JOURNAL OF OCCUPATIONAL BEHAVIOUR, Vol. 5 , 131-146 (1984)

The derivation of job designs

CHRIS W. CLEGG Social and Applied Psychology Unit, University of Shefield, England

SUMMARY

This paper presents a theoretical account of the derivation of job designs incorporating consideration of technology, structure and managerial control, viewed from an information processing perspective. A conceptual distinction is made between tasks and roles which has practical relevance in that organizations have independent choices regarding their design. These choices are underpinned by economic and psychological values as well as by managerial needs for control.

The paper argues that whilst options exist, organizations typically choose to simplify jobs, a strategy which may well be ineffective, especially under conditions of uncertainty. New, more complex job designs may be very difficult to implement for economic, psychological, managerial and political reasons. Research and development should now be directed towards a more detailed cognitive and social psychological understanding of the derivation and impact of job designs as well as towards study of the introduction and impact of new technology. These represent qualitative shifts in research emphasis.

INTRODUCTION

Most of the theoretical and empirical literature on job design has focused on job complexity as the independent variable. Thus the research question has usually been formulated as, ‘What are the eflecfs of various job designs?’ This has been reflected in predominantly psychological analyses of individual behaviour. Two general sets of findings have emerged: first that there is some consensus over the dimensions on which jobs can be represented (e.g. autonomy and variety); and secondly that much of the evidence is consktenf with the hypothesis that job complexity influences psychological well-being (usually job satisfaction) and performance (see, for example, Pierce and Dunham, 1976; Wall, 1978). However, this area of enquiry has not been without its difficulties. For example, Cummings, Molloy and Glen (1977) describe some prevalent methodological problems and Roberts and Glick (1981) have pointed to the need for more conceptual clarity, one particular concern being the widespread lack of differentiation between the objective characteristics of jobs and people’s perceptions of them.

More recently a complementary research interest has emerged in which job design is treated as the dependent variable, the question being formulated as, ‘What are the causes of job complexity or job designs?’ This development provides the stimulus for this paper, particular emphasis being placed on the determinants of the objective characteristics of people’s jobs rather than their perceptions of them. This area of enquiry is important for a number of reasons. In the first place

0142-2774/84/02013 1-16$01.60 0 1984 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received 20 December I981 Revised 23 February I983

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it requires that job design is considered and analysed in an organizational context, a perspective of particular significance for students of organizational behaviour, and especially for those trying to bridge the gap between the micro and macro approaches to organizations (see Aldag and Brief, 1979; Mitchell, 1979; Pierce and Dunham, 1978; Moorhead, 1981). Furthermore, for those seeking an understanding of people’s perceptions of, and reactions to their jobs, as well as for those undertaking new job designs, it is essential to appreciate why it is that jobs are designed the way they are and what forms they take.

The paper presents a theoretical framework of the determinants of job designs which attempts to clarify certain concepts and synthesize some related but disparate literature. The practical implications of the theoretical perspective are also considered. Overall, the objective is to promote understanding of the derivation of job designs and to suggest some promising lines of enquiry for further research and development.

Certainly a review of the empirical literature in which job complexity is treated as the dependent variable reveals the need for such work. Unfortunately the small amount of research that has been undertaken (for example, Hrebiniak, 1974; Billings, Klimoski and Breaugh, 1977; Rousseau, 1977, 1978; Moorhead, 1981) has exclusively examined the relationship between macro-organizational variables, such as technology and structure, and perceived job characteristics. From this it is clear that there are links between these variables which merit further investigation: indeed, on intuitive grounds, it would be surprising if there were not. However, the research is also characterized by some confusion, and not simply over the lack of distinction between objective and subjective characteristics. Thus different writers tend to use different conceptualizations and measures for key constructs (such as technology) and most do not attempt a theoretical specification of how and why key variables influence one another. In this paper an attempt is made to provide such a specification as well as some clarification.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This theoretical account attempts to explain why job designs differ, and in particular why it is that some jobs are objectively more complex than others. Thus the ‘natural’ unit of analysis is at the job and work group level. The framework is presented by working from the macro-organizational variables (the ‘causes’) to the micro (the ‘effects’).

Technology and structure

The literatures on technology and structure are in each case enormous and potentially confusing, many writers pointing to conceptual and measurement difficulties with these variables (e.g. Child, 1977; Ford and Slocum, 1977). However, Hickson, Pugh and Pheysey (1966) provide a classification of the different meanings of the term technology, two of which are particularly useful in this context. The first, operations technology, is defined as the equipping and sequencing of activities in the workflow. In this formulation, technology provides a set of operations which are undertaken by the job incumbent and comprises elements such as the levels of automation and workflow rigidity, cycle time, the

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number of necessary operations, and the uniformity of equipment. It is technology in this sense, with which the individual is interacting, that shapes the objective characteristics of the physical task undertaken, In this view a complex task would involve low levels of automation and workflow rigidity, a long cycle time, a large number of operations and use of a range of equipment. The second view, labelled as knowledge technology, focuses on two dimensions, the number of exceptions that must be handled and the degree to which problem-solution is an analysable procedure (Perrow, 1967). In this view technology is a variable incorporating more or less uncertainty, a position which is also adopted in this paper.

With regard to organization structure a relatively recent perspective has emerged which builds on the work of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and views organizations as information-processing systems which design and structure themselves to cope with prevailing uncertainties (see Galbraith, 1973, 1977; Tushman and Nadler, 1978). This theoretical position is particularly powerful, since it provides a set of dimensions on which the effects of both technology and structure can be represented. These dimensions are: task difficulty; intra-group task inter- dependence (or ‘technically required cooperation’-Meissner, 1969); inter-group interdependence (or level of ‘boundary transactions’-Thompson, 1967) and environmental uncertainty (Duncan, 1972). Particularly noteworthy is the fact that task difficulty is closely allied to the concept of task complexity described above. One would hypothesize, for example, that complex tasks (i.e. those low on automation, workflow rigidity and equipment uniformity, but high on cycle time, and the number of operations) would also be difficult (i.e. high on uncertainty). Thus this particular dimension provides for some common ground between these two conceptualizations of technology.

Information processing

Each functional work group is viewed as an information processing system facing internal and external uncertainties. In order to meet its goals and cope with its environment, it uses certain techno-structural arrangements. These arrangements themselves result in different kinds and levels of uncertainty for the workgroup and for individal job holders, where uncertainty can be defined as the ‘difference between the amount of information required to perform the task and the amount of information already possessed’ (Galbraith, 1973, p. 5). Following from the conceptual distinctions described above, local uncertainties arise directly from three sources: the technical difficulty of the particular tasks; the interdependencies (or required levels of co-operation) within the work group; and the interdependencies (or level of boundary transactions) with other groups. A fourth source of uncertainty, the wider environment, is assumed to impinge upon the work group indirectly through one of the direct sources (in particular, the inter-group relationships). Thus, technology can be conceptualized as a set of operations which will shape the objective complexity of the task. And the technological and structural arrangements together can be seen as forming a decision-making environment within which the job holder works: this can be conceptualized in terms of the different kinds and levels of uncertainty faced.

It follows that high levels of uncertainty, at the work group level, require large amounts of information processing by job holders, whilst low levels require little processing. Thus, an assembly line operator will have low information processing

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requirements because the task itself is not intrinsically difficult and the pattern of workflow is highly predictable. Such uncertainties as do arise are the result of sequential dependencies on previous jobs done by others within the group (i.e. on the line). On the other hand, members of the engineering maintenance department with responsibility for maintaining and repairing the plant, have relatively high information processing requirements, stemming from three sources. The task itself is difficult, the workflow is unpredictable and the members of the group may need to pool their skills and work together when diagnosing and/or undertaking complex repairs.

Patterns of local control

The premise here is that managers typically seek to maintain control over operations so as to ensure effective performance. Galbraith (1973, 1977) points out that when uncertainty and information processing requirements are low, control can be achieved at the individual and work group level by the specification of various standards, rules and procedures. In effect the tasks can be routinized. Furthermore, under these conditions, means-ends relationships are likely to be relatively predictable. As such, targets can be specified and direct supervision is possible (Ouchi and Maguire, 1975). Thus, when information processing requirements are low, local control can be achieved through three complementary strategies: the specification of rules and procedures; target setting; and direct supervision (Van de Ven and Delbecq, 1974; Van de Ven and Morgan, 1980). Operationally, the result is a job tightly controlled and circumscribed by management.

At the other extreme, when information processing requirements are high, jobs cannot effectively be pre-specified and routinized. When means-ends relationships are uncertain (i.e. when knowledge of the transformation process is imperfect) then direct supervision is inappropriate and control can only be achieved through the monitoring and evaluation of outputs (Ouchi, 1977). Control here is characterized by the specification of general goals (but not the means) and by the establishment of sets of norms and expectations over appropriate behaviours (Van de Ven and Morgan, 1980). Interestingly, the specification of appropriate behaviours may well be achieved externally through the definition of professional standards and procedures (Mintzberg, 1979). In between these two extremes, medium levels of information processing are accompanied by a mode of control which delimits targets and constraints and which specifies a repertoire of available procedures and methods for achieving goals.

Thus the pattern of local control, a construct which incorporates routinization and target-setting as well as managerial or supervisory style, is influenced by the information processing requirements. This is consistant with the view of Susman (1976), who observed that when uncertainties are high, regulatory decisions tend to be made by the people doing the job, but that when they are low, the decision-making is often ‘upwardly dispersed’.

Objective job complexity

The objective characteristics of jobs are a function of both the work roles and the physical tasks undertaken by the job holder. The Work Roles are largely prescribed

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by the pattern of local control described immedately above. Thus, when a job is closely controlled (through some combination of routinization, goal-setting and direct supervision), the job holders themselves will have few opportunities for decision-making or self-regulation. Similarly, when local control is low, opportunities for self-regulation (i.e. more complex work roles) will be high. Thus, maintenance engineers, for these reasons, are hypothesized to have more complex roles (i.e. more decision-making rights) than assembly-line operators. Such a zero-sum view of local decision-making is not being propounded for the whole spectrum of organizational control. The sorts of decisions involved here are those concerned with daily operations such as allocating jobs, choosing the order in which to do things, setting the pace of work and organizing the timing of breaks.

The second component of a job, the Tusk itself, is largely technologically determined. Thus the hypothesis is that with increasing automation, workflow rigidity and equipment uniformity, and with decreasing cycle time and numbers of operations, then the task undertaken becomes simpler. If some or all of these processes are reversed, then a more complex task results. For these technological reasons, the maintenance engineer has a more compex task than the assembly-line operator.

Clearly, these two aspects of a job are related-indeed one might speculate that, in many cases, more complex tasks are accompanied by more complex work roles. Nevertheless, the distinction is important for reasons explored later.

Choice

Child (1972) stressed that an understanding of the relationships between organizational structure, technology, the environment and performance requires recognition of the strategic choices open to management, a point reiterated by Monanari (1978, 1979). In this framework, choices also exist (typically for management), in two principal respects.

In the first place management has choices to make about the techno-structural arrangements it will adopt to meet its requirements. Thus, it can decide (albeit, probably at discrete intervals) on the sort of technology in which to invest and on the type of structures used to manage the organization. For example, motor cars could be manufactured and assembled in a variety of ways although historically the assembly-line method has been the technological option typically chosen. In fact research into the practical considerations of industrial engineers when they are designing people’s jobs, reveals how widespread are a common set of criteria (see Davis, Canter and Hoffman, 1955; and Taylor, 1979). Thus, job designers typically opt for a technology which minimizes the time required to perform the job, the skill level needed, the necessary training time and the individual’s contribution to the whole process. In short, the choices usually made, seek to minimize immediate costs through specialization and routinization.

In the same way management has choices concerning the pattern of local control. When information processing requirements are low, then job holders are usually subjected to a relatively direct form of control. The values and ideologies underpinning these choices are considered below. The point here is that this framework is not, at this stage, intended to be either prescriptive of how things should be done, or deferminisfic in terms of how they are always done. .Rather, the model attempts to be descriptive of what typically happens.

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Values

Two domninant values underpin the choices described above. The first is economic and lays stress on the benefits which accrue from specialization. These include the ease of training and replacing staff and the reduction of direct labour costs resulting from deskilling. These of course are the advantages described by Taylor (191 1) in formulating his principles of scientific management. The second underlying value is psychological and rests in the belief that individuals need close external control to shape their behaviour at work. This perspective is reflected in McGregor’s (1960) characterization of Theory X in which the industrial worker is seen as naturally lazy and unreliable.

Insofar as these orientations to work may be shared by decision-makers, they represent strong pressures to design and operate simple rather than complex jobs. Furthermore since such views may well be deep-rooted, this gives some indication as to why making jobs more complex is, in practice, so difficult. This issue will be discussed latter.

Summary

This framework has considered the derivation of job designs arguing that jobs are comprised of tasks and roles. The former are determined by the technology and can be characterized in terms of difficulty or uncertainty using dimensions such as cycle time and automation level. Work roles are concerned with decision-making rights and reflect the pattern of local control. This in turn is set by the information processing requirements of the situation which are themselves influenced by the chosen techno-structural arrangements. This schema is summarized in Figure 1, which also indicates that managers have choices over the technology, structure and control strategies they adopt. Those choices are influenced by underlying economic and psychological values.

Clearly, the framework presented is an over-simplification insofar as more complex relationships may pertain and other variables may also be significant. For example, a work group may be able, perhaps by performing very effectively, to extend its decision-making rights (its role) and thereby increasing the information processing requirements of that situation. Thus, feedback loops will exist. Similarly, it would be naive to argue that the pattern of local control is simply a function of information processing requirements. Since certain activities are strategically much more significant than others, one would expect more efforts at control over, say, an assembly line operation than a group of janitors. For these reasons, the framework is presented as a set of working hypotheses aiming at a partial explanation of the derivation of job designs.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The second half of this paper considers the implications of this theoretical perspective, especially for those with a practical interest in the design of jobs. To this end, five specific questions are posed:

(1) What job design options exist? (2) Which options are usually chosen? and why?

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Figure 1. A framework of the derivation of job designs

(3) Which choices are most effective? and when? (4) Why is it difficult to achieve new designs? and ( 5 ) What specific issues now require Research and Development?

(1) What job design options exist?

The framework stipulates that organizations have choices to make over the technology and the structure they adopt to meet their goals. These choices influence (but do not determine) subsequent choices regarding appropriate patterns of managerial control. It is these successive decisions which delimit the

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jobs that people do. There are two principal components to a job design, namely a task and a role. For example, in the case of a machine operator the task is technologically determined and comprises a number of movements and actions requiring varying degrees of skill. The Requisite Task Attributes scale of Turner and Lawrence (1 965) was designed primarily to enable an independent assessment of this aspect of a job. The second component is made up of the decision-making role that surrounds the task. ‘ f ie machine operator, for example, may be able to fetch materials, set the machine speed, undertake routine maintenance and monitor aspects of quality control. Alternatively, storemen, supervisors, maintenance engineers and quality inspectors may make these decisions.

At this stage five points are worth making. In the first place, tasks and roles can be designed independently. Thus all combinations of simple and complex tasks and roles are feasible. These alternatives are represented schematically in Figure 2 and examples given of jobs in each cell. These are taken from blue collar work in an engineering factory making diesel engines.

Thus the assembly line operators have simplified tasks and a highly circumscribed role involving little decision-making. The storemen also have straightforward tasks taking materials into and out of stock, but they do have some ancillary decisions to make. For example, they set their own pace of work, determine the order in which to do things and decide on some of their own priorities. The engine testers are quite different: they test finished engines, a task requiring a range of complex engineering skills. Their roles, however, are quite simple insofar as they are required to sequence their operations in a fixed order and test different engines according to a predetermined schedule. Finally, the maintenance engineers have difficult tasks and complex roles incorporating a number of operational decisions.

The second point is that much of the job design literature fails to recognize this distinction between ‘tasks’ and ‘roles’, using the terms ‘task’ and ‘job‘ interchangeably (for example, see Roberts and Glick, 1981). Furthermore, the most widely used measures of perceived job complexity (see Hackman and Oldham, 1975; Sims, Szilagyi and Keller, 1976; and Warr, Cook and Wall, 1979) make no such distinction and respondents are given no guide as to whether the scales ask for descriptions of their tasks, their role, or some unspecified amalgam of

Simple

Complex

Role

Simple Complex

e.g. Assembly line operator

e.g. Engine tester

e.g. Storeman e.g. Maintenance engineer

Task

Simple

Complex

Simple Complex

e.g. Assembly line operator

e.g. Engine tester

e.g. Storeman e.g. Maintenance engineer

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both. Such global measures may be satisfactory if comparing heterogeneous groups of people in organizations: indeed the most widely used scale by Hackman and Oldham was validated on such samples. But if making comparisons within groups of employees, it is difficult to know what meaning to place on such scores. In the jobs cited earlier, for example, one would expect maintenance engineers to report more autonomy and variety than do the assembly line operators. But what predictions would one make comparing engine testers and storemen? The argument here then is for more discriminating measures to match this amended conceptualization.

The third point is that this distinction is of real practical significance since there may well be enormous scope for redesigning roles without necessarily changing the technological arrangements. In the short and medium term there are opportunities for redesigning jobs by opting for alternative patterns of local control-usually by changing supervisory and managerial practices in order to devolve decision-making to individuals or groups. Recognition of this possibility leads to the fourth point: most of the longitudinal job redesign studies reported in the literature (see, for example, Wall and Clegg, 1981; Orpen, 1979; Lawler, Hackman and Kaufman, 1973) in practice involve role redesign where decision-making responsibilities are changed around a relatively unaltered task.

The final point is that this writer knows of no recent well-documented job redesign experiment in which both tasks and roles are fundamentally altered. In most cases the technology is taken as given, perhaps with peripheral rearrangement, and improvements attempted in realizing better roles to fit the situation. The notion that there are researchers undertaking ‘socio-technical’ redesigns in which the social system and the technical system are both altered to achieve ‘Joint-optimization’ is in practice, a myth.

The conclusion then is that job designers have independent choices as to how simple or complex to make the tasks that people do and the roles they undertake. In the short to medium term it is probably most realistic to think in terms of redesigning roles: in the longer term both variables are manipulable.

(2) Which options are usually chosen? and why?

The argument here is that job designers typically choose the most simple technological and structural srrangements which afford management the most control. This is not to claim that these options are inevitable, nor that they are necessarily the most effective (see next section).

There are several inter-related reasons which account for this general preference for work simplification. In the first place the overwhelming historical trend traceable through the work of Adam Smith (1 776), Charles Babbage (1 8 3 9 , and Frederick Taylor (1 9 1 1) has been towards technological simplification and routinization. Furthermore this is still evident amongst current generations of designers. As described earlier, Davis, Canter and Hoffman (1955), and Taylor (1979) found that industrial engineers use a set of principles and criteria which lead to simplified jobs. Whilst some of the reasons underpinning this trend are considered below, the point is that these requirements are widely accepted and the process, in engineering terms, is well understood. Thus the use of assembly lines whether to manufacture cars or confectionery, is a logical historical choice from an

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engineering perspective. As such long-term custom and practice and its corollary, the development of particular forms of engineering expertise, have guided and perpetuated this process of job simplification.

One reason that this trend is so pervasive lies in its support by certain widely-held values. As specified in the framework, there are economic and psychological grounds for believing that job simplification represents an effective strategy. In the former case such designs are relatively inexpensive since employees require little training, acquire few skills, are paid at a relatively low rate, are easy to replace if absent or leaving and become highly skilled at specific tasks. Such designs are also psychologically appropriate to those who believe that most people neither want nor respond to increased responsibility, preferring instead to be closely supervised and controlled. Insofar as economic and psychological views of this kind may be widely held (by key decision-makers in organizations as well as by the job incumbents), clearly they represent strong pressures for, and expectations of, the design of relatively simple, closely supervised jobs.

One other factor is also important. Managers are not simply motivated by overall notions of productivity and profitability. In certain circumstances they are motivated by desires to make their operation predictable and to maintain direct control of events. Employing substitutable people in technologically simple jobs which are highly constrained and directly supervised goes a considerable way towards meeting these needs.

Thus when one considers historical practice and the development of expertise amongst industrial engineers, some widely-held economic and psychological views on how organizations and the people in them work, and the desires of managers to make their operations predictable and maintain control of events, one can see the overwhelming pressure towards work simplification.

The final point to make here is that this process is continuing. A number of writers have described how simplification occurs as new jobs are created and develop around new technologies. Thus Kraft (1977) demonstrated in the computing field how the less skilled component of the work (such as data preparation) has been removed from programmers and specialist positions created to work exclusively on this task. Similarly, Crompton and Reid (1982) describe how computerization in a clerical office was at ‘the cost of much that had been interesting and valued in the work: personal knowledge of payees; control over the pace of the labour process; knowledge of the whole work process; and the variation of work which accompanied this’ (1982, p. 171). And finally, Buchanan and Boddy (1982) report that the introduction of word processors in a company led both to a reduction of job complexity (in terms of variety, meaning and contribution) and to the institution of a specialized ‘typing pool’. Thus the argument here is that the ways in which organizations appear to have adopted and adapted to computers and new office technology represents the most recent example of an overwhelming and apparently inexorable trend towards work simpification. The next section considers whether such choices are effective.

(3) Which choices are most effective? and when?

The framework encourages one to make some predictions about the circumstances under which particular forms of job design are effective, but first an important

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distinction must be made. This lies between the functional and the motivational aspects of a job design. The former is concerned with whether or not a particular design is effective from an information-processingjdecision-making perspective whilst the latter focuses on how motivating people find the job arrangements.

Thus, from a purely functional perspective, the framework allows hvo predictions. The first applies when techno-structural arrangements exist which create conditions of high uncertainty, and which thereby are accompanied by the need for high levels of information processing. The first prediction is that in these circumstances, a managerial strategy allowing high levels of self-control is optimum. For example, when a production process is unpredictable (because of the materials, the processing, the labour or work interdependencies), devolving decision-making to the operators (or groups of operators) is recommended since a supervisor alone will be unable to process all the necessary information and make appropriate decisions. This is equivalent to the idea prevalent amongst socio-technical writers (see, for example, Fitter, 1982; Cherns, 1976; Taylor, 1978; Trist, 1978) that ‘variances’ should be handled at source by those having the necessary information and skills. At the other extreme, when uncertainties arising from and within the techno-structure are low, the second prediction is that either close control or self-control will be equally effective choices since individuals, groups or supervisors, could, in principle, process the necessary information and take appropriate action.

A third prediction derives from the adoption of a motivational perspective. If it is true that complexity is intrinsically motivating, then designers should always try to reverse the process of work simplification by making jobs more complex. Providing the people concerned have the necessary skills (training) and support, the result will be increased motivation, attended by improved performance.

Clearly, the functional and motivational aspects of a job design are liable to be inter-related both conceptually and empirically. If this is the case, is the distinction useful? The answer is ‘Yes’, since we do not know in detail what happens functionally and motivationally when jobs are redesigned. An example from the author’s own experience illustrates the point. In this instance a longitudinal field study (see Wall and Clegg, 1981) led to the introduction of semi-autonomous group working and to predicted increases in job complexity. These were followed by significant increases both in productivity and self-reported motivation. However, the new (more complex) job designs could have become more effective for a number of reasons. Thus it could be that: (a) the group members were intrinsically motivated to perform better by more complex jobs; (b) the group members worked harder to earn certain extrinsic rewards, such as more free time and freedom from supervisory pressure; (c) the group members in fact worked less hard but were more productive because they cut out all wasted effort and counter-productive work by coordinating and managing themselves well; and, (d) the group members performed better because they actually enjoyed working together solving problems.

Looking at this mix of motivational and functional explanations makes it clear to this writer that any or all of them may have been true since there is some confirmatory data in each instance. More generally we do not know which explanation (if any) is potentially the most powerful since there has been no detailed empirical work which has been designed to consider these as either alternative or complementary possibilities. Before this framework (or any other)

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can make general predictions linking job designs and motivation these issues require detailed analytic consideration. This issue is considered later: in the meantime the major prediction that derives from this framework and in which one can have some confidence is that, complex job designs, for functional reasons, will be especially effective under techno-structural conditions which produce uncertainty.

(4) Why is it difficult to achieve new designs?

Many people have described difficulties when attempting to reverse the processes of work simplification and make jobs more complex (see, for example, Clegg, 1979). To a large extent the reasons for this have already been described (see question 2 earlier). Thus work simplification is seen as the appropriate strategy since: engineers have considerable expertise in this area; such a process meets the major criteria specified by the designers; to many people it makes economic sense and is based upon principles which are psychologically sound; and, such arrangements are desirable in that they promote managerial control.

Put more bluntly new designs which attempt to increase complexity can be seen as historically, economically, psychologically and managerially risky. But there are two further reasons why changing to more complex designs can be difficult. The first is relatively straightforward and concerns the cost, particularly of technological change. For example, Klein (1982) describes how she acted as a social science consultant to an organization building a brand new factory based upon socio- technical principles. At one stage the design team discussed the layout of the packing belts which were manufactured such that the packers were unable to face one another whilst working. She suggested that the packing belts be altered such that pairs of packers could face one another. After lengthy discussions the suppliers of the packing belts reported that, for a variety of reasons, such changes were impossible in the short-term and would be exceptionally expensive if attempted in the medium term. In this case a relatively modest change in layout proved prohibitively expensive even in a factory specifically designed to promote social working conditions and complex jobs.

The second inhibitory factor focuses on changes in decision-making roles and recognizes the political, power-based nature of organizational life. Thus, Pfeffer (1 978) highlights the point that the design of organizational decision-making structures (and roles) both influences and is influenced by the power relation- ships in the organization. For example, devolving significant amounts of local decision-making to an autonomous work group may require fundamental changes in vertical relationships most obviously concerning the role of supervisors (see, for example, Lawler, Hackman and Kaufman, 1973; Cummings, 1978). Just as significant, and often relatively unrecognized, are the necessary changes that may result in lateral relationships. Clegg (1982) illustrates the significance of this point in his description of the institution of semi-autonomous work groups which were created and made responsible for meeting agreed production targets. These groups exerted considerable pressure on the maintenance engineers whom they now perceived as a service function which should be responsive to the needs of the production groups. Hitherto the engineers had acted relatively autonomously, having the freedom to set their own priorities. To the engineers this change in

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emphasis represented a reduction both in their freedom of action and in their relative status in the factory. These changes were resented and opposed by the skilled engineers. The second factor then which inhibits changes of this kind is that the perceived costs (as well as benefits) will be unevenly distributed up, down and across the organization. On rational grounds they will therefore be resisted by those of the interested parties whose objectives are not met or furthered by the new system of working.

To summarize briefly, more complex job designs may be exceptionally difficult to implement for a mixture of historical, economic, psychological, managerial and political reasons. Little wonder perhaps that relatively few major initiatives of this kind have been attempted and survived.

(5) What specific issues now require Research and Development?

Whilst each aspect of the framework described in this paper requires empirical evaluation, this section identifies two specific topics which the author believes are important.

The first concerns the need to fill gaps in our understanding of what actually happens with different sorts of job designs. In particular there is a need to study what decisions are made, who makes them, what information is received and used, how it is processed, and how gaps in information are accommodated. The argument then is for a cognitive appreciation of both ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ job designs which will enable assessment of the functional claim that uncertainties are best handled at source. In the case of job designs based on group working methods, the issue is further complicated since there is little information available on how such groups allocate and make decisions, coordinate plans and actions, and generally manage themselves. Whilst social psychologists do have information on group behaviour, to date this has not been applied in such a way as to promote an understanding of what takes place within working groups of this kind.

At present our knowledge on these issues is severely limited, particularly with respect to new forms of job design since the few rigorously conducted longitudinal field studies have typically confined themselves to rather global (and some would argue, arid) statistical elaborations focused upon variables such as autonomy, motivation and satisfaction. The argument here is that a more microscopic cognitive and social psychological understanding of the derivation and impact of job designs could be pursued by the adoption of an information processing perspective. In this view whether or not complex jobs are intrinsically motivating ceases to be the dominant psychological issue and becomes one of a number of plausible rival hypotheses requiring explicit empirical evaluation. This author believes that this area has been dominated for too long by an emphasis on the motivational properties of jobs and individual differences in people’s reactions to them. A shift towards the view that job designs primarily involve cognitive and social psychological processes would perhaps be more productive.

The second identifiable area for study concerns the introduction of new technology. For example, the widespread introduction of word processors in offices is an instance of task redesign through technological innovation. The critical point, however, is that this new technology is relatively cheap and flexible. Thus it will present genuine opportunities for considering alternative configurations of

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technological and social arrangements in the manner prescribed by socio-technical writers. The argument earlier was that, to date, ‘ joint-optimization’ has been evident only in the rhetoric of job design and not in the practice. If the new technology is as cheap and flexible as its proponents claim then perhaps it will become a variable for manipulation. In this light, new technology represents a qualitatively new research and development opportunity which should not be missed. As well as being of such theoretical interest, this writer also believes that the designers of these new systems are the ‘job designers of the future’ directly equivalent in their role to the industrial engineers designing technology for blue collar workers. It is important that the new designers are aware they are not simply introducing new bits of machinery: rather they are designing work systems which will have an impact on the tasks people do, the decisions they make, their patterns of local control and the structural arrangements within which they work. Hopefully this framework provides a preliminary way of understanding and analysing these processes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author wishes to thank colleagues at SAPU, and in particular Toby Wall and Nigel Kemp, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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Babbage, C. (1835). On the Economy of Machinery and Manufacturers, Charles Knight, London.

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