ToGuillaume,forwhombooksarewritten.

Contents

Introduction

CHAPTER1TheWayoftheWind

CHAPTER2HowtheGridGotItsWires

CHAPTER3TheConsolidationofPower

CHAPTER4TheCardiganPath

CHAPTER5ThingsFallApart

CHAPTER6TwoBirds,OneStone

CHAPTER7

ATaleofTwoStorms

CHAPTER8InSearchoftheHolyGrail

CHAPTER9AmericanZeitgeist

Afterword:ContemplatingDeathintheAfternoonAcknowledgments

NotesIndex

ANoteontheAuthor

Anysufficientlyadvancedtechnologyisindistinguishablefrommagic.

—ARTHURC.CLARKE

Rightnowthere’sthreepowercompaniesinNewYorkCity:thereisConEdinManhattan,thereistheBrooklynpowercompanyBrooklynUnionGasupinBrooklyn,andthereisawindmillhereon519East

EleventhStreet.—INTERVIEWFROMTHE1978FILMVIVALOISAIDA

Introduction

Energy is a hot-button issue these days. From the marble halls of state toLouisiana’sonce-batteredandbesmearedcoastline,weasanationkeephearingabouttheneedtomakethetransitiontogreen,clean,sustainableenergy.Doingso,wearetold,willhelpputourjoblessbacktowork,contributetoAmerica’striumphantreemergenceontheworldstage,andquitepossiblysavetheplanet.At the very least, it will spare us from the oil spills, rig explosions, frackingquakes, and mining disasters that come without warning and destroy withoutcompunction.So,too,wehopethatmoresustainableformsofpowermighthelpguaranteeusa futurewith fewer superstormsand snowpocalypses, rising tidesandshrinking icecaps.The stakes forchanginghowwemakeanduseenergyhaveneverbeenhigher.Transitioningtosustainabilityisthebig,long-termchallenge.Butleftoutof

thispictureisthefactthatforthemostpart,Americadoesnotrunongas,oil,orcoalanymorethanwemayonedayrunonwind,solar,ortidalpower.Americaruns on electricity. The age of information has remade the ways wecommunicate, socialize, and even learn things into electricity-dependentprocesses.Andthoughwetendtothinkofthisshiftintermsofcomputerization,thecomputer isonly the tool.Electricity iswhatmakes itwork.Ascomputersbecomeevermore essential tohowwe live, travel, andcare forourselves, so,too, have electric appliances brought us bright, functional homes andworkplaces.Ourhealthandourhospitalsare intenselydependentuponelectricpower,asareourfactories,ports,police,andmilitary.Evenmoneythesedaysiselectricallymadeandstoreddatathatwesometimesconvertintopiecesofpaperand the jingle of coins. Some of us even smoke electric cigarettes, and it’slooking likely that soon we’ll be shuttling about in self-driving electric cars.Electricityhasbecomesoessential thatusingtheword“blackout”torefer toapower outage is something of a misnomer. Losing light is the least of ourproblemswhenourelectricity systemnowcrashes toground,which it’sdoingwithincreasingfrequency.Our energy sources might be the main cause of our worry—coal with its

carbon emissions, natural gas with its methane emissions and questionable

extractionmethods,nuclearwithitspoisonedwaste,andevenoilwithitscostinwartimeblood—buttheyarenotallthatmatterstothestoryofAmericanpower.Therestofthetalebeginsattheprecisemomentthesefuelsgoupinflames.Wedon’t use them raw. And while lots of oil still goes into cars, almost all theothersareusedtopowerthegrid—acomplexandexpansiveelectricaldeliverysystemthatwecarelittleforandthinkevenlessabout.Though it is situated squarely at the center of our modern lives, for most

Americansthegridrarelybreachesconsciousness.AcoupleofyearsagoIwasshown a snapshot a friend had taken of a sunset, its dusky pinks and eveninggrays bisected straight through by power lines; it even had a couple of utilitypolessmack-dabinthemiddleoftheframe.“Look,”shesaid,“whatabeautifulsunset.” The gridwas right there and it didn’t even disturb the view. It’s theworld’s largest machine and the twentieth century’s greatest engineeringachievementandweareremarkablyoblivioustoit.Expertsatunseeingitswiresand poles, we are equally unlikely to be able to differentiate a power stationfromanoilrefinery.Substations,essentialtoourgrid,flitperhapsattheedgesofrecognition,thoughmosthavebeenwellhiddenbehindcementwallsorstuckinout-of-the-way corners of our cities and towns. Transformers, once a world-altering technology, have also been rendered utterly unspectacular, secretedinsidegraycanistersthatclusterlikecoconutsatthetopsofurbanutilitypoles.Evenoursmartphones,whichalsoformapartofthegrid,albeitonethatcanbedisaggregated and carried around in a pocket, don’t seem properlyinfrastructural.Yetopenoneupandwhatyouwillseeis,ineffect,somecircuitboards carefullywrappedaround themassof abattery. Its power source is itsheart,andthisisonlyfedbyaconstantreturntothegrid.Assuch,thegridwouldseemtobestFrankensteinintheheterogeneityofits

parts,tooutdotheEisenhowerInterstateSysteminitsgeographicscope,andtodwarf space exploration in the complexity of its science. It also reveals abizarrely accurate picture of this nation in the particularities of its historicalunfolding.Thegridisnotjustsomethingwebuilt,butsomethingthatgrewwithAmerica,changedasourvalueschanged,andgaineditsformaswedevelopedasanation.Itisamachine,aninfrastructure,aculturalartifact,asetofbusinesspractices,andanecology.Itstendrilstouchusall.Literallyspeaking,ourgrid iscomprisedof thebattery, itsport, thecharger,

itsplug,theoutletanditswall-hiddenwiresouttothestreet,thetransformerandthe familiar forest of urban utility poles, the low-voltagewires that run alongthese poles out to the substation, more transformers (bigger here), some

syncrophasers,relays,switches,andfusesandthegiantpylonsthatmarchawayacross the empty parts of America carrying high-voltage wires to the powerplant,whereitallbeginsinanelectromagneticgeneratorspunfastbyasteam-heated,orwind-blown,orwater-wheeled,orgas-combustedturbine.Ourgridisapeculiarlypervasive infrastructure that touchesevery life,pierceseverywall,bifurcateseverylandscape,andrunseverybattery.Andthoughwecallitthegrid,inAmericaweactuallyhavethreeofthem:one

fortheWestthatincludesatinybitofMexicoandmuchofwesternCanada;onefor all of the East; and a separate, smaller one for Texas. For the most partMexico has its own grid, butCanada does not (except for its errant province,Quebec,which,likeTexas,haschosentokeepitsoptionsforsecessionopenbymanagingitsinfrastructureforitself).Lookingatitssleeklinesandhightowers,onemightmistakethegridforan

electrical transportation superhighway.But to those intimately acquaintedwithit,anotherimagespringstomind—thatofanold,beat-up,pothole-riddled,one-lane dirt road. The grid is worn down, it’s patched up, and every hoped-forimprovementisexpensiveandbureaucraticallybemired.More than 70 percent of the grid’s transmission lines and transformers are

twenty-fiveyearsold;addnineyearstothatandyouhavetheaverageageofanAmericanpowerplant.AccordingtotheindustryexpertPeterAsmus,werelyontwice as many power plants as we actually need because of “the massiveinefficienciesbuilt into thissystem.”Asaresult,significantpoweroutagesareclimbingyearbyyear,from15in2001to78in2007to307in2011.Americahasthehighestnumberofoutageminutesofanydevelopednation—cominginataboutsixhoursperyear,notincludingblackoutscausedbyextremeweatheror other “acts of God,” of which there were 679 between 2003 and 2012.Compare this with Korea at 16 outage minutes a year, Italy at 51 minutes,Germanyat15,andJapanat11.Notonlydowehavemoreoutagesthanmostother industrial countries,butours aregetting longer.TheaverageU.S.poweroutageis120minutesandgrowing,whileintherestoftheindustrializedworldit’s lessthantenminutesandshrinking.AccordingtoMassoudAmin,apowersystemsengineer,on“anygivendayintheU.S.abouthalfamillionpeoplearewithoutpowerfortwoormorehours.”Foreveryminuteofeveryoneoftheseblackouts,moneyislostandnational

securityisatrisk.Oureconomyliterallydroopswhenthevoltageonourwiressags (brownouts),and it seriouslystutterswhen thepowerbreaks for real.Bigoutages are themost dramatic in this regard, but they are not necessarily the

mostexpensive.The2003EastCoastblackout,causedbyanovergrowntreeandacomputerbug,blackedouteightstatesand50millionpeoplefortwodays.SothoroughandvastwasthiscascadingblackoutthatitshowsasavisiblediponAmerica’sGDPforthatyear.Sixbilliondollarslost:that’s$60,000perhourperblacked-outbusinessoflostrevenuesacross93,000squaremiles.As impressiveas thiswas,outagesof fiveminutesor lessareactuallymore

costlytotheefficientrunningofournationaleconomy,inpartbecausetheyaresomuchmoreprevalent.Foralotofmachines,anoutageoffifteensecondsandone of fifteen minutes or fifteen hours produces precisely the same kind ofdamageand takes roughly the same time toput rightagain.After thebigEastCoastblackoutof1965,causedbyanincorrectlysetrelay,wecouldn’tevengetourpowerplantstocomebackonline.Itturnsoutyouneedelectricitytomakeelectricity, and so diesel generators had to bewheeled in and used to “black-start”ourcoal-burningplantsandnuclearpowerstations.AnotherbiggieforNewYorkCitycamein1977,causedbyalightningstrike

atasubstationuptheHudsonRiver.AsthisonetorethelidoffPandora’sbox,itreleasedanotherkindoftrouble.Thelootingwastremendous.Theblackoutgavetheangerlongbrewingonthatcity’sstreetsanoutlet.NewYorkrangwiththesoundofsmashedglassandstankofsootandsmokeasscoresoftenementswereburnedtotheground.Therearemanywaysthatdarknesscanbedestructivetothe well-being of a community. It can bring cold and hunger, as did the icestorms that blacked out the Ozarks in 1987. Equally, it can play host to hottempersandopportunisticpredators.Ona lighter, ifno lesseconomicallydevastating,note in1987,andagain in

1994, the NASDAQ lost power because of squirrels gnawing on the electriclinesthatconnectthatstockexchangetotheworld.Noteveryblackoutiscausedby aworld-class storm.Many aremade bywildlife, squirrelsmost especially,and even more originate with trees—so many that overgrown foliage is thenumberonecauseofpoweroutagesinAmericainthetwenty-firstcentury.Ifthegrid’sonlyproblemswerethatitisold,worndown,andvulnerableto

attacks by maleficent forces as diverse as kudzu and commandos (people dooccasionallygoafterthegridwithshotguns),wemightjustshoreitupabit,payitslightlymoremind,andcontinueonourway.Justkeepingthetreestrimmed,thestormdamagetoaminimum,thesupplychainsinmotion,andthesquirrelsaway from thewires is plentyofwork.Add inworries about terrorist hackersthat have come with modes of grid modernization that use computing to“smarten” our electrical delivery system, and clearly we have an epochal

infrastructuralupgradeonourhands.Thereis,however,anotherissuepressingitswayintothesystemthatbringsa

new urgency to the inevitable task of reforming our grid. It turns out thattransitioning America away from a reliance on fossil fuels and toward moresustainableenergysolutionswillbepossibleonlywitha serious reimaginationof our grid. Themorewe invest in “green” energy, themore fragile our gridbecomes.Acoal-burningplantmightbebadfortheenvironment,itmightbebadforthe

miners who struggle underground to bring that coal up and bad for theWestVirginiamountainsrazedinitsproduction,butit’saremarkablygoodfitforthegrid.Andnot just coal.Thegrid is at itsbestwhenwemakeelectricityusingwhat are called “stock resources.”These are fuels thatwhenweuse them,weuse themup—plutonium,naturalgas,oil, coal,andanythingelsedugup fromthegroundorgrownupontheearththatweburnandthenhavenomore.Thesesteadyfiresarewhatourtwentieth-centurygridwasbuiltfor.Duringthatperiod,the business of making and delivering power was a remarkably centralizedactivity, run by “natural” monopolies (the utilities) that built infrastructureaccording to a top-down system of command and control. Renewables,especially the twomostpopular,solarandwind,havebeencreeping theirwayintoournationalenergymixsince the1970s.Theseareanythingbutobedient.Theutilitiescancommandthem,buttheydonotlisten.Theutilitiescanattempttocontrol them,but theirefforts falter in the faceofmeteorologicalprocesses,planetaryinscale.At issueare thevagariesofnature.Thewindcanneverblowwith thesame

steadiness that factory-combustedcoalprovides,and thesun’srays,whileeverpresent,arealltoooftenblockedfromreachingthepanelswe’vebuilttogatherthem by clouds. Eachmoment of shade, nomatter its length, is translated bysolarpanelsintoadipintheelectricitytheyproduce.Everyshiftinthewind’sspeedbecomesanunevenriseandfallofavailableelectricalcurrent.This is further complicated by the fact that our machines, which strictly

speakingarewhatthegridwasbuilttopower,weredesignedtorunonawell-regulated, predictable electrical flow. For over a century this steadiness andpredictabilitywasmadeat thepowerplant.Sustainableenergysourcesprovidesomething else: an inconsistent, variable power that our grid is unprepared toadapt to. Nevertheless, it is increasingly clear that these alternatives to fossilfuelsarewhereourenergyfuturelies.Ifgreeningthegridwereonlyamatteroftransitioningtovariablegeneration,

Isuspectthatthegrumblingandfootdraggingmightbeassuagedbysomewell-thought-outpolicydecisionsandlotsofseedmoneythrownatthedevelopmentofsomenewandbettermeansforstoringelectricity(seechapter8).However,itis problematic not only how renewablesmake power butwhere theymake it.Windfarmsgoupwhereitiswindy.AndplaceslikeWyomingorIowaorWestTexas have a lot of strongwind on constant offer.What they don’t have aremanypeopletousethispowerorverygoodlong-distancepowerlinestocarryittomorepromisingmarkets.Thegridwasneverbuilttoberobustinthemidstofwastelands.But theseempty,oftenuninhabitableplacestendtobewherewindandsolarpoweraremosteffectivelyproduced.No less problematic for the grid is the phenomenal recent growth in home

solar systems, which as of this writing are being slapped up pretty mucheverywhereit’ssunny(andeveninsomeplacesit’snot).Theseare,inessence,tinyrenewable-powerplants.Weallusetheelectricitymadebypanelownersinaggregate, in exactly the samewaywe use power generated by a natural gascombustion turbineor ahydroelectric dam.Whenwepayour electricbill,weare also nowpaying the producers of this homemade electricity for the powertheycontributetothewhole.Intheorythisisallwellandgood,exceptthatinAmericawehavelongmade

electricityinhugequantitiesinbig,centralizedpowerplants.Ourgridwasbuiltwiththesefactoriesatitsheart.Everythingaboutthewayit isstructured,fromthemerestwiretothebiggestsubstation,wasdesignedfortheeffectivetransitofpower from a few massive producers to a wide scatter of users. All of useverywhere use electricity, but we never used to make it. Home solarinstallations turn this logiconitsheadwithoutdoingmuchtohelpreconfigurethe grid, which in certain pockets of our nation now has to take power fromeverywhereanddistributeittoeverywhereelse.Toapplyanothersharptackofmisanthropytotheebullientballoonofgreen-

energyoptimism,transformingourgridforthetwenty-firstcenturydoesnotjustmean integrating newer technologies with the old. The grid isn’t just somecontraptionwiredtogetheroutofvariousbitsofthiscenturyandbitsofthelast(plus a substantial shake of nineteenth-centuryways of doing and building aswell). It’s also amassive cultural system. And the stakeholders—the utilities,investment firms, power plant owners, mining firms, and “too-big-to-fail”multinational conglomerates—will not go gently into the future’s bright night.Anabundanceofcarbon-freeenergyisaniceidea,butfossilfuelcompaniesarestill responsible for the vastmajority (66.5 percent) of the power on our grid.

Coal may be on the way out; the Energy Information Administration (EIA)predicts that roughlyafifthof totalcoalcapacitywillberetiredbetween2012and 2020, and even the chief executive of theAmericanCoalCouncil admitsthattheindustryhasabandonedanyplanstoreplacetheretiringfleet.Therecentboominnaturalgas,however,seemstolegitimatethatindustry’s

claimthatitistheperfecttransitionfuel.Forthemoment,it’salmostascheapascoal;wehavealotofit,ripefordomesticexploitation;anditismoreefficientforproducingelectricitybecausepowerplants that runonnaturalgasarespunfirst by the raw force of combustion and then run on steam, giving twice thebangforthesamebuck.Atfirstglance,naturalgasisalsocleanerthancoal.Thisis certainly true if one is thinking in terms of particulates and not greenhousegasesorwastewaterpollution.Methaneemissionsfromnaturalgasdevelopmentand leaky transport infrastructure, however, undercut some of the climateadvantagegashasovercoal.One2012studyestimatedthatiftheindustryweretoletleakonly3.2percentofthegasproduced,itcouldbeworsefortheclimatethan coal. In most places, leakages are not that bad. In some places they areworse.Evennuclearpower,whichisproblematiconmanylevels,hasgainedanew

sparkleas“green”hascometomeancarbon-freeratherthanpollution-free.Theycanstillmeltdown,andtheproblemofstoringtheradioactivewastetheseplantsproducehasneverbeenadequatelysolved.It’shardtofigureouthowChina,forexample,cantransitionawayfromarelianceoncoalwithoutasignificantuptickin nuclear power development. The cost of these plantsmeans that anywherewith a market economy has almost entirely stopped building them, but thetechnologyisbeingimproved.Thereareanumberofongoingefforts,globally,toscalenucleartechnologywaydown,makingitportableandmass-producible.Ifsuccessfulwemaybesurprisedtofindnuclearbloomingbackuponoursoilonefutureday.Existingwaysofmakingpowerforourgridinvolvemuchmorethantheraw

fuelswechoosebetween.Theyarealsomassivenetworksofbusinessinterests,geo-political stakeholders, and carefully wrought legal structures. These tookdecades, and in some cases centuries, to build, and each has a specific inertiathat will need to be shifted, or in some cases overcome, in the process ofremakingthewaysandmeansofAmericanpower.Thegrid, then, is built asmuch from lawas from steel, it runs asmuchon

investment strategies as on coal, it produces profits asmuch as free electrons.Evenfair-mindedpoliticiansmakepoordecisionsastheynavigatethelabyrinths

of legislative change. For-profit power companies, deeply subsidized oil andnaturalgasinterests,theminingindustry,andeventherailroadsallhavevestedinterests in keeping America dependent upon fossil fuels. These are big,unwieldycorporatemachines.Theydochangewithtime,butitisaglacialkindofchangecharacterizedbyrecalcitranceandtorpor.Norshouldwebesurprisedthat these behemoths of old power are unwilling to embrace a transformationthatwillquitelikelyputthemoutofbusiness.Inthistheyarenodifferentfromanycompany—thoughit iseasytovalorizesmallermoreinnovativeendeavors—none of them commit suicide on purpose. Maneuvering to capture marketshareisabigpartofwhatisdrivingtheenergytransition,anditisinaconstantstateofvacillation.Onestepforward,twostepsback,welurchratherthancruiseintothefuture.Thechangestoourgridwillnothappenovernight,buttheyarealreadyfarenoughalongtoberightlyconsideredirreversible.

As the first decade of the twenty-first century crested, making power fromrenewablesourcesshiftedfromaniceideaandaminorplayerontheelectricitysceneintothemainstream.Thespeedandthescaleofthisshifthavebeentrulyextraordinary—amomentum that isonly likely to increase. It is estimated thatby2050“nearlyeverysinglepowerplantintheU.S.willneedtobereplacedbynewplants.”If,then,in2015wehadthreetimesasmuchwindpowerasin2008and twenty times asmuch solar, these looming plant retirements only furtheropen thedoor to renewable technologies,bigandsmall. InHawaii, atpresent,over12percentofthehousesareequippedwithsolarpanels—somanythatoncertain sunnydays thesehomesolar systemsproducemoreelectricity than thestate needs.In the summer of 2015, Hawaii’s utility began refusing furtherconnections by home solar owners to the grid. Not because they are mean-spirited,butbecause theycan’tuse itall,andexcesspoweron thegridcausesbitsofittoshutdownself-protectively—ameasurethatsparestheinfrastructurebutblacksout itsusers.Thesamewashappening inVermont,which issayingsomething, because Hawaii might have a lovely climate for solar power, butVermontisbothnorthernandgray.Nevertheless,itstwolargestutilitieshad,formuchof2015,alsocalledforahiatusonnewgridconnectionsforhomesolarsystemsasthesewerecausingthebillsoftheircustomerswithouthomesolartorise precipitously.Until something infrastructural, in some cases, and fiscal inothersmustbedonetodealwithallthehomemadeelectricitybeingpumpedinto

thegridduringdaytimehoursonsunnydays,bothstateswillbestickingwithabaseline of fossil fuels despite the fact that both would openly and honestlypreferagreenerroute.Thisrevealsanothercuriousthingaboutourgrid:thoughitmaybebig, it is

also intensely local. For example, right now, variable generation is producingonlyatinyportionoftheelectricityusedinthiscountry,about7percentoverall.But in some places this number is much higher. In Texas, wind power aloneaccountsfor9percentofelectricityproduction,inOregonit’salmost13percent,andinIowait’sastunning30percent.ThereissomuchwindinsomeplacesintheUnitedStatesrightnowthatonparticularlyblusterydays,thelocalbalancingauthority—charged with making sure the amount of electricity going into thegridandtheamountbeingdrawnfromitareexactlythesame—hastopaysomeof the wind farms to shut down their turbines and also pay large industrialconcerns to take and use more power than they actually need. In Texas, oneblustery September day in 2015, the price per megawatt-hour of electricitydropped to negative 64¢. The utilitieswere actually paying their customers tousepower.Everythinghasgoneabittopsy-turvy.By2025theDepartmentofEnergywants25percentofAmerica’selectricity

to come from renewables. It sounds like a pipedream,until you consider thatbetween 2009 and 2014 the amount of renewable power traveling the lines ofour grid has more than doubled. And this federal goal is actually ratherlightweight when compared to certain state efforts. Maine is aiming for 40percent by2017,California for 50percent by2030—and thesenumbersdon’tevenincludetheelectricitymadefromrooftopsolarsystems.Vermont,everthetiny optimist, has a goal of 75 percent by 2032. Hawaii is aiming for 100percent.Thesearenot impossibleobjectives,but theywill requireus toutterlyreimagineourgrid.At issue is that when these goals are set, the grid rarely enters the larger

conversation.Attimesitisalmostasifitdoesn’texist.Weall—youandI,ourstateandfederallegislators,ourbusinessleadersandupstartentrepreneurs,eventhe world climate change experts—we just dream our dreams, run our coffeemachines, takeoursnapshotsoffinesunsets,andsetourexaggeratedgoalsforthefuturewithouteverseeingthatbetweenusandeverythingweenvisionstandsthis technological monument to recalcitrance. The grid is there. It’s time welearnedtonoticeitsothatwe,handinhandwithitsmomentouscomplexity,canstep forward into a brighter day, a brighter night, and a cooler, less storm-muddledplanetaryfuture.

Thoughwetendthinkaboutthegridinwaysborrowedfromthephysicsofwaterpipesthathold,transport,anddeliverdrinkingwaterorthoseofnaturalgasfuellinesthatbringmethanetostovetopsandhotwaterheaters,thisisnotintheleasthowelectricityworks.Thelinesarenothollowwithelectricityinsidethem,theyaresolidthroughandthrough.Nordoeselectricityflow,trickle,ordrip.Itisnotaliquidoragassubjecttothelawsoffluiddynamics;it’saforce.Wemakeit—which isalreadyprettyawesome—bybreakingelectrons free from theiratoms(at the power plant) and then allowing these to bump into their next nearestatomicneighbor,dislodgingtheirelectrons,andallowingthesetobumpalongtothe next. Some metals, at the atomic level, make this process of dislodgingelectronsfromatomseasy,andthesearethemetalsweusetobuildconductors(powerlines).Thelines,inturn,playmaterialhosttothisatomicdominoeffectthatmovesatroughlythespeedoflight.Thoughthistumbleofelectronsisthefastestthinginourknownworld,actualatomicdriftisonlyabout.05inchespersecond,orroughlythespeedofcoldhoney.Tohumaneyes,allthisactionattheatomic level looks like static, coolmetal, but this is the falsest of views. Theelectricitywemakeanduseeverydayiseffectivelyinseparablefromthewiresof the grid. And yet the product chains we’ve designed to make (and makemoney off of) electricity, ignore the ways in which electricity and itsinfrastructure are different from all other kinds of products. This has becomeevenmorethecasesincelegislationpassedintheearly1990seffectivelymadeelectrons and, say, bananas identical objects from themarket’s point of view.Nevermind thatelectricityhasso little incommonwithabanana that the twomightaswellhaveoriginatedindifferentphysicaluniverses—wenowtreatandtradetheminanalmostidenticalway.Wecantouchabanana,boxit,evenletitsitawhileifthepriceisnotrightfor

sale.Wecanengagepeopletogrowabananaandthennotbuyitfromthem.Wecan charge a specific price for a banana that customers can know and judgebefore theypurchase it,and if theyfindonebrand,variety,orcolorofbananalessappealingthananother,theycanchoosetobuyadifferentone.Preferencesmatter to supply and demand, and the possibility of choosing from a limitedselectionofbananashasbecomepartofwhatdefinestheproductandalsowhatmakesitwork—andmakesense—withinoureconomicsystem.Electricityisnotlikethis,ever.Itcannotbeboxedorstoredorshipped.Itis

alwaysusedthesameinstantitismade,evenifthepersonusingitisathousandmiles from the source. If electricity is made, it’s shipped; if it’s shipped, it’sused.Andallofthishappensinthesamesingularmillisecond.For our part, consumers,whoknowverywellwhat a banana is andwhat a

dollar is and how the two kinds of things stand in relationship to each other,rarelyhaveanyrealsenseofwhatakilowatt-houris,howmuchitshouldcost,how many we are using, and how much we might be paying for them. Tocomplicate matters further, the utilities are essentially state-supportedmonopolies,makingtheelectricitybusinesslikeastorewhereeveryonewithinacertain area is obliged to shop.At this store no prices are listed on individualitems(theseunlistedpricesarealsosubjecttochangewithoutnotice),andattheendofthemonth,shoppersareissuedasinglebillfortheentiremonth’sworthof purchases. Without specific information, one study showed, consumers ofelectricity“haveahardtimeestimatingthecostsandbenefitsoftheiractions.”This is part of why we pay electricity no mind. Understanding it meansunderstanding thegrid,andbothfunctionaccording to termsbeyondthescopeofdailylife.Yet because the electricitywe depend so heavily upon cannot be separated

from its infrastructure, we cannot reform our energy system without alsotransformingourgrid.Therecanbenoelectricpowerwithoutallthemachinesandwiresthatmakeit,makeitsafe,andtranslateitacrossourgreatnationintoourlightbulbs,toasters,andair-conditioningmachines.Wealsohavetopayforthis system, something that renewables have complicated as they mix upproducerswithconsumersinentirelynewways.And,becauseit’sAmerica,thewholeshebangneedstoconveyaprofitintosomebody’spocket.Almostallthebigutilitiesareinvestor-owned,whichmeanstheyhaveshareholderswhohavebeenpromisedatleasttheoccasionaldividend.Cornersgetcutinordertoensurethat this flow of cash continues apace, and decisions get made with profitmotives in mind that brook little concern for the particular capacities, andincapacities, of the grid.Wemay imagine the grid as primarily amachine tomakeandmoveelectricity,butintegralfromtheverystartwasthatitalsomakeandmovevastquantitiesofmoney.Alotofpeoplearestillhappywiththiswayofdoingthings.

Thegrid’scurrentshapehasalottodowiththespecificsofitstechnologicaland

businesshistory.Nostrangertochaos,initsearliestdaysAmerica’selectricgridgrew haphazardly, not radiating out from one imaginary center point butspreading instead like a pox, appearing only in spots with dense enoughpopulations to ensure a profit.This iswhy for its first half century, electricitywas largely an urban phenomenon. That finally changed during the GreatDepression,whenthegovernmentintervenedandbroughtthegridandelectricitytotheruralfolkswhomcapitalismwouldhavehappilyleftbehind.Despite theabsenceofanoverarchingplanandonlyoccasional intervention

onthepartofstateandfederalgovernments,thegridquicklygrewinbothsizeandcomplexity.Andthoughithasbeenupgradedperiodicallyastechnologicaldevelopments have leapt forward, these upgrades have been evolutionary, notrevolutionary;everyimprovementhashadtomeshwiththeexistingsystem.Noadvance could be made in one place that couldn’t accommodate weaknessessomewhereelsedowntheline.Littlebylittle,thisbuildhere,thatreformthere,developed into thegridwehave: it isa jury-riggedresult—highly inventive inplaces, totally stodgy in some, fantastically Rube Goldberg in yet others. Asimplausibleas itmust sound, themachine thatholds thewholeofourmodernlifeinplace“worksinpractice,butnotintheory.”Noonecansee,grasp,orplanforthewholeofit.Wrappedupinthisishowtheutilitiesestablishedthemselvesasmonopolies

and saddled the industry with the long-term inertia a lack of competition toooftenbegets.Inpartbecauseofitsprotectedstatusasaregulatedmonopoly,thegridworkedreasonablywellfromthemomentofneartouniversalelectrificationin the late1930sthroughtheendof the1960s.Butwhenitstoppedbeingtruethat utility profits were assured by an ever-increasing rise in demand, and astheir fundamental strategy of grow-and-build simultaneously faltered, the gridbegantoslipintoastateofdisrepair.Theutilities,whichforsolonghadthrivedon being the least inventive, least flexible, most run-of-the-mill companies inAmerica, didn’t knowhow to change.This indifference, even fromwithin theindustry,whencoupledwithlegislativeattemptstomaketheelectricitybusinessmoreprofitableasthedigitaleconomyrosetoprevalenceinthefinalyearsofthetwentieth century, have made the grid an ever more uneven technology. Theparts thatcanbe leveraged tomakemoneygeta lotofattentionwhile therestsilentlymolder.Beforetheblackoutsbeganinearnest,apartfromafewconcernedengineers

andenvironmentalists,amongthemAmoryandHunterLovins,notmanypeoplecaredmuchabouttheconsequencesofthisprotractedinattention.In1979,inthe

wake of America’s second energy crisis that decade, the Lovinses prepared areportforthePentagononthestateofAmerica’sdomesticenergyinfrastructure.Their conclusionwas surprising: national securitywas threatenedmore by the“brittleness”ofAmerica’selectricalgrid thanbypossible futuredisruptions intheflowof importedoil.Aspropheticas that reportwould turnout tobe, fewwerereallylistening,apartfromJimmyCarter,whowouldlosehispresidentialpowersoonafteritspublication.Andsoyearspassed.Decadespassed.Andtimetransformed thesystemtheLovinseshad labeledweakandbrittle intoanevenmorefragileversionofitself.Andthentheinevitablehappened.Intheearlyyearsofthenewmillennium,thegridfinallybegantobreak;its

business model cracked open as much as its copper and cement were worndown.California sufferedblackouts so severe thegovernordeclared a stateofemergencyandoneofitsmajorutilitiesfiledforbankruptcy(thefirstforalargeutility since theDepression). Then a nuclear power plant in Vermont toppledover. It literally fell down; its support structure had rotted right through. Notbecause it hadn’t been subject to regular maintenance and inspection, butbecause all the cameras set to watch the infrastructure age were pointedelsewhereandthemaintenancechecklistsdidn’tincludethebeamsthatheldthecooling tower up.Bits of thePacificNorthwest’s corner of the grid started tocrashnot twoor three timesawinter—ashad longbeen thecase—but twoorthreetimesamonth.Thelocalstormshaveawholenewkindofblowtothem.Texas watched helplessly as its grid went down again and again, the blamefalling on excessive air-conditioner usage. TheWhiteHouse even lost power,notoncebuttwiceduringtheBushyears(andtwicesince!).The Executive Branch, in 2013, finally admitted that “grid resilience is

increasinglyimportantasclimatechangeincreasesthefrequencyandintensityofsevereweather,”promisingthatAmericanscanexpect“moreseverehurricanes,winter storms, heat waves, floods and other extreme weather events beingamong the changes in climate induced by anthropogenic emissions ofgreenhousegasses.”Bigstorms,andotherweatherweirdnesses,haveironicallybecomeoneofthe

main drivers of contemporary grid reform, but in the least efficient wayimaginable.Weuse fossil fuels, including natural gas, tomake electricity, thechemicalpollution from thesecontributesmassively toglobalwarming,globalwarming makes for more ferocious storms, and these storms swoop in anddecimatethegrid.Thisdestructionpromptspeopletothinkaboutwaysthatthe

gridmight bemade harder to destroy.Occasionally they take action on thesethoughtsandsomesmallelementofourinfrastructuregetschanged.Ifouraimistoprompt infrastructural reform thatwillwork forusover the long term, thenthis absurdist loop is clearly the least efficient and most destructive routepossible.Andyetitistheonewetake.Ourgrid, its form,and theway this fits intomodern life isholdingusback

fromourenergyfuture—notjustfromtheintroductionofsustainablesourcesofelectricalgenerationbutalsofrommeaningfulconservationand,mostimportant,fromenergyindependence.BythisIdonotmeanjustthatwemightbefreefromthe vagaries of Middle Eastern oil (or British drilling companies or our ownminingconglomerates),thoughthis,too,hasitsbenefits,butalsothatwestandon thebrinkof anewkindof energy independence: the type that comes frombeing able to make our own energy decisions as individuals, households,neighborhoods,ortowns.Thescaleofourinfrastructureischangingandpeople,intheprocess,mattermore.Almostanythingthatcanbesubdividedisbeingcutup into smaller and smaller parts. Individuals, small businesses, towns, andcounties are developing the means to stamp their feet, vote with theirpocketbooks,andbeheard.Thiswasalreadytrueyesterdayanditwillbeevenmoretruetomorrow.The U.S. military, for one, is unable to tolerate even the tiniest of voltage

fluctuations (thesemake computers behave as if they have been possessed bydemons, and they are common onAmerica’s grid) or risk physical attacks onunsecured public infrastructure. As a result the military is in the process ofconvertingalltheirdomesticbasestomicrogrids.Googleisdoingthesameforitsheadquartersanddatacenters,asarethestatesofConnecticutandNewYorkfor their towns.NewYork alone is in theprocess of constructing eighty-threenew microgrids. Others, including CitiBank, Businessweek, and the EdisonElectricInstitute,arepredicting theendof theelectricalutilitycompanyasweknowit.Perhapstheywillremainstewardsofthewires,butnolongerwilltheymakepower(theyalreadymostlydon’t)norwilltheymakemoneyfromsellingit.Ofallthemyriad“unintendedconsequences”and“creativereactions”arising

fromruinedbitsofourcurrentsystem,themostimportantisthis:inventorsandcorporations, everybit asmuchas individuals, are thinkingaboutwhatcanbeaccomplished by small actions and collective efforts. They are doing so enmasseforthefirst timesincethedomesticationofelectricityinthe1880s.Thecumulativeeffectofthisnewemphasison“small”istowrestcontrolawayfrom

big men accustomed to fighting their battles on a grand scale. America’sinfrastructure is being colonized by a new logic: little, flexible, fast, adaptive,local—thepolaroppositeofthewaythingshavebeenupuntilnow.This kind of thinking, and the activities that follow from it, confound the

powersthatbe.Ifyouwanttounderstandjusthowmuch,thinkabouttheextenttowhich theU.S.military is flummoxedwhenbesetby smaller,moremobile,morelocal,moreflexible,moreadaptive,andmorecreativemilitantforces.Thisis what it feels like to be a utility company, a regulatory agency, or agovernmentalbody in the electricitygame rightnow.Theways inwhich theymanagedAmericanpowersincetheendofthenineteenthcenturyareslowlybutsurelybeingrelegatedtothetrashheapofhistory.SometimesthepeopleleadingthisassaultlooklikeSiliconValleysmart-guys,sometimestheylooklikeaginghippies finally getting their way, sometimes they look like multinationalcorporations, and sometimes, every so often, they look like a retiredschoolteacherinseasonallydecoratedknitwear.Togetherthesearethefootsoldiersontheattack.Theobjectoftheirireisnot

so much the big grid but the habitual and increasingly ineffective anduninteresting ways that the electricity game has been run. And they, in theirdiversity and their passion, allow us to witness new logics emerging: smallsystemsandsolutionsaregainingincurrencyoverbigones,flexibleorvariableways of doing things gain favor over rigid ones, mobility and portability aremore appealing than the static and the fixed, and wirelessness is championedwhenever and wherever possible. Initially it will seem chaotic, and it will bechaotic,asathousandinterestedactorsgrabforapieceofwhathaslongbeenaproprietary infrastructure. But within this mess, certain unspoken culturalattitudeswillproliferate,andfromthese,patternswillemerge.This book brings all of this into focus—the ruins and the dreams, together

with the incomparable complexityofourgrid’s technology; itshistory, repletewithabsurditiesandbrilliances, togetherwith thepeople, laws,and logics thatbrought it into being—so that as historical and technological exigencies pressdown upon us, we, the users of the grid, might understand the stakes andimplications of our choices and its failings a little better.The gridmight lookstable,itspresenceassteadfastasiteverwas;itmightfeelknown,itselectricalpoweralmostasreliableasiteverwas.Butwewoulddowelltowiseuptothefactthatbothimpressionsbelieanintenseseethingchangeintheverystructureofthepowermachinethatkeepsusallwarm,lit,and,relativelyspeaking,welloff.

CHAPTER1TheWayoftheWind

Day one. It’s a bright autumnmorning inWashington,D.C. I and about fourthousandotherpeople,mostinbusinesssuits,havealreadymadeitthroughfourtight rings of security, descending at each stop-and-check farther undergrounduntil we pass the final metal detector and emerge into a startlingly well-appointed, underground bunker of a conference center, the Ronald ReaganBuilding and International Trade Center. The lighting is subtle, the decor anelegantsymphonyofbeige.For thenext fivedays thisvenuewillplayhost tothe (mostly) men who spend their lives making, regulating and transportingelectricitytoAmericanhomesandbusinesses.WelcometoGridWeek.This is the human side of the grid, not itswires and poles, substations and

powerplants,but industryexecutives,electricalengineers,andutility-companyrepresentatives, some of whom are newly in the business of smartening theelectricgrid;someevenaresmall-techentrepreneurs.Allofthemplayapartinmakingitwork.Weareherethisearly-autumnmorningtoheartheconference’sfirst keynote address, to be given by Stephen Chu, a Nobel Prize–winningphysicistandalsoforatimetheU.S.secretaryofenergy.Aswesettleintoourseats, Dr. Chu steps up to his place at the podium and the auditorium fallsrespectfully still. He, too, has a quietness to him, a demeanor that with hisdelicate frame and slight baldness make him look more like a monk than abureaucrat.Inanoddway,Ithink,perhapsheisboth.Thiskeynotewillbebothasermonandapolicyspeech.What Dr. Chu is going to tell them, the men who keep our grid up and

running, is to integrate more renewable power generation—more wind, moresun, more waves and tides, more geothermal, more of everything that is hotwithoutbeingheatedandthatmoveswithoutbeingpushed—butfirstheisgoingtotellthemsomehorrorstories.Sureenough,byaboutslide5(afterwehavelearnedmanygreatthingsabout

our energy future and how America will soon be rocketing back tounprecedentedinternationalsuccess),thingsstarttolookreallybad.“On September fourth, 2008,” says Secretary Chu, gesturing with his laser

pointer at amassivePowerPoint display, “at just before fiveP.M. inAlamosaCounty,Colorado,a thick layerofclouds sweptacross the sky.”Hepauses to

glancedownathisaudience.Nooneiscoughingorshiftingintheirseat,nothingbeepsorbuzzes.Weare

attentive.Infact,givenhowtheroomfeels,Iimaginemyselfinaclusteroften-year-old

boyswithrattysneakerslisteningtoghoststoriesaroundalate-summercampfireinstead of with several thousand middle-aged industry men in well-pressedpants.Theotherdifferenceisthatratherthantheplayofshadowsattheedgesofafire’scircleoflight,wearegivenstatisticsandsharplinesongraphs.Thisone,theoneChuispointingatnow,plummetsprecipitouslydownward.“Fiveminuteslater,”hecontinues,“therewasajaggedbutrapideighty-one-

percent drop in the electricity output from the solar farm that served thecommunity.”Eighty-one percent. Five o’clock P.M. A nicely drawn downward-plunging

line.Everyoneintheroomknowsexactlywhatisgoingon;whattheydon’tknow

ishowtodealwithit.Anallbutinstantaneous81percentdropingenerationatfive in the eveningwhen everyone is coming home fromwork, switching ontheirair-conditioning,TVsets,andcomputers is thekindofstory thatsets thehearts of electrical engineers palpitating. Electricity consumption on this, theworld’s largest machine, must at every moment be balanced with electricityproduction.Themoresolarthereisinanygivenmixof“fuels”usedtogenerateelectricity,theharderitistocopewiththesuddenarrivalofacloud,especiallyatfiveintheafternoonwhenthingsonthedemandsidehavejustshotthroughtheroof.Onthegraph,theblacklinelabeledGENERATIONispointingstraightdownward while the red line labeled CONSUMPTION is angling up and uptowardthesky.Whensolarishowyougenerateyourelectricity,nosunmeansno power. It puts these very men, in their workaday lives, into a ferociousscrambletoavoidablackout.“Fourmonths later,” says SecretaryChu, continuing blithely on to the next

slide, “on January fifth,2009, in theColumbiaRiverGorge, thewindstoppedblowingquitesuddenlyanddidn’tstartagainforthreeweeks.”Hepausesagain.He lets the ramification of thismassive and long-term stoppagewend itswaythroughhisaudience.Threeweeks.Threefullweeks.Youcouldhaveheardapindrop.“Meanwhile,alltwenty-fiveoftheGorge’swindfarmslaystill.”Nowindmeansnogeneration,andnogenerationmeansnopower.Yetallthe

peoplethatlivedownlinefromthesefarms,manyofthemleftyNorthwesterners

who believe strongly in the integration of renewable resources like wind andsolarintoelectricityproduction,aren’tjustgoingtositaroundhappilyforthreeweekswithout any electricity.Even the greenest of consumers aren’t going tojustwait for thewind topickupagainbeforechecking theire-mailormakingsome toast.Even if just a portion of their electricity comes fromwindpower,someonesomewhereishavingtomakeupforthiscalm,anadjustmentthatstill,inmost cases, involves firing up some othermassive power-makingmachine.It’snotimpossible,butit’sastruggle:it’shardtodowell,hardertodofast,andalmost impossible todocleanly.America’sbackuppowerplantsare theoldestanddirtiestinthefleet.Theyshouldhavebeendecommissionedandtorndowndecadesago.Insteadweusethemasalast-ditchresourcewhenpowersuppliesfallshort.Weusethemalot.It’snotjustthatmachineshavetorespondtothevariabilityofrenewables.It’s

also that the culture of electricity making has to be transformed. The powerplantsforcedtotakeuptheslackwhenrenewablesfallstillarematchedprettywellinagewiththepeopleinchargeofrunningthem.Asalaterspeakerintheday’s proceedingswould point out, 60 percent ofmenwho run our electricitysystemarewithinfiveyearsofretirement.AquickglancearoundandIwouldhavetoagree.Thepeopleinthisveryroomareattheendoftheircareers.They,togetherwith the institutions theywork for, have long had oneway of doingthings, and now they are scrambling to adapt to a changed landscape. Beforegrid-scalewindandsolarpowercameonline,slowandsteadyalwayswon therace.Therewasnocompetitioninelectricity,aprotectionenshrinedinlawthatmadeeachutilitytheuniquemasterofitsrealm.Theymadeourpowerandtheyalwaysknewhowmuchof it therewouldbe,where itwould come from, andwhereitwouldbeused.Plansweremadeseasonally,collegially,aseveryfourmonths utilitymenwould sit down in a room and talk about how the wintermightgo,orthespring,orthesummer;thesemenmadesuretherewereenoughpower plants chugging along to provide what they estimated to be the rightamountof electricity.Except for theoccasionalpanicof a too-hotdayor too-coldone—whendemand for electricity jumpsprecipitously—theirplansprettymuchworked.Nothing in the system they grew up in, and now run, prepared them for a

means of power generation that not only varies from minute to minute, butwhichtheydonotown,cannotcontrol,andhavenoplanfor.Thenewworldofprivately or corporately owned variable generation, strewn about everywhichwhere,demandsthattheybeverylightontheirfeet.Buttheutilities,theutility

men,and2,500-megawatt (MW)coal-burningpowerplantsdon’tdancemuch.It’sanindustrythatplodsalongandlikesitthatway.Theirballeticcapacitiestotheside,theutilitycompaniesdofindthemselves

trappedinanincreasinglytightspotbetweenarock(variablegeneration)andahardplace(keepingthelightson).Ifin2009,whenChugavethispresentation,thereweretwenty-fivewindfarmsintheColumbiaRiverGorge;todaytherearefour times that many, most containing hundreds of turbines, each turbineproducingwell over a thousand kilowatts of power. Some of the largestwinddevelopments in the nation sit nestled into this single slash of land. All thatpower, currently estimatedat6,000megawatts (or enoughelectricity topower4.5millionhouseholds)dependssolelyonthewaythewindblows.Andwhenthewind,everfickle,stopsitsblowingalltheelectronsthesevast

machines havebeenbuilt to harvest out of thin air disappear. It’s that simple.The grid must be balanced; consumption must always match production, forthereisasofyetnorealmeansofstoringthatelectricityforlateruse.Ifpowerisnotbeingmaderightnow,somewhere,somehow,wesimplydon’thaveittouse.As impossible as it may seem to people outside the industry, grid-scale

electricitystoragehardlyexists.Therearesomeartificiallakespump-filledwithwaterthatfolksinmountainstatescancalloninapinch,butthat’saboutasfarasitgoes.Fornow,nohouseholdhasacookiejarfullofwattssecretedawayforlateruse;nonationhasastrategicelectricityreserve.Asaresulttheelectricityweuse,dayinanddayout,isalwaysfresh.Sofresh,thatlessthanaminuteago,ifyouliveinwindfarmterritory,thatelectricitywasafast-movinggustofair.And if you live in coal country, it was a blast of pulverized coal dust beingblownintoa“firebox”—ahuge,industrial,flash-combustingfurnace.Ifyoulivein hydro country it was a waiting rush of water dammed up by a massiveconcretewall. Picture it. The electricity you are using right nowwas, about asecondago,adropofwater.Butit’snotwateranymore.Weliketotalkaboutelectricityas“flowing”from

one place to another, as if we could predict where it might go once we’vereleaseditontothewires.Butwecan’t.Itdoesn’tflowdownhill,itdoesn’ttakethe shortest path, nor will it follow one route at the expense of another. Thewiresweuse to transport electric current fromwhere it ismade towhere it isused aren’t much like pipes, or mains (as they are often called). Nor canelectricity really even be said to “flow” through them.Wires are conductors,which is to say that they are metal, and to the extent that something electrichappensbecauseofthem,itseemstohappenasmuchoutsideasinsidethelines.

Powerlinesaretheretochannelordirectbroadhalosofelectromagnetisminadirectiondeterminedbysomethingassimpleassomeonedepressingtheleverontheir toaster. Suddenly a pathway opens up, one that wasn’t there an instantbefore,andelectricityfollowsit,movingintoandthroughthetoaster,whereitisslowed down as it passes. This slowing down, or resistance, produced by thedevice causes electrons to release heat,which toasts the bread.After a certainnumberofsecondstheleverpopsbackup,ejectingthetoastandclosingoffthetoasterchannel,andelectricitymustfindanotherway.It’s not a system that needs to be planned.No one decideswhich electrons

willgo toLosAngeles tomakedoughnutsandwhich toWallaWalla tomaketoast; all of the electrons are going everywhere at once.As long as there is a“sink” (of thekindcausedbya toaster toasting), all the electricityon thegridwillmovetowarditbywhatevermeanspossible.Thereasonyourtoasterdoesn’texplode every time you turn it on is because there are thousands, indeedmillions, of other sinks on our gridwhere other devices aremaking the samekind of “hey, no resistance over here” calls to the available electric current.There are also a million little devices on the grid, and some big ones, tostandardizethevoltage,orpush,ofthatelectricity,sothatthepoweravailabletoyourtoasterinthefirstplaceissubstantiallylessthanthattravelingalonghigh-voltage lines from the dam to the nearest substation. Your average outlet isalreadyofferingthetoasteraccesstooneofthemildestintensitiesofelectricityavailable.Youstilldon’twant topryaburntnubofbreadoutof therewithabutter knife—a nasty shock greets that activity—but were you to somuch astouchalow-voltagedownedresidentialwire,itwouldkillyou.Thesystem,initscurrent form, isdesignednotonly toprotect the toaster,but toprotectusfromthe potential force that even the modest voltage of domestic electric currentdelivers.Toastersdon’t explode,wires functionwell, lightbulbsgoonwhen thewall

switch is flipped, all because the grid is kept in balance: there is enoughelectricity available to run ourmachines, but there is not somuch that it ripsthroughanddestroysthem.Thisisourgridinanutshell:itisacomplexjust-in-timesystemformaking,

and almost instantaneously delivering, a standardized electrical currenteverywhereatonce.Andthoughschematasofthegridtendtomakeitseemlikethere is a lineoutof apowerplant that ends in the toaster, thewhole thing isactuallyagiantloopthatbothstartsandendsat thepowerplant,orgeneratingstation.Thesefactoriesmakeanelectriccurrentbytearingelectronsoutoftheir

atomicorbitandthengivethemnorealchoicebuttopowerthewholesystemastheymaketheirway,ratherquicklyallthingsconsidered,backintotheseorbitsagain.Thepowerplantsthataccomplishthiselectron-rippingtaskcanbemadeto runonwind,ornatural gas, or coal, oruraniumhexafluoride, ordried cowdung;anyfuelwilldo.Strunginto this loopare themanufacturies,businesses,farms, and toasters that use the power electrons release as they pass by.Whatever power needs these consumers and their things have at any giveninstant in time has to be balanced pretty much perfectly with the amount ofpowerbeingproducedatthatsameinstantwayondowntheline.Thisisastrueof a customerwho turnson theirporch light as it isofonewhobrings anewserverfarmonline.Thisiswhypeakload—whencustomerssuddenlyusealotmoreelectricitythantheywereusingjustfiveminutesbefore—isastartlingkindofproblemforutilities. It’salsowhyfiguringoutways todesignourworld touse power when it is made, rather than whenever we feel like it, is a brain-twisting,butfundamentallysmart,idea.Variablegeneration—thetechnicaltermforpowerplantsthatmakeelectricity

outofunpredictablefuelsourceslikethewind,sun,orwaves—isaproblem.Itdoesn’tmatterwhichendofthesystemescapescontrol.Itcanbeus,usingtoomuch power all of a sudden (likewhenwe all come home after a long day’sworkandsimultaneouslyturnupourair-conditioningjustasthewindslackens),or it can be cloud cover, stripping the generative capacity from solar panels.Regardless,theutilitiesandotherbalancingauthoritieshavetoactveryquicklytosetthingsrightagain.Otherwisetherejustisn’tenoughpowerinthelinestokeepthelightson.Lotsofblackoutsstartthisway.The rub is that, with the exception of hydroelectric dams, the output of all

existing,comfortable-to-utilities,meansforgeneratingelectricitytakesignificanttimetoturnupordown.Thewindcanstopinstantaneously.Acloudcanblowover the sun just as quickly.Or, ten thousand customers can turn on their airconditioners.When this happens a controller sitting in front of a wall of flatscreenmonitorsinacontrolroomsomewhereseesit:bam,an81percentdropinoutputoran81percentincreaseindemand.It’saprecipitouscurvegraphedonascreen; it’s a red warning light blinking in mechanical panic; it’s a buzzerirritating in its insistence; it’s a nerve-jangling phone ringing and ringing andringing.Someoneontheotherendneedsafixandheneedsitnow.Isatinthecontrolroomonedayforthecompanythatruns54ofAmerica’s

windfarmsscatteredfromtheGorgetotheArizonadeserttonorthernNewYorkState and I saw how it worked. Response time is limited by human and

mechanicalcapabilities,butwindspeedandlightningstormsarenot.Therearepredictivemechanismsinplace.Themaninfrontofthosescreensseeslightningstrikesmove theirwayacrossamapdrawingcloserandcloser to repaircrewsuntilhepicksupthephoneandmakesthecall:“Getoutofthere,shutitdown.”Thesameistrueofthewind,usually.Theweatherispredictedtobeblusteryorcalm.Thespinningoftheturbinesiscloselymonitored,andelectricityispricedforsalebaseduponexpectedoutput.But sometimes a lull comes, like the oneChuhas pointed to, and it’s total,

stable, and unexpected. At this instant there is nothing the controller can do,there isnodialathis righthand thathecan just turn to increase theoutputofsomeothergeneratingplantonthesamelines.Notsoquicklyat least.Hewillturndials andpushbuttons andmake calls.He’ll dowhatever he can, but thephysics of electrical generation from “stock” or man-made resources such ascoal,naturalgas,ornuclearareagainsthim.Andthoughtheyaregettingfaster,they are just not very adjustable. Coal-burning plants, at 50 percent in fiveminutes, are one of the fastest; natural gas (from a cold start) takes about tenminutestogetuptospeed,whilenucleartakesafulltwenty-fourhourstoturnup,thoughitcanbeshutdowninseconds.In human time, five minutes might seem pretty quick, given that we are

talkingaboutmovingamechanicalsystemasmassiveandcomplicatedasacoal-burning power plant,which pulverizes and combusts, on average, 125 tons ofcoaleveryfiveminutes.But in electricity time,which iswhatmatters to grid stability, fiveminutes

mightaswellbeinfinity.Infiveminutes,electricalcurrentgeneratedbyapowerplantoutsideMuncie,Indiana,cangotoMars.Eveninthedecidedlyimperfectconditions of electrical transmission more characteristic of life on Earth, thewind power generated in the Columbia River Gorge that is not used by therelatively sparsely populated states of Oregon,Washington, and Idaho can beeasilytransportedalongalongDC(directcurrent)linetothegoodpeopleofLosAngelesCounty,whereitisgobbledupbyairconditionerswellbeforeitssixtysecondsareup.Thisisoneofthereasonsthegridisbig.Bigmeansthatpowerplantscanbebuiltinplaceswithnottoomanypeoplebutstillprovideelectricityto large population centers as distant from one another as Seattle is fromSanDiego.At times,however, even thegrid’s remarkable span is insufficient toabsorb

all the power produced in the Gorge. For this river valley is not only aphenomenalsourceofwindpower,asSecretaryChupointedout,but ithasan

extensive hydroelectric infrastructure left over from the heady days of biggovernment investment inpublicworks thathelped topullAmericaoutof theGreatDepression.TheseNewDeal dams (GrandCoulee andBonnevillemostespecially)andtheirsmaller,morerecentbrethrenwereproviding98percentofthePacificNorthwest’selectricityneedsbeforethefirst industrialwindturbinewentup;nowthereisallthathydroandallthatwindpowerallinoneplace.Washington,Oregon, and Idaho, they could live bright,warm, electric lives

without the wind. The rain, snow, andmeltwater aremore than sufficient. Infact,ofallthepowerproducedintheGorge,fromwhateversource,onlyabout15percentisusedlocally.Therestisshippedondownthelinestowhoeverwillbuyit.Thisiswhyitisabigdealwhenthewindstopsblowingforthreeweeks.It’snot just somewidelyscatteredLeftCoast ranchers that losepowerbut it’salso city people and townsfolk all over theWesternUnited States and certainchoicebitsofCanadaaswell.Thefactthatwedon’tyethaveagoodmeansofstoringelectricitydoesn’tjust

mean thatwehave little backuppoweronhand todealwith shortages; it alsomeans that it is difficult to dispose of surplus power when it’s produced inexcess.While our dependence on oil may have taught us to think about andprepare for interruptions in supply, it has never happened that instead of acarefully measured tank of gas, what you get at the filling station is a giantsplashofthestufftumblingdownandoverandutterlyinundatingyouandyourcar.Butsolarandwindpowerseetoitthattheenergeticequivalentofthisgreatmessysloshishappeningtothegridallthetime.Anywhereinthenationwithahigh concentration of wind turbines or a high concentration of photovoltaicsalwaysrunstheriskofgeneratingmoreelectricitythancanbeeasilyconsumed.ThisisthepartoftherenewableenergyhorrorstorythatSecretaryChuleftout.Youcan’t just turn thewinddown.When itblowshard, those turbines spin

and spin and theoutput is tremendous.Theyoung control roomoperatorwithwhom I satwatching theweather as it approached andmoved throughwidelyscattered wind farms told me with a note of awe in his voice that you canactuallyseeagustofwindasittopstheRockiesandthenhitsonesetofturbinesafteranotherallthewaytothecoast.Youcanseeitinthepowerspikes—bang,bang,bang—ofwindfarmafterwindfarmshootingelectricityintothesystem.Itfloodsthegrid;itcrashesthroughtheinfrastructuremuchlikeawavecrashingagainst a sea wall on a stormy day. Even Los Angeles can’t absorb all theelectricitymadeonaseriouslyblusteryday in thePacificNorthwest.Even theWesternDoughnut,asthehigh-voltageDClinethatcarrieselectricityfromthe

GorgetothepeopleofSouthernCaliforniaiscalled,withits3,100megawattsoftransmissioncapacity(orhalfofL.A.’speakcapacity),cannotcarryitall.Whenthereistoomuchpoweronthewirestheyoverload,orcircuitsbreakto

protect them, and in so doing they close, rather than open, available paths forexcesspower to take. It’shyperbole thatyour toasterwill explode; the systemwillself-protectivelyblackitselfoutlongbeforeyourtoasterturnsintoabombofflameonyourkitchencounter.Inthisway,blackoutsshouldbeseenassourceofgraceasmuchasabaneandaburden.Imagine, then, that Secretary Chu’s story does not stop with the wind’s

unpredictable calms, but rather continues to include its more impetuous,tempestuousside.Imaginethatinsteadofmovingontoadiscussionofsolutionshefollowshisharrowingtalesofwhatunexpectedcloudcovermeansforsolaroutputandwhatalengthycalmmeansforwindpowerwithathirdstoryoftherelationshipbetweenrenewableenergyandourelectricgrid,forthisstoryisalsotrue.“OntheafternoonofMaynineteenth,2010,”hemighthavesaid,“inasingle

chaotichour,morethanathousandwindturbinesintheColumbiaRiverGorgewentfromspinninglazilyinthebreezetofullthrottleasastormrolledoutoftheEast.”Herehewouldpause,toseeifhisaudienceunderstoodwhatwasabouttohappen,whatallof thiswindwasabout todotoall thoseturbines.“Suddenly,almosttwonuclearplants’worthofextrapowerwassizzlingdowntheline—thelargesthourlyspikeinwindpowertheNorthwesthaseverexperienced.”Amassiveuncontrollable,unmanageable,unstorable,undumpableelectricity

surplus.Chaosonthelines.Andwhatisworse:it’sMay.InOregon inMay it’s still raining. It’sbeen rainingsinceNovember,and it

willcontinuetorainforanothermonthorsobeforethingsbegintolightenup.IntheCascades,themountainrangethatbifurcatesthestate,allthatrainissnow,and inMayall that snow ismeltwater—pure, chill runoff.The rivers areveryfull,andtheyaresloshingtheirwaydownthesidesofmountainsandhillsintotheman-madelakesthatsitbehind,andfeed,eachandeverydamonthemightyColumbia. InMay these reservoirs can’t hold another drop. They are full up.Andthe turbinesoneverydamupanddownthatmightyriverchugalongatafearsome rate, because if they don’t there are only two options. Either thereservoirsfloodupoverthehomesteads,highways,andtownsthatdottheriver’sedge,orthedamoperatorsletthewateroutthroughspillways.Though the secondmight sound like a good option, sadly for them, it also

happens to be illegal. Because, in May, the fishlings are running, tiny silver

slivers that will, in two to three years, grow into beautiful, fleshy oceanicsalmon. If the dams flood their spillways, these fingerlings will be ravaged.Theirnumberswillbedecimatedyearbyyear,andnotonlywillthecommercialsalmon industry be threatened, but the species itself will slip slowly fromplentifultoendangered,fromdinnerplatestoGrandma’smemorybin.So,spillingthewaterisn’tanoption,atleastnotinMay.Theonlyoptionistoletthedamsoperateatclosetomaximumcapacity.And

ifthedamsaregoingtomakeallthepowertheycan,theyaregoingtoneedallavailable transmission lines tomove that power out ofOregon to anyone andeveryonewholookslikeamarket.Itcan’tbestored,itmustbetransportedandusedimmediately,orthelandwillflood,orthegridwillcrash.ThisiseverydayinMay.Thereiswater,therearefish,therearelaws,therearepowerlineswithafinitecapacitytotransportelectricity,andthereisamarketthatjustmightnotbebigenoughtouseallthepowertheyarebeingfed.Power production isn’t just an industry, it’s an ecology. And renewable

resources are not just about the planetary good kept from public offer bycorporations with other visions for their own profitable futures. MakingAmerican power is about how technological, biological, and cultural systemsworkinconcerttokeepourlightson,ourbasementsandroadwaysclearoffloodwater, and fresh fishonour tables. It’sdelicate in all sortsofways.Though Iwill concentrate largely on infrastructural delicacy in this book, it does thereader well to remember that the vulnerability of the grid as a technologicalsystem is intimately linked to the fragility of biological systems (like salmonruns), the intractability of legal and bureaucratic systems (like the endangeredspeciesact),andtheunpredictablyofmeteorologicalsystems(likewindstorms).Thewide-scaleintegrationofvariableformsofpowergenerationdidn’tcreate

thissituation.Thegrid’sentanglementswithcultureandlawandnaturalsystemswerealwaysthere.Renewableshavejustmadetheseentanglementsimpossibleto ignore; they stress the existing system just enough that all the delicatebalances reachedover thepassageofacenturyare thrownoff-kilter.Asallofthesediversebitsofwhatmakeourgridworkinterlockandentangle,therejustisn’talotofroomforquickaction.Oncepeoplewithpoliticsandprofitmotivesgettheirfingersintothebriarpatch,itseemsattimeslikethereisnoroomtoactatall.Thiswasthesituationintowhichtheequivalentoutputoftwonuclearpower

plants was suddenly poured that mid-May day back in 2010. The only realoption was to shut down the wind turbines. Switch the beasts off. Still their

spinning.Clearthelines.Letthestormblowitselfout.Leaveallthoseelectronsunreaped.Atthetime,that’sexactlywhatthelocalbalancingauthority—theBonneville

Power Administration (BPA)—mandated be done. They called up thecorporation that developed, built, and stillmanagesmost of thewind farms intheGorge,theSpanish-ownedconglomerateIberdrola,andaskedthemtoprettyplease, andyes, immediately, turnoff theirmanyhundredsofwindmachines,whippingaroundjustthenatabsolutelyferociousspeedsintheonslaughtofwildair.ButwhatdoesIberdrolacareforthegrid?Theyareinthebusinessofmaking

electricity,notofmovingittomarket.Transmissionistheutilities’problemandbalancing is the balancing authorities’ problem, regulation is the regulators’problem,interregionalcooperationistheISO’sproblem.Iberdrola’sproblem,asthe second-largest wind company in the world, is maintaining a profitablebottom line. Turning off their turbines at amoment ofmaximal productivity?Well,it’sjustnotasensiblecourseofaction.Mostespeciallybecausethefederalsubsidies that have helped them to build and maintain their almost threethousandAmerican-sited turbines only accrue if thosemachines are turned onandrunning.It’snotjustthattheyonlymakemoneyfromthesebeasts’ceaselessrotation,it’salsothattheyhavetopaybackmoneyiftheirturbinesareeveroff.EventheagencythatChuheadeddidn’timagineasitwroteupitsguidelinesforsubsidiesthatsometimesthebestthinganyonecoulddowithawindturbineisturnitoff;thatsometimes,inAmerica,wecanhavetoomuchofagoodthing.IfIberdrola switches off even one turbine just to be nice, this has very realramificationsfortheirprofitability.Fromtheirpointofview,ifthegridisn’tuptothetaskofmovingtomarketthepowertheymake,thenthegridneedstobebetter.Inthistheyareright.EverymanatGridWeekknowsit.Thatispartofwhy

theyhavecome.Over and over, investments in renewable sources of power generation are

failing or falling very short because America’s electric grid just isn’t robustenough or managed well enough to deal with the electricity these machinesmake.AndnotjustintheColumbiaRiverGorge.In West Texas, the largest wind farm ever planned on American soil was

abandonedin2008becausetheutilityrefusedtobuildahigh-voltagelineouttothesite.Andthedeveloper,thelocaloilmanT.BoonePickens,thoughtitwasatravestygivenhowmuchhewasinvestingtobuildthefarmitselfthathewould

beexpectedtoalsobuildthetransmissioninfrastructure.Heshelvedtheprojectafterhavinginstalledjustathousandturbines,afractionofthetotal.Addtothisasecondoutrage.Pickenshadalreadybeenobligedtouseturbines

thatwere small by international standards, just aswas every otherwind farmdeveloper inAmerica at the time. The grid’s fragility demanded it. If awindstormcanturnafieldof“small”windmachinesintotheequivalentofanuclearpowerplantinaperiodofminutes,youcanonlyimaginewhatwouldhappentoafieldofthereallybigones.Germany’sEnerconmakesa7.5MWmodel(onlyslightly smaller than the largest offshore turbines, which come in at 8MW),whereasintheUnitedStatesthemostcommonturbinesremainthe1.5MWGEmodelandtheslightlybigger2MWGamesa.Thishasnothingtodowithhowfast the wind blows across American plains versus German ones; it haseverything to do with the wires these massive machines feed into. It is thesystemthatstandsbetweenthepointofgenerationandpointofconsumptionthatdelimits productivity. The grid is the weakest link. It isn’t made for modernpower.

FIG1Theheight,sweptarea,andpowerratingofcommonwindturbines

So this one windy May day in the Gorge may have been exceptional as

regards the quantity of electricity suddenly surging through thewires, but theproblem of too much unpredictable electricity is all too ordinary, in theAmericanWestandPlainsstatesespecially.Inthespringof2011,whenIinterviewedElliotMainzer,thenBPA’sdirector

of strategic planning and now its acting director, the balancing authority hadonceagain just paid thewind farms in theGorge to shutdown.This timenotbecause of a storm, but because of an exceptionally robust runoff. The damsneededallthespaceonthewires.Mainzer,whoisbotharealistandanoptimist(a rarely seencombinationof traits),predicted then that “at thecurrent rateofwind development the region’s system of dams and power lines will start

running into consistent operational problems around 2013, when wind in theagency’sterritoryreachestotalcapacityofsome6,000megawatts.”In other words, we’ve already passed the point of no return. If they were

shuttingdownthewindfarmswithsomeregularityin2010and2011,rightnow,with6,000MWofpower rollingoutof thinairand intoourgrid,atpreciselythis point, Mainzer predicted that the grid “will require major structuralchanges”—adding,afterapause,“Ifit’sdonerightit’sahugeopportunity.”This,then,wasthesubstanceofthefearfeltinthesolesofthefeetofevery

well-shodindustrymansitting in theWashington,D.C.,auditoriumthat lovelySeptemberdaylisteningtothesecretaryofenergyspeakabouttheproblemsofintegratingrenewablesintotheexistinggrid.Theyknew,toaman,thatitwouldbebetterforthemandforthereliabilityofthetechnologytheyarechargedwithshepherding into the twenty-first century if we could just stick with coal andnaturalgas,nuclearandhydro.Thecomplexityoftherest,withitsnow-you-see-it,now-you-don’tvolubility,withitsfiefdomsandawkwardeconomics,withitsties toknottyphysical systems, andwith itsunpredictability acrossdomains—it’salla terribleheadache toan industrywhose job is tokeep the lightsonnomatter the social, technological, fiduciary, meteorological, or politicalcircumstances.And then,afterallof this,SecretaryChusmiles.He looksdownupon them

fromhispodiumanddropsthebombtheyallknewwouldcome.“TheObamaadministration,”hesaid,“hassetagoalof25percentrenewable

energyusebypowerproducersby2025;tenpercentby2012.”Andbeforethemen in attendance could leap to their feet and demandwith one unmodulatedvoice:“Yes,butHOW!?”SecretaryChucontinuedunperturbedthroughtherestofhisPowerPointpresentation,whichamountedtoatidylistofsolutionstothegrid’s known woes: use smart grid technologies, curb customer demand, endpeak demand, develop grid-scale storage, add a nationwide extra-high-voltageDC/AC transmission network, reduce line congestion, encourage interregionalcooperation, develop interoperability standards, increase governmentinvestment,trainanewgenerationofgridoperators,andintegratelargenumbersofelectricvehicles.Thisisthe“solutions”laundrylist,andaprettythoroughone,especiallyifwe

adddeployableenergyefficiency to themix.Almostallof it landssquarely inthe laps of the utilities and their regulators—sometimes friends, sometimesenemies, always themselves trying to balance investments with profits whilemaintaininginfrastructuralintegrity.Becauseiftheydon’tthereisnostateentity

that can just step in and make the grid work if the utilities have to declarebankruptcyorotherwisefailattheirappointedtask.Thereisnobackupsystemtothegrid.Ifwecan’tmakeitwork,thenitdoesn’t.It’sassimpleasthat.IfyoulistencarefullyyouwillnoticethatChu’slaundrylististhesamesetof

solutions, in part or in whole, that have become the talking points of anyoneinterestedinreformingthegridformostofthelastdecade.Butrattlingoffthelist is not the same thing as getting the state of California, balky after thederegulation debacle of the late 1990s, to talk to anybody about cross-bordertransmission.Pointingoutaseriesofbestpracticesisnotthesameaspersuadingconsumerstolettheirobtuseutilitycompanytakeremotecontroloftheirhomeair-conditioning.Andthrowingmoneyattheproblemisnotthesameasfiguringout how to getVermonters (or anyone else) to allow high-voltage lines to bebuiltintheirbackyards.Thecomplexityofthesituationiswaybeyondanythingactuallycapturedby

thetalkingpointsoranythingresolvablebyarepeatedreturntostatedgoals.Weknow,withthebenefitofhindsight, that theinterimgoalsof theObama

administration’s2009renewableenergyplanhavenotexactlybeenmet.Thoughthenumbersdolooksurprisinglygoodonfirstglance.AccordingtoNREL(theNational Renewable Energy Laboratory—a thirty-five-year-old federalinstitutionthat issomethingliketheNASAofrenewableenergy),12.4percentofAmerica’selectricitywasmadefromrenewableresourcesin2012.Readthesmallprint,however,and it immediatelybecomesclear thatslightlymore thanhalf(55percent)ofthetotalstillcomesfromhydroelectricpower.Droughtyearstotheside,thedamsaresteady.In2000theyweregenerating

about 78,000 megawatts, and in 2012 they were generating about 78,000megawatts, though this should rise somewhat in thenear future as thebigolddams are “returbined”—their efficiency raised by the integration of newertechnology.Inmostcases,however,whena“renewableenergy”goal is issuedbyanadministration,or anyoneelse, it is usually cast in termsof “nonhydro”renewables.Andthatnumber,fortheUnitedStatesasawholein2014,was6.76percent—though,becauseelectricalproductionisstill largelyalocalaffair, it’smuch more than that in certain pockets, such as the Columbia River Gorge,California’sAltamontPass,Arizona’s deserts,Hawaii, theDakotas, Iowa, andWestTexas.This6.76percentrenewablegenerationwithinournation’sstilllargelyfossil-

fuel-driven electrical economymightmakewind and solar seem negligible inabsolute terms. However, a closer look at the numbers reveals something

remarkable, something that grid engineers already know: the recent growth inthese two domains has been nothing short of explosive. In 2012,wind powerinstallationsaccountedfor75percentofallnewgenerationintheUnitedStates,whileinstalledsolar,stillatinypieceoftheelectricitypie—only0.3percentoftheon-grid electricity in the country—wasneverthelessupby83percentover2011(andin2011itwasup86percentover2010).Ifin2012,abanneryearforAmerican solar, only 30MW of new concentrating solar power was broughtonline,then2013isnothingshortofmeteoric—with900MWplanned.That’sa3,000percentincreaseinasingleyear.In 2015, theObama administration virtually promised that these trendswill

continueupwardforatleastthenextfifteenyears,bylegislatinga30percentcutto2005CO2levelsby2030.ThelargestproducersofCO2intheUnitedStatesare coal-burningplants formaking electricity, and theonlyway tomeet thesegoalsistoclosehostsofthem:“Theambitiousruleshopetoremakethenation’selectricity system by closing hundreds of heavily polluting coal plants whilerapidly expanding the use of natural gas plants, wind and solar power.” Inresponse to which, Nick Akins of American Electric Power, a Midwesternutility,respondedwithasimplethreat:“Iftheproposedrulestands,therewillbeblackouts.”Nor do these “national trend” numbers include home installation of solar

panels, which are contributing in their own way to the mounting crisis ofinfrastructuralmanagement.Thoughthereareissuesofexcessandshortagetiedinto “net-metering”—when electric companies pay homeowners for the powertheir solar panels feed back into the common system—this crisis for utilitycompanies is as much one of cash as it is of current. In certain expensivemarkets, like Hawaii and Southern California and in certain sunny ones, likeArizonaand,recently,NewMexico,homemadesolarpowernowcostsaboutthesame or even slightly less than grid-made power. Why, then, pay a utilitycompanyforsomethingyoucanmakeforyourself?Nogoodreasonatall.Quitesuddenly,theutilitiesaren’tearningenoughmoneytoperformbasicupkeeponthegrid,thoughalloftheircustomersarestillusingit.Solar-panelownersfeedpowerintothegridduringtheday,buttheydrawelectricityexclusivelyfromthegridin theeveningandatnight.Tocoverbasic infrastructuralcostsutilities inregionswith a lot of rooftop solar are charging those customerswithout solarpanels, theonesstillgettingall theirpowerfromthegrid,higherrates.Thisofcourse leads these folks to switch to solar aswell.The situationhasgotten sobad in Hawaii that in 2015 the state’s utility refused to enroll any more

customers’net-meteringprograms.Peoplecanstillputsolarupontheirgarageroofs in Hawaii, but the utility won’t connect to them, won’t pay for theelectricity they generate, andwon’t offer any kind of deal to homeowners onpowerconsumedafterdark.Thiscyclehadn’tyet reachedcrisis level in2009,whenChuwas listing theknownwoesofpowercompanies. It’satcrisis levelnow.Whatwearebearingwitnesstoaretheearlydaysofavariableanddistributed

generationrevolution.Electricityisbeingmadeeverywhere,bypowerproducersof all sorts and sizes, and increasingly from uncontrollable and largelyunpredictablemeans.AndbecauseofanawkwardpieceoflegislationcalledtheEnergyPolicyAct(1992),whichlaidthefoundationforthederegulationoftheelectricityindustry,inmanyplacesnotonlyhavetheutilitieslostcontrolofwhomakespowerandhowandwheretheymakeit,buttheyhavealsolosttherighttoownpowerplantsthemselves.TheEnergyPolicyActseparatedelectricitygenerationbylawfromelectricity

transmission and distribution (a divorce formalized by the Federal EnergyRegulatoryCommission’sOrder888 issued in1996). Ineffect thismeans thatprivate companies can build condensed solar power plants wherever the sunshineshottest,individualhomeownerscanmountsolarpanelsonanythingthatdoesn’t move, and multinational conglomerates, or farmers, can install windfarmswhereverthewindblowsmostferociously—aswelltheyshould,forthesearethesitesthataremostefficientwhenitcometothegenerationofelectricity.What is newwith theEnergyPolicyAct is that these investors in electrical

generation,largeandsmall,don’tneedtogivemuchthoughtastohowthegrid,inoftenveryout-of-the-wayplaces,mightdealwiththeinfluxofunpredictablepower.Nordotheyneedtocareforhowutilitycompanieswillmanagethetaskofkeepingpeople’slightsonwhentheyarefacedwiththeproblemoftoomuchpoweroneinstant,andtoolittlethenext.Andevenwheretheutilitiesdohaveamodicumof control over the stability of generation, they are losing control oftheir revenue streams, through rooftop solar, through the loss of big powerplants, through the advent of real-time electricity markets, and throughinterventionist rate making by regulatory agencies that control how muchcustomerswillbechargedfortheirelectricity.Itbeginstoseemthat inthenottoodistantfuturethecompanieswenowcall“utilities”willbecomestewardsofthe wires and little more. But the wires, of course, are the only piece of thewholesystemthatgeneratesnorevenuesaveasmallrentalfeetothosewhousethem to pass electricity from one cash cow power plant to a thousand or a

millionpayingcustomers.ForthemomentthisismostlyaproblemintheWest,onthepartofthegrid

known as theWestern Interconnection, and in Texas,which has its own grid.WithnumerousoffshorewindfarmsplannedinLakeErieandintheAtlantic,offtheEasternSeaboard, the renewable power problembesting gridmanagers ontheWesternInterconnectionisabouttobecomeanonusoneverybody.Renewables and their scattershot siting are not what make America’s

electricitydifficult tomanage in theseconddecadeof the twenty-firstcentury.They justbrings to light aproblem thathasbeencharacteristicofourgrid formorethanhalfacentury: itwasmadetobemanagedaccordingtoacommandandcontrolstructure.Therewas tobe totalmonopolisticcontrolon thesupplyside of great electric loop—which included generation, transmission, anddistributionnetworks—andever-increasingyetalways-predictableconsumptionon the customer side of things.Electricitywouldmove fromone to the other,whilecashwouldmoveinequalmeasureintheoppositedirection.Thissystemwasalwayspartly fantasy,but italsomostlyworkedfora long

time. Even the early big blackouts like the one that took down much of theEasternInterconnectionintheearly1960sweretobeblamedmoreonsystemscomplexity thanon flaws in the logicundergirding thegridasawhole.Todayit’sadifferentstory.Every timeAmericachanges,whethera littlebitora lot, infrastructure lags

behind.The thingswe build, especially the big things, and the institutionsweinventtosupportthesearefarmorepermanentthanthewayswechoosetolive.The1950swerenotthe1970s.Peoplelivedindifferentpartsofthecounty,theybought different products in different quantities, they consumed differentamounts of power at different times of the day, they lived in different-sizedhouses, pursued different professions, and raised their children with differentvalues.Yetthegridofthe1950swasinmanywaysthegridofthe1970s.Andthegridofthe1970swasinmanywaysthatofthe1990s.Forthemostpartitisstillourgridtoday.Whenitcomestoourelectricalgrid,decadespass,halfcenturiespass,andthe

logicalstructuresthatunderlieitsmass,mostofitsmachinery,andmostofthepeople educated to work on it age and are patched up, but they are rarelyreplaced. And then something happens to disturb the balance like the EnergyPolicyActor themassdeploymentofsomereallygoodwindturbines,ora50percentdropinthepriceofsolarpanelsandthewholesystemreels.Thegrid,itsvalues, and its base technologies have been out of true for decades, but

renewable and distributed forms of power generation have pushed the wholesystemovertheedgeoftheeasilyrecoupable.Thegridwillhavetobereimagined,itwillhavetobereinvented,andpartsof

it will have to be rebuilt. This would have happened without the massintroductionofwindandsolarpower,butthesehavehastenedtherealizationofthenecessityofchange.Or, toborrow thewordsofa recentarticle in theLosAngeles Times: “The problem is that renewable energy adds unprecedentedlevelsofstresstoagriddesignedforthepreviouscentury.”It’sworthconsideringinmoredetailwhatthispreviouscentury’sgridactually

is, where it came from, and why we have so long retained its most basicpremisesandcomponents.

Our grid might have long been an inflexible, brittle, monopoly-managedmonolith,but that isnothow its story startedout. In thebeginning, electricitywasahighlylocalaffair.Attimes,infact,itseemedwemightnotendupwithanationalgridatall,butratherasystemofhousehold-sizedgenerationplantswithno wires at all between buildings. Then for a while we also had a bunch of“microgrids” with a generation plant or two and a system of wires for arelativelyspeakingtiny“community”ofusers.Nowadaysthisishowquiteafewcollegecampuses,prisons,andmilitarybasesmaketheirpower,butbackintheearly days of electricity, unlike today, these designated grids all ran differentvoltagesofelectricity.Theyallalsooverlappedgeographically.Therewasonevoltageforstreetcars,oneforthelights,oneforindustrialconcerns,andeachofthesehad itsownprivate systemofwires.Therewere somanywires; the skywasablackspaghetti tangleofwires.Inthe1800selectricalinfrastructurewasanabsolutemess.Fromtheseinauspiciousbeginningswegotanationalgridwithpowerplants

far from view, long loping lines between us and them and, nearer at hand,distributionnetworksstrungthroughneighborhoods,thatlinkindividualhousesbymeans of pole-top transformers to the system as awhole.That this is howelectricityworks inAmericaandprettymucheverywhereelse in the industrialworld isnot the logicaloutcomeofphysics, it’s theproductofculturalvalues,historical exigencies, governmental biases, and the big money dreams offinanciers.Inordertounderstandwhywehaveagridatall—andwhywehavethisone

inparticular—weneedtojumpbackabit,totheearliestdaysofelectrification,andwatchhowthegridwasinventedandbuiltintoabrittle,inflexiblemachineofmassivescopeandunimaginablecomplexity that isnevertheless remarkablyegalitarian.Our grid delivers electricity as easily to the poor as it does to therich,anditblacksoutprivilegealmostasoftenaspoverty.

CHAPTER2HowtheGridGotItsWires

Electricityisnotlikeanythingelse.It’snotasolid,oraliquid,oragas.Itisn’tquite like light or heat. It doesn’t move like the wind or the tides. It doesn’tcombustlikeoilorburnlikewood.Ifitresemblesanythingatallfromtheworldwe know, it is in someway like gravity.Which is to say, it is a force to bereckonedwith.Unlikegravity,electricityislethal,mostespeciallyinitswildform—lightning

—though the threat of electricity’skilling side is always there, evenwhen it’sbeenmostthoroughlydomesticated.Thisiswhywedon’ttouchdownedwires,don’t domuch home electrical repair ourselves, and discourage children fromstickingbobbypinsintooutlets.Intheearlydaysofthegrid,peopledidn’tevenchangetheirownbulbsforfearofelectrocution.Instead,atrainedbulbreplacerwasdispatchedonabicyclebalancingagiantsackofhand-blownvacuum-filledampules on his back to replace all the bulbs that had burned out during thepreviousweeks.Although we now know that electricity is a force and we understand in

nuancedwayshowitworks—muchofwhichwillbeexplainedinthischapter—what is curious about the grid’s earliest days is that thenwe did not.Nobodyknewwhatelectricitywasuntil longafterEdison’sfirstgridwasbuiltandhadburneddown.Acircuselephantwaskilledbyelectricity,and thenaman,andnumerous dogs, as its precise killing force was tested without being properlyunderstood. Electricity was harnessed, made, transported (all wired up), andcausedtolightandpoweranynumberofearlydeviceswhilecontinuingtosecretwithin its ineffable physics the cause of its capacity to “communicate life” toinanimate beings and, equally, its ability to steal this life force from animateones.Despitealackofclarityonthespecifics,whatbecameclearasthetechnology

formakingelectricityandtransmittingitwasfinessedwasthatitwasuniquelycapable of powering things at a distance and doing so very close toinstantaneously. Thus did it become possible to make electrical power “overhere” and use it “over there” at essentially the same moment. Electricity’speculiar capacity to divorce space from time was in keeping with othernineteenth century inventions: the telegraph (1830s) sent “messages” across

town and later around the world in something like an instant; the telephone(1876) did the same with the voice itself; so, too, the radio (1896) with itswireless communication of sounds and songs everywhere all at once; and thephonograph(1877)with its reproducible, if slowerandmorematerialwaxandlatershellacdiscsthatallowedrecordingsmadeinonespottobeheardinquiteanother.Aseachofthesetechnologiesgainedgroundinthepopularimagination,and

withitacertainshareofthemarket,theydisplacedalesseffectivetechnology.Thetelegraphcausedtheposttoseempainfullyslow,whilethetelephonesoonrendered the telegraph if not obsolete a notably awkwardwayof dealingwithlong-distance communication. For its part, what electricity displaced was thesteam engine. With its capacity to be both here and there instantaneously,electric current made it possible to move the noisy, black-soot-belchingbehemothsweused to runmuchofourworld (andstilldo) fartheraway fromwherewe livedandworked.Wewere alreadymakingpower andusing it, yetwith electricitywewere slowly freed from the obligation to do both of thesethings in thesameplace.Thiswasnotonlyaboutmovingpowerplantsoutoffactories, but alsomills away fromwaterwheels, streetcars away from horses,andlightawayfromfire.This capacity to translate power from one point to another took about

seventeen years to become the cause célèbre of electricity.We can see theseseventeenyears—between1879,whenthefirstgridwasbuiltinSanFrancisco,and1896,whentheNiagaraFallspowerplantbegansendingitscurrenttwenty-two miles along high-voltage lines to Buffalo—as the history of a slow butsteady technological comprehension. Over these almost two decades, theremarkable capacityof electricity toproducegood lightgaveway to themoreawe inspiring possibility of electric power. As each of these years drew to aclose,Americafoundherselfhometoevermorepracticalmachines(andsomekooky, bad ones) designed to render feasible remotely produced mechanicalpower and remotely fueled electric lighting. Thiswas a rocky process, hardlylinear,characterizedbytrialanderror,alotofguesswork,andexperimentationwithouttruemodels.Becausethereweremanystumblingblocksandpuddlingsalongtheway,the

routes not taken are often overlooked in the story of how we got from thedomestication of electricity in the 1830s, to itsmass deployment in the 1880sand 1890s, and from there to the electricity dependent nationwe now live in.Theseoft-overlookeddevelopments arenot, however, always secondary to the

story.In part this is because competition was so important to the ways in which

earlyinventorspliedtheirtrades.Alreadybythe1870smostweretryingtocomeupwithviableproductsforobviousgapsinthemarket:alightthatworkedwellforcitystreetswas too terriblybright foroffice interiors;acircuit thatworkedwellforsmallnetworkswasdisastrousforlargerones;acurrentthatfunctionedperfectly well over short distances petered out when asked to travel furtherafield;avoltage thatcould lightonehundredbulbscouldn’tbudgeastreetcar.Everyfailingintheearliestmarketableelectricitysystemsalsopointedthewaytowardabetterpath,abettersolution,thantheonethatwasfoundering.Thisebbandflowofinventivecapacityisnot,however,ofinterestonlytothededicatedhistorian. Many of the earliest developments in electrical infrastructure—thesystemswe thoughtwe’d left behind—aregainingunexpectedpurchase in thepresentasweremakeandreimagineourgrid.Forthisreasonitisworthchartingapathtothegridwedidget,firstrealized

at Niagara but which would later grow to include the big federal dams(Bonneville (1937),GrandCoulee (1942),and theTennesseeValleyAuthorityproject(1933))aswellasbig,investor-owned,utility-run,government-regulatedcoal-burning,oil-burning, and laternuclearpowerplants. Iwill also,however,linger in considerationof the electricalpower systemsweoncehadbutwhichdid not for various reasonsmake the cut. Some of these, like arc lighting—apainfullybright formof early electrical illumination—would slowly fade fromhistoricalmemoryas itwasoutperformedbybetter,newertechnologies.Inarclighting’scase,theagentsofitsgradualdemiseweretheparallelcircuitandthemuch dimmer “soft, mellow, grateful to the eye” illumination produced byincandescentbulbs.Thepromiseoftechnologieslikethearclightwascollapsedintoobsolescencebythepowerofinventionitself.Other moments in the grid’s history and other means of making light and

powerhavehadalongerafterlifethananyonemightreasonablyhaveexpected.Individual power systems for a home, building, or factory were especiallydifficult togetridof,survivingwellintothe1920s,despitebettertechnologiesandstrongutilityandregulatoryresistancetotheircontinuation.Theseso-called“privateplants”remainedapartofourenergylandscapemostlybecausepeoplelikedthemand,almostassoonasthefirstwaveofseriousgridreformbeganinthe late 1970s, they started popping back up—despite fifty years of totaldormancy—toexertanewfoundpresenceontheelectricityscene.Evenmore recently,with themeteoric rise of solar power installations, the

preferredformofelectricalcurrentinthe1880s,so-calledDChasalsomadeacurious comeback despite having been outperformed by its most immediatecompetitor, AC, or alternating current, for 130 years. Although almosteverythingaboutourworldhaschangedsincethe1880s,itneverthelessremainsthe case that there is a certain appeal to private ownership, especially whenexplicitlylinkedtoasenseofcontroloveralimiteddomain.It justsohappensthatsmall,privatelyownedpowersystemsarewhatDCisbestsuitedto.The early story of the grid, then, is one of rapid technological change.

Inventing it was a collective process of learning what a newly domesticatedelectricalforcewascapableofandwhatthings,smallandlarge,mightbemadetorealizeitsremarkablepowersforthewidestpossiblesetofapplications.Thisstoryisnotsomuchoneofwinnersandlosers,butofmomentsoftriumphandobsolescence as the speed of technological change outpaced even the mostremarkablycreativemenwho,uponsteppingfromthegame,cededtheirspotstootherswithnewvisionsandnewlynecessarycapacities.

We’ve been able to produce electricity using electromagnetic forces sinceMichaelFaraday’sexperimentsinthe1830sandtoproduceitchemically,usingsomething like a battery, sinceAlessandroVolta invented the electrochemicalpile in 1800. Despite an intense interest in electricity and the machines onemightdevisetomakeit,itremainedunclearwellintothe1860swhatelectricitymightbegoodfor.Suchthatby1870thoughwecouldproduceelectricityandcontrolit,wehadnothingtodowithit.Manyofthefirstgenerationofelectricalproduct developers (inventors all, but with an eye toward serviceable,reproducible technologiesforsale)suspectedthat theanswerwouldbelight. Itwas a dim, smoky era of itchy eyes, dark factories, and early bedtimes.Somesortoflightingbetterthanthecandlesandgaslampsthatdominatedtheerawasonalmosteveryone’slistofnecessaryimprovementstobusinessanddailylife.Itwasbignews,then,whenFatherJosephNeri,aprofessoratSanFrancisco’s

Saint Ignatius College, installed a small battery-powered electric light in hiswindowin1871;slightlylessthanadecadelater,in1879,SanFranciscoalreadyhad thenation’s first-evercentralarc lightingstation.Thissystemconsistedoftwodynamos(anearlykindofelectricgenerator)poweredbyacoal-firedsteamengineatFourthandMarketStreets.Itmayhavebeentiny,lightingonlytwentyshockinglybrightlamps,butitwasagrid.

Less known, but no less remarkable, was the adoption of hydropoweredelectric lighting in thegoldminesof theSierraNevada.The first electricgridbuilt to light a mine also became operational in 1879. Using water-drivendynamos deigned byCharlesBrush, themine ownerswere able to light three3,000-candlepower arc lamps. These allowed the miners to work through thenight, effectively doubling the time they could spend searching for brightmountaingold.Electriclightingwassointimatelylinkedtoprofit, inthiscase,that it quickly became an essential tool for mining companies. Slowly thesecompaniesalsobegantoelectrifypumpsandhoists,buildinglongerandlongerlines to carry electric current fromwhere thewater fell to extraction sites.Aselectricity grew into an increasingly necessary form of industrial power, thegrid’s lines also grew and stretched to accommodate the circumstances intowhichitwasbuiltandwithinwhichitwouldneedtofunction.The press loved it too. Arguably no one needed electric light so much as

clerks, writers, and seamstresses—people whose eyes were their livelihood—though thewomenhemmed and darned by the flicker of gas lamps long afterelectric lighting had become commonplace in the large office buildings thathoused white-collar workers and newspapermen. The year 1879, which sawelectricitycometotheSierraNevadaalsosawanelectriclightingsystemfortheSan Francisco Chronicle: again, arc lamps, five of them, strung in a series.Threeyearslater,in1882,theNewYorkTimeshaditsofficeswiredforlight,inthiscasefifty-twoincandescentbulbsstrunginparallel.This subtle-seeming transition in the structure of circuitry, from serial to

parallel,was the grid’s first revolution.Thoughwe tend to giveThomasAlvaEdison the credit for having invented the lightbulb (hedidnot), he diddevisesomething just as remarkable—the parallel circuit, one of his greatest if leastlaudedcontributions to technologicalunderpinningsofourmodernworld.Thevery existence of a relatively dimbulb,whichwe take for granted today,wasmadepossibleonlybythepriorinventionoftheparallelcircuit.Theengineers,physicists,tinkerers,andinventorsofEdison’seraarguedthat

thephysical“division”ofelectriccurrentwas technologically impossible.Thatis, theyhadproved—beforeEdison found aworkaround—that the notionof abulb in every socket and a socket in every roomwas not only not financiallyfeasible,butactuallyagainstthelawsofnature.Whatwasfeasiblewasapowerplant for every lighting system and a single or very limited number offantastically bright lights for every power source. This is precisely how arclightingworks—eachnetworkconsistsofashortstringof tremendouslybright

lightspoweredbyasinglegenerator.Asnaturalasitmightseemtoustodaythatlotsofbulbs,and lotsofotherstuff,would runoffasinglepowersource, thiswas not the most evident or even the most inevitable form for masselectrificationtotakeinthelate1870s.Edison,however,notbeinganeducatedmanbutratheradiligentone,hada

tendencytodisregardthelawsofphysicswhenpursuingtechnologicalsolutionsto irritatingproblems,occasionallywith successandoftenwith failure.NikolaTesla, an inventor of a very different sort, once said of him, “IfEdisonhad aneedletofindinahaystack,hewouldproceedatoncewiththediligenceofthebeetoexaminestrawafterstrawuntilhefoundtheobjectofhissearch…alittletheoryandalittlecalculationwouldhavesavedhim90percentofhislabor.”Asithappens,Edison’sdiligenceaside,thephysicistswereactuallyright.An

arc lamp, because of its low resistance, can’t be extensively divided. If a 1.5-horsepowerdynamoranthesmallestofCharlesBrush’sarclamps,thenasystemof eighteen such lamps strung in a series took all the power of his largestdynamo—a13-horsepowermonsterofamachine.Thatisalotofelectricityandalotoflight.Infact,itwastoomuchofbothforpeopleusedtothesixteenfoot-candles’ worth of light (the equivalent of a 25-watt bulb) given off by theaverage indoor gas lamp. What is more, the color of arc lights was horrid,making everyone look “ghastly,” and they buzzed disagreeably. The powerfrequencyofarclampswas,muchlikeearlyfluorescenttubes,withintherangeofhumanhearing.Thatsaid,onecouldseequitewellbyarc lighting,andthatwas a decided improvement over the flickering flames of gas, candle, liquidcoal,orwhaleoillampswithwhicharclightingwasindirectcompetition.In order to overcome this problem of too few, too bright, ghastly, buzzing

lights, Edison adapted his parallel circuit, a rudimentary version, which hademerged from his work on the transmission of sound, to the problem ofsubdividing an electric current. At issue was that unlike water an electricalcurrentdoesn’t seek the easiestor shortest route fromonepoint to another; toelectricityallpathwaysareequal.Soifoneprovidestwopaths,itwilltakethemboth simultaneously and indiscriminately, even if the second is twenty timeslonger than the first; if one provides forty paths, this pattern of all-options-at-oncetravelisthesame.Thesimplestexplanationofthedifferencebetweenthetwokindsofcircuitsisthatparallelcircuitsallowforthissortofboth/andflowpattern,whereasseriescircuitsgiveelectricityonlyasinglepathtofollow.OlderchainsofChristmastreelightsworkinthissingle-pathway.Ifyouhave

everspentaneveningtryingtofindtheburned-outbulbinsuchachain,you’ll

knowthatthedownsideofseriescircuitsisthateverythingwiredintothecircuitneedstobeabletoallowtheelectriccurrenttopass.Onebrokenconnection,oneburned-outbulb,renderstheentirecircuitunusable.Ifweusedseriescircuitsinourhousestoday,allthelightsandthefridgewouldshutoffwhenyouturnedoffyourTV.Withseriescircuits,eithereverythingisonoreverythingisoff.Parallelcircuits,incontrast,allowtheelectricityflowingthroughasystemto

takemanypossiblepaths.Ifallthepathshavethesameresistance,saya15-wattbulb wired into them, the electricity in the system will take all the availableroutessimultaneouslyandwithoutbias.Ifoneofthesebulbsburnsout,therestwillcontinuetoworkasbefore;onepathisblocked,butallotherpathsremainopen.If the maximum number of arc lights wired in series was eighteen, each

burningwiththeequivalentbrightnessofa2,000-wattbulb,allofwhichhadtobeeitheronoroff,thenEdison’sgrid,thegroundingpremiseofwhichwastheparallelcircuit,lookedawholelotmorelikeourown.WhenThomasEdisonputthis theory into practice, building his first grid at the Pearl Street Station inLower Manhattan, it was an act of competition. Charles Brush’s arc lightsystemswerealloverthecityandhadbeenforalmostthreeyears.WhatEdisonsetouttoproveatPearlStreetwasnotthatelectricitywasgoodformakinglight—by1882thatwasknown—butthatelectriclightingcouldbecomfortablydimandelectricsystemsgreatlyexpanded.

FIG2Inaseriescircuit(left),ifonebulbisoutoroff,theelectriccurrentcannotcontinueitspatharoundthecircuit. In thiscase,everythingelsewired into thecircuitwill,bynecessity,alsobeoff. Inaparallelcircuit (right), a burned-out bulb or other blockage does notmake a difference to themovement of thecurrent.Otherdevicescanbeturnedonandoffatwill.(LoïcUntereiner)

WhenEdison’s first public grid flickered to light in 1882 itwas littlemorethanasixthofasquaremile.By1884,ithadexpandedtoafullmileandheldmore than eight thousand bulbs, each a little circle of golden dimness with alumen count equivalent to a contemporary15-watt bulb.These eight thousandbulbswerewired in parallel, connectedone to the next by a networkofmorethanahundredthousandfeetofwire,whichranthroughconduitsburiedunderNew York’s cobble. The entire network was powered by six 27-ton 100 kWJumbo Mary-Anns, as Edison’s dynamos were called for their admittedly“leggy” form. This was the nation’s first public lighting system to relyexclusively on incandescent bulbs wired into a parallel circuit. It ran directcurrentandwascoal fired—amessywaytomakepower inaplaceasdenselypopulatedaslowerManhattan,wherehorsesladenwithblackdustycoalarrivedinaconstanttraincloggingthenarrowstreet.Whileequestrianlifewasfarfromexceptional in themess thatwas street lifeat the time, further increasing theirnumberswas a boon to neither the livability nor the traversability of the areaaroundPearlStreet.Onepower stationwas irritation enough,butEdison’splan forhisgridwas

not limited to what he could accomplish at Pearl Street. Because of thelimitationsofdirectcurrenthisnetworkcouldnotphysicallybeextendedfartherthanamilewithouthishavingtobuildanotherpowerstation.Hisvisionforthecitywasapowerstationforeverydensecitymile,eachwithitsclogofhorse-drawncoalcarts,itsbelchedblacksmokeanditspipedinsourceoffreshwater.EventhoughthousandsofarclightsystemswereburninginAmericancities,

manufactories,andminesbeforeEdisonturnedthelightsonforthestaffoftheTimesandotherresidentsofWallStreet,thePearlStreetStationiswhere,intheAmericanpopularimagination,theelectricagebegan.Thisisduenotsomuchto the fact that our current grid looks orworks likeEdison’s first attempt—inmanywaysitdoesnot—butbecauseparallelcircuitschangedboththeintensityof lighting and the proliferation of bulbs, and both of these have becomeordinarytousinthepresent.Thoughit’sEdison’snamethatweremembertoday,ratherthanMr.Charles

Brush’s—theinventorofthearclampandadynamothatrivaledEdison’sown—Brush’s arc lights were, in the early 1880s, swiftly becoming the nation’spreferred means of mechanical illumination. According to an 1881 issue ofScientificAmerican,1,240arclampshadbeeninstalledinwoolen,cotton,linen,silk,andother factories,800 in rollingmills, steelworks,andsimilarmachineworks, 425 in large stores, hotels, and churches, 250 in parks, docks, and

summer resorts, 275 in railroad depots and shops, 130 inmines and smeltingworks (like those in the Sierra Nevada), 380 lights in factories and“establishments of various kinds,” and 1,500 along city streets, with another1,200 lights inEnglandandother foreigncountries. Indeed, inEngland,whereanEdison-stylegrid(lotsofdimlightsrunonaparallelcircuit)wasverylatetoflourish,arclightingwasthepreferredmethodofelectricilluminationwellintothe1920s.Today,arclights,withtheirinconvenientbrightness,areusedprettymuchonlyasthesourceofilluminationinIMAXfilmprojectors.Edison’ssystemwasnotwithoutcompetition,notonlyfromarclightingbut

alsofromgaslamps.Addtothisthat therewereliterallyhundredsofdynamoson themarketbeforeEdison inventedhisown.Hisparallel circuitmighthavebeenrevolutionary,hisbulbsanaesthetichit,buttherewasnorealreasonforhisgrid,hisdynamo,orhisrecipeforinsulatingwirestobetakenupbycompaniesandmunicipalitiesconsideringelectriclighting.To give himself an edge, Edison took a route not unfamiliar to students of

contemporary marketing. In creating his grid, he took care to make eachdedicatedpieceonlyinteroperablewithotherEdisoncomponents.Ifyouwantedhisbulb,orhiscircuit, thenyouhadtoalsobuyhisdynamo,hisswitches,andhislines.Whensomethingwentawry,youhadtohireEdison’smentocomefixit. Edison’s grid was thus rather like a kit—a grid-kit—which could becustomized for whomever wanted a full-on, ready-to-go, public or privatelightingsystem.Manyearlycustomerswerefactoriesandlargepublicbuildings,some were municipalities, and very few, very occasionally were wealthyindividuals.The larger versions of Edison’s parallel circuit system, installed by cities,

were called “central station”gridsbecause at theveryheart of thenetworkoflines stood the power station. The smaller, privately owned versions, whichwould plague latter attempts to unify electricity networks, were known as“privateplants”becausetheyhadasingleowner,andusuallyalso,asingleuse.Theownersofelectrifiedmansionsusuallyusedtheplantforlighting,whilethemanagersofstreetcarcompaniesusedthemfortheelectrifiedhaulingofpersonsallaroundthetown.In1882,notlongafterManhattangotitsfirstincandescentgridatPearlStreet,

awealthybusinessmanfromAppleton,Wisconsindecided to invest inadirectcurrent Edison grid, which arrived by train with all necessary components,including the dynamo, and a team of men to do the installation. His grid-kitincluded a couple of generators, copper wires insulated in cotton, and

incandescentlightbulbswithcarbonizedbamboofilaments.ThoughthiswasbutoneofanumberofkitsshippedoutbyEdisonthatyear,whatmakesAppleton’scaseuniqueisthat,unlikeDetroit,NewOrleans,St.Paul,Chicago,Philadelphia,andBrooklyn,allofwhichwereearlyadoptersofEdison’scentralstationgrid,itwasn’tjustindustry,offices,orpublicspacesthatwerelitbyAppleton’sgrid—italso lit houses. InAppletonwegotAmerica’s first true, smallmunicipal grid,powerforthepeople,anditrannotoncoalbutaccordingtotheerraticspinningofawaterwheel.LikethePearlStreetStation,Appleton’sgridproducedanddistributeddirect

current at 100 volts, give or take, and was used exclusively for poweringincandescent lightbulbs—alsoofEdison’smanufactureand included in thekit.What quickly became clear to the town’s people and nascent utility men ofAppleton is that maintaining a constant voltage is much easier with coal-powered dynamos, like the ones Edison was using in Manhattan, than withwater-poweredones.The problemwithwater in theMidwest and on the East Coast is that it is

alwaysfallingatadifferent rate.Afteraspringdeluge it is torrential; ina latesummerdroughtitdribblesanddripsitswaydownward.Curiously,thisislessaproblemintheWest,wherelow-velocity,high-volumemountainstreamsrunataremarkablyconsistentrateasgradualsnowpackmeltsmeldintoearly-autumnrains. The SierraNevadawas by its very nature a better place to install earlyhydropower, which ran in rivers and streams, than wereMidwestern industrytowns,becausewitheverychangeinwater’svelocity,theintensityofthepowerproduced by the dynamo in early hydroelectric systems shifted as well. As aresult,thebrightnessofAppleton’sbulbswasnotentirelypredictable.Toodimtoseebyatonemomentand toobrightby far thenext, thevagariesofnatureweremaintaininganimpolitequotientofcontroloverman-madelighting.In Appleton, this meant that everyone on the grid still needed candles and

kerosenelampsonhandforwhentheirbulbsfadedto littlemorethanagentleorange curl of filament. For their part, the utilitywas constantly struggling tomaintain sufficient funds for new bulbs, as the “too bright” produced byexcessivevoltageall toooftenburnedoutabulb’sdelicate filament, renderingthe entire contraption useless. At $1 a replacement bulb (or $23.50 in 2015dollars), this voltage problemwas not a negligible expense for tinyAppleton,Wisconsin’sfledglingutility.

In order to understand the problemAppletonwas havingwith its waterwheeland,morecritically, theproblem that allofAmericawouldbehavingwith itsgrid by the mid-1880s, it is necessary to delve into the technicalities ofelectricityproduction,andvoltagemostespecially.Thoughtherearemanywaysto describe voltage, nonemake it a particularly easy concept to grasp. Often,again,what theprocessof trying togetdown to thephysicalnutsandboltsofelectric power makes most plain is how much electricity really isn’t likeanythingelseweknowormanage.Sodifficultisitto“think”aboutelectricitythatdescriptivemetaphorsquickly

enter into any explanatory matrix. Odd as it may seem, the most accurate ofthese for explaining voltage is the highly anthropomorphic notion of “desire”:electrons that have been artificially split from atoms (which is what anelectromagneticgenerator does) “want” to resolve themselvesback intowholeatomsagain.Thismaymakeelectricitysoundrathermorelikeasinglesbarthana problem of physics, but the notion of “desiring to complete oneself bycoupling” does give a pretty good sense of the ferocity with which electronswithoutatomsmovetowardatomsthatlackelectrons.What an electric grid does, then, is first forcibly divorce happy electrons

which hold a negative charge from their atoms which hold a positive charge(generation)andthenprovideaneasyroute(thewires)forthemtoreuniteagain.Astheelectronstravelalongthesewirestheypassthroughallthethingsweputin their way—things like incandescent lightbulbs. And as they pass theyencounterresistance.Afilamentinabulbis lessconductivethanthelinesintoandoutofthedevice.Someoftheelectrons’potential—thepushithastoreunite—isthusexpendedingettingthroughthisresistivematerial.Inthecaseofanincandescentbulbthispotentialbecomesheat,someofwhich

radiates in the visible spectrum—about 5 percent for an Edison bulb. In anelectric motor, like those in refrigerators or washing machines, this electricalstream is used to produce a rotation within a magnetic field, which in turnproduces a mechanical force. This nicely boxed-up conversion of electricalenergy tomechanical energy runsmuch of ourmodernworld, fromnose hairclipperstoelectriccars.Regardlessofwhetheroneissiphoningoffthe“desirethatmovesthem”inan

electricflowforheat,light,orpower(allofwhicharesubsumed,technically,by

the term“work”), twothingsare important: first, that theelectronsaremovingthrough, not stopping in, the device; and second, that they are not overlydiminished in theirdesire (orpotential forwork) in theprocess.Thename forthedrive,alsocalledapotentiality,isvoltage.Themeasureofthisdriveisavolt—oraunitofelectricaltension.Voltage ismeasured bymeans of a potentiometer (it does, onemust admit,

soundlikeapoorlyaccomplishedsexjokefromstarttofinish).Thestrengthofvoltagegivesusagoodsenseoftheworkthatelectronscanreliablybeaskedtodoastheybumptheirwaythroughthesystemandpassthroughourstuff.Onehundredtenvoltscanpowerabulb,220anelectricrazor,500astreetcar,

and2,000anelectric chair;50,000volts isgood forhigh-voltage transmissionlinesand100,000voltsforastungun.Lightning,earth’swildelectricforce,isseveralhundredmillionvolts,andbestavoided.Asabstractasthisallmightsound,maintainingconstantvoltageonagridis

not merely a theoretical problem, nor even principally a financial one(Appleton’scripplingbulbbudgettotheside).Atrootitisapracticalone.Ifwewantthegridtoworkforus,therelativevehemenceoftheelectricflowmustbecontrolled.Forthoughweareaccustomedtosayingthatourmodernworldreliesuponelectricity,it’sfarmoreaccuratetosaythatitreliesuponconstantvoltage,which electricity, when properly managed, provides. Our machines, unlikeourselves,brooknovariation.Ortoputitanotherway,anelectricgrid’smostsignificantpointofappealis

itsabilitytomakeandreliablytransmitstandardizedpower—notforus,wearefinetogetthecandlesoutoftheclosetifthelightsgrowtoodim.Ourmachines,thetruecustomersoftheelectricage,arenotsoforgiving.Saggingvoltagewilltearapowerplanttobitsinminutesasallthetinyballbearingsthatmakethatplant work quickly build up enough heat to destroy every motor and pulleysystemintheplace.Lessdramatically,adecreaseinvoltagewillcausebulbstodim,andthesecondhandonelectricclockstoslow.This laggardly voltage can happen for all sorts of reasons, though themost

commoninEdison’sdaywasnotenough“desire”generatedattheplanttokeepeverything strung along the wires chugging along at a constant pace. TheoccasionalsluggishnessofAppleton’s localwaterwheeldidn’tcauseelectricityto cease to flow through the grid (a blackout), it simply didn’t provide quiteenoughpowertoactuallyruneverythingwiredintothatgridatitsfullpotential(a brownout)—a bulb that needs 110 volts to shine like “a little globe ofsunshine”is,at85volts,adimlittlebeigesortofthingthatturnsalltheworld

notfromnighttobrightbutintoasepiasort-of-colorlesswash.If tinyAppletonwas struggling in 1882with one kind of voltage problem,

America’surbanareaswere fast confronting another.Differentmachineswerebeing built to run on different voltages. This wasn’t merely a product ofinventors’whimsybutwaslinkedrathertotheamountofpowerittakestomakea machine work. In the 1800s an incandescent lightbulb, much like today,needed100 to110volts toglowwithadequatebrightness,whereasa streetcarranon500volts,andearlyelectric factorymotors ranateither1,200or2,000volts.Thismakessense; it takesmorework,and thusmoreenergy, tomoveawagonfullofpeoplealongarail,ortorunamechanicalprintingpress,thanitdoestogetaminusculecarbonfilamenttoglowinavacuum.The problem for places like New York or Cleveland or Chicago (but not

necessarilyforAppleton)wasthatthereweremanypotentialusesforelectricity,eachwithaspecificvoltageneed.Directcurrent,whichiswhatallgridsranuntilabout1886andmostgridsranwellintotheearlyyearsofthetwentiethcentury,usesaninflexiblevoltagesetatthedynamo.Ifagridisusingdirectcurrent,thena streetcar simply cannotbe runusing the samegeneratoror set ofwires as astring of lightbulbs. Either all the bulbs explode (overvoltage) or the streetcardoesn’tbudge(undervoltage);thereisnohappymedium.The result was that in big cities, the grids almost immediately began to

multiply.Directcurrentgridswerenotonlybuilttomeetdifferentvoltageneedsof their customers, but competing electric companies and streetcar companieswereunmotivatedtoshareinfrastructures,eachpreferringtoconstructagridofitsown.Eachoftheseprivategridshaditsowngeneratingstationanddedicatedsetoflines.Addthetelephoneandtelegraphwiresthatwerealreadyoccupyingthepolesthesenewgridsshared(inmuchthesamewaythatTVcablenetworksand telephone landlines share poles todaywith electric distribution networks),andthespaceabovecitystreetswasamess.By1890onecouldhardlyseetheskyindowntownManhattan,sothicklystrungwerethewiresforeachoftheseseparate,parallelelectricalsystemslopingbetweenbuildingsandalongstreets.Tomakemattersworse,all thesedifferentelectricsystemsweremadeupof

components patented by a host of competing inventor-entrepreneurs. In the1870sand1880s, literallyhundredsofpatentswereissuedintheUnitedStatesfordynamosofdifferentbuildsandcharacteristics.Andasdowntownswerelitacross the nation—Muncie, Fayetteville, Jackson, Topeka, Laramie, Chicago,Los Angeles, San Jose—their city governments, streetcar companies, andindustrial concerns were all making quixotically individual choices about the

best system to light their streets and power their machines. Some had arclighting, others a version of the Thomas Edison’s mail-order grid-in-a-boxcarthatAppleton,Wisconsin,hadinstalled,andbytheendofthedecadestillotherswereputtinginGeorgeWestinghouse’salternatingcurrentgrids.Bythe1890s,mosthadsomecombinationofthethree,pluslargenumbersofprivateplantsaseveryone from thebrewer to themayorhad startedbuying and installing theirownpowersystems.

FIG3NewYorkCityduringtheGreatBlizzardof1888.Thewiresareamixoftelephone,telegraph,andelectricitylines.(ReproducedwithpermissionfromtheMuseumoftheCityofNewYork)

The more electric power there was the more strongly a cultural proclivityrarelymentioned inhistoriesof thegridwasmaking itselfknown.Rather thanoptingtobehookedintoapublicgrid,industrialconcernsandsomefewwealthypeoplewerechoosingtomakepowerforthemselves,privatelyonsite.Fromthe1880s well into the 1900s electricity production was actually tending towardbecomingthesortof individualizedsystemweuse today tomakehotwaterorcoolair.Thecentralstationgrid—asbothanotionandaproduct—wasreceivingits greatest competition not from other electrical companies or competingelectricalsystemsbutfromprivateplants—agridnolargerthanasinglehome,orasinglefactory;agridbought,paidfor,andownedbyoneman,onefamily,oroneindustrialundertaking.Though we tend to overlook it, hot water and cold air can, much like

electricity,beproducedmoreeconomicallyindenselypopulatedareasbycentralstations thanby individuals. Insomeplaces thissystembecamethenorm.TheSovietUnionhadmunicipalhotwaterplants thatalsomadesteamforheating,and many American universities have a central cooling facility that uses acampuswidesystemofductworkstoair-conditioneverythingoutofonecentralcold-air plant. There is no material or infrastructural reason that these twoproducts are for themostpart in theUnitedStatesprivatelyowned.The samewastrueofelectricity.Wethinkof itasapublicgoodonlybecause itbecameonewithtime,notbecauseitworkedthatwayfromthebeginning.

The history of the grid has been largelywritten to give the backstory for thecentralstation,polyphaseACsystemweusetoday(andhavebeenusingprettymuchexclusivelysinceabout1915).Butinthelate1800sduringthescrambletolight, and later power, as much of urban America as possible by means ofelectric current the story of our electrical infrastructure could have unfoldeddifferently. Municipalities, investors, and inventors may have preferred thecentralstationmodel,butpeopleandfactoryownerslikedsmallpowersystems.Theylikedacoalchuteinthebasement,adynamodowntheretoo,andahouseorfactorywiredtousethislocallyproducedpower—mostlyforlightintheearlydays,butaselectricmotorsbecamemorereliableandelectricalappliancesmorecommonplace,these,too,couldbepoweredonsite.Nordidtheseundertakingsneedtoexistinsideabuilding.Thegridsthatranstreetcarswellintothe1920swerealsoessentiallyprivateplants—despitethesprawlinggeographytheselines

traversed,therewasbutasinglecustomerandsingleproducerfortheelectricityeachused.Thoughwetendtothinkofelectricityasaneliteproductduringthisepochbecauseonlyrichpeoplecouldaffordtohaveitintheirhomes,itmightbemoreapt to say that itwasa corporateand industrialpower source first andameansofartificiallyilluminatingthehomesoftherichsecond.Brush’sarclights,toobrightforhomeuse,soldasprivateplantsatarateof

twotooneovermunicipalsales.Similarly,Edison’scentralstationgrid-kitwassellingbest tosingleowners.Onehundredandfiftyof thesewereoperatinginthemansionsoftherichlikethoseoftheVanderbiltsorMr.J.PierpontMorganbeforeEdisonhadevengottenthePearlStreetStationupandrunning.AndoncePearl Streetwasworking and theEdisonGeneral ElectricCompany had beenestablished for the making and marketing of small municipal grids to citiesacrosstheMidwest,another134isolatedplantshad,muchtoEdison’schagrin,been ordered and installed, most into factories. “The light that proved mostsalable,”onehistoryrecounts,wasintheformEdison“consideredunsound:theisolatedplantprovedtobeaseasytosellasthecentralstationwasdifficult.Bythe spring of 1883, there were 334 isolated plants in operation and the PearlStreetplantwasstillalmostaloneasacentralstation.”Fromthenon,foreverygridEdisonfranchisedtoatownhesoldtenprivate

plants. Between 1882 and 1887—the year that George Westinghouse’scompetingACsystementered themarket, taking itbystorm—Edison licensed121centralstationgrids,likeAppleton’s.Duringthesameperiodhe’dalsosoldandhelped installover1,200privateplants.And, to jumpaheadabit, in1907onlyabout8percentofAmericanhomeswereservedbyelectricityandmostofthesewere stillprivateplants—this, longafter thechaos in the skieshadbeenresolved, by means of the rotary converter, into a “universal” system forelectricityproductionanddistribution.PartofthereasonforthisisthatasremarkableasEdison’sdirectcurrentgrid

wasindenselypopulatedlowerManhattanortinyAppleton,Wisconsin,itwasbettersuitedtosmallinstallationsthanlargeones.ThePearlStreetStationonlyconfirmedthis,asevenwiththesixjumbodynamoshe’dinstalleditstilldidn’thavethecapacitytotransmitelectricityfartherthanaboutamile.Hecouldputalot of bulbs in thatmile, andby adding additional generation, he couldpowerthemwell,butafterthatthelawsofphysicstookover.Directcurrentatsolowavoltage (100 volts) just can’t be transmitted farther before becoming sodiminishedthatonecouldn’tsingeamustachehairwiththestuff.Therejustisn’tenoughoomphintheelectronstreamtopushitbeyondamile.

Iflimitingformass-lightingorlargemunicipalprojects,thischaracteristicofdirect current meant that it was perfectly suited to smaller scale installations.Evenabigfactory,oranofficetower,orarichman’smansionwere,inthelate1800s, smaller than a squaremile. Itwas amanageable task to determine thelight or power needs of each individual customer and build that customer abasementpowerplant, install thenecessarylighting,drillholesinthewallsfortheelectricsconces,addthebulbsandswitches,andcallitasuccess.Strictlyspeakingtherewasnoreasontoengineerbigger,morecomplexgrids

thanthis.Lotsofsmallgridsweretheorderoftheday.Onesuspects,thoughitisconjecture, that had these private plants become the way we made and alsothoughtaboutelectricity,thechaotictanglesofwiresthatbedeckednineteenth-century city skies would have calmed in time as traction companiesconsolidated, as competition between local power providers eased, and asmunicipalgridsgavewaytosmallerbuilding-basedelectricalinstallations.This didn’t happen, but an understanding of a past that almost, but didn’t

produce an electric system based in private plants rather than central stationshelpstoilluminatesomeofthepeculiaritiesofthepresent.Today, the tensionbetweenindividualpowerproduction(privateplants)and

utility-supplied electricity (central stations) is once again becoming thebattleground upon which the future of our grid—the form and scope of itsinfrastructure—is beingwaged. Formost of the intervening years,which is tosay,theentiretyofthetwentiethcentury,itseemednaturalthatpowerwouldbemadeenmasse,transmittedbyimmense,high-voltageAClines(and,bythelate1960s,high-voltageDClinesliketheWesternDoughnutaswell),toclumpsofcustomers, linked one to another and to the greater grid through a massivesystem of pole-top transformers and local substations where the intensity oftransmissionscalevoltagewassteppeddowntodomesticallyconsumableflows.Until,bytheturningofthemostrecentmillennium,thissenseofabigpublic

gridasthenaturalwaytomakeanddistributeelectricitywas,forallintentsandpurposes, absolute. Evenwhen I spoke to peoplewhowere so upsetwith theinconsistent functioning of utility-provided electricity that theywere trying tofigure out ways to make their own power for themselves, they neverthelessconsistently reiterated theviewthatelectricitywasabasichumanright. Itwassomething the government should ensure all people had access to just likepotablewaterorbreathableair.Indeed,thisisalsomyview.Themostdiabolicaloutcomeofareturntoasystemofprivateplants,which

couldeasilyhappeninthenextcoupleofdecadesinsunnyplaceslikeArizona,

Hawaii, and southernCalifornia (and to some degree has already happened inGermany)isthatitthreatensuniversalaccesstoqualityelectricalpower.Ifournationisgroundedinthenotionofequalopportunityforall,thentherecannotbepartial,orunevenlydistributed,electricity.Wecannotcontinuetobethenationwehavebecomeandalsoendorseorproducehavesandhave-notsintheworldelectric.One can go even further to claim that it is not only electricity-for-allwhichmakesourcountrystrong,norevenelectricitypricedsolowthatalmosteveryone can use itwith unbridled avarice, but thatwe all have access to thesamequalityofaffordableelectricpower.Thepooraren’tfacedwithflickeringbulbs, or a ration system that grants them an hour of electric power per day.They are not saddled with prepaid meters, like those in South Africa, thatfunctiononlyifonehasmadeadepositontheaccountbeforeuse,whiletherichhave air-conditioning, light, Internet, and electronic trading systems 24/7.Standardizedpower for all is a twentieth-centuryvalue that has donemuch tomake America what it is. As private plants come back into vogue, it will beimportant tokeepinmindhowshifts inpowerproductionfromabiggrid intomanysmallonesmightbe integrated intoa system that stillpromisesandstillprovideshigh-qualityelectricitytoeveryone.Intheearlydaysofelectrification,however,thissenseofpowerasacommon

goodwasnothowelectricitywasmadeormarketed.Itwasbydefinitionaneliteproduct, not for everybody but for those who could afford it. This was notsimply because electricity hadn’t yet spread to the masses, but because themasseswerenotconsideredamarketworthreachinguntil later inournation’shistory.Someevenarguethatitwasn’tuntilaftertheGreatDepressionthatthenotion that one could make money by selling lots of cheap things to lots ofrelatively poor peoplemade any inroads at all.Most, however, agree that theideaofa“massmarket”or“consumerculture”cameaboutinpartbecauseutilitycompanyentrepreneursneedednewwaystomakeaprofitfromelectricity.GE(originallyEdisonGeneralElectric)startedoutasapowercompany;itwasonlywith time that it becamean appliance company renting, and then later selling,peoplestuffthatneededtobepluggedintowork.Moneywasmadetwiceover,firstwiththesaleoftherefrigeratorandsecondwiththeongoingsaleofelectricpowernecessary tomakeit run.Thisshift invision involvedboth imaginingawholenewsetofdemands,beyondlightingforelites,forwhichelectricitymightbeusedandseeingawholenewpopulation—everyone—asapotentialmarket.Notelitelightbutpopularlight,popularheat,andpopularpower.Inotherwords, thenotionofconsumerormassculture, inwhichallpeople

arepromisedaccesstoallthings,wasinparttheresultoftheuniversalizationofelectricity andnot the otherway around.A standardized electric current camefirst,withtheconstructionoftheNiagarageneratingstationatNiagaraFallsintheearly1890s,whiletheveritableexplosionofhomeappliances,andtheideaof a mass market for them, did not emerge until the early 1940s. Thestandardized plug and outlet thatmade this consumer revolution possiblewasnot achieved until the unfortunate year of 1929, after which point—theGreatDepressiondecimatingour lives and livelihoods—very fewpeople inAmericawereinthemarketfordomestictechnologiesofanykind.

Thefirststeptowardabiggrid,onethatwouldmakeitpossibletouniversalizeaccess to electric power, was the invention and successful manufacture ofalternatingcurrent(AC)electricalsystemsin1887.Itseemedatfirstthataddingyetanotherdifferentsortofelectriccurrent to thechaosmultiplyingat rooftopand pole topwould onlymake thingsworse, and for awhile that is preciselywhat it did. ButAC had a strong advantage overDC, an advantage thatwithtimefacilitatedthestreamliningandorderingofthetangleofwires,companies,currents,voltages,andratesofoscillation.Forunlikedirectcurrent,alternatingcurrent can travel; it was outpacing its rival’s single sad mile from its firstmomentonthemarket.Thesingularadvantageofalternatingcurrentisthatlowvoltages,madeatthe

generator, can be “stepped up” to much higher voltages by means of atransformer—a simple devicemade of two sets of tightly coiled copperwiresthat almost, but don’t quite, touch.Higher voltages can go farther than lowervoltages. Ithas, ifyouwill, ahigherquotientofdesire, it “wants”harder, andthusispropelledfarther.Thetransformerisasimpleifgeniusmeansbywhichthis“steppingup”and“steppingdown”ofvoltageisaccomplishedwithoutanyloss in efficiency. It only works, however, if the current traveling through it“alternates,”whichistosay,movesinaseriesofrapidlyreversingwaves.Despite the fact that their flowsmove somewhat differently the underlying

physicsofalternatingcurrentanddirectcurrentarethesame.Inboth,electronsare forcibly separated from atoms, and once the divorce is accomplished, theformerseeksoutthelatterwithamagneticsortofardor.Thedifferenceis thatwith direct current, the direction in which this positively charged slot (in anatom)istobefoundisalwaysthesame,andthusthestreamofelectronsseeking

thisslotalwaysmovesinthatdirection.Inthiscase,electricityinawireisratherlikewaterflowinginariver.Withalternatingcurrent,incontrast,arotatingpolarityatthegeneratorcauses

the “direction” of the positive charge to switch. The free electrons, stillpassionateintheirstruggletoregainatomsoftheirown,thusalsoshift:surgingfirst forward, then stopping, then surging backward. And stop. And forward.Stop.Backward.Stop.Andsoonandonandon.Thisflowofelectronsisstilldoing work every time it passes through a machine. With AC, however,sometimes the electrons aremoving in one direction through themachine andsometimes in theotherdirection.These stop/go, stop/go, stop/go reversals andinterruptions in the direction and flow of power are so quick (in the UnitedStates, about sixty per second), that nothingmuch ofwhat is plugged in evennotices these directional shifts, though the buzzing of early fluorescent lightswasa symptomof it. In the earlydaysof thegrid therewere several typesofalternating current—single phase, dual phase, and polyphase; the differencesbetween these,while important, can be simplified for our purposes to the factthatdualphaseandpolyphasesendmultiplewavesthoughthewiresandsinglephasesendsjustone.IfEdison’sManhattan grid, in 1884,made and transmitted direct current at

110 volts over about a mile before its usefulness diminished to zero,Westinghouse and Tesla’s early alternating current system, in 1886, madeelectricityat500voltsbuttransmitteditat3,000volts.By1891,AChadbeentransmitted 16miles betweenTivoli andRome, 14miles inPortland,Oregon,2.6 miles in Telluride, and an extraordinary 108 miles at 40,000 volts inGermany.Everyexperimentalinstallationfromthelate1880stotheearly1890sprovedmoreandmoresuccessfulonthisaccount,untilby1894,80percentofthegridsbeingorderedandinstalledintheUnitedStateswereusingalternatingcurrent.Just as arc lightingwas not immediately replacedwhen lower voltage grids

became the norm, direct current networks lingered on as alternating currentsystems grew in popularity. Each simply added to the chaos of systems,voltages, dynamos, alternators, lines, bulbs, and the thousand and one othercomponents that multiplied in the wake of electricity’s growing popularity.Among theproliferatingelements,not evenone setof commonpairings stoodout from the rest. In other words, there was no grid, but only hosts ofindividually,corporately,ormunicipallyownedgrids,alloverlappingintheskyasontheground.

DowntownManhattanalonewouldhave1,500arclightsby1893,aswellastwenty light and telegraph companies, each running independent sets ofwirescarryingvaryingvoltages(ifdirectcurrentsystems)oroperatingatdistinctratesofoscillation(ifalternatingcurrentsystems).Chicago,atroughlythesametime,washometofortydifferentelectriccompanies,mostofwhichwereassociatedwithcompeting streetcar lines.Direct currentoperationsofferedpowerat100,110,220,500,600,1,200,and2,000volts,withoneormorededicatedsystemsofwiresforeach.Alternatingcurrent,alltheragebytheearly1890s,wasnottheimmediate improvement it had at first seemed. It could be transported muchfartherandbemadetochangevoltagesfairlyeasily,aclear improvementoverDC power, but in the early days therewas little agreement about the optimalfrequency atwhich this currentwould “alternate.”As a result even thismoreflexiblevoltagesystemhaddedicatedwiresfor25,30,33⅓,40,50,60,66⅔,83⅓, and 125 cycles per second. Making it all even worse, when electriccompanieswentoutofbusiness,theysimplylefttheirwirestomolderandfrayinthesky.By theearly1890sregularpeople, industrialists,white-collarworkers, small

business owners, corporate managers, manufacturers, traction companies,investors,andinventorshadallgrownfondofelectricityandwhat itcoulddo.Nevertheless,mostalsofoundthewildwayofbuildinganinfrastructuredeeplyunsatisfactory,withfourdifferentkindsofcurrent(DC,single-phaseAC,dual-phaseAC,andpolyphaseAC), twodifferent intensitiesof lightingsystem(arcand incandescent) that relied on different wiring logics (series and parallel),seven different possible voltages, nine different rates of oscillation, and up tofortycompetingelectriccompanies(dependingonthesizeof themarket),plusall the folkswho’doptedoutofpublicpowerand installedprivateplants.Theresult was predictable: not only were there too many wires, but the lack ofstandardizationmadeitdifficultforanyonetomakeanymoney,whethersellingcurrentorsellingthevariouscomponentsandmachinesthatusedit.There was no hope of cornering a market and it was equally difficult to

manufacture machines that could work within this chaos. In the late 1800sAmerica was an intensely industrializing nation. Automation and complexmachinery were critical to this process and electricity seemed to promise acommon currency by which these mechanical systems might be run. Thispromise was frustrated, however, by the intense, and increasingly irritating,diversityatthelevelofinfrastructureandthelackoftranslatabilitybetweenthevarious systems. This dissatisfaction, without necessarily prompting much

agreementorkindlyfeelingsbetweencompetitors,producedawillingmarketforonekindofmachine inparticular: therotaryconverter—“asinglearmatureforchangingdirectcurrentfirstintopolyphaseandthenthereverse.”Liketheparallelcircuit,thislittlethinghasremainedmostlyunlaudedinthe

face of more luminous undertakings. And like the parallel circuit it was amissing link without which the evolution of electrical infrastructure was notprogressingverywell.Americawasinthisbriefmomentbeforethearrivaloftherotary converter in danger of having nothing like a national grid, nothing likemunicipal grids, but just a mess of competing interests and inventions,mechanicalsystems,andinvestorpreferences.In 1891, when the decision was made to build America’s first large-scale

powerplantatNiagaraFallsandtosenditspowertoBuffalo,sometwentymilesdistant,itwasnotevencleartothesystem’sdesignersifthatpowerwouldtakethe form of electricity. Even before coming to the question of which kind ofcurrent theywould use, theCataractConstructionCompany atNiagara had tofirstruleouttried-and-truemechanicalmeansfortransmittingpower—bywaterunderpressure,bycompressedair,orbymanilarope.Theyevenconsiderednottransporting thepowerproducedat the fallsatall,but ratherusingall200,000horsepower in the tiny village of Niagara Falls, population five thousand in1890. How, theywondered,might they turn this hamlet into amanufacturingcenterfortheNortheast?Once it had been decided, toward the end of 1891, that moving power to

Buffalo by means of electricity was the most efficient option available, theproject’s engineers did not immediately rule out direct current. Itwas not yetknown, for example, whether several AC generators could bemade to run intandemwithoneanother—theoscillation rateof eachmeldingwith thatof alltheothers.Thiscapacity,whichEdisonhaddemonstratedinNewYork,workedwell withDC, as it allowed formore, or less, power to be brought online asneeded. One could just pack a power plant with a number of different-sizeddynamosandbyturningthemonandoffindifferentconfigurationsensurethatdemandwouldalwaysbebalancedwith supply.How,withAC,would similarchangesindemandbemet?ThedesignersoftheNiagaraplanthadnoidea.NordidtheyknowifallthepowertheywerehopingtogenerateatNiagarawouldbeused for lighting or if other kinds of machines and motors would eventuallydraw from it. Indeed, so little confidence was accorded the capacities of ACpoweratthisscalethatLordKelvin,aphysicistofsomenote,sentacablelatein1893,justastheInternationalNiagaraCommissionwascompletingitsdecision-

making process, saying TRUST YOU AVOID GIGANTIC MISTAKE OFADOPTIONOFALTERNATINGCURRENT.Lessthanamonthlater,two-phaseACoscillatingat25cyclespersecondwas

decided upon and the construction of the Niagara hydroelectric plant, itsgenerators,and its lineswasbegun.By1895 theplant itselfwascompleteandwassupplyingpowerlocally,totinyNiagaraFalls;inNovember1896,point-to-point transmission began to Buffalo, where the availability of constant poweralmost immediately began attracting large manufactories making things likeabrasives,silicon,andgraphiteonanindustrialscale.PerhapsmostimportanttoAmerica’s future, it was in Buffalo, with the force of Niagara’s own power,wherethemanufactureofaluminumfirstbecameaprofitableenterprise.Finallywehadalight,strongmetalforourairborneandland-boundengines;theeraoftheautomobilewasofficiallybegunwithairtravelsoontofollow.Thegridwewouldget,thegridthatthemessofthe1880swouldresolveinto,

reflected in many ways the decisions made at Niagra—polyphase alternatingcurrent, oscillating at 60 cycles a second, produced by large power stations,transmitted by means of point-to-point high-voltage wires, and distributed bynetworkedand ringed lower-voltagedelivery systems, standardizedat 110and220volts.Asmorenewelectrical installationswerebuilt tofollowthismodel,rotaryconvertors,andslightlylater,phaseconverters(whichmadesingle-phaseAC systems interoperable with multiphase systems) made diverse, existingelectrical infrastructures interoperable, such that companies did not have toabandonlarge,unamortizedinvestmentsinordertoworktogether.Traction(streetcar)companiesgot tokeep theirdirectcurrentsystemswhile

alsomaking and selling power to neighboringACgrids;manufacturers got tokeepmaking single-phase ACmotors that could nowwork on polyphase ACsystems;andpolyphaseACcouldbemadetoworkwithsmaller-scale,localDCdistributionnetworks.Eventheveryfirst,smallestgrids,thosethatpoweredarclights,couldbeintegratedintothismishmashofnewlytranslatabletechnologicalsystems. The old could be coupled with the new, and themess of America’selectrical infrastructure began to resolve itself, not in the direction of privateplants,but towardwhatwouldcometobeknownas the“universalsystem”ofbiginterlockinggridspoweredbycentralstations.The hydroelectric plant at Niagara Falls was thus the closing bell on the

effervescent,chaotic, immenselycreativeandinventiveactivityofthepreviousseventeenyears: 1879, the first arc light grid inSanFrancisco; 1882, the firstlow-voltagedirectcurrentgrid inNewYork;1887, thefirstalternatingcurrent

grid; 1891, proven long-distance high-voltage transmission. And in 1896, thecompletionof the first large-scale generating station atNiagaraFalls, togetherwiththefirstlong-distancetransmissionwiresinconstantuse,thetotaladoptionofparallelcircuits,incandescentlighting,andtheequallyneartotaladoptionofalternatingcurrent.Americahadhergrid.

Thisstoryofelectricity’sdomesticationandquickspreadmakesitsoundasifitwere commonby thedawningof the last century for ahome, abusiness,or afactory tohavegrid-providedelectricity. Itwasnot.RuralpeoplehadvirtuallynoaccesstoelectricityuntilthepassageoftheRuralElectrificationActin1936during thedarkestdaysof theGreatDepression.Andevenbefore that, duringthe first decade of the twentieth century, urbanites, suburbanites, and factoryowners rarely chose to use electric current over more constant and familiartechnologiessuchasgaslampsandsteamengines.In 1900 only one factory in thirteen used electric motors, and only one

domesticlightintwentywaselectrified—therestwerestillgaslamps,kerosenelamps,andcandles.Athome,peopleoftenpreferredthewinkandflickeroffireto themoreeven,unwavering, ifequallywarm, lightof incandescentbulbs. Infactories there was some suspicion about the reliability of a steam-generatedelectriccurrentwhensteam-drivenmechanicalengineshadforso longworkedsowell.Addto this thefact that therewerenooutlets,noplugs,andveryfewusesforelectricityotherthanforlight—athomeandintheoffice—andpowerinindustry.In1901therewereonlyeighteenrefrigeratorsinallofManhattan,andadecadelater,in1910,thoughtherewerecloseto45,000electricalappliancesinSouthernCalifornia, 80percent of thesewere irons, all ofwhich screwed intolight sockets.Norwas the dearth of electric lamps, electrifiedmotors, electricrefrigeration,electricoutlets,andtheplugsthatfitintothemonlyaboutpersonalpreferenceortechnologicallag.Thestateofstate-of-the-arttechnologyandtheadoption thereofalso reflectedAmericansocial structures, incomedistribution,andbusiness imaginaries at that time—nobodyhadyet grasped that electricitymightbeaproductfor themassesor thatautilitycouldmakeasmuchmoneymanufacturing electrical appliances as making and distributing an electriccurrent.Asmuchaswe takeuniversalaccess toelectricity forgranted,amerecentury agowewere still a longway frommass electrification, in ourmindseverybitasmuchasinourinfrastructure.

NOTABLEPASSINGSThePearlStreetStationburneddownin1890;itstechnology,sorecentlystateoftheart,washardlycompetitiveupon itsdemise,andso itwasnot rebuilt.Thesite is currently a parking lot run by an affable native of New Delhi, India.Appleton,Wisconsin’s utilitywent bankrupt in 1896 andwas replaced by theWisconsinEnergyCorporation(nowcalled“WeEnergy”).In1956theNiagaraFallsgeneratingstationfelloffthesideofthecliffatthefalls’edge,whereithadbeen perched. A total loss, it was one of the largest industrial accidents inAmericatothatdate.JohnHaney,ajanitorattheplantthatday,remembersthat“there was water seeping in and we were trying to keep it away from thegenerators.Thepressureon thebuildingwas tremendous.Thewindowsfacingtheriverwerejustpoppingout,theconcretefloorwouldbuckleupandIwouldjumpoverit.Thenthewalltowardthefallscamecrashingdown.Ithenheadedtotheelevator.Waterandstonewasfallingintothebay.Istoodunderthesteeldoorframewatchingtheoperatorcall tomeandI jumpedon.It tookforty-fiveseconds to reach the top and I saw the gorge collapse on the area I was at.”Thirty-ninemenescapedtheplantasitfell,whileonewas“hurledthroughthewindowintotheriver”whena“jetlikeaburstofwaterfromabrokenpenstockcarried his body along with thousands of tons of debris into the surgingmaelstrom.”PoweratNiagaraisnowmadebytheRobertMosesNiagaraPowerPlant.

CHAPTER3TheConsolidationofPower

That first remarkable moment when the Pearl Street Station breached theinterminableduskofinteriorofficespacewiththewarmglowofelectriclightingwasnottheonlybignewsin1882.Thiswasalsotheyearthatsawthecreationof the Standard Oil Trust, a business entity that brought 90 percent of theworld’s oil production and refining under the control of a nine-person board,headed by John D. Rockefeller. With twenty thousand oil wells, most inPennsylvania,fourthousandmilesofpipeline,fivethousandtankcars,andoverone hundred thousand employees, Standard Oil was a thorough monopoly.Rockefeller’s sprawlingvertically integrated corporationperfectly captured thetrendinthelate1800sofreplacingmanysmallcompaniesincompetitionwithoneanotherwithsinglelargeentitiescapableofproducingandmovingproductstomarketatascaleinconceivabletofamilybusinessesorlocalundertakings.The electricity business might have been a chaotic diversity of competing

interestsandalternatesystemsinthefinaldecadesofthenineteenthcentury,butitwastheexceptionnottherule.AccordingtothehistorianRichardHirsh,intheyears immediately following the creationof theStandardOilTrust,more than4,000businessesintheUnitedStateswerecombinedinto257corporations,and“by 1904, one percent of American companies controlled 45 percent ofmanufacturedproducts.”Theseincludedcorporationsofphenomenalreachsuchas U.S. Steel, American Tobacco, DuPont, Anaconda Copper, and AmericanTelephone&Telegraph(AT&T).Like all big business undertakings these companies had the capacity to

streamline their industries by binding more efficient production andtransportationtoeconomiesofscale.Asmonopoliestheyalsohadthecapacityto set prices since no customer could purchase oil, steel, copper, or telephoneserviceanywhereelse.UntilitwasdismantledbytheU.S.governmentin1911,StandardOilwasvirtuallytheonlyoptionforalmostanypetroleumproductthenin existence—from kerosene, to fuel oil, to Vaseline. Mr. Rockefeller, in theprocess,becametherichestmanin theworld.J.P.Morgan, theownerofU.S.Steel, became one of America’s most august tycoons ruling over empires—includingtheonebuiltbyThomasEdison—farbeyondtheSteelIndustry.AndJ.B.Duke, the owner ofAmerican Tobacco, if somewhat farther down the list,

still numbers the 49th-richest man in the history of the nation (for context,WarrenBuffettisnumber39).Despite thereachof these titansofcapitalism,monopoliesdidn’tneed tobe

national in scope or even big. Smaller, more local enterprises, like the grainelevatorownersintheMidwestaccusedofpricefixingin1877,orevenaferrycompanywithasingleboat—ifthiswasthesolemeanstotransportgoodsandpersons across a body of water—were effectively monopolies, in that theymaintainedabsolutecontrolofamarket.The most important thing about a monopoly or other organization of

companiesthatcolludestofixpricesisthatthepriceofagoodorserviceneednotberelatedtothecostofproducingit.Afarmerwithgraintosellalsoneedstotransportandstoreit.Heeitherpayswhattheelevatorcartelisaskingorhisgrainrotsandheloseseverything.Or,ifheisslightlybetteroff,hecanbuildasiloofhisown.Forthat,heneedssteel;hepaysthepriceMr.Morganisasking,orhedoesn’tusethatmetalinhisconstruction.Acustomer’schoiceislimitedtopaying the price on offer, regardless of how arbitrary or exorbitant, or notpartakingofthatparticulargoodorserviceandthuscourtinghisownruin.Originally,asHirshpointsout,therewaslittleworrythatelectricityproviders

might join in this trend. The early technology didn’t permit it. Before thewidespreadadoptionofalternatingcurrent,thephysicsofelectricityproduction,andmostespeciallydistribution, limitedboth the scopeand theavariceofanygivenelectriccompany.Low-voltagedirectcurrentwasbyitsnatureaproductthat facilitated local ownership and the formation of separate companies foreveryuse towhich itmightbeput.Onecompanymightprovide light,anotherfactorypower;a thirdwouldrunstreetcars,whileahandfulofothersdesignedandbuiltthedynamos,switches,andlinesthefirstthreedependedupon.Despite Edison’s dream of creating an electric grid thatwas both vertically

and horizontally integrated, his DC network was the exact opposite—decentralized,small,unwieldy,andprohibitivelyexpensivetoscaleup.Assuch,electric companies provided very poor fodder for the processes ofmonopolizationsopopularinotherindustriesatthetime.Evenaftertheadventof alternating current in the late 1880s,which introduced flexible voltage andvastly increased the scope of a given network, multiple, overlapping, andcompetingserviceproviderswerethenorm.As the nineteenth century rolled over into the twentieth and the universal

systemthathadbeendevelopedinNiagaraslowlybecamethestandardforanynew electrical project, therewere still tens of companiesmaking electricity in

any largemunicipality.While small cities and towns tended towardmunicipalgrids, in most cases these were run by local governments, nascent utilityentrepreneurs,ormillownerswhosoldtheirexcesspowertonearbycustomersasasideproduct.And,justasmostAmericantownsin1900existedasthicketsof population surrounded on all sides by miles of rural farmland, forest, oruncultivatedprairie,so,too,weretheirgridstinyislandsofnetworkedpowerinavastseaofflickeringcandleandgaslamps.In1902therewere815city-ownedand-governedmunicipalpowercompaniesintheUnitedStates,whichgrewatthe rateofabout100ayearuntil1907,when thesenumberedovera thousandandaccountedforabout30percentofthenation’selectricalsupply.AlmostalloftherestoftheelectricitygeneratedintheUnitedStateswasmadebyprivateplants—mostly traction companies to run their streetcars and electric trains,industrialmanufactories,andcommercialbuildings.As lateas1905, itwasabsurd to imagine thatoneday thekindofelectrical

services that small-townAmerica provided to its relatively isolated pockets ofpopulation might be knitted into a single system by monopolizing electricitytrusts.OrthatallthemanystreetcarcompaniesfunctioninginAmerica’sbiggercitiesmightbeconvinced tostartbuying theirpower rather thanmaking it forthemselves. And yet within twenty years the eight largest utility holdingcompaniesintheUnitedStatescontrolledthreequartersoftheelectricitymarket.So powerful had these trusts become, and so questionablewere some of theirbasicaccountingpractices,thatnotonlydidseveralcollapsecompletelyduringthe 1929 stockmarket crash, but the lastwave of antitrust laws passed in theearlyyearsof theGreatDepressionwasaimedsquarelyat them.The thrustofthe1935PublicUtilityHoldingCompanyActwas, as its titlemakes clear, tomake it illegal for any company to hide their debts in “holding companies”—specialshellcorporationsthatmadetheactualworthofanenterpriseimpossibleforinvestorstodetermine.By 1925 almost nobody in the electricity business could even imagine a

systemformaking, transmitting,distributing,ormanagingelectricpowerotherthanasamonopolyenterprise.Thiswasanextraordinarilyrapidtransitionfromchaos and competition to a single service provider. Remarkably disparateinterests, including advocates of municipal power networks, of public powerprojects,andevenelectricitycooperatives,wereallconvincedbythe1920sthatthemonopolywasthebestwaytomanagethemanufactureandsaleofelectricpower.Thereweredifferentvisionsofwhomightcontrolsuchamonopoly—thepeople, the government, a corporation, a co-op—but the basic notion that

electricity markets were to be consolidated andmanaged without competitionwas,bythe1920s,universal.Muchofthecreditforthischangegoestothehard,thoughtfulwork(aswell

as some barely legal machinations with piles of cash behind the scenes) ofSamuelInsull.BornandraisedinEngland,InsullspenthisfirsttwentyyearsinAmericaasThomasEdison’spersonalsecretary.Apparentlyhissuccessinthisjobwasattributednotonlytohisfastidiousnessinallthings,butalsotothefactthathewasoneofthefewpeoplewhoneededaslittlesleepastheinventor.IfEdisonwantedtoorderabunchofcopperat twointhemorning,Insullwasathisdesk,readytomakeithappen.Aselectricityshiftedfrombeingagameinventorscouldwintoonebetterleft

to the balance sheets and business strategies of businessmen, Edison retreatedfrom the limelight, leaving Insull tomanagemore andmore of the inventor’sholdings.By1892,whenEdisonhad to admitdefeat in thebattlebetweenhisDCsystemandWestinghouseandTesla’sACsystem,retiringtohisNewJerseylaboratory toworkon fluorescent lighting (aproject that endedbadly forhim,blindinghiminoneeyeandkillinganassistant),Insullsteppedfirmlyoutfromhisaugustpatron’sshadowandtookupthestandardofAmericanpower.Neitheraninventornoranideologue—bothtermsthatmightbeaptlyapplied

to Mr. Edison—Samuel Insull was an accomplished businessman, and thebusinessofelectricityintheearlytwentiethcenturywasripeforinnovationand,more important, formonopolization.Therewasmoney tobemade,butonly ifthefractiousnatureoftheindustrycouldberesolvedintoafarlesscompetitive,far more secure system, free of redundant investments in overlappinginfrastructure. Insull wanted the kind ofmonopoly that Rockefeller hadmadewith StandardOil and J. P.Morgan hadmadewithU.S. Steel. The best he’dmanage was almost this kind of monopoly because of the ways in which hisproduct was crucially not the same as theirs.Molding the electricity businessintotheformdujourofAmericanmonopolistswasoneofthemostremarkableprojects,intellectuallyaswellasfiscally,ofthetwentiethcentury.Insulldidn’tstartoutknowinghowtodo this.Hefelthiswayforwardwith

hisgut,hisintellect,andaverygoodsenseoftherelationship,inthelate1890s,between government, banks, and the business community. His first majorstumblingblockwastheintractabilityofelectricityitself:sinceitcan’tbestoreditcan’tbestockpiled;sinceitisindivisible,itisdifficulttocountandaccuratelybillfor;sinceit is lethal, itrequiresahighlytrainedworkforcetomanage;andsince it is utterly inseparable from the infrastructure that carries it, one has to

bearthecostofbuildingandmaintainingitsinfrastructure.Given all of this, electricity was at the very least an extremely unwieldy

commodity; at worst it was an almost impossible one to stay in businesssupplying. This was one reason why many early electric companies were soeagertosellandinstallprivateplants:itwasaneasierroutetosureincomethanconvincing a whole neighborhood to buy their product and then building thenecessary infrastructure and maintaining the necessary workforce to supplycentralstationpower.In the earliest days of mass-electrification the intractabilities that caused

electricitynottoworklikeoil,gas,steel,orgrainseemedlikeminorissues,butthey were not. Edison himself, as the historian Maury Klein explains,“discoveredhiserrorinusingthegasindustryasamodel.Gascouldbestored,which made it possible to produce on an orderly, rational basis like othermanufactured products. It could maintain reserves to meet peak requirementsandleveloutdemandoveratwenty-four-hourperiod.Notsoelectricity.Ithadtobe produced, sold, delivered, and used all at once,whichmeant that the plantsupplyingitneededthecapacitytodeliverthetotalmaximumloaddemandedbycustomersatanygivenmoment.”In other words, one could build an electric monopoly and totally control a

market,butfirstoneneededtounderstandhowthevariouspiecesofthatmarketfit together. An electricity monopoly does not have the same shape as amonopolyongrainstorageorsteelproduction.Becauseelectricityisatemporalproduct, customers’ consumption also had to be arranged, in roughly equalmeasure,aroundtheclock.Ifprofitabilityisthegoal,midnightloadneedstobeon par with five P.M. load and ten A.M. load. Nothing else on the marketdemandsthiskindoflevelingofconsumptionforeachhouroftheday,neitherinInsull’stimenorinourown.Thus, though Insull proceeded like other monopolists in his dealings with

competitors—mostly by buying them, or running them out of business, orbuying the companies that supplied them (and thus running them out ofbusiness)—the secret tomaking a fortune off of electricitywas not simply tohavelotsofcustomersbuttohavelotsofdifferentkindsofcustomersinordertoprovidesufficientdemandtorunalarge,centralizedgeneratingstation24/7.WhenEdisonretiredtohisinventor’sstudio,Insullwasofferedahandsomely

paidpositionassecondvicepresidentof thenewlyformedGeneralElectric inNewYork—apositionherefused.Insullwasdonebeingsecond,evenifforoneofthelargestcompaniesinthenation.Instead,atthirty-twoyearsold,hepacked

up andmoved toChicagowhere, for $12,000 a year (a third ofwhatGEhadofferedhim),he tookthehelmof thatcity’sEdisonfranchise.Hewas,at longlast,theboss,albeitofaminorityplayer,inacrowdedmarket,inaforeigncitythathemadenosecretofdetesting.“Hismostvividimageofthecityconcernedneitheritsmennoritsfuture,”onebiographerrecounts,“butitsfilthanditshugerats.”SoworriedwasInsullthathewouldbedrivenbyhisdistasteforChicagotoescapeeastward,backtoNewYorkorevensofarashishomeinLondon,thathe insisted on a binding three-year contract. For that length of time at least,ChicagoEdisonwashisandhewouldgrowitonhisownterms.Hestayedmuchlonger and did much more with this tiny franchise than even he could haveimaginedatthestart,stayinginChicagountil1932,whenhefledthecountryongovernment corruption charges. In the interveningyears hewouldbecome theworld’sfirstutilitytycoon,ChicagoEdisonhisempire.UponInsull’sarrivalintheCityofBroadShouldersin1892therewashardly

amoreaptword forChicagoEdison thanminor.Though theyhadopened thecity’s firstcentralgeneratingstation in1888,a3,200-kilowattDCpowerplantonWestAdamsStreet, by the timeof Insull’s arrival on the scene therewereeighteencentralstationelectricityprovidersinChicago’sdowntownLoopaloneplusanotherfivehundredprivateplants.What this meant, practically speaking, was that Chicago Edison’s five

thousandorsocustomersonlyused,andpaidfor,allthepowertheAdamsStreetplantmade during the early evenings.When dusk settled over the city, everyfront-office clerk and every corner-office executive alike found themselves inneed of artificial illumination. The demand for electricity then dropped offprecipitouslyasofficesclosedupforthenightandthelastofthecity’sworkerssteppedaboardLtrainsboundforthesuburbswheretheyreadbygaslightandate food cooked with a gas flame. Even the most precocious electricalentrepreneurs in the 1890s were limited in the scope of their dreaming toChicago’surbancenterbythephysicallimitationsofDCnetworks.Thesuburbs,andevencloserresidentialneighborhoods,weretoofarawayforelectriclights.Atnight,intheLoop,whennoonewasatwork,inthemornings,andformost

of the day (most especially during the summer),ChicagoEdison’s sole powerplant,fullycapableofsupplyingits3,200kilowattsallthetime,satidleorwasmassively underutilized.As Insull once famously said: “If your entire plant isonlyinuse5.5percentofthetime,itisonlyaquestionofwhenyouwillbeinthehandsofareceiver.”Heneededawaytosellpowertherestofthedayorhiscompanywouldfounder.

Before Insull’s arrival, Chicago Edison, like almost all of Edison’s utilityfranchises,hadmadeup for theveritable impossibilityofevermakingaprofitwithacentralstationgridbyselling, installing,andprovidingmaintenanceforprivate plants. Indeed a great many of the private plants in the Loop werevariouslysizedversionsofEdison’soriginalgrid-kit,whichhadbeensoldandinstalled by the franchise. While this was a wise strategy for maintainingsolvency over the short term, over the long term themultiplication of privateplants further diminished the customer base for central station power. Theseprivate plants, however,were in a criticalway as limited as theAdamsStreetStation,thenChicagoEdison’slargestpowerproducer.Chicago’smanufactories, for example, produced andusedpower during the

day, turning theirgeneratorsoff atnight;privateplants in apartmentbuildingsand luxury residences usually sprang into use in the evenings just as the bulbsystem in the business district was being shut down; streetlights—oftenmunicipallyowned—onlyburnedatnight;whilestreetcarsranmostintensivelyatdawnanddusk.Everybodywasusingtheirfairlyexpensive,almostidenticalinfrastructureonlypartofthetimebecauseitwasascheaptoproducetheirownpowerasitwastobuyitfromanycentralizedsource.In the 1890s and early 1900s, the sound logic argued that because of the

relationship between capital costs, which were prodigious, and profit percustomer,whichwasminimal,electricitywasbyitsverynatureaneliteproduct.Theonlyrealwaytomakemoneysellingitwastosellalotofitatahighpricetorelativelyfewcustomers.Itdidn’tmattertomostcentralstationmanagersthatelectricity cost 50 percent more than gas in urban markets, because electriccompanieswerenotincompetitionwithgas.Gaswasforthemasses;electricityforthefew.Ifin1892Chicagohadamillionpeople,fewerthan5,000ofthemused electricity at home. Some optimistic souls thought that one dayChicagomighthaveasmanyas25,000regularusersofelectriccurrent.Suchexpansionwasunlikely,butnotimpossible.A short fourteen years later Insull’s Edison had doubled the Pollyanna’s

estimatewith50,000payingcustomers;by1913hehadanimprobable200,000customers,oratenthofthepopulationofthecity.What Insullwanted and strove to buildwas an infrastructure the inverse of

whathewassaddledwithuponhisarrivalintheMidwest.Insteadofmanylittlegenerating stations, with many owners, running intermittently, he wanted onethatheownedandwhichranallthetime.Inordertodothisheneededtoacquire“load” for each time period during the day.He needed streetcar companies to

buyfromhimatduskanddawn,residentialcustomersforthelateeveningsandearly nights, municipal street lights for nighttime, businesses for the lateafternoonsandearlyevenings, andmost importantof all, industry formidday.Hewantedtomakealotmorepower,makeitroundtheclock,andtosellitall—everylastwatt.The factorieswere theonepieceof thepuzzle that couldmake this scheme

work. They were the only customers which could be counted on to use atremendousamountofpowerduringdaylighthours;withoutfactories,novisionofasingleon-all-the-timegridcouldbeprofitable.It’sworthnoting thateven this idealcocktailofcustomersand timesofday

fails to provide significant nighttime load. This remains a problem for ourutilities today. Even taking into account public street lighting, electricity usedrops off precipitously as people start to go to bed and only starts to creepupward again around six A.M. One of the reasons that electric cars havereceived such public praise is that they can be programmed to charge almostexclusivelyatnightandthusprovidethatrarestofbeasts—substantialmidnightload.Insull,ofcourse,getsnocreditfor thecars,butmanyof theother thingswe use electricity for at night we can thank him for zealously promoting,including a rate structure that rewardsnighttime electricityuse, but alsohomerefrigerators and hot water heaters which, until the rise of the conservationmovementinthe1970s,werephenomenallyhungryappliances,andeventodayremain—withair-conditioning—themostelectricallyintensiveitemsinahome.Beforehecouldsethissightsonconvincingregularfolkstoinvestinthisnew

array of electric appliances he had to first bring the city, with its tractioncompanies,richhomeowners,andmanufacturers—allofwhomwerereasonablycontent with the private systems they had in place—into the fold of a singleprovider. To accomplish this, Insull made a series of interlocking businessdecisions. First, he radically lowered the price of electricity, making itcompetitivenotonlywithcostsrelativetorunningaprivateplant,butalsowithgas.DuringthefirstfiveyearsthatInsullmanagedChicagoEdisonhehalvedthepriceforhiscentralstationelectricityfrom20¢akilowatt-hourto10¢(in1897)and “proceeded every year or two to impose an additional 1-cent drop untilprices reached2.5¢perkilowatt-hour in1909.” Itwasduring the sameperiodthat the number of customers served by Chicago Edison skyrocketed into thehundredsofthousands.In1911,toensuresufficientindustrialload,SamuelInsullstartedselling“off-

peak” power (themiddle of the day and themiddle of the night) to industrial

customersat0.5¢perkilowatt-hour—apricethathelpedpersuadefactoriesandother industrial concerns running private plants to make the switch to grid-providedelectricity.Atthisprice,buyingpowerfromInsullwasbothcheaperinreal money terms and cheaper when considering maintenance, upkeep, andnecessarycapitalinvestmenttokeepprivatesystemsingoodworkingorder.Forthe utility itself, the reduced price of 0.5¢ represented a straightforward gain,becauseproducingelectricitywastheliteralleastoftheircosts.Of themany strange financial logics that adhere to the electricity business,

twogaveInsull themostpause.Bothof these, itwouldturnout,hadthesamecause. First was that the lower the price he charged for electricity, the moremoney he made. Second, and related, was that his costs remained relativelyconstantregardlessofhowmuchelectricityhesold.IfherantheAdamsStreetStationfullboreonly5.5percentofthetime,thecostsofrunninghiscompany(includingthestationbutalsopersonnel,systemmaintenance,lineupkeep,sales,andcoal)wasvirtuallythesameasifheranthepowerplantatfullcapacity95percentofthetime.Thiswasbecause,inInsull’sownwords:“Byfarthemostserious problemof central stationmanagement andby far the greatest itemofcost of the product is interest on investment.” Thus, the more “units,” orkilowatt-hours of electricity he sold, the more the interest cost per unit fellbecause this cost was being spread across a larger number of units. And thecloseraplant’sactualoutputwastoitspotentialmaximumthemoretheburdenofthisinterestwasoffsetbyincome.Everyhalfcenttheymadesellingpowertoindustrywasahalfcentmorethantheywouldhavemadeiftheirplantspentitsmiddaysidlingforlackofload.Likemanyof the logicaldevelopmentsInsullcameupwith todealwith the

odditiesofelectricalpowerproductionandsale,thisoneremainswithustoday:industry still pays substantially less per kilowatt-hour than do residential andcommercial customers, while relationships with industrial customers areprivileged and cultivated in ways that seem, from the outside, to be fairlynonsensical.Topotentialresidentialcustomerswhowerealreadymakingtheirownpower,

Insull made a similar argument, one grounded in good economic sense.Independence was more costly, almost foolishly so, than was subscription.Richard Munson explains: “To describe the disadvantages of small, on-sitegenerators,” Insull “often discussed the economics of powering a block ofnortheastChicagohomes.The189apartments,heexplained,usedanaggregateof 68.5 kilowatts of electricity for lighting. But because the lampswere lit at

differenttimesindifferentapartments,theblock’smaximumdemandforpowerat any single moment was only 20 kilowatts. Therefore, Insull reasoned, acentral power station providing 20 kilowatts would be more efficient andeconomicalthanaseriesofseparategeneratingplantsineachapartmentwiththeaggregatecapacityof68.5kilowatts.”Luring in customerswith lowprices and thenusingeconomiesof scale and

storiesofmodernprogresstoincreaseboththeabsolutenumberofpeopleservedand the amount of electricity each consumed formed the “grow” half of the“growandbuild” strategy that for-profit utility companieswouldborrow fromInsullandflourishunderuntilthelate1960s.Theotherhalfwastobuildmore,bigger, and more efficient power plants. And this was supported by Insull’sgreatest coup: he used government regulation to protect his interests fromcompetition and to insure long-term, low-interest construction loans. As hecourtedbiggovernment,hisbusinessstrategieswereobservedandslowlytakenupby industrialistsandmonopolistselsewhere in thenation,whogrewprivateelectricityempiresbythesamemeansthathadprovedsosuccessfulforInsullinChicago.Southern California Edison, for one, took strong steps toward merging

smaller, community power companies into its developing monopoly. DetroitEdisonfirsttookcontrolofserviceinthatcity(whichisnowhometotheleastreliable grid in America), and then it slowly expanded into all of easternMichigan. J.P.Morgangot into thegamewith theUnitedCorporation,whichmanaged electricity service in New York, New England, and much of theSoutheast.EvenAlaskagotitsmonopolistasWilberFoshayfoundhisfortuneinSteward’sFolly, thirteenotherstates, theWesternProvincesofCanada,andinCentral America. All thesemen, with their top hats and cigar-clenched teeth,madeprivate empiresoutof electricityby following Insull’s leaduntil, by theclosingyearsof the1920s, tenholdingcompaniescontrolled75percentof theAmericanelectricityindustry.Toavoidbeingshutdownby theantitrust laws thengaining invigor itwas

necessaryforalltheseearlyutilitiestoworkhand-in-glovewithgovernment.AsInsullwasquick to learn,workingwithgovernmentwasnot thesamethingasworkingwith individualpoliticiansorpoliticalparties—ephemeral in their realpowerandgreedyintheirpursuitofapermanentmajority.Rather,afunctionalelectricalinfrastructureneededitsechoinapermanentgovernmentbureaucracy.In this way one might limit real competition while also avoiding theuncertaintiesthatcameofcolludingwithparticularpoliticiansorparties.

As Hirsh discusses in detail in his history of what he calls the “utilityconsensus,” themove toward government regulation as a survival strategy fortheutilitieshad thegood fortuneofcoincidingwith theprogressivepoliticsofthe1910s.Themainaimoftheprogressiveswastoroutoutcrookedpoliticianswhose rulewas grounded in relationships of patronage rather than systemizedgoodgovernment.Progressivesandutilitycompanymanagers thus foundeachin the other an ally, andwhatwas born of their alliancewas an agreement tomonopoly;iftheutilitiesacceptedtobeheavilyregulated,thegovernmentatthestate and federal levels agreed to grant themaguaranteed service area,withinwhichnootherelectricutilitywouldbeissuedachartertofunction.UnlikethetrustsheldbyStandardOilorU.S.Steelthatattemptedtocontrol

theentireU.S.market thereweremanyelectriccompanies—theysimplyneveroverlapped.Inthisway,theterm“monopoly”tookonaveryparticularmeaningwhen speaking of power projects; despite the fact that there were numerousplayersinthemarkettherewasnocompetitionbetweenthembecausethemarketitselfhadbeendividedintoquadrants,thebordersofeachenforcedbyapoliticalapparatus designed largely for that purpose. In this the utilities bore a certainresemblance to modern-day street gangs whose territorial agreements, hashedoutalbeitwithsubmachinegunsratherthangovernmentalsubcommittees,sportasimilarstructure.Onesimplydoesn’tofferone’sproduct in territoryclaimedbysomeoneelse.Pricesarefixedbytheproviderandthestructuresofpowerinplacebrooknocomplaint.Insullandhisilkthusgrewandbalancedtheircustomerbasethoughamixof

smartentanglementswithgovernmentandthegobblingupofcompetitors.FiveyearsafterInsullarrivedinChicagoheownedeveryotherelectriccompanyinthe Loop. He also owned all their generating stations, whole hosts of smallpowerplantsthatwerenotinhisopiniongoodformuch.Theeraofsmallpowerwaspassing.TheAdamsStreetStation,shutteredin1894,ameresixyearsafterit opened (it was simply too small for all the load Insull had recruited), wasimmediatelyreplacedbythelargestpowerplantintheworldatHarrisonStreet.The Harrison Street Station was not only big in absolute terms but moreefficient: itshigh-pressurecondensing“marine”enginesreducedtheamountofcoalneededtogenerateonekilowatt-hourfrombetweentenandfourteenpoundstobetweenthreeandfive.AsHarrisonStreetballoonedfrom6,400kilowattsintheearlyyearsto16,400kWin1903thisefficiencytranslatedintoadifferenceof roughly 115,000 pounds of coal per hour. Though its newfangled enginesusedaprodigiousamountofwater,itslocationattheedgeoftheturgidChicago

Rivermeantthatthisresourcewas—unlikefuel—effectivelyfree.The Harrison Street Station was the machine that in its grandeur and

efficiencyallowedChicagoEdisontobeginreducingitspricesinearnest.Italsoconvinced “the Chief,” as Insull was often called, of something he had onlypreviouslysuspected.Plantscouldgetbiggerandtheywouldgetbigger,andthetechnological innovation that guaranteed their efficiency, could also beguaranteed to improve. In 1892 the Pearl Street Station ran at 2 percentefficiency—which is to say, it transformed about 2 percent of the potentialenergy in the coal it burned into electricity—twelve years later the HarrisonStreetStationhadanefficiencyratingof12percentandFiskStreet,Chicago’sfirstACpowerplant,completedin1903,didevenbetter.By1940evenaveragepower plants were running at 20 percent efficiency. One can see why Insullfoundtechnologicalimprovementsuchapromisingroutetowardprofitability.IfInsullknewthistobetrueofhisownerahesuspectedthatitwouldalways

be true, that technological improvement would forever allow for greaterreliability over a wider service area at lower cost. One could grow a centralstation,electricmonopolyindefinitely.In thishewasnot entirelywrong.For thenext seventyyears this is exactly

howtheelectricutilitiesdidgrowwhilemaintaininganexceptionalcapacitytoproduce a low-priced, infinitely available product. Until about 1969 thereseemednoendtotheamountofelectricityAmericacoulduseandstillbewellwithinthelimitsofwhatAmericanutilitiescouldprovide.Whenthislogicatlastbrokeitwasdevastating.Nottheleasttothecohortof

electrical engineers who had never known anything but the truth of the grow(yourcustomerbase)andbuild(moreandbiggerplants).Asthefirstwavesofwhatwouldbecometheenergycrisesof the1970screstedover thenation, themenwhoranandregulatedthebusinessofelectricitywereuniquelyunpreparedforchange.Theirworldhaditsnaturallaws,andwhentheselawsquitesuddenlyceased to hold true, they were thrown from their feet as if gravity itself hadstopped pulling things to ground. Technological improvements would not, itturned out, increase plant efficiency forever, nor would individual Americansalways choose lives that increased their electricity consumption. Lastly, theunexpected,drasticincreaseinfuelpricesattendantontheoilembargoesofthe1970s,coupledwithanequallysurprisingincreaseinthecostofbuildingpowerplants—linkedmostlytothevagariesofnuclearpower—meantthatforthefirsttimesince1900,electricitypricesbegantoriseratherthantofall.

Thefirstblowcameintheearlysixties,whenitbecameclearthattechnologicalimprovementsnolongerpromisedincreasedplantefficiency;thiswasprimarilya problem of physics. The second law of thermodynamics, and its corollaryCarnot’s theorem,dictate that temperature ratios limit theamountofworkanygivenfuelcanbeexpected todo inaheatengine.A traditionalpowerplant isexactlysuchanengine:itturnsfuelintoheat.Thisheatisthenusedtoconvertwaterintoafuriousjetofsteamdirectedatthebladesofaturbinewhich,withtheirspinning,turnashaft.Thisshaftthenpokesintoagiantelectromagnet,andastheshaftspinsinsidethemagnet,itproducesanelectriccurrent.Asystemlikethis,thatconvertsafuel—anyfuel,coal,plutonium,oil,gas,biomass,ortrash—intoheat,isgoingtotopoutatabout50percentefficiency.Thisisaninevitablelaw. No power plant built by man or some yet-to-be-invented machineintelligencewilleverdobetterthanjustunder50percent.Thereisanotherproblemthatlimitsthethermodynamicefficiencyofaplant

—the fragility of the metals from which boilers and turbines are forged.Technologically, we can now build a steam plant that works at 40 percentefficiency.Wehadsomeofthesealreadyinthe1960s.Practicallyspeaking,thismeans superheating water to over 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit while upping thepressure to an awesome 3,200 pounds per square inch to convert this waterstraight into dry, unsaturated steam without boiling it. The construction of amachinerobustenoughtoperformthistask24/7forthirtyyearshasturnedouttobebothfraughtandexpensive.The closer a steam plant comes to 40 percent efficiency, the more routine

maintenanceitneeds,themoreoftenitbreaksdowndespitetheconstantupkeep,and the more costly the high-tech alloys necessary to endure this onslaught.Soonerorlatereventhesefancycraftedmetalswillfatigueandgiveway.Bythemid-1960s it had become clear to utilitymen that a plant run at just over 30percentefficiencywasboththemostreliableandthemostcost-effectivewaytomakeelectricity.The truth of this has not changed in the fifty years since. In 2012, the best

fossil fuel power plants in America ran at 42.5 percent efficiency—but thisnumber is only for a few natural gas combustion (no-steam) turbines. Thenewest steam plants operating in the United States between 2007 and 2012,whether fueled by coal or plutonium or petroleum, came in right around 34

percentefficiency.Whencriticsofthewaywemakeelectricityseemtobespeakingofwasteful

practices when quoting such low numbers of plant efficiency, they rarelyrecognize that for a traditional power plant, 48 percent efficiency—not 100percent—is the maximum achievable and that in fact, we made great stridesduringmuchofthetwentiethcenturytowardapproachingthisgoal.Thattheendof this long asymptote toward perfect thermal efficiency arrived should havecaughtnoonebysurprise.Thesecondlawofthermodynamicshasbeenknownsince1824andtaughttoelectricalengineerssincetheprofessionemergedinthelate1880s.Thebeliefthatpastsuccessesmightbeprojectedindefinitelyontothefuture regardless of inconvenient truths like the workings of physics was afoolishway to runabusiness.This is trueevenof theelectricitybusiness, forwhich the bottom line is never actually at issue. Once they’d becomegovernment-regulated monopolies, profits for the utilities were guaranteedalmostregardlessofhowtheychosetorunthings.Everydollarspentpromisedaset return.Whatwas shaken by this rather rude intrusion ofCarnot’s theoremintothebusinessofmakingandsellingelectricityinAmericawasthatindefinitegrowth—asabusinessstrategy—wasnolongertheonly,noreventhebest,waytoproceed.Nevertheless,seventyyears isa long timeduringwhich linesongraphsand

basicinfrastructurallogicsdidseemtofollowapredictable,andlargelypositive,path.Thetruismthatthefuturesimplycannotbereliedupontomimicthepastwas lost as the third generation of electrical engineers entered the electricitybusinessinthelate1950s.TheconsolidationofpowerthathadpropelledSamuelInsullforwardintoevermoreimpressivecyclesofinventivenesshadbecomethestagnationofastructureknowntoworkprofitablyevenwhenleftwellenoughalone.Unfortunately for utility companies, Carnot’s theorem was not the only

surprise that awaited them as dawn broke over the 1970s. They had beenencouragedtoswitchfromburningcoaltoburningoilinthe1950sand’60s—acostly retrofitting of power plants that was en vigor as the first OPEC oilembargohitin1973.Thedrasticfuelshortagethatensuedsawpricesrisemorethan70percentalmostovernightandthenotionoftheshortage,asmuchasthereality of it, hit mainstream America like a sledgehammer. The skyrocketingprice of oil affected not only howmuch it cost to make electricity in all thenewlyconvertedpetroleum-burnersbut also for thenation’s largeunconvertedfleetofcoal-burningpowerplants.In1973anyindustrythathadthecapacityto

usecoalinsteadofoilwasmakingtheswitch,amovethatalsodrovethepriceofdomesticcoalthroughtheroof.Forthefirsttimeintheirhistory,utilitieshadtoraise the price they charged for electric power, shattering another seeminglynaturallawoftheutilitybusiness.Beneath the immediacyof this crisis for theutilities lay a slow-burning fire

thatwouldeventuallyunravel theeconomicsuretyof thegrow-and-buildyearsentirely—the burgeoning environmental movement. A newfound care for thenatural world, while troublesome to the utilities, was less of a dagger to thekidneythanthelegislativeandregulatoryshiftsthattransformedthis“care”intoa viable political platform. Simultaneously, the shortages of the 1970s thatpushed electricity prices up also produced a new relationship betweenAmericansand theirpatternsof consumption. “Conservation”and“efficiency”becamethewatchwordsofthe1970s.Irememberbeingtrainedatschool,inthemiddleof thisdecade,howtoconserveelectricity: thelastkidoutof theroomalways turnedoff the lights, thehallwayswerenever lit, theheatwasdowninsweaterterritory,andthegirlswereencouragedtowearpantsratherthantightsundertheirdresses.Daily practices of this kind drove down electricity consumption while

environmentalregulationsdroveup,wayup,thecostofbuildingpowerplants.Thepriceoflaborandmaterialnecessaryforplantconstructionrose120percentbetween 1970 and 1979 (comparedwith 23 percent the previous decade), andtimetocompletionoftheseplantsalsoexpanded.Fromstart tofinish,apowerplantbeguninthelate1960stooksevenyearstocomeonline,whileonestartedinthelate1950shadtakenonlyfive.Muchofthisincreasedtimetocompletionwas due to the incessant layering on of environmental standards after theEnvironmentalProtectionAgencywas formed in 1970.Power plant emissionsbefore this point were environmental horrors. Today, for all our worry aboutcarbon emissions, we at least no longer suffer crop failures and fish die-offsfromacidrain.All of these developments combined to confound the economic truisms of

power production: the price of electricity had always dropped; the cost ofmaking electricityhad also alwaysdropped,whileplant efficiencyhad alwaysrisenandelectricityconsumptiontoohadalwaysrisen.Thatallofthesefactorschangedatoncewasaseriesofblowsto theutilitiesnotatallunlike thefinalmomentsofaboxingmatch.Theirsurprisewasthatofthemanabouttohitthemat,caughtsothoroughlyoffguardbyasuddenvolleyofwell-placedfiststhathefailedtoprotecthimselfagainst them,flailingalittlebitmoreaseachblow

hithome.Meanwhile, long an enterprise in the background of American popular

consciousness,thehordesofprotesterscampingforweeksatatimearoundtheperimeters of the nation’s newest electricity-generatingmachines—the nuclearpower plants—made the dull intricacies of everyday power production intofront-pagenews.Theutilitieswerebeinghithardandtheirinabilitytorespondwithanythinglikeaplombwasbroadcasttothenationinprimetime.Asunfortunateandconfoundingastheseunforeseendevelopmentswerethey

hardlyheldacandletowhathadactuallybroken.Theseeminglynaturallawofgrow-and-build,supportedallalongbyagentleman’sagreementonthepartofthe utilities to be regulated and on the part of the government to regulate, inwaysnottoooneroustotheutilities’profitmargins,hadbeguntobreakdown.ThishappenedslowlywiththeCarteradministration,andthenmuchfasterwithReagan-eraderegulation.Morethananyfactofphysicsormarketsorculture,regulationintheformof

long-term loan guarantees coupled with assured profit on investment hadenabled electric companies to weather the intense infrastructural costs ofbuilding ever bigger, more powerful electricity factories and ever moreexpansive power networks. Regulation had also protected them fromcompetition,cedingeachabsolutecontrolovertheproductionanddistributionofelectricpowerwithingivenserviceareas.Thereasonforthislong-standingstatesupportwasthatelectricitywasdeemedthatpeculiarkindofpublicgoodwhoseprice is driven up rather than down by competition and whose availability isdisturbed rather than assured by multiple, competing providers. In the 1970s,however, it slowly became clear that the supposed deleterious effect ofcompetitionwas lessanatural lawthanabureaucraticallyenshrinedfunctionalreality.And likemuch ofwhat Insull built, it had remained true for just longenoughforitsculturalrootstobeforgotten.

Theagreementtogeographicallydelimitutilitiesandtoallowthegovernmenttoregulatethemasmonopoliesishowwegotthequeerlyspeckledmapofutilitydistricts we have come to accept as normal. Inmost places, a singlemassiveinvestor-owned utility holds sway over thousands of acres of territory and acustomerbasethatcanmountintothemillions.Youknowthese,youlikelypayabilltooneofthemeverymonth.TheyhavenameslikeConEd,NationalGrid,

PG&E, PEPCO, Xcel, Entergy, and Southern Company. These are the directdescendantsof thesystemthat Insullbuilt inChicago,Millerbuilt inSouthernCalifornia,Morgan built in the Northeast, and Foshay built in Alaska and itsneighboringprovincesandstates.Thereare3,306electricalutilitycompaniesintheUnitedStates,yet twothirdsofus(68.5percent)payourbill tooneof the189bigfor-profit,investor-ownedleviathans.The other roughly three thousand are tiny, nonprofit, municipally governed

utilities or public utility districts (called a PUD in the West or a PPD inNebraska) that provide power to a city or town. LosAngeles, California, hasone; so do Clatskanie, Oregon, Anderson, Indiana, Coffeyville, Kansas, andOsceola,Arkansas, among two thousand others scattered across every state inthe nation. Often these exist as islands in themidst of a vast sea of another,larger electric company’s territory. For example, Burbank’s utility is almostentirelysurroundedbyLosAngeles’sutility,whichisitselftotallyencompassedbySouthernCaliforniaEdison—thefor-profitcolossusofSouthernCalifornia.Tiny Rancho Cucamonga out in the middle of the California desert has a

municipal utility of a mere four square miles, fifteen thousand daytimecustomers, 197 streetlights, and a single substation. It is surrounded for threehundredmilesineverydirectionbySouthernCaliforniaEdison,whichwith14millioncustomersoverfiftythousandsquaremilesactuallyhasmoreemployeesthan Rancho Cucamonga has people. Yet the latter is required to leave theformer in peace. Rancho Cucamonga gets to settle its own problems, buy ormake itsownpower, set itsownprices (within regulatory limits), andprovideforitsowncustomersasitseesfit.Nomatterhowdelimiteditsserviceareaorhowsmallitscustomerbaseamunicipalutilityisjustasmuchamonopolyasisaninvestor-ownedutility.Bothareprotectedbylawfromcompetition;bothareprohibitedbylawfrompricegauging.Andtheonlywaytobreakout,orin,toanothercompany’sterritoryisthroughlegislativeaction.ThisisexactlywhatMarinCountydidin2010.ManyresidentsofMarin—a

dry,half-empty,hyperwealthy, leftystronghold in thesun-beatenhillsnorthofSan Francisco Bay—wanted the right to producemore of their power locallyfrom renewable resources, or in their terms, to “locally curate” their energywhile also managing their prices, rate structures, and customer relations forthemselves.Inessence,whattheywantedwastogetoutfromunderthethumbofPG&E—thecolossusofNorthernCalifornia,whichhasneverbeenknownforhavingalighttouchwhenitcomestocommunityrelations.ThoughMarinhadthelegalrighttobreakfreefromPG&Ewhenalocalvote

authorized the switch, they found themselves in the midst of a much larger,indeedstate-wide,battlewiththeirformerutility,anexceptionallywealthy,irateadversary. In addition to an admirably thorough public information campaign,PG&EsponsoredaballotmeasurethatwouldchangeCalifornialawtorequireayes vote by two thirds of all the residents in a community in order for thatcommunityto“aggregate”andthendefectfromtheirexistingutility.The wording is important. PG&E’s measure sponsored not a two-thirds

majorityofthevotesactuallycastinanelection—alreadyadifficulttask—butatwo-thirdsmajorityreckonedintermsof thetotalpopulationofanaggregatingarea.GiventhatvoterturnoutintheUnitedStatesrarelytops60percent,eveninhotly contested races, the success of this ballotmeasurewould have virtuallyensured that no community in the state would ever manage to gather thenecessaryvotestosecedefromtheirutility.Therightwouldhaveremainedbutthemeansofrealizingthatrightrenderedunattainable.Thecarefulplacementof ads, editorials, and informationalbulletins and the

money spent byPG&E—a cool $43million—made clear howdesperately theutility wanted to keep the Pandora’s box of community choice aggregationfirmlyshut.AndwhenPG&Elost thisballotmeasure,despitehavingoutspentMarinCounty430to1(Marinmanagedtoraiseslightlylessthan$100,000fortheirpartofthecampaign),thebordersofCalifornia’sutilitymapwereredrawnwith a new player,MarinClean Energy, standing guard over their own smallpatchoflandwithinwhichtheycandecidewhatconstitutespower.This case is important not just because it did indeed open the door to

communitygovernanceofelectricpowerinCaliforniabutbecausethetoolsusedby PG&E to defend its groundwere almost identical to those championed byInsull in the late nineteen-teens to ward off the public power projects thengrowinginpopularity.Samuel Insull didn’t just build an infrastructure, he didn’t just make a

monopolyenterpriseoutofthemostunlikelyofcandidates,hedidn’tjustfigureouthowtofoldgovernmentregulationintotheveryheartofautility’sfinances,he also conceived of and pushed a dedicated propagandamachine, funded bycustomer rates, toensure that investor-owned (for-profit)utilities remained thewaytheAmericamade,distributed,andranthebusinessofelectricity.During his earliest years in Chicago Insull may have concentrated on

consolidatingadjacentelectricpowernetworksintoasingle,massivecentralizedmachinethatcustomersreceivedpowerfromandpaidmoneyinto.Butoncethishad been accomplished he turned his attentions to the preservation and

multiplicationofthissystem.From the late nineteen-teens until the early days of the Great Depression

Insull battened down the hatches and began to build walls. His goal was torender the privately owned, corporateway ofmaking and distributing electricpower unassailable. The battle Marin found itself in with PG&E was but askirmish in a long-standing war between public power and investor-ownedutilities.Awarinwhichallthemoneyandallthepowermoneybegetswasonone side. Though curiously (as with Marin) this fact has been in no way aconsistentguarantorofvictory.BythetimetheDepressionhit,demolishingInsull’sempireandanumberof

otherutilitieswithrickety,indeedquestionable,accountingpracticesthatburieddebtinsideofholdingcompanies,theissuewasnolongeroneofprivateplantsversuscentralstationsbutofpublicpowerversuscorporatepower.Norwasitaquestion of competing providerswithin a single locality, but ofwhich sort ofmonopoly an electricity customermight find themselves a part of: a nonprofitmunicipalnetworkorafor-profitinvestor-ownedutility.AftertheNewDealswungintoeffectin1933andcomplicatedthescenewith

itsbigpublicworksprojectsliketheTennesseeValleyAuthority(TVA)andtheColumbiaRiverdams runby theBonnevillePowerAdministration (BPA)andlegislativeinterventionstowarduniversalelectrification(mostnotably,theRuralElectrificationAct,orREA),thestandardbusinessmodelsbywhichelectricitywas made, distributed, and sold opened to include rural cooperatives andfederally managed power administrations. Despite this, all electric powerremained monopoly-made, monopoly-distributed, and monopoly-billed, whileallmonopolyprofitsweregovernment-regulatedandall electricitypriceswereregulatorilydetermined.Lastbutnotleast,regardlessofwhereonelivedinthenation,rateswerestructuredinsuchawaythatthemoreelectricityoneusedthelessmoneyonepaid.Forexample,ina1934bulletin,SouthernCaliforniaEdisondetailswhattheir

customersmightexpect toget fromamodestmonthly“light”bill.Saying:“Inthe typical six-room house, electricity does all of the washing, ironing andsweeping.ItmakesapotofcoffeeandeightslicesoftoasteverymorningwithwafflesonSunday.Itsuppliesenergyforradio threehoursadayandprovidesfortheoccasionaluseofthecurlingiron,fan,warmingpad,andotherappliances—all for an average monthly bill of $1.92. For an additional $2.00 or $2.50monthly, electric refrigeration may be added, while complete electric serviceincludingdishwasher,mangle,andamodernrangetodoallthecookingcostson

theEdisonmarketanaverageofonly$6.55amonth.Thereisnocheaperservantonthemarket.”It isclear that this isnotyeteverybody’spower:formost it isstilla“light”

bill, in part because few people had six-roomhomes in themid-1930s, not tomentionaspare$6.55amonthtospendonpowerfortheirhouseholdappliances(theequivalentof$110in2015).Neverthelessthefutureisclear,thehomewillbecomeahubofhappyconsumption,notjustofelectricitybutofallthematerialconvenienceselectricitywillmakepossible.Growthwasnotsomuchanindustrywatchwordasadogmathatwouldcarry

it, and us, forward until, bit by bit, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, all thetruthsoftheelectricitybusinessbegantobreakdown.Onlythen,seventyyearsafter Samuel Insull took the helm of tinyChicagoEdison, fifty years after heturned all of Chicagoland’s electricity into a monopoly enterprise, thirty-fiveyearsafterthecollapseofhisempireandthirtyyearsafterhisownignominiousdeath in a Paris metro station, did the “natural” laws of the utility business,discoveredand instrumentalizedby Insullhimself,prove tobe littlemore thanwillfullyheldarticlesoffaithandcarefullyengineeredblindnesses.

In many ways it is more correct to say that Samuel Insull, and not ThomasEdisonorNikolaTeslaorevenGeorgeWestinghouse,madeAmerica’sgrid.Henormalizedandrenderedprofitablethecentralstationswithoutwhichwewouldhave no grid at all, just a bunch of factories,municipal buildings, and homeswith little electricity plants in their basements.He imagined electric light andpowerasproductsforthemassesnotthefew;hemadeitseemnaturalthattheelectricitybusinesscouldonlyworkasamonopoly,andheusheredinanerainwhichoneof themostpowerful thingsonecoulddowithmoney,andtomakemoney, was to use information to manipulate public opinion and influencepublicinvestment.Smallpower,bythe1960s,wasgonenotonlyinfact,butithadbeenerased

bureaucratically and legally. While sensible approaches to difficult problems,likeprovidingalltheelectricityagrowingAmericawantedwheneverwewantedit, were limited in their scope by the formal structures and infrastructures ofpowerthatwerebuiltupinthewakeofSamualInsull’sremarkabletakeoverofChicagoland’sdiversityofnineteenth-centuryelectricitysystems.SamuelInsull’sonceinsignificantEdisonfranchisesetthestageforboththe

modern structure of electric power in America and also for a moral andnormativesenseofwhatitmeanttobeagoodcitizen-consumer.Ifin1920onlythe poor and the rural had no access to electricity, not just in Chicago buteverywhereinAmerica,thenin1950itwasinconceivablethatpowermightbemade privately on-site, and by 1970 only suspect radicals and known freakswereoffthegrid.Americanswerebydefinitionpeoplewhohadrefrigerators,hotwaterheaters,

air conditioners. We had electric lighting, wall outlets, and a multiplicity ofthingstoplugintothem.Increasingnumbersofpeople,especiallyintheWest,cookedonelectricstovesandheatedwithelectricradiators.Wepaidourbillsina timely manner, without much understanding howmuch electricity we wereusing, for what, and how much it actually cost. And though since the 1970sthings have slowly begun to change, both culturally and in the business ofelectricity,forthemostpartthesetruismsstillhold—webuyourpowerfromasoleprovideratareasonableprice,thatwedon’tunderstand,andtheyinsurethatitstaysonmostofthetime.

NOTABLEPASSINGSOnJuly2,1938,SamuelInsullstumbledandthencollapsedinaParissubwaystation.Hewasdeaduponarrivalatthehospitalhalfanhourlater.Accordingtohiswifehisheartwasrenderedstillbythetaskofmountinganddescendingsuchan innumerable quantity of steps. He was a poor man obliged to take publictransit.HisobituaryintheBerkeleyDailyGazetteread:

AtthepinnacleofhispowerSamuelInsullsatonthedirectoratesof85companies,waschairmanof65, president of 11, and through his holding companies controlled more than 6,000 power units,employing72,000workersin324steam,196hydro-electricgeneratingplants,89gasplants,328iceplants.Hiscompanies served1,700,000customers,apopulationof10,000,000.Therewere600,000securityholders.Thevaluationofthesystemroseabovethe3,000,000,000dollarmark.

CommonwealthEdison, the finalnameof theChicagoutilitybuiltby Insull(and still its name today) was decimated by the stock market crash of 1929,takingthelifesavingsofalmostallthose600,000securitiesholderswithit.The

FiskStreetStation,Chicago’sfirst large-scaleACgeneratingplant,wasclosedby labor unrest in 1942 and again for failure to live up to environmentalstandards in 2012.Making it, too, part of the story of howAmerica changedaroundanelectricpowerinfrastructuretoohardenedinitswaystokeepup.

CHAPTER4TheCardiganPath

Early in 1977 President Jimmy Carter, urged America, while sporting asurprisingly casual bit of beigeknitwear, to turndown their thermostats.He’dbeenpresidentforalloftwoweeks,andhisposition“fireside”forthislittlechatwiththenationwasnolesssymbolicthanwashiscardigan—thefirsteverseenonanAmericanpresident.For the better part of the decade the country had been in the midst of an

energy crisis, and Carter had run, and won, on a platform of serious energyreform.We,asanation,weregoingtoneedtodothingsdifferently.“Wemustface the fact,” he said that cold February in his kindly Southern lilt, “that theenergyshortageispermanent.Thereisnowaywecansolveitquickly,butifweall cooperate and make modest sacrifices, if we learn to live thriftily andremember the importance of helping our neighbors, thenwe can findways toadjust,makingoursocietymoreefficientandourownlivesmoreenjoyableandproductive.”In other words, cardigans, fireplaces, thermostats, and later, solar panels

(thirty-twoofwhichCarterwouldmountontheWhiteHouseroofin1979inthemidstofyetanothercripplingoilembargo)—theseweretobecomewatchwordsforusall.Tomodernears,anexecutivecallforapoliticsofthrift,moderateprivation,

cooperation between neighbors, and adjusting to (rather than mastering)circumstancessoundsabittinny.Solonghavewebeenenjoinedtoconsumeourwayoutofeconomiccrises, tobuymoreandspendmore inorder tostimulatemanufactories toproducemore and thushiremore, that theverynotion that asittingpresidentmightencourageustodolessofanyofthesethingsiskindofashock.ButCartermeantit.Hewantedpeopletowearsweaters.And people listened.We actually did start to consume less, not just during

pricespikesand thepanicsattendant toepochalshortages,but inadeeperandmoreabidingwayconservationbecameapartofhowAmericansthoughtabout,used,andmanagedenergy.This turn toward conservation and energy efficiencywas the first crisis, of

three,thatwouldshocktheelectricutilitiesduringtheCarterera.Theirbusinessmodel, longpremisedonendlessly increasingconsumption linked to endlessly

increasing production of ever cheaper electric power tied, in turn, to theconstruction of ever bigger,more technologically advanced power plants, hadbeguntofail.Forthefirsttimeinthestoriedhistoryofelectricity,consumptiondropped; for the first time theirpowerplantsgrew toocostly tocomplete;andthen,muchtotheirsurprise,somethingelsehappened:monopolycontrolofthegridwaswrestedfromthembylegislativefiat.This was initially done in such a minor way that most utilities and many

politicians (including some who had voted the change into law) didn’t muchnoticewhenithappened.Themenwhowrotethelegislation,themenwhovotedforit,andthelobbyistsofutilitycompaniesmissedthereinstatementofaminorsub-clauseofa sub-actofanomnibusbill called theNationalEnergyAct thatonlyjustsqueezedthroughCongressaftersignificantcajolingandadministrativearmtwisting.ItpassedintheHousebyasinglevote(207–206)intheautumnof1978.What this clause said was simply that the utilities would need to buy, and

movetomarket,electricityproducedbyanyfacilitywithanoutputoflessthan80MW(aboutatenthofwhatmighthavebeenproducedbyanaveragenuclearpowerplantatthetime).And,justasimportant,theywouldbeobligedtopayanonmiserly rate for it. This rate would be set according to what were called“avoidedcosts”—that is, themoneyitwouldhavecost theutility tomakethatpreciseamountofelectricityforthemselves.Even though few realized the implications at the time, section 210 of the

PublicUtilitiesRegulatoryPoliciesAct(PURPAforshort)effectivelybroketheutility’s total control over everything that entered,moved through, and exitedtheir power system.And it worked, not just because ofwhat itmandated butbecause of the vehemence with which this mandate was taken up andimplemented.Americanswerefedupwiththepowersthatwere,andgraspingatevery straw made available to them (including the election of Jimmy Carterhimself ), we changed the power industry, very slowly, but inexorably andforever.Onereasonthissubsectionwaslittlenoticedortroubledoveratthetimewas

that no one could have predicted the fervorwithwhich itwould be enforced,another reason, however, for its having been overlooked was the ambitiousscopeoftheNationalEnergyActasawhole.In a 2012 address to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Meeting,

President Carter recalled that the act “put heavy penalties on gas-guzzlingautomobiles; forced electric utility companies to encourage reduced

consumption; mandated insulated buildings and efficient electric motors andheavy appliances; promoted gasohol production and carpooling; decontrollednatural gas prices at a rate of 10 percent per year; promoted solar, wind,geothermal, and water power; permitted the feeding of locally generatedelectricity intoutilitygrids; and regulated stripminingand leasingofoffshoredrillingsites.Wewerealsoable to improveefficiencybyderegulatingourair,rail,andtruckingtransportationsystems.”Giventhelitanyofchangesenactedbythissinglepieceoflegislationonecan

seewhypermitting“thefeedingoflocallygeneratedelectricityintoutilitygrids”might initially have slipped past a radar tuned to the measure of significantthings. All of the copious features of this bill had an impact on the ways inwhichAmericaused,produced,managed,andimaginedenergy.Inthis,aswithhis other bureaucratizing and legislative attempts to rationalize America’srelationship topower, thePresidentgot it right.At theendofhis lone term inofficewehadournation’sfirsteverNationalEnergyPlan(theNationalEnergyActwasits legislativeform),aDepartmentofEnergyinsteadofthemorethanfiftyunrelatedgovernmentofficespreviouslychargedwithoverseeingnationalenergypolicy,aStrategicPetroleumReserve tohelpsmoothwildlyvacillatingoil prices caused by our national dependence on foreign oil, and theNationalRenewable Energy Laboratory, whose mandate was to explore and makefeasiblerenewableandsmall,decentralizedpoweroptions.Inorder tounderstandhowsuchaseeminglyminorencumbrance toutilities

rosewith time to the level of a crisis that in thepresent is often, if somewhatmelodramatically, referred to as a “death spiral,” it is necessary to spend amomentinthe1970s,atimeinwhichweasAmericanswerebecomingdeeplyaware of, and increasingly concerned about, the vulnerability andincomprehensibilityofthesystemsthatsustainedus.

We,asacountry,hadspentdecades,indeedmostofthetwentiethcentury,andbillions of BTUs in the project of national uplift. By 1970 we had largelysucceeded in this task.Americawas awealthy nation and an infrastructurallysoundone.Yet,thesystemwehaddevisedtomakeusrichhadalsodevelopedsome obvious downsides. The government had gotten us ass over teakettle inVietnam, and at home our prosperitywasmade fragile by our dependence onforeignoil, thesteadysupplyofwhichwecouldn’tcontrol,while thematerial

bounty that flowed from our industry had saddled us with a set of pressingenvironmentalissuesthatregularfolkshadnopowertocorrect.Theinstitutionsthat ran America in 1970 were making decisions that increasing numbers ofpeopledidn’tagreewith,andyetthesepowerplayersseemedbeyondthereachofanyonetoaffect.Theprotestcultureofthelate1960swasinpartaresponsetotheinaccessibilityandcalcificationofstateandcorporatepowers,butitwasalso linked to a growing understanding that the steady stream of engineeredgoodsthesepowersprovideddidnotcomewithoutcost.Pollution,likeshortage,was becoming part of the national consciousness. Certainly not everyonewasjostled into awareness in the same way, but enough Americans had becomeinterested in systemic change that Carter, an unusual pick, was elected to thehighestofficeintheland.By the time Carter took office, every home in America was its own

miraculous technological node, built into a complexly woven support net ofwiresandpipesandductwork.By1976everyoneinAmericawhowantedithadelectricity, indoor plumbing, central heating, a refrigerator, and a phone. Ourworkplacesweresimilarlywellserved.Living in thesehomesand laboring in theseworkplaceschangedus. Itonly

took a generation after the end of the Depression for Americans to becomeconsummately modern individuals, until as a nation we had lost workingknowledge of a coal brazier, a kerosene lamp, a latrine, an ice box, awell, amangler,oranythingelsemorecomplicatedthanaswitch,abutton,anoutlet,asocket,atap,oraflusher.Andyet,itwasalsothecasethatalmostnoonehadany idea how the replacement technology (a coal-burning power plant for abrazier,orsewertreatmentplantforanouthouse,orwaterpurificationplantforawell)worked.By themid-1970s,who,drivingdown thehighway,could tellthedifferencebetweenanoilrefineryandacoal-burningpowerplant?Asewagetreatment plant and a water purification plant (or, for that matter, a fishhatchery)?A telephonewire, aTVwire, andanelectricitywire?Realistically,whoneededtobeable todistinguishamongtheseclassesofsupport?Nobody,excepttheprofessionalschargedwithmaintainingthem.Aslongastheswitches,buttons, outlets, sockets, taps, and flushers worked, the benefit of all the resthavingbecomedistantundertakingsrunningalonglongwiresandthroughlongpipeswasthattheywerenolongerourimmediateconcern.Thus didAmerica lose one kind of knowing—that involved inmanaging a

low-tech household—without gaining another kind of knowing—that of thedistant complexityundergirdingahigh-techhousehold.High-techheredoesn’t

mean digital, though that transformation was also on the horizon by the late1970s;rather,itmeansamodestbutorderlyentanglementofanalogsystemsthatprovidedforacomfortablelife.Theseintimateinfrastructuresfreedusuptolivein ways unrecognizable to even big dreamers two generations earlier; our“normal” was blind luxury from the perspective of almost any other time inhumanhistory.Oneresultofthiswasthatwegottothinkaboutotherthings,dootherthings,andlivelonger,lessdisease-riddledlives.Theproblemwasthatallofthesesystemsbeyondthescopeofdailyunderstandinghadconsequences,andbythe1970stheseconsequenceshadbecomealmostimpossibletoignore.Theoilembargoesof1973and1978broughtanascentunderstandingtothe

nationasawholeof theglobal complexityandvulnerabilityofourgas tanks’supply chain. The smog crisis in LosAngeles,which began in the 1950s andlasted through the 1960s, made the link between machines—including coal-burningpowerplants—andtheireffectspalpabletoSouthernCalifornians’lungsandred,itchyeyes.LoveCanalin1978intinyNiagaraFallschangedpollutionfromanabstracteviltoanimmediatehorrorshow.Though environmentalism grew in force and impact with Love Canal and

similar “Superfund” sites, the partial meltdown of one of the nuclear powerplantsatThreeMileIsland,Pennsylvania,in1979shiftedthetideforgood.Thiseventseemedtoprovetonuclearpower’snaysayersthattheyhadbeenrightallalong.Nuclearwasano lesspoisonousway tomakeelectricity thanwascoalthatblackenedlungsandsmudgedpores,andoilthatwasuncontrollablebecauseofitsoriginsonthefarsideoftheplanet.Morethanthis,eachmess,fromDDTto acid rain, seemed to further convince a generation already angered andradicalizedby the excessesof theVietnamWar thatwithout an abidingwide-scalecommitmenttofundamentalchangedisasterdidindeedloomforAmerica(andmaybe,somesuspected,weevendeservedit).Bythelate1970stheproblemwasnotsomuchawarenessofwhatwasgoing

wrong,butratherhowtochangeanyofit.Thesystemsinplacethatmadesmog,lakesofindustrialpollutants,sweetlightcrude,andwarhadbeenhardening,insomecasestothepointoftotalcalcification,sincetheearliestyearsofindustrialconsolidation.Inthistheelectricitybusinesswasnodifferent:therewasnowayforregularpeopledevelopinganewenvironmentalconsciousnesstohaveasayinhowpowerwasmade,fromwhat,andwithwhatafter-effectsexceptthroughprotesting or opting out. Many Americans did both. Protests around nuclearpower stations blossomed throughout the late 1960s and into the 1970s asthousandscampedoutaroundthesepowerfactorieswhenevertheyweredueto

open.Manymorepeopleweredissatisfiedwithouttakingtostreetsorgoingoffthegridentirely.Thedropinelectricityconsumptionnationallywasonesignofthisdiscontent.Evenpeoplewhocouldn’taffordto“turnon,tunein,anddropout”couldfollowtheCardiganPath,andsotheydid.Despite thesedevelopments, the industry’sstrangleholdongenerationmeant

thattherewasnoalternateroutethatdifferentlogicsofpowerproductionmightfollow. There was no place for choice or self-sufficiency and no reward forconservationorefficiency.Cartermayhavechampioned lessrather thanmore,but before his legislation began to force change upon the status quo, acts ofconservationorefficiencywerewithoutreward.Onecoulduse lesspower,butbecause of the tiered rate structures that charged the most for the first fewkilowatt-hours used in any given billing period—a system put into place bySamuelInsull—theseeffortswereonlyminimallyreflectedinthedollaramountowedonthebill.Theimpossibilityoftransformingabuddingenvironmentalconsciousnessinto

effective action against entrenched industries was not just an issue forindividuals,butalso forstatesandothercommunitiesattempting toenact theirownresponsestoenvironmentaldegradation.California,forinstance,hadpasseda bill into law, in the 1960s, that would mitigate pollution and encouragerenewableformsofelectricityproductionbutcouldnotenforceitbecauseofthewaysinwhichfederalregulationsprotectedbigpollutersfromattemptsatstatereform.Americawasinastraightjacketandherfrustrationcreatedaparticularlyfertileenvironmentforeventinyseedsofhope,likethatprovidedbysection210of thePublicUtilitiesRegulatoryPoliciesAct.TheCarter administrationmayhavegiventheactitswords,butthespiritofthetimesgaveititsclaws.Norwasitjustthattheutilitieshadgrownblindtothepeople;theywerealso

isolated fromgovernmentalwhimsy and reformby virtue of having their owndedicated regulatory bodies. The very institutions that had protected theminitiallyfromcompetitionhadbecometheagentsoftheircloister,divorcingtheutilitiesfromtheeffectsofthemarketontheirbusinessdecisionsbecausetheywereguaranteedamodestreturnoneverydollarspent.Buyanewofficechairfortheaccountant?Earnadime.Buildanewcoal-burningpowerplant—earnahundredthousanddimes.By the 1970s the utilities had ceased to live and function in the realworld.

Their ruleswerenotourown.Theirpowerhadgrownabsolute,plodding, andblind.EnergyhistorianRichardHirshtakesitonestepfurther,arguingthatfordecades the utilities had been attracting the bottom of the graduating classes

from engineering schools: the students who didn’t want an exciting career in“the glamor industries—electronics, aerospace or computers” or who weren’tquiteagileenough to landamore interesting job. Itwasa stagnant sector thatpromisednoadventureandasteadypaycheck.Asaresult,themostriskaverseandleastfacilemindswererunningthegame.

Oneof the reasons that section210ofPURPAmade it through the legislativeprocessandintothelawwasthatitdidn’tatfirstglancechallengeanyofthis.Itleft the utilities as monopolies untouched and instead reformed an almostaccidental right they had been given all the way back in the early 1900s; itstrippedthemoftherighttocontrolthemarketforelectricitynotassellersbutratherasbuyers.PURPAactuallylefttheirmonopolypowerswellenoughalone,butsummarilyretractedtheirpowersasmonopsonies.Mostpeopleknowwhatamonopolyis—anentitythatmaintainscontrolover

the supply of a good or service, like howU.S. Steel controlled themarket inrebarin1900orhowtheSovietStatecontrolledtheavailabilityofprettymucheverythingfromtoothbrushestopotatosackswithinthevast,sprawlingterritoryoftheSovietUnion.Whatislesscommonknowledgeisthatthemonopolyhasan echo on the consumer side of the business world called a “monopsony,”which is the sole customer for a product.We don’t talk about thesemuch inAmericabecauseit issorarelyaproblem.Hereconsumersaresuchapreciouspartofcommoditysystemsthatevencompanieseager tocontrolamarketasaproviderofaproductorservice(amonopoly)will rarelysomuchasflirtwiththe notion of controlling amarket by being its sole customer (amonopsony).Nevertheless,amonopsonyiseverybitasmuchakingmakerasamonopoly—andAmerica’s utilities before PURPAwere a rare instance of both.Not onlywere they the only ones providing electricitywithin a given territory but theywerelegallyalsotheonlybuyeravailableshouldsomeotherintrepidindustry—oronethatgeneratedalotofexcessheatinitsdailyoperations,likeasmelter—trytomakeandsellelectricitywithinthissameterritory.Theutilitiesmanaged thegrid, theymade thepower, theyowned thewires,

they distributed the electricity, and they collected themoney. Theywere alsoregulatedinsuchawaythatanyoneelsewithanotiontosellelectricitycouldn’t.The lawpreventedotherelectricitymakers (bydintofnotprovidinga license)frombuildingtheirowndistributionnetworksandenteringintocompetitionwith

the existing utility.While utilities, for their part, either refused to buy powerfrom these thirdpartiesoutrightor theyset sucha lowpriceperkilowatt-hourthatmostwannabepowerplants,whentheydidthemath,realizedtheywouldbelosingmoneyontheprojectandoptedout.Thiswaspartofthereasontherewasno “alternative” generation during the middle years of the twentieth century.Evenpowersystemsthathadexistedwellbeforetheutilitymonopolieshadbeenestablished,suchassmallhydroinstreams(popular inCaliforniawell into the1920s)orcogenerationplants(whichin1908producedalmost60percentoftheelectricity made in the United States), had been almost utterly erased by theutilities’ preference for large, dedicated power plants. And since no one elsecouldenterthemarket,becausetheutilitieswouldn’tbuytheirproductnomatterhowcheaplyorcleanlytheymadeit,thatwasprettymuchthat.Regulation, backwhen itwas hashed out in the early 1900s, had presumed

exactly this kind of vertically integrated electricity system. No one reallyanticipatedthatonedaymorethanhalfacenturylaterthatsameentitymightbeinthepositionofa“customer”formodestquantitiesofelectricityproducedbysomeone else.Monopsony powers had been granted to the utilities almost byaccident.ThiswaswhatPURPAreversed:Theutilitiescouldstillbemonopolies,but

theycouldn’tbemonopsoniesanymore.Theutilitiesnowhadtobuypowerfromentitiesmaking small amounts of electricity in their territory; and they had topaythesameratefor this independentlyproducedpowerasitwouldhavecostthemtomakeitthemselves.Thissecondclausenotablyusedthemarkettoforcesmallpowerproducers tobemorecost effective than theutility.Tomakeanymoneytheyhadtomakeelectricityforlessthantheutility’s“avoidedcosts”—afuzzy term that could be (andwas) interpreted to include everything from thecost of fuel to the amount of new generation a utilitywouldn’t have to buildbecauseoftheelectricitytheywerenewlyobligatedtobuyfromothersources.PURPAwas,inotherwords,asmartbitofanti-monopsonyregulation.So long regulatedasmonopolies, theutilitieswerenot initiallyalarmed that

theywouldnowbe regulatedasmonopsoniesaswell.Thisdoesn’tmean theywereexactlyhappyabout the terms, it’s just that theywerealmostmyopicallyconcernedwithlosingtheirabilitytoofferso-calledpromotionalrates.By the late 1970s small had become beautiful and less had become more.

Therewasnoplace in thisnewworldofmodest,consensualprivation for ratestructures designed to cajole people into usingmore power than they actuallyneeded.Regardless,promotionalrateswerealsooneofthefewtricksleftinthe

utilities’ toolbox for keeping the cost of their massive investments ininfrastructure from dragging them into the red. From the last chapter you’llrecall that the biggest problemwithmaking a profit from electricity is that apowerplantonlypaysoffifitisusedatclosetomaximumcapacitytwenty-fourhoursaday.Reducedconsumption,whateverthecause,wasadistinctthreattothe utilities’ main way of making money. Once everyone had electric powerthere was no real way to grow a customer base; the only option was tomanipulatehowmuchpowerthesecustomersusedandwhen.Promotionalratesweretheutilities’bestwayofdoingthis.This tried-and-truemeans of convincing customers,most especially energy-

intensiveindustries,toincreasehowmuchelectricitytheyusedwasbyofferingspecial deals like almost free power in the middle of the night or half-pricepowerafterthefirst60kilowatt-hoursusedinanygivenbillingcycle.Alwaysanimportantpartoftheirbusinessmodel,suchofferswerecriticalinthe1970sasconsumptionwas fallingoverallandpowerplantconstructionwas reaching itsapex. This effective means of maintaining an equilibrium in the electricityindustrywasalsounder threat fromPURPA,andtheutilities,asaresult,weremore worried about whole sections of the Energy Policy Act related to rateregulationsthantheywereaboutbuyingalittlebitofpowerfromascatteringoftinyproducers.Thus, though the utilities did lobby against section 210 of the act—at one

pointtheyevenmanagedtocutitentirely—nobodypaidmuchmindwhenitwasslippedbackinbyNewHampshiresenatorJohnDurkin.SenatorDurkin’sgoalwastoassurethatagarbage-burningplantinhisdistrictcouldstarttomovetheelectricityitwasmakingtomarketintheBostonarea(andmaybeevenincreasetheircapacitybystartingtoburnwoodwastefromNewEngland’sforests,whatwenowcall “biomass”).The utilities thought they had bigger fish to fry thanfightingCongressabouttherightsofatrashburnertosellalittlepower.Inthis,asitturnedout,theywerewrong.In the United States in the 1970s there were still two types of electricity

producers that were not part of the national grid. First were the cogenerationplants, like the New Hampshire trash immolation facility. These produced somuchexcessheatthatrunningtheirsteamthroughasmallelectricgeneratorhadnoappreciableeffectonthefactory’sother tasks.Secondwerethehippiesandotherdo-it-yourselfsmallpowerinnovators.Bythemid-1970sbothgroupswerealready making their own electricity, though both were infinitesimally minorplayers in the national electricity game. In 1975, cogeneration plants were

producing about 3 percent of the nation’s power and selling none of it,whilewhat the off-the-grid folks were up to wasn’t even worth the trouble ofquantifying. Nevertheless, in the 1970s, minor players were the only realdirectiononecouldturninhopesofbreakingthestrangleholdthemajorplayershad over almost everything. In crafting section 210, then, the Carteradministrationthoughtitwouldbewisetointegratetheone(cogeneration)andpolitic (and perhaps interesting over the long run) to include the other (hippiepower).Inthistheywerenotfarwrong.

If so-called “frontier electric technologies” such as small hydroelectric dams,solarelectricsystems,andwindpowerwere included in thebillasameansofsupportinginnovationatthesmallestscale,moreofanexperimentthananythingelse, cogeneration was neither a new idea nor a new technology. From theearliestdaysofelectricpower,factorieshadbeenmakingelectricity,atfirstonlyfor themselves, but as the grid had grown, this almost incidental current hadinitiallybeen included in thenationalmixofgenerations.Moreelectricitywasbeingproducedin theUnitedStatesbycogenerationthanbyutilitiesas lateas1912.Butby1962,allthathadchanged—industrialcogenerationplantswere,atthetime,deliveringlessthan10percentofthenation’selectricity.By1978thatnumberhadshrunkto3.2percent.Withoutdirectgovernment intervention, thenumberseemeddestinedtofallallthewaydowntonothingatall.As it slowly became clear during the early 1980s that PURPAwould stick,

cogenerationbeganitsclimbbackintothedoubledigits.Asof2015,thereweremore than 3,600 factories in the United States making 12 percent of ourelectricity as a by-product of their own industrial processes. The U.S.DepartmentofEnergy’scurrentgoalisthat20percentofAmerica’selectricitycome from cogeneration plants by 2030. If its nesting efficiencies suited theprevailing attitudes of the 1970s, cogeneration alsomaintains a solid fan baseamong electrical engineers because its double use of the same heat increasesplant efficiency to over 50 percent, leaving Carnot’s theorem in the dust.Existingmeansforincreasingpowerplantefficiencycannotbemadetodobetterthancogenerationdoesbyitsverynature.NolongerjustaquestionofasingleNewHampshiretrashburnertoocloseto

Boston to regret all thedollars it’s losingas itvents itswasteheat rather thanrecycling it into electricity, cogeneration today has officially entered the

mainstream. So, too, have the chancier technologies—wind and solar mostespecially—thoughtheirpathtowardubiquitywasmuchlesssure.Thoughtheintegrationofcogenerationintothenationalgridwasclearlywise,

PURPA alsomade it explicit that alternative renewable power projectswouldalsobegrantedtherighttoselltheirpowertothelocalutility.Aslongasthesegeneratorsremainedsmallerthan80megawattsandproducedelectricityforlessthantheavoidedcostsof theutility thentheywould, just likethecogenerationplants,beguaranteedabuyerandafairpricefortheirelectricpower.WhilePURPAwaswendingitswaythroughthecourts—aprocessthatlasted

fiveyears—smallpowerproducersbegan takingout loans,buying land, fixingupoldriverdams,anderectingwindturbines.NowherewasthismoretruethaninCalifornia,whichhadbeenpreparing, institutionally, for just such exigencyformorethanadecade.In1983,whentheSupremeCourtconfirmedthelegalityofPURPAandputanendtofurtherlegaldillydallying,Californiawasready.Ithadahostofsmallenergyentrepreneurswithalmostoperationalprojectsandithadlocallegislationinplacetosupportelectricityproductionthatwasverifiablyenvironmentally friendly—what we would now call “green.” A surprisingnumberofpermitsforsmall-powerconstructionwerefiledalmostimmediately,1,800fordamsalone,aswellmorethan16,000windturbinesandevensomeforexperimental solar projects. And all this new small-power generation wasscattered to the fourwinds—in the river canyons and oldmines of the SierraNevadas, in the desert outsideL.A., in the passes betweenSanFranciscoBayandtheCentralValley,evenindowntownSacramento,andalmostallofitwasvariable.Itblewwiththewind,fellwiththewater,andwarmedwiththesun.Theutilitiesquicklyfoundthemselveswithaplethoraofnewproblems.Never

beforehadtheyhadtodealwithvariablegeneration,neverbeforehadtheyhadto deal with distributed generation, and never in the seventy years of theirexistence had they lost control over the production side of their business. Atissuewasn’tthattheysuddenlyhadtointegrateamassiveamountofnewpowerbut that they weren’t getting to decide howmuch, where, or when relativelysmallamountsofelectricitywouldcomestreamingontotheirpowerlines.Theyjusthadtopayforitanddistributeitwhenitgotthere.Theirbusinessmodelhadnoprovisionsforthisnewreality.ItdemandedthattheybehavelesslikeSoviets.Forhalfacenturythedaily,quarterly,andannualrunningofthegridhadbeen

accomplished in meetings between the managers of various arms of a utility.Notes were taken, plans made, and later operationalized. In place of this

centralized and somewhat perfunctory organizational routine the utilities nowneeded something like real-time flexibility. Even if the scale was initiallymodest,theintroductionofvariable,distributedgenerationforwhichtheywouldhavetopayamarketpricewas,fortheutilities,alittlelikealienscomingdownfromouterspaceandaskingthemtoenterintoanintergalacticenergyalliance.It’sfineintheory,butunimaginableinitsdetails.Takeasimpleseemingthinglikepayingmarketprice.Theutilitiesweren’texactlyclearbythelate1970showmuchitactuallycost

tomake a kilowatt-hour of electricity.Much like anymonopoly, they had notneededtotakethemarketpricefortheirproductseriouslyintoaccount.Forfiftyyearstheyhadbeenfreefromcompetition, theyhadhadthepriceoftheirsoleproductsetforthembyregulators,andtheyearnedareturnonwhattheyspentregardlessofhow frivolously.Over this sameperiod theirbusinessmodelhadbecomewholly reliantonguaranteed low-cost loans forbig-budget items (likenuclearpowerplants).Asaresult theyweremoreattentivetoshiftingpoliticaltidesthantothemarket.BythetimePURPArolledaroundtherewasnolongeranyoneworking in the electricity businesswho rememberedwhat it had beenlikebefore,whencompetitionwaspartofwhatgovernedthewinnersandlosersof the electricity game. In 1978 they could hardly account for uncertain fuelprices, uncertain consumption practices, and the mysterious vagaries ofenvironmentalregulation.Theproblemofaccuratelyestimatingcost,profits,andpriceonlybecameexponentiallymoredifficultwhenappliedtothefuture,whichPURPAwasnowaskingthemtopredict.Meanwhile,therewassomefearonthepartoftheFederalEnergyRegulatory

Commission(orFERC,foundedin1977)thattheutilitieswouldtaketheprojectofdoingthemathonthesingle“avoidedcosts”parameterofthetransitionasameanstostallimplementationoftheentirebillindefinitely.Ifeachsmallpowerproducer was treated to a long bureaucratic process before receiving a viablecontract,thenPURPAwouldfail;theletterofthelawhavingbecomeatoolinthedemolitionofitsspirit.Toreducewranglingandconfusionandtomakecertain thatPURPAwas in

factimplemented,FERCmandatedthatutilities,orincertaincasesstates,dothemath thoroughly, but only once, and then use the number they found todetermine all initial contracts with non-utility electricity providers. So labor-intensivewas this task that the joke at the timewas that PURPAought to becalled the “FullEmploymentAct forEconomists of 1978.”Even thismassivedeploymentofpeoplegoodatfiguresyieldedunsatisfactoryresultssince,asthen

presidentoftheCaliforniaPublicUtilitiesCommission(andlaterU.S.secretaryof commerce) JohnBryson pointed out in 1982, accuracy “will varywith thetimeofday,season,andtermofcontracts,aswellastheutility’smarginalfuelor next planned facility.” The level of flexibility that the utilities foundthemselvesneeding,mostespeciallyintheirattemptstolinkpricingmodelswithtime-of-dayrates,wouldnotberealizeduntiltheInternetwouldbringreal-timearbitragetoelectricitymarketsalmostfifteenyearsinthefuture.Thereasonthepriceperkilowatt-hourhadtobesetat thetimeoftheinitial

contract, even if that contract stretched out for fifteen or thirty years, is thatsmallpowerprovidersneededtoknowhowmuchtheyweregoingtobepaidforthe electricity theywouldbe selling, not justwhen theybrought their projectsonline, but for the foreseeable life of their infrastructure. In order to win acontract theyhad to first demonstrate that they couldproduce electricitymorecheaply than could the local utility. And second, they, too, like large powerproviders, stumbledover the costs of facility construction.Almost all the newplayers in the generation game had a significant outlay of capital at the verybeginning of the process,which theywere required to tacklewithout the low-cost-guaranteed loans that hadmade traditional utilities big builders since theInsull era.And though these samesmallproducerswereunencumberedby theregulationsthathadmadetraditionalutilitiesslowtoinnovate,theystillneededtoprojectaguaranteedincometoattractinvestorsattheverystart.Once the initial requirements of figuring “avoided costs”weremet by state

regulatory agencies, often in conversation with the utilities, went about“offering”contractsinverydifferentways.Insomestates,suchasVermontandNew York, the same price per kilowatt-hour was offered to any and all newelectricityprovidersregardlessoftheutilitydoingthebuying;inNewYorkthiswascalledthe“six-cent”lawasitpaidoutaflat,invariable,6¢perkWhforallearlyPURPAera contracts. In other states, likeVirginia, non-utility providersbid for contracts. For example, in 1986, when Virginia Power wanted to add1,000kilowatthoursofgeneration,foruseby1990,theyheldanopenauction,received 5,000 kilowatt hours’ worth of bids from fifty-three differentcompaniesfromwhichtheyselectedseventhatpromised1,178newkWh.Thissystem of competitive bidding would become the most revolutionary of themanyvariantstriedoutbydifferentstatesasitallowedforsomethinglikefree-marketcompetitiontoactually,andatlonglast,enterthegovernanceofthegrid.Onceawardedthecontract,thesenew,smallpowerentrepreneurs“builtout”thepromised generation facilities, and on the appointed date, they began

contributingapredictablekilowattagetothegrid.Not all states followed this model. Some avoided the bidding process and,

ratherthanproducingasinglestandardizedcontract,producedaseriesofthem.Californiaisthestatethatlivesinthehistorybooksbecauseoftheunique(somemightsayspectacular)wayinwhichtheircontractsopenedthestates’electricitymarkets to “frontier electric technologies” rather than to cogeneration, whichwasthewinnerinmostotherplaces.Californiagavethehippiestheirdue,andmanyof these leaptat thechance tomakethestate’selectricity,oftenwithfarmoregumptionthanmanifestskill.InCaliforniatherewerefourstandardizedoffers,ofslightlydifferentlengths

and with slightly different terms, which once written were made available tocogeneratorsandotherwannabesmallpowerproviderstochoosebetween.Thefirst three were all a little too beneficial to the utility side of the contractingparties and as such received such a lackluster reaction that a fourth, interimchoice—calledbythedashingnameInterimStandardOffer#ns4,orISO4—wasmade available. It had terms remarkable enough (and it turns out, foolishenough)thatnotonlydidagreatmanysmallpowerproducerssignupduringtheeighteenmonthsbetween1983and1985thatitwasavailable,butamuchlargerpercentage of thesewere “alternative” renewable projects than in other states.Unlikebackeast,forexample,whereinsomestatesupwardsof90percentofthenew generation contracted during the first decade post-PURPA came fromcogeneration,inCaliforniaitwouldbewindthatstoletheshow.“The combination of federal and California incentives and innovative state

regulations launched the wind industry in the U.S.,” write wind advocatesRandall Swisher andKevin Porter, and these “gave California the short livedtitle of having the most installed wind capacity in the world. Grid integratedwind development increased from 10MW in 1981 statewide to a cumulativetotalof1039MWin1985 [theequivalentof twocoal-burningplants].By theearly 1990s as construction was completed on most of the remaining ISO4contractsCaliforniahadabout1700MWofwindprojects inplace.”All in80MW chunks. “By 1990, California had become home of 85% of the world’scapacityofelectricitypoweredbythewindand95%oftheworld’ssolarpowerelectricity.”TheISOsthathelpedstructuretheearlydaysofPURPA’simplementationin

California functioned a lot likeMedicaredoes today. In the caseofMedicare,different retirees have different needs; some need good prescription coverage,others need lots of very cheap doctor visits, others need regular high-tech

services (such as dialysis). They then look to the small print of the plans(contracts,infact)onofferandsigntheonethatseemstobethebestfit.Everyfiveyearsorsotheygettorevisethisdecisionandchooseagain,thoughusuallyfrom a slightly different set of standardized contracts. It’s not free-marketcompetition,exactly,but itmeansthat individualcasescanbe“batched”whilegiving the minority partner in the interaction the ability to pick. No singlecontract isaperfect fit,but therealityofchoicemakescompromisingonwhatareinfactnon-negotiabletermsalessbitterpilltoswallow.ISO4wasuniqueamongCalifornia’sofferingsinthatforthefirsttenyearsof

thecontract itpaidmore than theavoidedcosts to theutility; it thenpaid lessthan this amount in the final years. This was particularly appealing toentrepreneurs because of how expensive it was to build new energyinfrastructure. Unlike cogeneration, which had been around in one form oranother for a long time, there was no tried-and-true means of making windpower or solar power in the early 1980s.Even themany small hydro projectsthatblossomedacrossCaliforniaduringthefirstpost-PURPAyears,whichusedknown technology,still involvedbuildingnewdams.Allof thisnecessitatedalotofcapitalup front.The ISOs,andmostespeciallynumber four,providedasolidassuranceofincomeoverthelongterm.Thisinturnmadewind,solar,andsmallhydroquitesuddenlyandsurprisinglyintogoodinvestments.

Intheearly1980sTyroneCashmansatatthe“Wind”deskofCalifornia’saptlynamedOfficeofAppropriateTechnologyinSacramento.Heislargelycreditedwith bringing wind power to California, because he understood thatentrepreneurialwill alone, not evenwhen coupledwith utilities’ signatures onthe rightpiecesofpaper,wouldbe enough tobring about a renewable energyrevolution (to which he was, and remains, deeply committed). Tax credits,Cashmanfigured,weretheanswer.The Federal Government, as a part of PURPA, was already offering 10

percentcreditforinvestmentinnon-utilitygeneration,tunedupto15percentbytheCrudeOilWindfall Profits TaxAct in 1980, and further sweetened by anadditional10percentinvestmenttaxcreditwhichcouldbeappliedtoanycapitalinvestment “regardless of whether it was used for a robot at an auto plant inIndiana,agiantshovelatastripmineinOhio,orawindturbineinCalifornia.”A 25 percent tax credit provided by the Feds for investing in the electricity

generationbusinesswasalreadyaveryenticingdealtoinvestors.WhatCashmandid was double it. In California, any investment in renewable infrastructure(includingsolarandwindpower,butalsosolarhotwaterheatersandothernon-electricity producing uses of renewables) was rewarded with a tax break ofnearly50percent.Moneypouredintothestate,andmostofitwastransformedinto the steel stalks andmassive rotating blades ofwind turbines. Therewereveritableforestsofthem.WhatnobodyinvolvedwithcraftingISO4orthetaxcreditsthataccompanied

ithadexpectedwashowwellitallmightgo.Doinganythingnewinrelationshiptothebulkenergygamehadforsolongbeenimpossiblethatthebestthesenewenergyentrepreneursand ideologueshadhopedforwas tomakea tinydent inthe existing edifice.What they got instead was a party that everybody (evenpeopletheyhadn’texactlyinvited)cameto.Takentogether,ISO4andthestate’soverlygeneroustaxcreditscreatedaglut in therenewablesmarket.Andasoilandnaturalgaspricesplummetedinthemid-1980s,California’stwobigutilitieswerequitesuddenlybeingrequiredtopurchasemorepowerthantheyneededforfar more money than they could recoup through their rates. Meanwhile, theReagan-era deregulation of the savings and loans in 1986 tookCashman, andmosteveryoneelse,totallybysurprise.Suddenlyeveryone,notjustthesuperrich—“the baseball players, football players, plastic surgeons and SouthernCalifornia actors” that Cashman’s turbine investment plan had beenmeant toattract—could secure the financing necessary to buy their very own personalwindturbine.Fartoomanypeople,inhisopinion,didjustthat.“There justweren’tanystodgybankersout there,”heexplained tomemore

thanaquarterofacenturylater,inhismodestMarinCountylivingroom.“Therewere onlywildcat bankers,whoweren’t going to lose a thing nomatterwhatthey invested in.” And then “all these Wall Street types turned up, hidingthemselves so we wouldn’t see them, but crawling all over this place.” Thissentiment of too much investment too fast is echoed by energy analyst PaulGipe,whopoints out that the “tax creditswere so lucrative that they attractedthose who knew more about constructing a deal than about building windturbines.”UnwittinglyRonaldReaganhadcreatedoneoftheweirdestmarriagesAmericanbusinesshaseverseen,asManhattaninvestmentbankersscrambledtobuyupwindturbinesmadebycommune-living,Vietnam-eradraftdodgers.TheresultwasthatCalifornia,bythemid-1980s,hadamassivewindbubble,ripeforpopping.Californiamight havebeen the planetary center ofwind energy in themid-

1980s,buttheirturbinesweremoremachinesforchurningoutvisionsofgreenerfutures thanactualwatts.Thebuy-yourself-a-wind-turbineplanhadbecomesoappealingthat,inCashman’swords,“anawfullotofmachineswereputupthatwereworthless.”Nobody, at least no one inAmerica, had figured out how tobuildanindustrialgradewindturbine.Whatwe’dfiguredoutinsteadwashowto finance them. The state-of-the-art turbines during those early heady dayswere, in Cashman’s words, “prototypes” that, unfortunately for California,operatedaccordingtothewronglogic.America’sfirst turbineengineerswereaeronauticalengineerswhohadopted

outofworkingforVietnam-erahelicoptercompanies.Asaresulttheydesignedtheir turbines with floppy flexible blades based on the aerodynamics ofhelicopters. It turns out that the blades you need on a helicopter are the exactoppositeoftheonesthatmakeforasuccessfulwindturbine.“Onahelicopter,”Cashmanexplains,“youneed lightnessbecauseyouhave

togetoff theground,butyoudon’twantlightnessinawindturbine.Heavyiswhatyouwant,bruteforce,andanotherthing—whenahelicoptergoesintheairithasachancetomovewithbigmovementsofwindwhereasaturbinecan’t…it’sjuststandingtherebeatingitsbrainsoutagainstthewindallthetime…andtherewereotherproblemstoo:flexibilityofjointsandeverything;windturbinesdon’t need that either.” Since the helicopter guys had thewrong theory, oncetheygot to the trialanderrorphaseof things theynevergotverygood resultswithout really understanding why. Their machines couldn’t be tinkered intoefficacy.By1989,adecadeafterthepassageofPURPA,theaveragetimeaCalifornia

wind turbineworkedatcapacitybeforebreakingdownandneedingrepairwassevenhours.Californiahadthousandsuponthousandsoftheseandnoneofthemreallyworked.“Wekeptsayingaturbinelaststwentyyears.Thatwasourvision.”Cashman

laughs.“Butnoneofourturbineslastedtwentyyears.Asamatteroffact,AlcoaAluminum had a huge Darrieus Rotor that they had made, just straightaluminum.Theythoughttheyweregoingtobethewindenergyguys,youknow,reallybig.ItfelldownthedaybeforewehadtheannualAmericanWindEnergyAssociationConferenceattheirheadquarters.Itwasgoingtobethebigsymbol,anditfelldown—itgotresonantvibrations.”Ican’ttellatthispointinthestorywhetherCashmanfindsallofthistragicor

funny.Afterall,California’ssuccess inbuildingwindpower in the1980swascritical in establishing the idea that renewables could be used to generate

electricityforpowergridsatascalecomparabletofossil-fuel-poweredplants.In1984, according to Cashman, even with the questionable life span of theirmachines, California’s nascent wind industry produced as much electricity asSanFranciscoused thatyear.Theyhadproved that evenwithprototypes theycouldmakeenoughenergyoutofthinairtopoweramajorAmericancity.Thiswasarealvictory.IfAmericanwardefectorshadbeentheonlyonestryingtofigureouthowto

makeelectricitywithwind,PURPA,ISO4,andsomeof themostgeneroustaxcredits inhistorycouldn’thavesaved it.The industrywouldhavecrashedandburned;italmostdid.Butasitturnedout,theAmericanhippiesweren’ttheonlyonesturningtheirsightstothewind.TheDanishhippies,withtheirsmall,flat,windsweptcountry,hadthesameidea,andifAmericansweremostlytrainedasengineers, the Danes were former blacksmiths. “They had a totally differentrelationshipwithmetal,”Cashmanexplains.“Theyspenttheirtimefixinglarge-scalefarmequipment,somachinerywastheirmodel.”“Ourfirstandsecondgenerationofprototypes,stillneeded…reconceiving,”

Cashmansays,tryingtoputitnicely.“Whereastheirsecondtothirdprototypesweregood.TheycouldjustmanufacturethembecausetheywerealldoneontherightprinciplessotheythrewupfactoriesassoonasourtaxcreditinCaliforniawentintoeffect.TheyjustthrewupfactoriesinDenmarkandjustkeptshippingthemover.Shippingthemover,shippingthemover.”CaliforniaslowlyfilledupwithDanishturbines,andeventodayifyoudriveoverAltamontPass,dueeastof theSanFranciscoBayBridge,youcanstill seesomeof those firstDanish-made,movie-star-owned,S&L-financedturbineschuggingaway,withtheirstiff,heavy,inflexibleblades.It’sbeenthirty-fiveyearsandtheystillwork.AsCalifornia’s nativewind industrywas faltering by the end of the 1980s,

Denmark’s was surging forward, and they colonized the world differently,spreadingwindpowerfirsttoSpainbeforejumpingbackoverthepondtoTexas,Iowa,theDakotas,andeventuallybacktoCalifornia,whichin2015with6,018megawattsofinstalledwindwasthesecond-largestwind-power-producingstatein the country, just after Texas, with 15,635 megawatts, or 10 percent of itsinstategeneration.

Inotherwords,PURPAworked.Therewerebumpsintheroad,greatswervingmomentsatwhichitseemedthat thepathtowardmoreefficient,smallerscale,

and renewable power generation might be lost completely. But it wasn’t.CogenerationisnowacommonwaytomakeelectricityintheUnitedStates,andmoreimportant,ithasbecomepartofwhatiscommonsensicaltous:thatexcessheat, forexample,notbewasted,or thatefficiencybeavalue inandof itself.Likewise, renewables, ifnot exactlyaprovenorevencheap technology in the1980s,hadbecomeawaytothinkaboutmakingpower.Thewind-powerboomin California changed Carter’s Cardigan Path from a notion to a visible,mappablerouteleadingtonewideasthatwouldfollowinthewakeofthesefirst,flawedefforts.ThatevenWallStreetacceptedthatthesemachineswereawaytomakemoney alsohelped as themoderationof the1970s slippedover into theresoundinglyimmoderate1980s.Today renewables comprise 13 percent of installed electricity generation in

theUnitedStates,butthat’snotnews.Whatisnewsisthatin2014,53.3percentofnewgenerationinstalledintheUnitedStateswaseitherwindorsolar,andthispercentageispredictedtoonlygrow.Texasisaimingfor75percentrenewablepowergenerationby2050.TheUnitedStatesasawholehasamoremodestgoalof 20 percent by 2030, though a recent report from NREL, the NationalRenewable Energy Laboratory that President Carter helped to establish, holdsthatwearealreadycapable,withexistingtechnology,ofmaking80percentofAmericanpowerfromrenewablesources.What happened inCalifornia cemented something of the spirit of the times

into national consciousness. Therewas a better, less harmful, and ideally lesscostlywaytomakeelectricitythanwithcoal,ornuclear,orevennaturalgas.ButPURPAwasnotonlyimportantbecauseitchangedourideasabouthowpowermight be “better” made, it also opened the door to honest-to-goodnesscompetition in electrical powergeneration.Asbiddingauctionsbetween smallpowerprovidersgraduallybecamethemosteffectivewaytointegratenewformsofgeneration,andthecompaniesmakingit,PURPAhelpedtoprovethatbiggerwasn’t better and that monopoly-governed, vertically integrated, government-regulated megacompanies were far and away not the best way to make andmanageAmericanpower.Smallwasnotonlybeautifulbutefficient,and,as ithasturnedout,cost-effective.TheunexpectedsuccessofPURPAwasamomentousoutcomefortheculture

ofelectricityinthiscountry.“Passedmoreonfaiththanonknowledgeofitsrealpotential effects,”PURPAhelped todestroy the rationale for the regulationoftheutilitiesasnaturalmonopolies.Bytheearly1990stheirmonopolystatuswasindubitablyunnatural;itwasratherentirelycultural—theremnantsofanearlier

timewhen buildingmonopolieswas how one did things.What PURPAmadeclearwasthatthismonopolystructure,atleastonthesupplysideofthesystem,wasarealandprovendetrimenttotheefficientandhumanefunctioningofthebusinessasawhole.Thusdidthe1970ssweepthe1890sfrompower; theCardiganPathbecame

thenewideologicalbaselineforthinkingasmuchasmakingandregulatingtheelectric power industry—though only after it had been adequately proven thatsmaller,privatelyownedandmanagedgenerationwasnotonlyagoodway tomakeelectricitybutalsoagoodwaytomakemoney.

ItisoftenpresumedthattheCarter-erareformsdiedaslowdeathasReagan-eradebaucheryandeasywealthexpandedtocapturetheimaginationofthenation.We love to read about the excesses ofWall Street as its brokers took a lastrunning gasp at the possibility of outthinking machines.Money flew throughfingertips, up noses, between lips and hot, sweaty, very well-paid legs.Overconsumptionwasback invogue, toomuch color (rememberneonpink?),way too much hairspray, twenty-four-hour music television,Miami Vice, andslippery easy credit.Deregulationwas in the air.What hope could a bunchofoff-the-gridorganicfarmerswithPh.D.sandtoomanypairsofbell-bottoms,likeCashman, have in the face of the brighter, cheaper, gaudier epoch thatoverflowed the cusp of the 1970s tomake the 1980s a decade of big risks inhopes of big returns? The Cardigan Path, on the surface of things, had beenutterly erasedbyDuranDuran, crack cocaine, and the drive to deregulate andmakeaprofitoffeverything.In the electricity business, however, the move to deregulate, which would

blossominearnestinthe1990s,wasnotentirelycountertothecounterculture,foritwasregulationthathadkeptalternativegenerationoutof thegrid; itwasregulation that had privileged the construction of ever larger, often carelesslypollutingpowerplants through the1960sand into the1970s; itwas regulationthathadmadeconservationandenergyefficiencynotmatter.If,asoneindustrycriticpointedout,theelectricitybusinessistheonlyoneinwhichyoucanmakeaprofitbyredecoratingyouroffice,whatdiditmatter ifsomepeople,oreventhe president himself, were wearing sweaters and turning down theirthermostats?Thoughitisfashionabletousetheterm“deregulation”torefertothisepoch

in grid history when the utility consensus was first fractured by legislativeaction, a more accurate term would be something like “reregulation.” TheNationalEnergyActof1978wasaregulatoryinterventioninthecultureoftheindustry,anditwaspushedintoefficacybyfederal,state,andutilityregulators’enthusiasm for the law.Likewise, the next big pieceof federal “deregulatory”legislation, theEnergyPolicyActof1992, essentiallyushered inanewsetofregulatorynormsratherthanderegulatingolderones.For the utilities, despite the quaking of the ground under their feet, these

regulatoryshiftsfromonhighalsofeltalotlikethestatusquo.Theywerestillbeingveryheavilyregulated,justastheyhadbeensincetheearliestdaysofthetwentiethcentury,attheirownbehest.Intheinterveningyears,stateandfederalpolitical bodies had become used to regulating the utility companies and theutilitieshadalsobecomeveryusedtobeingregulated.ThisdidnotchangewithPURPAorwiththe“deregulatorylegislation”thatfollowedinitswake—itfeltnaturaltoallpartiesthatanynewregulationswouldoblige,ratherthanrequest,utilitycompliance.Thiswastrueatthestateandfederallevel.PURPAcrackedopentheutilities’monopsonycontrolofthegridandinitiated

what would become the end of their “natural” monopoly control over ourelectricity system as a whole. What it did not change, however, was theprevailingattitudeonthepartoflawmakersandtheutilitiesthattheonlywaytoexert control over the behavior of the latter was through requiring absoluteadherence to whatever happened to get legislated. Over time this culture ofobligationhashadtheunfortunateeffectofmakingtheutilitiesevenlesscapableof adapting to the rapidly changing electricity landscape than they had beenoriginally.WhenCalifornia implemented the first state-level “deregulation” bill aimed

squarely at the reform of the utility sector in 1998 several years before theEnergy PolicyAct became law in the early 2000s they created a debacle, notonlybecause thebillwas averypoorly constructedpieceof legislation—littlemorethanaremarkableseriesofloopholestwistedthroughwithsomeregulatorylanguage—but because it obligated utility and regulatory compliance to itsterms.Or as Fred Pickel, an industry insider during this period, explained to me,

deregulation inCaliforniafailedbecause itbetrayed“anengineeringmentality.They tried tosetupcommercialsystems in toomuchdetailand in theprocesstheystartedupanadministrativeprocessinwhichittakestwoyearstochangearule.”

SadlyforCalifornia, in1998,as theInternetfirstcreepedandthenswoopedinto the national economy, two years was the time scale of dinosaurs.Information was newly electric, and it moved at electricity’s own speed, achangeoftempothatmadeloopholeexploitationoneofthemaincomponentsoftheearlyInterneteconomy.Theprocessatthetimewascalledfinding“thekillerapp” (for example, someone figures out that “gas stations in Germany areexempt from the country’s rigid early closing laws for most stores. Voilà!German gas stations become virtual shopping malls”). California’s“groundbreaking”deregulationbillmadeiteasy,andevenfun,tofind“thekillerapp.” A number of companies got in the game, none more infamously thanEnron. One of the first companies to operationalize online trading of energyfutures aswell as the exploitation of spot (just-in-time)markets, Enron foundsomeresoundinglykillerappsindeed.TheseincludedplayfullynamedschemeslikeDeathStar,Ricochet,FatBoy,andBigfootaswellmorestraightforwardlynamed,equallynew,procedureslike“megawattlaundering.”EnronwasnotaloneinexploitingtheloopholesofCalifornia’spoorlymade

deregulation bill; smaller companies inSanFranciscowere doing the sameorverysimilarkindsof transactions.ButEnron’s relative size inconcertwith itsbroadorganizationalcommitmenttomakingmoneybywhatevermeanspossiblelent a monstrousness to its undertakings that other new economy companiescould only but aspire to. It has also been useful for the historical record thatEnroncollapsed,andcriminally so,opening their internalworkings in2002 tointensepublicandlegalscrutiny.Enron’scollapsewasnotthedirectresultofmalfeasanceinthemanipulation

ofelectricitymarkets;rather,itwasaconsequenceoftheirpoormanagementofdebt,greed,andrisk.Despitethefactthattheirprofitability(orlackthereof)asacompany was not primarily rooted in their activities on the ground, thesenevertheless have had enduring consequences for the electricity industry. InCalifornia these consequences included the near bankruptcy of its two largestinvestor-ownedutilities, theconsumptionofan$8billionstatebudget surplus,andalmostninemonths in2000–2001ofuncertainelectricitysupplyaspowerplantswere takenoffline for “repairs”or the linesnecessary to carry essentialcurrent between the northern and southern halves of the state were“overbooked.” As rolling blackouts became the rule, many new economybusinesses,likeAppleandCiscoSystems,aswellasotherelectricity-dependentundertakingssuchasmilitarybasesandprisons,begantothinkaboutwaystheymightdetach themselvesfromgrid-providedpower. Institutionalgriddefection

inthewakeof2000–2001becameasignnotofradicalismbuttheinverse:wiseorganizationsengineeredwaystousethegridasabackuppowersystemratherthanas somethinguponwhich theymust rely regardlessofhowpoorly itwasmanagedorhowsporadicallyitsproductwasdelivered.GrayDavis, then governor ofCalifornia, though hewould soon be recalled

largely because of his failures to contain, or even deal reasonably, with theenergycrisis,putitperhapsbestashesummedupderegulationinhis2002Stateof the State address, saying: “We must face reality: California’s deregulationschemeisacolossalanddangerousfailure.Ithasnotloweredconsumerprices;ithasnot increasedsupply. In fact ithas resulted in skyrocketingprices,pricegouging,andanunreliablesupplyofelectricity.Inshort,anenergynightmare.”Onthisalmosteveryonewouldagree.Itwasnot,however,“deregulation”persewhichcausedthedebacle,butthat

the state required the utilities to comply to its poorly crafted legislationwhilesmaller,moreflexible,moreinnovativecompaniesranringsaroundthemboth.This, too, was the result of the culture of PURPA, which presumed thestodginess and unadventurousness of the utilities to be inherent and thusunreformable characteristics of the industry. The utilities could be regulated,wiselyorfoolishly,buttheywouldnotbeaskedtolearnadaptability,flexibility,orcreativitythemselves;insteadtheywouldbetoldwhattodoandtheywouldbeexpected todo it.One resultof this is that as theholesPURPArent in thesystem have grown larger over the decades, the electrical utilities in theirhamstringedattemptstoreinventthemselvesalltoooftenremainanimpedimentinthetaskofreimaginingandremakingourgrid.

CHAPTER5ThingsFallApart

OnMarch6,2002,ameretwoweeksafteralong-delayedinspection,aworkerattheDavis-BesseNuclearPowerStationnearToledo,Ohio,foundarustholethesizeofapineappleinthereactor’slid.Allthatwaskeeping87,000gallonsofsuperheatedradioactivewaterfromexplodingoutofthetankwasathinstainlesssteelliner.Atthetimeofitsdiscoverythereactor’scontainmenttankhadbeenrustingforyears.Alreadyin2000aprodigiousquantityofthatrustandleakingboric acid had been documented, and yet nothing had been done, not by theNuclear Regulatory Commission (who, it seems, ignored the photographicevidenceofseveredamage)norbytheutilitythatonceownedbutnowmerelymanagedtheplantandwhohadrepeatedlyrequestedthatinspectionsbedelayedorsteeredinspectorsawayfromitsmostdamagedareas.In thescrutiny that followedthisnear tocatastrophiceruptionofradioactive

coolant it was found that Davis-Besse’s emergency equipment had been“severelycompromised”andcouldnothavebeencountedontoworkproperlyduring a nuclear disaster. It was highly unlikely, had the tank burst, that theoperatorswouldhavebeenabletokeepthereactorcorecoveredwithwaterandthuscoolenoughtoavoidanuclear-fueledfireorameltdown.In2002,Davis-BessebecametheclosestthingtoanucleardisasterinAmericasincethepartialmeltdownatThreeMileIslandin1979.Mostofushaveneverheardofthisnuclearpowerplant,oneofanagingfleet

of a hundred pressurized water reactors in the United States churning out asteady 20 percent of America’s power. In 2007 the cooling tower of anotherreactor,VermontYankee,inVernon,Vermont,actuallytippedover.Oneofthelegsholdingupthisvastvatrustedintounstableflakesofmetallicdustwhilethewoodensupportsthathelditalofthadalsorottedthrough.Therewasnoriskofmeltdown in the case of Vermont Yankee’s cooling tower collapse, and thethousands of gallons of water that gushed forth were not radioactive;nevertheless, the incidentwasaspectacularone.Thisplant, too,was inspectedevery year and had surveillance cameras focused on the most vulnerablelocations collecting endless streams of data for review. The problem is thatnuclearplantsarehugeandcomplex.Itseemsthatforalltheirlooking,nobodysaw themetal rust and nobody saw thewood rot. For the decades it took the

elements to eat through the rebar and timber holding up this tank, nobodynoticed.Just as quietly, and just as slowly, the plantwas leaking radioactive tritium

into the groundwater supply. A leak that despite multiple attempts and evenmoreassurancestheplant’smanagingcompanynevermanagedtostanch.Asaresult Vermont Yankee, which produced almost 80 percent of the electricitymadeinVermont,wasdecommissionedin2014.There are many stories of this kind. And though heated debates about the

safety of nuclear power have been raging inAmerica since these plantswerenew,thereisnowlittledoubtthattheyareold.Davis-Bessebeganoperatingin1978,VermontYankeein1972.Evensomeofouryoungerreactorsarecausingusproblems.Reactors2and3ofSouthernCalifornia’sSanOnofrestation,bothofwhichcameonlineinthemid-1980s,wereshutforgoodin2014afterhavingbeenbesetwithmaintenanceproblemsintheirsteampipesthatnobodyseemedtobeabletofigureouthowtofix.WiththisclosureSouthernCalifornialost20percentofitsgeneratingcapacity.Evenour“young”nuclearpowerplantsareprettyold.Andold thingsbreak

down. They rust through, they develop inexplicable leaks, they function at afractionof theircapacity,and theybecomeincreasinglyexpensive tomaintain.Anuclearpowerplant in thisregard isnotunlikeanagingcar.Therecomesamomentwhereonehas todecide to scuttle the thing rather than continuing tosinkmoneyintoitsrepair.Thedifference,ofcourse,isthatuponhavingdonatedone’s infuriating, money-gobbling, vehicular rust-heap to a local charity onepromptly sets about buying another car.Whereas none of America’s utilities,withthesingleexceptionoftheTennesseeValleyAuthority(whichistosay,theU.S.government)arebuyingnewnuclearpowerplants.Almostnonearebuyingnew coal-burning plants, though year by year the number of these plants inoperation is also quietly shrinking. And none are building new large-scalehydroelectric dams. Those heady mid-twentieth-century days of massive,secured investment inbigpowerprojects areover.As a result, in2005, a fullfifth ofAmerica’s power plantswere over half a century old and reliant upontechnologythatwasstateoftheartinthe1950s.Moreimportant,ascomplicatedand old as these massive electrical generating factories are, they are but oneaginganddifficult-to-maintainbitoftheolderandevenmorecomplicatedgridthat binds them all together.As rightly afraid aswe have all learned to be ofnucleardisaster,especiallyafterthemeltdownofJapan’sFukushimareactors1and3in2011, in theUnitedStates thefragilityofourgrid isamorepressing,

andmorepersistent,issue.This fragilitycan takemanyforms.Onenuclearpowerplantmayage, leak,

break,may be decommissioned, or be taken offline.This is a stress on a gridorganizedaroundthepresence,ratherthantheabsence,ofthatsourceofpower.Orvinykudzumay creepwith its unerring tenacity to the topsof local utilitypolestodrapewireandwoodandceramicinsulatorsalikeinathickblanketofgreen.This,too,isafragility.Foliagecausesshortsand,occasionally,evenmoredramatic flashovers when our oh so carefully domesticated electricity goesinstantly wild again and shoots like a bolt of lightning from a line to anovergrowntree(explodingthelatter).Or tencoal-burningplantsmaybequietlydecommissionedandreplacednot

byplantsofasimilarsizeandmakebutbysmallergeneratingfacilitiesthatrunon altogether different kinds of fuel. To continue with the old car metaphor,shuttingdownSanOnofreandbuilding thirtyscatterednaturalgascombustionturbinestoreplaceitisrathermoreliketradinginyour1964CadillacFleetwoodfor a garage full of jet packs rather than a brand-new Prius. Each of thesereplacements,whilehelpingtoprotectusfromthepollutantsandwasteproducedbyearliergenerationsofpowerplants,complicates life for thegrid,mostlybyintroducing variability without storage (chapter 1) and radically distributed,privatelyownedgenerationwithoutoversight(chapter8).Thelegislativeactionsputinplacetostreamlineandopenupthebusinessendofpowerproductionandsalefurthercompromisedaninfrastructurealreadyweakenedbyage,decadesofincompatiblepatches,andgeneralinattentiveness.Despite this, it ishard tobeafraidofgrid-scale failure.Blackouts,evenbig

ones, rarely lastmore than twoor threedays,and they tumble intogoodtimespunctuatedbyfleetinglyscarymomentsandoccasionalfitsofirritation.Moneyis lost, a few peoplemay die, but formostAmericans, blackouts are recalledwithrealfondness.Theyareconvivialtimeswhenstrangerscometogether,icecreamisdistributed freely toall,andweeatmeatcookedoveranopen flame.Whatisweak,whatiscausal,whatistoooldormisaligned,istoofarfromtheimmediateexperienceofablackouttomeritattention,especiallyifaccountingsarepublishedmonths(attimesyears)afterthefact.Andyet,onewouldbewisetotremblealittlemorethoroughlyinone’sbootswhenconsideringthefantasticcomplexityofthegridthatsupportsus.Itissurprisinglyeasyforlittlethingstogowrong;littlethingsthatcanbecomebigthingswitharemarkablespeed.Acaseinpoint:OnAugust14,2003,eighteenmonthsafterDavis-Bessewas

shutdownforrepair,thelargestblackoutinournation’shistory,andthethird-

largesteverintheworld,sweptacrosstheeasternhalfoftheUnitedStatesandpartsofCanada,blackingouteightstatesand50millionpeoplefortwodays.SothoroughandsovastwasthiscascadingblackoutthatitshowsasavisiblediponAmerica’sGDPforthatyear.Theblackout,whichcovered93,000squaremiles,accounted for $6 billion of lost business revenue. If ever itwas in doubt, the2003 blackout proved that at its core America’s economy is inexorably,indubitablyelectric.Though initial speculationas tocauseplaced theblame firmlyonCanada it

was quickly confirmed that this massive outage had been caused by threeovergrowntreesandacomputerbugnearAkron,intheterritoryoftheselfsameutilitythatoperatedDavis-Besse—Ohio’sFirstEnergy.NotonlyhadFirstEnergybeenlaxinkeepingupwiththeirreactor’sintegrity,

butwithderegulationtreetrimming,anexpensiveandthanklesstask,hadslowlyfallenbythewayside,ashadbasic,low-levelsystemsmaintenance.AndthoughFirstEnergyisjustoneofmorethan3,300utilitiesoperatingintheUnitedStatestoday, the utility’s decisions and failings in the months and days before theblackout—nottomentiontheirbehavioronceitwasinprogress—grantusararemoment of insight into the workings and stumblings of a modern electriccompany.Thetroublebeganinearnestin2001,justastheEnergyPolicyActswungat

long last out of the contested halls of court into the law of the land. Thiscomplexpieceoflegislationwaspassedintolawin1992,justfifteenyearsafterPURPAfirst changed theutility landscape.After almost adecadeof ferociouslegalwrangling that took it all theway up to the SupremeCourt, the actwasimplemented in thespringof2000.Mostradicallywhat theactdidwasobligetheFederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission(FERC),whichgovernsthegrid,toseparateelectricalgenerationfromelectricaldistribution.Utilities,obligedsincethe late 1970s to buy power from small producers at the same price itwouldhave cost them to make it themselves, were, with the act, taken even morethoroughlyoutofthegenerationsideoftheelectricitygame.TheEnergyPolicyAct mandated absolute competition in the wholesale power market. In manystates this also camewith an obligation for total, or significant, divestiture ingenerating stations. From this point forward the main way for the utilities tomake money would be by transporting, delivering, and metering electricity—rather than by producing it. That the utilities were shaken up by thisorganizationally and also fiscally becomes almost immediately evident inFirstEnergy’sactions,orratherinactions,intheyearsimmediatelyfollowingthe

implementationofthischangedpolicy.In FirstEnergy’s “Annual State of Power Report” for 2001, filed with the

PublicUtilitiesCommissionofOhio,orPUCO(a local regulatorybody), theyhadwhatmightbeconsideredareasonableifnotexactlyadmirabletrackrecordof repairs and upkeep. They reported having fixed 75 percent of known“common” problems—like brokenwires or poles, leaving 25 percent of theseissues for the followingyear.But in2002, theyearof thenearmissatDavis-Besse, theycompletedonly17percentof themaintenanceandrepairson theirToDo list, leaving a backlog of almost eleven thousand items for 2003—theyear of the blackout.During the same period, the utility laid off five hundredskilledworkerswhosejobswere tokeepbasic infrastructure,suchaselectricallinesandpowerplants,ingoodworkingorder.Morecriticaltothenationasawhole,however,wasalessdramatic-seeming

shift in policy: the utility’s tree-trimming schedule was changed from everythree years to every five. Given that a utility’s compliance with their owninternalpoliciesregardingtreetrimmingisvoluntary(whichis tosay, theyareencouragedtosticktoitbutthereisnooversightorsanctionstructureinplaceifthey don’t), even checking and cutting back trees every three years canmeanthatparticularpointsonthesystem,especiallythoseonprivateproperty,cangomuch longer between prunings. The tree that started the 2003 blackout wasalmost fifty feet tall.Andwhile therewasat the timenonational standard forhowtall treesnearhigh-voltage linesmightbeallowedtogrow, it isgenerallyagreedthatfiftyfeetisaboutadecademoregrowththanisacceptable.FirstEnergy was hardly the only utility to have cut back on foliage

maintenance;tree-trimmingbudgets,whilenotgigantic,doformaneasysourceof revenue for utilities tightening their belts or, as was the case of PG&E inCaliforniain1994,expandingexecutivepay.It is rare for cutbacks and cash transfers of this kind to rise to the level of

criminalnegligence,makingitarelativelysafepoolofmoneytosiphonoffformorepressingpurposes.ThoughwedonotknowhowmuchFirstEnergysavedbyextendingitstrimmingschedulebytwoyearsandthennotactuallystickingto it,we do know that PG&Emanaged to transfer about 80million ratepayerdollars into directors’ and shareholders’ pocketbooks using the same kinds ofminorshiftsinscheduling.UnfortunatelyforsparselypopulatedNevadaCounty,California,theyalsocausedamassive,fast-burningfirethatdestroyedmorethanfivehundredacres—afirethatstartedwhenatreetopbrushedupagainstapowerlineandburstintoflames.Thisoffendingtreewasoneof767violationsinthat

countyalone,allofwhichPG&Eknewaboutandignored,whilesimultaneouslyreducing tree-trimming crews from three to two men, shifting their cuttingschedule from three to five years, and lobbying the California legislature tochange the recommendedclearancebetween the treetopsandpower lines fromfourfeettojustsixinches.TheTraunerfireof2004,muchliketheEastCoastblackoutof2003,wascausedbyatreethatwasatleastadecadebehindonitstrimmingschedule.Had tragedynotstruck in theOhioandCaliforniacases,noonewouldever

havebeenthewiser:thetreesgrowalittlebit,thebudgetsworkoutmoretotheliking of one party or another, and business continues as usual. Many U.S.utilities “adjust” their tree-trimming and their fiscal budgets in similar ways.This despite the fact that there is something utilities know and that theircustomers (including most of Congress) remain ignorant of—in the UnitedStatestoday,asin2003(andasin1994),thegreatestthreattothesecurityandreliabilityofourelectricalinfrastructureisfoliage.Treesmostespecially,thoughkudzuanditsilkaretroublesomecreepersintheirownright.Politiciansmay talk a lot, andutilitymanagersmayworry a lot, about how

terroristsmighthackinto,shootup,orbombvariousbitsofourgridinordertobring the United States to her knees. And yet the trees constitute a far moresignificant threat to the security and reliability of our national electricinfrastructure.Itiseveryutility’sresponsibilitytokeeptheplantsawayfromtheelectriclines;thisisastrueonpubliclandsasonprivatelyownedfarmsteads.Every utility knows the stakes, and yet trees still causemost of our power

outages. During storms, trees and branches falling on lines do most of thedamage.Evenincalmweathertreesregularlytangleintohouseholddistributionlines, shorting them out or ripping them down. These are small-scale issuescomparedtowhattreesdotothehigh-voltagelinesthatrunfrompowerplantstoperiurban substations. These long-distance lines are the arterial system of ourgrid.Bring themdown,short themout,orcause themto tripofflinebyaskingthem to carry more electrical current than they are able and the system as awholeisthrownintoanintensestateofrisk.Thisiswhathappenedin2003inOhio.Notjustonebutthreeseparatetreescameintomortalcontactwithaline.The first, a 345-kilovolt line, “arced” in the suburban Ohio subdivision of

WaltonHills, shooting a bolt of energymuch like lightning out at the closestthingaround—in this case, the tipof anovergrown tree.Thisbolt of artificiallightningwasaccompaniedbytwothunderousbangsand,shortlythereafter,theexplosionoftheMuhafamily’sdishwasher.

AdamMuha, then eighteen years old, lived with his parents just under thenownonoperational lineandnext to theoffending tree.He’d justgottenhomefromschoolwhen the linearced.As surprisedashewasby thenoise,hewaseven more stunned that most of his family’s home appliances and two of itsoutletsbeganbillowingsmoke.Goingoutsidetoinvestigate,Muhawasmetbyatree-trimming team that by chance had been working across the street(investigationshaveprovedthattheirpresenceonthescenewasincidental,notcausal). One of the men ran toward Muha when he saw the boy standingsomewhat confusedly in his driveway. “Get of here!” he yelled. “If that linecomesdownyour carwillmelt, our truckwillmelt, andwewillmelt.”Muhaobliged.There is nothing unusual in the story so far: a hot day, an overtall tree, a

saggingwire,a flashover,which,whilebad forboth the treeand the line,washardly a harbinger of the violent voltage swings—and resultant blackout—tocome.ThiskindofdeathofawirehappensallthetimeintheUnitedStates.Atree,awire,abang,ashort,followedbytheautomaticshiftofthedeadwire’s“load”—this is the technical term for the electricity it is asked to carry—toanother,duplicatewire,headinginthesamedirection.Thiskindofredundancyon the system, which has been intentionally increased since 1968 after theNortheast’sfirstbigblackout,istodayderigueur.Evenmostruralsystemshavesomeduplicationofdutiesontheirhighervoltagelines.Thisdoesn’t,however,meanthatthereisanindefinitenumberofavailablelines;therearemorethanweneedforeverydaypower transmissionanddistribution,but thisdoesn’talwaysadduptoenoughforexceptionalevents.AllofthisredundancyabsorbedthelossofthatfirstlineinnorthernOhio.Its

failurewasmostlyanuisance.Theproblemcamelater.Andwhenspeakingofaproduct that moves at nearly the speed of light, later came on very quicklyindeed.A second wire also sagged into a tree, waiting there, too tall, its branches

stretched skyward to catch every ray of sun and channel every drop of raindownward to its thirsty summer roots.Thiswire, like the first,waswarmandsagging lowwith theheatof theday; itwas, likeallconductors,apt tostretchlonger inhotweather.Thisexpansion isamolecularpropertyofmetals that isexacerbated,butnotcaused,bythepresenceofanelectriccurrent.AllthelinesinOhio,intheMidwest,intheEast,werehanginglowthatdayastheywereonany day in any August. Had the tree not been there, or had it been trimmeddown,bothitandthelinewouldhavesurvivedthelimpidafternoon,ratherthan

abang!andafizzleandthesmellofcharredwood.Andasecondlinewasout.Thisone,theChamberlin-Hardingline,ranjustsouthofCleveland.Itsload,too,was transferred to yet another set of wires, headed yet again in the samedirection.And thusdid thecascadebegin.A loadeasilybornebyonewireortwoprovedtoomuchforthethirdduplicate.Everylinehasarating,avoltage,a“quantity”ofelectricitythatitcansafely

conductfromoneplacetoanother.ExtraHighVoltagelines,theonesthreadedacross openprairies andhighmountain passes borne up byhuge steel towers,carryfrom275kilovolts(kV)to765kV,whilethosethatlinkthecornerpoletothesideofyourhousehavea lowvoltage rating,usuallyaround50kV.Linesare actually pretty remarkable technology even if they all look the same fromgroundlevel; itstheshapeofthepolesthatallowaveragefolkstodifferentiateonevoltageratingfromthenext,butuptherethelinesthatarestrungbetweenthese poles are a complex assortment of alloys and weaves and nestedarrangementsofmetals,eachdesignedtocarryitsassignedcurrentsafelyfromthepointofproductiontothepointofuse.The first line thatmet that first tree out there inWaldenHills,Ohio,was a

345-kV line. This is a midsized long-distance transmission line carrying ACpower,aswasthesecond,aswasthethird(thisoutage,too,wascausedbyatree—youbegin,Ihope,toseethetroublewithtrees).Itishere,aboutanhourintowhatwasnotyetbutwasfastbecomingablackout,thatautomationbegantogetseriously involved.Within tenminutes of the third deadly tango between lineandtree,afourth345-kVlinewaslost—thisonebecauseitwasbeingaskedtocarrymorecurrentthanitcouldsafelytransport—followedalmostimmediatelyby fifteen 138-kV lines shutting themselves off automatically. This is a self-preservation technique designed into electrical conductors (“conductor” is thetechnical term for an electric transmission line)when giantwaves of unstablevoltagethreatentofry,melt,orotherwisedisablethem.Atthispoint,3:41P.M.,about thirtyminutes before the actual blackout started, trees ceased being theproblem. Line failures were fast becoming commonplace because circuitbreakershadbeguntotrip.Muchlikethefuseboxinyourhome,transmissionanddistributionlinesare

armed with a delicate, and fairly simple, analog system (that means nocomputers are involved) for keeping lines in good working order. If, forexample, the electrical current a line is asked to carry exceeds its rating, itscircuit breaker trips, the line is taken “offline,” and its load is transferred to aduplicateline.Unfortunately,byabout3:41P.M.thereweren’tmanylinesleft,

duplicate or otherwise, and within a few minutes of the circuit breakers’snappingopen,cuttingoffcurrent fromat-riskconductors,an interesting thingbegantohappentothegrid:itbecameunbalanced.Likeamadmanor -woman suffering fromsome sortof inner-ear condition,

the lack of available transmission caused a lopsided high-speedwobble of thequeerest sort. It seems that there was way too much current on what littletransmissioncapacity remained to carry it—aconditioncalledovercurrent thatcausesanylow-voltagearea,inthiscasealmostallofOhio,toworklikeagiantsuckonanyandalltheelectricityelsewhereinthenetwork.Tounderstandthiswehavetopauseamomenttotalkaboutelectricity,inallitsweirdness,again.Aswe know from chapter 2, electricity does notmove by human logic—it

does not, for example, take the shortest path between two points.Nor does itmove by water’s logic, though there are certain similarities—it does not, forexample,“flowdownhill”or“puddle”oneventerrain.Nicely,too,itwon’tdripoutofan“open”outlet.Rather,electricitywilltakeallpossibleroutesavailableto it simultaneously with a preference for that with the least resistance evenwhenthatisnottheshortestormostrational(toourminds)waytomovefrompointA to point B. The routeswe’d prefer electricity to travel are built fromhighly conductive materials and those we’d rather it avoided are made ofmaterials with low conductivity. Air is not very conductive; this is why theelectricity in your outlet doesn’t seep out. Metal, as we know, is a lovelyconductor,hencethelong-standingrelianceontransmissionlinesasaverygoodwaytocorralanddirectelectriccurrentfromwhereitismadetowhereitisused(andincidentallywhywearetrainedfromanearlyagenottostickaforkinanoutlet).TotravelaroundLakeErie,anelectriccurrentmadejustoutsideTorontowill

simultaneously take the shortest path to New York City (about five hundredmiles)anditwilltakethelongestpath,windingitswaythroughMichigan,downto Kentucky, over to Virginia, back up throughMaryland and New Jersey tofinally arrive in New York. It will also take every single other path, with adecidedpreferenceforlowresistanceroutes.So longas resistance isequalonallpaths theelectricity that takesa longer,

moreconfusedorcircuitousroutewillarriveatthesameinstantastheonethattooktheshorterpath.Distanceisirrelevanttoit,onlyresistancematters.Thereasonabulbilluminateswhenyoufliponalightswitchisthatyouhave

justloweredtheresistanceonthecircuit,fromtotal(whentheswitchisoff)tonearzero(whentheswitchandlampareon).Thereisnoneedto“communicate”

with electricity in any other way—our grid, indeed the whole of our world,might be thought of as a symphony of varying resistances, each beckoning orshunningelectriccurrentinitsownway.

FIG4Electricpowerdoesnottraveljustbytheshortestroutefromsourcetosink(top),butalsobyparallel

flowpathsthroughotherpartsofthesystem.Wherethenetworkjogsaroundlargegeographicalobstacles,suchastheRockyMountainsintheWestortheGreatLakesintheEast,loopflowsappearthatcandriveasmuchas1GWofpowerinacircle(bottom),takinguptransmission-linecapacitywithoutdeliveringpowertoconsumers. (Reproducedwithpermission from“What’swrongwith theelectricgrid?”EricJ.Lerner.PublishedonlinewithPhysicsTodayonAugust14,2014.Copyright2014,AmericanInstituteofPhysics)

Thisbeckoning,calleda“sink,”saystoallthecurrentonthegrid:“lookhere,thisistheeasyway.”Togetelectricitytowhereweneeditwemakelittlesinks,likeflippingonalightswitch,andbigoneslikefiringupapapermill.Thereal-worldramificationsofthissimplephysicallawareflabbergastinginasystemascomplex as our electric grid. As one physicist explained, “any change ingeneration or transmission at any point in the system will change loads ongeneratorsandtransmissionlinesateveryotherpoint—ofteninwaysthatarenotanticipatedorcontrolled.”OnAugust14,ageneratingplantinEastlake,Ohio,wasdown;sowasDavis-

Besse. This meant that electricity was already moving through the griddifferentlyfromhowitwouldhavebeenhadthesetwogeneratorsbeeningoodworkingorder.Thatthegridissolarge,sointerwoven,withsomanyhundredsofgeneratingplants,somanythousandsofmilesoflines,somanyutilitiesandotherpower-managingentities—allthismeansthatitsimplycan’tbemodeledinrealtime.Thebestwecandoismonitor,computerize,andreacttoitasquicklyaspossiblewhenthesituationchanges.ButFirstEnergydidn’treact.Onelinewentdown,asecond,athird,afourth,a

fifth, and then simultaneously fifteenmore. Twenty high-andmedium-voltagelines down and no word is coming out of FirstEnergy’s control room. Theyaren’t doing anything. They aren’t calling anybody. They are hardly reactingwhenotherscallthem.Allbecauseofaproblemofadifferentsort.Theyhaveasoftware bug—a tiny, fairly innocuous, incompatible line of code that slowed,perhaps even halted, the refresh rate on their computer screens while alsosilencing their alarms.They didn’t know they’d lost all these lines; theywereblindtotheblackoutthatwascoming.Andbecausetheydidn’tseeit,neitherdidanyoneelse.What FirstEnergy couldn’t see electricity itself was already attempting to

right,butinitsownway,whichinthisinstanceprovedtobemostunhelpfultothe grid and its human operators. Ohio, thirty minutes before the East Coastblackoutbegan,hadtransformedintoanenormoussink.Fromelectricity’spointofviewitlookedasiftherewasnotenoughavailablecurrenttomeetdemand.

This was, in a way, true. Enough lines were down that the current that wasstranded on the system just kept overloading and incapacitating the linesavailabletoit;itcouldn’tgettowhereitwasneeded.Thesinkremaineddespitethe fact that toomuch current, rather than too little,was causing it.What theelectricitybeingproducedbyeverypowerplant aroundLakeErie andup intoMichiganandoverintoNewYork“saw”wasapathofleastresistanceleadingright into theheartofOhio.Ohiolookedlikeasink, itactedlikeasink,but itwas not a sink. This confused the current, which began to surge first in onedirectionandtheninanother,ratherliketsunami-sizedwavessloshingaroundinabathtub.SoNewYorkState, forexample, insteadofhavingbeenduly informed that

something was amiss in the Midwest in the usual ways (a phone call fromsomeoneatFirstEnergywouldhavebeenbest),gottheirfirsthintoftheblackoutto come when 800 megawatts surged suddenly westward—effectively beingsuckedout of their system towardOhio—and then abruptly reversed directionandshotbackintoNewYorkwhenthesinkitwasreactingtoprovedfalse.Thisis the equivalent shift in voltage that they would have seen if someone hadflippedtheOffswitchofanuclearpowerplantthesizeofDavis-Besseandthen,having realized their error, flipped it rightbackonagain.Such swingsarenotgoodforthecontinuedlongevityofouralreadyenfeebledinfrastructure.Toprotectthemselvesandtheirmachines,operatorsinAlbanystartedshutting

downgeneratingplantsandisolatingtransmissionlinesacrosstheNortheast.AsinNewYork,soalsoinPennsylvania,thewesternhalfofMichigan,Ontario,alltryingto“island”themselvesfromOhioanditsgreatenergysink.Thisprocessof islanding,ordecouplingone’s localgrid fromthesystemasawhole, isnoteasygiventhecurrentorganizationandsizeofourinterconnections.Andthoughitwas awise protectivemeasure (in 2003 islanding kept a greatmany powerplants and power lines in New York State from being destroyed by massiveswings in voltage), it also caused the blackout in that state. As soon as NewYorkwasislanded,itwasproducingfarmorepowerlocallythanitneeded,andsinceit’samuchslowerprocesstoturndownacoal-burningpowerplantthanitis to island a bit of the grid, their lines, like Ohio’s and Michigan’s andOntario’s, began to automatically isolate themselves from the dangerousquantitiesofelectricity theyweresuddenlybeingasked tocarry tonowhere inparticular. Somuch powerwasmoving around so fast fromone imbalance toanother thatAmericanElectricPower (FirstEnergy’s neighboring utility to thewest)reportedthatonelinewascarrying332megavolt-amperes(MVA)despite

beingratedforonly197MVA.After having put in several panicked phone calls to FirstEnergy during the

hourandahalfbeforetheblackoutsmashedintotheEasternSeaboard,operatorsatAmericanElectricPoweralsochosetoislandthemselves—closingtheirentirenetworktotheerraticsurgesofcurrenttheysawcomingtowardthem.Becausethey were closest to FirstEnergy and because they were among the first tounderstandthatFirstEnergyhadnocognizanceofthesituationunfoldingintheirmidst, the western edge of the blackout was precisely the line betweenFirstEnergy’soperatingareaandthatgovernedbyAmericanElectricPower.NorwerebefuddledengineersfromAmericanElectrictheonlyonestohave

called FirstEnergy in the hours leading up to the blackout. They got a lot ofphonecallsthatdaybeforethingswentcriticalandwentblack.At three P.M., almost exactly one hour after that first line inWaldenHills

arced, alarms began to clatter and complain in the municipal service districtheadquartersintinyWadsworth,Ohio.GenePost,theelectricsuperintendentfortheborough,calledFirstEnergytoaskwhatwasup.“Theysaidtheywereinthedark,”Postsaid.Notliterally,ofcourse,notyet.Hemeantthattheydidn’tknowwhatwasgoingon.Worse, theydidn’t seem toknow thatanythingwasgoingon.“Theycouldn’tgiveusanyinformation.”Postwasbefuddled.Theswingson

thegridwere remarkable.Unusual.Dangerous.CertainlyFirstEnergyought tohavenoticed!Ifanyonehadinformationitwasthem,theguyswhoownedandmanaged the lines. These are exactly the circumstances, Post said, “whenweexpectsomeonetoknowwhatisgoingon!”WhenSteveDupee,thedirectorofOberlinMunicipalLightandPower,called

FirstEnergyaboutthirtyminuteslatertoaskwhyOberlinwasexperiencingsuchextremely low voltage, “the guy told us he didn’t know what was wrong,becausehiscomputerwasdown.”Two minutes later, FirstEnergy got an even more worrisome call, this one

from theorganizationchargedwithmonitoringand regulatingall thepower inthe Midwest as it moves across state lines—the Midwest IndependentTransmissionSystem,orMISO.WhenMISOoperatorDonHuntercalledinjustafter3:30P.M.hegotabefuddledJerrySnickey,anengineerwithFirstEnergy.Hunter startedwith the obvious losses: “I thinkwhat happened here is that

youguyslostthe…SouthCantontoStar,andalsotheHanna-Juniperline…atthesametimeroughly.”TowhichSnickeyreplied:“YoushowtheHannaJuniper lineoutalso?!We

havenoclue…Ourcomputerisgivingusfits.Wedon’tevenknowthestatusofthestuffaroundus.”Hunter,frustrated:“Icalledyouguysliketenminutesago,andIthoughtyou

werefiguringoutwhatwasgoingonthere!”“Wellwe’retryingto!”snipedSnickey,alsoclearlyirritated:“Ourcomputer

…it’snothappy…It’snotcooperating.”Thiswasat3:32.By3:45,whenaforemanofCuyahogaFalls’selectricsystemcalledbecausea

low-voltage alarm had gone off on his system, FirstEnergy clearly knewsomethinghadgoneterriblyawry.Basically,hewastold,“Thereisaproblem,nowhangupthephone.”FirstEnergyhadgottenthemessage.Butanhourandthirtyminutesbetween

the lossof the first lineand thatmomentof awarenesswasanhourand thirtyminutestoolong.And,worse,forsixtyminutesorso—andthisisgossip,mindyou,notfact—systemmonitorsseemednottohavenoticedthatsomethingwaswrong with the computers. Critical information was not being highlighted oreven displayed, the refresh rate had slowed dramatically; it may even havestopped altogether. In otherwords, therewas enoughnot going onwith thosemachinesthatsomebodywithacarefuleyeorabitofconcertedattentionshouldhavebeenabletoseethattheywerebehavingdifferentlythanonatypicalday.Totheircredit,thecontrolroomsofpowercompaniesarefullofscreens,and

these are full of data, charts and colors and rows of text, and control roomoperatorsarehighlydependentonalarmsystemsthatareeitheraudibleorflashon their screen,callingattention tocriticalchanges in the flowof information.Without these alarms it’s questionable whether any normal human being iscapable of noticing critical shifts in data patterns or laggardly mechanicalbehavior.AndthealarmsthatdayinFirstEnergy’ssystemdidn’twork.Neitherthe onscreen alarms nor the speaker-blasted ones. There was no reason foranyone to have paid attention to the fact that their screensweren’t refreshing.Those screens said everything was A-OK. Before the stream of phone callsbegan,itseemedentirelyreasonabletobelievethatthiswasthecase.August14,well into the chaos that would become the blackout, was for FirstEnergy’scontrolroomoperatorsjustanotherdayattheoffice.Allthewhilethebugwasthere.Notabitofmalware,notavirus,notaworm.

Justaglitch,moreofaprogrammingerrorthananythingelse.Ineffectwhatthisbug,calledXA/21,didwascauseamachinetorespondwithabusysignalwhenmultiple systems tried toaccess it simultaneously rather thanprioritizing these

requests and then taking each of the “calls” in turn. As more and more datapointswererebuffed,theystartedtostackupratherthanbeingloggedandthendeleted.Likesiltinawaterpurificationsystemorcholesterolinyourartery,allthese tiny bits of retained information started to stanch the free flow of allinformation, slowingeverythingdown,waydown,andeventuallycrashing themainserver.Alltheaccumulatedunprocessedeventswerethentransferredtothebackupserver,whichwasnobetterequippedthanitspredecessortohandlethisvastbacklogandso it, too, failed.Atwhichpoint,anhourorsoafter the firstlinefailureinWaldenHills,rightaboutthetimeHunterfromMISOwascallinginbecausethesituationhadbecomeverydireindeed,thecontrolroomoperatorsatFirstEnergyfinallyrealizedsomethingwasterriblywrong.Though there are many differences between the electric grid and the

microelectronic processing equipment we use to monitor and run most ofmodern life—including the grid itself—there are a couple of commonalitiesworthmentioning.First,bothrelyuponthesamephysics.Informationthesedaysis also electricity. Second, as the case of the XA/21 bug makes very clear,cascadingoutagescananddohappenonboth information systems (computersmostly)andelectricalsystemsifrelativelyminorerrorsarenotacteduponwithallduehaste.In the case of the 2003 blackout the error on the grid took the form of

overgrowntreesandtheerroronthecomputerstooktheformofalineofcodethat disallowed simultaneous incoming data reports. Each error had small butsignificant effects on the actual physical infrastructure they came into contactwith,whilethewayinwhichthisphysicalinfrastructurewasdesigned—itslogic—allowed for stochastic propagation of negative effects.Which is to say: thecascadeandthentheblackout.Oneelectricallineandonetreebecamethreedifferentlinesandthreedifferent

treesbecamefifteenlinesoverloadedandautomaticallytripped;puremechanicalself-preservation becomes great peaks and valleys in voltage in Ohio andMichiganwhichbecomesvastwavesofvoltagescrashingacrossstatesalloverthe Eastern Seaboard, smashing into generating stations, substations, high-voltagewires and low-voltage lines, disabling themall.All ofwhichbecomestheoft-quoted$60,000perhourperbusinessoflostrevenuesandanupsurgeinblackout-conceivedbabiesninemonthslater.Asinglelineofcode,inaprogramcomprisedofamillionsuchlines,afluke

lasting littlemore thanamicrosecond,causesanalarm-eventapplication togointo a loop. It just keeps spinning, spitting that bit of data back at the server,

getting a busy single, spinning and spitting, as the data notmaking it throughmushroomfrombitstobytes.Thisspinningmanifestsitselfinslowcomputers,frozenscreensdisplayingperfectlyacceptableconditionsasthegridoutsidethewindow is degrading ever more quickly. It becomes alarms that don’t sound,which become systems operators that look at their screens and tell worriedcallers that everything is fine.Until there are enoughworriedcallers, until thedatagluthasgottensoseverethattheservershavecrashed.Untilitistoolatetodoanythingaboutit.Withintwentyminutesofthatlastphonecall,FirstEnergy’sowncommandandcontrolcenterhadblackedout.Itwastoolate.Theblackouthadbegun.Thiswas not the firstmajor blackout in theEast, norwill it be the last. In

2003 no one in particular was to blame. Nobody noticed the tree as it grew,nobodynoticed thebug as it slowlygummedup theworks.Like rust and rot,like tiny leaks and hairline cracks, like age itself, the tree and bug were toominor and too quiet to catch anyone’s eye. And yet there they stand at thebeginningofthecascade,singularmonumentstoallthesmallnessesthatcanaddup,withtimeandopportunity,tototalsystemscollapse.Onemightbegivento thinkthat thisblackoutmighthavebeenpreventedif

somebody had just noticed as things slowly went awry—if in 2002 all ofFirstEnergy’s “known common problems” had been dealt with rather thanmerely17percentof them,if the treeshadbeenclipped, ifabrightyoungeyehadseenthestaticinthescreen.Butwhatmoststudentsofindustrialaccidentsrecognizeisthatperfectknowledgeofcomplexsystemsisnotactuallythebestway tomake these systems safe and reliable. Inpart becauseperfect real-timeknowledgeisextremelydifficulttocomeby,notonlyforthegridbutforotherdangerous yet necessary elements of modern life—like airplanes and nuclearpower plants. One can just never be sure that every single bit of necessaryinformation is being accurately tracked (and God knows what havoc thosemissingbitsarewreakingwhilethepresumedto-be-knownbitschugalongtheirorderly way). Even if we could eliminate all the “unknown unknowns” (toborrow a phrase from Donald Rumsfeld) from systems engineering—and wecan’t—therewouldstillbea seriousproblem tocontendwith,and that ishoweven closelymonitored elements interactwith each other in real time.And ofcourse humans,who are always also component parts of these systems, rarelyfunctionaspredictablyaseventheshoddiestofmechanicalelements.Rather than attempting the impossible feat of perfect control grounded in

perfect information, complex industrial undertakings have for decades been

veering toward another model for avoiding serious disaster. This would alsoseem to be the right approach for the grid, as its premise is that imperfectknowledge should not impede safe, steady functioning. The so-called SwissCheeseModelof IndustrialAccidentsassumesglitchesallover theplace, tinylittle failures or unpredicted oddities as a normal side effect of complexity.Rather than trying to “know and control” systems designers attempt to build,manage, and regulate complexity in such a way that small things aresignificantlyimpededontheirpathtobecomingcatastrophicallymassivethings.Threetreesandabugshouldn’tblackouthalfthecountry.Or, to put it differently, one doesn’t try to eliminate the holes in the Swiss

cheese—bycompactingallcheeseintocheddar,forexample—butrathertokeepthe holes in the cheese from lining up, frombecoming one big hole that runsthrough the entiretyof the loaf.Theholeswill be there (treeswill be too tall,budgetswill be tamperedwith, regulatorswill be put off, computer bugswillwormtheirwayin),buttheywon’tsnowballintototalsystemscollapsethewaytheydidinAugust2003,andthewaytheyverynearlydidatDavis-Besseayearearlier.The problem with the Swiss cheese model, which is otherwise remarkably

robust (we have it to thank for the past thirty years inwhich flying has beenconsistentlysaferthandriving;evenfrequentfliersaremorelikelytobekilledinalawnmoweraccidentthananairplanecrash),isthatthegrid,likeanycomplexmechanical system, is not just a machine but also the regulatory, business,cultural,andnaturalenvironmentswithinwhichthismachinefunctions.Thegridis thephysics,mechanics,engineering,construction,management,upkeep,anduseinternaltoitself.Itisalsothestorms,earthquakes,laws,hatreds(andotherpersonalopinions),andprofitmotivesthatsurroundthemechanism,thatchangeover time, and that can differ drastically between one state, one city, oneclimacticzoneandthenext.Inthecaseofthegridthese“externaltothecheese”circumstances are not necessarily conducive to the machine’s capacity tofunctionwellandstrongly.Ifthe2003blackoutwastracedbacktoparticularfailingsonthesystem—the

holes in the cheese of our grid—and if a number of these failings have beensincecorrected,thistracingoutofproximatecausestoasingle,massivesystemsfailuredoesn’tnecessarilydirectourgazeintherightdirection,orsetourmindstotherightproblems.Noamountofprecisioninthechainofeventsthatledtothe2003blackout,muchdetailedandinvestigatedafterthefact,willleadonetothewholestoryofwhyithappenedwhereandwhenitdid.

For thatwehave to lookbeyond themachine into thevagariesofAmericanpoliticalandeconomiclife.Forwhatisperhapsmostremarkablewasthatitwasadisasteralmostentirelydevoidofcriminalacts,butwhichwas,nevertheless,thoroughlyman-made. This differentiates 2003 frommore catastrophic eventslikeHurricaneKatrinaandSuperstormSandy,whichwerenaturaldisastersfirst,if renderedmoreextremein theireffectsbyan immensityofhumanerror,andfrom outages like those in California in 2000–2001, which were criminallymanufactured by Enron and other energy trading companies operating in thatstate. InOhio in2003 theoutagewasman-made from the first fault, trip, andshort to the last, yet there was no causal malfeasance associated withFirstEnergy’smanyfailingsthelongAugustafternoontheEastwentdark.Shortlyafterthereleaseofthefirstgovernmentreportontheblackout,which

apportioned blame almost exclusively to FirstEnergy, the vice president ofenergy delivery for the company, Chuck Jones, did as one might expect—he“vigorously defended the company against allegations that it was the primarycauseoftheblackout.”It would seem a weak, indeed indefensible position, like preparing for a

critical battle by stationing all your soldiers in the bottomof a valley. Jones’sreparteesoundssopat,sopredictable, that itblurs into thewhitenoiseofself-defense that corporations often make when claiming innocence. It’s not ourfault, Jones said. “Too much electricity flowing over an antiquated grid wasreallytoblame.”It’sthegrid,hesaid,that’stheproblem.DespitehowhabitualithasbecomeformostAmericanstodisregardclaimsof

innocencemadebycorporatespokesmen,inthiscaseChuckJonesactuallyhasapoint.WhetherornotFirstEnergyshouldhaveletone—nottomentionthree—treesgrowoverforty-fivefeetnearpowerlines,whetherornottheircomputerswere buggy and their control room operators too invested in coffee anddistraction to notice that their screens were not refreshing, whether or notFirstEnergyistoblameforalltheproximatecausesoftheoutage,andtheyare,ChuckJonesstillhasapoint.Theproblemisthegrid.Andnotjustbecausethetechnologyisold,notjust

because it’s insanely complicated, and confusingly managed, and not justbecause when something goes wrong our number one most effectivecommunicationtoolisstillatelephone.ThisisnotwhyweshouldgivecredencetoJones’swords.Inordertounderstandwhythegridhasbecomesomuchlessstablesincethe

early 2000s (and it has), it is important to return again to a more careful

consideration of the aftereffects of the Energy Policy Act and accompanyingOrder888.Muchlikethe1996deregulationbillinCalifornia(thatmadeEnronmomentarilyveryrichandthatstatebyequalmeasurepoor),theEnergyPolicyActdidnotseparategenerationfromtransmissionanddistributionjustforshitsandgiggles.Itdidsoforareason,andthatreasonwasenergytrading.Theactturned electricity into a commodity—a thing like any other. While the grid,electricity’sinfrastructure,wasreconceptualizedinlawtosomethingratherlikeaboxorshippingcontainer.Conceptuallyifnotactually,electricitynowismadeand sold in units towhoever pays the best price and then shipped to thembymeansofthegrid.Atthetime,JackCasazza,anexecutiveatPSE&GinNewJerseysaidthatthe

lackof recognitionof“the singlemachinecharacteristicsof theelectricpowernetwork” enshrined into law with these policies is rather like “having everyplayerinanorchestrausetheirowntunes.”Within a month of the Energy Policy Act becoming the law of the land

electricitytradinghadshotthroughtheroof.Therewasenergytradingprevioustotheactbutithadbeenaminorpartofautility’soperationsandoftenlookedalotmorelikehorsetradingthanmodernarbitrage.Atraderatautilityinapinchmightcallapapermillandsay:Hey, ifyouguysturnyourmillofffor twelvehours,we’llgettheguysatthechloramineplant,whoneedalittlemorepowerrightnow,togiveyou40tonsofchlorinebleachforfree.After the act, the situation could not have been more different, foremost

becausethepriceforelectricitywas,forthefirsttimeever,beingsetbytraderstyingtoanticipatedemandincertainlocations,undercertainconditions,andatcertaintimesoftheday.Theywouldbuythecheapestelectricitytheycouldfindand“wheel”(transport)ittobesoldinthemostlucrativemarket.Electricitywasnowandnewlybotharealcommodity—tradeable,transportable,andprofitable—andareal,hedgiblefinancialentitywithfuturesmarketsandderivativesallitsown. Electrons, from the point of view of the market, have never looked somuchlikeporkbelliesorpigiron.The ideabehind theactwas twofold.First, itwould liberalizeand thusalso

reform (by means of the market) electricity production. This has indeedhappened. There are many more kinds of fuel feeding the power plants thatsupply the grid today than ever before, andmuchof the innovationwe see inpower production—from the rampant adoption of rooftop solar to the newpopularity of natural gas fracking—is the direct result of competition in thissector. And second, it was to make a unit of electricity into a tradable

commoditywithapricesetbyrelationsbetweensupplyanddemandratherthanby a utility’s regulatory body or by convention. This is literally whatderegulationmeanswhenappliedtotheelectricindustry.Inadditiontothelossof regulatory support for both monopsony and monopoly powers, the pricesutilitiespayforand theprice theychargeforelectricityhavebecomefarmorevolatile.Marketforcesnowmattertotheutilities.Regulatorsaswellasstateandcitygovernmentsstillhaveawholelotofsayoverwhatautilitycanandcannotdo,whattheymustdo,andhowmuchtheycanchargeforanyofit,butthis“alot” isawhole lot less than itused tobe.The introductionofmarket forces togridmanagementhas,aftersomeinitialbumpsintheroad,alsohadaprofoundeffectbothonhowmuchelectricityweasanationuse(less)andonthewaythatelectricitymovesthroughthegrid(farther).Boththepossibilityoftradingelectricityandofmakingitbywhatevermeans

strikesone’s fancyhas inexorablychanged theworkdonebyourgridwithoutchanging its structure verymuch.How this electricitywasmoved from cheap“there” toexpensive“here”almost immediatelybegan toproveaproblem.Aswasmentionedearlier,allelectriclines,calledconductors,areratedaccordingtothemaximumvoltagetheycansafelycarry.Theirstructurereflectsthisrating,asdo the regulations that come with it: the minimum distance of the lowestconductorfromtheground,themaximumheightofnearbytrees,andthekindsandstrengthsofthetowerstheselinesarestrungon.More poetically and of equal technical relevance is that different kinds of

electriclinesarenotidentifiedbylongstringsofnumbersandlettersbutratherare named after birds.So, for example, a 765kilovolt (kV)partridge line thatrunsonehundredmileshasamaximumcarryingcapacityof3.8gigawatts(GW)—or3.8billionwatts,roughlytheelectricityneededtolight10million100-wattbulbs or all the homes in Columbus, Ohio. Now take that same partridgeconductor,stretchittofourhundredmiles,anditcancarryonly200GW,abouthalf asmuch power. Distance reduces the carrying capacity of lines, whereaslong-distance wheeling increases the amount of electricity transported overprecisely these same lines. TheEnergy PolicyAct did nothing to upgrade thelines.Theresultwasasimpleone.Thefreetradeofelectricitymeantthattherewas too much electricity traveling too far. Lines were getting overburdened,heatingup,sagging,shortingout,arcing,andfillingwithharmonicresonances.All of which are both very bad for reliability and wasteful, and thus bad foreffortsatconservation.InMay2000,ameretwomonthsaftertheorderthatutilities“wheel”electric

powerratherthanmakeitwentintoforce,thenumberofTransmissionLoadingReliefProceduresontheEastCoast’sgridwassixtimeswhatithadbeenayearearlier.Theserequestsforhelpmanagingtheloadofparticularlinesareoneverygoodwayofmeasuringstressonthegrid.Justbeforetheactwasmadelaw,thenumberoftheserequestsontheEasternInterconnectionwasatrightaroundtenper month. Six months later, in August 2000, there were almost 175 suchrequests,andbymid-2003,rightaroundthetimeoftheblackout,morethan250suchrequestswerecominginpermonth.Problemsofthiskindwithlineloadcouldleadtounusualflashoversinplaces

where one would not expect to see them, places like suburbanWalden Hills.Therewasjusttoomuchelectricitymovingtoofaronthegridforittobehaveinthe same, somewhat predictable ways it had when power production andtransmissionwerebothmorelocalphenomena.“Predictability” is an awkward term when speaking of electricity, because

strictly speaking it isn’t. Previously, predictability had been premised upon analgorithmic sense of user behavior and existing patterns of generation,transmission,andconsumptionthatfollowfrompopulationdensity,theseason,theworkday, and other fairly stable indicators ofwhen and howmuch powermight be used. The utilities made their generation and investment decisionsbasedontwelvedatapointsperyearpercustomer(themonthlymeterreadings).Long-distancewheelingandtheunlinkingofgenerationfromlocalconsumptionhabits hasmeant that a lotmore data is nowneeded tomanage the electricitymovingonthesystematanygivenmoment.Utilities,however,arenotmastersofdata.Norisitexactlythecasethatsomeoneinacontrolroomsomewherecanusethisdatato“see”thegridinallitsreal-timecomplexity.Whatismanagedisa guessed-at set of demands, and of supplies, and of line carrying capacity.Whentheseguessesgowrong,that’swhenthealarmbellsshouldstarttoring.Indeed,this“guessed-at”wayofinsuringgridstabilitywaslargelyhowEnron

managed tomanipulateCalifornia’s grid so profitably. For example, oneway,amongthemany,thattheymademoneywastopurchasetransmissionrightsonessential power lines, most significantly a thousand of the 1,600 possiblemegawattsonCalifornia’spath26,oneof twoconductors linking thenorthernandsouthernhalvesof thestate.Theycould thenfictitiously“clog” this route.Theydid this not by adding any actual electricity into the grid, but by simplysayingtherewasnomoreroomavailableonthesecriticalpathsandthengettingthe state to pay them to “free up” transmission capacity that had in fact beenthereallalong.

Enron’s market-manipulating machinations to the side, almost allcontemporaryelectricitytradersengageinformsofelectricityarbitrage(buyingcheaphere,sellingdearthere)madepossiblebythecriticalcombinationoftheInternetandtheEnergyPolicyAct.ThiswayofmakingmoneyonpowermayhavebeenfirstexploitedbyEnron—inthelate1990s,25percentofallenergytrading in theUnitedStateswasbeingconductedviaEnronOnline—but italsobroughtcompetitiontothemarketinawayneverbeforeseen.Theunfortunatesideeffectof thiswastomaketheflowof informationlessfreeas theflowofelectricityhasbecomesimultaneouslymorecomplex.Utilitiesusedtotalktooneanother.Nooneevermademoneyoffofanybody

else’scustomerbaseandsogridinstabilityinanyoneregioncouldserveasanobjectlessonforutilitiesdealingwiththesameissuesintheirownlocales.Since2000, however, not only is there far more information pouring into utilitydatabases—aproductofthewidespreadintroductionofcomputerizationatmanypointsinthesystem,ofwhichdigital“smart”metersarethemostinfamous—butthatinformationistreatedasproprietary.Electricitytrading,inthisway,failstobe laissez-faire capitalismbecause nobody quite has access to the informationnecessary tomakereal-timedecisionsabouthowtomanage theirsystems,andthusalsotheircapital.Noteven,oddly,theutilitiesthemselves,sincetheynowhave somuch information to contendwith thatmost of it sits unprocessed ingiantserverscalled“historians.”Bigdatahasbecomejustanothermodernwaytouseupelectricity.Beginning is the early 1900s utilities made decisions about how electricity

was generated and how itmoved on their slice of the grid—information theyfreely shared among themselves. Now they neither make these decisions norshare information about them.Historically, utilitiesmademoneywhen peopleusedelectricity;themoreweusedthemoremoneytheymade.Nowtheydon’t.Today’s utilities make money by transporting power and by trading it as acommodity.WhiletheyarestillchargedwithkeepingAmerica’spowersupplyreliable theyhave a real incentive to sell electricity towhomeverwill pay themostforitwherevertheymaybe.Long-distancewheelingistotheirbenefit;itistotheplantowners’benefit;itistotheenergytraders’benefit;intheory,atleast,it is also to our benefit. In fact, the only thing that really suffers from thisarrangementisthegrid.Thiswouldn’tbethecaseifweputalotofmoneyintoupgradingthegrid—

making it the technological equal of thenew regimeof power that governs it.Theproblem is thatutilitycompanies’profitmarginshavebeenshrinking,not

just since the passage of the act into law, but since the late 1960s. Then,overinvestment in nuclear power coupled with the nascent conservationmovement led to the surprising trend—for Americans—of decreasedconsumption. By the late 1970s, big capital investments in electricalinfrastructure had slowed to a trickle,where it remained until the actmade itstartlingly lucrative to start buyingor buildingnewgeneration facilities again.Manyof thesebrand-newpowerplantsaremuchsmaller,moredispersed,andmore variable than anything the grid has ever seen. Natural gas combustionplants, solar panels on rooftops, wind farms in the Dakotas, all are forms ofprivatelyownedpowerthatfurthercomplicatethegridwhile,finally,breathingnewlifeintotheelectricityproductiongame.Butthesenewconstructionsareasoftenownedbyinvestmentfirms,like.Ifwefollowthe flowofmodernmoney,anewterrainof investmentandof

privationemergesintoview.Andwheremoneydoesn’tgo,wherepeopledon’twanttospend,startstogiveusagoodideaofwhichbitsofourgridaregiventofallingapart.Thisisthelandscapeofcollapse—imminentandactual.Moneydoesn’tgo to theupkeepof the fleetofold, lumberingpowerplants

trudging toward retirement that nevertheless still form the backbone ofAmerica’s electrical generation facilities. In the case of nuclear this lack ofdesire tomakesignificant investments inupkeep is themostworryingbecausetheresultsofplantfailurecanbethemostcatastrophic.Thisisn’ttosaythereisnocapitalinvestedinthisdomain—farfromit—it’sjustnotwheretheutilitieswant to spend their diminishing returns. FirstEnergy is currently spendinganother $600 million to upgrade Davis-Besse’s steam generators, this afterhaving spent an equal amount in 2004 to replace the perforated reactor head.Given the cost, one can easily imagine why they diverted inspectors’ gazeselsewhereandrequested,onmultipleoccasions, tohaveinspectionsdelayedorcanceled as rust slowly ate into the nuclear containment vessel; for this theywere fined$5millionby theNuclearRegulatoryCommission, the largest finethe NRC has ever levied, and they paid another $28 million to the U.S.DepartmentofJusticefordeliberateobfuscationofthefacts.In the decades preceding the 2003 blackout money didn’t flow toward the

upkeep and new construction of long-distance transmission lines. It isincontrovertible thatourwireswereunderprepared for long-distancewheeling,justastheywereunpreparedformorepredictablethingslikepopulationgrowth,theveritableexplosionofpluginabledevicesthathascomewiththerevolutionin telecommunications technology, andour seemingly insatiablehunger forair

conditioners.Nottomentiontheworrisomepossibilitythatourcars,too,mightbeelectriconedaysoon.Since2003,however,thetransmissionportionofoursystemhasgottenalot

ofattentionandmore than its fairshareof thecash.Hundredsof thousandsofmicrosensors have been placed on lines and substations, effectively“smartening” these. The promise, to date fulfilled, is that this fusing of smarttechnology to the transmission system will help ensure that a complexitygeneratedblackoutwillneveragainsoeasilypropagateonourcommonwires.One resultof this is that, according toa2014WhiteHouse report, roughly90percentofpoweroutagesintheUnitedStatesnowstartondistributionsystemsthathavenotbeentheobjectofthesamecareorrecipientofcash.There is another complicating factor.When it comes to new investment in

long-distance, high-voltage lines, cost is not the only problem. We averageAmericans also pose a problem, for two reasons. First, we don’t want to paymore money for our electricity, even though we enjoy some of the cheapestpowerintheworld.Second,lineshavegoneoutofvogue.Noonewantsthemnear their house. No one even wants them in their wilderness areas. No onewantstoseethemrunningalonghilltopsorthroughcanyonlands.Noonewantstocedetheirbackfortyforthepassageofthesegreatcordsofmodernlife.“NotInMyBackYard” has come to the bulk power industry, and asmuch aswemight desire reliable electricity delivered to our homes,we don’twant to paymoreforit,andwefighttoothandnail(asbattleafterbattlehasshown)tokeepanynewtransmissionfrombecomingavisibleblightuponourland.Last, money doesn’t flow toward a critical part of the grid system—vars.

Vars, or reactive power, help to stabilize voltage levels on the grid. Evenalternatingcurrent,withitsremarkablecapacitytobetransmittedsofarwithoutdiminished force, needs occasionally to be buoyed up and smoothed out. Theincrease in long-distance wheeling after the Energy Policy Act has mademaintaining power quality an even more critical element of basic gridfunctionality.Thisiswhatvarsdo:theyhelpensureaconstantvoltageintimesofstress.Assuchtheyareessentialtothewell-being,reliability,andefficiencyof thegrid.Theyare,however,alsoaveryhardsell,becausestrictlyspeakingtheydon’texist.Varsareevenmoreproblematicnon-thingstounderstand(ifnottomake)than

arewatts.Nevertheless,before theactbroughteconomiesofprofit to thegrid,everyutility ran somegeneratingplants thatmadewatts and fewer, far fewer,thatmadevars,becausevarsarewhatkeepvoltageandcurrentinsync.Withthe

separationofmoneymadebygeneratingelectricityandthatmadebywheelingiteverybodywhoused tomake varswas, after 2000, trying to get into thewattmarket.Varproductiongrewexceedinglyslack.Thislackofvarsonthegridhasbeencalled“akeyfactorinthegreatNortheastblackoutofAugust2003”aswellas in a series of blackouts on theWestern Interconnection in the summer of1996.Thereturnof theelectricgrid to themelodicstrainsofprofithasmeant that

the companies that purchased recently divested power plants, aswell as thoseinvesting in building new ones, are for the most part, uninterested in the varmarket.Firstbecause theycan’tsell them,andsecondbecauseonce thepowertheycansellisoutonthelinesitsqualityisnolongertheirconcern.Problemslikepowersurges(whenvoltageleadscurrent)orbrownouts(whencurrentleadsvoltage) normally happen in the transmission of electricity, not its production.Producersdon’tneedvars,andutilities,nolongerinthebusinessofproducingpower, reactive or otherwise, do need them to keep things stable on the lines.They don’t, however, want to buy them because they can’t be resold orotherwise rendered a viable product; there is no futures market in vars, forexample.Consumersneitherknow,norcare,ifthevarsarepresentorifthey’vegonemissing—untilthepowersurgesbegin.Thelinkbetweenthesesurges(andblackoutsandbrownouts)andtheabsenceofaninvisiblenon-productfromtheelectricgridisasimplerealityaboutwhichmostofusareentirelyclueless.TheEasternInterconnectioncareenedoutofcontrol thathotAugustdaynot

justbecauseofwhatFirstEnergydidorfailedtodo.Abiggerfactorthanthosetoo-tall trees, that computer bug, is how the Energy Policy Act drasticallychangedthewaysinwhichwenowusethegrid.Thephysicsandtheeconomicsofthesystemtodayhavenochoicebuttoworkatcross-purposes.Meanwhile,weall also lovewhat theacthasmadepossible, if fordifferent

reasons.Leftycleangreenenergytypesloveitbecauseatlonglasttheyhavetheright tobuypower from lesspolluting,oftenmoreproximate sources,or evenbetter, tomake it themselves. Themoneymen love it because they can finallymake a profit off of the trade in electricity. The conservative right love itbecause itbrings the freemarket,deregulation,andcompetition towhatwasahighly controlled noncompetitive industry riven through by the meddlingtentacles of big government. Multinational corporations and multimillionaireslove itbecauseat long last theycan invest in theenergysectorwith relativelylittle riskof loss.Building electrical generation, bettingon electricitymarkets,making solar and wind mainstream technologies—it seems that whatever

(social)wayyoulookatit,theEnergyPolicyActisawinninggig.Itmayalsospell theendoftheutilitiesasweknowthem.Itmayevenspell

theendofthegridasweknowit.ButthisiswhatreformlookslikeinAmerica.Give themarketan incentiveandeveryonewithan idealisticglint in theireyewill set themselves to working out how to make a better world out ofopportunity,optimism,andgrit.Whatconstitutesa“betterworld”isofcoursealwaysupforgrabs.Butthat’s

Americatoo.Ifsomepeoplewanttogetrichwhileotherswanttoputanendtoglobalwarming,well,letthemdukeitoutinthemarketplace.That’seffectivelywhattheEnergyPolicyActhasmadepossible.It’snotaprettyfight.Norisitacleanone.Butwheretherewasstagnationthereisnowinnovation.Andwherethere was a stable, if aging system—our grid—there is now a fantasticallyunstable,oldonewithnewbitsandmoremodernlogicssolderedintothejointsandaroundtheedges.Bethatasitmay,atleastthechipsareintheair;thefightfromhereonoutis

all about how, where, and into whose pockets they will fall when they comebacktoground.

CHAPTER6TwoBirds,OneStone

In mid-July 2012, Thelma Taormina, a fifty-five-year-old woman from thegreaterHoustonarea,pulledagunontheworkersentbyherlocalutilitytoswapout her old analog electric meter for a new digital one. Like 2 million otherTexans, Taorminawas getting a smartmeter that summer. Taormina, though,was uniquely displeased to see hers arrive. Her utility did nothing to helpmatters.Themeterinstallerwasrude,comingonherpropertydespiteanumberof signs, clearly posted, proclaiming her dissenting position regarding smartmeterinstallation.ItwasonlyafterhepushedTaorminaoutoftheway(shewasphysicallyblockinghisaccesstothemeter)thatshegothergunandhefinallysawthewritingonthewallandleft.Taormina’s complaintwas thatbecause thesenewelectricmeterswirelessly

transmit real-time information about electricity usage they would allow theutility to not only track but also record and store patterns of her family’selectricityuse.“They’llbeabletotell ifyouarerunningyourcomputer,orairconditioner, whatever it is, they all put off different signatures,” Taormina’shusband pointed out in an interviewwith the local television station after theevent. And though this sounds like paranoia, and the press has treated theTaorminas in precisely this far-fringe-of-the-American-right sort of way, theTaorminasareactuallycorrect.AGermanresearchteamprovedin2011thatacareful studyof themicropatternsofelectricityusemadenewlyobservablebydigital meters can reveal what appliances you have running and even whattelevisionprogramyouarewatching—aslongastheprogramisbeingbroadcaston scheduled TV, as signatures can be compared only with known possibleoutputs.Similarly, researchersat theUniversityofWashingtondiscovered thattheycouldtell,basedonelectricalsignatures,whichhouseswerewatchingTheLionKingandwhichwerewatchingShrek2.EvenifnooneevergoesthroughthetroubletomonitortheTaorminasclosely

enoughtonoticethattheycookmorewiththeirmicrowavethanwiththeiroven(thisisconjecture),forthemthesmartmeterisessentiallyasurveillancedevice,regardlessoftheutility’sclaimstothecontrary.TheTaorminasaresureabout thisbecausetheutilityalreadyhasaperfectly

serviceablemachineforthepurposeofmeasuringhouseholdelectricityuse—the

meterbeingreplaced.Theanaloginductionwatt-hourmeterhasbeenpartofourelectrical system since the nineteen-teens and still works just fine. Studies ofmeter accuracy—done by the utilities and also by the haters-of-utilities—havefoundboththeoldmetersandthenewmeterstobesufficientlyaccurate,neitherreallyoutdoingtheotherinanysubstantialway.Realistically,thereplacementoftheanalogmeterbythesmartmetercannothavebeenmotivatedbyadesiretoimprovetheaccuracyofmeasuringelectricityconsumption.Wherethetwodifferisinthenuanceoftheinformationtheyprovide.Digital

meters offer a lotmore data,which can,with the right software, be linked totime-of-dayuse,averyhelpfuldatapointfortheutilities.Andsincetheycanbereadremotely,theyalsoallowtheutilitytocutcostsbycuttingemployees.Farfewerpeopleareneededtoreadthenewmeters thantheold.Plustheyget theutilityoffthephone.Previous to the mass installation of smart meters utilities had to guess the

parametersofanoutagebasedupontriangulationsofcustomer telephonecalls.Before ten calls came in they couldn’t even dispatch repair crews, since theydidn’tknowthepreciseareaaffected.Now,withthenewmeters, theyknowifyourpowerisoutwithoutyoueverhavingtopickupthephone.Betterstill,theyalso knowwho among your neighbors has lost power, andwho has not. Thismeansthatrepairtrucksoftherightkindgototherightplacerightaway.Sincethe introductionofdigital smartmeters, outage timeshave shrunkover all theUnitedStates.Butarethesefeaturesenoughtojustifywhysomanyutilitiesarespendingso

much and pushing so hard tomake sure everyone gets the newmeter? ItwasTexas’sCenterPointEnergy’sseventhvisittotheTaorminaswhentheguncameout. From the Taorminas’ point of view, and not theirs alone, the degree ofimportancetheutilityplacedongettingthemthenewmeterseemedsuspicious.What the Taorminas don’t see, because it’s been pretty well hidden from

public view, is that something is in fact broken—it’s just not themeters. Theutilities themselves are suffering not only from a greatly attenuated revenuestream—whichthenewmetersdohelpcombat—butfromanumberofstressesthatcomefromnolongerbeingincontroloftherelationshipbetweengenerationandconsumption.Powerplantsfromtinytomassive,manyproducing“variable”and thusunpredictableamountsofelectriccurrent,arepoppingupallover theplace. Lines are more difficult to manage as well because of increased long-distance wheeling and, since 2003, increased automation. Arbitrageopportunities are shrinking because more smart people with proprietary

algorithmshavegottenintotheenergytradinggame.Andconsumptionisdownafterpeakingin2007,acrossthegridandacrossthenation.Despitethefactthatweownevermore thingsneeding tobeplugged in, there isno indication thatconsumption levels will rise again anytime soon. The utilities, having lost,irrevocably, their iron grip on the electricity business, are being forced bycircumstances to look elsewhere for stable revenue streams. Demand-sidereform,itturnsout,isoneofthelonedomainslefttothem.Inelectricityspeak,the“demandside”ofthegridistheTaorminas.It’syou

andme. It’s thepeopleofBoulder,Colorado, andBakersfield,California, andthe 38.5million otherAmerican householdswith installed smartmeters as of2014. Demand side means Walmart, and Google, and Alcoa Aluminum. Itmeans the Old Executive Office Building in Washington, D.C., and all thelobbyingfirmsonKStreet.ItmeansAppleton,Wisconsin.Upuntilnow,otherthanhavingbeenencouragedtousemore,more,evermoreelectricity,we“thedemandside”havebeenalmostentirelyleftoutoftheindustry’sconsiderations.Bycontrollingandmonitoringourbehaviorasusersofelectricity,utilitiescan

also control their own revenue streams. This is largely accomplished bytrimming wasteful expenses on their side. Some of these might seem minor,though theyaddup, like shrinking themeter-reader force,or sending the rightkindofrepaircrewtotherightspotonthefirsttry.Othersaremoremomentous.Smartmeters,forexample,allowutilitiestotakestepstolimitelectricityusageatmoments of peak demand—whenwe all ramp up our electricity use at thesametime.Beforesmartmeters,10percentofautility’sresourceswerealwayson the ready for these precisemoments, though they only happen a couple oftimesayearandthenoftenonlyforacoupleofhours.Thepowerplantsreservedforperiodsofpeakdemandalso tend tobe theoldestanddirtiestplants in thefleet—plantsthattheutilitieswouldliketoseeretired.Asthepeoplethatbreathethe air in America we also have good reason to want these plantsdecommissionedandshutteredforgood.It’sgoodthattheyareoffmostofthetime; it’s bad that they are on anyof the time.But if theseplants don’t comeonlinewhenneeded,firstbrownoutsandthenblackoutswillbeginrollingacrossthelandscape,asdemandandsupplyfailtoalign.To run these otherwise hibernating electricity factories the utilities need to

makesurethereisenoughfuelsittingaroundreadytocombust,toturnturbinesthatturncrankshaftsthatspininsideelectromagnetsthatpulsevastquantitiesofelectricity out into systemsbuilt tomove less of it.Theyneed enough trainedstaffoncallandreadytogotofireitupandkeepitrunning,andtheyneedto

ensurethatitisingoodworkingorderdespitesittingidlemostofthetime.Thisismassivelyexpensive for them,and it isa simpleandconstantdrainon theirbottomline.Finding a goodway to control peak demandwould offer the possibility of

continuedplantretirement,easingcoalevermorethoroughlyoutofthenumberonespotforAmericanelectricityproductionandreplacingitwithsmaller,moreefficient, and relatively speaking cleaner natural gas combustion turbines (andoccasionallyevenwindandsolarpower).Likewise, themoreelectricitythelinesareaskedtocarrythelessefficiently

theyfunction.Peakdemanddoesn’tjustmeanmakingmoreelectricitywithourleast efficient plants. It also means losing a much higher percentage of thatelectricityintransit.Thisfurtherlowerstheamountofthepotentialpowerinalumpofcoalthatactuallymakesitintoyourreadinglamp—downtorightabout2percent.Theutilitieswouldthusprefertocontrolhowmuchpowerweuseor,barring

that, chargeus a lotmoremoney for the electricity that ismore expensive forthem tomake andwheel. In this way, theymight recoup expenditures forceduponthembyourproclivitytoengageinthesamepower-hungryactivitiesatthesame times. Itgetshot,weall turnup theair-conditioning; itgetscold,weallturn up the heat. In the UK, where electric kettles are common, they have aproblemwithsomethingcalledTVpickup—asurgeindemandduringtheadsofwidelywatchedTVshowsastelevisionviewersheadtothekitchentoboilupaspotof tea.This isacommonenoughphenomenonthatEngland’sutilityoftenhasthreeorfourofthese400-MWsurgestodealwitheveryday.Inmostcases,theutilitieshavejustrolledwiththeseexpensivebehaviors.Withsmartmeters,however, they finally also have the chance to pass this cost on to us,transformingpeakdemandfromamomentofcrisis for them,andfor thegrid,intoamomentofpeakrevenue.Thisinterestincontrollingcustomeruseisbrand-new.Forthewholeprevious

historyof thegrid theutilities didwhatwasnecessary to adapt toourwhims,whethergreedyorconservative.Theydidlittle,however,toopenlyinterveneinhowwe thepeopleusedelectricity.Consumptionwasapersonalmatter.Evenwhen people wanted to begin conserving electricity by turning out lights, orinsulatingwalls and buying betterwindows (and later, better refrigerators andclothes dryers), the utilities just grumbled to see their profits flatten asconsumptiondropped.This lackof interventionwasalso,effectively,a lackofcommunication. The utilities have a scant history of crossing the line that

separatesthemandtheiroperationsfromusandourdishwashers.Thisiswhyutilityintervention“feels”soweird,sobad,totheTaorminasand

othersprotesting themassdeploymentof smartmeters. It’s a sea change.Thelong-established laws of the electricity game have shifted under their feet—whichareourfeetaswell—and,evenwithoutknowingit’shappened,wecanallfeelit.Inourcollectivegutweknowtheutilitywithitsoftengracelessattemptsat demand-side control has crossed some invisible line and is now, officially,behavingunusually.Wearerightlysuspiciousofthem,evenifspuriouslyso.It is true then, as the Taorminas fear, that the new meters are in fact

informationcollectorsthat,onceinplace,canbeusedforcommunicationaboutand control of customers. In many places, smart meters do already allow theutilitytotakeremotecontrolofyourhomeair-conditioningandthusloweryour“demand” by setting your thermostat a tad warmer (and so running the airconditioneralittlebitless).WhattheTaorminas(likesomanyotherprotesters)miss,however,isthatat

least for the moment these communication and control capabilities have verylittle to do with any sort of utility interest in the behavior of any individualcustomer.Wematter to them as amanipulable aggregate, rarely as individualunits, and almost never as particular people. This disinterest in customers ashumanbeingswithideas,wants,beliefs,andproclivitiesthatmattertothemhasbeenat theheartof almost allpopular resistance to themass rolloutofdigitalsmartmeters,notjustinTexas.EverywhereintheUnitedStatespeoplewere,tovaryingdegrees,angryabout thisparticularcombinationof forced interventionandpersonaldisregard.IftheTaorminasareprettysurethattheirutility’sulteriormotiveistospyon

citizensinviolationoftheConstitutionandanynumberoflawsofbasichumandecency, then thepeopleofBakersfield,California, also ahighly conservativearea,suspectthenewmetersareatrickymeansofchargingmoreforthesameelectricity.Theirutility,PG&E,hastogothroughaseriesofcomplicated,highlybureaucratizedproceduresevery time theywant to raise the rates, so thesmartmetersthathavemagicallyandprecipitouslyincreasedcustomers’billswithoutthe normal hoop-jumping by the utility have raised some serious hackles. SoferociouswasBakersfieldinitsprotestsagainstthenewmetersthatcommunity-levelresistancetometerinstallation,whereverinthecountryithaspoppedup,hasbecomepopularlyknownas theBakersfieldEffect,as in“TheBakersfieldEffectHitsSantaCruz.”Acenturyofignoringcustomershastranslatedintoallkindsofflatfootedand

tone-deaf interactions in the present. InBakersfield, thesewere everywhere inevidence. From the customer surprised to discover that his electricity usageactually increasedduringasix-hourblackout toapartmentdwellerswhofoundthemselvesquite suddenly in thepositionofpayingmore for their electricbillthanfortheirrent,smartmeterslookedlikeandfeltlikeacashgrab.Andthoughtherehasbeenalotofquibblingastowhy,nobodyargueswiththefactthatwiththe new technology’s arrival, monthly electric bills doubled, at times trebled.This happened in 2010, when Bakersfield had an unemployment rate of 16percentandanunderemploymentratedoublethat.Nobodyhad$1,000topayaJulyelectricbill thathadcost$300 in June (not tomention$300 thepreviousJuly)withnoappreciablechange inconsumerbehavior. Ifboth theoldmetersand the newmeterswere accurate, as the utility claimed, then the only viableexplanationforthepeopleofBakersfieldwashighwayrobbery.PG&Eoffereddifferentinterpretations:July2010hadbeenmuchhotter,they

claimed,thanJuly2009,resultinginmoreintensiveairconditioneruse;time-of-dayratesmeantthatcustomers,notyetusedtotheideathatakilowatt-hourofelectricitymightcostmoreat four in theafternoon thanat six in themorning,werecontinuingtousepower,andlotsofit,atthemostexpensivetimesofday;andapoorlytimedrateincreaseunrelatedtothenewmetershadbeenrolledoutas a means of covering the unexpectedly high costs of integrating morerenewableenergyintothegrid.As the Bakersfield protests grew in their vehemence, customers all over

Californiastartedbarricadingtheroads,refusingtoallowtruckscarryingsmartmeterstopass;baseballbatswereseen(thoughnoguns)asmeterinstallerswererunoffofprivateproperty;andaclass-actionlawsuitwasfiledonthepartofthecitizensofBakersfield.Therewerealsosometinfoilhats,thoughthoseworriesaboutelectromagneticradiationsickeningcustomerswhosleeptoonearthenewmeterswerelesscommoninBakersfieldthaninMarinandMendocinoCounties.Nationwide, LasVegasCounty,Nevada, home to SinCity and surprisingly

alsotosomeofthemostenvironmentallyconscientiousbuildingsinthecountry,becameground zero for radical fury as to the physical perils presentedby themeters. In2012LasVegaspublicutilitycommissionersweresurprised to findanopenmeetingontheprogressofsmart-meterinstallationfloodedbycitizensclaimingnotonlythattheywerebeingsecretlymonitoredbytheirutilitybutthatthesmartmeterswereemittingraysthatarethe“ratpoisonusedinenergy.”Andthough these protesters were not painting their homes with electromagneticshieldingpaint(ashasbecomecommoninVictoria,Australia,aftertheirutility

beganthemassinstallationofdigitalsmartmeters),utilitycommissionersinLasVegassoonfoundthattheirhomeaddresseshadbeenpostedonline,followedbythe arrival of “strange packages” at several of the commissioners’ residences.Meanwhile, in rural Maine, residents successfully pushed through an opt-outprogrambecause“safetystandards forpeakexposure limits to radio frequencyhavenotbeendeveloped to take intoaccount theparticular sensitivity toeyes,testesandotherball-shapedorgans.”Thepublicoutcryagainstsmartmetershasprobablybeen loudest,andmost

resoundingly belittled, in the domain of health. The radiation emitted by themeters is very similar to that emitted by cell phones and wireless Internetrouters, which while not proven to be safe are both types of electromagneticpollutionpeopleopttouseallthetime.Itdrivesutilityrepresentativesalittlebitmorecrazyeverytimetheyholdahearingatwhichtheverysamefolkstheretocomplain about being poisoned by smart meter radiation are chatting happilyawayontheirphones.Consistency, however, is not the point. Control is.When, back in the day,

limitlessconsumptionwaswhatcustomersdesired, they felt incontrolof theirelectricity. Therewas always enough power available to them to dowhateverstrucktheirfancy.Forthemostparttherestillis.Whenconservationbecameanew value forAmerica in the late 1960s, this sense of controlwas eroded ascustomers began to discover that itwas very difficult to use substantially lesselectricitythantheyhadbeenandevenmoredifficulttoseeattemptedchangesin consumption reflected on theirmonthly bills. They also felt like therewaslittle say they could have in how their electricitywas beingmade, fromwhatkinds of fuel, andwithwhat environmental aftereffects. Regulation since thattimehashadaprofoundeffectupontheworkingsofthesupplysideofthegrid,and even some ripples in the construction of more efficient appliances, butdemand-side frustrations haven’t changed very much. Customers still don’tunderstand their bills, usage still doesn’t seem to be linked to cost, and thepromiseofbeingabletochoosecleaner,moreefficientlyproducedelectricityisheldconsistentlyatbay.Thisiseversoslightlylesstruenow.AsIwritein2015,thetidehasfinally

beguntoturn.Today,oneseescustomer-driveninitiativestoproducetheirownpower,largelyfromhomesolarinstallationsandcommunitychoiceaggregationthat lets municipalities decide the mix of fuels they want used to generateelectricityfortheirtown.Some modest competition has emerged in larger markets between retail

electricity service providers, which offer different types of plans to pleasedifferenttypesofcustomers:100percentwindforalittlemoremoney,aflatratefor a little less money, and so on. Some of these changes have been almostaccidentalaftereffectsofthewidespreaddeploymentofsmartmeters.Theutilitymay havewanted to disconnect their capacity to do business from things liketelephonesanddumb,greedyairconditioners,butwhat theyalsoenabledwiththese newmeters is “netmetering” bymeans ofwhich homemade electricity,fromrooftopsolarpanels,forexample,canbefedbackintothegrid.Theutilityhastopayyouforthispowerandthesmartmeterhelpsthemkeeptrackofhowmuch theyoweyouat theendofeachbillingcycle.Asof2015,all the statesexceptSouthDakota,Mississippi,Alabama,andTennesseehadactivenetmeterpoliciesinplace.In2012,however,whensmartmeterirewasreachingitspeak,thesechangeswerenotyetonmanypeople’sradar.Alltheysawwastheirutilityonceagaindoingthingstheydidn’tunderstandandaboutwhichtheyhadnosay.

Nowherewasthisdisconnectbetweenwhatcustomerswantedandhowutilitiessetout tomanage themmoreoffkilter than inBoulder,Colorado—America’sSmartGridCity.Xcel,aMidwesternutilitywithaneight-statereach,decidedtobuildaprototypeofafuturegridinaplacewhere,theydeemed,peoplewouldbe receptive tohigh-techmeansof reducingenergyconsumption.Boulder andSt.Cloud,Minnesota,madetheshortlist,andintheendBoulderwasselected.Ratherthanjustbeinggivensmartmeters,theutilityundertook,andvigorouslypromoted,afarmorethoroughupgrade.Theirvision,astheytellit,wastobuilda real smartgrid, anewgridof substance that could think, inmanyways, foritself,with smartwires, smart appliances, smart thermostats linked in constantconversationwithoneanother,withtheutility,andeventuallywithhomesolarsystems,batterystorage,andagrid-enabledelectriccar.The ideabehind this first serious attempt tooperationalize a real smart grid

wasanadmirableone.Gridoperatorsandagreatmanyutilitymenunderstoodthat the revolution in telecommunications that followed from the shattering ofMaBellin1982providedaninterestingmodelforhowelectriccompaniesmighttransition from government-regulatedmonopolies to customer-oriented serviceproviders.No one could have imagined at the close of the 1970s (whenmostpeoplestillrentedtheirphonesfromtheirlocalmonopolyphonecompany,fewpeoplehadlongdistanceservice,andthoseonabudgetsharedaphonelinewith

some other random customer) that in thirty years’ time phoneswould be tinycomputerstotallyunlinkedfromthewall,andthatabsolutelyeverybodywouldhaveoneof theirown.Thenumberof landlines in theUnitedStateshasbeenplummeting since 2003, but this shift away from embedded infrastructure isalmostirrelevanttothephonecompaniesthatsurvivedtheinitialshattering.Thesurvivorsnowhavetwonewproductstosell:Internetserviceandsmartphones.Though there was a lot of chaos in the transition and a number of phone

companiesdidcrashandburnalongtheway,thereissomethinghopefultotheelectricityreformersaboutthewaythatthephonesthemselveshavesurvivedasa product and how providing the interconnection between these phones hassurvivedasaservice.Thegrid,theyhoped,coulddothesame,thoughperhapsonamoremodestscale.Thisideaofatransitionliketheonethetelecommunicationsindustryhadjust

survived,ifideallywithmorewinnersandfewerlosers,wasnotmerelyindustryconservatism. The grid is thewires. These could be “smartened” (which is tosay, rendered capable of transmitting information aswell as electricity),whileelements of the grid’s communication structure could be rendered wireless—mostnotablymeterreadings;however,attemptingtounplugelectricityfromthegrid, as the phone has been unplugged from thewall, was too radical a leap.Even in 2012 the so-called smart grid was, just like our regular old grid,premiseduponarobustendoskeletonoflong-distancetransportationandshorter-distancepole-topdistributionnetworks:namely,wires.Whateverelsehappened,itreallydidseemlikethevastmajorityofthesewireswerehereforgood.In 2015, three short years later, we’re not so sure. Once a technological

revolution gets rolling it has the potential to outstrip even the most radicalpredictionsregardingitsendpoint.Wemight,inotherwords,losealotofwiresinthecomingdecades.Notbecauseweinventourwayoutoftheneedforlong-distancetransmissioncapacity—efficientwirelesstransmissionofhighvoltagesdoesnotseemtobenearathand—butbecausedistributedgenerationisbringingelectricityproductionmuchcloser tohome.Wearen’t (yet) inventingourwayaroundthewires,butwearechangingourhabits tomakethemlessnecessary.However,backin2008,whenXcelstartedconstructionofitsSmartGridCityinBoulder,thisnotionwassofarbeyondthepaleastobeunimaginable.ThefirstthingXcelsetouttodoinBoulderwasverysimilartothefirstthing

EdisondidinManhattan:theystartedbydiggingupthestreetstolaycable.Intheend,thisdecisionwouldbetheonethateffectivelybankruptedtheproject;itturns out thatBoulder has a lotmore hard rock nestled just up underneath its

pavement than anyone had predicted, or budgeted for. Etching conduit tracksinto the stony underpinnings of the city proved both horribly expensive andtime-consuming. In 2014,when the project officially ground to a halt, only afractionof the totalnecessary fiberopticandbroadband-over-powerline (BPL)cablinghadbeenput toground,atacostof$21million.Asearlyas2012, thecompany had admitted that BPL was an overly expensive technology that itwouldnotuseagain.Withthebenefitofhindsight,whatisperhapsmostinterestingabouttheXcel

project was the degree to which a wireless future had not yet permeated themindsoftheverymenplanningandconstructingthecitytheyhopedwouldbethecuttingedgeof this future. It seems inconceivablenow thatanythingotherthanan Internet-connectedwireless systemfor information transfercouldevenbeconsidered.ForXcel,atthetime,thingswerenotsocutanddried.Thegrid,the sound logic went, was developing into a wired system for themultidirectional transmissionofboth informationandelectricity. Itwouldrivalexisting telecommunication systems at the level of infrastructure whilesimultaneouslytransportinganddistributingelectricityfromwhereitismadetowhereit isused.Thesmartgridwasarealopportunitytoupgradethewiresaswellasafirstchancetosubstantiallyaltercustomerusagepatternsasapartofthelong-termprojectofbalancingandmaintainingtheprofitabilityofthelargergrid.Thefirstcriticaldifferenceisthatwithaperfect,futuresmartgrid,electricity

mightbemadeeverywhere.Flowsofpowerwouldbemultidirectionalasrooftopsolarmetbackyardwindmetbignuclearorhydro, and theoutputof all thesetypes of generators would intermingle “intelligently” on the wires. Second,informationwouldalsotravelfreelybetweenutility,customers,andthevariousmachines that populate the grid, including both those that used electricity andthosethatproducedit.Themovementofbothinformationandelectricitywouldbe monitored because meters could run both forward and backward, keepingperfect track of electricity outputs and inputs from even the smallest sources.Smart thermostats would form the hub of home-based networks of smartappliancesthatalteredtheirbehaviorswithoutdirecthumaninterventiontotakeintoaccountreal-time,variablepricingofelectricity.Sincethelinesnecessarytocarryradicallydistributed,uncoordinated,andsmall-scalegenerationtomarketalsoneeded tobesmart (which is tosay tohavesomebasicdigitalcomputingcapacities), itmade sense to build the two functionalities into the same set ofwires.Informationandelectricityfinally,inBoulder,becomingone.

In a perfect world, the various component parts of the Boulder smart gridwouldhavefunctionedlikedistributed,systemicthought.Thegridwouldmakesimpledecisionsfromthedishwasher levelall thewayupto thatof thepowerplant; it could communicate both to and between people and machines whilebalancing its load, all while avoiding the electrocution of its linemen, prettymuchallbyitself.PerhapsXcel,withitsgrandplansforBoulder’sgrid,overlookedthecheaper

option of wireless information transfer (which almost all the nation’s otherutilitieshadgrabbedon towithsuchvehemence)because theirvision forboththecity,andthefutureofthegrid,wassomuchgrander.Theydidn’tjustwanttogiveBouldersmartmeters, theywanted tomakeBouldersmart,at themostbasic level of infrastructure, but also at the level of appliances. Xcel wouldsmarten Boulder’s residents, too, so that they might interface seamlessly,happily,intoalltheradicaltechnologiesindeploy.None of thismaterialized inBoulder. The fiber optic andBPL cablingwas

only ever partially installed, smart appliances never hit the market (they stillhaven’t),only43percentofcityresidentsgotsmartmeters,andonlyabout100households(ratherthantheplanned1,850)gotsmartthermostats.Evenforthosewith thenewmetersandnewthermostats, thepromised“real-timereadability”ofelectricityusagewasneitherreal-timenorwasiteverexplicitlylinkedtocost.Ski Milburn, an outspoken Boulder resident, captured the spirit of the

project’smanymisstepsina2013interview:“IliveinSmartGridCity,”hesaid.“And I have a smartmeter, and the problem… it’s that the system is really,reallydumb—sodumbastobevirtuallyuseless.Caseinpoint,theclosestIcanget to real-time energy consumption data iswith a fifteen-minute delay.Overopticalfiber!eBaycangivemeamillisecondresponsetosomethingI’mbiddingon halfway around the world and it takes Xcel fifteen minutes to give mesomething I could have gotten frommy dumbmeter by walking outside andlookingatit.Givemeablinkingbreak.”MikeWarwick,alsoofBoulder,sumsitall up (givingSki the credit): “SkiMilburnhit the nail on the head.Thiswasdesignedfromtheget-goasa‘SmartGrid/StupidCustomer’pilot.”Intheend,itseemsthattheSmartGridCityfailedtocongealbecauseonmany

fronts Xcel executives failed to understand the spirit of the times. They laidwireswhenwirelessness,inallthings,wasthemorepopularpath.Theyactuallyreduced customers’ ability to understand their electricity consumptionwithoutcontributinginanywaytotheonethingmodern-dayelectricitycustomerswantthemost:thecapacitytounderstandandcontroltheirownconsumptionandits

cost,coupledwithsomemeasureofcontroloverwhereandhowtheirpowerismade.Allthewhiletheutility’sconstantmeddlinginhouses,instreets,andwithelectricityratesirritatedpeoplewhomostlywantedtobeleftalone.In2009,anexecutivefromXcelsaid,inutterexasperation,abouttheBoulder

project:“Wejustdon’tknowwhatourcustomerswant!”Notfiveminutesbeforehehadquotedacustomer,who’dsaid:“Allwereallywantwhenwegethomeisfor theTVtoworkand thebeer tobecold.” Itwasalmostas ifXcelcouldn’thear what people were saying no matter how clearly these people articulatedtheirpositionsonthematter.The lack of conformity between the vision for the smart grid and the

technologytomakeitpossibleturnedouttobebutonepieceoftheproblemforthe SmartGridCity. An equally destructive factor was Xcel’s failure tocommunicatethepurposeoftheprogramtoitscustomerbase.MuchliketheTaorminasofTexas,Xcel’sBouldercustomersdidn’twantthe

utilityspendingalotoftimemeddling,orlurkingabout,ontheirproperty.Theydidn’twantamoreexpensiveandlessstableelectricitysupply,theydidn’twantto interact with poorlymade thermostats and smart home controller modules,theydidn’twanttheutilityremote-controllingtheirair-conditioning,theydidn’twant their streetsdugup, theydidn’twant theirdryer to turnonat two in themorningall by itself, and they reallydidn’twant tobe encouraged todo theirvacuumingatmidnight inorder to saveanickelor two. In fact itwasunclearfromthecustomers’pointsofviewwhattheentireundertakingwasgoodfor.AsBoulder resident Stephen Fairfax put it in 2010: “How are meters thatcommunicate with the utility supposed to benefit consumers?What does thisgiveusthatwedon’thavenow?TomanyconsumerstheSmartGridmeansthatsomebureaucratwill turnofftheirairconditionerwhenit isveryhotoutside.”Everythingthattheutilitycastintermsofchoiceandcontrolwassomethingthatcustomerseitherdidn’twantorwerespectacularlyunderwhelmedby.ItseemedthatboththeradicalvisionfortheSmartGridCityandtherealityof

the halfway-done, sort-of-smartish grid the city actually got offered even lesscontrol tocustomers than they’dhadunder theoldsystem.Asa result,almostmore than any other group of smart grid resisters in the nation, Boulder’sresidentsrejectedtheirutility’seffortsontheirbehalf.Theytooktheirexpensiveutility-providedsmartthermostatsoffthewallandputtheminthekitchenjunkdrawer; they ignored theirmetersor refused to let theutility install them; theydid nothing to limit or change their behaviors in relationship to restructuredrates; and theygrew furious as theprojectwentoverbudget.When theywere

asked(alongwiththerestofColorado’sutilitycustomers)topayforthesecostoverruns, they lobbied the Colorado Public Utilities Commission to be freedfromaburdenthey’dneversignedupfor.And theywon. ThoughXcel’s 1.7million Colorado customers did have to

absorb$27.9millionincostoverrunsfortheproject,whentheutilityaskedfor$16.6millionmore, the commission said that it would not consider a secondbailoutuntiltheutilitycouldprovetheyhadprovidedsomebenefittocustomerswith the undertaking. To date, Xcel has not been able to provide sufficientlyconvincinginformationinthisregard.ThequestionremainsthesameinBoulderasinBakersfieldandHoustonand

Maine(withresidents’worriesaboutthewell-beingoftheirball-shapedorgans):Ifsmartmetersorevenawholesmartgridcan’tbeprovedtobenefitcustomersevenbytheveryutilityundertakingtheupgrade,whom,then,dotheybenefit?WhydidXcelgotothetroubleandexpenseofbuildingacitywidesmartgrid?WhydidCenterPointvisittheTaorminasseventimesinattemptingtogivethemasmartmeter?WhydidPG&Eriskaclass-actionlawsuittoensurethatallthepeopleofBakersfieldalsogot theirnewmeters?Theanswer,ofcourse, is thatsmartmetersdon’tbenefitus,thecustomers.Atleasttheydon’tdirectly.Smartmeters, and to a lesser extent othergrid-smartening investments, benefit them,theutilitycompanies.The levelofexpenseandof riskfor theutilitycompanies isonlysuspicious

until one realizes the stakes. The utilities vastly underestimated the degree towhichreformingthe industrywouldnegatively impact them.By2014,asXcelwas pulling out of its SmartGridCity commitments, as Colorado waswithdrawing its fiduciary supportofutilityoverspending, andas thepeopleofBoulder were voting for a municipal takeover of their grid, there was a fatalphrase in the air: “theutility death spiral.” It’smelodramatic, but neverthelesssuggestive.America’s for-profit utility companies are fighting for their continued

survival; a number of them, including Texas’s Energy Futures HoldingCorporation, are actively dying. Some observers claim that what we arewitnessing is not an evolutionary trimming of the business-model tree but anextinction of the utilities as such—permanent and total—such that in agenerationkidswon’tknowwhattheword“utility”meansanymorethantheyunderstand why we use the term “dial” for making a phone call. Others,includingWarrenBuffett,thinkthatthenotionoftheutilitydeathspiralissheerfearmongering, and though some utilitieswill surely perish, as happens every

timean industryundergoesamajor transition,manyof theutilitiesalive todaywill emerge from the singularity to bill us on the other side.Most likely thecompanies left standing will be the biggest of the big: Duke Energy, PG&E,ConEd, FirstEnergy, and probably even Xcel. Almost no one is optimisticenoughtosaythattheywillallcomeoutofthetransitionunscathed.Despitethemoderate,modest,andoftenquitehopefulwaysthatgridreform

beganin thelate1970s,anddespite themoresubstantialwaysthat theutilitieshadpowerandcontrolwrestedfromthembythe1992EnergyPolicyAct,mostcompanies suspected theycouldweather the shifting seasby simply runningatighter ship. Through the California energy crises of 2000–2001, through the2003EastCoastblackout,throughtheriseofvariablegenerationandtheforcedprivatizationofgeneration inmanymarkets, theybelieved that something likebusinessasusualmightpersevere through the rough times.People inAmericawouldalwaysneedelectricity,andwhobetterthantheytocontinuemanagingitsprovision?What theydidn’t seecomingwasgriddefection.Forso long,“off thegrid”

had been a suspect term. Going off the grid was something that longhairsingigliated in clouds of pot smoke and right-wing alligator farmers did (bothgroupsformanotablepresenceinthenewColorado).Itwasnotsomethingthatwould ever occur to regular folks, city folks, and reputable mainstreamcompanies. Not since alternating current did away with private plants in the1890s, and not since the consolidation of power in the 1910s brought wholeregionsunderthepurviewofasingleserviceprovider,haditbeenfiscallysoundtobeelectricityindependent.Then,quitesuddenly,itwas.By the time Boulder’s smart grid was being run into the ground by its

inhabitants’ sheer recalcitrance,ahouseanywhere in thecountrywithoutgrid-provided electricity had stopped being regarded with suspicion. It was now a“nanogrid”—a pretty cool-sounding sort of thing—while a larger installation,say,aprisonoruniversitycampus,thatcouldislanditselffromthebiggridandtakecareofallitsownlocksandlights,centralheatingandcoolingwasneitherradical nor suspect. In fact it was just the opposite; as a “microgrid,” theseinstitutions could make mutually beneficial deals with their utility to, forexample,stopdrawingpowerfromthebiggridduringheatwavesinexchangefor substantial cash payments. Using available local generation—like solarpanels, fuel cells, and diesel generators coupled with battery storage—theseinstitutionsneednotpassprivationalongtotheirinmatesandemployees(inthefirstcase)orstudents,professors,or researchers (in thesecond).All theyhave

done is change where they get their power from, and when it’s done right,nobodyshouldevennoticethechange.Asweenteredtheseconddecadeofthetwentiethcentury, theelectricitybusinesswasafreshwithopportunities.Theseopenedwholenewdoors forcompaniesquickon theuptakewhile leaving thelesssavvytofounderinthewakeofchange.This transition happened so quickly that in 2008 the men behind the

SmartGridCitycouldnotgraspwhatwascoming.Inonecase,however,Xcelnotonlyanticipatedthisfutureofthenanosandmicrosandvehicle-to-gridstorage,buttheyactuallybuiltitandgaveitaway.This case was that of the home of Bud Peterson, then chancellor of the

UniversityofColorado,andhiswife,Val.BudandVal,who’dbeenpickedbyXcel to serve as the poster children for the SmartGridCity as a whole, had amuchmorethoroughgoing“smartgrid”madeavailabletothem—onethatinitsdetailsrevealswhatitactuallytakestotransformtheelectricalinfrastructurewehaveintotheelectricalinfrastructurewe’dprefer.ThedreaminthiscasewasnotBud andVal’s, butXcel’s,whichhad imagined and compiled (almost) all thenecessaryingredientsforarealsmartgridupgrade.Intheprocess,theyalsoverynearlygotthePetersonsoffthegrid.LikemanyBoulderresidents,thePetersonsweregivenasmartmeterandthe

broadband-over-powerlinecablingthatallowedthismetertocommunicatewiththeutility.They,andninety-nineothers,gotthesmartthermostatandsmartwallplugsthatcouldberemotelycontrolledorprogrammedviatheInternet.ForthePetersons,however, itdidn’t stop there.Xcelalso installedsolarpanelson thePetersons’ roof, gave them a hybrid electric vehicle (that’s right, their utilitygave them a car), on-site battery storage, and the more-or-less-real-timefeedback to make it all work together. They didn’t get the promised smartappliances,norwasthelinkmadebetweenrealish-timeelectricityuseprovidedby their meter and the actual price they would pay for that electricity. Theseelements were never incorporated into the Boulder grid, not even for thePetersons.Theseremain,however,criticalelementsofcontemporaryimaginingofafutureperfectgrid.Inexchangeforwhattheydidget,thePetersonsspokepubliclyandglowingly

infavoroftheproject.SaidBud,“Today,whenyougoonlinetobuyanairlineticket,youcanselectonscheduleorprice.Withthistypeofsystem,youwillbeable to select whether you would like to use renewable energy, sustainableenergy,orcoal-fired.”SaidVal,“Iprettymuchgetonmycomputer,tellmyhouseandmycarwhat

todoandthenIwalkaway.Mysolarpanelsaretalkingtomyhouse,aretalkingtomycar,aretalkingtomyhouse.It’sabeautifulsystem.”SaidXcel, “Since thePetersons started theprogram, theyhavebeenable to

produce590.7fewerpoundsofcarbon,savingenoughtomicrowave154pizzas.Multiply that by fifty thousand customers—the number currently expected toinstallthesystem—anditcanmakequiteanimpact.”NomatterhowmuchcarbonthePetersonsmighthavesavedwiththeirPrius

andpanelsandbatterypacks,itwillneverbeenoughtomicrowaveapizza—noteven one pizza—because running a microwave oven on carbon is about asfeasibleasflyinganairplanewithcoalorrunningahotwaterheateronbananas.Carbon is not a power source. I point out such factual troubles because, ingeneral,theplaceswherefactsgetwobblyhelpus,asreadersofinterviewswith“satisfiedcustomers,”understandnotsomuchwhattheyhaveandwhatitdoesbutwhat they’d like tohaveandwhat theywould like it todo.Assuch, theseinterviewscanbeveryrevealing.Bud, for example, thinks it’s valuable to be able to choose what fuels are

beingusedtopowerhisworld,andheexpectsthatthisissomethingasmartgridshouldbeabletohelphimdo.This,critically,wasoneofthemaincomplaintsthat all Boulder had about Xcel, and not just in regard to the SmartGridCityproject. They really wanted more renewable energy integrated into theirelectricity supply, while Xcel seemed wedded to the continued support of anearby coal plant. When Boulder divorced Xcel in 2014 as the result of acitywide referendum, leading to the municipalizing of all local electricalinfrastructure, themainreasongivenbyvoters for theirvoteagainst theutilitywas a lack of choice regarding generation. Whatever they thought about theSmartGridCity,whatmadethemreallyangrywas theutility’sunwillingness tointegratemorewindpower.Val,however,hasdifferentconcerns.Shewantsherhouse tomanage itself.

Shewants it tomake electricity, store it, and use it without her having to domuchmorethanpunchintohersmartphone,DISHESWASHEDBY5P.M.andMAKESURETHECARISCHARGEDBY7.The coming “Internet ofThings,” ofwhich smart phones, smart appliances,

smartmeters,andelectriccarsareallintegralparts(itiscoming,bytheway,itjust hasn’t quite arrived yet), is in many ways the continuation of anemancipationprojectthatbeganinthe1930stofreewomenfromthedrudgeryofhouseholdworkbyelectrifyingcommonappliances.Thelaundrylinebecametheelectricclothesdryer, thewashboardbecametheelectricwashingmachine,

the iceboxbecame the refrigerator, thekettleon the stove for theweeklybathbecametheelectrichotwaterheater,themanglebecametheelectriciron,andsoonandsoforth.ThepleasureValtakesinherhome’sabilityto“talk”tothevarioushousehold

machineswithoutmuch interventiononherpartpoints toward thenextstep inthisprojectofemancipation.Themachineswillmanagethemselves.Nolongerdoesawomanneedtobephysicallypresenttopressabuttonorturnadial.Thesolarpanelswillmakeelectricitywhenthencan, theywillstorethatelectricityforuseasneeded,andthestoragedevice,usuallybanksofdedicatedbatteriesor,even better, the battery in the car, will communicate with the smart meter todeterminewhen the autonomous vacuum should slide out of its docking port,when thewasher should click on, orwhen ice should bemade in the rooftopfreezer (latermelted to cool the home, thus doing awaywith air-conditioningaltogether).Moneywill be saved, since grid-provided powerwill be accessedonly when it is cheapest, and time will be saved, since Val Peterson will nolongerneedtobehometopushthebuttons.Thisshiftingofwheneverydaydevicesdotheirworkfromthetimesomebody

is home to turn them on to the time that electricity is cheapest is not justappealingtoVal;itisattheheartofwhythesmartgridisvaluabletoutilities.The reason companies would pay to outfit a house along the line of thePetersons’—and why they would dream of also including all the smartappliancesthePetersonsdidnotget—isbecausethesmartgridmakesitpossibleto shift consumption around the clock. It doesn’t reduce consumption; in fact,quite the opposite: the utilities would be pleased if everyone used moreelectricitythantheycurrentlydo.Rather,whatthesmartgriddoesischangethetimeatwhichconsumptiontakesplace.Insteadofmostofthenationvacuuming,washing anddrying laundry, cookingdinner,watchingTV, charging their car,andturninguptheirair-conditioning(orheat,dependingupontheseason)atthesame time of day, some people, like Val, will let the house decide. And itsdecisions will be based upon time-of-day tariffs that cause electricity to becheapestatnight—whenthereistheleastdemand—andmostexpensivebetweenfive and ten P.M.,when demand is highest. Val’s house is very likely to usegrid-providedelectricitymostlyatnight;it’snothappenstancethatthisisexactlywhenherutilityneedsittobeused.The “smart” grid uses computers to alleviate the abiding problem of peak

load.Italsohas thebenefitofproducingnewthings thatcustomersmightfindappealingtobuy:autonomousvacuumcleaners,programmableclotheswashers,

and learning thermostats. Following the model provided by thetelecommunicationsindustrytheutilitieswouldliketoremakeelectricityintoanew, more easily graspable commodity while remaking themselves intoprovidersofservicesandgadgets.Iftheycanmanagethisdoubletasktheywillstay alive. If they fail a great many of them will very likely die, as thetelecommunications companies Covad, Focal Communications, McLeod,Northpoint, and Winstar died during the deregulation of that industry, asWorldComdiedin2002—atthatpointthelargestbankruptcyinU.S.history.Thesuccessof thesmartgrid, therefore,hasveryrealstakes.Forutilities, it

could stay their demise. For consumers, it offers away of keeping somethinglikeabiggridandtheequalaccesstoaffordableelectricpowerthatthisenables.Smartmeters,asthedevicesthatatleastintheorymakereal-timeelectricityusecalculable,maketheconsidereduseofelectricitypossibleforthefirsttimeever.Itdoesn’tquiteworkyet,piecesaremissing,andthesoftwareistroglodytic,butwithluckandcreativediligenceitwillallcometogetherintheverynearfuture.In giving the Petersons their SmartGridHouseCarComboPack,Xcel actually

did something remarkable: they built one of the firstmainstream instances ofexactly the kind of nanogrid that we are still, a decade later, dreaming ofoperationalizingenmasse.ThePetersons,thankstotheirutilitycompany,wererendered very nearly self-sufficient.HadXcel given their other fifty thousandBouldercustomersanelectriccar,somesolarpanels,andbanksofbatteries,theywould have changed the electrical profile of the city in a radical andunprecedentedway.ThevisionofBoulderpresentedin2008,haditbeentrulybuilt,wouldhaveborne a strong and abiding resemblance to a futurePhoenix(ca.2029).Xcelwouldalsohavebankrupteditself.Thisisinpartbecauseelectriccars,solarpanels,andgiantbanksofbatteries

are expensive, and in part becausewith all of these elements installed in theirhomes,veryfewpeoplewouldhaveneededtobuytheirpowerfromtheutility.Thebiggridwouldhavebecomeabackupsystem.Andtheutility,whichstakesitslivelihoodonthecontinuedpresenceandrelevanceofthisgrid,wouldhavebeenrenderedobsolete.This, then, is exactly the problem.Theutilities don’t knowhow to upgrade

existing technology without putting themselves out of business. Nor do theyknow how to continue with the existing infrastructure without going out ofbusiness.Asacompromise,mostutilitiesinthecountryareoptingtoinstallthesmart

metersbutnottoprovideconsumerswiththerestofwhatthePetersonsgot.At

leastnotontheirdime.Asmartmeterallowsforsmartappliances,suchasanairconditioner or thermostat, that can be set in conjunction with a utility’spromotional-rate structure to encourage time-of-dayuse that smoothsout peakdemand.Italso turnsout, toalmostnobody’ssurprise, thatsmartmetersallowtheutilitytoremotelycontrolelectricityuse.Despiteallthechattertothecontrary,whenitcomestobeingtoohotortoo

cold, people tend not to act in economically rational ways. They follow aphysiological rationality instead.Thisdictates turning theair-conditioningwayupon the summer’shottestdays and theheatwayup to fightoff thewinter’sfiercest cold.With a smartmeter,many utilities can regulate these electricity-intensiveproclivitiesbeforeyou,andallyourextra-hotorextra-coldneighborscrashthegrid.The smart meter is the only part of the

SmartGridHouseCarNanoGridComboPack that is actually necessary to theutilities, because, to borrow the words of the technology journalist GlennFleishman, “shedding 5 to 10 percent of their load at peak times on demandcould reduce or eliminate turning to the expensive spot power market orpowering up dirty old power plants. Shaving that usage can have enormouslydisproportionatecostandenvironmentalsavings.”Peakloadistheutilities’nightmare;ithappensonceortwiceeveryyear,and

it’s always a scramble to make sure things don’t go disastrously awry everysingletime.This iswhyitwouldbeuseful totheutilities ifpeoplehavesmartmetersthatcanbothmonitorusageandbeusedtocontrolitintimesofsystemicstress. It is alsowhy utilities like Consolidated Edison inNewYork robocallpretty much every one in the five boroughs on particularly hot summer daysaskingresidentstoprettypleaseturndowntheirairconditionerselserisksettingoffacitywideblackout.Manypeoplerightlysuspectedfromthestartthat“smartmeter” actually meant “device for remotely controlling residential air-conditioning”evenbackwhentheofficiallinewasthatitwouldn’teverbeusedtosuchBigBrotheresqueends.

The utilities’ panic is real; it’s not aesthetic, not even greedy, and notparticularly malicious. As improbable as it might seem, it’s real structural,organizationalpanic.Most of the time customer usage is fairly predictable. Refrigerators, for

example,arealwayson,anduseabout14percentofdomesticpower.Freezersuse another 4 percent. Based on this data, the utility can bank on needing tomakeand transportacertainbaselineofpowerall the time.This isoneof theadvantagesofnuclearpowerplants.Theymaybedifficulttorampupordownquickly,butsincetheyprovide20percentofAmericanpowerwithexceptionalreliability, they are basically big machines for transforming plutonium intorefrigeration.Otherthings,suchaslights—11percentofdomesticpower,but26percentof

commercial electrical consumption—go on at a predictable point in time. Theutilitychartssunriseandsunset,openinghoursandclosinghours.Theyhaveagoodideaofwhoisgoingtoneedthelightsonwhenandwhere.Eventhoughthis isasemi-shiftingpointofdata,utilitiesadapt theirelectricalproductiontomeet demand, ramping power plants up and down at a slightly different timeeverydayassummersslipintowintersandwintersbacktosummersagain.Still other things are culturally predictable. Between five and six P.M.,

Americanstendtocomehomefromwork.Whenthishappensweuseallkindsof electrical devices weweren’t using before: big TVs,microwaves, washingmachines,andgaragedooropeners.Onaverageweopenourfridgeninetimesinthehourbeforedinner.AllofthesethingsadduptoafairlysubstantialjumpindemandfromjustafterthecloseoftheworkdayuntilabouttenP.M.,atwhichpointdemandbeginsaslowdownwardslidethatendsatfourA.M.—thehourofminimumload.Tomeet this steady bump in demand, power plants rampup everywhere in

America justbefore fiveP.M.Unfortunately, it isalsowhen thewind tends toslowdownand,atcertaintimesofyear,whenthesunstartsitssetting,makingrenewableswithoutbackupstoragetheleastusefulmeansofproducingpoweratthemostnecessarymomentoftheday.Becausewestilllackagoodsystemforstoringrenewablepower,America’seveningsarepoweredbycoal,naturalgas,andtheever-presentbaselineofnuclear.Allofthisis,again,prettypredictablefromtheutilities’pointofview.They

provideelectricity to thesamecommunityyear inandyearoutand theyknowpeople’shabits—at least inamassandcalculableway—and theycanplan forvariations in load as long as behaviors are both predictable and moderate.“Balancing” load is for themost part a dull andnondramatic business.Peopleusealittlemoreelectricity;theutilitiesproducealittlemoreelectricity.Demandisusuallywithinlimitstheutilitycanmeet.Infact,98percentofthetimethisisthecase.Theproblemisthat10percentoftheutilities’resourcesaredevotedto

theother2percentofthetime.Thefewdaysayearthatarecausingall theproblemsarethereasonutilities

likeXcel,CenterPoint,PG&E,andConEdarepayingsomuchmoneytowireuptheir service districts with smart meters. These are the days when demand isneithermodestnorpredictable.As American homes get bigger, as population shifts toward the southern

states, and as air-conditioningbecomesubiquitous in all newconstruction, thesummerpeakshavegrownsteadilygraverthanthoseinwinter.Someblamecanalso be apportioned to globalwarming: thirteen of the fifteen hottest years onrecord (since the start of record-keeping in 1880) have been since 2000,with2015 being the hottest year ever recorded. Even though summers are gettinghotter,drivingupair-conditionerusagenationwide, therehavealsobeen somespectacularcoldsnapsaswell, thepolarvortex in2014beingamong themostmemorableinrecenttimes.Alloftheseextremeweatherevents,includingentireyearsthatarehotterthantheyshouldbe,causemorecrisispointsforthegrid.Ifonly the rich kept cool, then peak demand would be just another day at theelectricity factory. But given that even Inuit in tiny villages in the CanadianArcticnowownair conditioners,wecangiveuphopingagainsthope that thesweltering masses won’t have access to the one machine that will ease theirsufferingandsoothetheirwoes.The air conditioner is here to stay. And, as Fleishman, quoted above,

succinctlypointsout:“Anywherethere’sair-conditioning,smartgridswilllikelyprosper.”Thisisnotjustbecausethesedevicesusealotofelectricity(theydo),butbecauseeverybodyuses themat thesametimeandbecausewhen it’sveryhot outside the utilities are already having a difficult time for a variety ofreasons: long-distancewheelinggoesup,spotmarketsgetexpensive,and linessagandgrowlessefficient.Addtothisthattheutilitiesareinfactrunningamuchtightershipthanever

they did. “In the need to stay competitive,” says industry expert, critic, andinnovator Massoud Amin, “many energy companies and the regional gridoperators whoworkwith them have been ‘flying’ the grid with less and lessmargin of error. Thismeans keeping costs down, not investing sufficiently innew equipment, and not building new transmission highways to free upbottlenecks.”Amin,apassionatemanwhen itcomes toquestionsofenergy infrastructure

(hesawthegood that itcandoasachild in Iran),putsnumbers toallof this:“Abouttwenty-fiveyearsago,thegenerationcapacitymargin,theabilitytomeet

peakdemand,wasbetween25and30percent—ithasnowdeclinedtolessthanhalfandiscurrently[2008]at10to15percent.”Whatthismeans(andhereI’mjusttranslating)isthattwenty-fiveyearsago,

intheearly1980s,weasanationcouldincreaseourelectricalconsumptionbyabout30percentatthedropofahat,andtheutilitieshadallthesepowerplantssitting around primed for precisely this kind of sudden increase in load. Theyfired them up, blasted some fuel in, set the crankshaft a-spinning, and theelectromagnet too, fwamp fwamp fwamp (but much faster than that at 3,600rotationsaminute)churningoutafloodofelectrons.Astheseelectronsbumpedoneintothenexttheforceoftheirserialdesireflewdownthewiresandouttothe switchyard, where its voltage was ramped way up and then shot downAmerica’selectricalsuperhighwayat60cyclespersecond.Asecondorsolateritisinyourhomehelpingyourairconditionercheerilyblowitscoolalloveryouandyours.Withsuchsystemic“shockabsorbers,”asAmincalls them,inplace,noday

wasevertoohot,nopeakloadtoopointy,forthegrid’sinfrastructuretoabsorb.Granted, there were fewer people in the United States twenty-five years ago,fewer air conditioners, and even fewer disastrously hot days. But even giventhesechanges,hadutilityinvestmentininfrastructurekeptpacewithpopulationgrowthandGDPgrowth,peak-loaddayswouldsimplynotbethesortofpanic-inducingandblackout-causingaffairsthattheyaretoday.In a way the utilities are right in paring back. Having 30 percent of one’s

power plants just sitting there 359 or so days a year, and 30 percent of thecarryingcapacityofone’slinesequallyleftunused“justincase,”iswastefulinallkindsofways.Theissuewasnotthetightnessoftheship,oreventhedesiretoshaveandshaveatthemarginofthesystem.Theproblemispeakloaditself.The phenomenon is what needs to be done away with, and without a viablemeanstostoreelectricitytheonlywaytocontrolitistocontrolthepartofthesystemthatcreatesit—us.We make peak demand with our air conditioners (and less often with our

heaters).Thisiswhytheutilitiesrobocall,whytheyareinstallingallthosesmartmeters,whytheywantcontroloverhomeair-conditioning,andwhytheypreferwe all vacuum at midnight. Each and every weird demand the utilities havemadeuponussincethe2003blackoutcomesbacktothissingleproblem:theyneed away to control peak demand.At issue is not howmuch electricitywecollectively use but when we use it. Remember Samuel Insull’s point: it iscosting theutility the sameamountofmoney tokeepall theirplantsbasically

idlebetweenelevenP.M.andsixA.M.as itwouldbecosting torun themfullbore.Theypreferthatwepaythemsomethingfortheelectricitytheyarecapableofproducingallnightlongratherthanusingnothingduringthistimeandthen,worse,askingthemtospendevenmore tobringbackuppoweronline tomakeextraelectricityatfiveP.M.whenwewantmoreofit.Until the utilities can figure out away to shift our time-of-day usage, their

“backup”plan,whicherupts intoactionwhenpeak loadappearsunpredictablyanddramaticallyonthehorizon,istwo-pronged.First,aswealreadyknow,theyfire up a massive coal-burning plant or a natural-gas combustion turbine thatisn’tused98percentofthetime.Itjustsitsthereexceptforthosesixorsevendaysayearwhenitisnotjustusedbutiscriticalandnecessarytomaintainingthe viability of the grid as a whole. The second approach, which is done inconcertwith the first, is to askhigh-power-consuming industries to scale theirconsumptionwaydown,toshutdowncompletely,ortodosomethingevenmoreshocking—totransfer their loadtodieselbackupgenerators.Onveryhotdays,or less often on very cold days, the utilities literally pay lumber mills andsmelters,prisonsandpublicschools,tostopdrawingpowerfromthegrid.Mostof these big consumers don’t have microgrids. They are 100 percent griddependent, andusing lesspowermeansmaking lifeprettyunpleasant for theirworkersandotherinhabitants.InNewYorkCity, in2010,sixty-fivedifferentfacilitieshadenrolledinone

suchprogram.ReductionsatRikersIslandalonethatsummeraccountedfor5.2megawatts pulled off the grid on the hottest days of the year, providing theDepartment of Corrections with an incentive payment of $100,000 for thesavings it incurred. It’sworth adding that it is easier to take something awayfrom prisoners and other institutionalized persons (like high school students)thanfromsuburbanites.Turningtheair-conditioningoffinaprisonorinahighschool(NewYork’sotherhighperformerin2010wasLaGuardiaHighSchool)is,astheysay,“pickingthelow-hangingfruit”offthepeak-loadtree.More expensive and more socially and technologically complex are

incentivized “opt in” programs like the one Pepco runs inWashington, D.C.These give modest cash payments to individual households, usually in theneighborhood of forty dollars a summer, in exchange for “letting the utilityautomatically control their air conditioners on the few summer days whensystemdemandishighest.”Xcel has started something similar inColorado.Their program is called the

Saver’sSwitch, and it involves a small device that resembles a beeper of old,

installedbytheutilityontheoutsideofyourhouse,justnexttothecentralair-conditioning unit. This device allows Xcel to wirelessly switch the airconditioneroffandonasneededthroughoutthesummer.Theprogramistoutedasbeing“100percentfreetoyou.”Plus,likePepco,Xcelpaysyoufortydollarsforparticipating.Forthemoment,theseareprogramscustomerscanchoose,orchoosenot,to

beapartof,andtheirrelativesuccessinplacessuchasD.C.andColoradohaveled tomore andmore utilities trying them out around the country. TheOpenSource Initiative, an organization devoted to protecting open-source software,estimated that in the summer of 2012, forty-nine utilities in twenty-five stateshad programs such as EnergyWiseRewards (the Pepco undertaking) and theSaver’s Switch, with over 5 million customers already having signed up toparticipate. Inalmosteverycase, thesmartmeter iswhatmakes thisvoluntaryceding of control over household energy use to the utility possible. It is theirprimaryweaponinsofteningpeaks.Andit’sbeguntowork.In truth, though the utilities really would like it if you decided to use less

electricityatexactlythosemomentsthatit’smostexpensiveforthemtoproduceit,buttheydon’tnecessarilytrustyoutodoso.Yourinterests(tostaycool)andtheirs(toavoidpeakload)arestructurallymostmisalignedatexactlythesesameinstants.Thesmartmeterthusfunctionsasasinglestonemeanttokilltwobirds.First,

it allows them to monitor and control for themselves your electricity use, afunctionality that has already been operationalized in many markets. Second,ideally if not yet actually, it would provide you with sufficiently accurateinformation to enable you to monitor and control your electricity use foryourself. The best-case scenario from their point of view is not, however,someone remotelyswitchingoffa forgotten lightwith their smartphonewhilerunning to work, but rather the kind of programmable intelligent home areanetwork(aso-calledHAN)liketheoneValPetersonimaginedforherself.Thehouse, or its computerizedmind, should be left tomake reasonable decisionsbaseduponyourdesires,whilealsoaligningwith theelectriccompany’smostpressingneeds.That this has not yet happened given all of the thingswe can nowdowith

computers is suspicious, though I suspect that this is indicative of a profoundmistrustofcustomersonthepartoftheutilities.HereIamwithSkiMilburn:Iam not convinced that it’s a computing or even systems complexity issue.Rather, it is entirelypossible thatwhengiven real and significant controlover

ourelectricitywe,thedemandsideofthegrid,willnotactinwaysbeneficialtotheutilities’interests.Inotherwords,onceweunderstandhowmuchelectricityweareactuallyusingandhowmuchitisactuallycostingus,what’stostopusfromdisregardingourutilityanditsproblemscompletely?Mostpeopleeitheractivelydisliketheirutility—oftenbecauseofexactlytheir

flatfootedness in the customer relations department on display in Boulder,Houston, andBakersfield—orwe feel neither onewayor another about them.Theutilitiesgenerateabill,wepayit; thereislittleroomforaffectionorcare.Why, after all, should we have to worry about the problems they’re havingmanagingtheiradmittedlyunwieldybusiness?Inmanywaystheyareasrighttodistrustusaswearetodistrustthem.If,then,in2010customershadreachedtheapexoftheirirritationwithsmart

meters, by 2014 industry insiders had begun talking about the “utility deathspiral” as if itwas inevitable.As if, once themeters had been installed, therewouldbenowayforestablishedutilitiestostopcustomersfromtakingpreciselythekindofcontroltheyhadbeenpromisedandthenusingittokilltheutilitiesbyathousandcuts.Inmanyplaces,eachsuchcutlooksratheralotlikeasolarpanel plus a battery pack as people begin to chart their own course out at theedgesofthegrid.

NOTABLEPASSINGSIn 2014 the people of Boulder voted to municipalize their electricalinfrastructure.TheysimplyboughtthewiresandalltherestfromXcelandbadetheir digging, meddling, poorly communicating, investor-owned utility good-bye. Their main complaint: the utility had not given them enough choice; inpoorly realizing their SmartGridCity, Xcel had failed to offer customersanything like real control.Mostly the people of Boulder wanted the utility toensurethatmorerenewablesandlesscoalwasbeingusedtogeneratepowerforthetown.Asecondstickingpoint,however,wasthatiftheyweregoingtosuffertime-of-dayelectricityrates,theywanted(asSkiMilburnpointedoutabove)thereal-time information necessary to make informed decisions about bothelectricityuseanditscost.IntheendthepeopleofBoulder,Coloradowereessentiallyguineapigs.They

were used by their utility as part of a PR campaign that was also a researchproject intogrid reform.TheSmartGridCitywasnomoreaboutgivingpeoplesubstantive control over their electricity use than it was about giving them a

smartdishwasherorafreeelectriccar.Instead,whatBoulderresidentsgotwerehigherbills,alessreliableelectricitysystem,andeffectivelynocommunicationsavearainofglossysalvosfromtheutility.Xcelsurvived,evenastheirSmartGridCitydied,asanideaandinfact.Other

for-profitutilities, largeandsmall,havenotbeenso lucky. If, fromtheendoftheDepressionErato1988,nomajorelectriccompanyintheUnitedStatesfiledforbankruptcyprotection,thenin1988,ascompetitioncreptintothesector,theimpossiblebegantohappen:powercompaniesstartedtofail.FirstoneinNewHampshire,thenoneinElPaso,asmalloneinColorado,andanotherinMaine,hereandtherethey’dfoldandquietlygounder.ThefirstreallybigbankruptcyfilingwasPG&Ein2001(sincerestructuredandrevived).Enron’scollapse,alsoin2001,pointedtoanotherfutureforfailure.Youdon’t

have to be an electric company to go bankrupt in the electricity business. By2001 electricity was often controlled by larger energy companies—ofteninvestment consortiums—that might own a utility, some power plants, andmaybeevensomelines.Enron,with$65.5billioninassets,wasthefifth-largestbankruptcyinU.S.history;itownedthreeutilities,onlyoneofwhichwasintheUnited States (Portland General Electric), and thirty-eight power plantsworldwide,includingtenwindfarmsintheUnitedStatesandeighthydroelectricdams,allinOregon.ThecollapseoftheEnergyFuturesHoldingCorporationin2014,alesswell-

known industry bomb than Enron, continues this trend. The eighth-largestbankruptcyinU.S.history,with$40.9billioninassets,EnergyFutureswasonlytwo-thirdsthesizeofEnron,butallofitsholdingswereinasinglestate—Texas.EnergyFuturesHoldingwastheparentcompanyofNorthTexas’sretailelectricservice provider TXU Energy, which has more customers than any otherelectricity retailer in that state. Energy Futures also owned the state’s largestpower company, Luminant Generation Co., with twenty power plants acrossTexas(includinganuclearplant)andageneratingcapacityof18,300MW.AndEnergy Futures controlled Texas’s largest transmission and distributioncompany,Oncor,with7.5millioncustomers inmore than fourhundredTexascitiesandtowns,includingDallas–FortWorth.EnergyFuturesfailednotbecauseitwascrooked;itsbankruptcywasrun-of-

the-mill,utterlyunlikeEnron’s.Itmadeafewtoomanybadbusinessdecisionsovertheyears.Whatisinterestingaboutitscollapse,however,ishowevidentitbecameas thebusinesswasstrippeddownforpublicviewing thateven thingsthat look like utilities aren’t really utilities anymore.What’s really there after

deregulation, restructuring, and the incorporation of the free market is aninvestment company running a bunch of endeavors that when taken togetherwere,onceuponatime,knownbythename“utility.”Evenifthe“utilitydeathspiral”doesn’tgetthem,themarket,itseems,alreadyhas.

CHAPTER7ATaleofTwoStorms

For most people, December 1, 2007, was just a regular early-winter day—amakeacupofcoffee,commutetoworkandhomeagain,cookupsomedinner,watchalittleTV,givethekidsasnuggleandpackthemofftobedkindofday.NotsoforSylvieStrawandaboutahundredthousandofhernearestneighborsscatteredalongeighthundredmilesofPacificNorthwestcoastline.Foron thatmorning,oneoftheworststormsevertohittheNorthwestCoastrolledofftheoceanandslammedintoadozenruralcountieshoursfromanyplaceimportant.Theycreakedandshatteredunderawindthatblewat100mph,gustingattimesto140mph,untileverycommunity fromCrescentCity inCalifornia toForks,Washington,waseithercrackedorflattenedorflooded.Imagineawindsostrong thatwindowscurve inwardwith the forceofeach

gust.Imaginethosewindowsshatteringafterthefifteenthortwentiethsuchgust,anicyrainhowlingdownandin,as thenightof thefirstdaygiveswayto thesicklyyellowdawnof the second.That ishow itwas.On the secondday, thestorm continued unabated. Dormers were blown clean off houses. Treeshundredsofyearsold,somewiththegirthofgiants,wererippedupbytherootsand flung down on roadways, on people’s roofs, on power lines, and on oneanother.Forestswerelaidflat.Everyroadinandoutwasrenderedimpassable.Everycellphonetowerwasdown,everyphonelinedead.Theisolationwastotaland itwasnot fleeting.Thepowerwasout foraweek.Theroadswereclosedandphonesweredeadalmostaslong.Sylvie Straw, a then fifty-seven-year-old newly retired schoolteacher, spent

mostofthatstorm—andtheweekofdark,coldDecemberdaysthatfollowed—huddled on an old couch in the back room of the nursing home where herhusbandworked. Sylvie is no stranger to isolation.Originally from the SouthSideofChicago,shechosetoliveonthisremotespitof landat theendof theearth.Butthisstorm,thisstormwasanotherwholeorderoflonely:“Wewereallsoisolated,”sheremembers.“Itwassosurreal,likegoingbackintime;thatwasthe feelinghere in2007.Like, ‘This is theway itwasbefore.’ ”Sheputshercoffeecupdownwithabang.“AndIreallydon’tlikeit!”WhenIspokewiththeStrawsitwasApril2011,morethanfouryearssince

theGreatCoastalGale,asthelocalscallit.WearesittingintheStraws’house,a

minuscule,rain-cloud-grayVictorian,justablockfromthemouthofthemightyColumbiaRiver.Sylviehasinvitedagroupofherfriendsandneighborsovertodiscuss the stormand its aftermath.There is a retired ship captain, a therapistandhiswife—smartaswhipsandtwiceasquick—asocialworker,themanagerofthelocalchorale,anengineer,andaretiredgraphicartist,whomadehislivingdoingtechnicaldrawingsforPG&E.Hewastheguywhosejobitwastodrawthepoleswithlines,transformercanisters,andglassinsulatorsalltospec.Everyone is balancing a plate of carrot cake on their lap and sipping at a

strong,blackcupofcoffeeastheychat.Youwouldn’tknowbylookingatthem,butseatedaroundmeonanoverstuffedflowerysofaandinacoupleofmatchingarmchairsareabunchofradicals.Thesenice,middle-aged,middle-classfolksinseasonalknitweararenothere

to talk about how they rebuilt and recovered from the storm of the century—though theydid rebuildand recover.Theyarehere tosharehow theygaveuprelyingonutility-providedelectricity.Likemanyothersthenationover,SylvieStrawandsomeofherfriendshave

takentheproductionofheat,light,andhotwaterfortheirhomesbackintotheirownhands.Noone in thisgroup ismakingall their electricity all the timebythemselves.Rather,theyhaveeachcobbledtogethersomesortofhybridsystemthat works when their grid doesn’t. And, in certain cases, that also worksalongside their electric grid—in concertwith it.Theyhavenatural gasheatersandwaterheaters,propane-poweredburnersandlights,hand-crankedshortwaveradios,rotaryphones,andevenafewdieselgeneratorsbetweenthem.Theyhavemadethesechoicesbecauseofthefrequencyofweather-relatedoutagesintheirsmallpointofland,theverylastbitofsolidgroundbeforethewildexpanseofthePacific.Not all of their ilk, the “Locavolts,” to borrow a term coined by Tyrone

Cashman (whomwemetback inchapter4),havemadechoices for electricityindependence based upon their local grid’s lack of resilience in a storm. Allacross the Southwest, the Northeast, and Hawaii, people are mounting solarpanels on pretty much every south-facing thing that doesn’t move (and evensomethatdo)—houses,garages,officebuildings,parkinggarages,emptyfields,even RVs—while computer-intensive industries and electricity-reliantenterpriseslikeallofSiliconValley,manyuniversitycampuses,militarybases,prisons, and even the state ofConnecticut are buildingmicrogrids that can beisolatedfromthebiggridinmomentsofcrisis.These bigger systems rely on expert knowledge to plan, build, install, and

manage, while in the case of the distributed solar revolution, third-partyownership (which basically means that the panels are leased from a privatecompanythatinstallsthemonhomes,garages,andotherstructures)hasbecomethenorm—75percentofCalifornia’sresidentialsolarworksinthisway.In the rural Pacific Northwest, however, there is still no blueprint for the

systemsbeingcobbled intoplace.Folks there can’torder theirget-off-the-gridkitfromacatalogandassembleitonthelivingroomfloor.ThereisnoIKEAofalternativeenergysystems,andthuseachofthesolutionstheyhaveindividuallycomeupwithisdifferentinitsdetailsandparticularinitspriorities.Thatsaid,there were some pretty strong opinions about how to best preserve heat andpowerandaccesstohotcoffeewhenthegridwasdown.(Thelastofthesewasoneoftheprimeissuesunderdiscussion.Itturnsoutthatthelackofhotcoffeethatmiserableweekwasoneof thestorm’sgreatestoffenses;curiously, inmydiscussionswith Serbianswho lived through the blackoutsmade by the 1999NATObombingsofBelgrade,theyalsomostlycomplainedaboutthelackofhotcoffeeanddetailedtheremarkablycomplexandoftendangerousmeasurestheytooktoacquireit.)Thereare,accordingtoStraw,goodsystems,honorablesystems,formaking

one’sownheat,light,andpower.Therearealsobadones.Neitherbatteriesnordiesel generatorswere getting anypoints fromher.AfterSuperstormSandy, IheardverysimilarsentimentsfromstrandedNewYorkers.Generators,batteries,and even electric cars are only as robust as their supply chain, and this, in apinch, is rendered almost immediately as fragile as the system it is meant tobuoyup.Whenshewasbivouackedinthenursinghomeduringthegale,SylvieStraw

explains, she shared her couch in shifts for the duration of the stormwith themanwhosejobitwastofillthegenerator.“Hewasexhausted,”sheremembers.“Evenmoreso than therestofus.”She isexplainingsomething thateveryone(in her opinion) should already know. Diesel generators—the PacificNorthwest’sgo-tobackupsystemforpoweroutages—aren’tanymorereliableinarealemergencythanutility-providedelectricity.“Thegeneratoratthenursinghome was huge because of people on oxygen and stuff. But how to keep itfilled?Evenwithlightsonlyoninthehallwaysandthetemperatureinthewholefacilityatsixty-threedegrees,therejustwasn’tenoughgastorunit.”Straw is angry all over again in retrospect: “There was nothing left at the

docks.That’swhereyouusuallygotogetgas,atthedockswheretheboatsfillup,butthosepumps,theywereemptyafterthefirstday!”Sherememberswhen

Walter, theguyinchargeofgenerator logistics,camein towardtheendof thesecondday,exhausted,wet,andtriumphantbecausehe’dcaughtaglimpseofanoiltruck.“Hechasedthattruckdown,”shelaughed,“imaginethat.Thewindisblowing at a hundred miles an hour, branches and trees are flying aroundthroughtheair,andthere’sWalterspeedingalongtryingtocatchtheoiltruck!Ittook some fast talking on his part, that’s for sure, but in the end the oil guystoppedbyeverydayorsoandfilledupthegenerator.”Strawpausesforamoment(sheisabouttoexplainhowtheoldpeopleinthe

home are incorrigible cheats at bingo) and says: “That’s what people don’trealize. They think ‘Well, I’ve got a generator, I’m safe, I’m warm, I’ve gotlight.’Butno,whatyou’vegotisaproblem,becausewhenarealstormhitsyoudon’thaveanygasfor thatgenerator.You’re justascoldandmiserableas therestofus.”BobJohansson,herneighbor—eighty ifhe isaday—aquietwhitemaninfadedblueoveralls,chimesin:“Betteryoudoityourself.”“Bobsavedmyhide,”Strawinterjects;sheisafairmeasuremoreloquacious

thanhermoremodestneighbor.“Imean,Iwasfreezing!Weweresounpreparedforthat.AndsoI justwentovertoBob’s.Hehadheat;hehadcoffee.Andhewas showingmeall this cool stuff hehad, thathehad compiled after theSanFranciscoearthquake…thatshowerwaswhatjustblewmymind.”(SaysBob,“Itwasjustafertilizersprayerthatyoubuyatthehardwarestorewithashowerhead on it and you pump that up, get the pressure upmanually, and then thewatercomesout.”)That’sBob.Practical.Butthat’sbecausehe’dlivedthroughitbefore.Thisis

something else I learned from these rural residents—something that everyonewhosufferedthroughsimilarlylong,cold,miserabledaysinthewakeofSandynowalsoknows:onceyou’vebeen througha reallybadblackoutandseehowill-equippedthesystemistodealwithdisaster,it’stemptingtotakemattersintoyour own hands. You have to go through enough storms or earthquakes ortsunamisorwhathaveyou—oryouhavetohavegonethroughjustonethatwasbadenough—beforea“switch is flipped”:electricity isno longermagic, it’sapainintheass.TheSanFranciscoearthquakein1989didthetrickforBob,buthewasquick

ontheuptake.Lotsofpeoplelivedthrough1989andneverthoughttosomuchas buy a generator, not tomention design and build their own shower.Manymore of those same Californians lived through the deregulation-generatedblackoutsandbrownoutsin2000–2001andstilljusthunkereddownandwaitedforthegovernmentortheutilityorsomeregulatorsomewheretoputthesystem

rightagain.Notthetechcompanies,though.Google,Apple,Yahoo,Cisco(andmany others like Facebook,which didn’t exist in 2000) can’t lose power, noteven for an instant. They are companies that brook no interruption. They canneverbedown,offline,oroutofpower.So,likeBob,theyhavebuiltthemselvessomesystems,differentineachindividualcase,sothatwhenthegridgoesout,theystayon.Theyarewarmandwelllit;theyhavecoffee,evenprobablysomeshowers,andmostimportant—computingpower.Some of them are using fuel cells or solar and wind with backup battery

storage,but,liketheStraws,fewereveryyeararerelyingupondieselgenerators,andforthesamereasons.

SandydidsomethinginNewYorksimilartowhattheGreatCoastalGaledidinthePacificNorthwest. Peoplewhohadbeen considering a plug-in electric carstoppedconsideringit.Mostofthepeoplewhogotoutofthatstorm’sblastzoneafterthefactdidsobecausetheyhadaccesstoacarwithafull-enoughgastank.Theypackedupthatcaranddroveaway,southusually,tofriendsandrelativesanywherebeyondSandy’sdisastrousreach.It wasn’t just individuals who felt their priorities change with the storm’s

windsand rains. Inmanyways,Sandydid forEastCoastbusinesses andEastCoast utilities what deregulation never managed: it made them realize thatresiliencyinacrisisneedstobebuiltintothesystem,fromthegroundup.Theyrealized that discussions about infrastructure are not only discussions aboutmarketsandmoneybutalsomattersofsurvival.SandywasNewYork’sGreatGale.Itwasastormthatchangedpeople’sminds.Meteorologically speaking Sandy was a far lesser storm. It was where and

when it hit that account for its impact. Sandy, which smashed into the mid-Atlantic states onOctober 29, 2012,was a post-tropical cyclonewrapped in aNor’easter“fullycoupledtothejetstream.”Atriumvirateofforcewhosefiercewailingbreathwhippedupthewatersatexactlyhightideoverthemostdenselypopulated 56,000 square miles in the nation. If the Great Gale, with its epicreach, affected 100,000 people, Sandy, feebler by far, hit 50 million. Withmaximumsustainedwindsatabout80mph,thedamagedonebyherwindwasnothingcomparedwithwhatherwaterdid.Tidesmeasuringalmostfourteenfeethigh engulfed everything, sloshing into subway tunnels and up over coastalseawalls.

Peoplewere not just stranded, theywere immobilized. For some, the lightswereoutforamonth.As in the rural Pacific Northwest, individual homes and businesses were

batteredbythesuperstorm.Butforthemostpart,inthecrowdedEastthethingsthatweredestroyedwerethosethatmakelifeincommonbearable:thecommonelectric grid, the subway and other transit systems, access to potable water,functioningsewers.Itwasahavoc-wreckeruponinfrastructure.Justasthegaleradicalizedmild-mannered townsfolk too frustrated, cold, and isolated to everwanttogothroughitagainonthesameterms,SandyputthefearofGodmostespeciallyintothoseNewYorkersandNewJerseyiteschargedwithkeepingthelights on for everyone, the commuter trains running, the people warm, thecompanies churning out widgets, and ATMs spewing bills. Sandy madebusinessesandgovernments(state,local,municipal)reconsiderwhatittakestoproducereliabilityunderduress.Similarly, ifNorthwesternersworkedin thewakeof thegale toconniveand

cobbletogetherindividualsystemsinresponsetotheirtoo-fragileinfrastructure,Sandy has had a more profound impact on our thinking about whatinfrastructuresmeanfor living life incommon. In thatstorm’swakewebeganaskinginearnesthowthisinfrastructuremightbebuilttoworkintheaftermathofdisaster.Ifitcan’tbemadetobendinahighwindatleast,thenewthinkinggoes, perhaps we can avoid its being so inexorably broken; perhaps we canrebuilditinsuchawayastoassureitsabilitytorecoverquickly.

On both the East Coast and theWest, after both Sandy and the Great Gale,“resiliency,”ratherthan“independence,”hasbecomethewatchwordforreform.Resiliencymeans the ability to take a blow and not be bowled over by it; itmeans designing ones and structures that can bend but not break; it meansblackouts that bounce back into brightness rather than cascade across thecontinent; it means backup systems so seamlessly integrated into primarysystemsthatonedoesn’tevennoticetheswitchbetweenthem.Resiliencymeansaccepting that sometimes things do break and then imagining and engineeringwaysnotsomuchtomakethemunbreakable,astoconsiderhowtheymightbelessthoroughlybrokeninthefirstplaceandthusalsoeasiertofix.Resiliencyisadifferentwayof thinkingaboutsecuritythanisusuallytaken

aftersignificantdisasters,whentheaimistorebuildstronger,bigger,moresolid

systems (or structures) that can withstand the same stressor that felled theirpredecessors. That route, “The Hard Path” or “Infrastructural Hardening,” isequivalent to managing illegal immigration by building a border wall, orprotectingafrequentlyfloodedareabystrengtheningandexpandingadikeoraseawall.There isevenahintof thehardpath in the initialyearsof thewaronterror,whenfindingwaystogathertotalintelligenceseemedthesurestroutetovictory,regardlessofthecosttohumandignityandcivilliberties.Thehardpathisawayofbuildingsecurityintosystemsthatispremiseduponbothrigidityandmass—whethermassesofconcreteormassesofinformation.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthehardpathisalwaysafoolishone.Hardeningcan

alsomean convertingwoodenutilitypoles to cementor addingguywires andotherformsofstructuralsupport,whichmakethesepoleslesslikelytofalloverin a highwind.Higher-voltage towers are usuallymade of aluminum, aweakmetalthatisnotnecessarilythebestchoiceforareasexpectingoccasionaldirecthitsbyhurricaneforcewinds.Theseareslowlybeinghardenedasaluminumisreplacedbygalvanizedsteelorconcrete.Substationsarebeingmovedtohigherground in easily flooded areas and distribution lines are being buried in areassusceptible to severe weather but not to flooding. Sometimes something ascommonsensicalasstoringcriticalequipmentontheupperfloorsofabuildingrather than at or below ground levelmakes all the differencewhen the lowereightfeetofeverythingissoakedbyaseriousstormsurge.Allofthesepracticalandaffordablereactionstoavulnerablegridarepartofthehardpath.So,too,isthe long-standing preference among U.S. utilities, regulators, and investors toincreasethesizeandcomplexityofthegrid’smorecriticalelementsandtorelymoreassiduouslyuponfossilfuels.From the1970s through the first decadeof the2000s thehardpath, for the

grid,wasmostlyaboutmakingpowerplantsbiggerandaddinghigher-voltage,longer-distancelinestomorefirmlyinterlockregionalsystems.Itwasalsoaboutrelying on fuels thatwere both finite and hard to transport in times of stress:coal, oil, natural gas, and plutonium, as thesewere themost reliable ways tomake massive quantities of a standardized electric current. As late as 2010,despite undeniable shifts in both the form and governance of electricalinfrastructure, thehardpathwas still theprimaryway that improving theU.S.electricgridwasfiguredbyboththegovernmentandbythefor-profitutilities.It is also awayof imagining “security” that a solid subsetof theAmerican

Lefthasbeenarguingagainst since the1970s.AmoryLovins,whocoined theterm “the Soft Energy Path” in 1976 as ameans of articulating an alternative

wayofthinkingaboutnationalsecurity,arguedthatourhardenedinfrastructure,farfrommakingthingsstronger,infactincreasesinfrastructuralbrittlenessandthusalsotheeasewithwhichthesystemsthatsustainuscanbebroken.ItisinterestingtonotethatfortheLovinses(Amorywrotemostoftentogether

withhiswife,Hunter),securityisnotadomainisolatedfromtheeveryday.Forthem,energysecurity,oilsupplychains,andarobustelectricalinfrastructureareall singular and inextricable elements of national security. Without our gridalmosteveryelementofmodern life is lost.Nocomputingpower,no light,notelecommunications, no entertainment or news, no public transit, no air-conditioning, and in many places no potable or hot water. An otherwiseundamagedrefineryorpipelinewillnotoperatewithoutaccesstoelectricpower.Gasstationsdispensefuelbymeansofelectricpumps,makingsuppliesofliquidfuelforcarsandairplanesalsoatriskwhenthegridbreaks.Evenmoneythesedaysismoreelectricthanit ismaterial; therearenocashmachinesinastorm,nobankingorinvestmentsystems,nowaystomonitor,use,orcontrolcurrencynot made of paper or metal. No communications networks also meansinoperativemilitaryandpoliceforces.In 1982 the Lovinses published a report commissioned by the federal

precursor of FEMA in thewake of the previous decade’s two devastating oilembargoes.Their conclusion: “The energy that runsAmerica is brittle—easilyshatteredbyaccidentormalice.ThatfragilityfrustratestheeffortsofourArmedForcestodefendanationthatliterallycanbeturnedoffbyahandfulofpeople.Itposes,indeed,agraveandgrowingthreattonationalsecurity,life,andliberty.Thisdangercomesnotfromhostileideologybutfrommisappliedtechnology.Itisnotathreatimposedonusbyenemiesabroad.Itisathreatwehaveheedlessly—andneedlessly—imposedonourselves.”“Ourrelianceonthesedelicatelypoisedenergysystems,”theycontinued,“has

unwittinglyputatriskourwholewayoflife.”FromtheLovinses’pointofview, thepoweroutages thatoccur regularly in

the United States regardless of their cause—whether big storms or changinglegislation or computer bugs or terrorist hackers—are a natural and utterlypredictablesideeffectofhavingsuchabig,centralizedelectricalgrid.“Thesize,complexity, pattern, and control structure of these electrical machines,” theywrote,“rotatinginexactsynchronyacrosshalfacontinent,andstrungtogetherby an easily severed network of aerial arteries whose failure is instantlydisruptive…maketheminherentlyvulnerabletolarge-scalefailures.”Thegridisawesomelycomplex.Itisthelargestmachineintheworld.Tothe

Lovinses,however,thegrandeurofthiscomplexityislessimpressivethanitisfoolhardy.Ifenergysecurityisourgoal,ratherthansimplyelectrification,suchintricacyisapoorroutetothesystem’sreliability.Wehaveseenthistobetrueinthe2003EastCoastblackout.TheLovinsesmadethesamepointtwenty-fiveyearsprevious, inacarefulanalysisof the1977NewYorkCityblackout.Theconclusion could also have been reached in the wake of the 1965 Northeastblackout,causedbyanincorrectlysetrelayjustoutsideNiagara,andofthe2011blackoutintheAmericanSouthwest,whichpropagatedfromalineman’serrorinArizona,andofa2014blackoutinDetroit—hometothenation’sleastreliablemunicipalgrid—whenasinglecablefailed.There are storm-made tragedies, like those that followed from the Gale or

fromSandyorfromHurricaneIrene(whichblackedoutover40percentofthepeople living in Rhode Island, Connecticut, andMaryland in 2011), and thenthere are blackouts produced by complexity itself. The Lovinses, however,wouldarguethattheseverityandreachofanystorm’sdamageisalsolinkedtotheintricacyandcomplexityoftheelectricitysysteminitscurrentform.For the Lovinses, reconceptualizing and then rebuilding our systems-in-

common as smaller, more flexible, more self-contained, less polluting, andcloser to home was the wisest way to proceed. Soft energy technologies, theadoptionofwhichtheyconsideredtobethefirstnecessarysteptowardensuringenergy security in the United States, have five defining characteristics. First,theyrelyonrenewableenergyresources,likewindandsolar,butalsobiomass,geothermal, wave, and tidal power. Second, they are diverse and designed tofunctionwithmaximumeffectivenesswithinspecificcircumstances.Third,theyareflexibleandrelativelysimpletounderstand.Fourth,theyshouldbematchedtoend-useneedsintermsofscale,andfifth,theyshouldalsobematchedtoenduseintermsofquality.Allofthisisnestedwithinalargerculturalcommitmenttoenergyefficiencythatisbuiltintoourstructuresandourlife-waysfromtheground up. For the Lovinses, the soft energy path is not about privation butthoughtful,thoroughintegrationofenergyuseintosociallife.Thefirstmaximisfairlyself-explanatory.Renewableenergyresourcesdon’t

needriskysupplychains—likethechancearrivalofafueltruckinthemiddleofahurricane—inordertofunction.Becauseit ismoredifficult(thoughfarfromimpossible)todisrupttheirfunctioningtheyarebytheirnaturemoresecure.The second criterion needs a little more explaining. To say that an energy

systemshouldbediverseanddesignedformaximumeffectivenessinparticularcircumstancesis,essentially,the“don’tputallyoureggsinonebasket”maxim

of maintaining constant access to electricity. For the Lovinses, every power-supplysystemregardlessofitssizeshouldintegrateanumberoftechnologicallydifferent sourcesofgeneration,withdifferentweaknesses anddifferent supplychainproblems.Adieselgenerator isfineas longas it isonlypartof themix.Onalargerscalethesamecouldbesaidofanaturalgasturbineorsolararraythatisusedtobalanceawindfarm.The Lovinses would say, however, that one or two components are not

enough.Neverjustdiesel;notjustnaturalgasorsolarpluswind,butwindplusnatural gas plus battery storage plus conservation and energy efficiencymeasuresalltakenasone.Diversification,asanyinvestorknows,istheessenceof a robust portfolio. The same, they argue, is true of power production,transmission,anddistributionsystems.WhatisinterestingabouttheLovinses’formulationhereisthattheydon’tjust

imagineacookie-cutterworldinwhichthesamefourorfiveelementsmakeupthe electrical infrastructure for a Florida suburb prone to flooding, a researchlaboratory highly sensitive to small outages, a paper mill in the Rockies, amilitaryoutpostinAfghanistan,oranindividualhomeinMaine,orArkansas,orUtah.Rather,theyurgethateachsetofcircumstancesbeconsideredinlightofthemixofavailabletechnologiesthatwillbestmeetboththeriskprofileandtheexplicitneedsoftheenduserwhileincurringtheleastpossibilityoffailure.Thisleads straightforwardly to the third, fourth, and fifth elements of a resilientpowersystem:itshouldbebothflexibleandrelativelysimpletounderstand, itshouldbematchedtoend-useneedsintermsofscale,anditshouldbematchedtoenduseintermsofquality.From a study of biological systems rather than technological ones, the

Lovinses argued that an organism’s longevity consistently relies upon “localback-up, local autonomy, and a preference for small over large scale and fordiversityoverhomogeneity.”Allofthesethingsincreaseresilienceinallcases.It’sastrongargument,butoneverymuchatoddswiththeprevailingmodesofimagininganddesigningenergysystemsatthetimeofitspublication.Fromthelate1970suntilthefirstsolidsmackofwinddeliveredbySandythirty-fiveyearslater, resiliency, or the soft path, was just another radical thing that certainenthusiasts argued for with modest success (like building sustainablecommunities,eatinglocallysourcedfood,orpracticingvoluntarysimplicity).WithSandy,allofthatchanged.Resiliencyasawell-developedphilosophyof

energy security stepped out from the shadows and into the spotlight. EvenRepublican politicians from the broad swath of storm-affected states are now

advocating,and incertaincasesmandating, that thegridbebuiltandmanageddifferently.Theywantsmall,“islandable”gridsthatrelyuponamixofresourcesto become the norm rather than the exception. This shift toward support forsmaller, more local, more independent, andmore resilient “micro” grids isn’tnecessarilya totalembraceofall theLovinses’ suggestions.However, the twovisionsforamoresecureworldelectricgriddohavealotincommon,notleastofwhichistheterm“resiliency”itself.Nolongeranotionfromthefringe,itisnowthestuffofheadlines,federalreports,andpontificatingpundits.TheWhiteHouse, for example, recently releaseda report called “Economic

BenefitsofIncreasingElectricGridResiliencytoWeatherOutages.”Init,theydefinearesilientgridasoneinwhich“outageswillaffectfewercustomersforshorterperiodsoftime.”Thisistobeachievedbyamixof“hardening,advancecapabilities,[and]recovery/reconstitution”inwaysthatintegrate“high-andlow-techsolutions.”FortheExecutiveBranch,resiliencyisneitherahardpathnorasoftpath.Moreofaresultthanaprocess,gridresiliencywilllessenouroutages(and their impact) by making utility poles stronger and moving criticalequipment to higher floors, by adding synchrophasors and smart meters, bymanufacturingsubstationsonAmericansoil,andbyadaptatingthegridtomorelocalneeds.Resiliency as it has been taken up by the states, the military, and many

businesses has added another possibility to the federal laundry list for gridimprovement—apossibilitywithastartlinglyold-fashionedshape.AfterSuperstormSandy,theNortheastbegantowitnessthereturnofthetiny

grid. These new constructions bear a lot in common with Edison-era privateplants,whichgeneratedcustomizedelectricityforasingleowneron-site.UnlikeEdison’sprivateplants,thesemodernmicrogridscanconnectandunconnectasneeded to thebiggrid (which isnow increasinglyknownas the“macrogrid”).And,unlikeanysystemsincetheconsolidationofpowerin theearly twentiethcentury, these microgrids work perfectly well in “island” mode. When theydisconnectfromthebiggridduringablackout,somethingmostmicrogridscandoeasily,ifnotalwayssmoothly,theytendtostayon.Inthisway,theyfunctionaspocketsofpower,light,andheatinthemidstofgreatswathesofdistress.DuringSandy, for example, themicrogrid atSUNYStonyBrook tookover

supplyingpower to the campus,which experienced a single nighttimehour ofoutage, in comparison with the ten cold, hungry days suffered by thesurrounding area. Seven thousand studentswere housed in dorms in themaincampusduringthecrisis,andmanyothersweremovedtothemaincampusfrom

satellite campuses that had lost power. The campus police force and medicalcenterwerefullyoperationalthroughoutthedurationofthestorm.Similarly, the South Oaks Hospital on Long Island stayed on and fully

functionalduringandafterthestorm.SouthOaks,likeSUNYStonyBrookandNYU on Manhattan, has a microgrid fueled by a cogeneration plant—atechnologyformakingheatandpowerthatdatesbacktothe1880s.Fartherfromhome, “the Sendai one megawatt microgrid at Tohoku Fukushi Universityoperatedfortwodaysinislandmodewhilethesurroundingregionwaswithoutpower” after themagnitude9.0 earthquake and subsequent tsunamidevastatedJapanin2011.Ifin2015therewerethreehundredmicrogridsintheUnitedStates—currently

theworldleaderinsuchsystems—halfagainasmanywillbebuiltinthepost-Sandy years in the state of Connecticut alone. Usually smaller than 50MW,microgridsaredesignedtobealotlikethesmaller,moreflexibleinfrastructureimaginedbytheLovinsesbackinthe1970s.Themaindifferencebetweentheirvision for resiliency and contemporary constructions is computing power—adifference that makes microgrids an even more compelling solution to gridcalcificationthantheywerebefore.Amicrogridmightbe“anintegratedenergysystemnetworkconsistingofdistributedenergyresourcesandmultipleelectricalloadsand/ormeters”(thisisoneofficialdefinition),butwhatismoreimportantisthat,despitebeingprivatelyowned,theyhaveasortofrepublicanspirit.Ourgrid could just as well be an amalgamation of ten thousand microgrids as asinglesystem.Solongasmicrogridscanfunctioninteroperablywitheachother,anddosomostofthetime,theyareindistinguishablefromtheenduser’spointof view from the grid we already have. The difference, “resiliency,” rears itsredeemer’s head only in moments of crisis when a microgrid’s capacity tooperate autonomously from the big gridworks to keep the lights, pumps, andpoweron.More like smaller versions of public power than instances of private power

per se, microgrids are thus very different from what the Straws and theirneighbors were building for themselves in the wake of the Great Gale. Notnanogrids (home-sized electrical systems that allow one to effectively live offthe big grid), microgrids always have multiple sources of generation. Theseworktodiminishthefragilityoftheirsupplychain,whetherfromoilembargoesorlongspatesofunexpectedcloudcover.Theyalsobydefinitionhavemultiplecustomers—or meters—drawing, ideally, a diverse load from this little grid.Becausetheircustomerbaseandgenerationbasejustaren’tasdiverse(andcan’t

be)asthosethatpeopleandpowerthebiggrids,microgridsalsoneedeffectivemeansforstoringelectricity.Theyalsohelptobolsterthepowerstoragemarket.Fornow,thismeansthatmostmicrogridsincludelargebanksofbatteriesaswellas some way to control load on the “demand side” (so-called controllable orsheddable loads). This usually means the ability to remotely shut downnonessentialpower-consumingdeviceslikeairconditionersorclothesdryers.NewJerseyTransit,forexample,isbuildingamicrogridforitscommuterrail

network,thefirsttractioncompanytobemakingitsownpowersincethedaysofSamuelInsull.Thisisapublicinfrastructureproject,butitisalsoanelectricitysystemwithasoleowner.It’sprettybig,coveringalotofgroundandrunningalotof trains, switchyards, stations, ticketmachines,andoffices. It canevenbeused to charge cars and phones,while creating safe houses—little bastions ofheat and light—in its stations during hard weather. Despite the scope of theproject,anditsgeographicreach,it’sessentiallyaprivatizedpowernetwork.Inthisrespectitisnodifferentfromanineteenth-centurystreet-carcompany.Microgrids are their own special kind of thing—a new niche carved out

betweenasystemthatreliessolelyupon“machinesrotatinginexactsynchronyacrosshalfacontinent”andanindividualhomethatmakespoweronlyforitself.Microgridsaresharingmachines thatarenotdebilitatedby thatcapacitywhensharing means being sucked dry. They are not mechanical martyrs but self-interested,social,individuatedelectricalsystems.Thoughonecanrunamicrogridon100percentstock(nonrenewable)fuels,

mostalsoembraceamodestamountofrenewablegeneration.NYU’sispoweredby a natural-gas-fueled combined heat and power (cogeneration) plant. TheUniversityofCalifornia,SanDiegohasadded3MWofsolarand3MWfromanatural-gas-powered fuel cell to their 30MWcombined heat and power plant(also natural-gas-powered). Together, these warm and cool 450 buildings andprovidehotwater to45,000people.Thissystemalonegenerates92percentofthe campus’s energy and saves them $8 million a year in electricity bills.Microgrids, as these examplesmake clear, often sidestep, ever so slightly, thegreenenergyrevolutionhopedforbytheLovinses.Despitethis,theyalsooftenend up being somewhat “light green” by accident. Because of the need forresiliency—which is to say, many ways of making power, many ways ofdeliveringit,andmanywaysofusingit,allofwhichcanbeadjustedinapinch—almostallmicrogridsincorporatesomeformofrenewablegeneration.Despite the emphasis on multiple forms of power generation and multiple

users (or, at the very least, multiple meters), these littlish, publicish grids,

especiallythosebuilt intourbanareas,aredesignedtoremainconnectedtothebiggridmostof the time. It isonly inmomentsofduress that theydisconnectandrunontheirown.Therestofthetime,theirflexiblyproducedelectricityisavailable to all the grid’s customers, and their load can be counted upon forbalancingthebiggrid’sproductionwithconsumption.

Somemicrogrids are necessarily isolated from thebig grid all the time—mostespecially those built for isolated communities in the Canadian north or formobilecommandunitsoftheU.S.militaryintheMiddleEast.Thesegridsarealwaysanisland.Whatmakestheseremotesituationsdifferentfromthekindsofmicrogrids being built for urban subdivisons or Sandy-besotted transitcompanies is that “resiliency” in these cases is not linked to their capacity tokeep the lights on, even under the most extreme forms of stress. Rather, itmeans, more simply, that they no longer rely solely upon diesel-poweredgenerators.Thedefinitionaldiversityofmicrogridsmeans that theyoffer ruraloutpostsamorerobustandcheapermeansformakingelectricitythathavewhattheLovinseswouldcallthetailofaManx—naturallyquiteshort.Byeliminatingor significantly reducing the amountof oil needed to run an

isolated grid, of whatever size, supply chains, with all their attendantvulnerabilities, are drastically curtailed. More than 80 percent of the supplyconvoys in Afghanistan are, according to the Pew Charitable Trusts, “fortransporting fuel and they repeatedly come under attack. The demand forelectricitygenerationalsoweighsdownourfightingforcesandtherisingcostofenergyputsamajorstrainonmilitarybudgets.”ThisconcernisechoedbyPeterByck, who points out that “at three hundred thousand barrels a day theDepartmentofDefenseisoneofthebiggestusersofoil.Gettingthatfueltothefrontlinesisincrediblyexpensive—indollarsbutmoreimportantlyinblood.”Militarybasesuntilrecentlywere100percentreliantondieselgenerators.Not

just for their lights, but their computers, and their air-conditioning, while theconvoys that supply all this fuel are obvious and appealing targets. Themilitary’s most immediate goal, according to Phillip Jenkins, is to cut theamount of fuel it takes to support a marine in the field in half—from eightgallonsadaytofour.Anythingthatcanbedonetoeliminatethenecessityofdieselgenerators,and

reduce the amount of oil necessary to feed them on the field of battle,

strengthens—adds resiliency, flexibility, and mobility to—the war effort.Mobile,matte,lightweight,anddiversifiedsystemsforkeepingthelightson,thedatasafe,andthetroopscoolarecriticaltomissionsuccess.Forwhilesomeofthisfuelispouredintogastanks,alotofitisusedtomakeelectricity.Microgrids can, thus, provide grid resiliency in twoquite differentways: at

home they can help keep the lights on during severe weather or other“complexity” generated blackouts (like the East Coast blackout in 2003) andfurther afield they simplify supply chains that are inherently vulnerable todisruptionorattack.Assuch,theyaddadegreeofflextotwootherwiseoverlyfragilesystems.Ifwhatweneedisresilientandreliableelectricalinfrastructure,thenitseemsourgridswillneedtogetsmaller,theirinterconnectionswillneedtobecomemorerobust,and their fuelsourcesmorediversified.Small is,quitesuddenly,notonlybeautiful,it’salsoreliable.IftherestofAmericaisjustnowfiguringoutthatgrid-providedelectricityis

notalwaysasreliableasweneed,themilitaryhasknownthisforthebetterpartof the twenty-first century. In part this awareness has arisen because of thesupply-chainproblemmentionedaboveassociatedwith fuelinggenerators,andinpartbecausetheloadcarriedbya“dismountedwarfighter”nowrangesfrom65to95pounds,almosthalfofwhichiseitherportableelectronicdevicesorthebatteries needed to run them.On a four-daymission, both thesenumbers rise.Thepackgoesupto150pounds,andthebatteriesaloneconstituteathirdofthisweight.Itissimplyimpossibleforourtroopstobequickwithoverhundredpoundsof

gearstrappedtotheirbodies.Thisisespeciallyrelevanttodayaswaritselfhaschanged since 9/11. American soldiers now find themselves in constantconfrontationwithaquick,light,flexibleenemythattheycanengageonlyinaplodding, obvious, and therefore inherentlyvulnerableway.Theweightof thetechnologymeanttoeasevictoryonthefieldofbattlenowstructuresandlimitsourstrategicoptions,andrarelyinwaysthatmakeoursoldierssafer.In addition to being heavy, all of this technology is also wasteful and

expensive.AccordingtoTheodoreMotyka,aresearchengineerattheSavannahRiverNationalLaboratory,morethan80percentoftheenergyneededtopowerdeviceslikecomputerdisplays,infraredsights,globalpositioningsystems,nightvision,andothersensortechnologieseachsoldiercarriescomesfromdisposablebatteries.Abrigade“willconsumeasmuchas seven tonsofbatteries ina72-hourmissionatacostof$700,000.”Justliketheoilsentincoveysthroughthepass,thesebatterieshavetobeshippedinandlaterdisposedof—aprocessthat

ifnotdonecorrectlyisincrediblytoxic.Abasenowhasitslatrinestodealwith(moreonthisbelow)anditsdepletedbatteries.Mostimportant,however,isthatthetransportationofliquidfuelintoAfghanistanissodangerousthatthemilitarypreferstoflyinthousandsofpoundsofnewdisposablebatteriesthantotruckinthe gasoline that would be necessary to run the generators to rejuvenaterechargeablesalreadyinplaceontheground.According to Amory Lovins, at a typical forward operating base that was

recently examined, 95 percent of the base’s electricitywent to “air condition,inefficiently, tents sitting in a hot sandy place.” All of this electricity wasproducedbyadieselgenerator.Hecontinues:“Wearegettingpeopleblownupinfuelconvoystodeliverthefueltobewastedinthatway.Justconnectthedotsandobviouslythereissomethingwrongwiththispicture.”At home the consequences are less extreme but the situation is not much

better.Here,themostcommon,expensive,anddisruptiveformsofpoweroutagearenot thebigstorm-blownblackouts,but thoseoffiveminutesor less.Theseare rampant.Two thirdsof theannual costofoutages in theUnitedStates arecausedbythoselastinglessthanfiveminutes,becauseof“thehighfrequencyofmomentary outages relative to sustained outages.” Lots of little outages aredisastrous for any industry that needs constant access to information networksand forwhich electricitymaintains security, including electric door locks, keypads,metaldetectors,surveillancecameras,andsoon.Themilitary isboth these things: theyneed tobe able to collect andacton

informationinstantaneouslyalways.Andalmostallthemeanstheyusetocollectand control access to this information, aswell as to the spaces andmachinesusedtocontainit,relyuponelectricitytowork.Thinkofhowmanymoviesyouhaveseeninwhichalltheactionispremiseduponsomeonerenderingabunchofsurveillance equipment inoperable for less than five minutes. This is not ascenario theDepartmentofDefenseeverwants toseehappenunder itswatch,neitherathomenorinthefield.Though the issues facing military installations and personnel might at first

glance seem different—supply chains too long, batteries too heavy, existingelectricitynetworks toobrittle—inmanyways thesolutionhasbeen thesame.The military too is turning to microgrids, of various sizes and structures,dependinguponthespecificneedsofanygiveninstallation.Itisestimatedthatinthenextfiveyears,theU.S.militarywillhaveaddedtwenty-onemicrogridstothe twenty they alreadyoperate in theUnitedStates,more thandoubling theirelectricityproductionto578megawatts.Manyoftheserely,atleastinpart,on

renewable sources of power, aswell as conservation and efficiencymeasures,whicharelumpedtogetherundertheterm“demandreduction.”Forexample,thearmy’s tents in theMiddleEast are now coveredwith a thick layer of orangespray foam,which reduces the electricity needed for air-conditioning, heating,and ventilation by 40 to 75 percent. At Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, foaminsulationwasappliedtothegymnasiumtent.Thisalonereducedthenumberofgeneratorsneededtopowerthecampby40percent.But“eskimoing”thetentsinthedesert(asthisprocessiscalled)isjustthetip

oftheconservationiceberg.Relianceuponbothgeneratorsandportablebatteriesneeds to be drastically reduced. Or, as a 2007 DoD report modestly put it:“Thereisadisconnectbetweenconsumptionpracticesandstrategicoperationalgoalsrelatedtothesecurityenvironment.”Totransformthisdisconnectintoanalignmentbetweenstrategicgoals,theenvironment,andconsumptionpractices,theDepartmentofDefensehasproposedasetofadaptationsthatbearmuchincommonwith the soft path.They are aiming for amixof generation, storage,andefficiencymeasuresthatinclude,butarenotwhollyreliantupon,renewablesor,forthatmatter,diesel;thatareflexible,whichistosay,theycanbeadaptedtotheparticularneedsofabase,orareconnaissanceteam,orabrigadeonfoot;thatarewellsuitedtoenduseintermsofscaleandofpowerquality;andthatarerelativelyeasytounderstand.Thislastpointisparticularlyimportant,forasonemarine said to me in passing, during a discussion about the problem ofdeveloping solar “panels” for use in theMiddle East (they can’t be black, orshiny,ortoohot,orrigid):“Yougiveamarinetwotitaniumballsinthedesert,he’llloseoneandbreaktheother.”Ifyouaregoingtobuildamultipart,modularmicrogrid,tobeassembled,disassembled,andcaredforbysoldiers,itneedstobehardtoloseessentialbitsofitandevenhardertobreak.Thesolutionsbeingimplementedbythemilitaryarethusasurprisingblendof

technologies.Forexample, theTacticalAlternatingCurrentSystem(orTACS)includes:

•2.8–3.1kWsolararray•powermanagementcenter•batterybank•4kWACinverter•4kWbackupgenerator

Themainsourceofpowergenerationisa“clean,silent…lightweightflexible

anddurablesolararray.Excesspowerfromthesolararrayisstoredinabatterybank for nighttime and cloudy day use and backup power is supplied by ageneratorconnectedtothesystem’scontrolunit.”Itshouldbenotedthatexceptforthegeneratorusedforbackuppower,thissystemisidenticaltotheoneXcelgavethePetersonsinchapter6;theonlydifferenceisthatforthePetersons,thegrid provided backup power, whereas a generator does this for the military,isolatedasitisontheplainsofeasternAfghanistan.Insunnyareas, thisbackupgenerator isononly5 to10percentof the time.

Whenit’sovercastitneedstorun15to20percentofthetime.Regardlessthismeansthat80to85percentofdaytimeelectricityproductionissilentandemitsno easily visible plumes of black exhaust. According to the military’s owncalculations theTACSsystemalsohas10percentof thefuelandmaintenancerequirementsofadieselgeneratoralone,andexceptingthegenerator, ithasnomoving parts, which greatly reduces the possibility of losing or breaking anypiece of it. TACS supplies 6 amps of continuous power at 120 volts, “theaverage load of a typical tactical operations center” with a peak load ofcapabilityof60amps,ortentimes,theaverageload.Forlargerapplications,theDoDisalsofield-testinga“mobilepowerstation”

called,inhigh-acronymicfashion,theTHEPSor“TransportableHybridElectricPowerStation.”MuchliketheTACSthiscombines“rigidsolarpanels,awindturbine, storage batteries, and an augmenting diesel generator to guaranteecontinuous power during prolonged periods when wind or solar alone do notmeetpowerrequirements.”Buthereiswhereitgetsinteresting.“THEPS provides, on average, 5kW of power output depending on the

weatherconditions.Theinclusionofthedieselgeneratormeansthewarfighterisnot entirely freed from fuel logistics; however, even this challenge can beovercome if a system such as THEPS can obtain its diesel fuel via an in-situresource such as biomass conversion.” In other words, kitchen garbage andlatrine sludge, burbling away in a specially designed tank about the size of aboxcar, generating biogas (farts andmoonshine, ormethane and ethanol) thatcanbesiphonedoffandused to run thegeneratorand,not incidentally,powerthe cookstoves. They have called this the TGER (TacticalGarbage to EnergyRefinery)anicelyself-containeddigestionmachinethatthearmyhasspentthreeyearsand$850,000developing.Thedaythemilitarystartsusingtheirshittomakeelectricity,theworldwill

officiallyhavechanged.It’saneasysystem;wecouldbuilditintoourhousesin

aboutthesamewaywebuildaseptictank.Kitchenwasteandolddiapers(inthehomesetting),or toiletwaterandlatrinegunkin thefield,gointoareceptacleandgascomesout.Thefourtosixpoundsoftrashasoldierproducesdailycouldthus be “metabolized” rather than just burned. You do still need diesel, orbiodiesel,tomixataratioof1to9inordertouseTGER-producedgastorunanelectricgenerator,butthismeansthatwithaTHEPSplusTGERtheamountofliquidfuelthatneedstobetruckedintomakeelectricityisroughly1percentofwhat is neededwith a conventional generator-only system.This reduction hastheancillaryeffectofreducingfuelusednotonlyforelectricityproductionbutfor running vehicles as well. One estimate is that 70 percent of the gasolineactuallyusedinthefieldisfortransportingothergasolinearound.Tankertruckshavetobefueledthesameasanyothervehicle.

Allofthesesystemsarestillindevelopmentorbeingfield-tested,butmilitary-runmicrogridsonhomesoilarefarfurtheralong,inpartbecausethesecanrelyon existing grid-provided powermost of the time.Unlike a forward operatingbase,amilitaryinstallationoutsideHanover,NewJersey,orWashington,D.C.,doesn’t, for the most part, need to make its own power, compost its ownexcrement, or burn its own kitchenwaste. It benefits from existingAmericaninfrastructureslikeflushtoilets,utility-providedpower,andgarbagepickupjustasmuchasdotheaveragenonmilitarycitizensofHanoverorD.C.Thesebasesalsosuffer thesamebreakdownsof infrastructurewhenstormslikeSandytakeoutorrenderdysfunctionaloursystems-in-common.Farfromexistinginasituationof“energypoverty,”whichcharacterizesmuch

oftheworld,includingthewar-embattledportionsoftheMiddleEast,domesticbases, much like the towns and cities that surround them, occupy a space ofabundance.Thereisplentyofpowerandagoodenoughinfrastructuretoensurethat most of the time electricity gets to where it’s needed. Nor are theinfrastructural underpinnings of abundance limited to the grid. They stretchbackward, first to thepowerplants and from there to the traincars and tankertrucks that transport the coal andnatural gaswecombust tomake that power.Indeedtheystretchfurtherstill,toWestVirginiaminerspullingdownmountainstoget at that coal and tocircled semisaroundWyomingboreholesextractingthatgas.Asecure,ampleenergysystemalsoincludesgoodemploymentpoliciesthat lead to peaceful labor relations and good county, state, and federal

regulations that ensure both the affordability and the long-term stability ofextractive technologies. And it includes making sure that disasters like LoveCanalorDeepwaterHorizonareathingofthepast.Manyof theseintegratedaspectsofenergysecuritycanbecontrolledwithin

theUnitedStates inways that are impossible inwar zones.Themistake is inimagining that the knowledge and organization necessary for abundance isnaturallylinkedtoenergysecurity,orthatanationalinfrastructureforsupplyingpower toAmerican townsandbases is situated ina “stableenvironment.”WehaveseenthiswithHurricanesSandyandIreneintheNortheastandKatrinaandRita along the Gulf Coast, the Gale in the Pacific Northwest, Boston’sSnowmageddon,theCaliforniadroughtsandtheirwildfires,andtheannualspinof tornadoes that wipe out, and cause to be rebuilt year in and year out, theinfrastructuresthatsupportnorthernTexas,Oklahoma,Kansas,andNebraska.Butstormsarefarfromtheonlywaytomakeanunstableenvironmentinthe

midstofanotherwisefairlystablenation.Inadditiontotheheadline-producingmeansof smashing through infrastructuresand their supply lines, thereare thethings hardly spoken of, yet ever present. If the blackouts we remember aseventsofnational importance aremostoften storm-madeor complexity-made,therearehundredseveryyear,mostinlessurbanareasofthecountry,causedbythings that city people can’t quite imagine. Like the time in rural ClatsopCounty,Oregon,when someguygot drunk and careenedhis car off themaindriveandintothelocalsubstation(thiswasbackintheday,beforetheutilityputabigchain-link fencearound it!),knockingoutpower to the surroundingareafortwofulldays.Asimilar,moremaliciousactionwastakenagainstthesubstationthatsupplies

much of SiliconValleywith its electricitywhen, inApril 2013, a vanload ofmaskedmenwithsubmachinegunsshottheruralinstallationtobits,andnotatrandom. They targeted key bits of the substation’s mechanics, like snipersagainstinfrastructure,shotbyshotdestroyingseventeenofthesubstation’slargetransformers. These men were never caught, but their know-how and malicemadeanimpression.Thoughnobodytalksaboutit,ourphysicalinfrastructureisnot just exposed to weird weather, it’s also shockingly vulnerable to weirdpeople.In 2014 there were seventy-seven serious power outages reported in the

United States due to severe weather, another seventeen due to fuel shortages(usually the result of supply-chainproblems, like congestionon the rails), andsixty-six thatwere the resultofphysicalattack,only twoofwhichwerecyber

attacks—a new problem that follows from computerized infrastructure. Thiscountincludespurposefulaction,liketheSiliconValleysubstationsnipers,andactsofstupidity,likethedrunkensubstationsmasherortheoverlyexcitedNewYear’sreveler(intheStraws’hometown)wholoadeduphisshotgunand,atthestroke of midnight, shot it exuberantly out his window. His aim was,unfortunately, a little low, and his blast hit the transformer across the streetsquareon,causingittoexplodeinafountainofsparks.Theincidentwasatotalaccident,hewasn’t in the leastbitaimingat it.Orsothepapersreportedoncethepowerwasbackuponthatsideoftowntwodayslaterandthepressescouldrunonceagain.Thenthereistheconstantrollofoutagescausedbyplants(seechapter5)and

animals.According toone lineman inSantaCruzCountywithwhom I spoke,the main cause of residential outages was the incessant gnawing of squirrels,followedcloselyby limb loss in the county’s redwood forests.According to areporterfortheNewYorkTimeswhobecameinterestedintheactualimpactofsquirrels on grid functionality after learning that they had shut down theNASDAQ not once but twice (in 1987 and 1994), found “50 power outages”largeenoughtobeworthreportingonwere“causedbysquirrelsin24states”injust threemonthsof2013. In“twoparticularlybusydays” in June,he reports,“FifteenhundredcustomerslostpowerinMasonCity,Iowa;1,500customersinRoanoke, Va.; 5,000 customers in Clackamas County, Ore.; and 10,000customersinWichita,Kan,”allcreditedtosquirrels.“InAustin,Tex.,squirrelshavebeenblamed for300poweroutagesayear.Otherutilitycompanieshaveclaimedthatbetween7and20percentofalloutagesarecausedbysomesortofwildanimal,anda2005studybytheStateofCaliforniaestimated,hazily,thattheseincidentscostCalifornia’seconomybetween$32millionand$317milliona year. Feral cats, raccoons and birds are also nuisances. Last month, reportssurfacedinOklahomaofagreathornedowldroppingsnakesontoutilitypoles,therebycausingfrequentpoweroutages.”In2011,astretchofhigh-voltagelinesoutsideMissoula,Montana, were shorted out by the carcass of a deer freshlykilledbyajuvenilebaldeagle,whothenpickeditupandattemptedtoflyawayonly todiscover (much tohischagrin) thatadeer is tooheavy foraneagle tocarry.Down thatdeercame,accompaniedbyahailofsparks,andonceagain,thepowerwasout.More recently and more endemically, there are the copper thieves. This

problem further adds to the count of physical attacks against infrastructure.Timeshavebeentougheverywhere inAmerica,andin theWestandMidwest,

wherethespacebetweencommunitiesislargeandfilledwithquiet,thetheftofcopper grounding wire from substations has reached epidemic proportions.Sometimesthesamesubstationisstrippedofitscopperseveraltimesinamonth,the copper spirited away almost as fast as the utility can reinstall it.Transformers,whicharewoundwiththemetal,fallnolessvictimtothenimblefingers of copper thieves.Even utility lines—which Iwould be loath to use apair of bolt cutters on, for obvious reasons—are not immune to being clippedandstolenfortheircopper.Itevenhappensthatgiantspoolsofcopperwireareliftedoffthebacksofutilitytrucks.Coppertheftisaneasyandprofitablecrime,if somewhatdangerous to the thievesand increasinglycostly tocustomersandutilitiesalike.Takentogetherthestorms,therandomdrunkardswithgunsand/orill-steered

cars, the carrion from on high, the incessant gnawing of squirrels, the rangybranches of trees, and the copper thieves have conspired for decades to leavepeople like the Straws and institutions like Google and the Department ofDefenseutterlyunconvincedofthe“stability”or“security”oftheirlocalenergyenvironment.Americamaybeblessedbyaveryrealabundancecharacteristicoflife in an advanced industrializednation, but a firstworld lifestyle andenergysecurityarenot,itturnsout,exactlythesamething.Whatiscuriousaboutthenewmillenniumistheadmittedlygradualbutever

more mainstream shift away from merely being disgruntled toward doingsomethingabout it.Whenspeakingof the far left coast itmaybeeasy for thedubiousreadertoattributeabackwoodsspiritofdo-it-yourselflibertarianismtothisswitchfrombelievinginandrelyinguponthegrid(suchasitis).Thisisnot,however,whathappenedalong theGale-flattenedPacificCoast in thewakeofthe2007storm.Not that therearen’tafairnumberof“thosepeople”—theoff-the-grid types

who live in compounds rather than houses and hold radical political opinionsconsideredfarrightorfarleft.Butmostofthefolkswemighttraditionallyreferto as “off-the-grid” have been industriously producing their own power, light,andheatsincethelate1960s,mostlybytheinsecure(ifwelistentoStraw’sandtheDoD’ssoundopiniononthematter)meansofdieselgenerators,thoughonedoes find the occasional waterwheel converting the unending rain into a tidystreamofvolts.Smallwindhasneverreallycaughtonhere,andsolar,forthoseof youwho have never had cause to visit the Northwest Coast of the UnitedStates,isnotreallyanoption.ThereisareasonwhythevampiresinTwilighthavechosentoliveinForks,

Washington, and it is not the stuff of legend. The sun never shines. SylvieStraw’s small costal town 180 miles south of Forks has fewer than thirtycloudlessdaysayear.Notonlyisitthemosthumidtowninthenation(whichisanicewayof saying that it rainsall the time),but itwasonce, longago,alsovotedtheleastgoodplaceintheUnitedStatestoinstallsolarpanels.Whatthisallmeansisthatoff-the-grid,thenasnow,isnotthesamethingas

being ideologically“green.”Mostpeoplewhoproduce theirownpoweraren’tdoing itbecause theyfeeldeeply that theelectricity theyget fromthenationalgrid is environmentally pernicious, though some do. Rather, absentingthemselves from government services—and thus also, ostensibly, from thegovernment’s meddling—means producing power for themselves. Diesel getsyou off the grid and so, too, does natural gas (an infrastructural network ofanother kind). To a certain extent, wood-burning stoves also accomplish this.But none of these embody the values that a distant observermight expect thebeardedmenandunshavenwomenoftheregiontosubscribeto.TheGreatGaleof2007didnotbringabouttheawaitedLeftCoast,ecotopic,

green revolution, nor did it help to affirm a Libertarian do-it-yourself-and-bugger-the-government’s-meddlingagenda.

Itwas rather thatmild-mannered townsfolk, peoplewithno alternative stance,people who would rather the government and the utilities did their job, hadsimplyhadenough.Theybegantotaketheprojectofheatingandlightingtheirhomesintotheirownhands.When I say theworld changed inDecember 2007, Imean that nonradicals

began to take what would have been, even a year earlier, considered radicalaction. Townsfolk turned away from utility-provided electricity and investedtheir ownmoney (thesewere still the boom years) tomake something better.Theydidsonotbecauseofsomestronglyheldantiestablishmentarianiststancebutbecausetheyweretiredofbeingcoldandsoggy,becausetheydreamedofaless hardy future. They dreamedwhat in a different time and placewemighthave called “immigrant dreams” but instead of imagining that somewhere faraway across an ocean there is a better,warmer, brighter place, they looked attheirownsorry,soddenlivesandsaid:“Here.Thisplaceismyhome.AnditisinthisplacethatIwillbuildabetterlife.”Andsotheyhave.In this theStraws are not alone.Nor are theU.S.military or the newpost-

SandyNortheasttheironlycompanions.Nicepeople,middle-of-the-roadpeople,arebuildingresiliencyintothenecessaryinfrastructuresofdailylife,notbecausetheyareopposedtogrid-providedelectricityonideologicalgroundsbutsimplybecause they are sick of its not working well enough to meet even the mostmodestexpectations.BythetimeSandyhitthegreaterNewYorkMetropolitanarea in 2012, the spirit of a bottom-up resiliency was already thick in thenation’sair,evenifontheEastCoast theydidn’tknowityet.All theyneededwastheirownstormtohelpthemturn,fasterthanonemightimagine,awayfrompreviousmodelsofhardeninginfrastructuretowardmorecontemporaryplansforaddingresiliencytoit.Even though the everyday actions of average people tend to get the least

fanfareandtheleastpublicexposure,inthecaseofourgridthesearepreciselythe activities that have set the tone for the revolution this infrastructure iscurrentlyundergoingatitsedges.Thisisnotarevolutioninoppositiontocurrentstructuresofpower,butratherarevolutionthatmovesinconcertwiththem.Thegreat benefit of microgrids, whether one is Google or Fort Carson or SylvieStraw’s neighbor Bob, is that they work for people and institutions that arehappytousegrid-providedelectricitywhenit istherewhileprovidingthemanoption for when it’s not; the responsibility for staying warm, well lit, andconnectedfallstothem.Bobisjustoneman,notbigenoughorwealthyenoughtohaveamicrogrid,noteventhescaled-downversionsuitedforonehouse—ananogrid. Bob lives in amodest apartment, he has a natural-gas-fueled heaterand water heater. A propane-fueled stove (for coffee) and that shower. TheStraws havemuch the same setup, though they have included a rotary phone,which doesn’t need electricity to function, and propane lights. Many of theirfriends,theoneswhocaremoreaboutelectricityandcomputingpowerandlessaboutthetemperatureoftheircoffeeandhome,haveoptedfordieselgenerators.NoonehasyetconspiredwiththeirneighborstobuildaTACS-stylesystemfortheblock.Andthecityforbidssmallwind,fornow.These activities, the tinkering as much as more formal constructions, are

collectively known as grid edge, a term that encompasses everything fromhookingupageneratortoahouseoraddingsomesolarpanelstothegaragerooforusinga50-MWacronymicallynamedS.P.I.D.E.R.S.microgridforyourbase,to building a wind farm, a substation, and private lines into your corporateheadquarters. It is here, at the thick black border between being on-grid (andthusreliantuponaninfrastructurethatbelongedsolelytotheelectriccompany)andbeingoff-grid(andthushavingnopower,asmyownfatherdidduringthe

1970s), that alternative visions and structures for power production are takingroot.It ishere,at thegrid’sedge, thatmicrogridsblossomandgrow.It isherethatunstableenvironmentsarereworkedintostableonesandthatbrittleisbeingremade in the idiom of resiliency. In the case of the military, this meansstandardizedelectricpowerregardlessofthecircumstances.FortheNewJerseyTransit Corporation it means keeping things and people moving even in thewakeofanepochal storm.Forpeople like theStraws itmeanshotcoffee,hotwater, light, andaphonewithoutworrying ifelectricitymakes this light,heat,andcoffeeorifit’sachievedbyothermeans.Thus have Sylvie Straw, retired Brigadier General Anderson (champion of

spray foam), Amory andHunter Lovins, the New Jersey Transit Corporation,andGoogleallarrivedonthesamepage.Withverylittlefanfare,theyhaveallstoppedexpectingthestateandtheutilitiestodotheirjobwhollybythemselves.Takingmattersintotheirownhands,theybegan—onebyone,familybyfamily,companybycompany,institutionbyinstitution—tofigureouthowtostaywarmanddryandwelllit,andhowtokeeptheircomputersrunningsteadyandcool,whenthenextstormhits,orthenextwaveofTalibanmountainfightershits,orthe next complexity-generated blackout hits. They want to be able to do thiswithout having to rely upon the big grid, which has at long last become toorickety and fickle a system for the constant production and distribution ofelectricity.

SylvieStraw toldme, ina follow-upconversation inJanuary2015,abouthowsheandherhusband (bothnownearing seventy)had justgone to aChristmaspartyatthelocalseniorcenterduring“abigwind”andhowthepowerhadgoneoutjustastheywereallsittingdowntoeat.“Itdidn’tmatter though,”shesaid,because thedinnerhadbeencateredand

“theywereusingthatSternostuff”tokeepthefoodwarm.Sotheyhadagoodhot meal with the rest of the local aging folks. Even the raffle was run bycandlelight. The Straws won a twenty-five-dollar gift certificate to a localFinnish-themedstore.“Daniel,”shetoldme,speakingofherhusband,“alwayswinsatraffles.”Itwasthefifthoutagealreadythatwinter,whichwasonlytwomonthsold.Despitetheirindividualeffortstobuildenergysecurityintotheirhomelives,

the Straws are still, in 2015, living their lives at the far edge of the grid’s

capacitytoprovidereliableelectricpower.They’dbethefirstpeopletocheeramicrogridfortheirtown,butuntilthattime,theywillsufferwhattheircommoninfrastructure fails to providewhile nestingmore or less comfortably inwhattheirindividualeffortshaveaccomplished.

CHAPTER8InSearchoftheHolyGrail

Toward the end of 2014 Lockheed Martin’s super-secret research anddevelopmentwing“SkunkWorks”madeasurprisingannouncement.Evenmoresurprisingwasthebrouhahawithwhichitwasgreetedinenergycirclesandevensome mainstream media outlets. Their claim was to have shrunk the timehorizonforaviablefusionreactorfromthirtyyearstoten.Thismodestchangeinthetime-until-releaseofanonexistent technologywouldseemafunnythingto havemade such a big splash. To understandwhy it did, it is necessary toknow the backstory, now transformed into a running joke, about the future offusion.For decades it has been said that nuclear fusion is thirty years away. In the

1950swecouldbecertainofitsarrivalinthe1980s;bythe1970s,theyear2000wasthepromisedtime;in2010itseemedthatthekinksmightbeworkedoutoftheprocessby2040.BeforeLockheedMartinstepped inandshrunkthisever-receding future down to ten years it seemed that our cars would fly, ourrefrigerators think, andnanobots swarm throughourbodies eatingour cancersbeforenuclearfusionwouldeverpowerourworld.Despite the retreating horizon of its success, fusion has, at least since the

1950s, been the promised end point of our energywoes.As a “clean” energysource,fusionproducesnoradiation,itusesaneutralisotopefoundinwaterasitsfuel,andthereactorthatproducesitcan’tmeltdown.Withfusionwewouldhavealimitlesssourceofnonpollutingpower.IfLockheedMartinwinstheracetowardafusion-poweredfuturewewillevengetasmallishreactor thatcanbeboth mass-produced and strategically deployed. Imagine the tiny town ofAnaktuvukPass,Alaska,withafusion-poweredmicrogrid.Nosupplychain,nopollution,totalenergy,totalenergysecurity.Theproblemisthatittakesaboutasmuchelectricitytorunafusionreactorasthatreactorproduces.Itisazero-net-energy machine; the power that goes in equals the power it spits out.Nevertheless, foroverhalfacentury, fusionhasbeen theelectricity industry’sholygrail:limitlesspowerfromwater.Fusionhasn’tlostallitssparkle;itstillmaintainsatinyglintofgrailness.The

Frenchhavebeenbuildingaverybigfusionreactorforthebetterpartofthelastdecade, andLockheed’sefforts tocomeupwitha smallermachinealsoprove

that fusion-fueled dreams still have the power tomotivate substantial researchand development projects. Upon reading the small print of Lockheed’sannouncementitbecomesclear,however,thatthecompany’stenyearsmightaswellbe thirty.Thepress releasewasbasicallya jobad.Lockheeddoeshaveafusionreactoronpaperandiscastingaboutfor“fusionexperts”tohelptranslatethe thing from design to prototype. And, as they search for the right guys tomaketheirsketchesintoreality,otherholygrailsriseandfallfromfavor.Soisittoday, so has it always been. What counts as the holy grail changes as ourvisions for a more perfect future are themselves transformed by present-dayconcerns.Today thegrail is lessanewway tomakepower than it is to findareallygoodwaytostoreit.Engineeringameanstoeffectivelystoreelectricityisnotanewproblem.It’s

been a priority for those involved in making, and making money off of,electricitysincetheInsulldays.Figuringoutthisproblemhasrisenuptograil-level urgency today because every dream for a cleaner energy future thatinvolvesalotofrenewablesrequiresthatwehavesomewaytoputasidethetoomuchelectricitytheyarecapableofmaking.Atpresent,ourcapacitytointegraterenewablegenerationgetscomplicatedas

weapproach15percentofpeakpower—or25percentofdailyelectricityuse.Thisdoesnotchangewiththesizeofagrid.Adieselgeneratorisabetterpowersystemthanasinglesolarpanel,unlessthatpanelcomeswithabatterypack.A500-megawatt coal-burning plant is a better power source than are 500megawattsmadebyawindfarm,unlessameansofbalancingthewindisbuiltinto the grid that that farm powers. And though we do have batteries robustenoughtobackupahomesolarsystem,forthemomentmostpeopleinstallingthesesystemsdon’tbotherwiththeexpense.Afterall,theyhavethegridtohelpthemoutwhen theirpanels fail.Scaleup the renewables and storagebecomesevenscarcer.Forthemomentwesolvethisproblembydoingthingsbackward.Ratherthan

storing excesspowerweusegeneration to “balance”generation.Every time acloudgoesbyanddiminishes solaroutput for a secondor two,weburn somefossil fuels togenerateenough little joltsofelectricity toevenout theelectronflow. Ifweuse a traditional power plant for this job, itwill operate at only 2percent of its productive capacity. These massive machines were built to beefficientonlyifrunningfullboreallthetime.Withtheintroductionandspreadof renewableswenow require somethingelse, somethingnot as staid as abigcoal-burningfactoryandnotasmercurialasawindturbine,somethingthatcan

runforalittlewhileoncall,beittwoorthreeseconds,ortwoorthreehours(butrarelytwoorthreedays).Up until now themost commonmeans for doing this has been natural-gas

turbines,whichmost largerenewable-developmentcompaniesalso invest inasthey build theirwind farms or solar fields.But nobody says this “something”needstobeanewformofelectricalgeneration,thoughifitiswe’llneedtolearnto think more symphonically. “In a symphony,” says Clay Stranger, “noinstrumentplaysallthetime,buttheensemblecontinuouslyproducesbeautifulmusic.”So too,hesuggests,mightwe learn toconductourgrid,moreartfullyandwithlessofaleadfoot.Storageatthispointisafarmorepopularsolutionandalotofpeopleareworkingonitwithsomeadmirablycreativeideasenteringthemix.There are also plenty of slightly boring but efficacious ideas floatingaround.Whatallofthemhaveincommonisagut-feltunderstandingthatawaytostoreelectricityisnecessary,ifwearetomeetthefuturewithopenarmsandanoptimist’sheart.

As improbable as it may seem, though we have been making and usingelectricityfornearly150years,thereisstillnowaytoputitasideforlateruse.Onecan’tloanacupofwattstoaneighborwhoisshortafewtobakeacake.Onecan’tfillbarrelswiththestuffandthenloadtheseontotraincarsorocean-goingtankersandshipthemacrosscontinentsoroverseas.Imagine,ifsomeofthat way-too-much wind power from the Columbia River Gorge could bepackagedupandsentbyrailorinterstatetoWestVirginiawherecoalstillfuels98percentof the localpowerplants.There it could sit in awarehouseuntil itwas needed and then this nicely aged green power could be emptied into thelocalsubstationandsentonitsway.Itcouldbeayear,orthirtyyears,later,andtheelectricitywouldbejustasfreshaswhenitwaspluckedfromtheair.Asoddas it sounds, this is precisely how oil and coal work today. It doesn’t matterwhenorwheretheywereextracted,anditdoesn’tmatterhowlongittakesforusto get around to using them.They canwait. Time, the crippling, confoundingfactorinelectricityproduction,isalmostnotafactoratallwhenthinkingabouttheotherthingsweusetofuelourworld.Mostofus,whenwe thinkaboutstorage, thinkfirstofbatteries,but though

batteries may be good for bringing electricity with you, they have not, untilrecently,beenverygoodforstoringpoweratgridscale.Atthemomentthereis

only one battery on our grid: a 22,000-square-foot, 1,300-ton nickel-cadmiumbattery that was built outside Fairbanks in 2003. This can supply 40MW ofpowerforaboutsevenminutes,thoughitismostoftenusedfortwiceaslongathalfthepower.Thoughitdoeskeepthelightsonandheatersrunningforabit,itisn’texactlyabackup-powersystemfor thegrid; it’sastopgapthatallowsthelocalutility thenecessaryquarterofanhour that it takes tofireup theirdieselgenerators. These then run the grid for the duration of the blackout. For themoment, this isboththebiggestchemicalmeansforstoringelectricityat“gridscale”andalsotheonewiththelongestduration.Therestofthemeagermeanswe do have for storing electric power for our grid are electrically drivenmechanicalprocesses thatcanbereversed toregenerateanelectriccurrentandtheseoptionsarealllimitedbytopographyratherthantechnology.Forplaceswithmountains,thereis“pumpedhydro.”It’sasortofman-made

drylakebednearanexistinghydroelectricdam.Whenthereistoomuchwater,whetherrun-offorrain,someoftheelectricitythedammakesisusedtopumpthe excess water uphill, into a second reservoir, where it sits until additionalpower is needed, then this water is allowed to flow naturally downhill againpassing through a set of turbines at the bottom to generate a “new” electriccurrent.Ninety-fivepercentoftheelectricity“stored”intheUnitedStatesisguarded

inthisway—22gigawatts’worthortheequivalentof2percentofournationalgeneratingcapacity.Pumpedhydroworksgreatinplaceswithhillsanddammedrivers.It’slessgreatintheprairie,swamp,ordesertstates.FromNevadaallthewaytoIndiana,thereareeffectivelynone.AndwheretheSouthflattensout,so,too,dothepumpedhydrostationsthinanddisappear.AcoupleofGulfstatesdohavesomethingasusefulforelectricitystorageasa

hill near an existing reservoir. Alabama and Mississippi have salt domes.Starting just north of Mobile and stretching all the way under southernMississippi are a warren of natural salt caverns long used for dumping toxicchemicalwaste. These can be just as profitably used to store compressed air.This is precisely what the CAES plant, in McIntosh, Alabama, does. Whenelectricityischeaporthereistoomuchofit,usuallyatnight,theexcessisusedto condense air and force it into these caverns. Then, during the day, whendemand is high, the air is released.As it expands, or decompresses, it spins aturbinetoregenerateanelectriccurrent.Unlikepumpedhydro,however,thisairisn’tstorableindefinitely.Compressedairisatwenty-four-houraffair.Electricityisusedto“charge”the

plant during off-peak hours, and decompressing air is used instead of coal tomake electricity during peak demand the next day. Unlike a battery—theworkingsofwhichacompressedairplantmimics—thebenefitofamechanicalratherthanachemical“charge-discharge”storagesystemisthatit’sgoodprettymuchindefinitely.TheAlabamaplanthasbeenrunningthisdiurnalcycle,dayinand day out, for twenty-five years (it was completed in 1991) with noappreciablelossinefficacy.Therearenobatteriesinexistencethatcancompetewith this, though “flow” batteries—a grail many feel is worth questing for—seem to hold the promise of almost twenty years of rechargeability. Flowbatteriesare,ifrumorsarecorrect,onlyayearortwointhefuture.Another even more recent stab at energy storage has come in the form of

concentrating solar towers. In theUnitedStateswehave twoof these,both inSouthernCalifornia,withathirdnearlycompleteinNevada.Similartopumpedhydro and compressed air, concentrating solar towers employ a battery-stylelogic.Anarrayofmirrorsissituatedinasunnyplace,usuallyadesert,withalloftheiranglesadjustedsuchthattheirindividualbeamsofsunlightaredirectedat a looming central tower filled with something rather like table salt, whichliquefiesatrightaround530degreesFahrenheit.The first twomonths after theplant is turnedon, all the forceof the sun is

neededjusttomeltthesalt;afterthatitremainsliquid,itstemperaturerisingandfallingwiththediurnalcycle.Thesun’sdaytimeheatisstoredintheliquidsaltuntil needed, and then that heat is used to boil water, which drives a normalsteamturbinetogenerateelectricity.Ifpumpedstoragecanhold“thepotentialtogenerateelectricity”indefinitely,

moltensalttowers,likecompressedairplants,workforonlyabouttwenty-fourhours.Solartroughplants,someofwhichalsohavemoltensaltstorage,aregoodforaboutsixhoursofpowerproductionafterthesunsets.Thismayseemlikeabriefperiod,butinsolar-poweredstates,sixhoursisallthatisnecessarytogeteveryonehomefromwork,fed,TV’ed,andintobed.Atthispointelectricityuseplummetsandmoltensaltbecomesalittletoocooltocontinuetodomuchgood.TherearecurrentlyeightsolartroughplantsintheUnitedStates.SixareintheSouthwest,splitunevenlybetweenCalifornia,Arizona,andNevada,andhalfofthese,includingthebigones(over250MW),havecomeonlinesince2013.That’sabout it.Grid-scale storage,anelementweneed inorder to integrate

significant variable generation into the grid and to deal with our marketproclivitiesforsellingandshippingelectricityasifitwerearegularcommodity,is limited to this: someartificial lakes, one compressed air plant, threemolten

salttowers,eightsolartroughplants,andalotofdreamsaboutbatteries.Eachofthe existing systems is a custom-designed one-off. We may be able to storeelectricityforallofsouthernAlabama,butwecan’tyetdo it for thefewsolarfacilities that make the meager 0.8 percent of that state’s power. Yet we aregoingtoneeddispatchableelectricityatagrandscaleifwearetohaveanyhopeofevenapproachingthegoalssetduringthe2015Parisclimatechangetalksandsimilar sorts national and international of conversations. These include:“Eliminate burning fuels wherever possible in favor of using electricity” and“Generate electricitywith clean power sources—such aswind and solar—andeliminate coal-and gas-fired power plants.” And we need dispatchability andprobablystoragenow,atasmallerscale,sothattheonetechnologythatpeopleactuallyseemtolove—thesolarpanels—canbeapartoftherenewable-energyrevolutionwearemoregloballyattemptingtobringtopass.Peopleliketoimaginethiswillbeabatterybutitneedn’tbe.Infact,limiting

ourimaginationinthiswayfromthestartisprobablytheworstthingwecandoas we move into the twenty-first century. As the anthropologist Akhil Guptareminds us: “We need to reimagine electricity use in the future that does notsimplyseektoextendpatternsinthepresent.”Rooftopsolarforcesourhandinthis regard. The solar revolution is alreadywell under way, and its particularfailings (namely, solar’s diurnal cycle, its minute-to-minute jitter, and itstendency tooverload thegrid at noontime) arepushingus right now toward abroader imagination of “other possible electric futures” for storage, for moreefficient design of everything from housewalls to clothes dryers, asmuch ashow,where,forwhom,andbywhomelectricitygetsmade.

HawaiiisneitherthesunniestplaceintheUnitedStatesnorthemostcloudless.Butit’ssunnyenough,anditselectricityratesarehighenough,thatsolarpowergeneratingcapacityinthestatehasdoubledeveryyearsince2005.Hawaiinowhasthesecond-highestpenetrationofrooftopsolarinthecountry(afterArizona)and the quickest payback on the investment anywhere.A homeowned rooftopsolarsysteminHawaiiwillpayforitselfinjustaboutfouryears—orfasterthanacarloan.PartofthisisbecauseHawaiiistheonlystateinthenationthatstillmakes its electricity from oil, floated over on tankers from themainland, andthushaselectric ratesmore than twice thatofanyotherstateandalmost threeandahalf timesthenationalaverage.Thisextra-expensiveelectricpower, ina

mid-ocean archipelago where most things already cost more than in thecontiguous states, is part ofwhat has convincedHawaiians to opt for rooftopsolar.Morethan12percentofthemnowhavepanelsontheirroofs.Andtheseprivately owned, rooftop-mounted solar systems on bright sunny days oftenproducemorethan100percentoftheState’selectricityneeds.

FIG5Solarproductionandelectricityconsumptionvaryoverthecourseofaday.FromnoontoaboutfiveP.M.solar, insomestates,canproducemore than theelectricityconsumedbyeveryonepluggedinto thegrid.Withoutameansofstoringorusingtheexcess,thisbountymakeslittleimpactontheneedsofutilitycustomersduringalltheotherhoursoftheday.(ReproducedwithpermissionfromtheEdisonFoundationInstitute for Electric Innovation, “Value of the Grid to DG Customers” IEE Issue Brief October 2013.http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iee/Documents/IEE_ValueofGridtoDGCustomers_Sept2013.pdf)

This “more than 100 percent” of daytime demand is the number to keep inmindwhenpeoplecitenationalstatisticsregardingsolarpowerproduction.Itistrue that nationally0.6percent of the electricityonourgrid is currentlymadefromsolar,but thisaggregatehides local truths (andworse, inmanyplaces, itdoesn’t includethepowermadebyhomeownersatallbutonlythesolarfrombig,corporatelyownedplants). Incertaindenselypopulatedsunnyplaces, likeHawaii and Phoenix and likely soon the whole of the L.A. basin, privatelyownedsolarfeedingthegridprovidesuptoand,attimes,morethanthedaytimeelectricityneedsoflocalpeople,factories,andbusinesses.Aswithwindpower(at5percentnationally)localdevelopmentsinsmallsolararemoreindicativeof

problems that still lurk on the horizon for most of America than they are of“national”realities,producedfromaggregatestatistics.Though privately owned, all the electric power made by rooftop systems,

everywhere inAmerica (includingHawaii), is fedby lawback into thepublicgrid.Thesearen’tprivatepowersystems;theyaretinypublicpowerplantsthatfunction,effectively,likeabigpowerplantinshards,itsmanymegawattsmadein 10-kilowatt packages by any private citizen willing to foot the initialinvestment.Eachroofapowerplant,notforthehouseitsitsupon,butforallofus.Theirpower feeds thegrideverybitasmuchasacentralizedcoal-burningplantorahydroelectricdam.And thesesmallproducersareusingpower fromthegridtoo,atnight,whenthereisnosun,oncloudydaysandevenminutetominute as the electricity their panels produce runs in little jagged peaks andtroughsoutofthepanelsandintoourcommonsetofwires.Hereishowitworks.Ahomeorbusinessowner,consideringtheemptyand

non-profitable spaceofher roof, calls a panel company,which comesout andwavessomethingratherlikeaniPad-on-a-stickaroundontopof thehouseandfrom this determines what portion of the roof would need to be covered inphotovoltaic cells in order to offset actual electricity use. Then they offer apackage that spreads the cost of these panels over a set period of time, in theneighborhoodof240months.Thisratepermonthisdesignedtozerooutapanelowner’s electricitybill, and it is usually aboutwhat a customerwaspaying totheirutilitytostartwith.Themaindifferenceisthatlikeamortgagethisrateisinvariableand,critically,itisn’tpaidtotheutility.Themoneyrathergoestothepanel companyor, in certaincases, to thebank.Mostoftenwhat thispackageincludesisthepanels,installationcosts,anothermeter,aDC/ACconverterbox,andmaintenance. Itcouldalso includeabigbatteryorsomesmartappliances,butforthemomentitdoesnot.Then,intheoryandoftenalsoinpractice,oncethepanelsareuptheyfeedroughlythesameamountofelectricityintothegridoverthecourseofayearthatthehouseorbusinesspullsoutofthegridoverthesameperiod.The numbersmight not cancel each other out day to day,whatwith clouds

andweakwinter sunlight, but over the long term the amount of power in andpoweroutisstructuredtobemoreorlessequal.Theelectricbill,alwaysatrickybit of documentation to understand and an impossible one to control, is thusnullified,andtheonlythingthehomeownerhastocomeupwithattheendofthemonthisaknown,mortgage-likepaymenttothepanelcompany.Asithasbeenengineeredbythepanelprovidersandtheelectriccompanythis

decision is neither one of increasing energy security nor of greening homeelectricity consumption.Rather it comes down to dollars and cents.Will it becheaper over thenext quarter of a century to have solar panels or not to havethem?Theanswer,quiteoften,isyes.Iftheangleofyourroofisgoodandtherearen’t toomany treesor tallbuildingsaround, itwill.Especiallygiven the taxcreditsandrebatesystemscurrentlyinplace.This turn toward economic rationality and away from ideological points of

argumentationforsolarhascauseda lotofpeople inAmericawhodon’t thinkmuchabouttheenvironmenttoadopthomesolarsystems.Whilethosewhodocare aboutmaking theworld a better place bymaking power differentlywerealways an easy sell. Together, the two groups have contributed to a 1,500percentjumpinsolarpanelsalessince2009,andnotjustintheSouthwestorontropicalislands.TheLiveFreeorDiestatesintheNortheastarealsoprovingtobe rapid adopters of rooftop solar despite not having anything like the sun oftheirfairer-weatherbrethren.Evenwithoutperfectconditions,residentsinNewHampshire,Vermont, andMassachusetts are betting that they can still have asmallermonthlyenergybillwith solar thanwithout.Maybenot in the twenty-teens,butcertainlyoverthelonghaul.Electricbills,afterall,haveatendencytogoup,whilethemonthlypaymentonthepanelsisguaranteednotto.Anotherpocketbook-drivencauseforthemassivejumpintheamountofsolar

in theUnitedStates in thepast fiveyears is that thepriceofverygoodpanelshasfallenbyhalf.ThisislargelyduetoincentivestoChineseproducersfortheGermanandJapanesemarkets,buttheUnitedStateshasbeenhappytogetinonthe boom times. As the price of panels goes down, paying for grid-providedelectricity becomes less and less appealing to home owners of moderate tosubstantial means, especially in places where big-grid electricity is expensive(suchasHawaii)andincivilizationalpocketswhereconsuminglocallyproducedproductsispartofthelocalculturalethos(suchasVermontorNorthCarolina).Hadmoreelectriccompaniesgottenintothesolarpanelbusinessearlier,this

switchfrompayingautilitybilltopayingapanelcompanyforelectricitymightnot have led to the dire situation faced by our grid today.Asmore andmorepeopleopt for thepanels, theelectriccompany is leftwith little tono revenuewithwhich tomaintain the grid—theway the utilities have dealt with this inHawaii, but also in Southern California and especially in Arizona, is to raiseratesonthecustomerstheystillhave.Peoplewithoutpanelsenduppayingmuchhigherutilitybillstomaintaintheinfrastructurethatthepeoplewithpanelsstilluseeveryday (as theypumpelectricity into thegrid)andeverynight (as they

draw electricity down from it). They use the system, we all do, but gridmaintenance is left on the shoulders of the remaining ratepayers. And thoughthisisn’tfair,utilityattemptstogetreasonablelineaccessfeesorstandbyfees(that allow solar panel owners to use grid-provided electricity when theirsystems fail) passed in stateswith high solar penetration have foundered. Foryearstheutilitiesusedthesesameratestructures,setatexorbitantlevels,aswellas fees of every imaginable sort—like demanding thousands of dollars just toread the applications ofwannabe solar power producers—to keep home panelowners from entering the market at all. State legislatures thus don’t trust theutilitiesnottotakeamileifgrantedaninch,andtheydenythemanyaccesstoratesorfeesthatmightbemanipulatedtoreducealternativepowergeneration.It used to be the case that the nonadopters of rooftop solarwere renters, or

peopleofsuchmodestmeansthateveniftheydidowntheirhomestheydidnothavetheresourcestobuypanels.These,thepoorestandmosttransientmembersof our population, were stuck with their utility, and so they were also stuckfootingthebillfortherestofus.This loopholewassoonclosed,however,withsolarpanel leasingprograms,

whichnowaccountfor75percentoftherooftopsolarinSouthernCaliforniaand85percent inArizonaandwithsolid inroads in theNevadaandUtahmarkets.Nowanyonewithoutamountainofdebtandwitharoofcanrentthepanelsandstillpay less than theirnormalmonthlyelectricbill.For theirpart,communityorganizationsarehelpingtofundopt-ininstallationsforapartmentdwellersandencouraging developers to build rental units with the panels already installed.Thelease,ortheloan,isthenfoldedintothecostofrentingthespace.Thetrueownerofthepanelsisthecompanyfromwhichtheyareleasedand

theycoverallinstallation,maintenance,andequipmentcostsinexchangefortheright tocollectstateandfederal renewableenergysubsidies.Theyalsoreceivepaymentsfromthecustomeroverthelifeofthelease.Everybodywins.Exceptpeoplewithbadcredit,unstablejobs,ortransientlives.Excepttheutility.Exceptthegrid.Theever-shrinkingnumberofgrid-only-electricitycustomersarerightlyirate.

Thecostofmaintainingourgridincommon,thegridweallstillusetwenty-fourhoursaday,sevendaysaweek,fifty-twoweeksayear, isnowontheirbacks.Becauserooftopsolarinstallationsdon’ttakepeopleoffthegrid,andtheyaren’ttransforming individualhomes into islandablenanogridsorneighborhoods intodiscrete, sustainable microgrids. Indeed just the opposite. Distributed solarcausestheonce“somewhere”ofelectricityproductiontostarttolookalotlike

themorefamiliar“everywhere”ofelectricityconsumption.Butwhileelectricityis increasinglymadeeverywhereandalsousedeverywherethegridstillstandsasitlonghasbetweenproductionandconsumption;itstillinterconnectsusall.Thegridasacommoninfrastructureiswhatmakesdistributedsolarpossible.

And, becausewe don’t have away to store any of the electricity these homesystemsaremaking,distributedsolarisfloodingthegridwithelectricity,atleastforpartoftheday,whilestarvingitofmoney.

All of this new activity is happening on the bit of the grid designed fordistribution—the low-voltage wires slung between homes and pole tops inresidentialneighborhoods.Ironically,thisisalsotheweakestpartofthesystem,themostlikelytogiveway,andtheleastwellkeptup.Betweenthe1950sand1980s, outages increased modestly, from two to five significant outages eachyear,comparedwith76in2007andawhopping307in2011.Almostallofthesemore recent blackouts,much like the bigEastCoast blackout of 2003, startedandpropagatedonunderfundeddistributionnetworks.Meanwhile transmission systems—those long high-voltage lines that stretch

between distant power plants where electricity was once solelymade and theurbancenterswhereitisstillmostlyused—aremuchlesspronetooutages.Thisisinpartbecauseoftheirsimplicityandtheirheight.It’sharderforatreetofallon a line 110 feet in the air. Their relative reliability is also the result ofsubstantial commitment to upkeep over the past fifteen years. Since 2001,investmentinhigh-voltagetransmissioninfrastructurehasheldsteadyatabout7percentayear,whileinvestmentinlow-voltagedistributionnetworks,includingsmartmeters,isbelowthenecessarythresholdforbasicmaintenance.Oneanalystnicelysummedupthisindustrywidecareforlong-distancewires

whenall thenewactivity,and thestressors thatcomewith it, ishappeningonlocal, tightly woven, short distance wires, saying: “A continued reliance oncentralized generation and the relative fragility of high-voltage transmissionlinesiscompletelyoutofalignmentwiththegrowingacknowledgmentamongstregulators,politicalleaders,andindustrythatgridresiliencyisnotaddressedinthisway.”ArecentspecialreportintheEconomisttookitonestepfurther.Asaresultof

theveritable explosion in rooftop solar, “thepowergrid isbecoming farmorecomplicated. It increasingly involvessendingpowerat lowvoltagesovershort

distances,usingflexiblearrangements:theoppositeofthetraditionalmodel.”The grid, in otherwords, is changing.We, the people, are changing it. The

utilities, so long the only game in town, are not keeping up. It’s not just aquestionofcorrectinvestment,it’salsoaboutthinkingontheirtoes.Theydon’t.Asaresultlighter,quickercompetitors,someofwhicharecompanies,manyofwhichare just regular folks, are runningcircles around the traditionalutilities.ThoughthesituationintheUnitedStatesisdire,inmanypartsofEurope,andinGermanymostespecially,thecrashthatexpertsfearherehasalreadyhappened.Whilewetalkabouttheutilitydeathspiral—whererenewablesruinthegridbyputting the utilities out of business—as something thatmight still be avoided,somethingthatlarge-scaleandsmall-scaleelectricitystoragemightstaveoff,inWesternEuropeithasalreadybegun.In2013Germany’stwolargestutilitieslostacollective$6billionasmanyof

thatcountry’scorporateentitiesg0toffthegridaltogether.IntheUnitedStatesweraiseelectricitypricesonpoorand transientpopulations (peoplewhodon’townhouses,mostly); inGermany,however, theyraise ratesonbusinessesandmanufactories.Thecompaniesare theonesbeingasked to foot thebill for theexpansion of renewable generation across all sectors. As a result, they havebegun to walk away from grid-provided electricity entirely. They can do thisbecauseunlikerenters,Germancompanieshavethecapitaltobuildthemselvesprivateplants.If,in2013,16percentofGermancompanieswerealreadyenergyself-sufficient,thiswas50percentmorethanthepreviousyear,andanother23percentwereactivelyinvestinginanearfuturedefection.Thisiswhatismeantbytheutilitydeathspiral:“asgridmaintenancecostsgo

upand thecapitalcostof renewableenergymovesdown,morecustomerswillbeencouragedtoleavethegrid.Inturnthatpushesgridcostsevenhigherfortheremaining customers, who then have even more incentive to become self-sufficient.”Meanwhile, utilities are stuck with a bunch of stranded assets. Those big,

expensivepowerplantstheutilitiesbuiltthroughoutthetwentiethcenturyaren’tneededmuch,ifatall,anymore.Theyarestillbeingpaidoff,however,eveniftheyarelargelyinactive.Muchlikeallthoseunfinishednuclearcoolingtowersthat dotted the American landscape in the early 1980s, big fossil fuel powerplants, in Germany as in Hawaii or Arizona, stand as a testament tomassiveinvestment in thewrongpath.TheCEOof theGermanutilityREW,whohasbeenchargedwithoverseeinghis company’s collapse, admitted that theutilityinvested too heavily in fossil fuel plants at a time when it should have been

thinkingaboutrenewables.“Igrantwehavemademistakes,”hesaid.“Wewerelate entering into the renewables market—possibly too late.” All of this, hecontinued, adds up to “the worst structural crisis in the history of energysupply.”If variable generation is bad for the grid, then distributed, renewable

generation isworse. If utilities have been slow to adapt to a customer base atlong last given amodicumof control over their bill, thengovernment actions,mostly in the form of subsidies that support ever-increasing renewablegenerationgoals,have transformedutilities intodinosaurs. In2015 theutilitiesarelumberingremnantsofatwentieth-centurywayofdoingthings.Andthoughmany are now scrambling to find new ways of generating revenue, they arehamstrung at every moment by a regulatory structure that impedes quickchangesandtrialballoons.One thing is clear: American utility companies cannot maintain the

transmissionanddistributionsystemsonourgridbychargingcustomerssolelyforhowmuchelectricitytheyindividuallyconsume.Customers,homeownersaswellas industrialconcerns,want touse lesspower,want tomakemorepower(andgetpaidforit),andwantthegridtomakethesethingspossible.Newmodesof billingwill need to be developed (and some are already in theworks) butbecause utilities don’t set their prices or develop their billing schemesthemselves,allofthisworkmustpassthrougharegulatorybureaucracy,andinsome places also through a state’s legislature. As such, easy fixes are all butimpossibletocomeby.Whatisperhapsmostsurprisingaboutallofthisis thedegree to which the conversation about solutions to the revenue problem areonly just getting started. It is as if theutilitieswokeupone chillymorning in2014andrealizedthattheirshipwasabouttobesunk.

Allofthiswouldalsobeplayingoutdifferentlyifonlytherewasawayfortheutilitiestoputsomeofthislocallymadesolarpowerandfarm-madewindpoweraside for evenings andwinters, calm and cloudy days. Finding away to storeelectricity so that it is there tobeusedwhenweneed it is at the topof everyideologue’s list.This is truewhetheronewants tosave thebiggridor replacefossil fuelsentirelywith100percent renewablegeneration;whetheronewantstochoptheexistinggridintooverlapping,interlinkingmicrogrids,orjustcreateauniverseofislandsinwhicheveryenterprisehasaprivategridandeveryhome

isanisolate.Whiledifferentvisionsofourcollectivefutureproduceaneedfordifferentkindsand scalesof storage, theyall relyuponelectric storageofoneformoranother.Asaresult,ifonecanlookbeyondthebattery,theworkbeingdoneonthisfrontisbothprodigiousandintenselyimaginative.IsawamaninStuttgartproposing“buried”hydroinplaceof“pumped”hydro

storagefortheGermans.PumpedhydroisimpracticableinGermanybecausethecitizenry like theirmountain valleys for tourist activities and dwelling places.Instead, he suggested, a great mass of earth could be perforated all the wayaround,abunchofgiantO-ringsinstalledunderit,andthenexcesselectricitybeused topumpwaterdown into theearth, raising this “plug”of landup to275feet high. Imagine, perfectly cylindrical artificial mountains rising up in themiddleoffertileGermanplains.He’ddonethemathandhewasserious.Thesepistons of bedrock would then be allowed to sink, with gravity, pushing thewateroutagainandthroughastandardturbinetocreateelectricitywhenneeded,usingessentiallythesamephysicsasregularpumpedhydrostorage.Closer tohome, there is agrandplanafoot in theWest thatwouldhookup

compressed-air storage inUtah towind farms inWyomingand then,usinganexistinghigh-voltagelinefromthemoresoutherninstallation,tosendpowertoLosAngeles—alinethatisbecomingavailablebecausethelastcoalplantitwasdesignedtoservewillberetiredin2027.Thelinewillbeserviceablebutempty;thesaltcaves,preparedandtreatedtoholdnaturalgas,willalsobeempty(theshortages of that substance proved a fleeting fear), while the fierce bluster ofwindacrossWyomingwill at long lastbeharvestable for anurbanpopulationdenseenoughtomakeuseofit.Thisprojectshimmerswiththefuture-possible.Itispracticable,likethebasaltlandplug,butfarfurtheralonginthepermittingand fundingprocess. Itwill gather itsmonies fromamixofprivate investors,governmentsubsidiesforkookybutviableideas(calledARPA-E),andstateandfederalfundssetasideforinfrastructuralupgrade.The feasibility of these kinds of big, better-than-abattery projects is not

dependent upon scientific ingenuity so much as the difficult process oftranslatingideasthroughreal-worldbureaucraticandculturalsystems,gatheringbothmoneyandsupportalong theway.All toooften the inventorsof thenextbigthingaresofocusedonthefactthattheyhavefoundthegrailthattheyforgethowharditistomaterializeandthensellit.Agreatmanypotentialsolutionstoourgrid’sproblemshavebeensketchedoutoncompanydrawingboards,allofthemcapableofradicallychanginghowwemake,use,andevenstorethepowerweneed inorder to live andprosper.Theonlyones thatmatter, however, are

thosecapableofmovingfromsketchtoprototype,fromprototypetoextant,andfromextanttoubiquitous.Itturnsoutthatthemorelandtobedisruptedandthemore visibly unusual that disruption, the harder it is tomove even a brilliantproject (like the basalt plugs) off the drawing board and into our commonlandscape.Togetfromhere,wherewehaveanimmediateproblemoftoomuchvariable

generation,tothere,wherewecanusethis“toomuch”tohelpusgetoffoffossilfuelsentirely,willinvolvealotofsmallstepsinmoreorlessthesamedirection.Andbecausechange,especiallyofthisscale,makespeoplenervous,itturnsoutthatthestoragesolutionswinningtheminuettowardthefuturearetheonesthateitherdon’t look “infrastructural” at all (like repurposed salt caverns)or thosethat at the very leastmimic the infrastructural forms of thingswe are alreadycomfortablewith,likehowpumpedhydrostoragelookslike,andis,justanotherreservoir. The closer new projects of infrastructural revolution come to morepopulousareasandthemoretheystandout,themorestringentresistanceonallfrontsbecomes.Thisinvisibility,orcapacitytodisappearintothegiven,isalsoapartofwhat

storage needs to accomplish in order to succeed, not physically so much asculturally.Andmimickingfamiliarurban“skins”seemstoholdagreatdealofpromisefortheadoptionofnewelectricity-storagetechnologies,bothlargeandsmall.Threefamiliarformsaregettingmostoftheattentionfromconsumersandthepress;thesearetheairconditioner,theofficetower,andthecar.Let us begin with the little one. Air-conditioning, as we well know, is the

grid’s true nemesis. If the gridwere a JamesBondmovie, the air conditionerwould play the villain. A subtle madness in its eye as the planetary weatherwarms and as climate-controlled spaces become increasingly normal, air-conditioning bides its time. It iswaiting for thatmomentwhenwe all, of ourownaccord,fireitupandtheneedforelectricitynowshootsthroughtheroof,thewholegridsagging,crackingundertheweightofourcollectivedemand.NotrueBondvillaincouldhopeforamorenefariousoutcome.Everywhere,andofteninefficient,air-conditioningisfinallybeingreplacedin

some places by an ingenious, if old-school, energy-storage device—an iceboxthatuseselectricityduring themiddleof thenight tomake iceand thenblowshot daytime air over that same ice during peak demand hours. Where anelectromechanicalairconditioner,thekindmostofususe,employselectricitytomovehotairoverarefrigeranttobecooledanddehumidifiedtheiceboxusesafantoblowhotoutsideairoverice.Bythismeanstheairis“conditioned,”asthe

ice melts and returns to water (ready to be refrozen the next night) and theedificetowhichtheunitisattachediskeptatacomfortabletemperatureduringeventhehottesthoursofthehottestdays.Allofthisisaccomplishedusingaboutthe same amount of daytime electricity as a ceiling fan. It’s an icebox and,effectively, also an electricity box—nighttime electricity stored in the form ofice.Ofall the recently introducedmeans for storingelectricityona small scale,

theIceBearenergystoragesystem,asitiscalled,istheonlyonethathasreallytaken off. Homeowners buy it, subdivision developers invest in it, andmanufactories,businesses,andevendatacentersmountit.Thisicebox,gracefulinthoughtiffamiliarlyclunkyinform,isawinner.Radical innovation, in wide deploy, ends here. All of the rest of the

mainstreamdreams,andthebiggestinvestmentsinrealizingthesedreamsinthetwenty-teens,comebacktothebattery,thoughitisoftenquitecleverlydisguisedasother things. If in 2010, before distributed solar really tookoff, the storagefieldwaswideopen, filledwith fantasiesofgiant flywheels;networked, smarthot water heaters; expandable hydrogen-filled balloons; and hyper-heat-absorbing ceramic tiles, the wonders of this brief early moment of graildreamingisnowradicallycircumscribed.Batterieswerenotsoverylongagoaminorpartofawide-rangingconversationaboutstorage.Theywerenoteveninthe top tier of not-very-good options because they were too unwieldy andexpensive.Thechemistryofthebestofthemwasinsanelytoxictomanufactureand to dispose of, and many depended on rare earth elements found almostexclusively in China. The limited rechargeability of early twenty-first-centurybatteries and their precursors was simply not sufficient to merit the initialinvestment.Allof thischangedwiththeriseofpracticable,affordablelithium-ion batteries, which have since 2010 taken over both the market and theimagination. A conversation about storage today is 85 percent a conversationaboutpresent-dayandfuturebatterytechnologiesand15percentaconversationabout weird ideas that somebody made work once, someplace suspect, likeAlberta.An interesting success story is a newly purchased, though not yet built,

storage facility just south of L.A., in Long Beach, California, which whencomplete will house the world’s largest electrochemical battery. Not that anycasual passerby will notice, because this megabattery is being built to lookalmostexactlylikeanofficebuilding.Partsofitwillevenfunctionlikeanofficebuilding, but for the most part it will just be thousands upon thousands of

stackedlithium-ionbatteries,capableofgeneratingupto400MWofelectricity(thoughitcanrunatthisrateforonlyfourhours).Andthoughitmightlooklikean office building to us, from the grid’s point of view it might as well be anormalgas-firedpowerstation.This project maintains one of the distinct advantages of batteries over the

otherkindsofmechanical,orevenchemical,storageon themarket:namely, itcanbescaledupordownbythemillisecond,usefulforbalancingoutthepowergenerated by solar andwind being pumped into the grid by all those rooftoppanelownersandwindfarmconglomerates.Itfails,however,onanotherfront.Likeasaltcave,orapumpedhydroreservoir,thismassiveofficetowerisnotaportablestoragedevice.It’sstuckwhereitis.Assuch,itfailstocapitalizeontheotherdistinctadvantageof thebattery.It’snot just that theycanbescaled, it’sthattheycanbemoved.Abatteryandabarrelofoilarenot, inthisregard,soverydifferent.Evenlesssowhentheyare(eachintheirownway)insertedunderthehoodofacar.Batteries, despite their ability to produce electricity on call, don’t actually

haveelectricity inside them, insteadtheyarefullofchemicals.Under therightconditionsthesechemicalscanbecoaxedintoareactionthatcauseschemistrytoproduceelectricity.Inordertowork,eachofabattery’stwo“terminals”hastobemadefromadifferentkindofmetalseparatedbyanelectrolyte.Anynumberofthingscanserveasanelectrolyte,fromsodapoporapotatotosulfuricacidoreven ceramic, though various kinds of salts and acids generally work best.Regardlessofwhichelectrolyteandwhichmetalsonechooses,abatteryworksbecausepositive ionsmoveinonedirectionthroughtheelectrolyte,effectivelypeelingoffinfinitesimalbitsofthemetalfromonepoleandstickingthemtotheother. Electrons simultaneously move in the opposite direction. AlessandroVolta,whomadethefirstbatteryin1799,usedstackedcopperandzincplatesashismetals,eachseparatedbypapersoaked inbrine(theelectrolyte).Anickel-cadmium battery uses nickel oxide hydroxide and metallic cadmium as itsterminals (metals), and potassiumhydroxide serves as its electrolyte.Andonekindoflithiumionbattery—therearemanychemistriesinplayforthistypeofbattery—uses lithiummetal andmanganesedioxide separatedby lithiumsalts.Whatisimportantisthatthewholeprocessisacircle:asionsspeedacrosstheelectrolyte, electrons travel across a conductor. Without the wire giving theelectronssomeplacetogo,theionsdon’tmovemuch,andviceversa.

FIG6Afamiliar-lookingbattery,inwhichonemetal(here,zinc)isusedtoconstructthecaseandtheother(here, graphite) runs through the core of the device. These are separated by an electrolyte and a porousspacerthroughwhichpositivelychargedionscantravelwithease.Todrawpowerfromabatteryitmustbewiredintoacircuit—itspositiveandnegativepolesconnectedbyawire—likethoseshowninFig2.(LoïcUntereiner)

This is why a battery can bemade, sit in a package for years (though notindefinitely),andstillbeusefulwhenpoppedintoyourTVremoteorhearingaidor electric car.Though itwon’twork forever; the electrolyte solutionwill gettired, and as one of the metals is slowly eaten away while the other growsheavier, thebattery lagsand thenceases toworkatall.Arechargeablebatteryreversesthedirectionofflow,usingelectricityfromanoutsidesourcetomovemost(butnotall)of the ionsandaccretionsbackto theotherside,where theywillbereadytoflowbackagainwhenconditionsdemand.Thecomponentsofabattery,bothmetallicandelectrolytic,arequiteflexible.

Different combinations of elements, however, give different results. Someproduce more, or more constant, power, some last longer, some are lighter,others rechargemoreeffectively.Everybatteryon themarket isacompromisebetween price, toxicity, reactivity, andweight. There are some very effective,very poisonous batteries, and some great not so poisonous batteries that areinsanely expensive because one element is rare, and there are some cheap

nontoxic batteries that don’t produce much power. A “revolution” in batterytechnology thus is less about inventing a newway for a battery towork thanabouttweakinganynumberofrelationshipsbetweenmetalsandelectrolytes.Lithium-ion batteries offer a particularly appealing mix of accessible and

affordablematerialswith longevity, the fast,evenreleaseofstoredpower,andlightness. Initially, lithium-ion batteries were used mostly to power smallcomputingdeviceslikesmartphones(intheearlydays,asonemightrecall,theyhadatendencytocauselaptopstoburstintoflame),butastimepassedandwegot better atmaking them, they got smaller, lighter, safer, and longer-lasting.Liketheirbrethren,lithium-ionbatteriescanbebundled,andthusalotofthemcanbeusedtostoremoreelectricitythanjustafew.Itisnowpossibletodriveasportscarorevenafancysedanthatrunsentirelyonlithium-ionbatteries.Newlyonthemarket,andnotyetinwidedeployment,thoughithasgenerated

significant buzz, is a home-sized lithium-ion battery storage system made byTeslaMotorsthatfollowsthesamebasicprinciplesasthebatterytheyputunderthehoodsoftheircars.CalledthePowerwall,itisbothapracticalandbizarrelylovelydevice.As ifsomeonewhospecialized in1950srefrigeratordesignwasaskedtopicturethefutureofelectricity,circa2015.Veryshinyandofferedinanarray of colors, the Powerwall, like Tesla’s cars, was meant to be a crowd-pleaser.Nolongerwilloff-the-gridtypesneedabasementlinedwithold-style,acid-leakyautomotivebatteriesinordertowatchTVintheevenings.ThepromiseofthePowerwallliesinitsabilitytochangethingsforthoseof

usonthegrid,intwodistinctways.First,anaffordable,long-lasting,easy-to-usehome-battery systemmight enable solar power producers to keep their excessdaytimeelectricityfornighttimeuse,ratherthanaskingthegrid,andtheutility,to deal with both their over-and underproduction. Second, the utilities areexhibitingtruehintsofinterestforusingamassofdeployed,distributedbatterysystemsasgrid-scalestorage.Vermont’sGreenMountainPowerwillbeofferingPowerwallstocustomersataveryreasonableprice(aboutfortydollarsamonth)ifthecustomeragreestosharethebattery’sstoragecapacitieswiththeutility.Itwillserveashosttobothhomemadepowerandgrid-madepower,forrainydaysandlong,darknights.

Manypeoplewhocareaboutgridreformdon’tseeelectriccarsascarssomuchasgreatbigbatteriesonwheels.Customers,whencontemplatingthepurchaseof

an electric vehicle, tend to care about its capacity tomove them speedily andreliably from one place to another. The grid guys, on the other hand, see aningenious form of storage that doesn’t rely upon the quirks of geology orclimate, that blends seamlessly into its environment, and that can bemade toworkfortinygridimbalancesaswellasbigones.Forpumpedhydrostorageyouneed hills, for molten salt storage you need some serious sun, and forcompressed-air storage you need salt caverns or similarly carved-out features.Butabatterydoesn’tneedtobeanyplaceinparticulartowork.Themobilityofbatteries, together with their scalability and relative effectiveness, has alwaysbeentheircharm.With electric car batteries, if there were enough of them and if they were

designedtobothgive toandtakefromthepowergrid(acapacitycalledV2G,for“vehicle-to-grid-enabled”)peakloadcouldbesmoothedouttoagentleriseat the workday’s end and variable generation might be balanced easily andthoroughly.Balancingsolarinparticular,whichtendstoexportjittertothegrideverytimeacloudpassesoverhead,tendstobeanenergyneutralprocess.Eveninareaswithahighpenetrationofrooftopsolaroverthecourseofadaythegridneedsaboutasmuchenergyinasitiscapableofproviding(out).Asaresult,acar’schargewillstayaboutthesame.Withcarbatteriesbackingupthegrid,wecould have more green power, fewer polluting backup power plants, and norobocallsaskingustoswitchofftheAConthesummer’shottestdays.Rooftopsolar could make all the power for desert and tropical metropolises withoutsinking the utility, overwhelming the grid, or causing the dreaded “solar duckconundrum” (more on which in a moment). These cars with their often-idlebatterypackscanbeengineeredtosupportandstabilizethegridbymakingtheirelectricchargeavailablewhenevertheyareparkedandpluggedin.Evenbetter,in only ten to fifteenyears, expert predicters now forecast,most of uswill beridingaroundincarsthatdrivethemselves.These,too,itseems,willbeelectric.Big“peakdemand”shortagesarenot,however,energyneutralprocesses. In

order toabsorb thebumpindemand thatcomesat theworkday’send,withoutfiringupanynewpowerplants,allthecars—andtherewouldneedtobealotofthem—would be drained a lot. Not all the way, obviously, because then youwouldn’tbeable todrivehome.And,withenoughcars,noonebatterywouldbearanythinglikethebruntofthedrain.ThissolutiontopeakdemandsoundsalittlelikeMarxism.Eachcar,neverexploited,givestothegridaccordingtoitsabilitywhileremainingavailabletothegridtotakefromaccordingtoitsneed.Together,allourcarskeepourcommonelectricalsystemstrong.Andthegrid,

with their help, can at long last balance itself. Upgrades, maintenance, andnecessaryinvestmentstokeepitsmartwillstillneedtobedone,butthecars,asintegrated, dispersed, deployable storage, would go a long way towardincreasingboththereliabilityandtheefficiencyoftheinfrastructureasawhole.Likeanygoodvision for amoreperfect future thisone isnotwithout solid

groundinginthefactsofthematter.Anormalcar,Dr.Gorguinpour,DirectorofTransformational Innovation to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force forAcquisitions,explains,isa“verypoorlyusedasset,”functioningformaybe3to5percentofitsusefullife.Ifyouhaveavehiclethatispluggedintothegridandprovidesenergybacktothegridwhenever it’snot inuse,“nowsuddenlyyourasset utilization is 95 to 97 percent. It’s basically not being used as either anenergyresourceoramobilityresourcewhenyouaregettingitfixed.”Better still, cars are used the least at night. The mass adoption of electric

vehicleswould thus help to provide a significant nighttime load that could bedischargedduringdaytimehourswhenthesesamevehiclesaresittinginparkinglots. Inaddition tohelpingestablishnighttime load,peakshaving,andhelpingcontrol jitter—those tiny second-to-second shifts in quantity and quality ofelectricityonthegrid—thewidespreaddeploymentofcarbatterieswouldallowustointegrateasmanyrenewablesaswewanted:thecarswouldholdtheexcessenergy these systemsmakeuntil itwasneeded, atwhichpoint thegridwouldautomaticallysuckthatpowerbackout.Thiswouldbeaboonmostespeciallyinplaceswithasignificantpenetration

of rooftop solar andwhere there also happen to be a lot of cars. Every solar-poweredcityinthedesertsuffersfromaparticularproblem—theinevitabilityofdusk.Fromthemomentthesunrises,itsraysshinedownhot,powerful,andasproductiveascanbe.Thesolarpanelsthat,fromabove,insomeplacesseemtohavepaintedthecityinglassmakeefficient,cleanelectricitybythemegawatt.Thecityruns.Alliswell.Untildusk.This moment has always been difficult for the utilities because it’s when

“everythingison.”Somepeoplearestillatworkandlotsofpeoplearealreadyhome.Nowaddtothisjumpindemandaradicalfallinsupply.Thesunisgoingdownandwith it aprecipitous fall ingeneration just asdemand is risingwithequalferocity.Thiseveningpeakismuchharderforautilitytodealwithwhenthesunispoweringmorethanabout25percentofthegrid.“For an illustration look at Hawaii,” writes the Economist. “On a typical

sunnyday the panels on consumers’ rooftopsproduce somuch electricity thatthegriddoesnotneedtobuyanypowerfromtheoilfiredgeneratorsthathave

long supplied the American State. But in the morning and the evening thosesame consumers turn to the grid for extra electricity. The result is a demandprofilethatlookslikeaduck’sback,risingatthetailandneckanddippinginthemiddle.”ItisnolongertheowlofMinervathatfliesatdusk,butthesolarduckwhich

rearsitsuglyheadasthesunfadesawayintodarkness.Tosolvethisnewkindofcurve,theutilitydoesn’tneedtwenty-fouroreven

twelvehoursofstoragecapacity; theyneedaboutsixhours’worthtoget themfrom four P.M. to ten P.M., when people start slowly trickling off to bed.SouthernCaliforniaEdison ishedgingeven this six-hourstoragewindowabitwithitsfourhoursofbattery-in-an-office-towerstorage.Mostnewsolartroughplantsalsooftenincludeamodestlevelofmoltensaltstorage,aboutsixhours’worth,preciselybecausethisisallyouneedtolopthetailofftheduck.The cars, however,would equally calm this curve. Forty-one percent of the

electricitywe use in theUnited States is used by buildings. If an electric car,which is essentially a big battery on wheels, were tomake itself available towhatever building it happens to be adjacent to, be it a home or an officebuilding, the owners of this structure would not need to invest in their ownstorage,norwouldtheownersofthegrid.Demandshiftswithpeople,sothatasindividualsleaveworkanddrivehometheytaketheirelectricityboxwiththem.Theyarenowusingnopowerintheoffice(becausetheyaren’tthereanymore)butlotsofpoweratthehouse.That’sfine,becausethecarispluggedinexactlywhere it is needed. As the battery runs dry in the late evening, householddemand is also dropping as everyone is turning off their machines beforetrundling off to bed. Simultaneously electricity prices are dropping at whichpointthecarbeginstochargeitselfbackupforthemorningcommute.Noticethatthoughelectricityinthisscenarioisstillpublic,storagehasbeen

thoroughlyprivatized.Theutilitiesdon’town thestorage.Becauseyouboughtthecar,youdo.Electriccars thusalsohelpsolvetheproblemofwhowillpayfor stabilizing our grid. People who own cars will. In the United States theproposed means for dealing with this oddity of privately owned, modularinfrastructureisthe“moneyfornothing”scheme.Utilitieswillcredityoutime-of-dayratesforthewattagetheysuckfromyourcarduringthedayandyouwillpay,theoreticallylower,time-of-dayrateswhenyourechargeit,usuallyatnightorduringmomentsofovergenerationofrenewablesatwhatevertimeofday.Inthisway,owninganelectriccarbecomeslikeowningalittlemoneyfactory.Allyouhave to do ismake sure it’s alwaysplugged in and the algorithmsdo the

rest.Attheendofthemonthyougetacheckinthemail.Thisadmittedlyhasacertainappeal.It’salsolargelythesamesystemthatledtotherampantadoptionofrooftopsolar.Youmakeelectricityandeitherpaynothingorgetatinycheckeverysooftenfromtheutilitythatisbuyingitfromyou.It’sagoodinvestment.And,uptillnow,itdoesn’twork.Denmark,whichcurrentlyhas53.4percentrenewableenergyonitsgrid,with

a goal of 100 percentwind power by 2050, is also looking hard for a storagesolution. Initially they bet heavily on the cars. The incentives were different,thoughequallywellmatchedtotheculturalandeconomicparticularitiesof theplace. First, if you bought an electric car you paid no taxes on the purchase.Normally, the Danes tax a new car at 100 percent, so buying electric wasessentiallythesameasgettingyournewcarathalfprice.Butpeoplestillbalkedattheprospect.Theycomplained,wisely,thatifthebatteryisbeingdrainedandfilled all day, every day, it isn’t likely to last very long. In response the stateinstituted a battery swap system, so that whenever a car battery ceasedperforminguptospec,anyDanishelectriccarownercouldhavetheiroldbatterypulledoutandanewonedroppedinforfreeatafillingstation.Inthiswaythebatteryisgoodforthelifeofthecar.LiketheAmericanscheme,thiswasalsoagoodideaanditalsodidn’twork,

in part because neither the cars nor the batteries were good enough yet.AccordingtotheDanishclimateminister(yes,theyhaveoneofthese),thecarsthemselves arenot ready: “Weneed longer range and lowerpricesbefore thisbecomesagoodoption,”hesaid.“Technologyneeds tosaveus.”Evenathalftheprice, theDanesdidn’twant to buy a crappy carwith a short range and alongcharge time—imagine,youstopon the interstate to refillyourcarbatteryandittakessixhours.And,givenhowtinyDenmarkis,whatassuranceistherethatwhentheircarbatterydiesinneighboringGermanyorSweden,gasstationstherewillbeobliged toperform the required swapasquicklyandat the same(zero) cost? Technologymay be one problem, but so are borders beyond theboundsofwhichdifferentlawsapplyanddifferentincentivesholdsway.Thisisas true of California as it is ofDenmark. People don’twant a car that forcesthem to stick close to home, no matter how good that car might be for theenvironment,thegrid,ortheirpocketbook.Addtothisthatifthevehicle-to-gridsystemisgoingtoworkaspromised,all

electric carswould have to be plugged inwhenever parked. Thismakes for amassive investment in infrastructural rebuilding. How do you get a chargingstation into every spot of a cement parking structurewithout tearing the thing

downandrebuildingit?Whatabouton-streetparking?Orprivategarages?Ifit’shardtopersuadecitizenstobearthebruntofthecostofbuyingthesecarsforthegoodofthegrid,it’sevenmoreimpossibletoimagineconvincingacitylikeLosAngelestopaytowireitselfupsuchthatthegridisremadeintoacapillary-likesystemthatpermeateseveryplacethatanyoftheir8millioncarsmightcometorest.Wirelesschargingpads(orasimilardevicebuiltintoanearbywall)mightbringdown thecostand increase the feasibility,but this technology too,whileextant,isnotyetreadyforthemassmarket.Norisitinteroperablewiththecars.Theexpenseanddisruptionofsuchanundertaking,giventhecurrentstateof

technology,wouldbeepic.Evenwheremostearnestlyimagined,vehicle-to-gridstoragesystemsaren’tbeingrealized.Inpartbecausewearen’tbuyingthecars.(Norway being the exception, with almost 30 percent of 2015 sales beingelectric; even they are not yet deploying theirwealth of batteries to the grid’sbenefit.) In America to date, only 1 percent of the cars are plug-in electricvehicles(awhopping3percentinCalifornia).Ofthese,almostnonearevehicle-to-grid-enabled.Andthenumbersshrinkwheretheyshouldrise:onlyabout0.5percentof fleetvehicles—suchas thoserunby thepostalservice,UPS,oranymunicipalgovernment—areelectric.Theeasiestway tobeginoperationalizing“V2G” technologies is to do it with fleets, all of which park together in theevenings, lessoning infrastructure costs for the installation of two-directionalsmartchargingandalsovastlysimplifyingtheeconomicsoffiguringouthowtopayautilitycustomerresidinginoneserviceareaforthepowershesuppliestothegrid,ortakesfromit,whileparkedinadifferentutility’sservicearea.Fleetsshouldbethefirstadoptersandyet,theyaren’t.Ifwearetalkingaboutthebiggrid,electriccarsforstorageremaineverybit

asmuchadreamasroomtemperaturefusionforpowerproduction,ortheairasa conduit for the long-distance, wireless electricity transmission. The worldwouldbeabetterplace if all these thingsdidwork.But, for themoment theydon’t,atleastnotatthescale,oraccordingtothetermswewantthemto.Nevertheless,everyconcreteplanfortheadoptionofvariablegenerationata

ratehigherthan30percentispremisedinpartuponthe“fact”thatwethepeoplewillbebuyingelectriccarsbythemillions“in30years.”Perhapswewillbeandperhapswe’llbechargingthemwithfusion,butfornowwearen’tandwedon’t.Thisholygrailretainsitsmassonlyinthemindsofthosestrugglingtobuildthebetterfutureinwhichwehopeonedaytoreside.

Asappealing and impossible as this vehicle-to-grid scenario seems for thebiggrid,itisturningouttobealotmorefeasibleforsmallerones.NotthegreaterLosAngelesLightandPowerDistrict,butthemicrogridthatistheLosAngelesAir Force Base; not Washington, D.C., but the microgrid that is Joint BaseAndrews in nearbyMaryland; not all ofNew Jersey, but themicrogrid that isJoint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, just outside Hanover. The next timesomethinglikeSuperstormSandyhitstheEastCoast,Hanoverwilllosepower,justasitalwayshas,butthemilitaryisbankingonthebase,thetown’snearestneighbor, remaining fully, resiliently operational through a mix of microgridtechnologiesincludingsolarpanels,fuelcells,dieselgenerators,backupbatterysystems,andasmallfleetofelectriccars.The military is in a unique position, for as it converts its U.S. bases and

foreignforwardcommandunitsintoanarchipelagoofmicrogridsitcomestobenotonlythesoleownerofalltheelectricalinfrastructureinitsdomains,butalsothesoleownerofalmostallthevehicles.Inthefield,convertingallnontacticalvehicles to battery power further reduces the supply chains for liquid fuel; athome this same transition makes their microgrids even more robust—ineverydayuseandintimesofcrisis.Asaresult,theDoD,whichoperatesafleetof200,000nontacticalvehicles,isworkingtoconvertthemalltoelectricitywithvehicle-to-gridtechnologiesdesignedinfromthestart.To date, only the Los Angeles Air Force Base has turned these ideas into

workable technologies—though the same transition is planned for the otherbasesmentioned.Sofar inL.A. theyhaveforty-twovehicles,somecars,sometrucks,andabigvan.Sixofthesearehybrids,buttheotherthirty-six“havethecapabilitytodirectpowerbothtoandfromtheelectricalgridwhenthey’renotbeingdriven.”Assuch,itis,accordingtotheairforce’sDr.Gorguinpour,“thelargest operationalV2Gdemonstration in theworld.”Even these fewvehiclescan,inapinch,providemorethan700kilowattsofpowertothegrid(about150houses’worth).Lessdramaticistheunderlyingmotivationfortheproject:“Thevehiclesenhancethepowergrid’sreliabilityandsecuritybybalancingdemandagainstsupplywithouthavingtousereservesorstandbygenerators.”The power grid here is both the air force’s power grid and our own.When

islandedintimesofcrisis,it’sjusttheirmicrogridthatwillbenefitdirectlyfromthe balancing capacities of an electric vehicle fleet and the “unique” charging

stationsthatallowthesetofeedintoanddrawdownfromthegrid.Mostofthetime,however,theirgridisindistinguishablefromourown;technicallyspeakingtheyareoneinthesame.Theelectricitytheygeneratedoesnotstayonthebase;rather,itflowsintothecommonpowersupply.Andthebalancingdonebythosethirty-sixvehiclesthe95percentofthetimethatnobodyisdrivingthemisbeingdoneforthegridasawhole:LosAngelesbenefitsfromthethirty-six,Californiabenefits,thedesertstatesoftheSouthwestbenefit,andthesoddenstatesofthePacific Northwest benefit. The whole of the Western Interconnection is onesystemwithmanypotentialislands—morewitheachdaythatpasses—andmostdays, none are islanded.The underlying texture of themacrogrid is changing,butinpracticethishasonlyminimaleffectsonitseverydayoperations.Mostofthe effects it does have, however, increase the reliability of this larger systemratherthandecreasingit.

Batteries, especially V2G-enabled car batteries, may not turn out to be theanswer,despitetheconstancyoftheirholdoverthemindsoftoday’sdreamers.Thatwearelookinghardforagrail,sketchingoutandevenprototypingalotofdifferent ideas, is itself an acknowledgment that we stand at the edge ofsomething. Not the end of an infrastructure, though it could go that far, butcertainly at the beginning of a new century’s imagination of how thatinfrastructuremightbeadaptedtosuitusbetter.Regardlessofhowonelooksbackatthetwentiethcenturythereisnowayto

imagine itwithout the gradual and complete adoption of electricity.There areother infrastructures, equally important, but aswe slip from the industrial ageintotheageofinformationelectricity’splaceattheheartofourlifeandcultureonlyincreases.Itismoney,itisdata,itiscomputing,itisalgorithmssocomplextheybegintoborderonintelligence.Electricitypowersthisworld,butitisalsothe means by which information constitutes it. The infrastructure we need tohold our present in place and allow for its increase is not the same grid thatprovidedthetwentiethcentury’snationalupliftandunion.Itisright,then,thatwenowliveintheeraofinfrastructuraldreamingandthat

thesedreamswouldbecenteredaroundfindingwaystounplugelectricityfromthe system of wires and power plants leftover to us from the past. Storage,whatever forms itwill take in theend, isnot theholygrailbecause ithelps tobalancethegridwehave(thoughthisisthestoryweliketotellourselves).It’s

the holy grail because it allows us to build an electric world that functionsotherwise,thathastheflexibilitytomoveandchangewithwhateverthetwenty-first century will throw at us. Or, more correctly, whatever remarkable,impossiblethingswewillbuildintoourownnearfuture.It may sound odd to advocate for giant hydroelectric storage pistons on

German plains, but why not dream big? And dream diversely? Dreams, evenones sketchedandprototyped,are thewayof the future, thegrail is itsdriver,andtoday’sentrepreneurs,andkooks,arenotsounliketheinventorswho,attheend of the 1800s, reached out and invited that future into the nation’s livingroomsandoffices,withsomesuccessesandmanyfailures.Batterieshavetheirplaceinallof this,but itwouldanerror to imaginethat

theircentralityinourimaginationsoverthelastfiveyearswillnecessarilyplacethem at the center of our twenty-first century grid. They might be. But thenagain,it—thegriditself—mightnotbe.Inallofthis,itisonlyimportanttokeepone’seyeonthegrail.Whatareitsparameters?Whatdowedreamof?Whatdowe seek? And how will this thing, should we invent our way to it, changeeverything about the circumstances that gave rise to the dream to beginwith?“Thechallengerightnow,”architectJohnKeatesenjoinsustoconsider,isthatgiventhatwedon’tknowtheanswertowhatcomesnext,toalsoask:“whataretheethicsthatwesetforourselves?Andtobeawarethatwhenweventureoutinto untrodden territory, that we are able to ask that question and dare to actwhen there isno clear answer.”Thedreamers andbuilders andkickstartersofelectricalstoragecampaignsandcomponentsaredoinganadmirablejobofthis.

CHAPTER9AmericanZeitgeist

InGermanthewordforanaddictisnotlikeourown.InEnglishtobeanaddictistohaveatotalizingidentity,controlledbya“soul-destroying,mind-numbingobsession that makes normal functioning impossible.” As such, addicts arewhollygovernedbythefactofaddiction,which,toputitmildly,“obscuresotherimportantqualitiesaboutthem.”NotsoinGerman.Themostaccurate,ifgraceless,translationforan“addict”

wouldbesomethinglike“seeky.”SothatifAmericansareaddictedtooil,thenourown language rendersusnothingbut.By thisdefinition,allwedo,all thetime, issuckupoil inevervasterquantities,atever-increasingcost,andat theexpenseofourgeneralwell-being.ManypeopleintheUnitedStates,aswellascitizens of Kuwait, Iraq, and Venezuela, would likely say that this is an aptdescription ofAmericans’ behavior in relationship to their oil. UsingGermanlogic, however, we might propose instead that Americans are “foreign-oil-seeky,” justasheroinaddictsare“heroin-seeky”andthosepoorsoulsaddictedto Friends reruns are “Friends-seeky.” This allows one to be both fairlyobsessed with one thing while simultaneously interested in, and capable of,manyothers.WhatiscuriousaboutthisGermanicwayoftypifyingaddictionishowwellitcapturesoureverydayrelationshipstoelectricity.Wearedeeplyandabidinglyelectricity-seeky.You’veseenityourself.Awomanentersacoffeeshopandpauses.Shedoes

something that looks rather like sniffing the air, except she is using her eyes,sometimesthereisslowstrollinvolved,untilsomewhatunexpectedlysheplopsdownintoachair,usuallynotthebestone,andbeginsremovingthecontentsofherbag.Aphonecomesout,a littlepadofphotocopies,acomputer,and…acord.Shebendsover,nudgesanoldmanwithabigcoatoutoftheway,snakeshercordoverhisheadandaroundthecornerofapost,andthenplugsitin.Shewas looking foranoutlet.She isnotanaddict,notexactly,butmostcertainlysheiselectricity-seeky.Oneseesthesamebehaviorwhenawell-pressedbusinessmanisfoundsitting

on the sullied carpet of the airport boarding area waiting for his flight to becalled while his phone charges from an ill-placed baseboard outlet. Or when,uponenteringacubicleforameetingwithitsinhabitant,onefindshimbeneath

hisdesk,khakiedbuttintheair,snufflingaroundlikeapigfortruffles,tryingtofigureoutwhat’sgonewrongwithhissurgeprotector.Electricitymovesus,ifnotyetinbigwaysandoverlongdistances:carscan

hardly be said to run on it, and jet planes simply do not.On a smaller scale,however,itisconstantlyorientingus,incitinginusadailyseekingbehavior;wesubtlystructureourlivesaroundaccesstooutlets,thoughweseeevidenceofthisfactonlywhentheoutletshavebeenpoorlyplaced.Designfailuresasmuchasoutright blackouts are what transform our everyday “seeky” into active andobviousseeking.Even themost professional amongus losedecorumaswe are about to lose

power. The richest maintain members of their staff, and circulate thoughspecially designed architectures, to ensure that such inconveniences neverhappen to them. They, too, are electricity-seeky, they just outsourceresponsibility for theaddiction to theworldaround them,making it seemas ifthephoneofprivilegealwaysholdsa fullcharge.Thismagical relationshipofinvisibleease,of forgetfulness,ofelectricitywithout“seeking,” is in factwhatwealllongforfromourgrid.Infrastructureshould,accordingtothedesignguruDonaldNorman,fadeintoinvisibility.Itshouldbemadetodisappearfromsightand equally to disappear from consciousness. It should be quiet, task-specific,and unobtrusive.We shouldn’t notice it, we shouldn’t think about it, and weshouldn’tseekit.Inallof the talkaboutwhatwillmakeourcurrentelectricgrid intoabetter

system,usability rarelyenters thediscussion. It is easy to forget that therearetwoways to lookat thegrid, fromaboveand frombelow.Whatweseewhentrying to grasp it more globally are the relationships between technology andfinance, or between legislation and cultural values; we see the grid for itsvastnessandcomplexity.We try tograpplewith it asa system theexpanseofwhich,geographicallyaswellashistorically,istrulyoutsidethecapacityofthehumanmind.Gainingsomemeasureofpurchaseonthisenormityhasbeenmytaskheretoo;Idon’tthinkwecan“get”thegridwithoutanintensecareforthecultural context and microdramas that are playing out between technologies,people, government policy, and corporate concern for the bottom line all thetime.Bethatasitmay,thisisnothowmostofusinteractwiththegrid.Mostofus

arenottheStraws,ortheU.S.military,orNewJerseyTransit.Mostofusstilldon’thavesolarpanelsoranintimaterelationshipwithbatteriesanylargerthanthosethatpowerourphones.Ourgrid,thepartofitweknowandinteractwith,

looks like the cords, plugs, outlets, and switches that link our portableelectronicstothewall.This,too,mightbethoughtofasthegridedge,sincethemomentthatweunplugelectricpowerfromthebiggridandcarryitaroundinour pockets is literally where the grid disaggregates, becoming somethingdifferentandnew.Thechargeristhefinalcord,theoneweknowbest,andthesmallestdendriteinaworldofcomplexity.Inthis,thelastchapter,I’dliketoturntowardourmoreintimateandpersonal

interactions with the grid and our desires for these. These interactions, andwants, have a pattern, and this pattern, I suspect, exerts more force over theshape of grid reform than experts, or those with a more global view, givecredence to.Whatwewould like ultimately is that our infrastructuremove usless andhavea lessobviouspresence inourworld—not justvisually,not justwhenitbreaksdownandemergesforcefullyintoconsciousness,butallthetime,andinbothlittleandbigways.Nomoreoutlets,cords,orplugswouldbenice.Nomoreblackouts,shortorlong,wouldbegreat.Sowouldareturntoanearthwithastableclimate,aplanetthatgrowsneitherwarmernorcolderbecauseofourattachmenttofossilfuelsformakingpower.In short, we’d like our grid to whisper away, to be less devastating in its

effects,andtoworkwithoutdeputizingustotheprocess.We’llkeepelectricity,thankyou.Infact, thefurtherweproceedintotheageofinformationthemoreelectricity becomes the base for all that we do, from banking, to reading, tocollaborative thinking.The futurepromises an evenmore thorough integrationofelectricityintoourlives,moredata(whichisafterall, justelectricity),more“smart”things(comingtopopulatetheInternetofThings),andtheeliminationoffuelfromcars,necessaryifwe’dliketostopglobalwarmingbeforeitexceedsthe 2-degrees-Celsius disaster line. Most important, we’d like this means of“beingelectric”tocomefromnothing,tobetransmittedbynothing,tocausenodamage,andtoworkalwaysandwherever.Thisabidingculturalattachmenttoelectricityonlymakestheunwieldyways

inwhichwehavetomoveinordertoaccessitall themoresalient.Ifonlywecould dematerialize the infrastructure while simultaneously making powerambient—ever present, never sought—then perhaps we’d have an electricitysystem better suited to the present and better oriented toward a future thatmesheswiththedata-drivenanddata-dependentbeingswearebecoming.The question is, of course, how to do this. Especially since our everyday

desires for the future of electricity have relatively little to do with what thevestedinterestspursueintheirattemptstomaintainthetechnologicalandfiscal

viabilityofthecurrentsystem.Oneoftheproblemswiththegridisthatwecan’tjustshutitoffforacoupleofyearswhilewecomeupwithsomethingnewerandbetter.Weneed it to be running all the time.One recent author described theproject of overhauling the grid as akin to “rebuilding our entire airplane fleet,alongwithourrunwaysandairtrafficcontrolsystemwhiletheplanesareallupintheair,filledwithpassengers.”Systemicreformundertheseconditionsisnoteasily accomplished: anything we add to the grid must have the capacity tointerfaceeffectivelywitheverythingthatwastherebefore,whileeverythingwesubtractfromitmustnotdisrupttheflowofpowerthatwearesoreliantupon.Given all this, the best routes forward are those that take the mess of

competinginterestsseriouslyanddesignforthem.Thisrangeofinterestsshouldnot be limited to investors, visionaries, legislators, utilities, regulators, and alltheother folks thathaveanactive interest in thegrid; it alsoneeds to includepeoplewhodon’tcareawhitforthebusinessofelectricity.Figuringouthowtodesignasystemformaximuminclusivityisharderthanit

sounds,inpartbecauseit’sdifficultforanyoneplayerinthegianttangleofourgridtohavemuchcomprehensionaboutwhatmotivatestheothers.Asthenearmeltdown of the Davis-Besse nuclear reactor or the incessant gnawing ofsquirrelsmakesabundantlyevident,it’schallengingenoughforeachofthemtobemastersoftheirowndomain.Yet,wheneveryonehastheireyespressedtightupagainstthedemandsoftheirownjobs,it’sthepeople,thepayersofbills,whoremain relatively easy to ignore. Unless we make trouble, with guns, airconditioners,orhomesolarsystems,weremainarelativelylumpenmasslackingeven basic demographic nuances one might expect any twenty-first centurybusiness toemploy.Forexample, inallmyresearch into thegridIhaveneverheardautilitycustomerreferredtointhefeminine.Whenspeakingoftheusersof electricity, the (mostly)menwhomake the systemwork, and the (mostly)menwhopushatitandtrytoinventawaybeyondit,imagineanationofuserswho are alsomen.This is necessarily only ever half true.But if the quiet butundeniablefactofgenderhasnotpercolatedupintotheconsciousnessofthosewhomake, and remake, ourgrid,what else is being lost?Attentiveness to thedetails, and not just aggregate data, is critical to the effective reform of aninfrastructure soessential toour lives.Yet askingeveryone topracticeamorenuancedawarenessofecosystemscomplexity is, I suspect,more than theycanbear.Therearethusthreeproblemsofdifferentkindsthatmeetatthegridandget

stuckthere:Howtodealwiththecombinedinterestsofmanydifferentplayers—

whichdoes, and should, includeglobalwarming.How todealwith the legacytechnology,which is to say thegridwe’vegot.Andhow todealwith the factthatit’smadeandrunbyhumans,whoarebytheirnaturerathersquirrellyandshortsighted.Ratherthanlettingitallgowild,givingeveryoneablunderbuss,adedicatedbanker, andanagentof thepress—theway thegridwaswon in thelate1880s—amorepracticablesolutionwouldbetodesignsomethingradicallyintegrative. To err, at everymoment, toward inclusivity and to design for theeasy incorporationof asmanydifferent interests aspossible.Thiswillmeanaclear setofobligatory standards that twist thearmsof even themost stubbornplayerstowardinteroperability.Itwillprobablyalsorequirelegalandregulatoryintervention.Pluswewillneedtofindawaytopayforthemostbasicelementsof the infrastructure, the wires and poles, that few people care about and yetmuststaystandingandingoodconditionforalltherestofthegridtoworkatall.Investors’moneymayflowtowardnewfangledformsofgenerationthesedays,and toward private companies, whether inventing microscopic components orrepurposingsaltcaverns,butbasicmaintenanceisstillonthebackoftheutility.We,theusersofelectricity,paythosebills,untilwedon’t.Coming up with a good system for grid-scale storage, with its capacity to

unlink generation fromconsumption, is onewayof pushing the grid toward amore open and assimilative attitude, but it’s not the only way. A second,increasingly popular means for translating interests of different kinds into asingle system is to rely upon a platform—an integrative computer programratherthanagadget.Inordertohelpensurethatourgridiswrenchedoutofitscurrentworkings,thisplatformwouldneedtobeopentoallthestrangesortsofthingspeoplearedreamingupandbuildingtoday(fromvehicletogrid-enabledself-driving car pods to real live nanogrids)and to the boring old stuffwe’restuckwith for themoment (likenaturalgascombustionplants andoldcoalornuclear), and also to the desires and activities of regular people. All withoutlettingthebasicstructuresofthegridgettoorottenoroutofdate.Aplatformisaninterestingtooltothinkwithinpartbecauseitmovesusinto

adomainwherecomputing,or“digital”systems,becomesthemeansforsolvingmechanical or “analog” problems. Platforms literally use computers to makemesses operable. Uber is a platform. It takes drivers driving around andorganizes them into ameans for nondrivers to alsomove around, in the samecars.Itbringsexistingresourcestogetherandcreatesafunctionalitywhereoncethere was only traffic. Facebook and Twitter are platforms for sharinginformation and opinions across vast social networks. In the process they

produceactively intertwinedrelationshipsbetweenstrangersaswellasfriends.Theseties,unexpectedly,movenewsmorequicklythanmoretraditionalmediaand thus allow for concerted action and organization significant enough (attimes) tobringdowngovernments.Thispatternofusingplatforms toorganizeunrelatedandcompetinginterestsintonewsocialandeconomicformationsisacomfortableonenow,inAmerica.Comfortableenoughthatsomealreadyexistforourgrid,andasolidsubsetofpeopleinsidethesystemareworkingouthowtomake these even better at integrating absolutely everything, and even some“nothings,”thantheyalreadyare.

Withinthispushforintegrativegridreformtherehasarisenacuriousdriver—acertain affinity with zero. In weird corners and in mainstream parts of thecountry one finds people advocating for aggregated nothings, for no fuels, nowires,andnomeasurableeffects.Conservationandefficiency,ascendantinthe1960sand’70s,weretheprecursorsofavaluationofwhatwasn’tusedandnotneeded.Andthedebatethatragestodayoverhowonemightaccuratelycountawattsaved,orvalueandremunerateapowerplantnotbuilt,alsobeganbackinthe days of President Carter and his Cardigan Path. In the age of wirelesscommunicationsystems,wecanaddanothervision:Howmightwemakeagridlessmaterialratherthanmoreso?Acrossdomainsonebeginstoseeanabidingconcernforwaysofreducingthematerialimpactsofinfrastructureandcountingevery zero we make as if it were something substantive. Even when notconsciousofthistrend,agoodmanypeople,companies,andinterestgroupsareleavingtovaluewhatisnotthereasmuchaswhatis.Thegreens,totaketheobviousexample,rootsustainabilityingettingpower

from nothing and producing no waste in the process. Renewables, once theyhave been built and put into operation, are not chemically polluting and theyinvolveneitherextractionnorwaste—nothingisbroughtupfrombelowground,nothing is burned, nothing is boiled, and nothing is released to thicken ouratmosphere.Engineers,fortheirpart,areinfavorofalmostanysystemthatcanincreasetheamountofpowertheycangetfromafuelsource.Doingawaywithheatengines,withtheirinevitablethermodynamiclimitations,isforthemabigstepintherightdirection.Largecorporationswithsignificantinvestmentsintheenergysectorlikethefactthatthecostoffuelcanberemovedfromthepower-production spreadsheet of inevitable expenses. For every watt not made from

coalorgasorplutoniumthesezerosareproduced,andtheyaddup.It’ssimplyeasier to make a profit if one can reduce to nothing the cost of a necessaryingredient.Thesemotivationsforsupportinggreenenergyarebelievableanddefendable

intheirownright,buttheyalsoalluniquelyconformtothespiritofthetimes:renewablesusenothing tomake electricpower just asphonesuse the Internetand4Gnetworkstoproduceinformationfromthinair,justaswirelesschargingstations for home electronics are now being integrated into the furniture wenormally put them on anyway. Indeed, consumers, who have gotten used togettinginformation,music,andevenmoviesfromthinair,andwhowillsoonbemaintaining an electric charge in their batteries through similar means, areincreasingly reluctant to embrace anything that has the aesthetics of an older,moremateriallyinvasivesystem.Andthoughconsumersarenotthearbitersofthegrid,theirpredilectionsdoaffectit.The grid’s wires bear the brunt of this discontent with the materiality of

infrastructure.BruceWollenberg,apowersystemsengineerattheUniversityofMinnesota,explains theutilities’ frustration in trying toaddmorehigh-voltagelinestothenation’stransmissionsystem,saying,“Peopledon’twantpowerlines—period.Theydon’tlikethewaytheylook,theydon’tlikealotofthings.It’suniversal across the country, and I think across the world. People don’t wantmore power lines.” Similarly, Caltech’s Nate Lewis, one of many engineersworkingonartificialphotosynthesis,speakswiththesamereiterativestutter.Histeam’sartificialleafhas“nowires.ImeanwhatIsay:nowires.Leaveshavenowires. Incomesunlight,water,andCO2,andoutcomefuels.” Inbothcases italmostseemsasifthepresenceofwiresorlinesinanewproductwillsinkit.If consumers areunwilling to allowutilities tobuildwires acrossprivate as

well as public lands—asNot-In-My-Backyardism rises togreet thegrid—theyarehappytopaymoreforanight tablewithawirelesspowerchargerbuilt in,likethoseIkeaiscurrentlyrollingout.And,somewhatsurprisingly,itisnotjustabout thescaleof the thingone ispaying for.Theutilitieshavebeenquick torecognize thefact thatpeoplewhoarenormallyquitestingywith theirelectriccompany, including those actively opposed to new high-voltage wires, willvoluntarilypayasurchargeontheirbillforrenewablepower.Thissurchargeisusuallyofferedasa“percentageoftotalconsumption”withdealslike85percentwindor100percentrenewable(wind,solar,hydro).When Xcel, the maligned former utility of Boulder, Colorado, offered this

deal to itsMinnesotacustomers,one friendofa friendonFacebookraved:“If

youareahomeowner,thereisnoreasononearthnottodothis…itwillcostme$4/monthandmyenergy fromhereonoutwillbe100percentwindpowered.What a great feeling! Plus, the energy that supplies Windsource will bepurchasedentirelyfromwindfarmsinMinnesotaandwillgoaboveandbeyondgovernmentmandates.”Whatmattershereistheemotionalforcebehindtheideaforacertainkindof

customer.Nooneconnectedtothegrid,eveniftheypaythesurcharge,isgetting100percentoftheirelectricityfrom“immaterial”fuels.Noristheirpower,onagrid that spans half a continent, guaranteed to bemore local. The same termsmaybeusedtolaudanenvironmentallyfriendly,locallyproducedelectronasanorganic,locallygrowntomato,butthetwoentitiesareimpossiblydifferent.Bothacustomerwhohascheckedtherenewablefuelssurchargeboxandherneighborget the same electricity.Theprincipal difference is that the electric bill of the“Windsourse® for Residences” customer runs her four dollars more everymonth.This payingmore for locally sourced green electricity is not a utility scam.

The surcharge does usually factor into a utility’s budget for the immediatepurchase and longer-term investment in renewablepower.Youmaynotget touse100percentwindpower,butyoudosubsidizetheincreaseofthismeansofmakingelectricityforeveryoneonthegridoverthelonghaul.Thefactthatthischoice isavailableallows individuals to takeameasureof fiscal responsibilityonto theirown shoulders as ameansof committing to immaterial fuel sourcesthatmakesensetothem.The argument, then, that our grid wouldn’t be in such a dire state if only

peoplewerewillingtopaymorefortheirelectricityislargelymoot.Peoplearewillingtopaymore,butonlyforcertainthings.Thelesssolidthesethings,thelessvisible,andthemorethoroughlyintegratedintothebuiltenvironmenttheyare,themorelikelyindividualsandcompaniesaretovolunteertheirmoneyforthe cause.Theways inwhich these immaterial power sources also fit into therising tide of concern for “green” energy makes the utilities’ job easier. Ifrenewableswillhelpraiserevenue,thenrenewableswillshowuponthebill.As bigwasteful things giveway to their smaller lesswasteful brethren—as

coalplantshavegivenwaytowindturbinesinMinnesota—itwon’tjustbethefuelthat’swhisperingawayfromourgrid.Theincandescentbulb,alreadyillegalin much of the world because of its incomparable wastefulness, uses only 5percentofthepoweritconsumestomakelight;theother95percentcomesoutas heat.This familiar and beloved bulb has been largely replaced, first by the

compact fluorescent bulb, which pretty much everybody hates, and morerecently by LEDs—small, intensely efficient, long-lasting diodes. Or take therefrigerator, thehousehold’ssecond-greediestdevice(after theairconditioner).IthasbeentheobjectofintensiveR&Dsincethelate1970s.Today’sfridgesuseaboutaquarterofthepowertheydidin1975.Thisincreasedefficiencyistrueofall refrigerators, but for awee bitmore you can get onewith an Energy Starrating—a truly good fridge, in both senses of the word. Just like today’srefrigerators, our dishwashers, clothes washers and dryers, lighting systems,evennewergenerationsofcomputersaredesignedtofunctionequallywellwithmuch lessofadraw.Allof thesemachines look likeandwork justaswellastheirprecursors.They justusea lot lesselectricity (andwater) todo the samejob.Andwhilesomepeople,mostlythoseolderthanforty,stillprimarilyapproach

problem solving in terms of buying better things, the nonbuyers of things, acharacteristic themillennialshavebecomefamous for, take itonestep further:Whybuyabulbatall?Whyafridgeatall?Whatmightwedotorenderthebulbandthefridgeobsoleteentirely?Mightnotaroombelitbyawallwovenoffiberoptic cablingcontrolled from thephone?Mightnot the fridgebe reduced to aceramiccontainerandashelfwithacoldspotbuiltin?Onecancontinueinthisvein:Mightnotasolarpanelbemadeasawindowor

asaroofingtileorabitofroadwayoratree?Mightnotoutletsbereplacedwithradiantelectricity?Theshowerwithavaporstallthatwetstheuserjustaswellwith30percentofthewater?Andsoon.Thesearenotidlequeries,norshouldtheybeeasilydismissed.Thisgenerationisalreadyintheprocessofembracingtechnologiesthatrenderobsoletethelightswitch,thedoorlock,thecarignition(anditskey),andthecreditcard.Whynotthefridge,theoutlet,thelightsocket,theshowerhead,andthe ineffable,uncontrollable,proliferationofchargersandtheir cords? The Clapper might still be the means for remote-controlling thelightswiththemostsignificantmarketpenetration,butthisisunlikelytobethecaseforlong.Allofthesechanges—toappliances,light,andheatingandcoolingsystems—

arehappeninginthehome,ourmostintimatespaceforthinkingaboutandusingpower.Weheatwhereweliveandwecoolit;weeatandcook,washanddry,cruise the Internet, play videogames,watchTV, and listen tomusic there.Ongooddaysweevenremembertochargeourportableelectronicsbeforeweleavefor the day. In the aggregate, what we choose to do in and with our homesmatterstothegrid.Thismuchwehavelearnedfromthehomesolarmovement,

butconservationandefficiency—waysofcausingpowernottobemade—matterjustasmuch,ifnotmore,tothefuturewell-beingofourenergysystem.Ifonestepsback,itbecomesclearthatchangestothedomesticspherearebut

a small, if necessary, element of a systemic transformation.Offices, factories,and other workplaces also need to be retrofitted and outfitted, and so do theplaces where we shop, socialize, and eat out. These are slower to transform,largelybecauseofthecost.Puttingsolarpanelsontheroofsofall thenation’sWalmarts (this is happening) is not the sameasputting solarpanelson topofone’sgarage.Noristhedifferencejustamatterofscale.Everysuburbandsemiruraloutpostwherebig-boxstoresclusterhasitsown

culture ofwires, its own utility, balancing authority, and regulatory apparatusthatmustpreparefor(andoftenupgradeexistinginfrastructuretoaccept)everynewsourceofpower.Whenweconsider thegrid in thisway itbecomesevenmore evident that some sort of hub capable of translating across all thecompeting interests and integrating all the structural intransigencies will beessentialtothesuccessofaninfrastructuralupgradethatisnationalinscale.Inproposingbettermeans formaking anddelivering electricity,weneed to

askourselves:Doesthispath,theonewelabortoproduce,theonewelegislate,thebusinessplanwefollow,cutoffawholesetofoptions,ordoesitallowthesetowrangleonintherewiththerest?Easeofgovernanceneedstocedewaytoameans of organizing a diversity of interests around a single vision. This isdifficult even when the vision is fundamentally about implementing systemsdiversity. In the high-stakes, low-sex-appeal battle to ramp up theinteroperabilityofthegrid’sthousandsuponthousandsofsubsystems,themostboring, if heated, conversations behind the scenes focus on standardization.Aplatformisnotjustasoftwareproblem.Weactuallyneedthetechnologiesthatcurrently constitute our grid to be able to work with, and communicate with,newercomponentsandnewerwaysofdoingthings.The list of standards necessary to make cross-generational interoperability

evenpossibleisdizzying.TheseincludeitemslikeCEA-852.1:2009“Enhancedtunneling device area network protocols over Internet protocol channels” orC37.118.1 “Standard for synchrophasor measurements for power systems” orIEEE1588“StandardfortimemanagementandclocksynchronizationacrosstheSmartGrid forequipmentneedingconsistent timemanagement.”Goneare thedayswhenasimplearmaturecouldbringallthedisparatedevicesfunctioningonourgridintoanewresolution.Achievinga“universalsystem,”thefinalformofwhichwe canneither imaginenorplan for at present, is going to take a great

dealoflegworkofthiskind.Whileteamsofcareerbureaucratsstruggletodevisestandardsthatwillmake

a heavily networked grid functional, other folks in other places take steps toensurethatthesewon’teverbeneeded.Thewisegrid,asthisoptionisknown,hasathousandopponents,eacharmingitselfinwhateverwaysitcan.Effectivesystemschangecanbederailedbyanyofthese.Ifeveryonewithastakeinthegamechoosestolimit,ratherthanworkwith, thechaosofthepresent,wewillend up with a balkanized system built of roadblocks and blind alleys. Anyaction, no matter how small, against interoperability creates new hurdles foranyone hoping for a future grid grounded in flexibility and reliability viadiversity.Evenforward-thinkingCaliforniahasprovedboneheadedon thispoint.Late

in 2015 the legislature in that state passed an extraordinary new renewableenergystandardintolaw,which(amongotherthings)obligesCaliforniatomake50 percent of its electricity from renewables by 2030. As remarkable as itsounds,at thecoreofthispieceoflegislationlurksanunexpectedlyretrogradelogic.Theonlyrenewableelectricitythatwillcounttowardthe50percentisthatproducedbycentralstations.Rooftopsolarwillnotbecounted.Thisdespitethefact that growth in homemade solar power has been exponential over the pasthalf decade: 45 percent of the nation’s total residential solar power is now inCalifornia, 82 percent of which has been installed since 2010. At present,rooftop solar is producing three times more electricity in California than arecentral station solar plants, despite seven of these massive power generatorshaving come online in that state in the past three years. As this legislatedreluctance makes clear, the utilities, which have a strong lobby in that state,wouldprefertoignoresmall,distributedpowerproducers;homeownersaretoocomplicated for them to control (or even to bargain with), and homemadeelectricity is almost impossible for them to profit from. This particular set ofplayerswasalsohopingthathomeinstallationswouldplummetafter2016,whentherenewableenergytaxcreditwasscheduledtoexpire,sincethisincentivehasrefunded30percentofthecostofinstallingrooftopsystemssinceitwasputinplace in 2005. It didn’t expire, but that matters not in California, since thelegislationwasalreadyinplace.Aconservativeeyetowardthefuturemightseeinthisa landscapeofpower

productionslippingbackward.Ifhomeownerslosethedirectfinancialincentiveto contribute to public power, then perhaps central stations might remain“central” to thebusinessofmakingmoney fromsupplyingelectricity.Turning

aninstitutionalblindeyetodispersedrenewables—byrefusingtolettheirpowercount—in favor of bigwind farms and sunpower factories is a first step in aprocess of marginalizing the means of making electricity that many regularpeopleobviouslyprefer. In thisway thenewCalifornia lawhasgivenutilitiesfreereignnottoworkouthowallthevariousmeansforgenerating,saving,andstoringelectricitymightcomeprofitablytogether.Theyhaveeffectivelylimitedsystems diversity in favor of securing, more tightly, their own interests. Thecentralstationsmayhavechangedtheirfuelsource,buttheCalifornialegislaturehas opted to leave them and the twentieth-century logics they embody at theheartofthatstate’sgrid.The explicit goal of the legislation, of course, is tomotivate the utilities to

invest more heavily in large-scale renewable power installations. A sentimentdifficulttofault,andyet,infailingtorequiretheutilitiestotakefulladvantageofall the renewablepowerresourcesavailable to them,California’s legislaturehas virtually assured that grid reform in that state will fall far short of itspotential.Thatthisblindnessisdirectedatatechnologywithanevidentappealtothepeoplemakesitdownrightnefarious.Here,then,wecanseehowagooddecision, in almost all terms, is also a bad one when considering the future-possible for our grid—largely because it excludes the desires of regular folkswhoarechoosingtotaketheirbusinesstosmaller,moreinnovativecompanies.Theutilitiesaremastersofignoringwhatpeoplewant.Andtheyarepracticedinrunning competitors out of business by controlling the market. California’slawmakers,inthiscase,havegiventhemafreehandtocontinuetodoboth.Therightpathwasthemoredifficultone—toasktheutilities toworkoutasystemwherebyallrenewablepowerwascountedandintegratedinthe2030goal.Theproblemofkeepingthegrid’swiresalive,atleastthosewecan’tgetrid

of,will neverbe solvedby sweeping thepersistentproblemsunder the rug. IfTesla Motors or some other smart start-up can create a battery pack that issufficientlycheapandsufficientlyreliable,peoplewiththemeanstomaketheirownelectricitywillstartdroppingoffthegrid.Thismightseemtosolveashort-term problem for the utility, but it would significantly undermine a larger,nationalprojectofprovidingthesamequalityofelectricpower,atafairprice,toallAmerica’speople.Forthiswewillneedagridcapableofbringingtogetherdifferent value systems as much as different mechanical systems into afunctionalwhole.Among themany thingswemust figureout inorder tohelpmake this happen is a way to allow utilities to make money off home solarsystems, but even this possibility was curtailed by the California legislature’s

groundbreakingrenewableenergybill.Way back in the 1970s, Amory and Hunter Lovins’s argument for the

integrationofrenewableswasgroundedpreciselyonthismeansofeffectinganinfrastructuraltransformationworthitswhile.Yes,renewablesaregreen,andonapollutedandwarmingplanetthatisclearlyagoodthing.MoreimportanttotheLovinses,however,wasthatthesetechnologies,whenconnectedtoourexistinggrid,forceittoworkdifferently.Itwouldbecomeamoresecuresystembecausegrappling with distributed and variable generation is such a mechanical andfiscalstresstothecentralstationmodel.Thispotentialforabetter,morerobust,moresecuregridgroundedintechnologieswebothuseandlikeismadepossibleby letting people findways tomake and store electricity at the smallest scalewithoutexcludingthem,structurallyorlegally,fromourcommonsystem.Thegrid,asshouldbeclearbynow,isnotatechnologicalsystem.Itisalsoa

legalone, abusinessone, apoliticalone, a cultural one, andaweather-drivenone,andtheebbsandflowsineachdomainaffecttheverypossibilityofsuccessof anyplan for its improvement. If the integrationof systemsacrossdomains,especiallytheirritatingbits,cannotbemadetoflourish,theproblemwillbenotwiththemachineryweuseorthetechnologywegovern,butwithus.Atissueisthataspoorastheutilitiesareatacceptingsmallreformsbysmall

players,Americans,ingeneral,arenotespeciallypracticedatascribingavaluetowhat isnot-used,especiallywhen thecount isofsomethingasabstractasawatt. And yet conservation and efficiency measures that reduce our need forelectricity are as important to reforming our energy system as is themainstreamingof renewablewaysofmaking that electricity—large and small.Two different sorts of things, then, need to be integrated into our accounting.First, all theelectricitymade,nomatterwho ismaking it.Andsecond,all theelectricitynotused,nomatterwho is saving it. Ifwecanworkouthow todothis, systemically, it will start to matter when a couple of big-box stores, acementfactory,orasubdivisionortwoareenergy-efficientenoughthatautility,or anyone else, can avoid building a new power plant. The owners of theseenterprises, just likeanyhomeownerwho’s investedinasmart thermostatorahostofcompactfluorescentbulbs,naturallywantcreditforwhattheyaresaving.Currentratestructures,whichchargedifferentamountsforwattsdependingonwhen in a billing cycle (or when in a day) they were used, however, don’ttranslateeffortsatconservingpowerverywellintothechargesonthebill.Theproblem becomes, given that all these various customers are still on the grid,how the electricity they don’t use—their so-called “negawatts”—might be

counted,paidfor,anddeployed.This is the real story behind contemporary grid reform: not just valuing

electronsmadebyunusualproducers,butvaluingelectronsthatweneverneededtomakeatall—thesavedpowerthatweshouldn’tevennoticehasgonemissing.

In 2011 I joined a green energy tour group of engineers and industry insiderstravelingaroundSanDiegolookingatthevariousprojectsunderwaythere.SanDiegoGas&Electricisanotoriouslyforward-thinkingutility.Oneresultisthatthecityhassomeprettyinterestinggrid-relatedthingsgoingon.Wesawsomeofthese. An office complex with a solar panel on every available bit of roof,includingtheparkinglot;atrainingfacilityforjourneymenelectricianswithtwoempty car-charging stations conspicuously placed at the front. And, much toeveryone’ssurprise,asuburbanAlbertsonsgrocerystorepoweredbyaboxcar-sizedfuelcelloutbackbytheDumpsters.It’sunusualtoseeafuelcell,andthebox drew plenty ofoohs andaahs from our group. From the storemanager’spoint of view, however, it clearly paled in comparison to the energy-efficient,understated refrigeration they’d had installed. He tried, unsuccessfully ifrepeatedly, to drawour attention to his coolers and freezers, hiswindows andelectricfans,hisrecyclingsystemforcardboardboxes.Thesedesigns,machines,andsystemsallworkedtolowertheabsoluteamountofelectricityneededbythefacility. They were what made the fuel cell out back a viable technology forpowerproductioninthefirstplace.ItwasnotanAlbertsonsoff-the-grid,butitsdrawfrompublicpowersystemswasclosetozeromostofthetime.Aninstallationlikethis,atlonglast,bringsthepointhome:iftheexpertsand

insidersonthetourwereexcitedbyhowthewattsthatranthisAlbertsonswerebeing made, the store’s manager was excited by all the ways in which thesewattswerenolongerneeded.Whathesawwhenhelookedathisgrocerystorewasnotapowerplantbutamachineformakingnegawatts;itwasthatmachinethat all of the rest of us had trouble seeing precisely because it looked, andworked,exactlylikeagrocerystore.Thelightingwasperhapsmarginallymorepleasant, but otherwise,what hadbeen accomplishedwaspraiseworthy less inrelationshiptohowthepowerforthisstorewasgeneratedandmoreintermsofthevariouswaysthatthewholethinghadbeenredesignednottoneedit.Or,asAmory Lovins (who coined the term “negawatt” way back in 1990) said,“Customersdon’twantkilowatt-hours;theywantservicessuchashotshowers,

cold beer, lit rooms,” and this can “come more cheaply from using lesselectricitymoreefficiently.”Thiswayof thinking—of lowering consumptionwhileminimizing the need

forgrid-providedelectricity,doesnotsimplyconformtothespiritofthetimes.It helps to further it. The power of nothing is expanded, by undertakings likethese, to include lighting from the sun, cooling from fan-made breezes ratherthan chemical air-conditioning, and wattage not used because it isn’t needed.Thesesaved-wattsornegawattsaretheelectricpoweramachineorabuildingora lighting systemor a factorydoesn’t use.Thoughanegawatt is a theoretical,rather than a real, unit of non-power, it serves the purpose of allowing us tomeasureandquantifyavoidedconsumption.Giventhis,thestoremanager’spointiswelltaken:Whynotdothesamewith

less?InthiswecanseetheremnantsoftheCardiganPath.Itisthereinpart.Wecanuseless.Infact,wedouseless.ElectricityconsumptionintheUnitedStatesceased its increase in 2007 and is predicted to remain flat until 2040, despiteinfinitely more electronics and significantly more people. As important,however, are the changingpresumptions that surrounda lifeofmodest energyconsumption.Weneedn’tsufferprivationasaresultofusingless.Thisisthemessagethat

Albertson’sCorporationhasbuiltintothissinglestore.Itisequallythemessageof the shift to LEDs, home solar panels, and ideally to electric cars. In thetwenty-first century, theCardiganPath has been remademore simply into thePath.Thesedays,notevenJimmyCarterneedstowearasweater.The Path means less energy consumption without turning down the

thermostat,wearingafleece,orlightingafire.Itmeanslonghotshowers,coldbeers, andwell-lit rooms.Therewillbenoprivation in thenewworldof less.(Not “less-is-more,”mind you, but “the samewith less.”)At least, this is thegoalof thosecommitted toanaccountingofnegawattsandequallyof themanwhomanagesthemostenergy-efficientAlbertsonsintheUnitedStates.Eventenyearsago,theanswertothisdesirefor“thesamewithless”wasthat

saving kilowatt-hours was expensive precisely because retrofitting inefficientbuildings with more efficient technologies is the least cost-effective way toachievethegoal.Negawattssimplycosttoomuchtobeworththeirwhile.ThisisthereasonwhythereisonlyoneAlbertsonswithafuelcellandaremarkablecoolingandlightingsystemandthereareliterallythousandsofAlbertsonsthatrelyongrid-providedpowertorunwastefulcoolersandpoorlydesignedlightingandHVACsystems.Retrofitting isexpensive inways thatdon’tquiteseemto

payoff.Acaseinpoint.I liveinaverycoldplace,verycold,andonecornerofour

housewasneverinsulated;ithappenstobethecornerthatourbathtubdrainrunsthroughandsoeveryyearthedrainfreezesandwehavenotubforsixtoeightweeks.OursolutiontothiswouldmakeAmoryLovinsblanch.Wejustrunthewater in the tub allwinter to keep the drain from freezing.We don’t pay forwater, it’snotmetered,solikemuchof therestofourwintercityof2millionthetapstrickleformonthsonend.Despitetheevidentridiculousnessofthisfix,wewon’tbetakingoutahomeloaninthenearfuturetopaythousandsofdollarstohaveourbathroomrippedupinordertoinstall$150worthofinsulationintoasinglewall.Wedon’twant to invest thenecessarymoneyand,evenmore,wedon’twanttodealwiththemessandbother.This ispreciselywhy,as longas investment inretrofittingremains themain

means of bringing about a negawatt revolution (or, in our case, a negagallonone), itwon’t happen. The efficiency and conservationmeasures necessary toinsureadrasticcommunity-widedrop inpowerconsumptioneitherneed tobebuilt in from the start or they need to be “plug-and-play,” like Energy Starappliances.This is half the secret, then: to design and to build places, things, and

machines inways that effortlessly and invisibly—from the enduser’spointofview—reduceconsumption. In somecases thismightbestbeaccomplishedbyreconceivingentirelythethingbeingbuilt:totakethefridgeoutofrefrigeration,theairconditioneroutofair-conditioning,thelightoutofthelightbulb.Inothercases,itmightmeanproducinganidenticalthing,likealaptopthatrunsequallywell on a quarter of the electricity as the samemodel three years earlier or abuilding that so seamlessly integratespower-saving systems that even itsmostconstant users would be shocked to know that they are moving through amassivenegawattmachine.Theotherhalfof thesecret is toget thegrid todomostof thework in this

directionforus.Weneedtoenforceasystemthattakesthemessesofthepresentandorientsthemnotjustaroundadifferentkindofgenerationoradifferentkindof distribution but also around countable nothings. Efficiency, not just for thesakeofit,butasastructuredmeansofgeneratinglesspowertobeginwith.Wedon’tusewhatisn’tmade,and(thisisthenewbit)thisnon-usewillgetfactoredinto our financial thinking about the grid, and its reform. If it can be given astableprice,anegawattwillmatterasmuchtohowactorsbigandsmallchoosetoreformourgridasataxcut,asubsidy,oraguaranteedlow-interestloandoes

now.Thegrid,intheAlbertsonscase,wouldseemtobelittlemorethananeutral

conduitbetweenpowerplantsandrefrigerationdevices.Evenadecadeagothisimpressionwouldhavebeenfairlyaccurate.Asit turnsout,however,all thosesmartmetersshootingoutwirelessstreamsofdata24/7aregoodformorethanjust helping the utility know that they should dispatch a lineman to yourneighborhoodbeforeyoucallthemupandtellthemto.Withinfiveyearsoftherollout,thedataproducedbysmartmeterswasprovingessentialtothecreationofpredictivemodelsofelectricityuse,minutebyminute,aswellasprovidingoccasional real-time data about peaks and troughs in variable and distributedelectricity production. And they were enabling real-time “demand-response,”which is to say that they gave the utility the capacity to ask big electricityconsumerstorampdownconsumptionasameansofbalancingthegrid.Ratherthangoingofflineandusingdieselgeneratorstoprovidebackuppowerforabitwhiletheutilitystraightenedthingsout,smartmeterscanbelinkedtoefficientbuildings that automatically deploy grid-scale conservation. At times this isaccomplishedbysomethingassimpleasdimmingthelights.Negawatts,inotherwords, can now be ordered up by the utility and delivered by an Albertsons.Networkenoughofthesepower-saversintoaflexible,smartpieceofsoftware,andyouhaveyourplatform.This demand-response capacity, called DR in the business, not only brings

energy saved into themix of resources available to grid operators by literallymaking conservation count, but it is another non-thing slowly taking gridgovernancebystorm.Anditdoesn’tstandalone.Withcomputerizationdemand-responsecanbelinkedtoothermachinesformakingorsavingpowerthatwearecurrentlybuilding,willy-nilly,intothegrid.Mostofthesearepaidforbyamixofinterestedpartiesincludinginvestors,utilitycompanies(whichistosay,rate-payers), and state and federal subsidies. When enough of these scattered butexistingresourcesarenetworkedtogetheritispossibletocreatewhatiscalledavirtual power plant.Not a plant formaking virtual power, but a platform thatconnectseverythingavailabletoitandgetsitalltoworklikeapowerplant.Avirtualpowerplantcanlink,forexample,abigcoal-burningplanttoalocal

military base’smicrogrid to three cogeneration plants to seven smaller naturalgascombustion turbines to thirty-fivehundredrooftopsolar installations(threehundred of which also have deployable battery storage) to fourteen reliable,flexible,medium-scalenegawattproducerstothirtythousandelectriccars.Itcanthenuse the resources of each—generation, deployable efficiency, storage—to

balance out demand with production capacity throughout the system by themillisecond.Such interconnections between resources allows us to keep the idea of a

power plant without our necessarily needing the power plant itself. A virtualpowerplantisthusprimarilyanorganizationaltoolthatusesinformationaboutelectricity transmitted by electricity (digital smart meters most especially) torespondtotheebbandflowofpoweronthegridwithadegreeoftimelinessandnuance thatahumansimplycannotmatch.Wehavealwaysbeen tooslowforelectricity, but with smart meters, thousands upon thousands of distributedmicrosensorsandtherightcomputerprograms,wecanatlonglastdosomethingaboutit.Themain issue with virtual power plants isn’t bringing them to pass; they

alreadyexist.Therearesmallversionsrunningallovertheplace.Theproblemisgettingallthenecessarycomponentsintothemainstream(thecarsmostnotablyarestilllacking,butsmartapplianceswouldmakeabigdifferencetoo),gettingthem all to speak the same language, and figuring out how to move throughregulatory regimes and ownership blockades still in place from the twentiethcentury’sfarmoreproprietaryandcentralizedgrid.Ourfirstvisionforapossiblefutureofourgrid,outlinedinthelastchapter,

wasofamaterialsystemunimaginable tous,yetbeingdreamed, tinkered,andbuilt despiteour incapacity to see exactlywhere itmight all begoing.Virtualpowerplantsallowusapeekatavisionforthefutureofelectricalinfrastructurenearerathand—agridsojam-packedwithcomputerizationthatitsparkles.Thisgrid,however,wouldnotlookfuturistic.MuchlikethatsuburbanAlbertsons,itwould appear to the untrained eye to be identical to the grid we have. Therevolutionwouldnotbeoneofformbutoffunction.The technology for this largely already exists, and the processes thatmight

bringit topassarealreadybeingputintoplace.InOctober2015,theSupremeCourtheardoralargumentsinacasethatpittedtheFederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission (FERC, the folks charged with managing our grid nationally)against the Electric Power Supply Association (ERSA, which advocates forcompetition among power providers). At issue was precisely the question ofwhether awatt savedwouldbe compensated at the same rate as awattmade.Unlike the California case, where the legislature narrowed the state’spossibilitiesforgridreformbyexcludingthemosttroublesomeelementsoftheircurrentgridfromtheiraccounting,thiscaseisbeingadjudicatedinfullviewofthenation.Andthestakesforhowwemake,use,andvalueelectricpowerare

alsomuchhigher.Ifthecapacitytointegrateenergyefficiencyistobecomecentraltotheway

publicpowerismanagedinthiscountryandifvirtualpowerplantsaregoingtobeamongthemeansweusetonetworkourresources—thosethatproducepoweraswellasthosethatnegateorreduceconsumption—thenanegawattwillneedastablevalue.Itwillneedtobecomeacurrencywhosewortheveryonecanagreeuponsothatitmightbetransactedwithoutunreasonablerisk.TheFederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission,theonlyregulatorybodywitha

mandate to govern our electrical system, felt that a “commitment to reducedemand” should “be compensated the same amount as an equivalentcommitmentbygeneratorstoincreasesupply.”Thiswasnotjustaboutfairness,but also ameans ofmaking the grid amore integrativemachine.Or, in theirwords,“payingdemandresponseprovidersthefullvalueoftheircontributiontothe market would help overcome preexisting barriers to demand-responseparticipation and increase the reliability and competitiveness of wholesalemarkets.” Legislation can be used to wrench open rather than delimit whoparticipates in our grid, whether as producers of power or of savings. FERCselected the more difficult path, but the one that will force an inclusivity—atechnologicalaswellasafinancialproblem—intothesubstrateofourgrid.Theutilities,who are once again the ones struggling tomaintain something

likeaviablerevenuestream,beggedtodifferandsuedFERCforjurisdictionalimprudence.Theyargue“thatrealenergygeneratedbyrealpowerplantsshouldattractahigherprice,inordertostimulatemuch-neededinvestment.”Hereagainthe battle’s lines take a familiar form. Some people value stuff, real existingstuff,more thannon-stuff,nothings,andzeros thatcanbeadded,counted,andmade manifest. Others think that negative 1 should be seen as the equal andoppositeof1andthatwehaveastrongenoughmathematicalsystemalreadyinplace toaccount for,measure,andvaluewhat isn’t thereeverybitasmuchaswhatis.Thestakesforthegridofthisargumentiswhetherallthevariouspeopleproducing,saving,balancing,counting,andmakingaprofitoffofpowerwillbetied intoacommonsystemor ifonly thebigguyswith theirbigpowerplantswillmatter.Regardlessofwhatthecourtdecides(asthisbookgoestopresstheyare indeliberation),evenaminorshift inpriceormandatewillproducemajorripplesthroughanearfuturesystemformakinganddistributingelectricpower.If, in all of this, nothings can be given an agreed upon, transactional value

thenvirtualpowerplantsmighthelpusintegratealltheresourcesatourdisposal,material and immaterial, legislative and corporate, collective and individual—

suchthatthewholesystemrunsmoreefficiently.Inthiswaywemightradicallydiminish howmuch powerwe aremaking and equally radically increase howmuch of this power will come from renewable sources. These are the firstnecessary,ifsmallsteps,towardengineeringachangedenergylandscape.Inthisversionofthefuture,wegettokeepthebiggridforawhilelongerand

most everything familiar from it—wires, substations, long-distance AC andelectricitymarkets.Weprobablyevenkeeptheutilitycompaniesbyfiguringouthow topay themfor somethingother thanhowmuchpowerweconsume.Wecouldpaythemforgadgetsperhaps,orabasiclinefeeperconnectedmeter,orasconsultantstonewlyaggregatingtownsandnewlyorganizingmicrogrids,oras innovators in thestill turgidwatersofourenergyfuture.Theonly thingwelosewiththisnewversionofourgridisourrelianceoncentralstations.Big generationmight stick around (bigwind farms and big solar plants are

proof of that) but it needn’t. Computing has given us the capacity to tear theheartrightoutofthecenterofourgrid.Itdoesn’tneedaheart.Itcanworkwithamillionhearts,orahundredmillion, scattered to the fourwindsandbroughtintobalancebyreactive,sensitive,ubiquitoussoftware.Virtualpowerplantsandtheir kin, the Energy Cloud, do something that microgrids and nanogridsthreatentoundo.Theykeepthegridanditsgenericpowerforthepeople.Allofus,together.Withgoodbatterysystems,whicharejustnowreachingthelevelofeaseand

affordability that make them interesting to residential customers, Americanscould,liketheGermans,decidetodefectentirely.Andyetwearen’tdoingthis.Wemaybehappy to starve the systemof cashbypayingourmoney to somecompanythatisnotautility,butevensowestaypluggedintothegrid.Isuspectthisisn’tjustbecauseofacommunitarianspirit, thoughthereisabitofthatinthe mix. Rather, it is largely because “alternative energy” has been sold inAmericaasamoney-makingschemethatrenderseachhomesolarinstallationatiny factory forproducingwatts that areguaranteedby law tobepurchasedatmarketprice.Theseller—youorI—doesn’thavetodoathingtoinsurethis.Nomarketing, no sales pitches, no advertising campaigns, no haggling over theprice. Going off the grid would mean losing this income, and it would alsonecessarily involve investing a lot more money in home storage systems andothersmall-powersolutionsforbalancingtheunwieldyelectricaldemandsofasingle customer. Getting off the grid would, in other words, be costly andcomplicated, just as it has always been. Insull soldChicago on central stationpowertobeginwith,waybackattheturnofthelastcentury,onpreciselythese

same terms. Sharing, when it comes to electricity, is simpler and more costeffective,thandoingitforoneself.The pragmatics of this simple truth are the elementary bond that keeps us

together,but it’s aweakbond rather thana strongone. It isonlygoing togeteasier to get off the grid, especially if a customer base funnels its frustrationswith the current state of the grid toward technological, and business,developmentsthatfacilitatedefection.It’scomplicatedandexpensivetogetoffthegridtoday,butinfiveyears?Inten?IfwewanttokeepAmericawovenintoonenationofequalopportunity thenthegrid, its technologies,anditswardenswillneedtopaymoreattentiontowhatindividualsexpectoftheirinfrastructure.Thisisn’talwaysstraightforward,sinceAmericansingeneraldon’tseethegridfor the enabling technology that it is, but symptomatically, our actions can bereadandrespondedto.Onethingwecertainlydowantisawaytoyankthecordsoutofoureveryday

experienceofelectricity.Therearetwodevelopmentsonthisfrontthatwillsoonenter themainstream.The first is to integratewireless charging intomost flatthings,likeshelves,countertops,tables,andlampbases.Thiswon’tgetridoftheoutlet,aswe’llstillhavetoplugintheshelf,butitwillrendertheplugsonmostelectric devices irrelevant. There is nothing radical about wireless charging:electrictoothbrusheshavebeenusingthistechnologysincethe1990s,andmanyof the forklifts in America spend their nights on flat pads that charge themwirelessly while their operators sleep.Within a couple of years we won’t beplugging in any of our portable electronics thoughwewill still likely have totoss,orpark,themintherightspot.In2015,forexample,Ikearolledoutaseriesofsidetables,nightstands,and

lampswithwirelesschargingpadssothoroughlyintegratedintothemthatthey“simply blend in.” Though these are not yet optimized—they won’t chargeAppleproducts, for example, leaving theworld’s7million iPhoneusers stuckwiththeirports,plugs,andoutletsforalittlewhilelonger—theydoclearlypointtoward a future inwhich outletsmove us less and cords, adapters, and powerstripsarereduced,atlonglast,tonothing.Thesecond,andslightlymoreanxiety-producing,possibilityforthoseworried

about the effects of ambient electromagnetic radiation on their ball-shapedorgans is the wireless distribution of electricity. The desire for wirelesstransmissionisasoldasthegriditself,andthecapacitytoeffectthistransferofpower through thin air over short distances has been viable for just as long.Nikola Tesla, the quirky Serbian-born inventor who brought us alternating

currentinthe1880s,also,in1893,litthreebulbswirelesslyfromahundredfeetawayasapartoftheColumbianExpositioninChicago—aWorld’sFairdevotedtoelectriclightinginallitsmultitudinous,miraculousvariations.ThoughtheclaimthatTeslalitevenmorebulbs(rumorsaysahundred)even

morespectacularlyfromtheambientelectricityproducedbylightningstrikesupto twenty-fivemiles awayappears tobe spurious (invented, apparently,byhisbiographer),whatissureisthatTeslacould,justaswecantoday,moveaviableelectriccurrentacrossamodestsliceofair.Hewasequallydevoted,laterinhislife, to theprospectof long-distance remotepowerprojects thatused theearth“literally alive with electric vibrations” as a giant conductor and tetheredballoons, thirty thousand feet up in the atmosphere, to transmit electricity atbillionsofvoltsaroundtheworld.Hishopewastomakepossiblebothuniversalwirelessilluminationandinstantaneous,wirelesscommunicationbetweenplacesasfardistantasLondonandNewYork.Heisquotedassaying,insupportofthisundertaking:“It will soon be possible, for instance, for a businessman inNewYork to

dictateinstructionsandhavethemappearinstantlyinLondonorelsewhere.Hewillbeabletocallupfromhisdeskandtalkwithanytelephonesubscriberintheworld. Itwill onlybenecessary to carry an inexpensive instrument not biggerthanawatch,whichwillenable itsbearer tohearanywhereonseaor landfordistancesofthousandsofmiles.Onemaylistenortransmitspeechorsongtotheuttermostpartsoftheworld.”Thiswas1909.Acentury laterwecoulddoall these things.Theonly thing

wecouldn’tdowaswirelesslytransmittingtheelectricpowernecessarytokeepthis “device not bigger than a watch” running. The telecommunicationsrevolution that Tesla understood to be part and parcel of the mass, wireless,electrificationofalltheworldgrewtobeadreamsplitintwo.Everyonehascellphones,eveninplaceswithnothinglikeareliableelectricgrid.Butverylittleoftheworldhasthewirelesscommunicationofelectricitytopowerthem.Bethatasitmay,Tesla’sdreamstillseethesbelowthesurfaceofourwished-

for way of interacting with electrical infrastructure, even more so now thatwirelessesnesshasbecomesocommonplaceinsomanyotherdomainsofdailylife.Long-distance wireless transmission of electricity remains something of a

fantasy,Tesla’sowneffortswereneitherbetternorworsethananyoneelse’sonthis front. It turnsout,however, that short-distance transmission is a relativelystraightforwardproject,accordingtoCroatian-bornMartinSoljačič,aprofessor

atMIT.Soljačič has figured out a system that, though fairly different in its physics

fromTesla’s, hasmuch the same effect—thewireless transmission of enoughelectricity across empty air to light a bulb. Soljačič even put awooden boardbetweenhisbulbandthetransmitteranditstillemittedalovelyglow.Whatisremarkable about Soljačič’s system is that it doesn’t fill the air withelectromagnetic radiation, as Tesla’s system did, but rather uses magneticresonance,whichessentiallyonly allows the electricity sent topower adevicespecially “tuned” to receive it. This use of magnetic fields targetingappropriately chipped electronics helps these devices to sidestep knownproblemswithwirelesstransmissionviaelectricfields,whichhavealongrangebutpooraim,envelopingeverythinginathick,invisiblehazeofelectromagneticradiation.Since Soljačič worked out the basic physics of point-to-point wireless

transmissionin2007,thestart-upmarkethasexplodedwithproducts,marketingalliances,and livedemos.Competitorsaremergingoreatingeachotheras thestruggle to bring a viable wireless charger to market heats up.We don’t seemuchofthisyet,asthewinnersandlosersarestillbeingworkedoutbehindthescenes, but we will soon. Says Brian Krzanich, the CEO of Intel (which ispushing this technology hard): “Imagine a world where you can charge yourdeviceswhereveryouare.That’s theworld Iwant to live in.”This is aprettysafethingforhimtosayafteramassivesurveyconductedbyIntelacrossforty-five countries revealed that four of the most common complaints people hadabout their computing devices had to do with the cords. Given that we canalready transmit power wirelessly across about three feet of thin air with 90percentefficiency,intimewewill.

Taken together it canbe saidwith some certainty thatwe’d like thegrid tomoveusless, tobelesspolluting,moreadaptive,andmorereliable.We’dlikesystems change to bemore about responding to the powers to come and lesscommittedtomaintainingthepowersthatbe.We’dlikesomecontroloverhowour power is made and also some legible way to understand how it is used.Despiteallofthiswe’dalsopreferagrid—anelectricalsystem—incommon.There is no reason to believe that the spirit of the time, orienting all of us

towardthingswhichdonotexist,willabateinthenearfuture.Theoddsrather

predict the inverse. More wireless, more renewable, more portable, moreintegrated,and thusmore invisible technologies thatwemove, rather than thatmove(orworse,root)us.Neitheristherereasontobelievethatdespiteastrongculturalpreferencefortheinvisible,theimmaterial,andthehiddenthatwewillabandon the ideaofagrid incommon.What remains tobeseen is thepreciseshapethis infrastructurewill takeoncethesetwobiaseshavebeentwistedintoone.Myvote isforabeautifulone,minimallyinvasive, thatshinesrather thanglowersandthatiswroughtintotheleitmotifofthecenturyweareonlyjustnowsteppingintoinearnest.

Much has been made of errors and faults as signs of beauty in Japaneseaesthetics. Incontrast toWesternnotionsofbeauty thathaveeverything todowith symmetry, balance, and perfection, in Japan flaws and irregularities arehighlighted. And where they might otherwise be overlooked—a cracked potperfectlyrepaired—theyarebroughtdeliberately to theforeandmade tocatchtheeye. In thecaseof thebrokenpot, for example,goldorbright red lacquermightberubbedintotheseamswhenitismended.Sorudeisthisinterruptiontotheformofthethingthatonehardlyseestheoriginalpotanymore.Thetrace—asparklingvein;arivuletinbloodred—theseoutshinethefactthattheobjecthasregainedintegrity.Thefactofhavingbeenbrokeniswhatmatters.Thehistoryofathing—itsdifficultlife—ismadetobeapartofitsattraction.In the United States, that same pot, clumsily dropped and shattered into

shards,mightbecarefullyrepaired,theowner(epoxyinhand)takinggreatcareto find all the bits and to reunite them into a seamless, usable whole. Morelikely, though, the broken ceramic would be blithely swept up and depositedwithout ceremony in the trash can, and another bowlwould be bought on themorrow,orperhapsevenorderedonlinefornext-daydelivery.Americans don’t like dealing with remnants or with imperfect things. We

don’twant to see thatwhat now serves us perfectlywellwas once broken ordamaged.Wewantyouthandvigor,notoldageandastoriedlife.Repairisnotaculturalvalue.Replacementis.Andyet, ifwe are tomaintain agridwith anational, or evenhalf-national,

span,wewillneedtochangeourmindsaboutwhatconstitutesa“good”thing.Agoodthingmightverywellbeanoldthingwithveinsofgoldpressedintoallthecracks. Itmightbeamendedthingwith themends themselvesconstituting the

mostpreciouselementofthewhole.Ifwewant tokeepagrid forall,wemightbewise tomendourgrid likea

Japanesepot.Themostvaluablebits,thegoldenthreads,thetinymachines,werubintoalltheseams—thegluewouldmattermost.Inthecaseofthegrid,thisglueisn’trealgoldbutrathermillionsoftinymachines—microprocessors—thatwhenworkingtogetherhavethereactivecapacitytomakedecisions.Thesystemasawholewouldbegiventheapproximateintelligenceofatick,whichhasonlyfourorfivebasiccapacities:toclimb,tosmellfood,todrop,toseekwarmth,toeat. As Ronald Bogue points out, “The tick’s milieu is a closed world ofelements,outsideofwhichnothingelseexists”;neverthelessit’sstillawholelotsmarter,morecapable,andmoreflexiblethanahunkofrebarorapuddleoftar.This tick-bright grid would react and communicate well enough that itscomplexity might become its strength. And because it will have amicroprocessorpushedintoeverycrackitwillbeabletotakeanythingwecanthrowatit—variablegeneration,distributedgeneration,smallpower,bigpower,negawatts,nanogrids,mobilestorage,weirdweather—andintegratetheseintoaself-balancing, highly reliable system. Such a gridwould be something like anational (or half-national, or regional, orwhatever sizewe choose tomake it)computerinwhichallthatisold,rusty,andbrokenishealed,andheldtogether,bythedensestnetworkofintelligentagentsanywhereontheplanet.Not for long, of course, as ubiquitous computing is coming to, well …

everywhere.Thegridthatvirtualpowerplants,andtheirilk,imaginemakingpossible,the

gridtheirpromotersaretryingtobuildwithelbowgrease,agoldentongue,anddifficult-to-extract handshakes across the front lines of old battlefields, mightwell be the first step toward a larger, more ambitious project: a self-healing,processor-dense, “intelligent” grid. One that heralds a sort of immersivetechnologyourchildren’schildrenwill takeforgranted inmuchthesamewaythat Edison’s firstmile of wires and bulbs laid into themuck-thick streets ofManhattan a century and a half ago heralded the present age of “ubiquitous”electricity.In order for this new grid to come to pass, its architects, its dreamers, its

schemers, itsmalcontents, and itsmake-a-buckquicksterswill allneed to findtheirwayintothisvisionoffuturetechnology,notasanidealtoberealizedbutas a pragmatic route to the best possible end.Wealth, of course. Growth, ofcourse. Excess, of course. But also a chance for something more than thesestandardbusinessgoalsofstandardizedbusinesses.

It’s not hard to have a less polluting, less irritating, and more reliableelectricalsystemthantheonewehave.Whatishardisfiguringouthowtobringbig dreams, smart inventions, and popular will together with the entrenchedinterestsof thepowers thatcurrentlygovern,own,andmakeaprofit fromourgrid. The easiest way to do this is to force upon them, at every possibleopportunity, a radical openness to variety—to avoidCalifornia’s path,with itseyes closed to small power producers; to avoid England’s path,where a shiftawayfrombigcoal-burningplantshasresultedinagrid-scalerelianceondieselgenerators;andtoavoidGermany’spath,wheretheexploited(intheircase,thecompanies) have walked away from public power, taking their poolableresourceswiththem.Thefuturewewantisoneinwhichdifficultthingsareintegrated,evenwhen

thisisamoretroublesomeroutethanexcludingthem.Let’stakethemall,everyvariation on the theme of “grid”; let’s consider them all, every form of beliefabouthowelectricpowershouldbemadeandused(ornotmadeandnotused);and let’s integrate themall inaway thatdoes the leastplanetarydamageoverthelongterm.Awisegridisnotjustasmartgridrampedupalittlebit.Wisdomisnotthe

product of added computational power (though that helps). It’s a mode ofsystemsreformcapableofhearingwhatpeoplesay,noticingwhattheydo,andpremisingthoughtfulactionuponboth.Wisdom,whenspeakingofthegridnow,is about helping people accomplish well what they have already begun. It isaboutfollowingvectorsofdesireandmodesofactionforwardandthenbuildingtheseinattheleveloftheinfrastructureitself.Idon’tknowwhatAmerica’sgridwilllooklikeinthirtyyears.Nobodydoes,

precisely because in America today grid reform is a groundswell, it is barelyorganized; it has no single valance and no political party touting a particularpath.Therearecrusaders,buttheyarethesortthatgodoortodoorandasktheirneighborstojoininasolarco-op.Therearewarriors,buttheyarethesortwhopetition their local government to allow anyone to opt out of a smart meter.There are visionaries, but they are thinking about how the seven homes thatshare a transformer might organize themselves into a collective of diverseenoughgenerationandsignificantenoughstoragetokeepthelightsonthenexttimethebiggridblacksout.Thereareinventors,butoddsarethatthey’regoingtotellyouastoryaboutself-inflatinghydrogenballoonsinthedesert.Thefutureisacrapshoot.Ifwearesmartenough,itmightalsobeachancetocapturethecuttingedgeoftechnologicalinnovationandculturalimaginationandconcretize

itinthegriditself.Allthevisionsofubiquitoustechnology,sentientcities,chipseverywherecouldwelltaketheiralphaformintheelectricgrid.Itis,afterall,asNicola Tesla pointed out, not only a system for powering the world but alsoessentialtothelinesofcommunicationthatweaveoureconomies,ourlabor,andour imaginations together. Ifwearegoing tobring the InternetofThings intoourdaily lives, thenwhynotstartwith thebiggest thingofall?Thegrid, tick-brightandaglowwithpromise.

AfterwordContemplatingDeathintheAfternoon

As I write this, the power is out. It’s below freezing outside, though it’smidafternoononasunnydayinearlyspring.Ihaveacoupleofhoursofbatterypower left in my computer. I was using it for most of the morning withouthavingpluggeditin,thoughtherewasanoutletlessthanacord’slengthaway.Iam kickingmyself for that now. Despitemy computer’s pending demise, it’sdifficulttothinkofthispoweroutageasa“blackout”—thehouseisfloodedwithsunlight. There is no hint of darkness. For themoment, at least, everything isfine,exceptperhapsaslight,naggingirritationthatmysingulartaskforthelatterhalfof theday—writingapproximatelyfour thousandoverduee-mailreplies—hasjustbecomeimpossible.Nopower,ofcourse,meansthatthereisnoInternet,either.Despitethisnowunavoidablefailureofe-etiquette,Iammostlyworriedabout

thecold.Itwillbefineindoorsforacoupleofhours,butIhaveachildtofeedandhouseattheendoftheschoolday,andtonight’stemperaturesareheadingtodownintotheteens.Ourheatiselectric,ourstoveiselectric,ourhotwaterheaterelectric;Imay

bewritingabookabout thegrid,butI, likealmosteveryoneelse,alsohavetolivewithit.Itismyintimate.Thegrid’sgooddaysanditsbaddaysstructuremylife,mycapacity towork,my reputation,myability tocare formy family. Itsmaterialquirksformtheundulationsofmyworry.Andtonight,astheblackoutbecomesreal,I’llwrapmyselfandthethickestofourblanketsaroundmyson’ssmallbody.Ashesleeps,I’llreadbycandlelightabookaboutmenslowlydyingofthirstinthemiddleofthePacificOcean(notahappystory)andI’llwonderifthisisustoo.Weliveinaseaofelectricity.Ourgrid,fornow,isthemeansweusetobring

this electricity home. It warms and nourishes us. It makes life in extremeenvironments likeFargoandPhoenix livable, evencomfortable.Despitebeingsurrounded by this abundance of power, ifwe cannotmake themeans to thiselectricity, more reliably our own, we, too, could die of “thirst.” It does notmatterhowmuchwaterisinthesea,orhowmuchelectricitywegenerate,ifthat

waterisnotdrinkableandthatelectricityisnotdelivered.I havewritten thisbookas anoptimist, thedreamsof abetter future are so

strong, so palpable, so motivating. And then the power goes out and I, likealmosteveryoneelse,don’thaveabackupsysteminplace.Nosolarpanels,nobankofbatteries,nodieselgenerator,nogasheater, thoughIdohavea rotaryphone (this much I learned from the Straws). It’s the second decade of thetwenty-first century, in one of the richest countries in the world. It is time, Ithink,forustodobetterthanthis.

Acknowledgments

IntheearlydaysofthisprojectIspentagreatdealoftimeinterviewingexpertsin every domain of grid governance, innovation, and upkeep, going toconferencesandpublictalks,andgenerallylearningfromtheknow-howofthosewhohavespenttheirlivesinthemidstofthisinelegantifremarkablemachine.Icannotnameyouallhere,butletitbeknownthatyourwisdomwasinvaluableto my own understanding. Special thanks to the Huntington Library for theirgenerous support of research in their archives, and in the papers of SouthernCaliforniaEdisonmostparticularly.Thegridiscomplex,impossiblyso;despitethewisestadvicefromthesagest

minds, I have most certainly gotten things wrong, though I hope only littlethings.Theseerrorsaremyown.Specialthanksgotomystupendousagent,SusanRabiner,withoutwhomthis

anthropologist’s dream of telling the story of a vast and unwieldy systemdifferentlywouldneverhavemadeitswayintoprint.Andalsotomyeditors,ofwhomthereweremany,eachandeveryonehaving lefthisorhermark in theform and unfolding of the story herein. It is a much better work for theircollectedefforts.Last,itissaidthatineveryrelationshipthereisagardenerandaflower.ForalltheyearsIhavespentpickingthegridapartandfindingawaytogiveitoverintowords,myhusband,JulienWeiss,hasbeenthatgardener,andIamintenselygrateful.The transformation that the grid has undergone during the six years I spent

researchingandwritingthisbookarealmostinconceivableintheirscope.Icanonly hope nothing slows down (or breaks down) as we abandon the grindingroutetowardreformingourenergyinfrastructureandoptforthefull-onsprint.

Notes

INTRODUCTIONstill goes into cars: “To achieve the emissions goals,” theNew York Times tells its readers, “the entire

economy, including transportation,needs tobeelectrifiedasmuchaspossible.Thatmightmeancarsrunning on batteries, but it could also mean cars running on hydrogen, created by using nighttimeelectricityfromnuclearreactorsorwindturbinestosplitwatermolecules.Eitherway,theimplicationisthattheinternal-combustionenginethathaspoweredcarssincethenineteenthcenturyisatechnologicaldeadendinthetwenty-first.SocountriesliketheUnitedStatesthatarespendingalotofefforttryingtomakegasolinecarsmoreefficientmaybegoingdownablindalley.”JustinGillis,“APathforClimateChange, Beyond Paris,” New York Times, December 1, 2015,http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/12/01/science/197816081961044065765.embedded.html. Seealso Justin Gillis, “Short Answers to Hard Questions About Climate Change,” New York Times,November 28, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/28/science/what-is-climate-change.html.

are remarkably oblivious to it: So deemed by the National Academy of Engineering in its “GreatestEngineeringAchievementsoftheTwentiethCentury,”www.greatachievements.org.

(its infrastructure for itself): Like Texas, which has preserved an independent electrical infrastructureunlinkedtothoseofitsneighbors,Quebecalsohasanelectricgridallitsown.LocatedintheCanadianprovincemostlikelytosecede,it’sthebestinNorthAmerica.

anAmericanpowerplant:Thisstatistic is taken fromCampbell2012,ascited in“EconomicBenefitsofIncreasingGridResiliencetoWeatherOutages”(Washington,D.C.:ExecutiveOfficeofthePresident,August2013),7,aswellas“FrequentlyAskedQuestions:HowOldAreU.S.NuclearPowerPlantsandWhen Was the Last One Built?” U.S. Energy Information Administration, February 20, 2015,https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=228&t=21.

from 15 in 2001 to 78 in 2007 to 307 in 2011: In the first six months of 2014 alone, there were 130significantoutages.Comparethistothepreviousfourteenyears’worthofoutages:

174in2013 123in2010 78in2007 93in2004 15in2001196in2012 97in2009 91in2006 61in2003 30in2000307in2011 149in2008 85in2005 23in2002

JordanWirfs-Brock,“Data:Explore15YearsofPowerOutages,”InsideEnergy,August28,2014,

http://insideenergy.org/2014/08/18/data-explore-15-years-of-power-outages/. See also ChristineHertzog, “Why Climate ChangeWill Force a Power Grid Makeover,”GreenBiz, August 23, 2013,http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2013/08/23/climate-change-power-grid-makeoever.

679 between 2003 and 2012: “Economic Benefits of Increasing Grid Resilience to Weather Outages”(2013).

Germanyat15:CraigMorris,“GermanGridMostReliableinEurope,”RenewablesInternational,July19,2011, http://www.renewablesinternational.net/german-grid-most-reliable-in-europe/150/407/31462. ForKorea and Japan, see Andy Bae, “Blackout in Seoul,” Navigant Research, October 4, 2011,http://www.navigantresearch.com/blog/blackout-in-seoul.

BecausetheUnitedStatesdoesn’taggregateitsstatisticsnationallywhenitcomestoannualoutageminutes,theestimatesvarywildly,fromabout1.5hours(fortheMidwest)to9hours.MeaganClark,“AgingU.S.PowerGridBlacksOutMoreThanAnyOtherDevelopedNation,”InternationalBusinessTimes, July 17, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/aging-us-power-grid-blacks-out-more-any-other-developed-nation-1631086; and “Power Blackout Risks: RiskManagement Options,”Emerging RiskInitiative—Position Paper (CRO Forum, November 2011),https://www.allianz.com/v_1339677769000/media/responsibility/documents/position_paper_power_blackout_risks.pdf

it’slessthantenminutesandshrinking:PeterAsmus,“HowMicrogridsImproveGridReliabilityandCityResilience,”GreenBiz,December5,2012,http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2012/12/05/how-microgrids-build-resiliency-extreme-weather.

“without power for two or more hours”:Massoud Amin, “WhyWe Need Stronger, Smarter ElectricalGrids,” GreenBiz, July 29, 2014, http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/07/30/why-we-need-stronger-smarter-electrical-grids.

squirrelsmostespecially:“LongmontPower&Communications,whichserves35,000customersnorthofDenver, says that more than 90 percent of its significant outages are caused by squirrels.” BarbaraCarton, “Fried Squirrel Fails to Find FavorWith Public Utilities,”Wall Street Journal, February 4,2003,http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1044309659373124584.

burnandthenhavenomore:“Stockresourcesarethoseresourceswhose‘totalphysicalquantitydoesnotincreasesignificantlywithtime…eachrateofusediminishessomefuturerate.’…Flowresourcesarethose resourceswhereofdifferentunitsbecomeavailable foruseatdifferent intervals…thepresentflowdoes not diminish future flow, and it is possible tomaintain use indefinitely provided the flowcontinues”MauriceKelso,“TheStockResourceValueofWater,”JournalofFarmEconomics43,no.5(December1961):1112.

of the power on our grid: 38.5 percent coal, 27.3 percent natural gas, and 0.7 percent petroleum. From“2014 Renewable EnergyData Book” (National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) of the U.S.Department of Energy, November 2015), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/64720.pdf, 10. See also“FrequentlyAskedQuestions:What IsU.S. ElectricityGeneration by Energy Source?”U.S. EnergyInformationAdministration,March31,2015,https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3.

solarpoweraremosteffectivelyproduced: It isarguable thatwind-poorandsun-poor locationscloser towherepeopleliveanduseelectricitymaywellhavesufficientlyrobust(ifmiddlingly)resourcestomeetdemand.PersonalconversationwithAmoryLovins,May2016.

to replace the retiring fleet: Karl Mathiesen, “Gas Surges Ahead of Coal in U.S. Power Generation,”Guardian, July 14, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jul/14/gas-surges-ahead-of-coal-in-us-power-generation.

for the climate than coal: There is some argument over the accuracy of these numbers. According toMichaelObeiter,aseniorassociateintheWorldResourcesInstitute’sclimateprogram.“There’snotalotofgooddataformethaneleakagenationwide,butit’sprobablylessthan3.2percent.TheEPAGHG[greenhousegas] Inventoryestimates roughly1.2percentorso,butmanyhave taken issuewith theirmethodology.”SeealsoRamónA.Alvarez et al., “GreaterFocusNeededonMethaneLeakage fromNatural Gas Infrastructure,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109, no. 17 (2012):6435–40. Gal Luft, an adviser to the United States Energy Security Council, points out: “Thegreenhouseeffectofmethaneisabout17timesthatofcarbondioxide.However,weknowthat if theoverflow ratio exceeds 2 percent methane, the greenhouse effect of shale gas mining may be moreseverethancoal.Currentmeasurementshaverecorded2.5percent,3percentand10percent.Currently,wearestillunclearoftheexactmeasurements;manybasicproblemsofshalegasdevelopmenthaveyettobesolved.”WangErdeWeiWei,“Nuclear,NotFracking,IstheAnswertoChina’sFutureEnergyNeeds,” China Dialogue, July 25, 2013, https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/6228-Nuclear-not-fracking-is-the-answer-to-China-s-future-energy-needs-.

nuclearpowerdevelopment:WeiWei(2013).“willneedtobereplacedbynewplants”:JamesE.Rogers, inhisforewordtoPeterFox-Penner’sSmart

Power Anniversary Edition: Climate Change, the Smart Grid, and the Future of Electric Utilities(Washington,D.C.:IslandPress,2014),xv.

twentytimesasmuchsolar:ThesenumbersarefromanAugust2015speechbyBarackObamaintroducinghis“CleanPowerPlan,”theaimofwhichis toreducecarbonemissionsby2030to32percent lowerthan theywere in2005.Powerplantsare responsible foraboutone thirdofcurrentcarbonemissionsnationally, and thus the plan should have a noteworthy impact on plant retirements, upgrades, andchoices of replacement technology. Since the plan also addresses methane emissions, a significantportionofwhichoccurduringtheextractionofnaturalgas,itwillalsoaffectthecostofusingnaturalgasasareplacementforcoalornuclear.

about7percentoverall:Tobeprecise,nonhydrorenewableenergysourcesamountto6.76percent.Windaccountsfor4.42percent,biomasswoodfor1.04percent,biomasswastefor0.52percent,geothermalfor 0.39 percent, and 0.39 percent is from solar. “How Much U.S. Electricity Is Generated fromRenewable Energy?” U.S. Energy Information Administration, June 12, 2015,http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/renewable_electricity.cfm.

it’sastunning30percent:“U.S.WindEnergyStateFacts,”AmericanWindEnergyAssociation,accessed

September15,2015,http://www.awea.org/resources/statefactsheets.aspx?itemnumber=890.droppedtonegative64¢:EricWieser,“ERCOTSetsWindGenerationOutputRecordSunday,Real-Time

Power Prices Move Negative,” Platts McGraw Hill Financial, September 14, 2015,http://www.platts.com/latest-news/electric-power/washington/ercot-sets-wind-generation-output-record-sunday-26208539.

hasmorethandoubled:Itwas3percentin2009,accordingtoDr.StephenChu,theNobelPrize–winningphysicist and former U.S. secretary of energy who spoke at Grid Week in Washington, D.C. (seechapter1).

Maineisaimingfor40percent:JocelynDurkay.“StateRenewablePortfolioStandardsandGoals”NationalConference of State Legislatures. October 14, 2015, http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx.

Hawaiiisaimingfor100percent:AriPhillips,“HawaiiAimsfor100PercentRenewableEnergyby2040,”RenewEconomy,March 13, 2015, http://reneweconomy.com.au/2015/hawaii-aims-for-100-renewable-energy-by-2040.

“month’sworthofpurchases”:W.KemptonandL.Montgomery,“FolkQuantificationofEnergy,”Energy7(10)1982:817–27.

“benefits of their actions”: Kathryn Janda, “Buildings Don’t Use Energy: People Do,” ArchitecturalScienceReview54,2011:15–22.

wouldhavehappilyleftbehind:WecanseethishistoryofunevendevelopmentinVermont,wherein1920only 10 percent of the farms in that state had electricity; by the start of the Great Depression, thepercentagehadrisento1in3.InthedecadeafterthepassageoftheRuralElectrificationAct(1936),mostofthestate’sruralresidentshadelectricalpower,intheirmilkingparlorsifnotyetintheirhomes.Andin1963—almostahundredyearsafterAmerica’sfirstelectriclight—itsfinaltwotowns,GranbyandVictory,Vermont,gottheirwiresandbecameapartofourgrid.Thisisjustoneexample,butit’sanimportantone:electrificationwasnotanall-at-onceaffair;insomespotsitshistoryisfarthinnerthaninothers. From a radio commentary by Vic Henningsen on Vermont Public Radio, August 27, 2015,http://digital.vpr.net/post/henningsen-statewide-service.

“worksinpractice,butnotintheory”:AlexandravonMeier,“ElectronicPowerSystems,”September17,2010,PublicLecturei4EnergySystems,UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley.

America,didn’tknowhowtochange:Inpart,accordingtoRichardHirsh,utilityhiringpracticesselectedfortherisk-averse,noncreative,bottomoftheengineeringbarrel.Thisledtoconservativereactionstonewproblems.RichardHirsh,TechnologyandTransformationintheAmericanElectricUtilityIndustry(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1989).

(utility since the Depression): The California blackouts in 2000–2001 were not caused by degradedinfrastructurebutbyaperfectstormofbadlegislation,criminalprofit-mongering,andpoorlydesignedinfrastructure(seechapter4).

“emissionsofgreenhousegasses”:“EconomicBenefitsofIncreasingGridResiliencetoWeatherOutages”

(2013),3.constructing eighty-three new microgrids: “Microgrid Deployment Tracker 4Q15,” Navigant Research,

accessed December 15, 2015, https://www.navigantresearch.com/research/microgrid-deployment-tracker-4q15.

CHAPTER1:TheWayoftheWindpower4.5millionhouseholdsannually:TheFoundationforWater&EnergyEducationestimatesthatthere

isthepotentialtoproduce100,000MWintheGorge,thoughthiswouldrequireblanketingmuchoftheavailable space with turbines. “Wind Farms & Northwest Energy Needs,”Foundation for Water &Energy Education, accessed December 1, 2013, http://fwee.org/nw-hydro-tours/how-wind-turbines-generate-electricity/wind-farms-northwest-energy/.

any fuelwill do:Dried cow dung, like oil, is a negligible source of electricity production in theUnitedStates.

overthesunjustasquickly:Theproblemwithsolarpower,andtoalesserdegreewindpower,isn’tonlythesedramatic instancesof totalcloudcoverorbreeze-to-stillness,butalso thatgenerationisactuallyveryjiggly.Solarpaneloutputshiftsfiveorsixtimesaminute,andafieldofsolarpanelsdoingthisinsyncisdifficultforthegrid’sautomationtobalance.

a full twenty-four hours to turn either up or down: Eric Hittinger, J. F. Whitacre, and Jay Apt,“CompensatingforWindVariabilityUsingCo-LocatedNaturalGasGenerationandEnergyStorage,”CarnegieMellonElectricityIndustryCenterWorkingPaperCEIC-10–01(December2010).

cangotoMars:55.8millionmilesinfiveminutes.Mars’sdistancevariesfromEarth;sometimesit’scloserthan this,sometimesfartheraway.But itwouldn’tbewrongtosay thatonagoodday,underperfecttransmissionconditions,wecouldsendacurrentfromIndianatotheredplanetinaboutfiveminutes.

beforeitssixtysecondsareup:The2003blackoutoftheEasternSeaboard,thethird-largestblackoutinthishistoryof theplanet,essentiallyhappened in thirtyof thesecondsbetween4:11and4:12p.m.Therewerealotofproblemsleadinguptotheseverybadthirtyseconds,buttheimbalancethattippedoverintodarknesspropagatedinaboutthetimeittakestodrawinabreath.

meltwater aremore than sufficient:On an average blustery day, thewind power in theGorge producesenoughpowerforthreetimesasmanypeopleasliveinOregon.

“Northwesthaseverexperienced”:TedSickinger,“TooMuchofaGoodThing:GrowthinWindPowerMakes Life Difficult for Grid Managers,” Oregonian, July 17, 2010,http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2010/07/too_much_of_a_good_thing_growt.html.

letthewateroutthroughspillways:ThereisalsopumpedstorageontheColumbia,andexceptingyearsofextremedroughtthisisallalsofullinMay.

from dinner plates toGrandma’smemory bin: Full disclosure:my father, Bill Bakke, did this (made itillegal for the spillways to operate in the spring). He is not well loved by many in the electricity

industry, but we as a nation still eat a lot of Pacific salmon, and without this law the palates of agenerationwouldalreadybeotherwise.

ferociousspeedsintheonslaughtofwildair:Mostnewerwindturbinescanbeturneddownviaadjustmentstopitchandyaw,thiswasnotsomuchthecasein2010.Suchabasictechnologicalimprovementisoneofthemanysmallthingsunderwaythatmaketheintegrationofvariablerenewablesintoournationalelectricitysystemincreasinglyplausible.

care for the grid: In 2013, 42 percent of Spain’s electricity demand was covered by renewables, 21.2percent wind, 3.1 percent solar photovoltaic, 1.7 percent solar thermoelectric, 2 percent renewablethermal, and 14.2 percent hydroelectric. “Corporate Sustainability Report 2013: 4. Committed toSecurityofSupply,EfficientManagementandInnovation”(RedEléctricaCorporación,May7,2014),http://www.ree.es/sites/default/files/02_NUESTRA_GESTION/Documentos/memoria-2013/English/RC/RC13_07_en.pdf.Despite thiscentralization,Spain’sgridsuffersfromsimilarkindsofproblemsasIberdrolafacesinOregon.Forexample,aroundEaster2013,Spainsaw“extremelylowdemand,highproductionofhydroelectricitywithdumpinginsomebasins,andahighproduciblewindpower… Given this scenario, to ensure system security it was necessary to give orders to reduceproductiontoalevelnotseentodate.Thesereductionsaffected,amongothers,nuclearproductionanexceptional fact [sic]andunprecedentedsince1997.”“CorporateSustainabilityReport2013” (2014),53.

machinesareturnedonandrunning:Therewere2,760turbinesin2011,sothreethousandin2014isaneducated guess. Miriam Raftery, “A Walk Through the Wind Farm with Iberdrola,” East CountyMagazine,April2012.http://www.eastcountymagazine.org/walk-through-wind-farm-iberdrola.

electricitythesemachinesmake:Someofthishastodowithmoney,butalotofithastodowiththewaythe utilities are run and managed. Historically they have been given a form—the so-called “naturalmonopoly”—that is slow to change, innovate, or cede power to anyone else. This is history and theprincipaltopicofchapters3and4.

line out to the site:The largestwind farm inTexas as of 2015was theRoscoeWindFarm, owned andoperatedbyE.ONClimateandRenewables,whichbeganoperating in2009.EileenO’Grady,“E.ONCompletes World’s Largest Wind Farm in Texas,” Reuters, October 1, 2009,http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/01/wind-texas-idUSN3023624320091001#1Oc6qUxRCSELa3Zr.97.

“Theturbinesinstalledatthefarmrangeinbetween350ftand415fttall,andstand900ftapart.Outofthetotal number of turbines employed, 209 were the Mitsubishi 1000A model, with a rated output of1.0MW.” From “Roscoe Wind Farm,” Power Technology, accessed November 8, 2015,http://www.power-technology.com/projects/roscoe-wind-farm/.

1.5MWGEmodel:“ThewidelyusedGE1.5-megawattmodel,forexample,consistsof116-ftbladesatopa212-ft towerforatotalheightof328feet.Thebladessweepaverticalairspaceofjustunderanacre.The1.8-megawattVestasV90fromDenmark isalsocommon.Its148-ftblades(sweepingmore than

1.5acres)areona262-fttower,totaling410feet.AnothermodelbecomingmorecommonintheU.S.isthe2-megawattGamesaG87fromSpain,whichsports143-ftblades(justunder1.5acres)ona256-fttower,totaling399feet.”“FAQ:OutputfromIndustrialWindPower,”NationalWindWatch,accessedNovember8,2015,https://www.wind-watch.org/faq-output.php.

“TheaveragenameplatecapacityofnewlyinstalledwindturbinesintheUnitedStatesin2014was1.9MW, up 172 percent since 1998–1999.” From “2014Wind TechnologiesMarket Report” (U.S.Department of Energy, August 2015), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/08/f25/2014-Wind-Technologies-Market-Report-8.7.pdf.

“done right it’s ahugeopportunity”:Thesequotes are from theSickinger (2010) article.Manizer and Imostly talked about domestic hotwater heaters andhow tomake interregional power swaps like theWesternDoughnutthenorm.Theseissuesareaddressedinchapters8and9.

fromrenewableresourcesin2012:Anegligiblyhigher13percentin2014.“HowMuchU.S.ElectricityIsGeneratedfromRenewableEnergy?”(2015).

asawholein2014was6.76percent:“HowMuchU.S.ElectricityIsGeneratedfromRenewableEnergy?”(2015).

Dakotas,Iowa,andWestTexas:ThomasP.Hughes,NetworksofPower:ElectrificationinWesternSociety(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1983).

75 percent of all: “U.S. Wind Energy State Facts,” American Wind Energy Association, accessedSeptember15,2015,http://www.awea.org/resources/statefactsheets.aspx?itemnumber=890.

a3,000percentincreaseinasingleyear:Thesenumbersarefromthe2012RenewableEnergyDataBook(National Renewable Energy Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy, October 2013),http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/60197.pdf.

“therewillbeblackouts”:CoralDavenport,“AChallengefromClimateChangeRegulations,”NewYorkTimes,April 22, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/business/energy-environment/a-challenge-from-climate-change-regulations.html.

“grid designed for the previous century”: Evan Halper, “Power Struggle: Green Energy versus a GridThat’s Not Ready,” Los Angeles Times, December 2, 2013,http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/02/nation/la-na-grid-renewables-20131203.

CHAPTER2:HowtheGridGotItsWiresduring the previousweeks: I use the term “electrocution” here, but in the early days of electricity. “No

standardwordshadyetbeenadoptedforkillingordeathbyelectricity.OnesponderedbytheNewYorkTimesincludedelectromort,thanelectrize,celectricise,electricide,electropoenize,fulmen,voltacus,andelectrocution.” Nicholas Rudduck, “Life and Death by Electricity in 1890: The Transfiguration ofWilliamKemmler,”JournalofAmericanCulture21,no.4(1998):86,note8.

without being properly understood: On August 1, 1890, William Kemmler, a convicted murderer and

inveteratedrunk,wasputtothechairandslowlyroastedtodeathoveraperiodofabouteightminutes.DespiteEdison’sassurances(forhehaddesignedandbuiltthechair)thatKemmler’swouldbeaswift,humane, and painless death, and despite the fact that the chair had been tested and retested andelectricityofvaryingvoltageshadbeenusedtoefficientlykillallmannerofthings,fromstraydogstoaretiredcircuselephant,Kemmlerdidnotgooutasplanned. Itwasnothissize thatwas theproblem;Kemmlerwasathinman,petitebytoday’sstandards.Norwasitalackofsufficientvoltageonthecoal-fed, steam-powered 1,680-volt dynamo used to power the chair. The problem was that the wireconnectingthechairintheAuburnprisontothedynamoinitsbasementwasalsobeingusedthatdaytolightthirty-sixbulbsstrunginparallel,whichcollectivelysiphonedoffaboutathousandvolts,leavingameretrickleofelectricalcapacityforthechair.WhatremainedwasenoughtokillKemmlereventually,butcertainlynotenoughtokillhimfast.ItwasahighlypublicizedhorrorthateffectivelyendedThomasEdison’scareer.

its ineffable physics:GérardBorvon,Histoire de L’électricité:De L’ambre à L’électron (Paris:Vuibert,2009),1.

somethinglikeaninstant:Thefirstworkingtelegraphsappearedinthe1830s,whilethe1850sto1870ssawtheadventofintermittentlyfunctionaltransatlantictelegraphy.

displaced a less effective technology: Or as Isaac Asimov once said, “No steam engine or internalcombustionengine,howeverpowerfulorhoweverperfect,couldrunatelevisionset(intheabsenceofelectricity)with thedirect simplicity electricitymakes available to us.”Froma funny little pamphletpublishedbytheU.S.AtomicEnergyCommission:IsaacAsimov,“ElectricityandMan”(UnitedStatesAtomic Energy Commission Office of Information Services, 1972),http://www.osti.gov/includes/opennet/includes/Understanding%20the%20Atom/Electricity%20and%20Man.pdf19.

with it remotely fueled electric lighting: The power plant built at Niagara Falls was turned on in 1895,thoughitdidnotbegintotransmitpowertoBuffalountil1896.

alwayssecondarytothestory:Thefirst“modern”dynamoforuseinindustrywasinventedindependentlybythreedifferentmenin1866;thoughFaradaygetsthetruecreditintheearly1830sforamachinethatmakeselectricity,hisdesignwasnotaprecursorofthenext-generationmachines,eventhoughhisideaswereessentialtothese.

byincandescentbulbs:HereRichardMoranwasquotingareporterfromtheNewYorkTimesinhisbookExecutioner’sCurrent:ThomasEdison,GeorgeWestinghouse,andtheInventionoftheElectricChair(NewYork:VintageBooks,2002),45.

butitwasagrid:JamesC.Williams,EnergyandtheMakingofModernCalifornia(Akron,OH:UniversityofAkronPress,1997),170.

3,000-candlepower arc lamps: 3,000 candlepower is a imprecise way to gesture toward the light threethousandcandleswouldemitif theywereall intheexactsamespot.Thoughthereisnogoodwaytoconvertfromcandlepowertothebrightnessmeasurewearemostusedto—thatofa100-wattbulb—asa

rough estimate, one 60-watt electric bulb generates the light of approximately a hundred candles.A3,000-candlepower arc lampwould thusgenerate the lightof something like an1,800-watt bulb. JonHenley, “Life Before Artificial Light,” Guardian, October 31, 2009,http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/oct/31/life-before-artificial-light.

toextractionsites:Williams(1997),172.bulbsstrunginparallel:The52bulbsEdisonhadturnedonintheNewYorkTimeseditorialofficewerein

additiontothe106hehadstrungupinJ.P.Morgan’sofficeonWallStreet.Munson(2005),18.“90percentofhislabor”:Munson(2005),10.OriginalquotefromPaulIsrael,Edison:ALifeofInvention

(NewYork:JohnWiley&Sons,1998).they buzzed disagreeably: Michelle Legro, “The Age of Edison: Radical Invention and the Illuminated

World,” Brain Pickings, February 28, 2013, http://www.brainpickings.org/2013/02/28/the-age-of-edison/. See also Ernest Freeberg, The Age of Edison: Electric Light and the Invention of ModernAmerica(NewYork:Penguin,2013).

range of human hearing: Sound researcher R. Murray Schafer discovered that when American andCanadian students were asked, during meditation in a deeply relaxed state, to sing whatever toneseemedtoarisemostnaturallyfromthecenteroftheirbeings,themostfrequentresponsewasBnatural.StudentsinGermanyandotherEuropeancountriestendedtohumGsharp.InAmericaandCanada,ourelectricity operates on an alternating current of 60 cycles per second. This resonant frequencycorrespondstotheBnaturaltoneonthemusicalscale.InEurope,theelectricalcurrentis50cyclespersecond,correspondingmusicallytoGsharp.Exposedforalifetimetothesilentnoiseinourwalls,lightfixtures, and appliances, we begin to hum right along with our electricity. R. Murray Schafer, TheTuningoftheWorld(Toronto:McClellandandStewart,1977),99.

subdividing an electric current: William J. Broad, “Subtle Analogies Found at the Core of Edison’sGenius,” New York Times, March 12, 1985,http://www.osti.gov/includes/opennet/includes/Understanding%20the%20Atom/World%20Within%20Worlds%20The%20Story%20of%20Nuclear%20Energy%20Vol.1.pdf

allpathwaysareequal:Curiously,thisqualityofelectricitystillconfoundsregularpeopletryingtoregulateandlegislatethegrid.Itisveryhardforustowrapourheadsaroundthefactthatelectricitywilltakeallpathsavailabletoitsimultaneously,withnopreferenceforwhatappearslogicaltous:theshorter,moredirectroute.Asweshallseeinchapter5,thisbecamearealproblemduringthe2003blackout.

turned off your TV: SteveWirt, “The Series Circuit,”Oswego City School District Regents Exam PrepCenter,1998,http://www.regentsprep.org/Regents/physics/phys03/bsercir/default.htm.

otherpathsremainopen:Asresistanceinaparallelcircuitsystemincreases—when,forexample,youplugfivepowerstrips,eachcontainingfivepowercords,intoonepowerstripandplugthatintoasinglewalloutlet—currentactuallyincreases.Thiscanleadtounexpectedconflagrations!Thisiswhy,whenyouwereeightandattendingmandatoryfiresafetyclasses,theyurgedyounottoplugtoomuchstuffintoasingleoutlet.

flickered to light in 1882:Technically, his first actual gridwas the one he built to light hisMenloPark

laboratory,butPearlStreetwasthefirstpublicinstallation.contemporary15-wattbulb:Ifyouhaveseenavintage“Edison”incandescentinastoreorhanginginyour

favorite bar, youknow the relativebrightness of thesebulbs fairlywell.Theyweredimenough thatbuildingcodesdemandinglightwellswerenotchangeduntilwellintothe1940s,whenfluorescentbulbsbecamemorereadilyavailable.CarolWillis,FormFollowsFinance:SkyscrapersandSkylinesinNewYorkandChicago(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonArchitecturalPress,1995).

populated as lowerManhattan: Pearl Street was designed to light a tiny tranche of lowerManhattan—principallyWallStreetbutalsotheofficesoftheNewYorkTimes,thoseofEdison’sprimaryinvestor,J.PierpontMorgan,aswellasthoseofhislawyerandprincipleadvocate.

areaaroundPearlStreet:NewYorkhadnearto200,000horsesinthelate1800s,eachofwhichlaiddownathicklayer(upto30poundsperday)ofhorseshitovereverycobbleofeverystreet,andthevalleysbetween the buildings were filled with sparrows feasting on the remnant grass seeds in this equineeffluvia.Theflieswerealesspoeticaccompaniment.

otherforeigncountries:“TheBrushElectricLight”ScientificAmerican44(14).April2,1881.intothe1920s:Hughes(1983).Edison inventedhisown:MichaelB.Schiffer,PowerStruggles:ScientificAuthorityand theCreationof

PracticalElectricityBeforeEdison(Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress,2008),289.carbonized bamboo filaments:MaggieKoerth-Baker,Before the LightsGoOut:Conquering theEnergy

CrisisBeforeItConquersUs(Hoboken,NJ:JohnWiley&Sons,2012),18.Theelectriclightbulbwas“invented”byatleasttwenty-twopeoplebeforeanimprovedversionwassuccessfullycommercializedbyThomasEdisonin1879.Henley(2009).

early-autumn rains:Curiously, this is anEastCoast andMidwestern problem,where streams have highvolumesofwaterbut runoverminimalelevation. In theSierra,wherewater-poweredelectricitywasvery common by the time Appleton got its grid, water runs at low volume but over large shifts inelevation. This, coupledwith the gradualmelting of snowpack over the spring and summermonths,yields a surprisinglyeven flowofwater and thus constantvoltage for the lighting systems.Williams(1997),171.

Wisconsin’sfledglingutility:Freeberg(2013),155.By1910thecostofabulbhadcomedownto17cents.unitofelectrical tension:Thisunitofelectrical tensionwasnamedafter the ItalianpolymathAlessandro

Volta (1734–1827), who invented the first electric battery (the eponymous Voltaic pile) and in theprocessproved that electricity couldbe chemicallygenerated.He attracted the attentionofNapoleonBonaparte, who summoned him to Paris in 1801 to present his work at a séance at the Institute ofFrance.By the timeBonapartewasemperornineyears later,hewassoenamoredwithVolta thatherefusedhisattemptstoretirefromhisprofessorshipattheUniversityofPavia,stating:“agoodgeneraloughttodieonthefieldofhonor.”BesetwithhonorsandflatteringinvitationsfromalloverEurope,thequietVoltafinallygothiswish,retiringinItalyin1819.JohnMunro,“AlessandroVolta,”inPioneersofElectricity;or,ShortLivesoftheGreatElectricians(London:WilliamClowesandSons,Ltd.,1890),

89–102.pulleysystemintheplace:EricJ.Lerner,“What’sWrongwiththeElectricGrid?”IndustrialPhysicist9,

no.5(November2003).electricclockstoslow:OnLongIsland,it’sbeenaconsistentsourceofjokesthateverythingisslowerthere

than in the restofNewYorkState,notbecauseof the leisurelypaceof life,butbecauseof thepoorqualityoftheirelectricpower—aNewYorkCitysecondtakessomethingmorelike1.005secondsonLongIsland.

sort-of-colorlesswash:Freeberg(2013).either1,200or2,000volts:Today’sAmericanhouseholdappliancesliketoastersandcurlingironsrunon

110volts,whileanythingthatchargesfromaUSBportisgetting5volts,andamodernlong-distancepowerlinecanruneasilyat765kilovolts(kV)(765,000volts).

LosAngeles,SanJose:DavidE.Nye,ElectrifyingAmerica:SocialMeaningsofaNewTechnology,1880–1940(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1992),3.

United States privately owned: The reason that we have private ownership of hot water and of air-conditioning in the United States is because of the very gradual way the two products entered themarket. The Soviet Union modernized all at once, and modern laboratory buildings were built onuniversity campuseswitha centralplant already inplace.Time spanofdevelopment (gradualversusfast) rather thanpolitical ideologyorastructuralbias towardcentralization is, in these twocases, themainfactorinthesesystemshavingbeendesigneddifferentlyindifferentlocations.

overmunicipal sales: If one looks back to the list from Scientific American above, about two thirds ofinstalledarclightingintheUnitedStatesin1881wasprivate.

upandrunning:Munson(2005),44.“almostaloneasacentralstation”:ForrestMcDonald, Insull:TheRiseandFallofaBillionaireUtility

Tycoon(Washington,D.C.:BeardBooks,2004),30.and electronic trading systems 24/7: Antina Von Schnitzler, “Traveling Technologies: Infrastructure,

Ethical Regimes, and the Materiality of Politics in South Africa,”Cultural Anthropology 28, no. 4(2013):670–93.

anyinroadsatall:RonaldTobey,TechnologyasFreedom:TheNewDealandtheElectricalModernizationoftheAmericanHome(BerkeleyandLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1997).

tomakeaprofitfromelectricity:Tobey(1997).power necessary to make it run: DonaldMacKenzie and JudyWajcman, eds., “The Social Shaping of

Technology:HowtheRefrigeratorGotItsHum”(MiltonKeynes:OpenUniversityPress,1987).technologiesofanykind:FredE.H.Schroeder,“More‘SmallThingsForgotten’:DomesticElectricalPlugs

andReceptacles,1881–1931,”TechnologyandCulture27,no.3(1986):525–43.flowinginariver:Toreturnforamomenttotheatomicphysicsofit,thethingthatanelectrondesiresinan

atomiscommunicatedbymeansofacharge.Anelectronmaintainsaminutenegativechargeandwillmovetowardanythingthathasapositivecharge,asthisiswhatbetraysthepresenceofaslotwhereinit

cannestle.Awholeatomisneutral;ithasnocharge,whereasanatomafterhavingbeenbrokenbyanelectricalgeneratorispositivelycharged.

asymptomofit:TodayinNorthAmericaalmostalltheelectricityonthegridispolyphase,anditiskeptataneven60hertz (Hz)or60cycles (reversals)persecond. InEurope it’s50Hz.Japanhasboth.Thenumberofcyclespersecondisalmostarbitrary.Toolowarateofalternationandincandescentbulbsflicker; you can literally see the packets of energypowering, stopping, and thenpoweringyour bulbagainas itglowsbright,stops,glowsbright,stops.With toohigha rateofoscillation,motorshaveahard timeworking very well; for themotors’ sake,most grids in industrialized countries run at thelowestrateofalternationpracticable,givenourlightingneeds.Mostindustrializingcountries,however,to the degree that they have a national electrical infrastructure at all, pick their preferred rate ofoscillationaccordingtothenormprevailingwheretheyimportmostoftheirelectronicsfrom(usuallythis is the country that originally colonized them), because the companies making the lightbulbs,toasters, and washing machines for particular markets build them with the appropriate electricalcapacities; theyaremade torunateither50or60Hz(oscillationspersecond)andeither110or220volts(intensityofardor).

using alternating current: “Tesla Life and Legacy—War of the Currents,” PBS,http://www.pbs.org/tesla/ll/ll_warcur.html.

competing streetcar lines:According toMunson (2005, p. 32), in 1887Edisonhad sold121DCcentralstations, andGeorgeWestinghouse, in his first year of business and Edison’smain competitor, wasworking on 68. A year later, in 1888, Edison had installed a total of 44,000 new bulbs, whileWestinghousehad installedmore than thatnumber (48,000) inOctober1888alone.By1889,ameredecadeafterEdison’sfirstviewingofelectricbulbsstrunginparallelatMenloPark,Westinghousehadgeneratorsrunningmorethan350,000AC-poweredbulbs.

125cyclespersecond:Hughes(1983),128.machinesthatusedit:Munson(2005),43,andSchroeder(1986),530–31.“polyphaseandthenthereverse”:Hughes(1983),122.OneremarkablethingaboutHughes’saccountof

theearlyprocessesofelectrification ishiscare in showing theeffects that things, rather thanpeople,have on systems design and infrastructural trajectories, including things like business structures,previousinvestments,littlemachines,andmaterials.

orbymanilarope:HaroldI.Sharlin,“TheFirstNiagaraFallsPowerProject,”BusinessHistoryReview35,no.1(1961):59–74.

center for theNortheast?:The seeping toxic pit calledLoveCanal,wasoneof theworst environmentaldisasters inAmericanhistory. Itwas the resultofanearlymisstep in thehistoryofelectrification.AditchwasdugbyoneMr.Loveinthe1890stomovepowerbetweenupperandlowerNiagaraand,evenbeforeitwascompleteditwasrenderedunnecessarywhenelectricitywaschosenasthenewestandbestmeansfortransmittingpower.Inthe1920sthishalf-finishedetchintothelocallandscapewasusedasanindustrialwastedump.Manyofthecompaniesthatmadetheproductsthatwouldallowustobuild

AmericaintoanindustrialpowerhousewereinitiallysituatedneartoNiagara,preciselybecauseofthevast quantities of easy-to-access electricity, and theirwastewent intoLove’s canal. In the 1950s theareawasredeveloped:thecanalwascoveredoverwithdirtandsomehouseswerebuilt,aswasaschoolforthekidsbornandraisedthere.ItworkedOK,forawhile,butinthemid-1970saparticularlyintenserainstorm caused the sludge that was buried beneath—22,000 tones of chemical waste—to begin toleachoutandpercolateupintothegardensanddugbasementsofthesehouses.Itstank.Andthekids,whocanbe reliedupon to touchanything, found themselveswithchemicalburnson theirhandsandfaces. More on this in chapter 4. Eckardt C. Beck, “The Love Canal Tragedy,” United StatesEnvironmental Protection Agency Journal, January 1979, http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/love-canal-tragedy.

“adoptionofalternatingcurrent”:Sharlin(1961),72.its lineswas begun: “HarnessingNiagaraFalls:TheAdamsPower Station—TheMost Famous ofEarly

HydroelectricPowerStations,”EdisonTechCenter:TheMiracleofElectricityandEngineering,2013,www.edisontechcenter.org/niagara.htm(5/2015).

soontofollow:“TheHistoryoftheAluminiumIndustry,”AluminiumLeader,accessedNovember27,2015,http://www.aluminiumleader.com/history/industry_history/.

screwedintolightsockets:Schroeder(1986),530–31.“ontheareaIwasat”:From“NiagaraFallsSchoellkopfPowerStationDisaster,Thursday,June7th,1956:

A History,” Niagara Frontier, accessed November 10, 2015,http://www.niagarafrontier.com/schoellkopf.html.

CHAPTER3:TheConsolidationofPower“45percentofmanufacturedproducts”:RichardF.Hirsh,PowerLoss:TheOriginsofDeregulationand

RestructuringintheAmericanElectricUtilitySystem(Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress,1999),12.(WarrenBuffett isnumber39):MichaelKlepper andRobertGunther,TheWealthy100:FromBenjamin

Franklin to Bill Gates; A Ranking of the Richest Americans, Past and Present (NewYork: CitadelPress,1996).

absolutecontrolofamarket:Hirsh(1999),16.andcommercialbuildings:Munson(2005),45.investorstodetermine:Thisuseofshellcorporations,orholdingcompanies,wasEnron’snumberonetool

inattractinginvestmentdespitebeingessentiallybankrupt.thestandardofAmericanpower:ItissaidthatEdisonnevermadeanothertrulyinnovativeinterventionin

theburgeoning technicalworldof the latenineteenthcenturyafter thedeathofhis firstwife in1884(see McDonald, 2004). “In 1884, Thomas Edison’s world was changing rapidly. Financing for hiselectric light systemwasdryingupandhewasplanning tocuthis lossesandgetoutof thebusinessaltogether.AndthenMarydied, leavingEdisonwiththreeyoungchildren(ages8to12),noreal job,

andnoclueaboutwhattodonext.Hehadtoborrow$500toburyhiswife.”From“ThomasEdison’sFirst Wife May Have Died of a Morphine Overdose,” Rutgers Today, November 15, 2011,http://news.rutgers.edu/research-news/thomas-edison%E2%80%99s-first-wife-may-have-died-morphine-overdose/20111115#.VfcmIKI_hUx.

the infrastructure that carries it: Batteries don’t change this fact, they just shrink down the size of the“infrastructure” for a drastically delimited period of time.The computer I am typing on needs to bepluggedineverytwelvehours,ratherthaneverythree.The“book”youarelikelyreadingthisonneedstobepluggedinatleastonceamonth.Andeventhebeste-carouttheretodayneedstobepluggedinafterit’sbeendriven.

“customersatanygivenmoment”:MauryKlein,ThePowerMakers:Steam,Electricity,andtheMenWhoInventedModernAmerica(NewYork:Bloomsbury,2010),403.

“butitsfilthanditshugerats”:McDonald(2004),56.anotherfivehundredprivateplants:Klein(2010),401.“in thehandsofa receiver”: “Centralstationelectric service; its commercialdevelopment andeconomic

significance as set forth in the public addresses (1897–1914) of Samuel Insull,” (Chicago: PrivatelyPrinted, 1915), 128. Available athttp://archive.org/stream/centralstationel00insurich/centralstationel00insurich_djvu.txt.

usersofelectriccurrent:Klein(2010),404.populationofthecity:Munson(2005),46.“2.5¢perkilowatt-hourin1909”:Munson(2005),46.thehundredsof thousands:By loweringhis rates Insullmade themassadoptionofapplianceswith their

guaranteedtwenty-four-hourloadaffordable,whilethroughhisfervent,somewouldsaypropagandistic,promotionofthemodernhomehemaderefrigerators,freezers,andhomehotwaterdesirable.

grid-providedelectricity:Munson(2005),48.“interestoninvestment”:Klein(2010),404.idlingforlackofload:Kleinwrites:“‘Ifyourmaximum[load]isveryhigh,’Insullsaid,‘andyouraverage

consumptionverylow,heavyinterestchargeswillnecessarilyfollow.Theneareryouraveragetoyourmaximum load the closeryouapproximate to themost economical conditionsofproduction, and theloweryoucanaffordtosellyourcurrent.’Insulldidnotarriveattheseinsightsquicklyorallatonce,but his experience kept reinforcing one central theme: The way to reduce costs was by increasingoutput,whichmeantgoingaftermorecustomersandfindingamixofusagesthatspreadtheloadacrosstheclock.Andthewaytogetmorecustomerswastolowerrates”(2010),405.

“capacityof68.5kilowatts”:Munson(2005),47.HereisInsull’sactualversion:“Take,forinstance…ablock in a residence district of Chicagowhich has 193 apartments in it.We have in that block 189customers,andthenumberoflampspercustomerisbetweentenandeleven.Thekilowatt-hoursusedperyearare33,000.Ifyoutakethecustomerseparatemaximaamountingto68.5kilowattsyouwillfindthattheloadfactorisonly5.5percent.Allofyouknowfullwellthatifyourentireplantisonlyinuse

5.5percentofthetimeitisonlyaquestionoftimewhenyouwillbeinthehandsofareceiver,butifyou take the maximum at the transformers you will find that the maxima of the various customerscomes at different times of the day, that instead of the load factor being 5.5 percent it’s 10 percent,representingamaximumof20kilowatts”(1915).

Americanelectricityindustry:Munson(2005),53.sportasimilarstructure:Onecanimaginethatifagang’sterritorywassupportedbygovernmentcharter,

thenegotiationsattheedgesofthisterritorywouldbelessbloody.SeeTheWire,season3.betweenthreeandfive:Klein(2010),402.about50percentefficiency:Asimilarlaw,calledtheBetzlimit,setsthemaximumachievableefficiencyof

awind turbineat59percent.Peakefficiency is70 to80percentofmaximumefficiency,or41 to47percentoftheenergyavailableinthewindbeingconvertedintoelectricity.Thisisslightlyhigherthanwhataheatenginecanreliablyprovide,buttherealdifferenceisnottheefficiency,butthemechanicsinvolvedinconvertingfueltoelectriccurrent.Windisjustmuchlesscostlyandfarlesspollutingthancoal.

withoutboilingit:Hirsh(1999),56.around34percentefficiency:“What Is theEfficiencyofDifferentTypesofPowerPlants?”U.S.Energy

Information Administration, accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=107&t=3.

approaching thisgoal:Abetter critique, andonediscussedat length in chapter7, iswhyconvert a fuel(wood,coal,gas,etc.)intoelectricity,transportthiselectricityvastdistances(whichinvolveslineloss),and then use it to heat a home, when the same fuel could be used to produce heat without theinterveninginfrastructure?

in the late1880s:Thesecond lawof thermodynamicswasfirstput topaper in1824byNicolasLéonardSadi Carnot in Reflections on the Motive Power of Fire. He was a French military engineer andphysicistwhodiedofcholeraattheageofthirty-six.Becausepeoplefearedcontagion,theyburiedhimwithmostofhiswritings;thisbookishisonlysurvivingwork.

business in the late 1950s: Indeed, as JonathanKoomey has pointed out, forecasting, regardless of howcomplex themodel is,doesnotappear toeveraccuratelymodel futureevents.Personalconversation,December12,2010.Seealsohttp://www.koomey.com/.

leftwell enoughalone: “Themanagers’ viewof technological progressmayhavebeen influencedby anassociated belief in mechanical perfectibility. Trained as engineers, managers had an educationalbackgroundthatstressedsolvingproblems.Thisbackgroundserved themwellas they integratednewtechnologies intopowerproductionanddistributionsystems,but it alsopromulgated theopinion that‘failure is but an anomaly that can be removed in a future that is more completely controlled byengineers.’Inotherwordsifaproblemexiststheengineercanfixitusingtheproblem-solvingapproachandsucceedinperpetuatingprogress.”Hirsh(1989),125.

Americalikeasledgehammer:DanielBarberargues that therewasasenseofworryabout the imbalance

betweensitesofproduction(ofoil)andsitesofuseasearlyasthelate1940sintheUnitedStatesandthatmidcenturysolararchitecture(craftsman)homesarearesultofthis.Neverthelesstherealityofthisissue didn’t hit home until 1973. Daniel A. Barber, “The Post-Oil Architectural Imaginary in the1950s,” public lecture, “Lines and Nodes: Media, Infrastructure, and Aesthetics,” at New YorkUniversity’sMedia,Culture,andCommunicationsymposium,2014.

investor-owned leviathans: “U.S. Electric Utility Industry Statistics (2015–2016 Annual Directory &Statistical Report),” American Public Power Association, accessed October 26, 2015,http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/USElectricUtilityIndustryStatistics.pdf.AmericanPublicPowerAssociation sourced this information from Energy Information Administration Forms EIA-861 and861S,2013.

and a single substation: “About Us,” City of Rancho Cucamonga, accessed September 1, 2014,http://www.cityofrc.us/cityhall/engineering/rcmu/aboutus.asp.

wealthy,irateadversary:AnyCaliforniacommunitywas,in2002,grantedthelegalrighttoadministertheirownelectricityasanaggregatebyAssemblyBill117,“AnacttoamendSections218.3,366,394,and394.25of,andtoaddSections331.1,366.2,and381.1to,thePublicUtilitiesCode,relatingtopublicutilities,” http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_0101-0150/ab_117_bill_20020924_chaptered.pdf.

“the 3,000,000,000 dollar mark”: “Samuel Insull Is Victim of Heart Attack in Paris,” Berkeley DailyGazette,July16,1938.

CHAPTER4:TheCardiganPathhadbeguntofail:Somuchso,thatanexecutivefromVirginiaLightandPoweratonepointreferredtohis

utilityasa“constructioncompany.”Hirsh(1989),111.grewtoocostlytocomplete:Theinordinateexpenseofbuildingnuclearpowerplants,eachofwhichwas

morelikeacarefullycraftedworkofartratherthanacookie-cutterprefabjobandthusbesetbythelast-minutemodifications andunanticipateddelays that comewithdoing something complex for the firsttime,madethisformertruthoftheindustry’sbusinessmodelstumbleaswell.

“truckingtransportationsystems”:“StatementofFormerU.S.PresidentCarteratEnergySecurityHearingBefore U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” Carter Center, May 12, 2009,http://www.cartercenter.org/news/editorials_speeches/BostonGlobe-energy-security-hearings.html.

decentralizedpoweroptions:CarteralsodidagreatdealtostrengthenAmerica’srelianceonfossilfuels,byencouragingmorecoaluseandtheexploitationofdomesticoil.Hisproblemwasenergysecurityandhewasverycatholicinhisapproachtosolvingit.Williams(1997),325.

commitment to fundamental change:This processmight havebeen inevitable, for asBuckminsterFullerfamouslypointedout,“Allthetechnicalcurvesriseintonnageandvolumetricsizetoreachagiantpeakafterwhichminiaturizationsetsin.Afterthatamoreeconomicarttakesoverwhichalsogoesthrough

thesamecycleofdoingprogressivelymorewithless.”CriticalPath(1981).theprojectandoptedout:Hirsh(1999),82.any given billing cycle: The most standard “promotional rate” structure was to charge less the more

electricitywasused.Forexample,in1973ConEd(NewYorkCity’sutility)charged“4.4centsperkWhforeachofthefirst50kWhofuse,butonly3.9centsforthenext60kWh,3.4centsforthesubsequent120kWhandonly2.8centsforeachunitgreaterthan240kWh.”RichardF.Hirsh,“ThePublicUtilityRegulatory Policies Act,” Powering the Past: A Look Back, accessed October 1, 2014,http://americanhistory.si.edu/powering/past/history4.htm. (Just as a point of reference, in 2007 theaverageAmericanhomeusedabout40kWhperday,or1,200kWhperbillingcycle,andpaidabouthalfasmuchforthelast1,000astheydidforthefirst50).Thefigureof40kWhperdaycomesfrom“Average Daily Electricity Usage,” Pennywise Meanderings, October 2, 2007,http://pinchthatpenny.savingadvice.com/2007/10/02/average-daily-electricity-usage_30740/.

mix of generations:Many early electric power stations, including thePearl Street Station, recycled theirwasteheat,usuallyfordistrictheating.Steamducts,ratherthanventingintotheair,exitedpowerplantsunderground and ran through nearby neighborhoods, providing hot water vapor to home and officeradiatorsasfarastheywent.Aspowerplantsgotbiggerandmovedfartherawayfromurbancenters,thanks in part to the long distance transmission AC enabled, this secondary use of excess heat byelectricitygeneratorswaslost.Theresimplyweren’tanyneighborhoodsaroundandsoexcessheatwasreleasedintothesky.

By 1962 all that had changed: As factories were slowly convinced during the Insull era to buy theirelectricityinsteadofmakingitforthemselves,they,too,begantoventwasteheatintotheatmosphererather than reusing it. Technically, the steam heated in a cogenerating factory is first used to makeelectricityandafterusedfortheindustrialprocessestowhichtheplantisdevoted.

all theway down to nothing: Hirsh (1999), 81.Hirsh goes on to state that in 1908, 60 percent of totalgenerationcapacitywasnon-utility, thoughonlysomeof thiswascogeneration. In1977 thatnumberwasslightlyover3percentandalmostallofitwascogeneration.

oftheirownindustrialprocesses:“CombinedHeatandPower:FrequentlyAskedQuestions,”UnitedStatesEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,www.epa.gov/chp/documents/faq.pdf.

powertothelocalutility:Hirsh(1999),83.almostallofitwasvariable:Williams(1997),328–40.“ActforEconomistsof1978”:Hirsh(1999),125.“fuelornextplannedfacility”:AsquotedinHirsh(1999),125.PURPAeracontracts:RandallSwisherandKevinPorter,“RenewablePolicyLessonsfromtheU.S.:The

Need forConsistent andStablePolicies,” inRenewableEnergyPolicyandPolitics:AHandbook forDecision-Making, edited by Karl Mallon (New York: Earthscan, 2006), 188. Swisher is a formerexecutivedirectoroftheAmericanWindEnergyAssociation(AWEA),1989–2009;PorterisaformersenioranalystforNREL.

promised1,178newkWh:ThisexampleistakenfromHirsh(1999),126.Allin80MWchunks:SwisherandPorter(2006),186.“world’ssolarpowerelectricity”:Hirsh(2014).“orawind turbine inCalifornia”:PaulGipe,WindEnergyComesofAge (Hoboken,NJ:JohnWiley&

Sons,1995),31.ataxbreakofnearly50percent:“AnincidentatOakCreekEnergysystemscapturesthefreneticpaceof

theperiod.OakCreek,awinddevelopernearTehachapi,wasmakingmoneysofastintheearly1980sthat they misplaced a check for $500,000. Auditors eventually found the check—still negotiable—nearlyadecadelaterduringbankruptcyproceedings.”Gipe(1995),31.

withoutreallyunderstandingwhy:Cashman’spointisthattheproblemwaswiththeweightandflexibilityof the blades—long, flexible blades are not particularly good for harvesting thewind. “All thewindturbinesthateverworked,theywerebuiltbyhippies,”hepointedout.“TheonesinAmericawerebuiltbyhippieswhoactuallyhadmastersdegrees,bachelorsandmastersdegreesinaeronauticalengineering.ItwasthemiddleoftheVietnamWaranditbecamecleartothemthattheonlyjobstheycouldgetwaswithSikorskiHelicopterorsomeotherdefensethingwhichwasgoingtobuildstuffforVietnamandtheydidn’twanttodothat.”“Sotheywerestuckwithanexpertiseandmanyofthemwentjustbacktothelandandthentheysatthereandwatchedthewindgobyandsaid:‘Iknowenoughaboutair:Icouldbuildalittlething.’Andtheybeganbuildingtheselittlewindturbinesindifferentplacesinthecountry.Andthentheythought:‘Well,maybeIshouldbuildsomeformyfriendsandweshouldmakealittlecompany.’Andsotheydidthat.”InterviewwithTyroneCashman,March2011.

10percentofitsin-stategeneration:Thesenumberscomefrom“U.S.WindEnergyStateFacts,”(2015).See alsoWieser (2015). “Electric Power Monthly: Table 1.17A. Net Generation fromWind,” U.S.Energy Information Administration, August 28, 2015,www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_1_17_a. The average Americanhouseholdusesabout1,000kWhpermonth;thisputsthepresentwindenergyoutputforCaliforniaat1.3millionhouseholdsandTexasat3.6millionhouseholds.

butthat’snotnews:ZacharyShahan,“RenewableEnergy=13.4percentofU.S.ElectricityGenerationin2014 (Exclusive),” CleanTechnica, March 10, 2015, http://cleantechnica.com/2015/03/10/renewable-energy-13-4-of-us-electricity-generation-in-2014-exclusive/. See also “2014 Renewable Energy DataBook” (NationalRenewableEnergyLaboratoryof theU.S.Department ofEnergy,December2015),http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/64720.pdf

predictedtoonlygrow:RoyL.Hales,“Solar&WIND=53percentofNewU.S.ElectricityCapacityin2014,”CleanTechnica, February 3, 2015, http://cleantechnica.com/2015/02/03/solar-wind-53-new-us-electricity-capacity-2014/.

power from renewable sources: Dave Levitan, “DOE: U.S. Could Easily Incorporate 80 PercentRenewables in 2050,” June 19, 2012, http://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/energy/renewables/doe-us-could-easily-incorporate-80-percent-renewables-in-2050.

utilities as natural monopolies: Hirsh (1999), 131, quoting Janice Hamrin’s “The Competitive CostAdvantagesofCogeneration”(1987).

turningdowntheirthermostats?:Hirsh(1989).would be something like “reregulation”: The term “utility consensus” comes fromHirsh’sPower Loss

(1999).compliance to its terms: James L. Sweeney, The California Electricity Crisis (Stanford, CA: Hoover

InstitutionPress,2002).“twoyearstochangearule”:ThiscomesfromapersonalconversationwithFredPickelinLosAngelesin

2010.Hecontinued,“whereasifitwasallowedtogounderamorecommerciallyresponsiveapproach,likethegasindustry,whensomebodyisabadactor,theruleschange.We’renolongerdoingthatkindofthing.”

“virtual shopping malls”: Bill Keller, “Enron for Dummies,” New York Times, January 26, 2002,http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/26/opinion/enron-for-dummies.html.

debt, greed,and risk: If someofEnron’sprofitswere linked to their energy trading,mostof theirmorestraightforwardlyillegalactivityhadtodowiththeexploitationofcomplexfinancialtools(derivativesmostly),money laundering,hidingdebt in affiliatedcorporations, andpayinggovernmentofficials tospeciallymanufacture loopholes for them.This,while also allowing individualswithin the company,mostnotablyAndyFastow(theCFO),tomaintainhugeconflictsofinterestinthemanagementofopenandhiddenassets.Enronwasthusfirstbutnotforemostanenergycompany.

“an energy nightmare”: Gov. Davis, State of the State Address, January 8, 2001. Quoted in Sweeney(2002),278.

CHAPTER5:ThingsFallApartduringanucleardisaster:DebbieVanTassel,“BeingaWatchdogofFirstEnergyCorp.,”NiemanReports,

Summer 2004: “The Energy Beat: Complex and Compelling” (June 14, 2004),http://niemanreports.org/articles/being-a-watchdog-of-firstenergy-corp/.

ThreeMileIslandin1979:VanTassel(2004).20percentofAmerica’spower:PaulL.JoskowandJohnE.Parsons,“TheFutureofNuclearPowerAfter

Fukushima”(MITCenterforEnergyandEnvironmentalPolicyResearch,February2012).stories of this kind: See especially Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station in New Jersey, NineMile

Point/Unit1inNewYork,andSanOnofre(seenotebelow)inCalifornia.doubt that they are old: Davis-Besse began operating in 1978, Vermont Yankee in 1972; San Onofre

reactor1cameonlinein1968,anditsreactors2and3(alongwiththeDiabloCanyonreactors)cameonline in themid-1980s,making themamong the last nuclearpowerplants in the country togo intooperation.

20 percent of its generating capacity: San Onofre—a complex of three nuclear reactors on the rocky

California coast betweenLosAngeles andSanDiego—had its number 2 and 3 reactors shuttered in2012 because of premature wear on over 3,000 newly installed tubes in the replacement steamgenerators.Ayearandahalfandmanyattemptstosolvetheproblemlater,Californiadecidedtoshuttheplants for good. (Reactor 1wasdecommissioned in1992; it is themost famousofSanOnofre’sthreebecauseitsreactorcorewasaccidentallyinstalledupsidedownbackin1977whenthestationwasfirst built.) SaidDavidFreeman (former head of theCaliforniaPowerAuthority) ofSanOnofre andDiabloCanyonnuclearpowerplants: theyare“disasterswaiting tohappen:aging,unreliablereactorssittingnearearthquakefaultzonesonthefragilePacificCoast,withmillionsorhundredsofthousandsofCalifornianslivingnearby”(quotedinEricWesoff,“PG&EStudy:DiabloCanyonNuclearPlantIsEarthquake-Safe Despite Newly Detected Faults,” Greentech Media, September 15, 2014,http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/PGE-Diablo-Canyon-Nuclear-Plant-is-Earthquake-Safe-Despite-Newly-Detected).Trueenough,butwiththeclosureofSanOnofre,SouthernCalifornialost20percent of its electrical generation capacity. Should Diablo Canyon, the last of California’s nuclearreactors,alsobeclosed(itwasunfortunatelybuiltdirectlyon topofageologic fault line),Californiawillloseanadditional7percentofitselectricalgeneratingcapacity—about2.2millionhomes’worth.

modern electric company: “U.S. Electric Utility Industry Statistics (2015–2016 Annual Directory &StatisticalReport),”(2015).

than by producing it: “The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 2000: An Update”(Washington,DC:EnergyInformationAdministration,OfficeofCoal,Nuclear,ElectricandAlternateFuels,U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,October2000).

ingoodworkingorder:VanTassel(2004).moregrowththanisacceptable:See“FrequentlyAskedQuestions(FAQs):TreeTrimmingandVegetation

Management Landowners,” Federal Energy Regulation Commission, accessed May 1, 2015,http://www.ferc.gov/resources/faqs/tree-veget.asp.

andburst into flames:PG&Ewasallegedly responsible forat least fiftyother fires inCalifornia, fourofwhich were serious, before the Trauner Fire case was filed. This is according to Tom Nadeau,ShowdownattheBouzyRouge:Peoplev.PG&E(GrassValley,CA:ComstockBonanzaPress,1998),14.ThisisanexceptionalbookthattellsthestoryofthepeopleofNevadaCountyattemptingtoholdPG&E responsible for their inactions. The company has more employees than Nevada County haspeople,andtheirbudgetforlegaldefensesisfortytimesthatofNevadaCounty.Butthecountywon.

nationalelectricinfrastructure:Squirrelsformanastysecondinthisregard;seechapter7.“andwewillmelt”:JohnP.Coyne,“BoomSignaledPowerLineArcinWaltonHills,”ThePlainDealer,

August24,2003,http://www.ohiocitizen.org/campaigns/electric/2003/arc.htm.veryquicklyindeed:Anelectricchargeinavacuummovesatthespeedoflight;domesticatedelectricityon

earthmovessomewhatslowerduetotheresistanceinthewires.Nevertheless,itstillmovesveryfast.aforkinanoutlet:Humansarerelativelygoodconductors,whichiswhywehavebuiltanelectricalsystem

thatseparatesusfromitbyallsortsofpoorconductivematerials,liketheair,rubber,glass,orceramic.

The reasonyoungAdamMuhawaswarnedwith suchvehemenceoutofhisdrivewaybya lineman,whoknewmoreaboutthewaysofelectricitythantheteen,wasbecausewhenelectricityisarcingitwillseek to landon agoodconductor that’s also ideally a bit pointy, like a tree, or a tall boy, or, in theAmericanWest,acow(hundredsofwhicharekilledbylightningeveryyear).

“notanticipatedorcontrolled”:Lerner(2003),8.withinwhichthismachinefunctions:Thisistrueforairplanesaswell;therewassimplynowaytotakeinto

account,before2001,thefactthatsomepeoplemightdecidetouseairplanesasbombs.ThischoicebyAlQaedafallsintoadifferentmodeloforganizationaldisaster:theBlackSwan,inwhichunimaginablethingsdoexistandveryoftenthesearetheselfsamethingsthatsurpriseusanddestroythesystemswehave put into place. The global cultural environment was not initially included in the Swiss cheesemodelforairlinesafety.Nowitis.Andwestandinlongsecuritylinesandaresubjecttotwoentirelynewgovernmentagencies(TSAandHomelandSecurity)asaresult.

thoroughlyman-made: Itdoes seem that inallof this, therewasa singlecriminal act.Somebody,undercoverofdarkness, stole the topof thatvery first tree.Sowhen thegovernment task force field teaminvestigating the blackoutwas sent round to theMuhas’ place, they found the offending tree nicelysawedup and stacked in piles—a task performedbyFirstEnergy’s crews as part of the postblackoutcleanup.Butwhentheselogswereunstackedandmeasured,theyamountedtoonly42feetoftree—theverytopwasgone!Whilenotexactlyaccusinganybodyofanything,theinvestigatingteamnotedinthe“Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes andRecommendations”(U.S.-CanadaPowerSystemOutageTaskForce,April2004),p.60,that“portionsofthetreehadbeenremovedfromthesite,”afactthatmadeitdifficultto“determinetheexactheightofthelinecontact,themeasuredheightisaminimumandtheactualcontactwaslikelythreetofourfeethigher.”

Inotherwords,thismissingarborealcrownservedapurpose.Withoutit,itwasimpossibletoprovecriminalnegligenceinFirstEnergy’sadmittedlypokyapproachtotreepruning.Theevidencenecessaryto make such a case had been tampered with. Admitting to nothing, FirstEnergy spokesman RalphDiNicolaretorted:“Ifsomethingwasmissingwecansurmisesomeonegrabbedsomefirewood.”Andperhapshe is right; somebodymighthave justcartedoff that last, critical four-plus feetof treetop toburnintheirwoodstove.Butwhynottaketherestofthetree?Afterall,therewereanother42feetofnicelyhewntrunkreadytobestacked,toage,andtobecomeheatoftheirown,onelongwinternight.Thougheyebrowswereraisedbythisseeminglyinnocuoustheftofevidencefromtheoriginpointoftheblackout,itisalmostmoreremarkableforbeingtheonlymomentofmaleficenceintheentiredebacle.See Peter Krouse, Teresa Dixon Murray, and John Funk, “Top of tree in blackout investigation ismissingremnantsfoundunderFirstEnergyline,”PlainDealer,November22,2003:C1.

afternoontheEastwentdark:Itwasn’ttheweatherthatbroughtdownthegrid;itwasn’tthewind,anditwasn’tevenraining.Andthoughitwashot,inthehigh80sacrossmostoftheblacked-outregion,noneofthefirstthreelineswereoverloaded—theywerenotbeingaskedtocarrymoreelectricitythanthey

couldbear.AirconditionersmayhavebeensuckingupelectronsandchurningoutcoolaireverywhereintheEast,andthisdemandforelectricitycertainlymeantthesystemwasoperatingunderstress,buttheywerenotdeemedcausal.

“usetheirowntunes”:Lerner(2003),10.40tonsofchlorinebleachforfree:JoeTaffe,personalconversation,May10,2011.likeporkbelliesorpigiron:Fromthepointofviewoftheconsumer,electronsstillbearlittleresemblance

toporkbelliesandpigiron.Thisisoneoftheproblemsdiscussedinchapter6.homes in Columbus, Ohio: This is using the crude measure of twenty-five 100-watt lightbulbs per

household.TheexampleisalsofromLerner(2003).25 percent of all energy trading: “Electricity 101: Frequently Asked Questions,” Office of Electricity

Delivery & Energy Reliability, accessed September 23, 2015, http://energy.gov/oe/information-center/educational-resources/electricity-101#ppl1.

careorrecipientofcash:Hertzog(2013).buoyedupandsmoothedout:Foranotherversionofthissamestory,onethatblamestheblackoutalmost

entirelyonalackofreactivepower(VARS)onthegrid,seeJaneBennett,VibrantMatter:APoliticalEcologyofThings(Durham,NC:DukeUniversityPress,2010):24–28.

in the summerof 1996:RobertPeltier, “How toMakeVARs—andaBuck,”PowerMagazine, June15,2007,http://www.powermag.com/how-to-make-varsand-a-buck/?pagenum=1.

CHAPTER6:TwoBirds,OneStonestationaftertheevent:CharlieWells,“HoustonWomanThelmaTaorminaPullsGunonElectricCompany

Worker for Trying to Install ‘Smart Meter,’ ” New York Daily News, July 19, 2012,http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/houston-woman-thelma-taormina-pulls-gun-electric-company-worker-install-smartmeter-article-1.1118051.

which were watching Shrek 2: “Researchers Claim Smart Meters Can Reveal TV Viewing Habits,”Metering.com, September 21, 2011, http://www.metering.com/researchers-claim-smartmeters-can-reveal-tv-viewing-habits/. For the research conducted at the University of Washington, see AntonioRegalado, “Rage Against the Smart Meter,” MIT Technology Review, April 26, 2012,http://www.technologyreview.com/news/427497/rage-against-the-smart-meter/. And for readers ofGerman: Prof. Dr.-Ing U. Greveler, Dr. B. Justus, and D. Löhr, “Hintergrund und ExperimentelleErgebnisse Zum Thema ‘Smart Meter und Datenschutz’ ” (Fachhochschule Münster University ofApplied Sciences, September 20, 2011),https://web.archive.org/web/20121117073419/http://www.its.fh-muenster.de/greveler/pubs/smartmeter_sep11_v06.pdf.

other in any substantial way: On the utility side the claims sounded like this: “The accuracy of SmartMeters, both in development and practice, has been confirmed to improve on the older electro-

mechanicalmeter technology.Allmeters, regardless of technology and design, are required tomeetnationalstandardssuchasANSIC12formeteraccuracyandoperationbeforebeinginstalled.”“SmartMeters and Smart Meter Systems: A Metering Industry Perspective” (Edison Electric Institute,Association of Edison Illuminating Companies, Utilities Telecom Council, March 2011),http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/grid-enhancements/documents/smartmeters.pdf.

Nevertheless,agreatmanypeoplenoticedthattheirbillsafterthenewmeterswerehigher.TomZellerJr.,“‘Smart’ElectricMetersDrawComplaintsofInaccuracy,”NewYorkTimes,November12,2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/13/business/13meter.html. See also Katherine Tweed, “AreTraditional Electricity Meters Accurate?” Greentech Media, March 30, 2010,http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/are-traditional-elecricity-meters-accurate.

willriseagainanytimesoon:“EnergyandTechnology:LetThereBeLight,”Economist,January17,2015,11.

meters as of 2014: “FrequentlyAskedQuestions:HowMany SmartMetersAre Installed in theUnitedStates, andWhoHasThem?”U.S.Energy InformationAdministration, accessedNovember 1, 2014,http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=108&t=3.

electricityuseat the same time:MartinLaMonica, “GreenBiz101:WhatDoYouNeed toKnowAboutDemand Response?” GreenBiz, April 29, 2014, http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/04/29/greenbiz-101-what-do-you-need-know-about-demand-response.

torightabout2percent:“Atypicalcoal-firedelectricalplantmightbe38percentefficient,soalittlemorethanone-thirdofthechemicalenergycontentofthefuelisultimatelyconvertedtousableelectricity.Inotherwords,asmuchas62percentoftheoriginalenergyfailstofinditswaytotheelectricalgrid.Onceelectricity leaves the plant, further losses occur during delivery. Finally, it reaches an incandescentlightbulbwhere itheatsa thinwire filamentuntil themetalglows,wastingstillmoreenergyasheat.Theresultinglightcontainsonlyabout2percentof theenergycontentof thecoalusedtoproduceit.Swapthatbulbforacompactfluorescentandtheefficiencyrisestoaround5percent—better,butstillasmallfractionoftheoriginal.”Thiscomesfrom“WhatYouNeedtoKnowAboutEnergy:SourcesandUses,”The National Academies Press, http://www.nap.edu/reports/energy/sources.html. Also, thoughhis math is wrong, Rob Rhinehart has a delightful article on the same subject. “How I Gave UpAlternating Current,” Mostly Harmless, August 3, 2015, http://robrhinehart.com/?p=1331&utm_source=Daily+Lab+email+list&utm_campaign=445526e8ef-dailylabemail3&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d68264fd5e-445526e8ef-364971681.

todealwitheveryday:“Inspiteoftheincreasingnumberofpubswithlarge-screentelevisions,71percentof football fanswouldwatch a final involving England at home or at a friend’s house, a survey…found.Thiswould lead to amassive surge in electricityduringhalf time intervals andafter the finalwhistleisblown,aspeopleheadtothefridgeforabeerorthekettleforacupoftea.Thephenomenon,knownasaTVpickup,occursmostdaysduringpopularprogrammes,butbigfootballmatchesresultina heavier demand. The expected increase in electricity usage for England v USA will be 1,200

megawattsathalftimeandaround1,100megawattsatthefinalwhistle.ThepredictedsurgeifEnglandgetstothefinalandthegamegoestopenaltieswouldbeatthepreviousrecordforaTVprogramme,setafterEnglandlostonspotkickstoWestGermanyinthe1990WorldCupwhena2,800MWdemandwasimposedbytheendingofthepenaltyshootoutintheEnglandvWestGermanyFIFAWorldCupsemi-final.”“NationalGridAnticipatesPowerSurgesduringWorldCup,”Telegraph, June11,2010,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/energy/7819443/National-Grid-anticipates-power-surges-during-World-Cup.html. See also Mark Raby, “Tea Time in Britain Causes Predictable, Massive Surge inElectricity Demand,” Geek, January 7, 2013, http://www.geek.com/news/tea-time-in-britain-causes-predictable-massive-surge-in-electricity-demand-1535023/.

amomentofpeakrevenue:Thebadnewsaboutpeakshavingisthatnowthatutilitieshavefinallyfoundawaytomakemoneyoffpeakdemandwithsmartmeters,eliminatingpeakdemandnowmeanstakingahitattheirbottomline.Chargingforthemostexpensivepoweratthemostexpensivetimeofdaywasan economic win for them. Bill McKibben, “Power to the People,” New Yorker, June 29, 2015,http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/power-to-the-people.SeealsoJohnFarrell,“UtilitiesCry ‘Fowl’ Over Duck Chart And Distributed Solar Power,” CleanTechnica, July 21, 2014,http://cleantechnica.com/2014/07/21/utilities-cry-fowl-over-duck-chart-and-distributed-solar-powercrying-fowl-or-crying-wolf-open-season-on-the-utilitys-solar-duck-chart/. And KatieFehrenbacher,“ThisStartupJustScoredaDealtoInstallaMassiveNumberofTeslaGridBatteries,”Fortune,June4,2015,http://fortune.com/2015/06/04/advanced-microgrid-solutions/.

“EffectHitsSantaCruz”:GaryL.Hunt,“TheBakersfieldEffectHitsSantaCruz,”Tech&CreativeLabs,August29,2010,http://www.tclabz.com/2010/08/29/the-bakersfield-effect-hits-santa-cruz/.

likeacashgrab:JackDanahy,“SmartGridFallout:LessonstoLearnfromPG&E’sSmartMeterLawsuit,”SmartGridNews,November13,2009,http://www.smartgridnews.com/story/smartgrid-fallout-lessons-learn-pge-s-smart-meter-lawsuit/2009-11-13, for individual customer complaints see:https://sites.google.com/site/nocelltowerinourneighborhood/home/wireless-smart-meter-concerns/smartmeter-consumers-anger-grows-over-higher-utility-bills.

digitalsmartmeters:JesseWray-McCann,“HouseholdersShieldingHomesfromSmartMeterRadiation,”Herald Sun, April 9, 2012, http://www.heraldsun.com.au/ipad/householders-shielding-homes-from-smartmeter-radiation/story-fn6bfm6w-1226321653862.

commissioners’residences:AnjeanetteDamon,“SmartMetersSpawnConspiracyTalk:TheyKnowWhatYou’re Watching on TV!,” Las Vegas Sun, March 8, 2012,http://m.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/mar/08/smartmeters-spawn-conspiracy-theories-they-know-w/.

“otherball-shapedorgans”:“AssessmentofRadiofrequencyMicrowaveRadiationEmissionsfromSmartMeters”(SantaBarbara,CA:SageAssociates,January1,2011),http://sagereports.com/smartmeter-rf/?page_id=196.

efficient appliances:Margaret Taylor et al., “AnExploration of Innovation andEnergyEfficiency in anAppliance Industry” (Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, March 29, 2012),

http://eetd.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/an_exploration_of_innovation_and_energy_efficiency_in_an_appliance_industry_lbnl-5689e.pdf.

policies in place: Jocelyn Durkay, “Net Metering: Policy Overview and State Legislative Updates,”National Conference of State Legislatures, September 26, 2014,http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/net-metering-policy-overview-and-state-legislative-updates.aspx.3.

the initial shattering: Jeffrey Sparshott, “More People Say Goodbye to Their Landlines,”Wall StreetJournal, September 5, 2013,http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323893004579057402031104502.

$21 million: Glenn Fleishman, “Stick a Fork in It: A Broadband over Powerline Post Mortem,” ArsTechnica, October 23, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2008/10/stick-a-fork-in-it-a-broadband-over-powerline-post-mortem/.“Datasignalsareblockedfromthehigh-andmedium-voltagelinesoverwhichBPLworksbythetransformersthatstepthatvoltagedownforhouseholdorbusinessuse.Toinstallsmartmeters,abypasshastobeputinplacethatsucksthedatafromthehigher-voltagelinesand feeds itouton thewire thatheads into thehome,usinghomepowerline technology.Somecompanies tried todo thiswithWiFion thepole;othersput inrelatively inexpensiveshunts.But it’sextremely labor-intensive;more akin—but far lesswork—toputting in fiber optic to a home than inoverlayingdataontocableortelephonewires.”

wouldnotuseagain:MarkJaffe,“Xcel’sSmartGridCityPlanFailstoConnectwithBoulder,”TheDenverPost, October 28, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21871552/xcels-smartgridcity-plan-fails-connect-boulder.

“Give me a blinking break”: April Nowicki, “Boulder’s Smart Grid Leaves Citizens in the Dark,”GreentechMedia,March18,2013,http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Boulders-Smart-Grid-Leaves-Citizens-in-the-Dark.

“ ‘StupidCustomer’ pilot”: JesseBerst, “SmartGridCityMeltdown:HowBad Is It?”SmartGridNews,August8,2010,http://www.smartgridnews.com/story/smartgridcity-meltdown-how-bad-it/2010-08-03.

positions on the matter: RandyHouson, business technology executive for Xcel Energy, public speech,Washington,D.C.,September22,2009.

“veryhotoutside”:StephenFairfaxwrotethisonlinecommentinresponsetoJesseBerst’s“SmartGridCityMeltdown:HowBadIsIt?”(2010).

neversignedupfor:Apparently,thedaybeforethepublicannouncementoftheselectionofBoulderasthesiteoftheSmartGridCityproject,citycouncilmembershadnoideatheprojectwasbeingundertaken.Therehadbeensomeseriousdiscussionaboutmunicipalizingtheutilitybeforetheirbeingchosentogetasmartgrid,andatleastoneBoulderresidentsupposesthatpartofthereasontheywerepickedwastokeepthemfromdefecting.Intheend,though,municipalizingthegridispreciselywhatthecitydiddo.InthewordsofSteveVanderMeer:“ThecityofBoulderhasbeenunhappywithXcelforyearsandhasbeen contemplatingmunicipalizing their system duringmuch of that time…By coincidence, I hadlunchwithahighBoulderofficialtheweekoftheSmartGridCityannouncement.Turnsoutthecityof

Boulder had no idea this was coming until the day before the announcement! There was no priorplanning, no collaboration. When I asked this official to speculate on the motives of Xcel’sannouncement, this person wondered out loud whether SmartGridCity was a bone that Xcel wasthrowingatBoulderinanefforttodissuadefurtherdiscussionsaboutpartingwayswiththem.Basedoncurrentdiscussionswithin thecity tonot renew the franchise agreement, it appears that if thiswasamotiveofXcel’s,itdidn’twork.”Berst(2010).

customers with the undertaking: Mark Jaffe, “PUC Reduces Amount Xcel Can Charge for SmartGridProject,”DenverPost,January5,2011.

permanentandtotal:LewisMilford,“TheEndoftheElectricUtilities?TheIndustryThinksSoToo,”TheHuffington Post, September 25, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lewis-milford/electric-utilities-future_b_3660311.html.

billuson theother side:MichaelKanellos, “AnotherWay toLookat theUtilityDeathSpiral,”Forbes,September 29, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelkanellos/2014/09/29/another-way-to-look-at-the-utility-death-spiral/.NicholasBrown,“WillRenewableEnergyCauseaUtility‘DeathSpiral’?NoNeed for That,” CleanTechnica, June 24, 2014, http://cleantechnica.com/2014/06/24/will-renewable-energy-cause-utility-death-spiral/.MartinLaMonica,“EfficiencyGroupSays‘UtilityDeathSpiral’TalkIsOverblown,”GreentechMedia,June13,2014,https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/utility-death-spiral-talk-overblown-says-efficiency-group. Zachary Shahan, “Warren Buffett: Utility DeathSpiral Is Bull S*&^,”CleanTechnica, March 25, 2014, http://cleantechnica.com/2014/03/25/warren-buffett-utility-death-spiral-bs/.

theirpower from:TheSantaClaraCountyJail (“thegreenprison”)andtheUniversityofCalifornia,SanDiegocampusaretwoexamplesofthissortofislandableinstitutionalmicrogrid.

via the Internet: “Vision vs. Reality,” Denver Post, accessed December 1, 2014,http://www.denverpost.com/portlet/article/html/imageDisplay.jsp?contentItemRelationshipId=4738191.

allworktogether:Berst(2010).“energy,orcoal-fired”:Thisisimpossiblesincebiofuelsforairplanes,whileindevelopmentespeciallyin

Brazilandwhiletheoreticallysustainable,arebarelyrenewable.Airplanesneverrunoncoal.largest bankruptcy in U.S. history: Paul Starr, “The Great Telecom Implosion,” American Prospect,

September 8, 2002, https://www.princeton.edu/~starr/articles/articles02/Starr-TelecomImplosion-9-02.htm.

“environmentalsavings”:Fleishman(2008).the polar vortex:AndreaThompson andClimateCentral, “2015May JustBeHottestYear onRecord,”

Scientific American, August 20, 2015, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/2015-may-just-be-hottest-year-on-record/.

soothe theirwoes: “In 1970, two thirds of newhomeowners kept coolwithout central air-conditioning:today, central air-conditioning is a standard feature in 90 percent of new homes, even in temperateclimates,”Janda(2011),18.

“gridswilllikelyprosper”:Fleishman(2008).“highways to free up bottlenecks”: Massoud Amin, “System-of-Systems Approach,” in Intelligent

Monitory, Control, and Security of Critical Infrastructure Systems, edited by Elias Kyriakides andMariosPolycarpou(NewYork:Springer,2015),337.

“iscurrently[2008]at10to15percent.”:Amin(2015),337.“demandishighest”:ChrisKing,“HowSmartMetersHelpFightPowerOutages,”Gigaom,July5,2012,

https://gigaom.com/2012/07/05/how-smart-meters-help-fight-power-outages/. See also “Energy WiseRewards: Frequently Asked Questions,” Pepco, accessed September 24, 2015,https://energywiserewards.pepco.com/md/faq/index.php.

power companies started to fail: “Memorandum:General Information onUtility Bankruptcy” (MontanaPublic Service Commission, July 9, 2003),http://psc.mt.gov/consumers/energy/pdf/BroganUtilityBankruptcy.pdf.

maybe even some lines:MorganStanley andCitigroup aremajor holders of electricity assets at present,includinggeneration.Lerner(2003),12.

including Dallas–Fort Worth: “Explaining Oncor Electricity,” Bounce Energy, accessed November 13,2015,https://www.bounceenergy.com/articles/texas-electricity/oncor-electricity.

CHAPTER7:ATaleofTwoStormsworks in this way: “The Energy Cloud,” Navigant Research, June 3, 2014,

www.navigantresearch.com/webinar/the-energy-cloud-1.tooktoacquireit:NATOdroppedspecial“blackout”netsonthecityduringthebombing;thesefallfrom

planesandcatchonelectricwires, shorting themallout and ideallypropagatingablackout from thepointofcontactthroughthegridasawhole.

fully coupled to the jet stream: Jeff Halverson, “Superstorm Sandy: Unraveling the Mystery of aMeteorological Oddity,” Washington Post, October 29, 2013,https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capital-weather-gang/wp/2013/10/29/superstorm-sandy-unraveling-the-mystery-of-a-meteorological-oddity/.

miles in thenation:Theareacalled theNortheastmegalopolis stretchesacross less than2percentof theU.S. landmass but contains 17 percent of the country’s population. JohnRennieShort,LiquidCity:MegalopolisandtheContemporaryNortheast(NewYork:Routledge,2007),23.

stranded,theywereimmobilized:“Two-thirdsofthoselivingintheaffectedregionreportedthattheylostpower. Forty percent of thosewho lost power report outages of aweek ormore. The storm left 44percentinthehardesthitregionswithoutheatandnearlyhalfthose,49percent,werewithoutheatformorethanaweek.Thirteenpercentintheseareaslostwaterwith36percenthavinglostwaterformorethanaweek…halfofaffectedAmericanssaytheyhadtroubleaccessingfuel.”TrevorTompsonetal.,“Resilience in theWake of Superstorm Sandy” (Associated Press–NORC Center for Public Affairs

Research,June2013),3.whenthegridbreaks:“EconomicBenefitsofIncreasingGridResiliencetoWeatherOutages”(2013).militaryandpolice forces:TedKoppel,LightsOut:ACyberattack,ANationUnprepared,Surviving the

Aftermath(NewYork:CrownPublishing,2015).“imposedonourselves”:LovinsandLovins(1982),1.“ourwholewayoflife”:LovinsandLovins(1982),1.a single cable failed: Thomas Gaist, “The Detroit Blackout,” World Socialist, December 4, 2014,

http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/12/04/pers-d04.html.“diversityoverhomogeneity”:LovinsandLovins(1982),184.reports,andpontificatingpundits:Manyacademicsandevensomebloggersareturningagainstresilience

as an approach tomaintaining systems (including individual humanpsychology), as it presupposes aworldincrisis.Toberesilientyouhavetoacceptthatthingsaregoingtobebrokeninthefirstplace,sothe question becomeswhat sort of life we have constructed for ourselves that we can’tmanage thebasics of security and have to just build and plan with the assumption of inevitable catastropheundergirdingeverythingwedo.SeeespeciallySandyZelmerandLanceGunderson,“WhyResilienceMay Not Always Be a Good Thing: Lessons in Ecosystem Restoration from Glen Canyon and theEverglades,”NebraskaLawReview87,no.4:2008.

“WeatherOutages”:“EconomicBenefitsofIncreasingGridResiliencetoWeatherOutages”(2013).“high-and low-tech solutions”: “Economic Benefits of Increasing Grid Resilience toWeather Outages”

(2013),pages17,12,and5,respectively.bythesurroundingarea:“IntheAftermathofSuperstormSandy:MessagefromPresidentStanley,”Stony

BrookUniversity,accessedDecember1,2014,http://www.stonybrook.edu/sb/sandy/.devastatedJapanin2011:Asmus(2012).pumps,andpoweron:ThequoteisfromPeterAsmus,AlexanderLauderbaugh,andMackinnonLawrence,

“Executive Summary: Market Data: Microgrids” (Navigant Research, 2013),http://www.navigantresearch.com/wp-assets/uploads/2013/03/MD-MICRO-13-Executive-Summary.pdf,2.SeealsoSilvioMarcacci,“Over400MicrogridProjectsUnderwayEnRoute to$40Billion Market,” CleanTechnica, April 3, 2013, http://cleantechnica.com/2013/04/03/over-400-microgrid-projects-underway-en-route-to-40-billion-market/.

airconditionersorclothesdryers: “AboutMicrogrids,”MicrogridsatBerkeleyLab,U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,accessedSeptember28,2015,https://building-microgrid.lbl.gov//about-microgrids.

$8millionayearinelectricitybills:“EnergyandTechnology:LetThereBeLight”(2015),11.“strain on military budgets”: Pew Trusts, “Military Clean Energy Innovation: Pew,” 2011,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HiOvfdYsQEE.”“butmoreimportantlyinblood.”:PeterByck,CarbonNation,2010.eightgallonsadaytofour:Jenkins(2011).batteries needed to run them: Roy H. Adams III, Martin F. Lindsey, and AnthonyMarro, “Battlefield

RenewableEnergy:AKeyJointForceEnabler,”JointForceQuarterly,no.57,2ndQuarter:StabilityandSecurityOperations(2010),45.Thesedevices include“computerdisplays, infraredsights,globalpositioning systems, night vision, and a variety of other sensor technologies.” Theodore Motyka,“Hydrogen Storage Solutions in Support ofDoDWarfighter Portable PowerApplications,”WSTIACQuarterly9,no.1(2009),83.

thirdofthisweight:PhillipJenkins,“Lightweight,FlexiblePhotovoltaicsforMobileSolarPower,”NinthInternationalEnergyConversionConference,SanDiego,CA,July31–August3,2011.

disposablebatteries:Motyka(2009),83.“acostof$700,000”:AdamsIIIetal.(2010),45.Thesebatteriesarecalled“primary”becausethey’renot

rechargeable,butarethrownaway.Thisarticleisfrom2010,andit’scitinganarticlefrom2009,whichiscitingareportfrom2007,soit’spossiblethatabrigadeisnolongerthrowingout7tonsofbatteriesfora72-hourmission.

“wrongwiththispicture”:CarbonNation(2010).“relative to sustained outages”: LaCommare and Eto (2005), as quoted in “Economic Benefits of

IncreasingGridResiliencetoWeatherOutages”(August2013),18.8.electricity to work: “More than ever our operating forces rely on the use [of] electric power to support

criticalcommandandcontrol functions; intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissanceassets.”AdamsIIIetal.(2010),43–44.

added twenty-one microgrids: “The DoD’s interest in improving energy security through microgridtechnologystems from itsheavy relianceuponall formsof fossil fuels,” saysPeterAsmus,principalresearchanalystwithNavigantResearch.“Inaddition,theDoDhasreexaminedtheexistingelectricityservicedeliverymodelintheUnitedStates,andhasconcludedthatthebestwaytobolsteritsabilitytosecurepowermaywellbethroughmicrogridtechnologyitcanoftenownandcontrol.”“MicrogridsforMilitaryBasestoSurpass$377MillioninAnnualMarketValueby2018,”NavigantResearch,May10,2013, http://www.navigantresearch.com/newsroom/microgrids-for-military-bases-to-surpass-377-million-in-annual-market-value-by-2018.

alreadyoperateintheUnitedStates:“NewJerseyBecomesLatestStatetoInvestinMicrogrids,”GreenBiz,(September 6, 2013), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2013/09/06/new-jersey-becomes-latest-state-invest-microgrids.Accordingtoa2013reportfromNavigantResearch, therearenowmorethanfiftyU.S.militarybasesthatareoperating,planning,ortestingmicrogrids.SeealsoKoch(2013).

to578megawatts:Marcacci(2013).ventilationby40to75percent:WilliamM.Solis,“DefenseManagement:DoDNeedstoIncreaseAttention

on Fuel Demand Management at Forward-Deployed Locations” (United States GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,February2009),http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09300.pdf.“Byfoamingtents,wegofroma50-toncoolingunitdowntoan8-toncoolingunit,whichreducesourpowerconsumptiontremendously.Wefiguredthatwithinapproximately10monthswewillpayforeverything.Soweareactually saving soldiers’ lives, giving them amore comfortable place to stay and savingmoney and

savingtheenvironmentallinonefellswoop.”“thesecurityenvironment”:AdamsIIIetal.(2010),43–49.toohot,orrigid:Jenkins(2011).Thisissimilartotheproblemofblacksmokeproducedbycoalburnerson

ships before World War I, which allowed enemies to spot them before they crossed the horizon.Technologyhasgottenbetteracrosstheboardandthefuelsinuseneedtoadapttothis.Thislinkstothedesireforasolarpanelthatisn’tsquare,isn’tshiny,andisn’tblack.Thereisadesireforcamouflage,forinvisibilitythatextendsnowintotheIRrange.Heatsignaturesareasortofvisibilitygivenournewtechnologicalvision.

“system’scontrolunit”:AdamsIIIetal.(2010),46.anypieceof it:Acoupleof theStraws’neighbors to thesouth, theYoxulls,havebeenoff thegridsince

theybuilttheirhouseeighteenyearsagobecausetheydidn’twanttopaytheutility$20,000toextendtheexistingsystemoflinestoanewpole.

“ofatypicaltacticaloperationscenter”:AdamsIIIetal.(2010),46.“meetpowerrequirements”:According toAdamsIIIetal., “[the] inherentadvantageof [renewables for

deployed off-grid operations] over conventional petroleum-fueled systems is that combined withdemand reduction, theygreatly reduceandeveneliminate theneed toprovide fuel logistic to remotesites, savingmanpower, funds,andmost importantlydecreasing the risk to forcesdeliveringsuppliesovercontestedlinesofcommunication.”Theygoon:“Inaddition,solar-PVandwindtechnologiesoffersignificantinherentsecurityfeaturesinthattheyarequietandhavelowthermalsignatures”(2010),44–45.

“suchasbiomassconversion”:THEPSisthenameofasystemmadebytheArlington-basedSkyBuiltthatmorerecentlyhasbeenworkingwithLockheedMartinontheIntegratedSmart-BEARPowerSystem(BEAR is the name for the base grid), the point being that the names and specifics of these thingschange,but for tenyearsat least, thebasicprincipleshave remained the same.See thisgreat article:“FrontlineCommandersRequestingRenewablePowerOptions,”Defense IndustryDaily, January24,2012, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/commanders-in-iraq-urgently-request-renewable-power-options-02548/.

power the cookstoves:Abiorefinery the sizeof a semi can “process thedailywasteof 500 soldiers andgenerate60kW.”AdamsIIIetal.(2010),46.

and$850,000developing:AdamsIIIetal.(2010),46,andSolis(2009).Morerecently,seealsoFranklinH.Holcomb,“Waste-to-EnergyProjectsatArmy Installations” (U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineers, January13, 2011), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/03/f11/waste_holcomb.pdf, “U.S. Military Waste toEnergy & Fuel Gasification Prototype V2.0,” December 7, 2012, http://www.waste-management-world.com/articles/2012/12/u-s-military-waste-to-energy-fuel-gasification-prototype-v2-0.html, andDonKennedy, “Garbage to Fuel: Trash-to-Fuel Generator, Battle-Tested in Iraq, Shows Long-TermPotential,”ArmyAL&TMagazine,April–June2013,138–141.

transportingothergasolinearound:CarbonNation(2010).

extractive technologies: Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil(Brooklyn,NY:VersoBooks,2011).

substation’s large transformers: Rebecca Smith, “PG&E SiliconValley Substation Is BreachedAgain,”Wall Street Journal,August 28, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-es-metcalf-substation-target-of-construction-equipment-theft-1409243813.

computerized infrastructure: “Electric Disturbance Events (OE-417),” Office of Electricity Delivery &EnergyReliability,accessedSeptember30,2015,http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/oe417.aspx.Thecountismine.

in just three months: Jon Mooallem, “Squirrel Power!” New York Times, August 31, 2013,http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/opinion/sunday/squirrel-power.html?_r=0. The litany continues:“SquirrelscutpowertoaregionalairportinVirginia,aVeteransAffairsmedicalcenterinTennessee,auniversityinMontanaandaTraderJoe’sinSouthCarolina.FivedaysaftertheTraderJoe’swentdown,anothersquirrelcutpowerto7,200customersinRockHill,S.C.,ontheoppositeendofthestate.RockHillcityofficialsassuredthepublicthatpoweroutagescausedbysquirrelswere‘veryrare’andthatthegrid was ‘still a reliable system.’ Nine days later, 3,800 more South Carolinians lost power after asquirrelblewupacircuitbreakerinthetownofSummerville.”

“InPortland,Ore.,squirrelsgot9,200customersonJuly1;3,140customersonJuly23;and7,400customersonJuly26.(‘Isoundlikeabrokenrecord,’aspokesmanfortheutilitysaid,briefingthepressforthethirdtime.)InKentucky,morethantenthousandpeoplelostpowerintwoseparateP.O.C.B.S.[poweroutagescausedbysquirrels]afewdaysapart.ThetownofLynchburg,Virginia,sufferedlarge-scale P.O.C.B.S. on two consecutive Thursdays in June. Downtown went dark. At Lynchburg’sAcademyofFineArts,patronswerelefttowavetheirlightediPhonescreensattheartonthewalls,liketorch-carryingVictorianexplorersgropingthroughatomb.”

“OneJune9,asquirrelblackedout2,000customers inKalamazoo,Mich., then921customersoutsideKalamazooaweek later.A localpoliticianvisited theblowntransformerwithherchildren totakea lookat the culprit; anotherwitness told a reporter, ‘Therewasno fur left on it. It looked likesomethingfromC.S.I.’ShepostedaphotooftheincineratedanimaltoherFacebookpage.”

“causingfrequentpoweroutages”:Mooallem(2013).to install solar panels:CoEvolutionQuarterly (1974–1985), an offshoot ofTheWholeEarthCatalog (a

counterculturegolden-eramainstay)awardedthissun-challengeddistinctiontoForksinthelate1970s.

CHAPTER8:InSearchoftheHolyGrailfromthirtyyearstoten:“ABigBetonSmall,”EconomistTechnologyQuarterly,December6,2014,7.sohasitalwaysbeen:Backin1973,withfusionbutthirtyyearsaway,therewasanothergrailsearchunder

way, thoughnotyet for storage.Unlike fusion, thegoalof thoseNixonera innovatorswearehardlyconscious of today because, in a rather unspectacular way, we found it. According to the papers of

SouthernCaliforniaEdisontheenergytechnologythatfueleddreamsin theearly1970swasadevicethatcoulddirectlyconvert“heat intoelectricity,”eliminating“theneedforshafts, turbines,andotherrotatingparts.”

Giventheseconditionsforsuccess,solarpanelsandfuelcells,bothextantbutpoortechnologiesatthetime,werewinningtheoptimists’race,forthesetwoseemedbestcapableofchartingapatharoundCarnot’stheorem.Limitsonthethermalefficiencyofheatengineswasbythelate1960sandearly’70scripplingthelong-solidelectricityindustry,soanymeansofmakingpowerwithoutfirstburningfueltoheatwatertomakesteamtoturnaturbinewas,effectively,ajewel-encrustedgrailworthyofpursuit.Atthat timeboth solar cells and fuel cellswereprohibitively expensive,barelyviable technologies.Butmoney and creativity and hope went, if sporadically, toward each. The half million Americanhouseholdsthattodayhavesolarpanelsontheirroofsarethebeneficiariesofthisonce-ascendantvisionofamoreperfectenergysource.

Evenmorenoteworthyisthatby2014,machinesdesignedtomakepowerwithoutsteamhadcometorulethemarket:96.1percentofallelectricalpowergenerationbuiltintheUnitedStatesthatyearwaseithernaturalgas,wind,or solar (53.3percentwindandsolar,42.8percentnaturalgas).Fuelcells,despitestillbeingtheobjectofflurriesofactivityandoccasionalpressreleasesproclaimingsuccess,stilllagfarbehindtheirrunningmatesinthe“nosteamforpower”racetothetop.Thisdoesn’tmakethemanylessthe repositoriesof hope, however, asK.R.Sridhar, the founder anddriving forcebehind theBloomBox, a recent addition to the struggling fuel cellmarket,makes clear. “Weonlywanted to solve thedifficultproblems,wedidn’twanttofindtheeasyanswer,wedidn’twant tofindthefirst little thingthatcouldwork.Weknewwhatwewereafter,wewereaftertheholygrailandifwedidn’tgetthatwedidn’tcare.That’s theonly thingwewantedandwewentafter it.”K.R.Sridhar,“BoomboxEnergyPhenomenon.”InterviewavailableonYouTube.

asmercurialasawindturbine:Balancingvariablegenerationwithotherformsofvariablegenerationcanbedisastrousbecauseshiftsinthesunandwindtendtobediurnal,whichistosay,surfacewinds,whichare driven by surface temperatures, have the unhelpful habit of slacking off at dusk. F.M.Mulder,“Implications of Diurnal and Seasonal Variations in Renewable Energy Generation for Large ScaleEnergyStorage,”JournalofRenewableandSustainableEnergy6,no.3(2014):033105.

“theensemblecontinuouslyproducesbeautifulmusic”:ClayStrangerisacolleagueofAmoryLovins.ThisaquoteLovinsusesoftentoexplainhowstoragemightbecomepartofasecureenergysystemthatisalways in motion. Not everyone agrees with him, but it is a compelling notion nevertheless. Seeespecially Amory Lovins, “There Are Cheaper Ways to Keep the Lights on than Vast ElectricalStorage,” Financial Times, April, 13 2016. The comments section is also revealing.http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a437955e-0098-11e6-99cb-83242733f755.html#axzz48YT31YG7.

fuels 98 percent of the local power plants: This statistic comes from an advertisement I saw at RonaldReagan International Airport in January 2012 (it was produced by Friends of Coal,http://www.friendsofcoal.org/).

durationoftheblackout:EdmundConway,“World’sBiggestBatterySwitchedoninAlaska,”Telegraph,August27,2003,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/3312118/Worlds-biggest-battery-switched-on-in-Alaska.html.

ournationalgeneratingcapacity:In2013,datagatheredfromtheDOEGlobalEnergyStorageDatabase,accessedJanuary15,2015,http://www.energystorageexchange.org.

regenerateanelectriccurrent:InAlabama,thisisdonewithanaturalgascombustionturbine.thereareeffectively,none:Thecapacityis336MWinColoradoand260MWinOklahoma,outofatotal

capacityof 18,341MWnationally. “LicensedPumpedStorageProjects,”FederalEnergyRegulationCommission, April 1, 2015, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/pump-storage/licensed-projects.pdf.

inMcIntosh,Alabamadoes:CAESstandsforCompressedAirEnergyStorage.Thereareonlytwostoragefacilities like this in theworld: theMcIntosh,Alabama plant, and one inGermany.Utah,Ohio, andIdaho also rest in part upon similar geologic structures,which are being considered for developmentnowthateffectivestoragehasgrownsocriticaltothegood,futurefunctioningofourgrid.

almosttwentyyearsofrechargeability:Flowbatteriesarealittlebitlikearegularbatteryturnedinsideout.Imagine the electrolyte being outside the terminals rather than surrounding them. As the electrolytecirculates it generates an electric charge across a membrane that separates the terminals. As it isdepleteditcanbetoppedoff,ratherlikegettingrefillsonone’scoffeeatadiner.Forthemomenttheelectron flow these batteries produce is not quite lustful enough to run much, and the very bestchemistries involve using platinum (expensive) or vanadium (a rare earth chemical, found only inChina,Russia,andSouthAfricaandthusrisky).Becauseoftheirpotentialforalonglife—about10,000cycles or twenty years—these batteries nevertheless offer much promise. Specifics can be found at“BU-210b: How Does the Flow Battery Work?” Battery University,http://batteryuniversity.com/learn/article/bu_210b_flow_battery.

topography rather than technology: “So far, when Energy storage systems (ESSs) are integrated intoconventionalelectricgrids,specialdesignedtopologiesand/orcontrolforalmosteachparticularcaseisrequired.Thismeans costlydesign anddebugging timeof each individual component/control systemevery time the utility decides to add an energy storage system.” Alaa Mohd et al., “Challenges inIntegrating Distributed Energy Storage Systems into Future Smart Grid,” in IEEE InternationalSymposiumonIndustrialElectronics(IEEE,2008),1627–32.

0.8percent of that states power:Alabamahas the potential to produce20percent of its electricity fromsolarpower;however,thisisnotbeingtakenadvantageof,inpartbecauseAlabamaisonlyoneoffourstateswherehomemadesolarpowerisnotpurchasedbytheutilityforredistribution.Theircurrentfuelmix is coal 70.53 percent, nuclear 17.99 percent, gas& oil 9.55 percent, hydro 1.93 percent. LarryClark,“AlabamaPower,aSouthernCompany,”atGridBootCamp,September21,2009.

“coal-andgas-firedpowerplants”:Gillis(2015c).“extendpatterns in thepresent”:AkhilGupta,“AnAnthropologyofElectricity from theGlobalSouth,”

CulturalAnthropology30,no.4(2015):555–68.doubled every year since 2005: Roxanne Palmer, “Solar Power Growing Pains: HowWill Hawaii and

GermanyCopewith theBoom inAlternative Energy?” International Business Times, December 23,2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/solarpower-growing-pains-how-will-hawaii-germany-cope-boom-alternative-energy-1518702.

in thecountry (afterArizona):ChristianRoselund,“Arizona,HawaiiLead theU.S. inPer-CapitaSolar,”PVMagazine, September 1, 2014, http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/arizona--hawaii-lead-the-us-in-per-capita-solar_100016279/.

on the investment anywhere: “Top 10States forResidential Solar—Fall 2014,” SolarReviews, accessedDecember14,2015,http://www.solarreviews.com/solarpower/top-states-for-solar-fall-2014-facts/.

makes its electricity fromoil: SodoesPuertoRico.Oil for electricity generation is a constant for islandnations,islandstates,andislanddemistates.

timesthenationalaverage:“U.S.SolarMarketTrends2013”(2014),21.solarpowerproduction:“SunshineandClouds,”EconomistTechnologyQuarterly,September3,2015.produced fromaggregate statistics:Alabama,Oklahoma,Arkansas, and Idaho are dead last in the 2015

solar power rankings (NewYork,Massachusetts, Connecticut, andOregon take the first four spots).Thislistdoesnotrankbaseduponinstalledsolarpower—CaliforniaandArizonadon’tevenmakethetopten—rather, it looksathowfelicitoustheregulatoryenvironmentis,atwhat thestateandutilitiesaredoingtomakeitaffordableandeasytobuildsolar,bigandsmall,andlinkthisbackintothegrid.“2015 United States Solar Power Ratings” http://www.solarpowerrocks.com/2015-solar-power-state-rankings/.

backintothepublicgrid:“U.S.SolarMarketTrends2013”(IREC:InterstateRenewableEnergyCouncil,July2014),15.

oron tropical islands: “Q22015SolarMarket InsightFactSheet,”SolarEnergy IndustriesAssociation,December17,2014,http://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/Q2%202015%20SMI%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.

wannabesolarpowerproducers:DavidGiles,“BlackoutInsurance:SolarCityRooftops,”CityLimits,July2,2007,http://citylimits.org/2007/07/02/blackout-insurance-solar-city-rooftops/.

NevadaandUtahmarkets:“Currently,Arizonaishometomorethan20,000residentialsolarcustomers,ofwhichapproximately85percentaresolarleasehouseholds.”IanClover,“ArizonatoImposeNewTaxon Solar Lease Customers,” PV Magazine, May 7, 2014, http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/arizona-to-impose-new-tax-on-solar-lease-customers-_100015000/.

“In2007,only10percentofCaliforniahomeownersweregoingsolarthroughasolarpanelleasingarrangement.Theshifttoover75percentsolarleasingin2012isclearlysignificant.”ZacharyShahan,“Solar Leasing Explosion In California (Chart),” CleanTechnica, December 9, 2013,http://cleantechnica.com/2013/12/09/solar-leasing-explosion-california-chart/.Onecompany,SolarCity,accountsfor32.5percentofthemarketshareresidentialsolarinstallationsinArizonain2012,and17.2percent in California. Andrew Krulewitz, “The Numbers Behind SolarCity’s Success,” Greentech

Media, March 18, 2013, http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/The-Numbers-Behind-SolarCitys-Success.

awhopping307in2011:Lacey(2014).underfundeddistributionnetworks:Hertzog(2013).“isnotaddressedinthisway”:Hertzog(2013)“oppositeofthetraditionalmodel”:“AllChange,”Economist,January17,2015,9.inWesternEuropeitisalreadybegun:EveryEuropeancountryisidiosyncratic.France,forexample,isall

about nuclear; this is part of the reason why France is working on fusion while Germany, whichoutlawednuclearafterFukushima,isgoingtowardrenewables.

investing inanear futuredefection:StephenLacey,“This IsWhat theUtilityDeathSpiralLooksLike,”GreentechMedia,March4,2014,http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/this-is-what-the-utility-death-spiral-looks-like.

“withabunchofstrandedassets”:Lacey(2014).they are largely inactive: According to Thomas Kuhn from the Edison Electric Institute, in the United

States in2010,manyofour largestpowerplantswere runningat10 to15percentof theirpotential;publicpresentation,Washington,D.C.,September23,2009.

waysofgeneratingrevenue:Forthetwosidesofthestorysee:BarbaraHollingsworth,“Report:DangerofGovernment-CreatedSolarBubbleBurstingWhenSubsidiesExpire in2016,”CNSNews,August13,2015, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/barbara-hollingsworth/report-danger-government-created-solar-bubble-bursting-when; and Jeff McMahon, “Solar’s Future: Boom, Bust, Boom,” Forbes,November 4, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2015/11/04/solars-future-boom-bust-boom/.

“pumped”hydrostorage:EduardR.Heindl,“EnergyStoragefortheAgeofRenewables,”TEDxStuttgart,March 11, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XF7mbEsEP04&index=9&list=PL9Xg-mFq2790Ok5edfcraCLAMs5v4a-BI.

enough to make use of it: Energy Storage for Renewables Integration: Challenges and SuccessesDeveloping Solutions for Wind & Solar Assets, Navigant Research Webinar, January 13, 2015.http://www.navigantresearch.com/webinar/energystorage-for-renewables-integration-3.

our common landscape: Richard F. Hirsh and Benjamin K. Sovacool, “Wind Turbines and InvisibleTechnology:UnarticulatedReasonsforLocalOppositiontoWindEnergy,”TechnologyandCulture54,no.4(2013):705–34.

almostexclusivelyinChina:Theseelementsarenotforthemostpartrare,despitetheappellation;theyaredifficult to depend on because of tariffs, and national borders, and unpredictable swings in currencyrates. TimMaughan, “TheDystopianLake Filled by theWorld’s TechLust,”BBCFuture,April 2,2015,http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150402-the-worst-place-on-earth.

both the market and the imagination: Sebastian Anthony, “At Long Last, New Lithium Battery TechActuallyArrivesontheMarket(andMightAlreadyBeinYourSmartphone),”ExtremeTech,January

10, 2014, http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/174477-at-long-last-new-lithium-battery-tech-actually-arrives-on-the-market-and-might-already-be-in-your-smartphone. See also “Battery Statistics,”BatteryUniversity,accessedNovember15,2015,http://batteryuniversity.com/learn/article/battery_statistics.

someplacesuspect,likeAlberta:“AboutDLSC,”DrakeLandingSolarCommunity,accessedNovember15,2015,http://www.dlsc.ca/about.htm.

acidorevenceramic:Whiledifficulttoexplain,batteriesarequitesimpletomake.Youwillneedacanofsoda(anybrandwilldo)—thisisyourelectrolyte;aplastic,Styrofoam,orpapercup,whichcontainstheprocess,likethewrappingonabattery;andastripofcopperthatisslightlytallerthanthecup.Pourthesodain(drinkwhatisleftinthecan),cutoutastripofthecanthat’sroughlythesamesizeasthecopperstrip,andstickeachpieceofmetalinthecup,butdon’tletthemtouch.Voilà,abattery.Ifyouconnecttheelectrodes(thecopperandaluminumstrips)withawire,aboutthreequartersofavoltwillstreambetweenthem.Youcouldrunathree-quarter-voltlightbulbwiththething,ifsuchabulbexisted.Thisdescriptionistakenfrom“HowtoMakeaHomemadeBattery,”wikiHow,accessedDecember17,2015,www.wikihow.com/Make-a-Homemade-Battery.

safer, and longer lasting: “Why Lithium Batteries Keep Catching Fire,” Economist, January 27, 2014,http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/01/economist-explains-19.

rainy days and long dark nights: Jake Richardson, “Tesla Powerwall Offered To Vermont UtilityCustomers … $0 Down,” CleanTechnica, December 9, 2015,https://cleantechnica.com/2015/12/09/tesla-powerwall-offered-to-vermont-utility-customers-for-free/.

has always been their charm: Though somewhat scalable and somewhat portable, fuel cells suffer frombeingexpensive and from the fact that theydoneedconstant exposure to their fuel (theyneed tobepluggedintonaturalgaspipelines,forexample).

itseems,willbeelectric:ZackKanter,“AutonomousCarsWillDestroyMillionsofJobsandReshapeU.S.Economy by 2025,” Quartz, May 14, 2015, http://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2015/05/autonomous-cars-will-destroy-millions-jobs-and-reshape-us-economy-2025/112762/.

ItsoundsalittlelikeMarxism:KarlMarx,CritiqueoftheGothaProgram(Rockville,MD:WildsidePress,2008[1875]).

“whenyouaregettingitfixed”:quotedinRyanKoronowski,“WhytheU.S.MilitaryIsPursuingEnergyEfficiency, Renewables and Net-Zero Energy Initiatives,” ThinkProgress, April 4, 2013,http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/04/04/1749741/why-the-us-military-is-pursuing-energy-efficiency-renewables-and-net-zero-energy-initiatives/.

“dippinginthemiddle”:Economist(January17,2015),10.outofthecenteratourgrid:“HowMuchEnergyIsConsumedinResidentialandCommercialBuildingsin

the United States?” U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed November 15, 2015,http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=86&t=1.

incentives were different: Justin Gillis, “A Tricky Transition from Fossil Fuel: Denmark Aims for 100Percent Renewable Energy,” New York Times, November 10, 2014,

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/11/science/earth/denmark-aims-for-100-percent-renewable-energy.html.

“Technologyneedstosaveus”:Gillis2014.(wealth of batteries to the grid’s benefit): The popularity of electric and hybrid vehicles in Norway is

largelytheresultofefficient,ifoftendeemedexcessive,subsidiesandotherbenefits(likebeingabletouse theHOVlane,even ifyouaredrivingaloneor takeferriesfor free).SteveHanley,“ElectricCarSales Surge inNorway during 2015,” January 21, 2016, http://gas2.org/2016/01/21/electric-car-sales-surge-in-norway-during-2015/.

municipal government—are electric: “ElectricVehicles and theGrid,”Navigant Research, February 10,2015,https://www.navigantresearch.com/webinar/electric-vehicles-and-the-grid.

just outside Hanover: The air force plans to expand the V2G demonstration to Joint Base Andrews,Maryland,andJointBaseMcGuire-Dix-Lakehurst,NewJersey.Theservicewillalsocontinuetolookfor additional capabilities, such as utilizing used batteries as a form of on-base energy storage. “AirForceTestsFirstAll-ElectricVehicleFleet inCalifornia,”U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,December17,2014,http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/news/news_detail.cfm/news_id=21787.

designed in from the start: Michael d’Estries, “Operation Sustainability: U.S. Military Sets AmbitiousEnvironmental Goals—Ecomagination,” Ecomagination, January 30, 2012,http://www.ecomagination.com/operation-sustainability-us-military-sets-ambitious-environmental-goals.

“V2G demonstration in the world”: “AF Tests First All-Electric Vehicle Fleet in California,”U.S. AirForce, November 14, 2014, http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/554343/af-tests-first-all-electric-vehicle-fleet-in-california.aspx.

ofourcollectivedemand:Ofthetenfastest-growingcitiesintheUnitedStates,ninearefirmlyintheACzone(includingfiveinTexas).“InPhotos:TheFastest-GrowingCitiesInTheU.S.,”Forbes,accessedNovember 16, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/pictures/edgl45emig/no-1-raleigh-nc-metropolitan-statistical-area/.

“whenthereisnoclearanswer”:AmeliaTaylor-Hochberg,“ZoomIn,ZoomOut:HashimSarkis,DeanofMIT’sSchoolofArchitecture+Planning,onArchinectSessionsOne-to-One#5,”Archinect,accessedDecember 12, 2015, http://archinect.com/news/article/142833231/zoom-in-zoom-out-hashim-sarkis-dean-of-mit-s-school-of-architecture-planning-on-archinect-sessions-one-to-one-5.

CHAPTER9:AmericanZeitgeist“important qualities about them”: A blogger going by the username “enkidu” notes that “seeky” is a

linguisticalternativetotheall-encompassing,“soul-destroying”definitionofaddictionadvancedbythePartnership for a Drug-Free America. “Seeky,” everything2, March 30, 2001,http://everything2.com/title/seeky.

somethinglike“seeky”:“Supposeyouhavearoofwithaholeinit,”thenovelistNealStephensonexplains,“thatmeansit’saleakyroof.It’sleakyallthetime—evenifit’snotrainingatthemoment.Butit’sonlyleakingwhenithappenstoberaining.Inthesameway,morphine-seekymeansthatyoualwayshavethistendencytolookformorphine,evenifyouarenotlookingforitatthemoment.”NealStephenson,Cryptonomicon(NewYork:AvonBooks,1999),373–74.

jetplanessimplydonot: Inawidelypublicizedcompetition inJuly2015,Airbusspent£14million($22million) just toensure thesuccessofa singlecrossingof itselectricplaneover theEnglishChannel.David Szondy, “Electric Aircraft Makes First English Channel Crossing,” Gizmag, July 12, 2015,http://www.gizmag.com/first-electric-aircraft-cross-english-channel-airbus-cri-cri/38410/.

task-specific,andunobtrusive:DonaldA.Norman,TheInvisibleComputer:WhyGoodProductsCanFail,thePersonalComputerIsSoComplex,andInformationAppliancesAretheSolution(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1999),viii–ix.

fossil fuels for making power: Mitchell (2011) and Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil,Money&Power(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,2011).

“filledwithpassengers”:Fox-Penner(2014),xiii.tobringdowngovernments:Mostfamously,ordinaryEgyptiansandTunisiansusedFacebookandTwitter

tohelpcoordinatetheirrespectiveversionsoftheArabSpringin2011.“don’t want power lines.”: Chris Kahn and Eric Tucker, “Easy Fix Eludes Power Outage Problems in

U.S.,” Yahoo! Finance, July 4, 2012, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/easy-fix-eludes-power-outage-problems-us-220940392.html.

“andoutcomefuels”:DavidRotman,“PrayingforanEnergyMiracle,”MITTechnologyReview,February22,2011,http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/422836/praying-for-an-energy-miracle/.

risestogreetthegrid:HirshandSovacool(2013).theirbillforrenewablepower:Thoughforthemostpart,whenitcomestotheelectricbill,veryfewpeople

(about 10 percent) are willing to pay more than about 5 percent for “green” electricity. MichaelValocchi,IBM.Publicpresentation,September22,2009.

“beyondgovernmentmandates”:She continues: “For thoseofyouwonderingwhereyour energycomesfromnowviaExcel[sic],hereisabreakdown:The2014averagemixofresourcessupplyingNorthernStates Power customers includes coal (38.5%), nuclear (29.2%), natural gas (7.7%), wind (13.8%),hydro(7.7%),biomass(3.0%)andother(0.1%).”FromFacebook,October2015.

money for the cause: In keeping with this trend of feeling more comfortable with the less materialsomethingis,liquefiednaturalgasisoftenprotestedwhilenaturalgasinitsgaseousformrarelyis.

of thepower theydid in1975:RolandRisser,“TheProofIs in thePudding:HowRefrigeratorStandardsHave SavedConsumers $Billions,”Energy.gov, July 11, 2011, http://www.energy.gov/articles/proof-pudding-how-refrigerator-standards-have-saved-consumers-billions.

onewithanEnergyStarrating:EnergyStarappliancesallowonetosavemoneyontheelectricbilloverthelife of the appliance, offsetting the higher purchase price, and they are a critical part of fallingU.S.

electricityconsumptionoverall.Individuals,households,andappliancesalluselesselectricitythantheyused to.Sodomanufactories,datacenters,and largeHVACsystems,becausealmosteverything thatreliesonelectricityhasbeenredesigned,oftennumeroustimes,sincethe1970stouselessofit.

take it one step further:Themiddle-aged still buycars andhouses, and stillmakechoices abouthow topower those cars andhouses, but the twentysomethings give every appearance of leaving evenbasicAmericanmaterialismbehind.Theyareundoubtedlythemostwirelessgeneration,buttheyalsodon’tbuybigstuff.Thebiggerthestuff,thelesstheybuyofit.Thisisnotonlybecausetheydon’thavethemoney forbig-ticket items,but alsobecause theyare fundamentallyuninterested inusing themoneytheydohaveinwaysthattiethemtopermanentdebtorimmobileassets.Whattotheirparentslookedlike security (homeownership, carownership, refrigeratorownership) to them feels likeunjustifiablerisk.

a cold spot built in?: Ikea already has a prototype for the non-fridge; the woven wall came from aconversation with a nineteen-year-old fiber arts student I know, who thinks bulbs are dumb andexpensive.

“consistenttimemanagement”:“NISTFrameworkandRoadmapforSmartGridInteroperabilityStandards,Release2.0”(NationalInstituteofStandardsandTechnology,U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,February2012), http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/NIST_Framework_Release_2-0_corr.pdf, pp. 79, 84, and87,respectively.

OnesetofstandardsthatmostAmericanslikelyassumearewellenoughinplacehavetodowithcybersecurity.Themorecomputerizedthegridbecomesthemorevulnerableitbecomestohackers.Itmaybesquirrelsandtreebranchestodaythatdothemostharm,butthat’slargelybecausethenetworksthatwillremakeourgridoverintoathinkingmachinearenotyetwellinplace.SeeKoppel(2015).In2001,astudentinChinawrotearesearchpaperarguingthattheentireWesternInterconnectioncouldbetaken down by destroying just three substations. But just because hackers can take down our griddoesn’tmeantheywantto.Inresponsetoa2012accusationbytheDailyMailthatthehackinggroupAnonymousnowhad the capacity to “shutdown the entireU.S. powergrid” they said, “that’s right,we’redefinitelytakingdownthepowergrid.We’llknowwe’vesucceededwhenalltheequipmentweusetomountourcampaignisrenderedcompletelyuseless”(GabriellaColeman,personalconversation,2012). See also William Pentland, “Push Back: Utility Coalition Fights Federal Cyber SecurityStandards,” FierceEnergy, September 24, 2015, http://www.fierceenergy.com/story/pushback-utility-coalition-fights-federal-cybersecurity-standards/2015-09-24.

fromrenewablesby2030:SenateBill350,CleanEnergyandPollutionReductionActof2015.hasbeeninstalledsince2010:“U.S.SolarMarketTrends2013”(2014),7and15.in thepast threeyears:According to IREC’s“U.S.SolarMarketTrends2013,” thisnumberwillchange

fastasmorebigsolarcomesonlinebetween2015and2020.TheCaliforniaValleySolarRanchbecameoperational in 2013with generating capacity of 250MW,while in 2014 alone, theMojaveDesert’sIvanpahSolarElectricGeneratingSystem (with a gross capacity of 392MW), theAbengoaMojave

SolarProject(280MW),andtheGenesisEnergySolarProject(280MW)werebroughtonline.In2015,SolarStar(579MW)inRosamund,TopazSolarFarm(550MW)inSanLuisObispoCounty,andtheDesertSunlightSolarFarm(550MW)intheMojavewereeachcommissioned.Threemorelarge-scaleprojectsareeitherinthecomplaintphaseorundergoingconstructionandareexpectedtobeoperationalby2020.

might come profitably together: Julia Pyper, “The Solar Industry Stands Divided Over California’s 50Percent Renewable Energy Target,” Greentech Media, July 17, 2015,http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-solar-industry-stands-divided-over-californias-future-renewable-energy. See alsoBethGardiner, “California Leads aQuietRevolution,”NewYork Times,October 5, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/business/energy-environment/california-leads-a-quiet-revolution.html,andChrisMegerianandJavierPanzar,“Gov.BrownSignsClimateChangeBillto Spur Renewable Energy, Efficiency Standards,” Los Angeles Times, October 7, 2015,http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-jerry-brown-climate-change-renewable-energy-20151007-story.html.

“using lesselectricitymoreefficiently”:AmoryLovins,“TheNegawattRevolution” inAcross theBoardXXVIIvol.9,September1990,21–22.

significantly more people: From Katherine Tweed, “U.S. Electricity Demand Flat Since 2007,” IEEESpectrum, February 6, 2015, http://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/energy/environment/us-electricity-demand-flat-since-2007 and Quadrennial Energy Review 2015, DOE from a presentation at theWoodrowWilsonCenterinD.C.onMay7,2015.Nevertheless,it’sworthconsidering“thattheend-to-endinfrastructureittakestokeepupwithourTweetinghabitisresponsibleformorethan2,500MWhperweekof demandon the grid that simply did not exist before the application’s advent.”MassoudAmin, “Living in the Dark: Why the U.S. Needs to Upgrade the Grid,” Forbes, July 11, 2012,http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/07/11/living-in-the-dark-why-the-u-s-needs-to-upgrade-the-grid/.

andwell-litrooms:“NebiaShower—BetterExperience,70PercentLessWater”(2015).simpleasdimming the lights:ChrisMooney,“TheElectricity InnovationsoControversialThat It’sNow

before the Supreme Court,” Washington Post, October 20, 2015,https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/10/20/the-electricity-innovation-so-controversial-that-its-now-before-the-supreme-court/.

runningallover theplace:“Severalrecent trendsarecreatinganenvironmentconducive toVPPs.Theseincludetheincreasingpenetrationofsmartmetersandothersmartgridtechnologies,growthinvariablerenewablegeneration,andemergingmarketsforancillaryservices.However,challengestocommercialrolloutsofVPPsremain,includingthelackofrelianceupondynamic,real-timepricingandconsumerpushback against the smart grid.The endgoal for thismarket is themixed assetVPP segment, as itbringsdistributedgeneration(DG)anddemandresponse(DR)togethertoprovideasynergisticsharingof grid resources.” From “Virtual Power Plants” (Navigant Research, 2014),

https://www.navigantresearch.com/research/virtual-power-plants.where it might all be going: There was a recent essay in the Atlantic about how we mess up future

predictionsbyfocusingonthewrongthings:howwegettowork,forexample,ratherthanwhatworkislike.Thus,inthefutureasimaginedinthe1950s,wealltookjetpackstotheoffice,butwhenwegotthere, there still weren’t any women. Rose Eveleth, “Why Aren’t There More Women Futurists?”Atlantic, July 31, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/07/futurism-sexism-men/400097/.

atthesamerateasawattmade:BrettFeldman,“All’sQuietontheDRFront,butaStormIsBrewing,”NavigantResearchBlog,October7,2015,http://www.navigantresearch.com/blog/alls-quiet-on-the-dr-front-but-a-storm-is-brewing. See also Katherine Hamilton, “SPEER Releases Report on Benefits ofDemand Response,” Advanced Energy Management Alliance, October 29, 2015, http://aem-alliance.org/speer-releases-report-on-benefits-of-demand-response/.

“generators to increase supply”: Mooney (2015). He goes on: “In particular, the objection before theSupremeCourtisthatthisschemeofcompensationgetsFERCintoregulatingretailelectricitymarkets,theonesthatyouandIarefamiliarwith,becausethat’swherewebuyourownelectricityfrompowerproviders.AndFERCdoesn’tgovernthose—statepublicutilitycommissionsdo.What’scomplicatedisthatwhile demand response companies participate and bid into thewholesalemarkets—governed byFERC—theirownclientsarecompaniesbuyingelectricityontheretailmarkets, just likeyouandme(but generally on amuch larger scale). In effect, demand-response blurs this distinction between themarkets.And thus, before the SupremeCourt, this has been framed as a battle over federalism, andwhetherFERCisgoingtoofarandgettingintostateterritory.”

“stimulate much-needed investment”: “Selling It by the Negawatt,” Economist, December 2, 2014,http://www.economist.com/news/business-and-finance/21635404-demand-response-industry-consolidating-selling-electricity-negawatt.

irregularities are highlighted: Donald Richie,A Tractate on Japanese Aesthetics (Berkeley, CA: StoneBridgePress,2007).

orapuddleof tar:JacobVonUexkülldistinguishesbetweenplants,whichareimmediatelyembeddedintheir habitat, and animals, which occupy a milieu (Umwelt). Perhaps von Uexküll’s best-knownexampleofthisconceptisthetick,whosemilieuisconstitutedbyaverylimitednumberoffactors.Thetickclimbstothetopofabranchorstalkanddropsontoapassinganimal,whoseblooditthensucks.Thetickhasnoeyes,thegeneralsensitivityofitsskintosunlightaloneorientingitinitsupwardclimb.Itsolfactorysenseperceivesasingleodor:butyricacid,asecretiongivenoffbythesebaceousfolliclesofallmammals.“Whenitsensesawarmobjectbelow,itdropsonitspreyandsearchesoutapatchofhair. It then pierces the host’s soft skin and sucks its blood. The tick’s milieu is made up of thoseelements thathavemeaning for it: sunlight, thesmellofbutyricacid, the tactilesenseofmammalianheat,hairandsoftskin,andthetasteofblood.Itsmilieuisaclosedworldofelements,outsideofwhichnothing else exists. Although it seems that animals all inhabit the same universe, each lives in a

different,subjectivelydeterminedmilieu”(58–59).InhisdiscussionofDeleuzeandGuattari’s“animalmusic,”assetforthintheir“OftheRefrain”sectionofAThousandPlateaus,RonaldBoguereiteratesthestoryofthetick,citingitssourcein“Uexküll’s1940studyBedeutungslehre(TheoryofMeaning).”RonaldBogue,DeleuzeonMusic,PaintingandtheArts(NewYork:Routledge,2003).

AFTERWORDI’llwonder if this isus too:NathanielPhilbrick, In theHeartof theSea:TheTragedyof theWhaleship

Essex(NewYork:PenguinBooks,2001).

Index

accesstoelectricityinearly1900s,hereaspublicright,here,hereinruralareas,here

AdamsStreetStation(Chicago),here,here,hereaesthetics,hereair-conditioning,here,here,here,here,here,here,here,hereAkins,Nick,hereAlabamasaltdomes,hereAlbertsonsgrocerystores,hereAlcoaAluminum,herealternatingcurrent(AC)advantageoverDCsystems,herebig-citygrids,hereasfirststeptowardbiggrid,hereinnetworks,hereforNiagaraFallsplant,herephysicsof,here

alternativeenergy,here.SeealsorenewableenergyAmericanElectricPower,hereAmericanTelephone&Telegraph(AT&T),hereAmericanTobacco,hereAmin,Massoud,here,hereAnacondaCopper,hereanalogmeters,hereAnderson,Brigadier,hereanimals,outagescausedby,hereantitrustlaws,here,hereApple,hereAppleton,Wisconsingrid,here,herearclighting,here,here,here,here,here,here

Arizona,solarpowerin,here,here,hereartificiallakes.SeepumpedhydroAsmus,Peter,here

Bakersfield,California,herebalancingauthorities,herebalancingload,here,here,here.Seealsostoringelectricitybatteriescomponentsof,hereofelectriccars,hereforenergystorage,here,hereflow,hereformilitarymicrogrids,here

biologicalsystemsandthegrid,herelongevityof,here

blackouts.SeepoweroutagesBogue,Ronald,hereBonnevillePowerAdministration(BPA),hereBoulder,Colorado.SeeSmartGridCitybrownouts.SeepoweroutagesBrush,Charles,here,here,here,hereBryson,John,hereBuffett,Warren,here,hereburiedhydrostorage,hereBusinessweek,hereByck,Peter,here

California,hereBakersfieldprotests,herederegulation,hereelectriccompanies,hereEnron’smanipulation,herefrontierelectrictechnologies,heregoalsforrenewables,herepollutionmitigationlaw,here

poweroutages,here,hererenewableenergystandard,hereSanOnofrepowerstation,heresmallpowerproducers,heresolarpower,here,here,here,here,here,heretreetopclearance,herewindpower,here

Canada,EastCoastblackoutand,hereCarter,Jimmy,here,here,here,hereCasazza,Jack,hereCashman,Tyrone,here,hereCataractConstructionCompany,hereCenterPointEnergy,herecentralstationgrids,here,here,here,hereChicagoearlyelectriccompanies,hereelectricityuse,hereprivateplants,here

ChicagoEdison,here,hereChu,Stephen,here,here,hereCisco,hereCitibank,herecleanenergy,here.Seealsorenewableenergyclimatechange,here,here,herecoal,here,herecoal-burningplants,herecarbondioxidefrom,herereplacementsfor,hereshrinkingnumberof,hereasstockresource,hereswitchtooil-burningplants,here

cogeneration,here,here,here,hereColorado.SeeSmartGridCityColumbiaRiverGorgewindfarms,here,here,herecommongood,poweras,here,here,hereCommonwealthEdison,herecompetition,here,hereSeealso.PublicUtilitiesRegulatoryPoliciesAct(PURPA),sectionhereamongserviceproviderplans,here

andelectricityaspublicgood,hereandEnergyPolicyAct,here,hereopeningdoorto,herefromprivateplants,hereandriseofmonopolies,here(Seealsomonopolies)inwirelessmarket,here

compressed-airstorage,here,herecomputerplatforms,herecomputer-relatedpoweroutages,herecomputers,here,hereconcentratingsolartowers,hereConEd,hereConnecticut,hereconservation,herecapacitytodeploy,hereandcontrolbycustomers,hereenvironmentalmovement,hereandreformofenergysystem,here,here,here

ConsolidatedEdison,hereconsolidationofelectricityservices,here.Seealsomonopoliesconsumerculture,here,herecoppertheft,hereculturalsystemsconsumerculture,here,hereandearlyprivategrids,hereandthegrid,heremassmarket,here

cultureofelectricitymaking,here

dams,here,here,here,here,hereDavis,Gray,hereDavis-BesseNuclearPowerStation(Ohio),here,heredemand-response(DR),heredemand-sidereform,here.Seealsoenergysecurity;humaninteractionswithgridandabilityofutilitiestomeetdemand,heretocontrolpeakdemand,here,heretocontrolpeakload,here

tocontrolrevenuestreams,hereandgriddefection,hereandInternetofThings,heremicrogrids,herenanogrids,herenetmetering,herenewattentionto,hereandpredictabilityofdemand,heresmartgrid,here,heresmartmeters,here,here,here,here,here,here

Denmark,here,hereDepartmentofEnergy,herederegulation,here,hereDetroitblackout(2014),hereDetroitEdison,heredieselgenerators,here,here,here,here,heredirectcurrent(DC),hereadvantageofACover,herebig-citygrids,herecomebackof,herelimitationsof,hereinnetworks,hereandNiagaraFallsplant,herephysicsof,hereforprivatelyownedpowersystems,here,here,here,hererotaryconverters,herefortractioncompanies,here

disasters,hereandattemptstocontrolsystems,herecomputer-related,hereEastCoastblackout(2003),here,hereandEnergyPolicyAct,here,here,here,hereandinstabilityofthegrid,hereandmovementofelectricity,herenuclearplantvulnerabilities,herepoliticalandeconomicfactorsin,herepowerplantfailures,here

SwissCheeseModelofIndustrialAccidents,heretree-related,herefromunpredictablerenewablesgeneration,here

distributionnetworks/systems,hereautomaticshut-offsin,hereinearlygrid,herepoweroutagesstartingon,hereandreplacementofagingplants,herewithrooftopsolar,hereseparationofgenerationfrom,hereseparationoftransmissionsystemsfrom,hereandtree-relatedpoweroutages,herewireless,here

Duke,J.B.,hereDukeEnergy,hereDupee,Steve,hereDuPont,hereDurkin,John,heredynamos,here,here,here,here,here,here

EastCoastblackout(1965),here,hereEastCoastblackout(2003),here,here,hereEasternInterconnection,here,hereeconomicfactors,indisasters,hereeconomicimpact,ofpoweroutages,hereEconomist,here,hereEdison,ThomasAlva,here,here,here,here,here,here,here,hereEdisonElectricInstitute,hereEdisonGeneralElectricCompany,here,hereefficiency,hereenergy,herelighting,hereasmeansofgeneratinglesspower,herepowerplant,here,here,hereandreformofenergysystem,here,here,here

electriccars,electricitystorageand,here

electriccompanies.Seealsoutilitiescompanies;individualcompaniesbenefitsofregulationfor,herebusinessmodelsof,here,hereinCalifornia,herederegulationof,hereandearlyACvs.DCuse,herefailureof,herefor-profit,investor-owned,heregrow-and-buildstrategyof,here,hereasmonopolies,here,here,hereasmonopsonies,heresmall,here

electricity,hereAC,hereaccessto(Seeaccesstoelectricity)addictionto,herefromcogeneration,hereascommodity,hereascommon/publicgood,here,here,hereDC,here,here,heredependenceon,here,heredropinconsumption,here,here,here,here,here,herefirst-generationusesof,hereflowof,hereinstantaneouspoweratadistancefrom,hereknowledgeabout,heremaking,heremovementof,herephaseconverters,herepredictabilityof,herepriceof(Seepriceofelectricity)rotaryconverters,here,herestoring(Seestoringelectricity)transitionfromserialtoparallelcircuitry,herevoltage,here,here,here

ElectricPowerSupplyAssociation(ERSA),hereEnercon,hereEnergyCloud,here

energycrisis(1970s),hereenergyefficiency,hereEnergyFuturesHoldingCorporation,here,hereenergyindependence,hereEnergyInformationAdministration(EIA),hereEnergyPolicyAct(1992),here,here,hereandenergytrading,hereandpowerquality,hereasreregulation,hereresultsof,here

energysecurity,herefuelformilitaryisolatedgrids,herelocalindependentenergysystems,heremicrogrids,hereandnon-storm-relatedoutages,hereresiliency,here

energytrading,here,hereEngland,hereEnron,here,here,hereenvironmentalism,hereenvironmentalmovement,hereEurope,here

Facebook,here,hereFairfax,Stephen,hereFaraday,Michael,hereFederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission(FERC),here,here,here,hereFirstEnergy,here,hereDavis-Besseupgradesby,hereEastCoastblackout,here,here,here

FiskStreetStation(Chicago),here,hereFleishman,Glenn,here,hereflowbatteries,herefluorescentlighting,hereForks,Washington,herefor-profitmonopolies,here

Foshay,Wilber,herefossilfuelpowerplants,herefrontierelectrictechnologies,here,hereFukushimanuclearreactors(Japan),here

GeneralElectric(GE),here,heregeneration.SeealsopowerplantsandEnergyPolicyAct,here,hereand2015Parisclimatechangetalks,herefrompumpedhydro,herefromrenewables,hereseparationofdistributionfrom,here

generatorsdiesel,here,here,here,here,heredynamos,here,here,here,here,here,hereforU.S.military,here,here

Germany,here,here,here,hereGipe,Paul,hereGoogle,here,here,hereGorguinpour,Dr.,here,heregreenenergy,here,here.SeealsorenewableenergyGreenMountainPower,herethegrid,here.Seealsospecifictopicscommandandcontrolstructureof,herecomponentsof,here,hereandculturalsystems,here,herecurrentcapabilitiesof,herecurrenteffortstowardfixing,herefunctioningof,hereandgoalsforrenewables,herehistoryof(Seehistoryofthegrid)asjust-in-timesystem,herelocalnatureof,heremicrogrids,herenetworksofbusinessinterests,geo-politicalstakeholders,andlegalstructuresof,hereoverhauling(Seereformingthegrid)poweroutages,here,heresolutionstolimitationsof,here

technological,biological,andculturalsystemsatworkin,herethreesectionsof,heretransforming,hereandtransitiontogreenenergy,here

griddefection,hereAmericans’reluctancefor,heredevelopmentsfacilitating,hereinearly2000s,hereandutilitydeathspiral,here

grow-and-buildstrategy,here,hereGupta,Akhil,here

Haney,John,herehardpath/hardening,hereHarrisonStreetStation(Chicago),hereHawaiigoalsforrenewablesin,herehomesolarsystemsin,here,here,here,here,here

Hirsh,Richard,here,here,herehistoryofthegrid,hereabsolutepowerofutilitiesin1970s,hereACelectricalsystems,herecentralstationgrids,here,herechaoticinfrastructure,hereChicagoEdison,here,herecogenerationplants,here,here,herecompetition,here,hereconsolidationofelectricityservices,hereDCsystems,here,herederegulation,hereearly1900saccesstoelectricity,hereearlyelectricityaslocalaffair,hereearlyproductdevelopment,hereearlytechnologydevelopment,hereelectricpowermonopolies,here,hereenergycrisis,here

environmentalism,here,herefirstmunicipalgrid,heregrow-and-buildstrategy,here,hereandknowledgeaboutelectricity,herelighting,heremunicipalvs.for-profit-companymonopolies,hereNationalEnergyAct,hereNiagaraFallspowerplant,here,herePG&Eandlocalcommunitygovernanceofelectricpower,hereandpowerasacommongood,hereprivategrids,here,hereprivateplants,here,here,here,here,here,hereproliferationofwires,here,here,herePURPA,here,hereregulation,hererenewablepowerprojects,here,hereriseofmassmarket/consumerculture,hereriseofmonopolies,hererotaryconverters,heresmallpowerinnovators,herestrategiesforpreservingmonopolies,hereswitchtooil-burningpowerplants,heretechnologicalimprovementsandplantefficiency,heretechnologydependenceby1970s,hereThreeMileIsland,heretransformers,heretransitionfromserialtoparallelcircuitry,hereinurbanareas,hereutilitiesasmonopsonies,here,herevoltage,here,herewater-powereddynamos,herewindpowerinCalifornia,here

homeappliances,here,here,here,here,here,here,herehome/rooftopsolarsystems,here,herebatteryback-upsfor,hereinCalifornia,hereandcrisisofinfrastructuralmanagement,here

inHawaii,here,here,here,hereasmoney-makingschemes,here

humaninteractionswithgrid,here,hereaddictiontoelectricity,herecostofretrofitting,hereandimperfectthings,hereandinfrastructurevisibility,here,hereandneedforgridoverhaul,herenegawatts,hereandpreferenceforcommongrid,heresurchargeforrenewables,herevirtualpowerplants,herewirelesssystems,here

Hunter,Don,hereHurricaneIrene,herehydropower,hereburiedhydro,hereinCalifornia,heredams,here,here,here,here,hereforearlysmallgrids,hereforlightingSierraNevadagoldmines,hereinPacificNorthwest,hereaspercentageofrenewableenergy,herepumpedhydro,here,here,hereshrinkingnumberdams,here

Iberdrola,hereIceBearenergystoragesystem,hereiceboxes,hereIkea,here,hereincandescentlighting,here,here,here,here,here,hereinfrastructure.Seealsothegrid;individualpartsofinfrastructureearlychaosof,hereearlyproliferationofwires,here,here,herelaggingchangesin,herelineloadsafterEnergyPolicyAct,herescaleof,here

virtualpowerplants,herevisibilityof,here,here,here,here,hereworkingwithgovernmenton,here

instabilityofthegrid,hereInsull,Samuel,here,here,here,here,here,here,here,hereintelligentgrid,hereInterimStandardOffer#4(ISO4),here,hereInternet,here,hereInternetofThings,here,hereinteroperabilitystandards,hereIowa,windpowerin,hereislanding,here,here,here,hereItaly,here

Japan,here,here,hereJenkins,Phillip,hereJohansson,Bob,here,here,hereJones,Chuck,here,here

Keates,John,hereKelvin,Lord,hereKlein,Maury,hereKorea,hereKrzanich,Brian,here

LasVegascounty,Nevada,herelegacytechnologies,hereLerner,EricJ.,hereLewis,Nate,herelightingarc,here,here,here,here,here,hereearlytechnologies/gridsfor,hereearlyurbangrids,here,here

efficiencyof,herefluorescent,hereincandescent,here,here,here,here,here,herepredictabilityinuseof,heretransitionfromserialtoparallelcircuitry,here

lithion-ionbatteries,hereload(s)afterEnergyPolicyAct,herebalancing,here,here,hereoff-peakpower,herepeak(Seepeakload)variabilityof,here

localcommunitygovernanceofelectricpower,herelocalindependentenergysystems,hereLockheedMartin,here,hereLosAngelesAirForceBase,hereLovins,Amory,here,here,here,here,here,hereLovins,Hunter,here,here,here,here

macrogrid,here.SeealsothegridMainegoalsforrenewablesin,heresmartmetersin,here

Mainzer,Elliot,hereMarinCleanEnergy,hereMarinCounty,California,hereMassachusetts,heremassmarket,hereMedicare,heremicrogrids,here,here.Seealsoprivategridsinearlydays,hereforenergysecurity,here,heremilitary,hereforresiliency,here

microprocessors,hereMidwestIndependentTransmissionSystem(MISO),hereMilburn,Ski,heremilitaryinstallations,heremicrogridsof,here,here

storingelectricityat,hereMississippisaltdomes,heremobilepowerstation,heremonopolies,here,here.Seealsoindividualcompaniesguaranteedprofitsof,heremunicipalutilitiesasguaranteedprofitsof,heremunicipalvs.for-profit,hereandNationalEnergyAct,hereriseof,herestrategiesforpreserving,here

monopsonies,here,here,hereMorgan,J.P.,here,hereMotyka,Theodore,hereMuha,Adam,heremunicipalgrids,hereinCalifornia,hereinearly1900s,herefirst,here,heregovernanceof,hereasmonopolies,here

municipalmonopolies,hereMunson,Richard,here

nanogrids,here,here.SeealsoprivategridsNASDAQpoweroutages,here,hereNationalEnergyAct(1978),here,hereNationalEnergyPlan,hereNationalRenewableEnergyLaboratory(NREL),here,here,herenationalsecurity,herenaturalgas,herenaturalgasplants,herenaturalgasturbines,herenegawatts,hereNeri,Joseph,herenetmetering,here,hereNevadaLasVegassmartmeterradiation,heresolarpowerin,here,here,here

NewHampshire,hereNewJerseyTransit,here,here,heresix-centlawin,hereSuperstormSandy,here,here,here,here

NewYorkCityblackoutof1977,here,here,herepeakdemandreductionin,herePearlStreetStationgrid,here,here,here,here,hereprivategridwiresin,here,here

NewYorkUniversity(NYU),hereNiagaraFallspowerplant,here,here,hereNorman,Donald,herenuclearfusion,herenuclearpowerplants,hereDavis-BesseNuclearPowerStation,heredeteriorationof,herefallofVermontnuclearplant,hereprotestsof,here,herereliabilityof,hereasstockresource,hereThreeMileIsland,hereVermontYankeepowerplant,herevulnerabilitiesof,here

Obamaenergyplan,hereofficetowers,batteriesthatlooklike,hereoff-the-grid,here,hereOhio,EastCoastblackoutand,hereoil-burningpowerplants,hereOpenSourceInitiative,hereOregon,windpowerin,hereOzarksblackout(1987),here

PacificNorthwesthydroelectricinfrastructurein,herepoweroutages,here,here,here

parallelcircuits,herepeakdemand.Seealsostoringelectricity

demand-sidereformstocontrol,here,herepowerplantsreservedfor,here,here

peakload,heredemand-sidereformstocontrol,hereincreasein,hereinsmartgrids,here

PearlStreetStation(NewYork),here,here,here,here,here,herePepco,here,herePeterson,BudandVal,herePG&E,here,here,here,here,here,herephaseconverters,herePickel,Fred,hereplatforms(computer),herepoliticalfactors,indisasters,herepollution,here,herePorter,Kevin,herePost,Gene,herepotentiality,here.SeealsovoltagePowerallbatterysystem,herepoweroutages,here.Seealsoindividualoutagescausesof,herecomputer-related,hereconsumers’attitudestoward,herecostof,hereondistributionsystems,heredurationof,hereimpactof,here,hereincreasein,hereandmovementofelectricity,herenon-storm-related,hereandresiliency,hererollingblackouts,herestorm-related,here,hereintransmissionsystems,heretree-related,hereandunderfundeddistributionnetworks,here

powerplants,here.Seealsospecificplantsandtypesofplantsefficiencyof,here,here,hereenvironmentalregulationsandcostofbuilding,herefailuresof,here

firstlarge-scale,here,heregrow-and-buildstrategy,here,heremoneyowedon,hereforrenewablesources,herereservedforpeakdemand,here,herevirtual,here

predictabilityofdemand,hereofelectricity,hereofgenerationfromrenewables,here

priceofelectricityin1970s,hereandamountofelectricityused,hereandconservationofpower,hereandenergytrading,hereandenvironmentalmovement,herefixed,hereinGermany,hereinHawaii,hereforindustryvs.residential/commercialcustomers,hereandmoneymadebycompany,hereinmonopsonies,here,hereforoff-peakvs.peakpower,hereandoilembargoof1973,herepromotionalrates,hereandrooftopsolarsystems,heresurchargeforrenewables,heretieredratestructures,hereanduseofsmartmeters,hereandutilitydeathspiral,here

privategrids,here,here.Seealsohome/rooftopsolarsystems;microgrids;nanogridsprivateplants,here,here,here,here,here,here,here

productdevelopmentforearlygrid,herelighting,here

promotionalrates,herepublicgood,poweras,here,here,here

PublicUtilitiesRegulatoryPoliciesAct(PURPA),sectionhere,here,here,herePublicUtilityHoldingCompanyAct(1935),herepumpedhydro,here,here,here

radiationfromsmartmeters,herefromwirelesstransmission,here

RanchoCucamonga,hereReagan,Ronald,hererebates,forhomesolar,herereformingthegrid,here,here.Seealsodemand-sidereformdealingwithcombinedinterestsofplayers,heredealingwithlegacytechnologies,herehumaninteractionswithgrid,here,herekindsofproblemsin,herevirtualpowerplants,here

regulation,here,here,hereandderegulation,here,hereenvironmental,hereasmonopolies,hereasmonopsonies,herebyutilities,here

renewableenergy,here.Seealsosustainableenergy;specifictypes,e.g.:windpowerCaliforniastandardfor,here

consumersurchargefor,hereandcurrentcapabilitiesofthegrid,herecurrentcapacityforintegrating,heregenerationfrom,heregoalsfor,hereforlivingoff-the-grid,herenewgenerationfrom,hereinObamaenergyplan,hereoverproductionof,hereunderPURPA,here,hereshiftto,heresubsidiesfor,here,heretaxcreditsfor,herevariablegenerationfrom,here

resiliency,hereREW,hereRobertMosesNiagaraPowerPlant,hereRockefeller,JohnD.,here,hererotaryconverters,here,hereRuralElectrificationAct(1936;REA),here,here

saltdomes,heresalttowers,hereSanDiegoGas&Electric,hereSanFranciscoearlyarclightingin,herefirstgridin,here

SanOnofrepowerstation,hereserialcircuits,hereSiliconValleysubstation,heresinks,heresmallpowerproducers,here,here.Seealsohome/rooftopsolarsystemssmartgrid,here,hereSmartGridCity,here,here,here,heresmartmeters,here,here,here,here,here,heresmartphones,heresmartthermostats,here,hereSnickey,Jerry,here,heresoftenergytechnologies,heresolarduckconundrum,here,heresolarpower,here.Seealsohome/rooftopsolarsystemsconcentratingsolartowers,herecondensedsolarplants,hereformicrogrids,hereoverproductionof,herepriceofsolarpanels,hererecentgrowthin,heresolarduckconundrum,here,heresolartroughplants,herestoring,here,here,here,hereWalmartsolarpanels,here

solartroughplants,here,here

Soljačič,Martin,hereSouthernCaliforniaEdison,here,here,here,hereSouthOakesHospital,LongIsland,hereSouthwestblackout(2011),hereSovietUnion,here,hereStandardOilTrust,here,herestandardsforinteroperability,heresteamplants,here“stockresources,”here,herestoringelectricity,here,herebatteries,here,hereburiedhydro,herecompressed-airstorage,here,hereconcentratingsolartowers,hereanddisposingofsurpluspower,hereinelectriccars,hereatgridscale,hereandhomesolarsystems,hereinicebox,here“invisibility”ofinfrastructurefor,hereatmilitarybases,herenon-batteryideasfor,herepumpedhydro(artificiallakes),here,here,heresaltdomes,heresolartroughplants,here,hereandutilitydeathspiral,here

StrategicPetroleumReserve,hereStraw,Daniel,here,hereStraw,Sylvie,here,heresubsidies,forrenewables,here,heresubstations,hereSUNYStonyBrookmicrogrid,hereSuperstormSandy,here,here,here,here,heresustainableenergy,here,here,here.SeealsorenewableenergySwisher,Randall,here

TacticalAlternatingCurrentSystem(TACS),here

TacticalGarbagetoEnergyRefinery(TGER),hereTaormina,Mr.,hereTaormina,Thelma,heretaxcreditsforrenewableenergygeneration,hereforrooftopsolarsystems,here,here

technologies.Seealsoindividualtechnologiesadoptionof,hereAmericans’lackofknowledgeabout,hereearlydevelopmentof,here,hereandthegrid,heregrowingdependenceon,by1970s,hereInternet,herelegacy,hereplantefficiencyandimprovementsin,hereSmartGridCity,here,here,here,heretelecommunications,here

telecommunicationsindustry,here,hereTennesseeValleyAuthority(TVA),hereTesla,Nikola,here,here,here,hereTeslaMotors,hereTexasblackoutsin,hererenewablepowergenerationin,herewindpowerin,here,here,here

ThreeMileIsland,heretransformers,here,heretransmissionsystems,hereautomaticshut-offsin,hereforearlygrids,hereandgridstability,hereforNiagaraFallsplant,hereduringpeakdemand,hereseparationofdistributionsystemsfrom,hereupkeepandnewconstructionof,herewireless,here

TransportableHybridElectricPowerStation(THEPS),heretree-relatedpoweroutages,here

TVpickup,hereTwitter,here

Uber,hereUnitedCorporation,hereUnitedKingdom(UK),hereuniversalsystem,here,hereuniversities,centralairfacilitiesin,hereUniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego,hereurbanareas,here.SeealsoindividualcitiesU.S.Steel,hereUtah,solarpowerin,hereutilitiescompanies,here.Seealsoelectriccompaniesabilitytomeetdemand,hereabsolutepowerof,in1970s,hereandchangesinthegrid,heredeathspiralfor,here,here,here,herederegulation,hereearlycentralstationgrids,here,hereeffectofPURPAon,hereFERCsuedby,hereandhomesolarsystems,hereinformationfor,hereasmonopolies,here,here,hereasmonopsonies,here,hereprofitsof,here,hereregulationof,here,here,hereandriseofmassmarket/consumerculture,here

variablegeneration,hereandEnergyPolicyAct,hereandPURPA,hereandreplacementofagingplants,here

vars(reactivepower),herevehicle-to-gridstoragesystems,hereVermontfallofnuclearplantin,here,heregoalsforrenewablesin,heresolarpowerin,here,here

VermontYankeepowerplant,hereVirginiaPower,herevirtualpowerplants,herevisibilityofinfrastructure,here,here,here,here,hereVolta,Allesandro,here,herevoltage,hereinACsystems,hereinearlyelectricalsystems,here,here

Walmart,hereWarwick,Mike,hereWashington,D.C.,hereWEEnergy,hereWesternDoughnut,here,hereWesternInterconnection,here,here,hereWestinghouse,George,here,here,hereWhiteHousepoweroutages,herewindpower,herebalancing,hereinCalifornia,hereoverproductionof,hererecentgrowthin,hereinTexas,here,here,hereturbines,hereunpredictabilityof,here,here,here

wireless,here,here,here,here,hereSeealsosmartmeters

WisconsinEnergycorporation,herewisegrid,here,hereWollenberg,Bruce,hereWorldCom,here

Xcel,here,here,here,here,here

Yahoo,here

ANoteontheAuthor

GretchenBakkeholdsaPh.D.fromtheUniversityofChicagoinculturalanthropology.Shespentthefirsthalfofhercareerresearchingfailingnations,includingtheSovietUnionandtheformerYugoslavia,beforeturningher

attentionstofailinginfrastructuralsystems.SheisaformerfellowinWesleyanUniversity’sScienceinSocietyprogramandiscurrentlyanassistantprofessorofanthropologyatMcGillUniversity.BorninPortland,Oregon,Bakkelivesin

MontrealbutcallsD.C.home.

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BLOOMSBURYandtheDianalogoaretrademarksofBloomsburyPublishingPlcFirstpublished2016

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Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproducedortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,electronicormechanical,includingphotocopying,recording,oranyinformationstorage

orretrievalsystem,withoutpriorpermissioninwritingfromthepublishers.

NoresponsibilityforlosscausedtoanyindividualororganizationactingonorrefrainingfromactionasaresultofthematerialinthispublicationcanbeacceptedbyBloomsburyortheauthor.

ISBN:HB:978–1–60819–610–4ePub:978–1–62040–124–8

LIBRARYOFCONGRESSCATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATIONDATA

Names:Bakke,GretchenAnna,author.Title:Thegrid:thefrayingwiresbetweenAmericansandourenergyfuture/GretchenBakke.

Description:NewYork:BloomsburyUSA,2016.Identifiers:LCCN2016001376|ISBN9781608196104(hardback)Subjects:LCSH:Electricpowersystems—Technologicalinnovations—UnitedStates.|Electricpowerdistribution—UnitedStates—History.|CleanEnergy—UnitedStates.|Electricpowerfailures—UnitedStates.|EnergyPolicy—

Socialaspects—UnitedStates.|BISAC:TECHNOLOGY&ENGINEERING/PowerResourcesElectrical.|SOCIALSCIENCESociology/General.|

BUSINESS&ECONOMICS/Infrastructure.|TECHNOLOGY&ENGINEERING/Environmental/General.|SCIENCE/Electricity.

Classification:LCCTK1005.B272016|DDC333.793/2—dc23LCrecordavailableathttp://lccn.loc.gov/2016001376

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