Roy Weintraub's Studies in Appraisal: Lakatosian Consolations or Something Else?

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Roy Weintraub's Studies in Appraisal:Lakatosian Consolations or Something Else?

Andrea Salanti

Economics and Philosophy / Volume 7 / Issue 02 / October 1991, pp 221 - 234DOI: 10.1017/S0266267100001401, Published online: 05 December 2008

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0266267100001401

How to cite this article:Andrea Salanti (1991). Roy Weintraub's Studies in Appraisal: LakatosianConsolations or Something Else?. Economics and Philosophy, 7, pp 221-234doi:10.1017/S0266267100001401

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Economics and Philosophy, 7 (1991), 221-234. Printed in the United States of America.

ROY WEINTRAUB'S STUDIESIN APPRAISAL

Lakatosian Consolations orSomething Else?

ANDREA SALANTI

Universita degli Studi di Bergamo

INTRODUCTION

As made manifest by Clower's (1975) comments on their "science fiction"nature, general equilibrium theories (GET) present such peculiar andpuzzling features that the methodologist must perforce seek some spe-cific methodological accommodation for this part of economic theory.The role played by such theories in contemporary economics is so fun-damental (in the sense of Green, 1981) that the impossibility of apprais-ing them by means of any version of falsificationism, and their patentlack of (excess) empirical content if approached with the conceptualdevices of the methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP),1

A previous draft of this paper was delivered at the 1987 annual meeting of the History ofEconomics Society. Trying to make my point clearer, I have benefitted from comments,criticism, and suggestions from Guy Ahonen, Bruce Caldwell, Neil de Marchi, DouglasHands, Daniel Hausman, an anonymous referee, and (last but not least) Roy Weintraub.With the usual caveat about responsibility, I am very pleased to thank all them (as wellas Richard Dury for valuable improvements in style) very much. Financial support fromC.N.R. and M.U.R.S.T. is also gratefully acknowledged.

1. The relevant literature is too extensive to permit detailed references, but a few quo-tations suffice to give a rough idea of what I am referring to. On falsificationism ineconomics see, for example, Blaug (1980), Caldwell (1982,1984a), Hands (1984a), Haus-man (1985), Hutchison (1981), and Klant (1984). For some stimulating reflections anda number of further references on the applicability of the MSRP to economics, seeHands (1985a, 1990, 1992). Finally, on the Popperian legacy in economics, see thecomprehensive collection recently edited by Neil de Marchi (1988).

© 1991 Cambridge University Press 0266-2671/91 $5.00 + .00. 221

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222 ANDREA SALANTI

have prompted several scholars interested in the methodology of eco-nomics (although from different points of view and for even more dif-ferent purposes) to search for a reasonable way out.

As a consequence, in a number of recent studies on the methodo-logical foundations of GET, it has been argued that it is possible to acceptthe lack of explanatory power of these theories, without denying theirheuristic value and/or their interesting achievements in dealing with"possible worlds."2 Note that, in a sense, this is tantamount to regardingGET as a branch of "applied" mathematics.

In contrast with such a "consensual view," Roy Weintraub (1985a,1985b) has more recently advanced a somewhat different interpretation.Pursuing a line of inquiry he had already hinted at (Weintraub, 1979,1983), he concludes that:

There are two approaches which must be utilized in an appraisalof general equilibrium analysis. First, we use criteria appropriatefor gauging mathematical progress to measure the growth ofknowledge associated with hardening the core of the program.Second, we use traditional appraisal techniques to evaluate thework in the belt of that hard core. (Weintraub, 1985a, p. 34)

More precisely, as will be shown in the following section, he claims thatgeneral equilibrium analysis3 (GEA) must be appraised according to La-katos's Proofs and Refutations (P&R) methodology of mathematics, whilemore specific theories in the protective belt of the neo-Walrasian program(which are supposed to be derived from GEA) are to be judged accordingto the standards of "sophisticated falsificationism."

Regarding Weintraub's thesis as "Lakatosian consolations for eco-nomics," Alexander Rosenberg (1986) has pointed out some possible"external" criticism of it. Given the nature of such criticisms, however,they are quite likely to leave rather unimpressed those who regard La-katos's MSRP as a descriptively adequate account of how the growth ofscientific knowledge occurs.4 Although I do not hold any a priori reasonfor maintaining that one kind of criticism is more effective than another,it seems to me that external criticisms are doomed to be rather incon-clusive until the existence of a wide number of competing methodolog-

2. A careful account of this thesis is provided by Hausman (1981a; 1981b, chaps. 6-7),while a critical restatement and other references can be found in Hands (1984b). Strictlyconnected with these questions, there is also a whole series of papers pursuing anapplication to economics of the "structuralist" approach of Sneed and Stegmuller: foran interesting review and an almost exhaustive reference list, see Hands (1985b).

3. For an account of the reasons of Weintraub's distinction between general equilibriumanalysis and general equilibrium theory, see Weintraub (1985b, pp. 121-22).

4. See, for example, Weintraub's (1987) reply to Rosenberg.


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ROY WEINTRAUB'S STUDIES IN APPRAISAL 223

ical approaches and of more than one school in economics must havebeen taken into account.

The main purpose of this paper is to carry the critical examinationof Weintraub's methodological assessment of GEA beyond the pointsmade by Rosenberg. Hence, I intend to set forth an "internal"5 criticismof Weintraub's appraisal, that is, to point out some inner inconsistenciesthat, in my opinion, seriously undermine it.

As I have tried to argue elsewhere (Salanti, 1989), we may have twodifferent kinds of internal criticism. Their object, indeed, may be eitherthe applicability of the methodological approach chosen by the metho-dologist (and accepted as valid by the critic) to the appraised piece ofeconomic theory or the correctness (in itself) of the methodologist'sparticular reconstruction of such a piece of theory. The former questionsthe applicability of the chosen methodological approach to the economictheory under study, the latter (as in this paper) questions the correctnessof the reconstruction of this theory.

Thus, being mainly concerned here with Weintraub's peculiar de-piction of the "neo-Walrasian research program" (NWRP), I will de-liberately leave aside questions such as (a) the descriptive and/orprescriptive adequacy of "sophisticated falsificationism"; (b) the possi-bility of solving the demarcation problem by means of the MSRP; (c) thevery existence of progressive (in Lakatos's sense) research programs ineconomics; (d) the correctness of his P&R approach to the philosophyof mathematics; (e) the explicative power of the theory of general (com-petitive) equilibrium; and (f) the continuous presence within economicsof competing "paradigms." Instead, I will focus my attention on thoseaspects of Weintraub's admittedly ingenious proposal concerning thesupposed links between GEA and the theories that would be derivedfrom it and at the same time ought to be suited to empirical applications.

THE MISSING POINT IN WEINTRAUB'S ACCOUNT OF NWRP

The main features of the "dualistic program appraisal" for GEA as putforward by Weintraub can be seized in the following passages:

5. The notion of "internal" (as opposed to "external") criticism, although frequently in-voked during discussions on methodological or substantive issues, is usually takensimply for granted. One of the few exceptions in the current methodological literaturecomes from Bruce Caldwell (1984b, p. 374): "Internal criticism proceeds by examininga given theory or methodology to see which avenues of criticism its proponents wouldaccept as legitimate. Internal criticism approaches a theory or methodology on its owngrounds, rather than assessing it from the standpoint of some external standard."

The above "definition" sets us on the right path (cf. also Caldwell, 1986). It shouldbe clear, however, that an internal criticism is not so much one that those criticizedare likely to accept, as one they are possibly prepared to consider as a proper form ofcriticism.



224 ANDREA SALANTI

This reconstruction of the series of papers on the existence of acompetitive equilibrium corroborates the claim that there exists aneo-Walrasian research program in the sense of Lakatos. The se-quence of papers represents a hardening of the hard core of thatprogram. Progress, for this sequence . . . corresponds quite wellto what Lakatos called a theoretically progressive problemshift. . . .The hardening process proceeded like any mathematical investi-gation; consequently, we have to appraise it as we would appraiseany research line in mathematics. . . . That is, the general modelfor appraisal is that of Lakatos's Proofs and Refutations and not thatof Popper's Conjectures and Refutations. . . . Theories in the protec-tive belt of the program, theories developed out of the heuristics,are appraised by the method that is appropriate for any empiricalscience. Thus it is entirely reasonable to ask that [such theories]be evaluated according to Popperian methods of sophisticated fal-sificationism. (Weintraub, 1985b, pp. 116-29)

As the reader can easily see, even within the limits imposed by apreference for internal criticism, Weintraub's attempt to apply a Laka-tosian model of scientific patterns to NWRP raises more than one ques-tion. Even if Lakatos's P&R and MSRP are accepted as valid, one mightindeed wonder whether:

1. GEA, as envisaged by Weintraub, can be correctly approachedby means of a P&R perspective on mathematics;

2. All theories in the protective belt satisfy the methodological stan-dards that are required for the descriptive (and/or prescriptive)effectiveness of MSRP;

3. These theories may be really said to be derived from the hard coreof the neo-Walrasian program.

As far as the applicability to GEA of the P&R approach to themethodology of mathematics is concerned, we must not forget thatwhat Weintraub (1983; 1985b, part II) successfully accomplishes merelyamounts to possibly showing that GEA is "good" mathematics. But thisis obviously out of question: what lies in the back of the mind of mostcritics of "mainstream" economics is just the conviction that this is notthe most appropriate field for such kinds of (otherwise very brilliant)exercises in advanced mathematics.6 To put it another way, if the hard

6. Nobody, for instance, would deny that Debreu (1986) is quite right in asserting that"An axiomatized theory has a mathematical form that is completely separated from itseconomic content. If one removes the economic interpretation of the primitive concepts,of the assumptions, and of the conclusions of the model, its bare mathematical structuremust still stand" (p. 1265). But when he goes on to say that "The exact formulation ofassumptions and of conclusions turned out, moreover, to be an effective safeguard




core is defined only as a set of "axioms," as Weintraub (1985a, pp. 29-30; 1985b, pp. 112-14) correctly maintains, the literature on the existenceof competitive equilibrium that eventually led to the Arrow-Debreumodel (ADM) can have hardened such a hard core only insofar as it ismeant to provide a demonstration of the inner consistency of such a setof axioms. In this respect, the most obvious analogy is clearly withEuclidean geometry, and Weintraub himself, indeed, resorts to this kindof metaphor (cf. 1985a, pp. 29-30). All this makes sense if we interpretit as intended to show that GEA is "axiomatized" in the same way inwhich Euclidean geometry is. But even when it is shown that this taskhas been successfully accomplished,7 the claim remains to be examinedaccording to which applied theories (that is, having an empirical contentsuitable for appraisal) would be "derived" from a set of "axioms." AsBertrand Russel pointed out as early as 1903,

The actual propositions of Euclid, for example, do not follow fromthe principles of logic alone; and the perception of this fact ledKant to his innovations in the theory of knowledge. But since thegrowth of non-Euclidean Geometry, it has appeared that puremathematics has no concern with the question whether the axiomsand propositions of Euclid hold of actual space or not: this is aquestion for applied mathematics, to be decided, so far as anydecision is possible, by experiment and observation. . . . All prop-ositions as to what actually exists, like the space we live in, belongto experimental or empirical science. . . . (Russel, 1903, p. 5)

Moreover, concerning theory appraisal in the protective belt, itshould be clear that Weintraub (1985a, 1985b) takes its feasibility ac-cording to the Lakatosian MSRP simply for granted. This misplacedreliance on the high value usually placed on "sophisticated" falsifica-tionism within what McCloskey would name the "official" Methodologyof economics prevents him from realizing the importance of all the well-known difficulties8 concerning the testability of economic theories.

Although the above-mentioned shortcomings may well appear to

against the ever-present temptation to apply an economic theory beyond its domainof validity" (p. 1266), many people (including myself) cannot refrain from asking them-selves what is the empirical "domain of validity" of most economic theories, and inprimis of GET.

7. For our purposes, despite some possible critiques of its historical accuracy (see Hil-denbrand, 1987), Weintraub's reconstruction of the literature on the existence of generalcompetitive equilibrium (1985b, chap. 6) can be taken to stand.

8. On this matter, in addition to the references already provided in note 1, see Salanti(1987, sect. 2).



226 ANDREA SALANTI

be of some importance,9 they are not the main object of my contentionhere. What I regard as even more unsatisfactory in Weintraub's meth-odological assessment of NWRP is what he says (or, perhaps, what hedoes not say) about the linkage(s) between GEA, the hard core, and thetheories in the protective belt of such a program.

In this respect, it must be first noted that Weintraub's definition ofthe hard core of NWRP is itself far from clear. Sometimes (cf., for in-stance, Weintraub, 1985a, pp. 24-27; 1985b, pp. 109-14, 125-27) it ispresented as a set of "axioms" or "hard core propositions" that amount,roughly speaking, to an endorsement of the maximization hypothesistogether with the major tenets of methodological individualism, but inother passages it is identified sic et simpliciter with the ADM of generalequilibrium (see, for example, Weintraub, 1985b, pp. 132-35). A cleardefinition of what constitutes the hard core of NWRP is crucial for un-derstanding the limits of Weintraub's peculiar theses about both the"hardening" of hard core and the appraisal of the theories in the pro-tective belt that would be "derived" from it.

If the hard core is characterized as a set of "hard core propositions,"it ends by being too loosely defined (because, in addition to NWRP,other approaches in neoclassical tradition could be easily shown to sat-isfy it).10 Otherwise, if the hard core were held to coincide with ADM,it would become problematic to claim either the empirical progressivityof NWRP along Lakatosian lines (by reason of its patent lack of "novelfacts," as recently pointed out by Toruno [1988], or its theoretical pro-gressivity (bearing in mind the well-known difficulties concerninguniqueness and stability, as forcefully stressed by Kirman [1989]).n Inthis case, moreover, in the hard core of NWRP there would be (inaddition to the "axioms") all the "assumptions" of ADM, so that onlythe theories in the protective belt that are compatible with suchassumptions12 could be regarded as "derived" from the hard core of the

9. This is especially true as far as the applicability of Lakatos's MSRP is concerned. AsLaudan et al. (1986) have forcefully pointed out, we should not have to rely on amodel of scientific change until it is supported by an exhaustive study of the workingsof actual science. But in the case at issue, however, it seems plausible to expectWeintraub's studies in appraisal to fit only a small number of preselected examplesat most. One of such examples (taken from applied microeconomics) is provided byWeintraub himself (1988a).

10. Weintraub's "hard core propositions" are indeed quite similar to Fisher's (1986, pp.172-80) reconstruction of the hard core of the early marginalist research program andto Hahn's (1984, pp. 1-2) rather informal account of himself as a neoclassical econ-omist.

11. Weintraub himself, dealing with general equilibrium dynamics, is unwilling (or un-able?) to replicate the same approach he follows as far as the existence of equilibriumis concerned (cf. his 1988b and 1991).

12. The terms "axioms" and "assumptions" are here used in the same sense as in Hahn(1985).


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program. According to Weintraub (1985b, p. 134), for example, mone-tarism ought to be placed (among other things) in the protective belt ofNWRP, and therefore regarded as closely related (at least) to GEA. Butit is this very link that has been the main target of Frank Hahn's reiteratedwarnings about the monetarism's lack of theoretical foundations.13

In all fairness to Weintraub, his representation of NWRP could bemore conveniently framed in terms of Remeny's (1979) account of "coredemi-core interactions." Within such a conceptual framework GEA (withits own demi-core) should find a place in the "pure theory protectivebelt," while applied subdisciplines would stand in the "applied theoryprotective belt." Even so reinterpreted, however, Weintraub's proposalof a "dualistic approach" to the appraisal to NWRP does not appear tobe very strong. Indeed, he simply asserts that the specific theories inthe (applied theory) protective belt are "derived" from the hard core (orfrom GEA), but he says virtually nothing - apart from some hints onthe "positive heuristics" of NWRP - about how such theories should belinked to the hard core (or to the GEA demi-core). Showing that progressin GEA "should be recognized as a hardening of the hard core of theneo-Walrasian research program" (Weintraub, 1985b, p. 112) is per seno refutation of the claim that the set of "intended applications" ofgeneral equilibrium models is virtually empty - as repeatedly maintainedby those who have recently approached such models through the "struc-turalist view," or of the merely heuristic role of such analytical frame-works - as frequently pointed out by a number of authors interested inthe methodology of neoclassical economics.14

Why a proof of consistency (as Weintraub correctly characterizesmathematical investigations in GEA) is by no means sufficient to estab-lish the soundness of a set of propositions that ought to generate em-pirically relevant theories can be more clearly understood following

13. When Hahn (1984, p. 312) convincingly argues that: "Everyone knows by now thatWalrasian sequence economies have many - mostly a continuum of - rational expec-tations equilibria. . . . Monetarist econometricians have chosen to work with modelsin which there is only one path that converges to the steady state. They then declarethat this is the path which an actual economy follows. . . . If they are also trying toplacate you they will mumble something about transversality conditions. This howevergives the game away. For these conditions are only relevant in an optimising context.Thus their 'explanation' is implicitly that the economy must behave as if someoneperformed an infinite optimisation exercise on it," he is making dear, perhaps some-what unintentionally, the interpretative dilemma facing those who try to work out aunitary methodological assessment of "mainstream" economics. In this case, for ex-ample, either we must admit the unreliability of the econometric evidence providedin favor of economic policies advocated by monetarists (because of the lack of theo-retical foundations), or we can give up the claim of such a "theory" being derivedfrom the hard core of NWRP and be satisfied with an instrumentalist justification ofit (because of the necessity of the "as if" assumption).

14. See, for some references, note 2.



228 ANDREA SALANTI

Musgrave's (1981) analysis of the epistemological status of "assump-tions" in economics (and in other sciences, for that matter). His threefoldclassification may be summarized as follows:

1. Negligibility assumptions assert that some factor, which might besupposed to be relevant, can be disregarded without losing thepossibility of dealing with the phenomenon under investigation.

2. Domain assumptions specify the domain of applicability of thetheory by bounding the set of events that the theory is intendedto "explain."

3. Heuristic assumptions stipulate a situation that conforms to noactual one (so that the resulting theory can never be tested),essentially because a method of successive approximations isfollowed.

What this classification enables us to point out is that in Weintraub'sdualistic appraisal it remains somewhat of a mystery how theories inthe protective belt - the appraisal of which must rely on some "domain"or "negligibility" assumption(s) - could be "derived" from a theoreticalconstruction entirely based on "axioms" that, at most, may be regardedas "heuristic" assumptions.15 This conclusion stems from the difficultyof seeing where the necessary domain assumptions would be introduced.Surely enough, they are not in GEA, as Weintraub himself (1985b, pp.121-22) implicitly recognizes when he invites his readers to avoid expres-sions like GET. On the other hand, if they are to be found in the theoriesin the protective belt, their adequacy should be checked in each singleinstance because in most "applied" theories they could turn out to benothing but untenable negligibility assumptions.

SOME MORE HINTS FROM SOCIOLOGY

If, as I argued before, NWRP is much less compact and methodologicallyconsistent than Weintraub would have us believe, it ought to be possibleto find some further evidence of such a state of affairs in the actualpractice of economic research. Thus, to strengthen my criticism, it maybe interesting to briefly check the implications of Weintraub's method-

15. On closer inspection, however, this difficulty appears as no less than the tip of aniceberg. Indeed, as I have tried to show elsewhere (Salanti, 1987), starting from Mus-grave's (1981) classification of "assumptions" and recognizing the heuristic nature ofmost economic theory, it is possible to obtain useful insights into (a) the recurrenceover time of methodological controversies involving similar issues; (b) the commonsource of the seemingly different difficulties encountered by the various approacheswithin economic methodology; (c) the widely recognized difficulty of meaningfullytesting economic theories; and (d) the ambiguity that inevitably arises when "gen-erality" is advocated as a proper criterion for theory choice in economics.




ological assessment of NWRP as far as the sociology of economic knowl-edge is concerned.

If Weintraub's reconstruction of NWRP corresponded to the actualstate of economics, we ought to expect a close intertwinement betweenresearch in "pure theory" and its counterparts in "applied" fields. In-deed, he himself claims that:

What may appear to be nonchalance about the empirical referentsof the competitive equilibrium models now appears to be a sensibledivision of labor. Some theorists develop models that can framethe basic facts about our daily economic life. . . . Other theoristsand applied economists test those frameworks. (Weintraub, 1985a,p. 33)

In this passage, Weintraub envisages a sharp division of intellectuallabor in economics that is open to question in various respects. First,despite the recurrent willingness (of which Weintraub's attitude is atypical instance) for describing the activity of applied economists as thatof checking the empirical adequacy of theorists' models, from a moreclose scrutiny of their actual way of doing applied research it usuallyemerges that things go quite differently. For example, as aptly pointedout by Morgan (1988), if we look at econometrics from a historical view-point, we realize that econometricians have always been concerned withthe problem of finding satisfactory empirical models rather than of testingeconomic theories.16

Second, studies based on citation patterns hardly support such aview. With reference to the very same issue with which we are concernedhere, Diamond (1988) has recently surveyed a random sample of De-breu's 1407 citations for the years 1966-1980 reported in the Social ScienceCitation Index concluding that Debreu's writings "have had a negligibleimpact on empirical work" (Diamond, 1988, p. 130). But even if we hadto find other kinds of evidence about the influence of theoretical workon applied research,17 we would need (to support the thesis of a strictintercommunication) further evidence about an equally relevant influ-ence in the opposite direction.

Unfortunately, casual observation seems to suggest that what usu-ally happens is just the opposite. Indeed, as Whitley has convincinglyobserved:

the major division in economics . . . is between the theoretical,analytical core which dominates training programmes, the com-

16. Note that this finding is quite in accordance with the well-known literature on thedifficulty of following falsificationist criteria within economics.

17. Of course, theorists' influence could be so overwhelming that one might find noreferences to their work despite their strong influence, but this is the intrinsic limitof this kind of study.



230 ANDREA SALANTI

munication system and academic reputations, posts and honours,and the applied periphery of problem fields which take their meth-ods and concepts from the core but do not contribute to its mod-ification or improvement. (Whitley, 1984, p. 185)

For our concern, however, the main implication of this situation is thatsuch a one-way communication system (if it really exists) prevents anyreal testing of economic theory, in the sense that possible "refutations"are doomed to remain confined within the boundaries of applied sub-disciplines in the periphery of the profession, without having any chanceto prompt a reorientation in the mainstream realm of "pure" theory.

If this is the case, even the neat division of intellectual labor ineconomics envisaged by Weintraub does not satisfactorily work for theintended purposes. It may well be, indeed, that GEA has strengthenedthe hard core of NWRP by showing the consistency of the "axioms" inthe hard core (in the same sense that Euclidean geometry gives a proofof consistency for Euclidean axioms). But what could signal the need ofchanging some of the axioms (that is, of a non-Euclidean geometry) ifthe current ones turn out to provide unsatisfactory explanations orwrong predictions?

FINAL REMARKS

In Weintraub (1985b, p. 55) the author openly asserts that his work"attempts to see whether, and in what sense, neo-Walrasian economicsis good economics." In doing this, he argues that GEA (regarded as amodel directed at establishing the mutual consistency of the hard corepropositions in NWRP) ought to be appraised according to Lakatos'sP&R approach to the methodology of mathematics, while theories inthe protective belt of NWRP should be appraised by means of Lakatos'sMSRP.

The first part of his argument is beyond question (but it simply showsthat GEA has progressively developed as well as "good" mathematicalresearch usually does),18 while its second part suffers from his inabilityto show how theories he regards as forming the protective belt of NWRPcould be derived from the set of propositions he regards as the hardcore of the program. Unless the linkage between the hard core and the"derived" theories in the protective belt is perceived to be of a merelyheuristic nature (as sometimes Weintraub himself seems to be inclinedto do), the difficulty of reconciling the methodology of such widelydifferent fields of research is quite evident. As far as I can see, such a

18. It has the further merit of stressing the importance of those nonempirical counterex-amples that undoubtedly mark (as correctly maintained also by Hands, 1985c) thegrowth of knowledge in the more analytic areas of economics.




difficulty arises mainly because, from the point of view of the explanatorypower of a theory, the same heuristic assumptions that must be regardedas basic axioms in GEA cannot be turned into domain (and even moreso, negligibility) assumptions when the theories in the protective beltshould be appraised according to a falsificationist perspective.

After all, this is why in economic methodology we can find, forinstance, both Friedman's (1953) instrumentalist defense of the logic of"as if" and the weak (in the sense of Boland [1982], who has coined theapt title of "defeatist conventionalism" for indicating it) methodologicalapproaches to GEA by distinguished practitioners such as Arrow (1974),Debreu (1984, 1986), and Hahn (1984, part I). Admittedly, we may wellbe dissatisfied with both these approaches to economic methodology,but the alternative that Weintraub offers us is not much better.

Perhaps it is a bit more appealing because of both its Lakatosianflavor and (as approvingly observed by Heijdra and Lowenberg [1988,p. 280]) the advantage of simplicity obtained by "arranging neoclassicaleconomics into a single research program," but this is by no means asufficient reason for begging the question about the missing linkagebetween what Weintraub puts in the hard core of NWRP and what heconsiders to belong to the protective belt of the same research program.

Finally, it should be noted that the vice of blithely assuming thatgeneral equilibrium models will find applications in other fields of re-search is by no means new. With reference to the two-sector model ofgeneral equilibrium, in Jones (1965) we are told that:

It is difficult to find any major branch of applied economics thathas not made some use of the simple general equilibrium modelof production. For years this model has served as the workhorsefor most of the developments in the pure theory of internationaltrade. It has been used to study the effects of taxation on thedistribution of income and the impact of technological change onthe composition of outputs and the structure of prices. Perhapsthe most prominent of its recent uses is to be found in the neo-classical theory of economic growth. (Jones, 1965, p. 557)

Unfortunately, as the reader can easily see, such "applications" areneither the most suited for appraisal along Lakatosian lines nor, evenmore importantly, the most likely to emerge from such a scrutiny asempirically progressive.19

If a lesson can be drawn from all the above discussion, it is that wemust not forget that within economics - and neo-Walrasian economics

19. Those who disagree with the opinion expressed here are invited to demonstrate (notnecessarily according to Lakatos's criterion, the less demanding ones proposed byother Popperian philosophers are accepted as well) the empirical progessivity of, say,growth theory.


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232 ANDREA SALANTI

as defined by Weintraub is no exception to the rule - we must distinguishamong at least the following three different bodies of knowledge: (a) afundamental core of "pure theory" where analytical rigor, generality,and deduction from first principles (usually untestable in the falsifica-tionist sense) are held in the highest esteem; (b) an array of "applied"subdisciplines like macroeconomics, labor economics, industrial eco-nomics, and so on, where the need of (hopefully sound) predictions ispretty urgent; and (c) a number of other fields of research whose scopeis somewhere in the middle between the previous two. Each of thesedifferent ways of practicing economics is likely to require a methodo-logical assessment of its own, and for this reason a pluralist attitude onthis matter is to be highly recommended.

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Roy Weintraub's Studies in Appraisal: Lakatosian Consolations or Something Else?