est-ce  un  pro blème poli que ? Un problème militaire ? Comment lu er contre ce e secte isla miste  qui  a  pris  en  étau  le  Nigeria  et  menace  l’ensemble  du con nent ?

En établissant un parallèle avec un certain nombre de pays ou de régions  afri caines  confronté  à  des  groupes  terroristes  comme  la Somalie,  le  Mali  et  l’es pace  sahélien,  on  est  obligé  de  constater  la faiblesse  des  résultats  obtenus.  Il  appara t  donc  indispensable  de reconsidérer les moyens de lu e contre le terrorisme. Mais sor r de l’ornière en ma ère de sécurité ne sera pas aisé.

CONTRE-MESURES PEU EFFICACES

Parmi les facteurs qui ralen ssent les di érentes ini a ves menées à ce jour par le gouvernement nigérian pour contrecarrer le groupe terroriste Boko Haram, le principal est sans doute l’absence de ma trise du territoire na onal et la transforma on de certains espaces en zones de non droit. Cet état de fait génère, ici comme ailleurs, des condi ons propices à l’enracinement de l’insécurité. 

Au  Nigeria,  l’émergence  de  Boko  Haram  a  commencé  dans  une mosquée 

Nigeria

créée à Maiduguri,•7 capitale de l’État de Borno (Nord-Est du pays) sous le regard d’autorités plus occupées à comba re le MEND (Movement  of  Emancipa on  of  the  Niger  Delta)  dans  la  région pétrolière du Delta du Niger•8 qu’à s’intéresser à la secte islamiste… 

De  simple  lieu  de  prière  pour  les  musulmans,  la  mosquée  s’est transformée très vite en bas on d’endoctrinement, d’appren ssage de l’islam fondamentaliste et de retour à la charia. Doublée d’une école coranique, elle a a ré en masse les popula ons pauvres et les jeunes sans emploi pour devenir le  ef du nouveau mouvement.•9 La secte de  Mohamed  Yusuf•10 a  connu  ensuite  d’autres  transforma ons, représentant une han se pour les chré ens nigérians comme pour les musulmans modérés. 

Boko Haram mène une guerre ouverte contre les forces de sécurité de l’État et tous ceu  qui lui semblent hos les à ses idées. Le groupe organise des a aques violentes, des a entats à l’e plosif, des prises d’otages, des destruc ons de biens publics et des pillages de villages. Sa  capacité  de  frappe  avoisine  celle  des  orga nisa ons  terroristes agissant  au  Moyen-Orient.  Et  ses  liens  avec  d’autres  groupes terroristes  radicau ,  comme  les  Shebab  somaliens  et  AQMI  ont amé lioré sa capacité opéra onnelle.•11 Certains membres de la secte capturés  par  l’armée  a rment  avoir  béné cié  d’une  forma on  au pra ques  du  terrorisme  e   e    r   e r   n r e r o rr en  ven r  n n o   er en  des cadres d’AQMI ayant rejoint  le  groupe  après  avoir  été  chassés  du  Nord  du    r o r on Serv  

Les  tac ques  des  autorités  nigérianes  n’ont  souvent  réussi  qu’à radicaliser  la  secte  et  à  renforcer  son  e cacité.•12 Ainsi,  pour  Paul Walker,  les  di érentes  r e   em o e   r  « e   en e   e r   o vernemen e   on re Boko Haram ont été uniformément brutales  et  contre-produc ves ».•13 L’État,  dans  les  op ons  qu’il  a choisies, n’a pas bien analysé la nature de la menace, privilégiant la force au lieu de tenter de résoudre le problème à la racine. 

Les  autorités  nigérianes  ont  parfois  hésité.•14 On  relève  une tenta ve de négocia on voulu par le Président Goodluck Jonathan en ao t 2011 et en mars 2012    e e n     onn   e r :  e mo vemen   error e  —  e   n midé  —  a  refusé  d’entamer  des pourparlers.  Marc-Antoine  Pérouse  de  Mont clos  note  que  «  le gouvernement  et  l’état-major  sont  conscients  de  leurs  er reurs stratégiques »,  mais  que  depuis  les  échecs  des  tenta ves  de négocia on « aucune poli que alterna ve crédible n’est envisagée ». 

On constate aussi le manque de coordina on et les rivalités entre les  principau   responsables  de  la  lu e  an -terroriste :  la  police, l’armée,  les    services  de  renseignement.•15 Par  ailleurs,  on  ne  peut e clure que la secte ait des sympathisants parmi les hauts dignitaires musulmans qui siègent au gouvernement, dans les forces armées et les forces  de  l’ordre.  Si  ces  complicités  on   ffi e     ro ver   e e on   b en   n       çon  on     e e 

34

35

islamiste parvient toujours à déjouer l’ac on des forces de l’ordre nigérianes. Des forces incapables de rétablir la sécurité dans les États d’Adamawa, de Yobé et de Borno qui sont les plus touchés par les a aques de la nébuleuse terroriste.•16

De  même,  les  forces  de  sécurité  ne  disposent  pas  de  forma ons spécialisées et adaptées pour lu er contre les mouvements terroristes. Certes, l’armée nigériane compte parmi les mieu  équipées et les plus performantes d’Afrique,•17 mais il ne s’agit pas tant d’un problème de personnel  ou  de  maté riel  que  de  forma on,  surtout  en  ma ère  de renseignement,  d’analyse  et  de  plani ca on  des  opéra ons.  Le fonc onnement  de  la  secte  semble  échapper  au   autorités.  Les terroristes n’ont plus de centres•18 ou de mosquées pour se réunir. Ils se  sont  fondus  dans  la  popula on.  En  conséquence,  nul  ne  sait combien ils sont, ni qui ils sont, aucune informa on ne  ltre sur leur structure opéra onnelle. Ils n’ont pas de tenue dis nc ve ou de signe par culier. 

Cela ajoute à la confusion puisqu’on ne peut jamais être certain que quelqu’un se présentant comme le porte-parole parle vraiment au nom de tous les membres de la secte.•19 Son  nancement reste également un  mystère.•20 Or,  la  ma trise  de  ces  informa ons perme rait évidemment au  agents de l’État déployés sur le terrain d’être plus e caces.  On  ne  sait  même  pas  si  la  pré sence  de  ressor ssants tchadiens, nigériens et camerounais au sein du groupe est avérée... 

Un  autre  problème  reste  la  méthode  u lisée  par  les  forces  de sécurité pour traquer les membres de Boko Haram. Le plus souvent, l’e trême  brutalité  des  militaires  et  des  policiers  para t  contre- produc ve. Les arresta ons sans discernement, les représailles, les actes de violence contre des innocents, les « dommages collatérau », tout  cela  envenime  les  rapports  entre  les  forces  de  sécurité  et  une popula on qui, au lieu d’être l’alliée des autorités, devient la « forêt qui cache la bête ».•21

FRACTURES SOCIALES ET R IONALES

Outre le Nigeria, on l’a dit, plusieurs États africains ne parviennent pas à étendre leur autorité sur l’ensemble de leur territoire. Les causes de ce e situa on sont mul ples : caractère inachevé de la construc on na onale ; détournement des intérêts  nanciers au pro t des élites et des bureaucra es ; érosion de la légi mité du pouvoir central à cause de la mal-gouvernance… Les fractures sociales et régionales qui en résultent e pliquent l’opposi on entre le « centre » hégémonique et les « périphéries » marginalisées qui revendiquent une redistribu on du pouvoir et des ressources du pays. Ces États sont, par conséquent, fragilisés  et  deviennent  un  terrain  fer le  pour  toutes  les  formes d’instabilité et de conflits, de rébellions et de guerres civiles, voire de catas trophes  humanitaires.  Mehdi  Taje  résume  bien  la  situa on : « l’incapacité  des  États  à  e ercer  leur  fonc on  régalienne  sur l’ensemble  de  leur  territoire  cons tue  la  probléma que  centrale alimentant  les  risques  de  déstabilisa on  et  de  conflits  armés » en Afrique.•22 Et Michel Luntumbue d’ajouter : « Ce e 

carence dans la ges on  poli que  et  socio-économique  du  territoire  est  une  source d’instabilité et un facteur de fragmenta on de l’espace na onal. Il en ré sulte  dans  bien  des  cas  une  rupture  du  monopole  de  la  violence légi me, débouchant sur une démul plica on d’acteurs concurrents à  l’État  :  groupes  armés,  milices,  réseau   criminels  régionau   ou interna onau ».•23

La situa on au Nigeria résume bien les parado es de ce e nouvelle Afrique  en  marche,  où  l’ancrage  dans  une  modernité  mondialisée cohabite,  parfois  vio lemment,  avec  des  tradi ons  séculaires  qui  se vivent au quo dien. On hésite toujours à généraliser sur le Nigeria, ce « géant » africain plus peuplé que la Russie, le Japon ou le Me ique, avec un Nord musulman contenant des poches chré ennes, un Sud chré en-animiste  (ou  animo-chré en)  abritant  des  poches musulmanes,  et  un  Sud-Est  spéci que  (les  Ibos)  qui  a  connu  une guerre  de  sécession  entre  1967  et  1970.  Pourtant,  il  e iste  des caractéris ques  com munes et  ce  sont,  hélas,  la  pauvreté,  la redistribu on  inégale  de  la  manne  pétrolière,  la  corrup on,  les revendica ons, etc. 

C’est  dans  ce  conte te  d’inégalités  territoriales,  de  mal- gouvernance, de tensions et de frustra ons socioéconomiques que s’est développé le mouvement de Boko Haram.•24 « Dans l’État de Borno, où  les  yusu yas  de  Boko  Haram  —  du  nom  de  leur  défunt  chef spirituel, Ustaz Muhammad Yusuf — ont entamé leur dérive sanglante, les trois quarts de la popula on vivent sous le seuil de pauvreté. Un record dans le pays. Seuls 2 % des enfants de moins de 15 mois y sont vaccinés. L’accès à l’éduca on se révèle également très limité : 83 % des jeunes sont ille rés ; 48,5 % des enfants en  ge d’être scolarisés ne le sont pas. Et 34 8 %  e  m m n   e 4   16  n  n on  j m r en   ne  o e » •25 Un comble pour ce pays qui compte parmi les plus grands producteurs d’hydrocarbures dans le monde.

Le  Nigeria  est  le  premier  producteur  de  pétrole  d’Afrique  (2,3 millions de barils jour) ; son sous-sol est riche en pétrole et en gaz qui cons tuent la ressource principale du pays. Or, on es me à 60 % le nombre  de  ses  habitants  vivant  encore  avec  moins  d’un  dollar  par jour.•26 C’est bien évidemment la redistribu on de la richesse qui pose problème.•27 Les retombées de la manne pétrolière n’ont pas amélioré les condi ons de vie des popula ons. Comme la poli que de l’État central accentue le principe de « dériva on » qui permet au  régions riches de gérer leurs ressources elles-mêmes, les régions qui n’ont pas de pétrole ne sortent pas de la misère… 

En  outre,  le  Nigeria,  13e producteur  mondial  de  pétrole,  est contraint d’importer des produits pétroliers ! Ce parado e est d  au défaillances  des  ra neries…  L’améliora on  de  la  ges on  dans  le secteur des hydrocarbures et l’augmenta on des capacités locales de ra nage  restent,  donc,  un  des  dé s  principau   que  doit  relever  le gouvernement pour assurer le développement socioéconomique du Nigeria.

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POROSIT ES FRONTIÈRES

L’absence ou la faiblesse des programmes de développement des zones frontalières, malgré l’importance que celles-ci revêtent pour la stabilité interne et le développement économique, est l’une des causes de la discon nuité entre le centre et la périphérie. Dès lors, comme le remarque Anthony Asiwaju, les zones frontalières sont reléguées au rang de « périphérie na onale, poli quement désavantagée du fait de sa vulnérabilité militaire ».•28 Ces no man’s lands res tent à l’écart des inves ssements, d’où leur sous-développement général. La région du Sahel, caractérisé par son e trême porosité et par un contrôle éta que très  faible,  voire  ine istant,  est  une  parfaite  illustra on  de  ce e situa on. Autre cas embléma que : la prise du Nord du Mali par des terroristes qui ont failli y instaurer un État islamique. 

Boko  Haram  pro te  de  ce e  faille  pour  poursuivre  sa  stratégie d’e pansion.  La  porosité  des  fron ères  et  les  solidarités transfrontalières rendent possibles les déplacements incontrôlés de personnes et de biens divers, licites ou illicites… Ces mouvements de popula on créent des liens entre les par es Nord du Cameroun et du Nigeria, par e emple, et facilitent la mobilité des membres de la secte.

Par  ailleurs,  plusieurs  ethnies  —  les  Haoussa,  les  Djoukoun,  les Margui, les Mousgoum, les Massa, les Ibo, les Arabe-Choa, les Kotoko, les Peuls, etc. — sont à  ev  en re  e Nor    N er  e   e  zone re e ve   e     vo n   e   même  au-delà.  Il  est  donc  facile,  là aussi,  pour  les  membres  de  Boko  Haram  e  e  on re  n   e o on   e    vo n   o r  r  n   re re r  par les forces de l’ordre. L’afflu  de réfugiés centrafricains, tchadiens ou soudanais qui convergent vers le Cameroun brouille encore un peu plus la t che de celles-ci. 

En n, la mauvaise coopéra on entre les forces de l’ordre des pays concernés, les limites du droit de poursuite, la faiblesse des autorités administra ves,  mb v en e    rô e  e   e   r onne ron er •29 e   e  rob ème de la sécurisa on de la na onalité •30 sont autant de raisons supplémentaires qui  erme en     oko H r m  e mener  e  o r on   - e   e   ron ère  nigérianes, de se segmenter ou de se regrouper hors de ses bases. 

IMA INER ES STRAT IES ANTI-TERRORISTES YBRI ES

A n  d’accro tre  l’e cacité  de  la  lu e  contre  Boko  Haram,  il  est d’abord impéra f de surmonter le décalage entre les inten ons et les ac ons et de veiller à mieu  prendre en compte les réalités locales. Les  groupes  terroristes  e ploi tent  la  vulnérabilité  structurelle  des États, les condi ons de vie di ciles des popula ons plongées dans la misère,  la  pauvreté,  le  désarroi,  ainsi  que  les  tensions  religieuses. Ainsi, pour éradiquer le terrorisme sur le long terme, il faut par r du lien évident entre sécurité, développement et bonne gouvernance. 

Il ne fait aucun doute que, dans le cadre de la lu e contre Boko Haram, l’État 

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nigérian doit en priorité améliorer les condi ons de vie des habitants, au niveau na onal comme dans la région du Nord où la part de la popula on vivant en dessous du seuil de pauvreté est deu à trois fois supérieure à celle du Sud.•31 Chacun sait que la pauvreté, le  chômage,  le  sous-développement  éco nomique  et  le  sen ment d’e clusion  cons tuent  des  terreau   fer les  pour  les  idées fondamentalistes.  Le  gouvernement  doit  donc  me re  en  place  de véritables  programmes  de  développement,  équilibrer  les  pouvoirs entre le Nord et le Sud et faire en sorte que l’argent du pétrole soit mieu  redistribué. 

D’autre  part,  la  nécessaire  approche  sécuritaire  ne  peut  être  que contrepro duc ve  si,  en  parallèle,  il  n’y  a  pas  d’éradica on  de l’idéologie  qui  inspire  les  terroristes.  Selon  Freedom  Onuoha  du Centre de recherche et d’études stratégiques d’Abuja, « il ne su ra pas de vaincre Boko Haram militairement, il faudra aussi s’a aquer à son  idéologie,  sinon  d’autres  forma ons  de  même  nature réappara tront  dans  le  futur ».  La  secte  n’est  plus  seulement  une me nace pour les communautés chré ennes, elle l’est aussi pour les communautés  musulmanes.  C’est  pourquoi  une  ac on  concertée impliquant les chefs tradi onnels et religieu  des deu  communautés (musulmans et chré ens) doit être menée pour apaiser les tensions, dissiper les malentendus et amener les uns et les autres à par ciper aussi à la lu e contre Boko Haram.•32

La  lu e  contre  la  secte  e ige  une  coopéra on  étroite  au  niveau régional et interrégional entre l’Afrique de l’Ouest et l’Afrique centrale. Selon les circonstances et les moyens, celle-ci pourra être militaire ou non  mili taire.•33 Cela  suppose  une  répar on  des  charges,  une complémentarité des ac ons et un système de renseignement partagé, pour ne citer que ces trois e emples… Le sens du bon voisinage est donc  nécessaire  pour  éradiquer  Boko  Haram  et  rapprocher  des stratégies qui, pour le moment, ne convergent pas.

En n, pour a ronter la menace terroriste, il faut aussi une approche globale  avec  l’appui  des  alliés  stratégiques  et  partenaires interna onau . L’ini a ve des États-Unis, de la France, de la Grande- Bretagne et de l’Union européenne réunis au sommet de Paris le 17 mai 2014 autour du Nigeria, du Cameroun, du Bénin, du Tchad et du Niger pour comba re Boko Haram est une avancée signi ca ve. Car l’e per se  de  pays  comme  la  France  ou  les  États-Unis  devrait perme re, on peut l’espérer, de renforcer l’e cacité des opéra ons de lu e contre le terrorisme.

Rodrigue Nana Ngassa

•1 Il faut souligner que Boko Haram, contrairement à d’autres organisa ons ter roristes implantées sur le con nent, a conservé toute sa force de frappe au Nige ria tant en termes de violences et d’influence sur le plan poli que du pays. Le groupe, ac vement comba u par les forces armées nigérianes, s’est illustré par une série de violences à l’encontre du gouvernement, des chré ens et de la popu la on musulmane des régions où il est implanté.

•2 O e om « N er : e e- e oko H r m » (en ne)

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c2012 (consulté le 29 11 2012), disponible à l’adresse suivante : h p: www.ouestaf.com Nigeria-le-casse-tete-Boko-Haram_a4137.html.

•3 m n b r o o e e o o re or en musulmane au l des siècles, au Nigeria comme ailleurs. Aujourd’hui, la doctrine que la secte prône veut redonner sa « pureté » à l’islam et au système nigérian. Pour ce faire, elle se présente comme l’an thèse des valeurs occidentales en écorchant au passage le gouvernement de Goodluck Jonathan, ce « complice » de l’ennemi. Ce e splendeur venue des temps révolus que Boko Haram veut dé terrer a cependant un pri qui n’en vaut déjà plus la chandelle : celui des quelques 1 500 vic mes qu’elle a laissées dans le sillage de sa croisade djihadiste.

•4 oko H r m ve n rer n r me ob en e b ne en en n n gouvernement provenant de ses rangs et dèle au fondements radicau de l’islam améliorerait la situa on au nord du Nigeria sur les plans de la représenta vité poli que et de l’économie. Pour une lecture approfondie, voir à ce sujet : « Qui sont ces

« talibans » du Nigeria », El Watan, 29 juillet 2009 (lire en ligne sur www.elwatan.com )

•5 n e N er e r 177 m on b n n e r men e travers deu spiritualités. Les protestants vivent au Sud, là où dorment entre 20 et 50 milliards de barils de pétrole sous les eau de la côte. Les musulmans se partagent le Nord, là où les condi ons de vie se sont vite détériorées depuis la jeune indépendance du pays.

•6 Se on m ne T z r e e e e e m r oko H kam serait ainsi passé d’une secte sala ste réac onnaire à une forma on dji hadiste pra quant le terrorisme islamiste.

•7 C e r r e 2002 e e mo vemen ommen e e re onn î re n le Nord-Est du Nigeria. Mais d’après le politologue Freedom Onuoha, son origine est plus ancienne. Selon ce chercheur au Centre de recherche et d’études straté giques d’Abuja, « les vraies origines de la secte remontent en 1995, quand Mallam Lawal a fondé un Shabaab group (un rassemblement de la jeunesse mu sulmane) dans l’État de Borno. La forma on est restée non violente jusqu’à ce que Mohamed Yusuf en prenne la tête en 2002 ».

•8 n e e r on ro ère S e or on j on tenir le mouvement gr ce à la poli que des amnis es. Mais la situa on reste fra gile. Dans le cadre du conflit avec Boko Haram, c’est une solu on qui a été à un moment envisagée, puis écartée.

•9 e Tr n N o « oko H r m : F e o men re » No e n e GRIP, 4 octobre 2012, p. 2.

•10 e e e oko H r m on ommen o r e nn e 2010 m me si le groupe, lui, e iste depuis bien plus longtemps. Ce e escalade de la violence a

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démarré à par r de l’assassinat de l’ancien leader de Boko Haram par la police nigériane en 2009. Puis un autre leader, Abubakar Shekau, a pris la tête du groupe. Et là on est dans un scénario réellement d’éclatement du groupe en plu sieurs fac ons qui ne sont pas nécessairement coordonnées, ce qui rend e trê mement di cile la lu e contre ce e forme de terrorisme.

•11 To e o er n e men e e e on re orm en n e djihad dans le Nord du Mali en

2012 Ce er or e e jo r r en er e onn e n e e a entats suicides, devenue depuis leur tac que préférée.

•12 b j en vo r e erm n e e en n e e ro e on chef Mohamed Yusuf. En réalité, il signait l’acte de naissance de l’organisa on djihadiste dans sa forme actuelle. De même, les dirigeants du pays ont eu jusqu’à présent tendance à minimiser l’importance des opéra ons menées par le mouve ment. Au mo f que ce e organisa on serait à la solde de ses ennemis qui ne veu lent pas le voir se présenter à la présiden elle de février 2015, Goodluck Jonathan a feint de l’ignorer. Il sait que son électorat ne se trouve pas dans le Nord du Ni geria.

•13 n rew W ker « W oko H r m? » Un e S e n e o Pe e Special report 308, June 2012, p. 12.

•14 e Pr en Goo k on n n rr e e rome re e e chaque a entat, une réac on décisive contre Boko Haram. Il y a eu un état d’ur gence qui a été proclamé dans trois États du Nord du Nigeria depuis l’an dernier : les États de Borno, de Yobe et d’Adamawa. Malgré ce déploiement militaire e trê mement important, y compris l’u lisa on d’hélicoptères et donc de moyens aé riens par l’armée nigériane, Boko Haram con nue à frapper jusqu’au environs d’Abuja, la capitale fédérale.

•15 e or e n r ne on m n e r e r v n erne en re e ff rents services de sécurité qui nuisent à leur e cacité. Face à ce constat, le Prési dent a des tué les chefs d’état-major des armées de terre, de l’air et de la marine le 16 janvier, déclarant qu’il ne pouvait « tolérer aucune compé on inu le qui ferait régresser le pays ». Voir à ce sujet, « Les chefs des trois armées renvoyés en raison de leurs rivalités », AFP, 29 janvier 2014.

•16 e orno e or e e e o n T k For e or e m re conjointes, en poste depuis cinq ans à Maiduguri, le ef historique de la secte. Plus de mille hommes sont sur place. Des opéra ons de grande envergure y sont menées, mais, apparemment, sans résultats tangibles.

•17 e ro e « n e r e » on on em offi e e « en darme » en Afrique de l’Ouest anglophone, et sont intervenues pendant les an nées 1990 au Liberia et en Sierra Léone.

•18 no er ve n en e n erven on e rm e n r ne

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mène une guerre sans merci à la secte au Nord du pays, les membres de la secte se sont refugiés dans la forêt de Sambisa et au abords de Bulanbuli où elle compte plusieurs camps disséminés dans ces zones entourées de champs de mines.

•19 n rew W ker « W oko H r m? » Un e S e n e o Pe e special report 308 c 2012 (consulté le 27 11 2012), disponible à l’adresse sui vante: h p: www.usip.org publica ons what-boko-haram

•20 On ffirme e oko H r m b n fi er fin n emen e ONG mistes d’inspira on wahhabite du Moyen-Orient, de certains pays arabes comme l’Arabie Saoudite et du sou en de hauts dignitaires nigérians. A cela s’ajoutent les revenus des prises d’otages, des hold-up et d’autres ac vités cri minelles du groupe.

•21 À e e e e v o en e on re- ro ve o on Nor erço de plus en plus l’armée comme une « force d’occupa on brutale » et non comme un facteur de sécurité.

•22 e T je « V n r b e e r n r S e » n « Enje ouest- africains », note publiée par le Secrétariat du Club du Sahel et de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CSAO OCDE), n°1 ao t 2010, p. 3.

•23 e n mb e « Gro e rm onfl e o vern n e en r e e l’Ouest : Une grille de lecture », Note d’analyse du GRIP, 27 janvier 2012, Bru elles, p. 6, disponible sur h p: www.grip.org

•24 Po r o n C m be e - mb e r m r n N er oko H r m e prime la colère d’une par e de la popula on du Nord du pays face à la dépra va on et la pauvreté. Voir à ce sujet, United States Ins tute of Peace, « What is Boko Haram? », Special report 308, 2012, disponible sur h p: www.usip.org

•25 n V k « or ne e e e oko H r m » e on e om que, avril 2012.

•26 Per e ve onom e en r e N er 2012 1

•27 P e Gen « oko H r m e refle e rob ème n r n » S REAS asbl (Service Interna onal de

Recherche, d’Éduca on et d’Ac on Sociale asbl), Bru elles, Novembre 2012, P. 10

•28 n on w j « Fon onnemen e e on e ron ère en Afrique de l’Ouest : l’e périence vécue du Nigeria et de ses voisins immédiats », Communica on faite à la réunion spéciale du Club du Sahel et de l’Afrique de l’Ouest sur le thème « Pour une meilleure approche régionale du développe ment », deu ième séance : « Les pays fron ères », Accra (Ghana), 20-21 mai 2002

•29 P r e em e om e v e ron er br en e e

d’armes et servent aussi de refuge pour les membres de Boko Haram, de zones de ravitaillement et de renseignements.

•30 On re ro ve n e zone ron ère ve e C mero n e nombre e personnes détentrices de mul ples cartes d’iden té. Un phénomène qui s’est accru avec la gratuité de la carte na onale d’iden té accordé au Camerounais pendant la période électorale au Cameroun en 2014.

•31 e o ze om o n e n re Nor r e ren e- e compte le Nigeria, demeurent les moins développés du pays, le gouvernement concentrant ses e orts principalement sur le Sud où sont situées les ressources pétrolières.

•32 P r e em e o r romo vo r o r n e e o e e om r en sion par l’éduca on au sujet de la pai , parmi les jeunes de communautés et de milieu divers dans le Nord du Nigeria.

•33 N n N m Ro r e « n r ron ère C mero n » Études, n°4203, Paris, mars 2014, p. 14.

h p: www.geopoli que-africaine.com _

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A stable and se ure Nigeria An asset to A eri a

Ladies and Gentlemen of the U.S. Council on Foreign Rela ons

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to the premises of the Embassy of Ni geria, Washington, DC. We are e cited by the fact that a council of your calibre made up of e perienced diplomats, top academics, captains of industry, adminis trators, and opinion-moulders in the United States consider it worth your while to grace our premises with your dis nguished presence. It is an indica on of the im portance which your council a aches to Nigeria, especially its rela onship with the United States of America.

Nigeria and the United States have come a long way. Our rela onship has its roots in the strong historical and cultural connec ons between our two peoples; a con nec on reinforced by e is ng economic and geo-poli cal reali es. Nigeria with 170 million people has the largest concentra on of black people anywhere in the world. United States has a large concentra on of black people. There are 1 million Nigerians-Americans and twice that number is present in the United States pursu ing various professions and contribu ng construc vely to the economic and social lives of the country.

Rela ons between Nigeria and the United States have, within the past 4 years, been on a very high pedestal. A Bi-na onal Commission Agreement signed in 2010 has been the framework of the rela onship between our two countries. The ma jor components of the Agreement have been in 4 key areas namely:

(i)Transparency, good governance, and Integrity

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(ii) Niger Delta and Regional Security,

(iii) Energy and Investment, and

(iv) Food, Security and Agriculture.

The coopera on agreement under these subheadings has been ac vely implement ed; thus leading to frequent contacts between Nigerians and Americans both in the public and private sectors. Nigeria is America’s largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa. A two-way trade between both countries in 2013 was valued at 18.2 billon. The United States is the largest foreign investor in Nigeria, with a stock of foreign direct investment in Nigeria worth 8.2 billion in 2012 concentrated largely in the petroleum, mining and wholesale trade sectors. Since March 2009, Nigeria and the United States have been mee ng under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) to discuss improvements in the Nigeria’s trade poli cies and market access. We also discuss coopera on in the world trade organiza on, e port diversi ca on, making use of AGOA provisions, intellectual property protec on, trade capacity building, and technical assistance.

Nigeria is s ll a middle income, mi ed economy, an emerging market with e pand ing nancial services, communica ons, technology and entertainment sectors. It is the largest economy in Africa with Gross Domes c Product (GDP) of 500 billion range. It is ranked 26th in the world in term of GDP and is on track to become one of the 20 largest economies of the world by 2020. Investment opportuni es are many in Nigeria with incen ves provided by the government in oil sector, par cu larly oil and gas, mining, food and agriculture services, and tourism.

The incen ves provided by government for foreigners to invest in Nigeria have been su ciently well communicated to the American private sectors by this Em bassy through investment fora on Agriculture 2010, Power 2012, and Infrastructure 2012. This has led to the massive presence of American investors in key areas of the Nigerian economy. Nigeria was a major par cipant in the August 2014 U.S. Afri ca summit. We are the rst country on Obama Power Africa programme and both countries discuss ac vely the reauthorisa on of AGOA. At the end of the summit, the U.S. Chambers of Commerce combined with the Corporate Council on Africa to host a recep on for President Goodluck Jonathan in Washington. It was a ended by over 500 business moguls. Our president was the only one so honoured.

The cultural and economic links between Nigeria and the United States is rein forced by the convergence and mutuality of our strategic global objec ves. Nigeria currently operates an American style presiden al system with a directly elected e ecu ve. Our two countries believe and work toward a world that is based on de mocracy, respect for human rights, equality of all ci zens, rule of law; a world that features more of consulta on than confronta on, a world that is free of nuclear prolifera on, terrorism, and one that seeks to achieve sustainable development. This convergence e plains why Nigeria and the United States have, for the past 4

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years, voted along the same lines at the United Na ons – be it on Iran and the nu clear issue Mali and Libya: some mes even when it involves disagreement with our African brothers as it was in the case of Libya.

Rela ons between our two countries are in good health, but there is room for im provement. In the recent past, we have had cause to complain, and are s ll com plaining about the style, nature and manner of the implementa on of some United States’ policies with par cular reference to terrorism in our country.

The whole world has been struck with the nature and scope of terrorist ac vi es in certain parts of the world, including the north-eastern part of our country. Boko Haram is Nigeria’s equivalent of ISIS. The group has up ll today killed thousands of our people and rendered many homeless. At rst, we thought that Boko Haram was a local group pressing for local demands. But it later became clear to us that the group was the West Africa branch of the world-wide Al-Qaida movement with connec ons with Al’shabb in Somalia and AQIM in Mali. We appealed for interna onal support and the United States was the rst and has remained a major pillar of support in our struggle against the terrorists.

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Council on Foreign Rela ons, I am sad to inform you that the Nigerian leadership: Military and Poli cal, and even the general populace, are not sa s ed with the scope, nature and content of the United States’ support for us in our struggle against terrorists. We nd it di cult to understand how and why in spite of the U.S. presence in Nigeria with their sophis cated military tech nology, Boko Haram should be e panding and becoming more deadly. At rst, we had problems with the manner in which intelligence was being shared. The U.S. Government claims that the problem has been addressed, but it is s ll there. The U.S. Government has up ll today refused to grant Nigeria’s request to purchase lethal equipment that would have brought down the terrorists within a short me on the basis of the allega ons that Nigeria’s defence forces have been viola ng hu man rights of Boko Haram suspects when captured or arrested. This is based largely on reports submi ed by human rights groups and sec ons of the Nigerian media that have sympathy for the opposi on par es and are prepared to use whatever means possible to embarrass the government of President Goodluck Jonathan. The Americans claim that leathal law forbids the sale of lethal equipment to govern ments that violate human rights.

We have made it clear to our American friends that the allega ons of human rights viola on cannot be substan ated by facts:

Nigeria declared a state of emergency in the three Boko Haram a ected states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. But the democra c structures were le in place. The parliament, judiciary, and the civilian e ecu ves con nue to func on as in normal mes.

Nigeria did not establish an e tra judicial body to try Boko Haram suspects. All

those who were arrested on suspicion of collusion with Boko Haram are being tried in the civilian courts; some of them are currently out on bail.

I say with all sense of responsibility that allega ons of human right viola on are based on rumours, hear-says and e aggerated accounts of clashes between the Ni gerian forces and Boko Haram ghters. There was a case of an incident in Baga in 2013 when human rights groups and the opposi on press said that, based on pic tures taken from satellite, over one thousand and si hundred houses were de stroyed in a village that has less than 600 houses.

There have been video reports of human rights viola ons involving a acks on women and children purported to have been carried out by Nigerian soldiers in Boko Haram a ected areas. We pointed out to our American friends that those ac vi es were carried out by Boko Haram members wearing stolen Nigerian army uniforms. Disguise and subterfuge are standard prac ces of insurgent groups. The Chibok abduc on of our school girls by Boko Haram succeeded because the girls thought that they were being carried to safety by soldiers of the Nigerian army.

With the approach of general elec ons in 2015, the Boko Haram issue is becoming heavily poli cised. Opposi on media provide half-truths, e aggerated accounts which are then aired by the foreign media, forming the basis of reports sent to the capitals of Western na ons. We have implored our colleagues in the embassies of Western na ons based in Nigeria to check and re-check the facts, and not use half-truths and rumours as the basis of their reports and recommenda ons to their cap itals. A famous philosopher said that facts are sacred; opinion is free. I hereby assert as a fact opinions on human rights viola ons by Nigerian defence forces are biased, were not subjected to the necessary veri ca on.

This unfortunately is the basis of America’s refusal to sell to Nigeria the necessary lethal equipment to use in the ght against Boko Haram and they would have been wiped out. We implore the Council on Foreign A airs to put pressure on the State Department and the Department of Defence to re-e amine the basis of their re fusal to sell the equipment to Nigeria. Our people are not very happy with the con tent of America’s support in the struggle against Boko Harm. The terrorists threat en our corporate e istence and territorial integrity. There is no use giving us the type of support that enables us to deliver light jabs to the terrorists when what we need to give them is the killer punch. A friend in need is a friend indeed. The true test of friendship is in the mes of adversity.

A stable and secure Nigeria is an invaluable asset to America. It was the democra cally elected, stable and secure Nigeria, under President Goodluck Jonathan, that ensured the triumph of democracy in Ivory Coast, Guinea Conakry, Mali, and has prevented the collapse of Guinea Bissau. Even in spite of our present challenges, President Jonathan is taking the lead in ensuring a quick return to democracy in Burkina Faso. America’s strategic global objec ve aims for a stable and secure Afri ca as an integral part of a peaceful and stable world. A peaceful, stable and secure

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Nigeria, free from the ravages of Boko Haram, is a necessary pre-requisite.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we are hereby conveying our feelings on the Boko Haram issue to your council. Now that the mid-term elec ons are over, we will carry our case to Capitol Hill, seek support from other think-tanks, and the American public. We are of course aware that the ul mate responsibility for ending the scourge of Boko Harm rests on us. We are, therefore, prepared to e ercise our rights as a sov ereign na on and use whatever means available to assure the security and territo rial integrity of our country.

Being the te t of an address, en tled: A Stable and Secure Nigeria: An Asset to America, delivered by Prof. Ade Adefuye, Ambassador of Nigeria to the United States, delivered at the mee ng with U.S. Council on Foreign Rela ons at Washing ton, D.C on Monday, November 10, 2014

h p: www.tribune.com.ng

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T E C ALLEN ES OF TUNISIAN EMOCRACY INSI TS FROM TURKEY AN E YPT

09.11.2014

The Nidaa Tounes, widely known as secularist party, received the majority of votes in the Tunisian elec on. Although this has been regarded as a major setback for the Islamist Ennahda Party, they s ll have tangible power in parliament

In 2011 Tunisia surprised the world by ending the 30-year rule of ine el-Abidine ben Ali, se ng a precedent for others in Egypt, Libya and Yemen. This wave of change was felt across the Arab world resul ng in reforms, revolu ons and con flicts throughout the region. Last week's parliamentary elec ons in Tunisia also surprised the world with the return of ben Ali's friends under the leadership of Beji Caid el-Sebsi, 87, who won the plurality of votes in the rst democra c elec ons under a democra c cons tu on. We must rst congratulate Tunisians for conduc ng a peaceful elec on process as Tunisia has been a symbol of the Arab revolu ons with its toppling of ben Ali's despo c regime in 2011.

The wave of changes a ected the whole region with ensuing reforms in Morocco and Jordan and more public spending in Gulf countries. However, there were seri ous setbacks in Egypt where a military coup reversed the democra c de, and in other countries - Syria, Yemen and Libya - where the struggles for democracy turned into civil conflicts. In this sense, Tunisia's moving forward with a demo cra c and conciliatory cons tu on looked promising. In this analysis I elaborate the challenges that lay ahead of Tunisian democracy through sociological insights and lessons from Turkish and Egyp an e periences.

Sociology posits that social change is di cult and painful. Every regime creates a set of social-poli cal arrangements with vested interests in the status quo. As

Tunisia

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many revolu onaries associate their regime with a person, generally a despot or a king, they are wrongly convinced that the fall of that person means the fall of the regime. When forced, the regimes may sacri ce their leader in order to main tain their vested interests. We saw that in Egypt where the military sacri ced Hosni Mubarak to relieve the popular pressures for change, but it managed to remain in control. Established elites and groups pose serious obstacles before so cial and poli cal change and they have the upper hand against challengers.

Another sociological insight suggests that resources ma er signi cantly in pro mo ng or resis ng social change. In the latest elec ons the two par es with the most resources were the most successful ones in Tunisia. The Nidaa Tounes party won 38 percent of votes - 85 seats - and the Ennahda Party won 31 percent of votes - 69 seats. As the party of the old regime with some reference to democracy and the Habib Bourguiba period (1959 to 1987), the former possess nancial, po li cal and bureaucra c resources. A strong intellectual and bureaucra c network and resources gave it an advantage against its opponents. The la er's rela ve success is also related to its organiza onal resources, especially widespread membership along with infrastructure it had build in the past. The two other par es in the elec ons, E eke ul and the Congress of the Republic Party, lost a sig ni cant share of their previous votes.

With all respects for the Tunisian people's preference, the electoral victory of the Nidaa Tounes party is not all good news for the future of Tunisian democracy. Dangers lie ahead of democra c consolida on because they served under des po c rule and can easily compromise democracy due to their old habits and out side encouragement to do so. Nidaa Tounes' success resembles Ahmed Sha q's in Egypt's 2012 presiden al elec on. It signi ed the return of Hosni Mubarak's men and boosted the morale of the status quo in Egypt. Nidaa Tounes is accustomed to use this opportunity to suppress the opposi on as in the past. Even though it is not very easy, no one can guarantee it will not happen.

How then can we e plain the return of the Nidaa Tounes party a er three years from their fall from power? First, this elec on was more a ma er of survival for the men of the old regime. Because its cadres fell from grace a er a popular up rising, their legi macy and statesmanship were at stake. Nidaa Tounes's leader ship presented themselves as the only solu on to save the country from Islamists and terrorists because an -Islamist discourse has some appeal among secular sec ons of society and abroad. Second, it gained pres ge with its construc ve a tude during the na onal reconcilia on process. Third, resource mobiliza on theory argues that it is neither grievances nor numbers but the possession and strategic use of resources makes a di erence in social contests. Nidaa Tounes possessed the most resources among the par es in terms of personnel, nance and intellectual capital. Fourth, Nidaa Tounes leader Beji Caid el-Sebsi presented himself as the second Bourguiba, the founder of the Republic of Tunisia, or a statesman needed during chao c mes. Fi h, the Nidaa Tounes party managed to

unite secular groups around itself from ben Ali's Cons tu onal Democra c Rally party, progressive liberals, strong businessmen, secular le ists and Bourguiba's Socialist Destourian Party. Si th, voter turnout remained low at 62 percent signi fying people's aliena on from the poli cal process and poten al for improve ment. This is probably due to the fading of revolu onary fervor among the youth. As we have seen in Egypt and Syria, the fact that the West is not sincere about Arab democracy and Gulf countries hate poli cal Islam like the Ennahda Party will encourage Nidaa Tounes to e clude the Islamist opposi on from the system de spite their moderate a tude. Nidaa Tounes was aggressively hos le toward the Ennahda Party, which was considered moderate even by many e ternal observ ers. There are signs that they began to tone down this antagonism but only me will tell the actual result. We can only hope the status quo par es internalize de mocracy quickly, but it is not very likely because old habits do not change easily. It took 50 years for Turkey's Republican People's Party (CHP) to admit legi mate popular demands such as the headscarf issue.

The ques on remains why Tunisians ousted ben Ali, an aging dictator, and now elected his friend el-Sebsi at 87. As it happened in other Arab countries, the revo lu on was followed by chaos and the persistence of old problems such as poverty and unemployment. While the Ennahda Party ruled for most of the transi onal period, it came short in delivering the needed improvements. Under huge pres sures from inside and outside it had to leave power, giving in to a technocra c government last year. This resembles Turkey's Feb. 28 process where the united opposi on forced the prime minister, Necme n Erbakan, to leave power. Demo cra cally speaking, governments are supposed to change by elec ons rather than e ternal pressure.

On the posi ve side, Tunisia showed that an Arab democracy is possible as it managed to pen a civilian cons tu on and have free elec ons, a rarity in the Arab world. We can hope that Nidaa Tounes, with the morale of an elec on victory, moves beyond its eli st and ultra-secularist approach and can come to an under standing with the opposi on. Does leadership has a choice to make between pop ular consent or a power game? The Ennahda Party sacri ced power and its party interests for poli cal stability by leaving its place to a technocra c government. It also admi ed the elec on loss, proving that Islamist par es are sincere about the peaceful transi on of power. The same can be e pected of Nidaa Tounes to im prove democracy rst.

The e clusive discourse of Nidaa Tounis may hint to their old nega ve a tude toward democracy and pluralism. A er the backlash and public disillusionment in the recent elec ons, the Ennahda Party declared that they will not eld a candi date for the presidency in the November elec on. The secularist bloc will not be in the steering wheel and might try to push the Islamists aside. As a counter-strategy, democra c forces must focus on coali on building. The Ennahda Party's

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ini al alliance did not fare well in the last elec ons, but they can s ll try to build a broader coali on with other democra c forces against the status quo. As we know from the Turkish e perience, democra c consolida on is a long and painful process. As the sole Arab democra c e perience, Tunisia will struggle through several failed a empts un l it nds its true model. This is mostly up to the players in the eld.

h p: www.dailysabah.com

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Are adrassas in A ri a edu a ng or indo trina ng

November 05, 2014

A student o Su aiya irls ig S ool being taug t Arabi P

A student of Sumaiya Girls High School being taught Arabic

Kampala, Uganda — Rocking her slim body back and forth, 17-year-old Aisha Mutonyi so ly reads her Quran, si ng on a wooden desk in an almost empty class. Her head covered in a white scarf, she wears a light blue short-sleeved sweater and a long sleeved white shirt. I interrupt the Sumaiya Girls High School student’s read ing and she looks up at me with a smile. A er the introduc ons, I ask her why it is important that she reads her Quran.

Aisha says as a girl she has learned many things from the Quran. I have bene ted how to behave in the society, how to treat di erent people even if a person is a Muslim or he is not or she is not, you have to treat her or him in a good way. She adds, And in the Quran they always teach us that, we girls, we have to respect ourselves and dress up nicely in our hijabs. Asked whether she doesn’t feel hot covered all over, Aisha responds, In the rst place, I wasn’t used to it and I could feel bad, but with me you get used to it .

Sebagala Muhammed the headmaster of Sumaiya Girls, a privately owned Muslim high school in Uganda, says they run a dual curriculum, including secular studies and Islamic theology. He says even though none of his students has graduated in Islamic studies, We give them the basic Islamic knowledge to take them through their lives to be responsible women of tomorrow.

Uganda

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He argues that once you have responsible women in a locality; you have a good country, children and ci zens. So you are looking at an all-round educa on that shapes a responsible girl, it has not been easy but we are on course and we cannot be diverted. Muhammed insists his school knows what the girls need. We are not enforcing it, but we are encouraging and showing them the good side in appreci a ng the Islamic discipline and knowledge. He believes that what brings about problems are people without fully formed religious beliefs. It is a must that our girls learn the Quran, it is educa onal, because there is nothing that has been le out in the Quran.

At the Nabisunsa girls Secondary School in Kampala, I meet Shiekhat Jawhara Naki boneka. She is the head of Quran lessons at the school. This girls-only school was founded by Prince Badru Kakungulu in 1954, with an aim to cul vate Muslim doc trines and way of life. The prince at the me felt that Muslim girls needed a good educa on in a school founded on Muslim grounds, for fear of being converted into Chris anity. These doctrines con nue today.

Sheikhat Jawhara, who herself has gone through Madrassa schools, believes learn ing the Quran nurtures the girls spiritually and gives them a purpose in life. But most of all it makes them yearn to do more for the sake of Allah. Shiekhat Jawhara says, First of all I am e cep onal. I am the only lady in this big ins tu on who can speak Arabic and am the only teacher who teaches Arabic. She argues that those who do not study the Quran miss something. Because when you have only one side, you can speak English, but you don’t have anything to add on that.

But many worry that madrassas in sub-Saharan Africa may breed Islamic e tremism and indoctrina on. Both Uganda and Kenya have had su ered terrorist a acks at the hands of Islamic e tremists. So, as a result, both governments keenly watch and inves gate any reports of e tremist teachings in Muslim schools. But Shiekhat Jawhara rejects the idea that e tremist teaching happens everywhere. About the cri cs, she says, They are ignorant, because in madrassas they teach us good mor als, because Quran teaches us good morals.

At many of the madrassas in this region, they learn their good morals from Quran lessons that start early in the morning before the secular curriculum starts. They resume again a er 7 p.m. During these sessions, students are taught how to read the Quran, and they learn how to write, recite, and translate, or tafsir, in Arabic. They also learn the sayings and prac ces of the Holy prophet and the oneness of Allah.

On a Friday at e actly 1 p.m. the call for prayer is made at Nabisunsa girls high. Dressed in long black prayer hibayas, the girls walk in silently while others so ly recite the Quran to the rhythm of the recording playing o the loud sound speakers in the mosque. In no me the mosque is lled to capacity with some girls le to pray outside the veranda.

The school sheikh in his summon encourages the girls to spread the word of God,

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be good members of the society and remember their rights as women Oh people it’s true that you have some rights in regard to your women, but they also have rights over you. If they abide by your rights, then to them belongs the right to be fair. The girls listen as he says, Treat your women well and be kind to them. He then poses the ques on, But how can we want people to respect our rights when we don’t in turn respect them.

In Uganda, madrassas are not as prominent in the educa on system or in the social system including as they are in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Ofwono Opondo, a Ugandan government spokesperson, says the majority of Muslim children go to mainstream, secular schools and so far they have not had problems with Islamic ins tu ons in Uganda.

Opondo a ributes this to the fact that Uganda is mul -ethnic and mul religious. It is a country that discourages e tremism, he says. Even if you are a Muslim being taught e tremism, when you come out to the community the chances of remaining an e tremist is really low.

Analyst Shiekh Hamiid Byamugenzi of the Islamic University in Uganda says perhaps it is also because of the disorganized origins of the madrassa system. Arab traders from countries such as Yemen, Oman, South Sudan and Egypt haphazardly estab lished the system and as a result, he says, the level of teaching e perience and training of the sheiks is low.

Repor ng on madrassas in Uganda was much easier than trying to do it in Kenya. In Kenya I approached two schools: the Nairobi Muslim Academy in South C, and the Mahadi Girls Training Ins tute in Pangani. The Mahadi Girls School never answered repeated requests for an interview. And at the Nairobi Muslim Academy, which sits ne t to a mosque, the manager angrily told me I would never have allowed you to step into my compound had I known you are here to discuss about Madrassa.

According to him, his school was the subject of several security raids by the govern ment. This outraged him because he was as a Kenyan of Somali origin and a for mer civil servant for more than 20 years. He also added that I was stopped ve mes along di erent road blocks on suspicion I could be involved in terrorism. So to me he said angrily, Spare me and leave my school! And that ended my visit.

Mohammed Mwijuma Mwinyipembe is the director of quality assurance and stand ards in the Kenyan Ministry of Educa on, which oversees the all-round perfor mance and curriculum of all of Kenya’s schools. To the claim that the government had been raiding madrassas Mwinyipembe replied, I am not aware that the gov ernment is targe ng any madrassa. And for your informa on the government re spects madrassas. His daughters, he added, go to madrassa classes and according to him, Only those who would be carrying out unusual ac vi es would have some thing to hide.

Kamwana Abdullah is the vice chairman of Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, the

umbrella body of all mosques and madrassas. He says that the e ects of these sorts of raids in Kenya are apparent. Muslims feel discriminated against, pro led and tar geted and this is true especially of the youth. Madrassas are meant to impart reli gious morals and acceptable knowledge as e empli ed by the Prophet Mu hammed.

Abdullah adds, When Muslims are denied this they feel their basic right of religion is being encroached upon and they feel the raids are a ploy to ght Islam as a reli gion. In the long run, according to Abdullah, Muslims will lose sympathy and trust in their government.

He argues that there ought to be a special commi ee comprised of the security arm of the government, professionals, especially lawyers and teachers and the main religious organiza ons, to vet Islamic teachers. He insists, Raiding and closing madrassas should and ought to be done by this commi ee, ad hoc closure and raids will only make a bad situa on worse. The rate at which girls are entering madrassas in Kenya is s ll low. Kenyan educa on o cial Mwinyibembe blames this low rate of educa on, especially for young girls, on Kenyan culture.

He stresses that the Quran obligates all Muslims to seek knowledge regardless of their gender. Many Kenyans, he said, s ll marry o their girls for a few thousand shillings. Because 20,000 Kenya shillings, will give you how many ca le or cows? Rather, he said, that the goal should be to educate girls, as it is in the Muslim tradi on, ... if that girl becomes an advocate, an engineer, she will buy you cows every month un l you die. This is true especially in the very poor areas of the North Eastern Province and the Upper East in Kenya.

So the government, along with the Muslim Supreme Council, is working to incorpo rate a blended Madrassa and secular curriculum, even into public schools. Kamwa na Abdullah of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims says, We are also working with the Cabinet Secretary of Educa on to ensure that the school feeding program is taken back to schools in arid and semi-arid areas.

He says they want girls to be given sanitary pads to ensure they remain in school. When a girl becomes of age, she might spend four days in a month, in a year it be comes over 36 days and she might lose that educa on.

As to the ques on of e tremism, Abdullah says that the worry over this emerged a er the terrorist bombing a acks of 9 11: The bombing of the twin towers in 2011 and President George Bush started this issue about terrorism and gh ng them.

To counteract that nega ve image within Kenya, Abdullah said he and others are working through the Inter Religious Council, which is an interfaith group that brings together di erent religions in that country. Abdullah says, We always give them the true picture of Islam and some of them are surprised.

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In addi on, this past February, Kenya’s Ministry of Educa on piloted new curricu lum in 50 schools in three major ci es. Shiekh Abdila f Abdulkarim, e ecu ve board member with al-Mutanda al-Islami Trust in Nairobi, was quoted as saying that failure by the government to have a uni ed Islamic madrassa studies curricu lum has le opportuni es open for e tremist clerics to e ploit radicalize youths. So he was pleased with the ini a ve saying it would help as one way to streamline Islamic studies and to deal with Islamic e tremism.

h p: www.pri.org

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RADICALISM IS A POLITICAL PROBLEM, NOT AN ISLAMIC ONE

11 November 2014 in

In the midst of the ongoing discussions about the link between Islam and violence,

and all the different “Islams” considered, one uncomfortable yet fundamental ques-

tion remains unanswered: Is a Muslim allowed in principle to be violent, should the

context justify such behavior? Based on the discourse as it stands, the answer from a

Western perspective is an unequivocal “no.” Incidentally, groups like Al-Qaeda and

the Islamic State (IS) use this as one of their talking points.

Jonathan Lyons pointed out this problem in his book “Islam Through Western Eyes”

by stating that the West has “arrogated to itself a monopoly over the legitimate uses

of force in conflicts involving the Muslim world.” Lyons further says, “the produc-

tion of Western statements on the subject of violence and war is shaped profoundly

by some of the central tenets of the anti-Islam discourse: That Islam is inherently

violent and spread exclusively by force; that Muslims are irrational and are motivat-

ed by religious fanaticism. The result is an unchallenged discourse that affords the

West the power to determine which tactics, weaponry, and targets are legitimate and

which are not.”

The very idea that Islam can be categorized into radical, moderate, extremist, etc.,

gives credence to the Islamophobic assumption that Islam has an inherent quality

within it that makes it dangerous—regardless of context. It also removes responsibil-

ity from the individual and places blame on the religion itself, as if it is something

that can stand on its own without the human element. To assume that Islam is the

primary motivation for the presence of extremist violence in the Muslim world is to

assume that without Islam, no violent groups would arise in the same political condi-

tions that exist today. It is not mere coincidence that all violent groups in Muslim

majority countries in modern times constantly speak of themselves as legitimate

forces of resistance against foreign occupation or local despotic governments that

serve foreign interests.

Islam is not a religion of peace. It also is not a religion of violence. It is a religion

for human beings, who by nature of their primal instincts sometimes engage in vio-

lent conflicts. It is, therefore, not appropriate to view the Quran as a contradictory

text, simply because it contains peaceful as well as violent verses. Rather, it is a text

that contains passages that relate to behavior during violent conflict, surrounded by

passages calling towards peace and co-existence.

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Terrorism in the World

Some will insist there is a direct link between the statements violent extremists make

and their actions. This is understandable if one views Islam as an entity that can be

removed from the culture of a population living with it for the past 14 centuries.

What many observers in the West fail to recognize is that for Muslims, Islam can

sometimes serve as a language of expression, which may or may not reflect the mo-

tivations of an individual or necessarily even the teachings of the religion. This co-

nundrum becomes clearer after reviewing the ample evidence available on violent

extremists.

In his article about the wannabe Jihadists who bought “Islam for Dummies” on Am-

azon, Mehdi Hasan cites a leaked 2008 classified briefing note on radicalization pre-

pared by MI5’s behavioral science unit. It revealed that a large number of radical

Muslims “do not practice their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and

could… be regarded as religious novices.” Contrary to their misguided belief that

they are fulfilling commands in the Quran, western wannabe jihadists project onto

the scripture conclusions they concoct in their minds after reading newspapers.

Without the tools of interpretation, this is all they can do with the Quran they recite.

However, while this religious ignorance may characterize Western men who join

extremist groups, the case for those indigenous to Muslim majority countries is

somewhat different.

Contrary to their Western counterparts, radicalism in the Middle East cannot so easi-

ly be dismissed as coming from ignorant, economically disadvantaged groups. In the

2007 Gallup publication “Who Speaks for Islam?” John Esposito and Dalia Moga-

hed dedicated a chapter to address the question what makes a radical. According to

Gallup Polls in Muslim countries, seven percent of the population was identified as

having radical political opinions, which view the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001

in New York as “completely” justified and have an unfavorable opinion of the Unit-

ed States.

Assuming that political radicals were more likely to support or be a source for ter-

rorist group recruitment, their answers were further analyzed and compared with the

rest of the population. The politically radicalized were, on average, more educated

than moderates: 67 percent of those with radical political opinions have at least a

secondary education (versus 52 percent of moderates). This disparity carries over in

economic terms where 65 percent of the politically radicalized have an average or

above-average income, versus 55 percent of moderates.

When it comes to religious observance, the data showed there were no differences

between moderates and radicals in the importance they placed on religion in their

daily lives and in their mosque attendance. The striking difference came about in the

responses from those who were asked why they condoned or condemned extremist

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acts. Many of those who condemned extremist violence did so for religious reasons,

citing the Koran as evidence. In opposition, not a single political radical who con-

doned the attacks of 9/11 cited the Quran as justification. Rather, they gave political-

ly secular reasons.

The available evidence presents a clear case that the presence of violent Muslim ex-

tremist groups is a direct consequence of political circumstances imposed by West-

ern foreign policies in the Middle East, and religion merely serves as a vehicle of

expression. All attempts to “refute” the theological cases of these groups are distrac-

tions from addressing the real causes why these groups exist in the first place. Not

only are such attempts unlikely to succeed, they also make it more difficult to tackle

the Islamophobic discourse that is becoming increasingly widespread more than it

already has been.

Mohamed Ghilan is a classically trained student in Islamic law and theology and is

currently a neuroscience PhD candidate at the University of Victoria, Canada.

http://www.yementimes.com/en/

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Le pro et de loi sur la lu e ontre le terroris e dé ni e ent adopté

Le Sénat a validé, par un ul me vote, le te te visant à renforcer l'arsenal législa f contre le terrorisme.

04 11 2014

Le ministre de l'Intérieur, Bernard Cazeneuve, donne un discours au cours d'une céré monie en hommage au vic mes du terrorisme, le 19 septembre 2014, au Inva lides.

Il renforce une législa on an terroriste déjà très fournie : 14 lois votées depuis 1986 e P r emen fin vemen o r n me vo e S n m r 4 novembre e roje e o r lu e contre le terrorisme Se on e r or e r te te à l'Assemblée, le socialiste Sébas en Pietrasanta, 1 089 Fran ais ont été ou sont impliqués dans des lières vers la Syrie et l'Irak à la date du 23 octobre. Près de 368 y comba ent actuellement, 212 en sont revenus et 205 ont des velléités de départ, les autres étant en transit ou morts pour 46 d'entre eu .

Une interdi on de sor e du territoire

La loi crée une interdic on de sor e du territoire pour entraver les départs deFran ais candidats au jihad en Syrie Ce e n er on ne r e e mo renouvelable jusqu'à deu ans, sera décidée en cas de croire que la personne participation des activit s terroristes ou ments terroristes E e o rr re on e e ev n j e m n r ve

Par ailleurs, le gouvernement a introduit un nouvel ar cle qui permet de prononcer une interdic on administra ve d'entrée sur le territoire à l'encontre d'un ressor s

France

sant d'un pays membre de l'UE, ou tout membre de sa famille, en France constituerait ... une menace r elle, actuelle et su samment grave pour un int r t fondamental de la soci t e j r e on j e e fin on e menace trop large et es mé qu'elle perme rait par e emple d'interdire l'entrée du territoire à des Roms roumains qui feraient de la mendicité agressive.

Un ou l ontre eu qui se radi alisent indi iduelle ent

Le te te instaure par ailleurs un qui sera un nouvel ou l contre ceu qui se radicalisent individuellement, le plus souvent sur internet. Il faudra que le projet criminel soit caractérisé par la déten on d'objets ou de substances dangereuses (armes, e plosifs), mais aussi par un second élément matériel (repérages, forma on au maniement des armes ou au engins e plosifs, consulta on habituelle de sites internet faisant l'apologie du terrorisme).

Une possibilité de blo age des sites illi ites

Sur le contrôle des sites internet faisant l'apologie du terrorisme, la demande de blocage d'un site devra obligatoirement être précédée par une demande adressée à l'éditeur du site ou, à défaut, à son hébergeur, de re rer le contenu. En l'absence de retrait dans un délai de 24 heures, l'autorité administra ve pourra faire procé der au blocage du site par les fournisseurs d'accès à internet. Ceu -ci de vront au sites concernés.

h p: www.francetvinfo.fr

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Terroris e trois pro ets d'a entats dé oués en Fran e es derniers ois

03 11 2014

Plusieurs tenta ves d'a entats ont été déjoués en France ces derniers mois, révèle une note de la Direc on générale de la sécurité intérieure (DGSI). | AFP

Plusieurs tenta ves d'a entats ont été déjouées en France ces derniers mois, in dique une note de la Direc on générale de la sécurité intérieure (DGSI) que révèle ce lundi RTL

Les jihadistes voulaient notamment frapper les villes de Lille, Nice et en Ile-de-France selon nos informa ons.

Invité de RTL ce lundi ma n, le ministre de l'intérieur, Bernard Cazeneuve n n lement démen la teneur de ce document et indique : «Je ne con rme aucune note classi ée. Ce n'est pas moi qui dois les rendre publiques, le ministre de l'Inté rieur comme de la Défense sont soumis à des obliga ons. Mais j'a rme que tous les jours, les services de la sécurité intérieure démantèlent des réseau et déjouent des actes qui pourraient être drama ques».

Selon nos informa ons, publiées ce lundi n re en jo en e- e-Franceaprès l'arresta on de Mohamed O., un jeune Fran ais de Créteil (Val-de-Marne). Après avoir séjourné en Syrie dans les rangs de l'Etat islamique, où il in tègre un camp d'entra nement et se forme au combat, le jeune homme gé de 20 ans s'informait sur des cibles poten elles en France en vue d'une ac on kamikaze. Pendant plusieurs jours, usant abondamment d'Internet, Mohamed O. évoque avec envie les «méthodes Merah et Nemmouche». Il se renseignait également sur les

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lieu chiites implantés en France et recherchait de l'argent pour s'acheter des armes, notamment un fusil automa que et des grenades.

Au regard de la dangerosité du jeune homme, les policiers de la DGSI décident d'interpeller Mohamed O. le 1er juillet au ma n. Mu que lors de son arresta on, Mohamed nie toutes les accusa ons en garde à vue, avant d'être mis en e amen et écroué le 5 juillet pour «associa on de malfaiteurs en lien avec une entreprise ter roriste». Un pro et d'a entat lors du arna al de Ni e

Selon RTL, le projet le plus avancé, selon la note de la DGSI, était celui d'un a entat déjoué lors du carnaval de Nice (Alpes-Mari mes). Un homme, Ibrahim B. a été arrêté au mois de février dernier sur la Côte d'Azur, en possession de TATP, un e plosif rudimentaire qui peut être fabriqué à domicile, capable de produire l'e et de plusieurs dizaines de grenades. Cet e plosif a déjà u lisé par le passé dans des a entats, comme à Marrakech en 2011. Toujours d'après la radio, le jeune homme venait tout juste de rentrer de Syrie. Il envisageait de mener une opéra on aussi spectaculaire que celle menée par Tamerlan Tsarna ev au marathon de Boston le 15 vr 2013 en n e rn v e N e ev m rrer e jo r tard. En n, il y a tout juste un an, un homme, Lyes D., était arrêté à Lille muni d'un mode d'emploi e pliquant comment confec onner une bombe et d'une le re en forme de cau on religieuse pour comme re une ac on suicide.

h p: www.leparisien.fr

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T e West s ailed ounter-terroris strategy requires a o plete re t ink

NOVEMBER 01, 2014 12:00AM

Iraqi special forces search a house in the Jurf al-Sakhr area, north of the Shi’ite shrine city Karba

la.Source:

T E e ents o — Isla i State in Iraq t e Syrian i il ar and its spillo er into Lebanon t e ollapse o Libya at looks in reasingly like a Taliban o e ba k in A g anistan t e string o Boko ara atro i es in Nigeria terrorist a a ks in Mali and So alia t e unpre edented o o Westerners to terrorist groups and a a ks in O a a and Melbourne — represent not ing less t an t e ollapse o Western ounter-terroris strategy as e e kno n it sin e

A er 13 years, thousands of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, we’re worse o today than before 9 11, with a stronger, more mo vated, more dangerous ene my than ever.

Whatever the reason — and there’s more than enough blame to go around, in many countries and on all sides of poli cs — the result is that governments are su ering task satura on . So much is happening, simultaneously, in so many plac es that leaders are struggling to decide what to do, in what order. The danger is that we will engage in panicked, knee-jerk responses rather than taking me to consider what an e ec ve strategy looks like.

The rst step, of course, is to admit that this really is, every bit, the strategic failure it seems. US president George W. Bush’s large-footprint approach, invading and

Iraq

occupying Iraq and Afghanistan, then rebuilding those countries from scratch at vast cost in me, troops, money and blood — what Maajid Nawaz, the former Is lamist radical who now heads the London-based Quilliam Founda on, describes as spreading democracy at the barrel of a gun — bogged down the US and its allies in a decade-long counter- insurgency ght that demanded immense sacri ces from our troops, cost us our strategic freedom of act ion and eroded the legi macy of a cause that, at the outset, enjoyed huge global support.

President Barack Obama’s strategy of precipitate withdrawal then pulled the rug out from underneath whatever progress had been made in stabilising Iraq and Af ghanistan, neutralising those sacri ces and making a bad situa on even worse. His passivity in the face of crises in Egypt and Libya, failure to support democracy movements in Syria and Iran, and reliance on unilateral drone strikes, raids and tar geted killings — again, in Nawaz’s formula on, ge ng rid of the democracy but keeping the gun — telegraphed weakness to adversaries such as Iran and Russia, enabled the rebirth of Islamic State from the ashes of al-Qa’ida in Iraq, allowed a humanitarian tragedy in Syria and ul mately failed just as badly.

America’s allies — Australia, Canada, Britain and the rest of NATO — went along out of solidarity, while corrupt, non-inclusive governments in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere have been as responsible as anyone for the dire outcomes in their coun tries. Nobody’s in the clear: this is a bipar san, mul na onal, equal-opportunity screw-up.

The second step is to realise that this truly is, as many have argued, a long war. There’s no magic bullet, no instant solu on, let alone some carefully calibrated combina on of repower, diplomacy and technology that can quickly put the genie back in the bo le. Many Islamic State ghters are sons of Iraqis imprisoned by oc cupa on forces a decade ago; many al-Shabab ghters in Somalia and Boko Haram militants in Nigeria are teenagers. Today’s Taliban members are younger, more rad ical, more ba le-hardened and be er trained than those we fought in 2001 — they have plenty of energy, and all the me in the world.

There are more than 30,000 ghters in Islamic State and about as many in the Tali ban and other e tremist movements. The rise of Islamic State, the s mula ng e ect of its rivalry with al-Qa’ida, the Taliban resurgence and, above all, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declara on of the caliphate are breathing new life into a global move ment that seemed to be declining — proving that the ideology, like the movements de ned by it, is tough and resilient. This conflict will not be over quickly or cleanly. On the contrary: it is, and will be, a mul -genera onal struggle against an implaca ble enemy, and the violence we’re dealing with in the Middle East and Africa is not some unfortunate aberra on — it’s the new normal.

Nor can we pull up the drawbridge, disengage from the world and somehow avoid the ght. For one thing, there is no drawbridge: we live in connected socie es whose prosperity and success rely on trade, travel and free intercourse with the world. Par cularly for Australians, as ci zens of a mul cultural na on, plugged into

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the global economy, a key player in regional and world events, op ng out just isn’t feasible.

For another, if we fail to face the threat where it is today — primarily overseas — we’ll su er the consequences at home. This isn’t to rehash some Cold War domino theory in which we ght them there or we’ll ght them here . It’s just to recognise the reality that a purely isola onist, defensive, policing strategy — protec ng our selves at home rather than seeking to defeat terrorism abroad — ul mately means the end of society as we know it. Mass surveillance, secret police, a na onal-security state, guards on every gate, a garrison society: that’s what a defensive strategy actually entails.

While ever there’s an en ty — Islamic State, al-Qa’ida, the Taliban — that can a ract and mo vate disa ected young people in our socie es, preying on their ide alism and aliena on, drawing them into what the late, great Time magazine Bagh dad correspondent Jim Frederick called a hyperviolent, nihilis c band of e termi nators , the threat will remain. We can lock down our socie es, destroying them in the process, or we can seek to remove that en ty.

In short, what we’ve been doing has failed: we need a complete rethink. That re think, I would suggest, needs to start with a threat analysis. What e actly is the threat we’re facing and how can we address it in ways that are cheap enough, e ec ve enough and non-intrusive enough to be sustainable across the long term, without undermining the openness, democracy and prosperity that make our soci e es worth defending in the rst place?

IN my view there are four dis nct (but related) threats to consider. In order of pri ority these are domes c radicalisa on, foreign ghters, the e ect of Islamic State on regional and global jihadist groups, and the destabilising e ect of conflict in the Middle East. Let’s consider each issue in turn.

Domes c radicalisa on — the mobilising e ect of overseas terrorist groups on peo ple in our own socie es — is the most immediate threat. Last week’s a ack in O a wa, a acks on police and members of the public in Australia, last year’s Boston Marathon bombing, and the horrendous a ack in which two Muslim converts ran down o -duty soldier Lee Rigby with a car, then beheaded him in a London street in broad daylight, are e amples of self-radicalisa on or remote radicalisa on .

The randomness, unpredictability and copycat nature of these a acks, which re quire li le prepara on, give few warning signs, and are di cult to prevent, is what makes them so terrifying.

A ackers are o en disenfranchised, alienated, marginalised young people, fre quently converts: society’s losers, who see radical Sala -jihadist ideology as a way to be part of something big, historic and successful. They’re not really self-radicalised. Rather, they o en access online terrorist materials (increasingly in Eng lish) for inspir a on, instruc on and training, or link up online with radicals who groom them for ac on.

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Defea ng this threat is partly a ma er of community policing to iden fy and en gage at-risk individuals, and partly a ma er of detec ng and monitoring access to online forums, radicalisa on networks, social media and online training materials.

Despite the fear these a acks create, police and intelligence agencies have a pre y good handle on this type of threat, but in the long term this brings a poten al cost to civil liber es and community cohesion. This is because, more broadly, domes c radicalisa on occurs amid aliena on, authoritarianism and conserva sm within some majority-Muslim communi es, and hence suspicion of those communi es from the rest of society. Ironically, it’s the ultra-conserva sm and lack of freedom for young people in these communi es that make radicalism so a rac ve and e ci ng.

Western governments have been their own worst enemies here: the tendency to treat Muslim communi es as a special case, to think that mainstream society can deal with the Muslim community (whatever that is) only through self-appointed, o en conserva ve, authoritarian elders and notables, is to deny people the individ ual freedoms that belong to them, by right, as members of our society while ab solving them from the responsibili es that go with those freedoms.

It’s to set up an unelected, o en illiberal intermediary between our wider society and the idealis c, mo vated young people who deserve — and from whom society has a right to e pect — the same rights and responsibili es as anyone else. So the right strategy for dealing with domes c radicalisa on is more freedom, not less — but with it must come more individual accountability.

The second threat is that of foreign ghters, people who travel from our socie es to join terrorist groups overseas. The pace and scale of foreign ghter flows into Syria, and now Islamic State, have been unprecedented, 10 to 12 mes the size of anything we saw during the Iraq war. And many of these people are cleanskins , people with Western passports, Western faces and no known previous connec on with violent radicalism.

The threat that such ghters, blooded in Iraq or Syria, may return to target their home countries is real and serious, though in prac ce many become disillusioned, are killed overseas or fail to return. S ll, it would take only a small propor on of the dozens of Australians gh ng with Islamic State in Syria to return home to pose a serious threat. Combined with self-radicalised individuals in their home communi es, these people could form the nucleus of a serious domes c terrorist threat.

The appropriate strategy here seems to be a combina on of pol icing and commu nity engagement at home, and intelligence gathering overseas. Much as for domes c radicalisa on, foreign ghters belong to communi es and have families who care about them, and want them home and safe — for many, reintegra on and monitoring may be the right approach. For others who commit atroci es overseas, par cipate in direct combat against their countrymen, or seek to bring their lethal skills back to target their home socie es — well, the ba le eld is a dangerous

place, they take their chances, and many may not come back.

For those who seek to return, robust monitoring, border security and the ability to revoke or suspend travel documents may be all that’s required. E perience has shown, though, that it’s unproduc ve to treat all returning foreign ghters as a threat — debrie ng, deradicalisa on and reintegra on programs can work, though results have been patchy.

These rst two threats, then — domes c radicalisa on and foreign ghters — are best dealt with through a strategy that combines policing, community engagement, intelligence work and border security. Australians, by global standards, are well served by ins tu ons that are e ec ve and generally bound by the rule of law and respect for civil liber es. But the ratche ng e ect of these kinds of security measures — think of airline security since 9 11 — is such that if this is all we do, we’ll eventually nd ourselves living in a garrison state, with para-militarised police and intelligence services that are more e ec ve at s fling freedoms in the name of safety than in providing security.

Dealing with the last two threats — the regional e ect of groups such as Islamic State and the destabilising e ect on the Middle East — requires overseas engagement because only by removing that overseas threat and its magne c e ect on marginalised individuals at home can we ul mately dial back the securi sa on of our society and thus preserve individual liberty.

The emergence of Islamic State has reinvigorated a global movement that seemed to be flagging a er the death of Osama bin Laden and in the wake of the Arab Spring. Sala -jihadist groups in North Africa, South Asia, Indonesia, The Philippines and even La n America have been re-energised by the movement’s success in Iraq and Syria, and by the declara on of the caliphate.

It’s worth no ng that Bagh dadi, unlike bin Laden, claims an actual religious quali ca on — a PhD in Islamic jurisprudence — and claims to be a Qureishi, from the tribe of the prophet Mohammed. When a man such as that gives a public sermon in the main mosque in Iraq’s second city, Mosul, a city occupied by Americans only a few years ago, then declares a caliphate, announces his intent to e pand that cali phate by conquest and calls on all true Muslims to join him and build a new, trium phant Islamic state, this has a huge e ect on Sala believers worldwide — at least some of whom may feel a sense of obliga on to support him, while many others feel a s rring of e citement and historical purpose.

The regional strategy to deal with such a challenge is one area where Australia, at least, has had a good track record since 9 11 — one of close co-opera on with, support for, and assistance to partners such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and The Philippines.

Australian co-opera on with Indonesia, for e ample, though it has had its ups and downs, has generally had an e tremely favourable impact on the capability of Indo nesia’s police and legal ser vices, on informa on sharing and on regional security,

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with support for jihadist groups dropping steadily across me. Australia’s diplo ma c leadership, peer-to-peer co-opera on among police and law enforcement, and carefully tailored foreign assistance and intelligence partnerships have made Australians and our regional partners safer, and at a modest cost.

Con nuing and deepening this co-opera on at the regional level is a key compo nent, then, of our overall strategy — as well as e tending it to other parts of the world such as Africa, parts of Eur ope and La n America.

Finally, the threat that has received most public a en on in the past few months, that of destabilisa on and conflict in the Middle East, clearly demands the strong est military response we can muster. Islamic State is a state-building enterprise, with a government, territory, an economy, a popula on under its control and an aggressive agenda of e pansionism and sectarian violence. If we are ul m ately to remove the other threats, Islamic State has to be destroyed.

Today’s strategy — of airstrikes, limited ground engagement in Iraq and training and logis cal support to Syrian na onalist rebels — is ne as far as it goes, but there are some serious problems in its e ecu on, and one fundamental flaw: the lack of a clearly de ned regional end-state. Ul mately, the tough choice will be whether to tolerate the con nued misrule of Bashar al-Assad in Syria or to seek a transi on — most likely through a nego ated process — to a new regime.

This will be di cult, but it’s essen al if the strategy is to have any chance of suc ceeding. At present, air a acks on Islamic State are simply crea ng room for the Assad regime to e pand its control. This is why the Turkish government has been reluctant to commit to an e ort that favours separa st Kurds and the Baathist gov ernment of Syria at the e pense of regional stability, and it’s why so few Syrian na onalist rebels — so-called moderates — have come forward for training.

Un l Western powers commit to the ul mate replacement of the Assad regime with a transi onal unity or ul mately a secular democra c government — some thing the original democracy protesters called for in 2011, right at the beginning of the war — it’s hard to imagine any Syrian volunteering to ght with us against Islamic State. In any case, it will be months or more before Iraqi and Syrian forces are su ciently trained to take the ght forward e ec vely.

Australia has a role in this, and an important one, both in the air and on the ground. But we should remember that of the four threats posed by Islamic State, this is last on the list for the simple reason that it’s a huge and comple challenge that is beyond Australia’s ability to address alone.

OUR goal seems to be — as it should be — to contribute where we can, par cipate as a valued and capable member of the coali on, and help develop a longer-term strategy as part of that coali on. At the same me, we shouldn’t make the mistake of meekly going along with a strategy with no clear or viable outcome in sight: Australia’s contribu ons in Afghanistan and Iraq have earned us the respect, and the right, to have a say in the strategy, and we should e ercise that right vigorously.

The bo om line is that 2014 has e posed the weakness of a strategic approach that for too long focused just on neutralising terrorist plots and killing or capturing sen ior terrorist leaders. This approach looked, and o en felt, as if it were proac ve — taking the ght to the enemy. But in reality, as this year has shown, it was too nar rowly focused to succeed.

The silver lining in this year’s crisis is that it forces us to a rethink. Australia should use that opportunity to broaden the strategy, building an integrated and sustaina ble approach that focuses on the four areas in priority order while e ercising the right, earned across more than a decade in the war against terrorism and more than 70 years as a leading US ally, to have a say as to how that campaign develops.

And as we do these things, we should remember our fundamental strategic pur pose: to preserve a free society, connected and integrated with the world and within itself, free from e ternal terror and internal oppression.

This is truly an enormous challenge, but mee ng it is essen al if we are to rise from this year’s crisis to a counter-terrorism strategy that can be maintained for the du ra on of this long conflict.

Australian David Kilcullen is a US-based counter-insurgency and intelligence analyst and a former adviser to General David Petraeus in Iraq. He will deliver the 2014 John Bonython Lecture in Sydney on November 12 for the Centre for Independent Studies, What are We Fighting For? Islamism and the Threat to Liberal Ideas.

h p: www.theaustralian.com.au

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To end terroris by Musli s end ars on Musli s

Syria is the seventh predominantly Muslim country bombed by the U.S. during Barack Obama’s presidency.

KUTLUHAN CUCEL GETTY IMAGES

An e plosion follows an air strike in the Syrian town of Kobani on Oct. 28, 2014.

By aroon Siddiqui Columnist, Published on Sat Nov 08 2014

Laura Bush was all for saving Afghan women and children from the evil Taliban. So were some feminists, becoming unwi ng enablers of America’s long and botched occupa on of Afghanistan. So were Stephen Harper and acolytes — un l our mili tary mission there came to an end.

Now Harper and Co. are saving Chris an, Yazidi and Kurdish minori es from the a es and knives of the evil Islamic State.

But the American-led bombing campaign is already running out of targets, as the jihadists have moved away from open spaces into populated areas. Canadian F-18 jets are bombing trucks and sundry equipment.

Barack Obama, Harper and other allies concede that the caliphate cannot be oblite rated without deploying ground troops, which they are unwilling to commit. In stead, they will arm the Iraqi Kurdish mili a and train Iraqi forces. The la er will take years, with no guarantee that the newly minted ba alions won’t do what the

Syria

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previous batches of American-trained troops did — abandon their posts and cede territory, and their American arms, to the marauding jihadists.

In fact, there’s no military solu on. What’s needed is a poli cal se lement in both Iraq and Syria, which is nowhere on the horizon.

An inclusive government in Baghdad would have to en ce away two key groups that joined the Islamic State only to protect their interests — several Sunni tribes and former Baathist army o cers. The la er have been the brains behind the ji hadists’ military strategy of controlling water resources, oil re neries and border posts between Iraq and Syria.

In Syria, a solu on is not likely without the help of Russia and Iran. Neither would help without ge ng something in return — in the case of Iran, a nuclear deal and the li ing of economic sanc ons, which Israel, Saudi Arabia and other American allies vociferously oppose.

The longer the current bombing campaign lasts, the more legi mate the Islamic State will become and a ract more wannabe jihadists from around the world, in cluding the West.

Why? Not because Muslims are savages and Islam is a violent religion, as we are repeatedly told, but because Syria is the seventh predominantly Muslim country bombed by the U.S. during his (Obama’s) presidency — Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya and Iraq — and he is the fourth consecutive U.S. presi-dent to order bombs dropped on Iraq, writes Glenn Greenwald , well-known American commentator (his italics).

Plus, there have been the bombing and occupa on of s ll other predominantly Muslim countries by key U.S. allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, carried out with crucial American support. It e cludes coups against democra cally elected govern ments, torture, and imprisonment of people with no charges.

By another measure, the latest bombing is the 14th me the U.S. has a acked a Muslim na on since 1980, writes American military historian Andrew Bacevich in the Washington Post.

He notes that in trying to keep its hold on the Middle East, especially its oil and gas, the U.S. has been good at toppling governments and destroying countries and civili za ons, but singularly inept at na on-building — leaving behind chaos and power vacuums.

Bacevich: By inadvertently sowing instability, the United States has played directly into the hands of an -Western radical Islamists intent on supplan ng the European-imposed post-O oman order with something more to their liking. This is the so-called caliphate that Osama bin Laden yearned to create and that now e ists in em bryonic form in por ons of Iraq and Syria.

Obama seemed to grasp this, which is why he resisted ge ng entangled in Syria

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and re-entangled in Iraq. But the gruesome beheading of two Americans and the ethnic cleansing of minori es galvanized public opinion and forced his hand on the eve of the American mid-term elec ons (which the Democrats have lost, anyway).

Washington is sending mi ed signals — Obama’s half-hearted bombing campaign and the Pentagon’s asser ons of a mul -year commitment of more American and allied military advisers.

Harper used to say that we were in Afghanistan to ensure the Taliban terrorists did n’t come to Canada. Now he says that if we are not in Iraq, the Islamists will come to your neighbourhood. The reverse is more likely. They may come here because we are a acking them there. Or their sympathizers here will do the job for them. This prompts the response, already used by Harper, that we are not going to be frightened o the war we have chosen to wage. Fine — but what’s the end game? That’s what Thomas Mulcair and Jus n Trudeau should be demanding of Harper. That’s what all Canadians, regardless of ideology or par san preference, should be asking.

The long-term solu on to ending terrorism by some Muslims, homegrown or other wise, is to end Western wars on many Muslims. Yet, curiously, this statement of the obvious is rarely if ever men oned by our poli cians and pundits.

h p: www.thestar.com

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Fig ng ISIS II To ork t is ust be ore t an ust a ilitary oper a on

OCTOBER 30, 2014

Best e ense guest olu nist

The current strategy to "defeat" ISIS will not work and will eventually evolve into a protracted campaign similar to the wars against terrorism, al-Qaeda, al-Shabab, and Boko Haram. As Chris Holshek e plained on the Peace Channel, military means alone, delivered through air strikes and training Iraqi, Syrian, and Kurdish forces, cannot dislodge an ideology that is a emp ng to entrench itself into the social fab ric of these socie es.

In order to defeat ISIS, a uni ed plan that leverages the full spectrum of diploma c, military, economic, and social means is required. Unfortunately, the military op on is the only one currently being applied and a er two months, the U.S.-led aerial campaign has had hardly any impact on the Islamic State's territory or capabili es. At the same me, ISIS con nues to build momentum and gain territory and control through in mida on, a ma a-style ta system, and revenues from oil sales. Moreo ver, the latest coali on fails to deliver a codi ed, coherent poli cal message, with each country suppor ng its own interests and agendas. Compounding these prob lems, the preponderance of humanitarian assistance in Syria con nues to be di rected toward communi es under Assad's control.

The success of ISIS in Syria is directly a ributed to the void of governance and secu rity le by over two years of civil war. In Iraq, ISIS e ploited deep sectarian resent ment between Sunni tribes and the Shiite-led government. But most importantly, its success is a ributable to poor U.S. policy decisions that created an environment within Syria for radical Islam to flourish and ignored ethnic, tribal, and religious structures and beliefs that counter Islamist e tremism in Iraq. Unfortunately, poli cal leaders con nue to ignore these factors and rely on military solu ons, which legi mize ISIS by recognizing them as a na onal security threat.

ISIS can be defeated and its ideology e ec vely countered. Most importantly, this can be achieved without commi ng U.S. ground combat forces, within e is ng au thori es and permissions, and funded through e is ng resources. However, this requires poli cal and military leaders to design and implement a long-term, popula on-centric strategy. This approach is designed to empower local communi es by suppor ng e is ng governance and judicial structures, delivering basic goods and services to the people, and suppor ng Syrian, Iraqi, and Kurdish forces that support the civil socie es where they operate.

This approach is not new -- in fact, the Obama administra on, including the State and Defense Departments, were briefed on an unconven onal warfare campaign plan to defeat the Assad regime in the summer of 2013, but it died on the vine. This was partly because such an approach requires a signi cant investment in me and

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resources, which is o en mes not palatable with poli cians looking for a quick win or military planners designing op ons around military-only solu ons.

There is a solu on. Idlib province, Syria is a microcosm of the region and provides an e ample of how a popula on-centric, unconven onal warfare approach can suc ceed. Within the liberated territories of Idlib, nascent governance structures called civil administra ve councils (CAC) operate. CACs are locally elected and networked organiza ons that delivery basic goods and services, administer jus ce, and provide security through local police forces to Syrian communi es. The CACs o en mes control Free Syrian Army (FSA) units, with some unit leaders subordina ng them selves to civilian authori es. CACs are the mechanism by which the Syrian Opposi on Council can gain legi macy within Syrian society and the interna onal commu nity, create the founda on for a transi onal government, and provide a viable op on and credible counter to ISIS.

Empowering CACs through a pipeline of humanitarian assistance, coordinated by non-government and private sector partners, links the Syrian Opposi on Council to the people through the CACs and moderate FSA units. This direct connec on be tween the Syrian Opposi on Council and the people shapes the environment and presents a viable alterna ve to ISIS and future radical Islamist groups. More im portantly, it also allows the U.S. to help reset the narra ve to a mul -sectarian civil uprising for poli cal reform and economic opportunity, rather than the sectarian conflict narra ve e ploited by ISIS and the Assad regime.

An ideology cannot be defeated by guns and bombs alone. If poli cal and military decision makers con nue to remain focused on "degrading" and "destroying" ISIS through military ac ons, instead of a acking it at its real centers of gravity, they will once again miss the mark. ISIS can be defeated but only a er winning back the popula ons who chose ISIS as an op on, or feel they have no other. However, un l the Syrian and Iraqi popula ons are presented a viable alterna ve, they will con n ue to tolerate ISIS and its evils. Unfortunately, this will allow ISIS to metastasize in to a broader, universal iden ty stream that will con nue to legi mize its claim for an Islamic caliphate. If this occurs, ISIS may indeed become a credible threat to U.S. na onal security.

Jim Sisco is a former recon Marine and naval intelligence o cer and is currently the president of ENODO Global, a business intelligence firm that focuses on population-centric analysis to solve complex social problems in dynamic cultural environments.

via Wikimedia Commons

h p: ricks.foreignpolicy.com

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Is Isla i State roup etting Into t e Pira y Business

Nov. 2, 2014

Alleged Islamic State group militants stand ne t to a flag atop a hill in the Syrian town of Ain al-Arab, known as Kobane by the Kurds, as seen from the Turkish-Syrian border in the southeastern town of Suruc, Sanliurfa province, on Oct. 6. (Aris Messinis Ge y Images)

UBAI — An e pert is downplaying concerns raised last week by the United Arab Emirates that Islamic State militants could unite with al-Shabab terrorists and e pand to the seas, since no evidence has been established of links between terror ists and pirates.

On Oct. 29, UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin ayed al-Nahyan raised the piracy concerns, calling for the interna onal community to be more vigilant regard ing new threats at the fourth UAE Counter Piracy Conference in Dubai.

As groups like Daesh Islamic State develop es to criminal networks and arms networks like al-Shabab, it is essen al that we prevent them from e panding their opera ons into the sea and threaten vital channels such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, Bab al Mandab and the Gulf of Aden, he said.

The ne us of criminal groups, violent e tremists, and weak states will require a coordinated response from governments and the private sector, he said. We have to ask ourselves these ques ons and prepare ourselves in case a union of the Islamic State group and al-Shabab occurs.

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The minister described the al-Shabab group not only as a terrorist group, but also an e tor onist group that we have mandated a number of ac vi es to limit their source of funds.

Abdullah made his comments as the Islamic State establishes itself as the world’s richest terrorist organiza on with funds es mated at more than 2 billion and daily income from black market oil sales.

The UAE is a member of the an -Islamic State Arab Coali on gh ng over Syrian airspace and has ac vely increased its security e orts to combat the organiza on on military, intelligence, nancial and ideological levels.

When it comes to addressing the nancing, piracy opera ons are, as I have come to understand, a form of venture capital, said Todd Chapman, principal deputy assistant secretary, Bureau of Poli cal-Military A airs, US State Department.

Somebody puts up the money for the boats, for the engines, for the gasoline and the hired hands to try and send them out to see if they can capture a ship for a huge return on investment, which is very risky, he said. However, fortunately, we have made it e tremely unpro table to invest in piracy.

Many of the nanciers are inland in Somalia and have strong links there, Chap man added.

Despite a number of terrorist organiza ons pledging their allegiance to Islamic State, no direct links have been found yet between Somali piracy and terrorist groups in the country and interna onally, according to an e pert at the conference.

In the speci c case of Somali piracy, we have not seen any direct link with al-Shabab and terrorist organiza ons because terrorists are ideological and pirates are criminals, the interna onal source said.

Gulf Coopera on Council (GCC) Secretary General Abdel La f al- ayani echoed the concerns raised by the UAE. In his statement to delegates at the conference, al- ayani highlighted the importance of intelligence communica on and informa on sharing between the countries involved in an -piracy and counterterrorism opera ons.

Along with the announced GCC uni ed military command, a GCC police force has been mandated to be headquartered in Abu Dhabi to facilitate communica on be tween the GCC agencies as well as the interna onal and regional ones, he said.

GCC na onal security is concerned with protec ng oil elds, the delivery of oil from the pla orms to the ships and the travel of those ships through interna onal waters; the responsibili es are na onal ones, regional and interna onal, he add ed.

h p: www.defensenews.com

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Is t e NSA a tually aking us orse at g ng terroris

Na onal Security Agency director Mike Rogers prepares to speak at Stanford Uni versity, Monday, Nov. 3, 2014, in Stanford, Calif. Rogers told professors and stu dents that U.S. intelligence is depending on Silicon Valley innova on for technolo gies that strengthen the Internet and sta to provide na onal cybersecurity. (AP Photo Marcio Jose Sanchez)

By Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy

POSTED: 11 11 14, 1:34 PM EST | UPDATED: 20 HRS AGO

The head of the Bri sh electronic spy agency GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, created a minor flap last week in an ar cle he wrote for the Financial Times. In e ect, Hanni gan argued that more robust encryp on procedures by private Internet companies were unwi ngly aiding terrorists such as the Islamic State (IS) or al-Qaida, by mak ing it harder for organiza ons like the NSA and GCHQ to monitor online tra c. The implica on was clear: The more that our personal privacy is respected and protect ed, the greater the danger we will face from evildoers.

It’s a serious issue, and democracies that want to respect individual privacy while simultaneously keeping ci zens safe are going to have to do a much be er job of reassuring us that vast and (mostly) secret surveillance capabili es overseen by un elected o cials such as Hannigan won’t be abused. I tend to favor the privacy side of the argument, both because personal freedoms are hard to get back once lost, but also because there’s not much evidence that these surveillance ac vi es are

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making us signi cantly safer. They seem to be able to help us track some terrorist leaders, but there’s a lively debate among scholars over whether tracking and kill ing these guys is an e ec ve strategy.

The fear of being tracked also forces terrorist organiza ons to adopt less e cient communica ons procedures, but it doesn’t seem to prevent them from doing a fair bit of harm regardless.

So here’s a wild counterfactual for you to ponder: What would the United States, Great Britain, and other wealthy and powerful na ons do if they didn’t have these vast surveillance powers? What would they do if they didn’t have armed drones, cruise missiles, or other implements of destruc on that can make it remarkably easy (and in the short-term, rela vely cheap) to target anyone they suspect might be a terrorist? Assuming that there were s ll violent e tremists plo ng various hei nous acts, what would these powerful states do if the Internet was there but no one knew how to spy on it?

For starters, they’d have to rely more heavily on tried-and-true counterterrorism measures: in ltra ng e tremist organiza ons and flipping e is ng members, etc., to nd out what they were planning, head a acks o before they occurred, and eventually roll up organiza on themselves. States waged plenty of counterterror ism campaigns before the Internet was invented, and while it can be di cult to in ltrate such movements and nd their vulnerable points, it’s not e actly an un known art. If we couldn’t spy on them from the safety of Fort Meade, we’d proba bly be doing a lot more of this.

Second, if we didn’t have all these e pensive high-tech capabili es, we might spend a lot more me thinking about how to discredit and delegi mize the terrorists’ message, instead of repeatedly doing things that help them make their case and recruit new followers. Every me the United States goes and pummels another Muslim country -- or sends a drone to conduct a signature strike -- it reinforces the jihadis’ claim that the West has an insa able desire to dominate the Arab and Islamic world and no respect for Muslim life. It doesn’t ma er if U.S. leaders have the best of inten ons, if they genuinely want to help these socie es, or if they are responding to a legi mate threat; the crude message that drones, cruise missiles, and targeted killings send is rather di erent.

If we didn’t have all these cool high-tech hammers, in short, we’d have to stop trea ng places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria as if they were nails that just needed another pounding, and we might work harder at marginalizing our ene mies within their own socie es. To do that, we would have to be building more e ec ve partnerships with authorita ve sources of legi macy within these socie es, including religious leaders. Our failure to do more to discredit these move ments is perhaps the single biggest shortcoming of the en re war on terror, and un l that failure is recognized and corrected, the war will never end.

Third, and somewhat parado ically, if we didn’t have drones and the NSA, we’d

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have to think more seriously about boots on the ground, at least in some places. But having to think harder about such decisions might be a good thing, because it would force the United States (or others) to decide which threats were really seri ous and which countries really ma ered. It might even lead to the conclusion that any sort of military interven on is counterproduc ve. As we’ve seen over the past decade, what the NSA, CIA, and Special Ops Command do is in some ways too easy: It just doesn’t cost that much to add a few more names to the kill list, to vacuum up a few more terabytes of data, or to launch a few more drones in some new coun try, and all the more so when it’s done under the veil of secrecy.

I’m not saying that our current policy is costless or that special opera ons aren’t risky; my point is that such ac vi es are s ll a lot easier to contemplate and au thorize than a true boots on the ground opera on. By making it easier, however, the capabili es make it easier for our leaders to skirt the more fundamental ques ons about interests and strategy. It allows them to do something, even when what is being done won’t necessarily help.

Lastly, if U.S. leaders had to think harder about where to deploy more e pensive resources, they might nally start thinking about the broader set of U.S. and West ern policies that have inspired some of these movements in the rst place. Move ments like IS, al-Qaida, al-Nusra Front, al-Shabab, or the Taliban are in some ways indigenous movements arising from local circumstances, but they did not spring up out of nowhere and the United States (and other countries) bear some (though not all) blame for their emergence and growth. To say this is neither to defend nor jus fy violent e tremism, nor to assert that all U.S. policies are wrong; it is merely to acknowledge that there is a causal connec on between some of what we do and some of the enemies we face.

But if some of the things the United States (or its allies) is doing are making it un popular in certain parts of the world, and if some of that unpopularity gets translat ed into violent e tremism that forces us to spend hundreds of billions of dollars try ing to protect ourselves, then maybe we ought to ask ourselves if every single one of those policies makes sense and is truly consistent with U.S. interests and values. And if not, then maybe we ought to change some of them, if only to take some steam out of the e tremist enterprise.

What I’m sugges ng, in short, is that the surveil and strike mentality that has dominated the counterterrorism e ort is popular with government o cials be cause it’s rela vely easy, plays to our technological strengths, and doesn’t force us to make any signi cant foreign-policy changes or engage in any sort of self-cri cism at all.

If we can solve the terrorist problem by throwing money at it, and enriching some defense contractors and former government o cials in the process, what’s not to like?

To be clear: I’m not sugges ng we dismantle the NSA, re all our cryptographers,

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and revert to Cordell Hull’s quaint belief that gentlemen or ladies do not read each other’s mail. But un l we see more convincing evidence that the surveillance of the sort Hannigan was defending has really and truly kept a signi cant number of people safer from foreign dangers, I’m going to wonder if we aren’t overempha sizing these ac vi es because they are rela vely easy for us, and because they have a powerful but hard-to-monitor cons tuency in Washington and London. In short, we’re just doing what comes naturally, instead of doing what might be more e ec ve.

Stephen M. Walt is a professor of interna onal rela ons at Harvard University.

h p: www.theoaklandpress.com

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arper poli ies under ine deradi aliza on

The Harper government's approach to gh ng terror plays into the hands of Islam ophobes and e tremists alike.

ADRIAN WYLD THE CANADIAN PRESS

Prime Minister Stephen Harper needs to look at the role played by his hawkish foreign and domes c policies on radicaliza on in perpetua ng what they seek to eliminate, writes Faisal Ku y.

By Faisal Ku y Published on Wed Nov 12 2014

I f they did turn him away I am sad that it is so, for that is what religion should be about, helping people in trouble, wrote Susan Bibeau in response to reports that her son, Michael ehaf-Bibeau, was turned away from a Burnaby, B.C. mosque.

She is right, but what are Muslims to do? In fact, our o ce recently acted for a mosque in repor ng another troubled youngster to CSIS a er pushing him out for his views. This snitch culture should be troubling to all who cherish privacy and freedoms. Unfortunately, if ac on is not taken and the e tremist is involved in violence (note: the actual number who do this is minuscule) then self-proclaimed e perts and Islamophobes will be quick to point out community complicity (guilt by associa on).

Radicaliza on is a highly individualized process involving the comple interac on of

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personal, social, economic, poli cal and ideological factors. Some mes, mental ill ness may also be in the mi (as Michael’s mother suggested). In fact, a few radicals that I have counselled were diagnosed schizophrenics.

How to prevent radicaliza on will be elusive un l the why is given more a en on without caving in to poli cal correctness or blind patrio sm. Prime Minister Ste phen Harper’s beli ling of the role played by his hawkish foreign and domes c poli cies on radicaliza on as well as Muslim defensiveness and denial are of equal con cern.

Studies including those by the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism and Duke University’s Triangle Center con rm that most violent radicals are mo vated by a cause as opposed to religion. Indeed, most have a poor understanding of Islam, but are empathe c to the plight of the oppressed and occupied. That said, e tremist ideas (including viewing people as believers and unbelievers) combined with re sentment and a vic m narra ve can provide the cogni ve opening that can be e ploited by violent preachers who provide the necessary religious support (chapter and verse) to jus fy heroically responding to these real or perceived injus ces.

Radicaliza on must be confronted without undermining social cohesion, viola ng human rights and devia ng from core democra c ideals.

The heavy li ing in this Herculean project must be borne by Muslims, who to their credit have repeatedly condemned violent e tremism in the strongest of terms even before 9 11. In fact the Na onal Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM) recent ly even came out with a handbook tled United Against Terrorism.

However, more must be done to challenge some of the e is ng narra ves fueling cogni ve radicaliza on. Imams must be more proac ve in undermining some of the classical te ts glorifying violence and martyrdom, by emphasizing the ethical peaceful vision of the Quran. This can only be done by deconstruc ng and be er conte tualizing the violent rhetoric in some of the Prophe c teachings and juris c interpreta ons adopted uncri cally by too many. Parro ng that Islam means peace is not enough. Teachings that may serve as the springboard to violent radicalism must be confronted head on. Such e orts must be internally driven. Any govern ment meddling will only back re.

Some souls may be forever lost, but this will help redirect the younger ones.

Before others get too smug, violence is not just a Muslim problem. In fact, non-Muslim terrorism has claimed more vic ms in North America since 9 11. The wor ship of guns, guts and glory and its reinforcement in popular culture truly have long-term human consequences. Indeed, a er no ng that Michael spent hours playing violent video games, Ms. Bibeau wrote I doubt he watched much islamic propa ganda…

Major Muslim groups, despite a string of legi mate grievances, have always called on Muslims to cooperate with authori es. Yet, rather than empowering them to

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o er structured programs to di use and redirect youthful energies toward produc ve causes, the Harper government has made it worse.

It has ignored the death and devasta on unleashed on Muslims around the world, be it through direct a acks or the uncondi onal support of our allies. At the do mes c level Harper has targeted the community by going a er its chari es and or ganiza ons (defaming NCCM for instance), and even religious symbols. These play into the hands of Islamophobes and e tremists alike. O awa is now busy ghtening the already draconian an -terror laws (preven ve deten on), introducing new hate laws restric ng speech, amending the CSIS Act, etc. These will ini ally a ect Mus lims (as noted by leading former jurists last week) dispropor onately but will even tually impact all Canadians.

In addi on to fueling resentment and distrust, this siege mentality will only alienate even more disillusioned youth. Indeed, if evic ng him from the mosque and deny ing him a passport may have triggered ehaf-Bibeau, then this is further proof (albeit anecdotal) that rushed and poorly conceived responses may be counterpro duc ve.

h p: www.thestar.com

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