The Land Ethic: A New Philosophy for International Relations

The Land Ethic: A New Philosophy for

International Relations

]ohn Barkdull and Paul G. Harris

The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment broughtworld leaders together for the first time to discuss the environmentalchallenge. Since Stockholm, environmental diplomacy has addressed

many issues, with varying results. Some success has been achieved, but ingeneral the record shows the inadequacy of international cooperation to meetthe environmental challenge.

In part, the shortcomings of the international response to global envi-ronmental degradation arise from the weak ethical underpinnings of environ-

mental law and policy. International approaches to environmental problemscontinue to subordinate ecological protection to human interests and give no

moral standing to the larger biotic community. To meet the challenge of globalenvironmental degradation, international law and practice must take intoaccount the intrinsic value of nature.

Aldo Leopold’s land ethic offers a biocentric, holistic approach to envi-ronmental ethics that can remedy the inadequacies of current international law

and policy. 1 Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac, in which the land ethic wasfirst formulated, is an established classic of nature writing that provides “thecore for modem conservation ethics.”2 The land ethic insists that the ecosystem

has value in its own right, apart from human interests, It asserts that it is ourmoral duty to maintain the stability, beauty, and integrity of the land, and thatto do otherwise is morally wrong. Taking this standard seriously, which isimperative if we are to halt and reverse global environmental degradation,means rethinking just war standards, the goals of economic development, andinternational law itself.

The worsening environmental crisis encompasses water scarcity, deterio-rating agricultural lands, tropical deforestation, lost biodiversity, climatechange, the spread of exotic diseases, bioinvasions, catastrophic declines inworld fisheries, environmental refugees, conflicts arising from environmentaldegradation, hazardous wastes, and the adverse effects of the military on theenvironment. The world’s most populous countries, including China, India,

lAldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches from Here and There (New York: Oxford Urri-versity Press, 1949; special commemorative edition, 1987). Leopold was a forester, ecologist, conser-vationist, and environmental philosopher.

2Robert Finch, “Introduction, “ in Leopold, Sand County Alrnattac, p. xv.

160 John Barkdull and Paul G. Harris

and Indonesia, are experiencing population growth and industrialization simul-taneously, placing increasing pressure on natural resources and theenvironment. If current trends continue, the world’s population will double by2030, and almost no one claims the earth can sustain more than ten billionpeople at the First World consumption rates to which most people aspire.Industrialized countries, with much greater per capita impact on the world’sresources than developing countries, show little willingness to forgoconsumerism and restrain economic growth in order to protect the environ-ment. Although the world has made some progress on many environmentalissues, the balance sheet shows little prospect for reconciling economic aspi-rations with environmental realities.

Prevailing international standards and behavior are simply inadequate toreverse these trends. The Westphalian state system’s principles, norms, andvalues make achieving environmental health extremely difficult. TheWestphalian ethos is that sovereignty and nonintervention are essential topeace. While this assumption was useful in limiting religious wars and inter-state conflicts in past centuries, it is inadequate against new threats to humanhealth, to other species’ continued existence, and to the biosphere. Traditionalviews of sovereignty mean that each state can, if it chooses, overexploit naturalresources, eradicate species, even destroy whole ecosystems without interfer-ence. Moreover, governments tend to deal primarily with local and nationalproblems, where costs, benefits, and responsibility are most obvious, while“environmental management and concern” become “less important as onemoves to the global scale.”3 Such behaviors increasingly threaten other statesand the ecological vitality on which all living things depend. The statesystem’s norms, coupled with the competitive, profit-oriented global economy,block moral consideration for ecological wholes, whether bioregions or theplanetary ecosystem.

The growing number of international instruments for environmentalprotection is a hopeful sign, to be sure. But few observers would say they areanywhere near what is needed to protect the global commons. Effective envi-ronmental protection will need to overcome the Westphalian system’stendencies toward national parochialism. Instead, world politics ought to beguided, in large part, by a global ethic, one that complements, rather thanoverwhelms, local, national, and regional ethics. Diplomacy and interna-tional law ought to be predicated on an ethic that seeks to preserve andprotect ecosystems for their own sake, not merely because they serve asinstruments of human well-being. By attaching to them moral standing, we

3Frank B. Golley, “Grounding Environmental Ethics in Ecological Science,” in Ethics andEnvironnsental Policy: Theory ?vleels Practice, edited by Frank Ferr6 and Peter Hartel (Athens:University of Georgia Press, 1994), pp. 9-10.

The Land Ethic: A New Philosophy for International Relations 161

protect all species and all ecosystems, including those that ensure humanwell-being and survival.

WHAT CRISIS?

Not everyone sees a crisis in current environmental trends. For instance, someanalysts claim that technological advances are reducing both per capita andtotal human impact on the environment. Popular writers and advocates inconservative think tanks argue that, because environmentalism is merely a

cover for a political agenda opposing the free enterprise system, it is unneces-sarily apocalyptic. Others, while acknowledging that a severe problem exists,assert that further liberalizing the market remains the solution to our problemsand that no major social and political change is needed.

These “cornucopian” authors are correct that the environmental crisis doesnot mean the end of the human race. Yet environmental degradation can causesevere social disruption.4 Even if the crisis is not imminent, current trends maynot be sustainable over the long run. In addition, crossing critical thresholdscan result in sudden, catastrophic change. Renewed global economic growthand rapid economic development mean that the global economy, now reaching

$28 triHion per year, is overwhelming the ecosystem—as the decline of worldfisheries, excessive livestock grazing, shrinking forests, parched aquifers, and

accumulating greenhouse gases show.5 Thus, the comucopians are unduly opti-mistic, and the environmental crisis remains pressing.

What is more, regardless of the consequences for humans, economic

growth and the spread of human settlements are eradicating species andecosystems. Ecosystem conversion to human use has accelerated markedly; alarge share of the earth has been converted from natural habitat to agriculturallands, human settlements, roads, and other uses.6 This, if not portendingecocollapse, represents a moral failure. Do we have the right to wipe outspecies and destroy irreplaceable ecosystems? If not, then environmentaldegradation is a moral crisis even if it does not threaten human survival.

Most current environmental problems are international in nature.Consequently, an environmental ethic that demands greater concern forecology must address international relations. An effective environmental ethic

‘Thomas Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Contlict,”International Securiry 16 (fall 1991).

5Lester R. Brown, “Nature’s Limits,” in Stare of the World 1996, edited by Brown (New York: W. W.Norton & Company, 1996); Lester R. Brown, “The Acceleration of History,” in Viial Signs: TheEnvirontnental Trends That Are Shaping Our Future, edited by Brown, Nicholas Lenssen, and Hal Kane(New York: W. W. Norton, 1995).

‘Janet N. Abramovitz, “Ecosystem Conversion Spreads, “ in Vital Signs: The Environmental Trends

That Are Shaping Our Future, edited by Lester R. Brown, Michael Renner, and Christopher Flavin (NewYork: W, W. Norton, 1997).


must shape international law, international treaties, and foreign policy. In short,environmental ethics is necessarily international ethics. As matters stand,global environmental protection depends on human-centered appeals tonational interest, to international equity, and to intergenerational justice.T Theseare important considerations, but they constitute a limited basis for environ-mental concern and therefore cannot meet the growing ecological challenge.

THE GAP BETWEENMAINSTREAMETHICSANDTHEENVIRONMENTALCRISIS

What moral and ethical principles inhibit environmental protection? A largebody of literature traces the environmental crisis to powerful currents inmodern values, beliefs, and philosophy. This radical critique asserts that tomeet the environmental challenge might require abandoning deeply heldcommitments to the market, individualism, representative democrac y, faith inprogress, economic growth, advanced technology, scientific attitudes, andperhaps even religious beliefs. As noted ecologist J. Stan Rowe observes,modem religions, philosophies, and sciences perpetuate “the departmentalizationof the global ecosystem whose ‘aliveness’ is as much expressed in its improbableatmosphere, crustal rocks, seas, soils and sediments as in organisms. . . . In thereigning ideology, as long as large organisms are safeguarded, anything goes.”g

The critics argue that Christianity, Judaism, and Islam posit a radical sepa-ration between one’s real essence, the soul, and the transient, ephemeral bodyin nature. Further, these religions say that God gave humankind dominion overthe earth, an authoritarian position from which human beings dispose of theearth as they please. Similarly, scientific rationality, according to the critics,separates the human observer from nature. Nature becomes an object to bemanipulated and controlled for human benefit. In political theory, the idea ofhumans as insecure, asocial individuals (oddly characterized as being in a“state of nature”), who joined others in society through a social contract, rein-forces an atomistic view of the world, again hindering holistic understanding.Economics sees the natural world as a storehouse of resources available forefficient, profitable transformation into products; it does not recognize suchalternative perspectives toward the earth as the notion of sacred places or theconcept of a natural world imbued with spirit.

7Paul G. Harris, “Considerations of Equity and International Environmental Institutions,”,rhvironmental Politics 5 (summer 1996); Edith Brown Weiss, “Intergenerational Equity: Toward an

International Legal Framework,” in Global Accord: Environmental Challenges and International

Responses, edited by Nazli Choucri (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995).SJ. Stan Rowe, “From Reductionism to Holism in Ecology and Deep Ecology,” Ecologist 27

(July/August 1997), p. 149.


Religion, science, and the market together rest on a hierarchical ranking thatplaces men at the top, women just below, and nature at the bottom of the ladder.Western belief systems “manifest the self-serving nature of the game of rankingdiversity. Always it is Man, the ranker, who just happens to end up at the top ofhis own ranking !“9 Such ranking justifies an ethic of domination and exploita-

tion, leading to heedless destruction of the natural environment. PrevailingWestern thought (increasingly emulated in non-Western societies, with similarresults), therefore, justifies human domination, exploitation, and objectificationof nature. With no moral worth in its own right, the environment has moralvalue only in relation to human interests, concerns, and evaluations.

As evidence of the environmental crisis has become more widely recog-nized, environmental philosophers have attempted to address the perceivedfailure of mainstream thought to encompass ecological concerns. Oneapproach is to assert harmony between human interests and environmentalprotection; health and aesthetic interests can outweigh cheap waste disposal or

economic growth. Hence, environmental ethics becomes a branch of appliedethics, evaluating policies in regard to true, long-term human interests.Another approach is to extend rights or other moral consideration to animals:if humans deserve happiness or have rights, then why not other creatures?

Alternatively, some have discerned an ethic of stewardship in the Christian tra-dition that calls on us to care for God’s earthly garden. Yet none of theseapproaches accords the ecosystem sufficient intrinsic value. They remain an-thropocentric, individualistic, and hierarchical. If we are stewards, we are alsomasters, whereas “a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens . . . to plain

member and citizen of” the biotic community, 10Other environmental philosophers have sought systems that accord moral

worth to ecological wholes, and many have found alternatives in deep ecology.We assume that the general critique deep ecologists make against anthro-pocentric ethics is correct: basing environmental ethics on human interests or

obligations to individual creatures is inadequate to meet the moral challengebefore us. Paradoxically, anthropocentric, individualistic ethics may well beinadequate to defend human interests. But the deeper moral issue is our oblig-ation to the ecological community.

AN ALTERNATIVE:THE LANDETHIC

Deep ecologists share the notion that the land, or the ecosystem, has moral

value in its own right and that our behavior ought to respect nature’s moral

9Elizabeth Dodson Gray, “Come Inside the Circle of Creation: The Ethic of Attunement,” in Ethicsand Environmental Policy, p. 22.

!oLeopold, Sand County Almanac, P. 204.


standing. Deep ecology is not a single ethical system; many alternative,holistic environmental ethics fall under its general label,ll but all share thecentral principle of according moral standing to ecological wholes. Deepecology also breaks with human-centered moral theory in granting natureintrinsic value, apart from human interests. Thus deep ecology is eccentricand holistic.

Deep ecologists vary widely on how they view the Western tradition. Someshare the radical perspective and call for complete rejection of received views.Others find resources in the Western moral tradition to support deep ecology’sconsiderable mandate for change. Leopold’s land ethic is a moderate approach.In our view, the land ethic represents the minimum moral, institutional, andbehavioral change required to meet the environmental challenge. Experiencemay show that even the land ethic is not enough and that more far-reachingethical change is needed. Still, the land ethic will put us on the right path, andtherefore it constitutes an essential first step.

The land ethic’s central principle is this: “A thing is right when it tends to pre-serve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong whenit tends otherwise. “12The land ethic requires us to think about “what is ethicallyand esthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient.” It “changes therole of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain memberand citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect forthe community as such.”13 According to Leopold, we can be ethical only towardthat which we can “see, feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in.”14Ethics need not rest only on calculations of the ecological community’s benefitsfor meeting human needs if we have direct experience of and love for the naturalworld. Our feelings toward the land arise in part from ecological education thatinforms us of our membership in an ecological community.

The land, in Leopold’s terminology, refers to all the living things, naturalobjects, and processes that make up a given ecosystem, Ecological science hasrevealed to us the land’s complexity and the interdependence of its parts. Thisknowledge, according to Leopold and reiterated in Callicott’s defense of theland ethic,ls should expand our moral compass to include the ecologicalcommunity as a whole. Each individual human is part of a natural community,and it would be absurd, according to Leopold and Callicott, to suppose that onehas no obligations toward one’s community. Our obligations are not toward

llMichael E. zi~er-man, J. Baird Callicott, George Sessions, Karen J. Warren, and Johs3Clark, eds.,

Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1993); Michael Tobias, cd., Deep Ecology (San Diego: Avant Books, 1985).

12Leopld, Sand Counry Almanac, p. 224.

131bid.,p. 204.lqIbid., p. 214.15J. Baird c~licott, in Defense of the Land Ethic (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989).


individual animals, but toward the ecological whole that makes life possibleand beautiful.

The land ethic’s justification is communitarian. As Callicott succinctlyphrases it, “Ethics and community or society are correlative.”16 The land ethicis an evolutionary possibility because our view of the community changes. Forinstance, as our conception of the human community has expanded, so has ouridea of who deserves moral standing. Thus, Callicott asserts, the human rightsparadigm reflects a growing sense that, as a result of global interdependence,“mankind worldwide is united into one society, one community, howeverindeterminate or institutionally unorganized.’’” In the same way, Leopold

says, “the Land Ethic simply enlarges the boundary of the community toinclude soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land. ” He specu-lates that “ethics are possibly a kind of community instinct in-the-making”and rest on the premise that “the individual is a member of a community ofinterdependent parts. ”*8

Callicott traces Leopold’s ideas via Charles Darwin to David Hume andAdam Smith. According to this formulation, the “moral sentiment” one feelstoward the human community can extend, with appropriate education, to thewider, nonhuman community. Hume posited concern for the “publick interest”that could override self-interest, a moral sentiment arising from simply

knowing one belongs to a society. Likewise, ecological science informs us thatwe are part of an even larger community, one that includes the earth’s naturalprocesses and all other living things. If we feel a moral responsibility to thehuman community, which Hume assumed we do, then extending such concernto the biotic community is a small step in moral evolution. As Leopold put it,“We know now what was unknown to all the preceding caravan of generations:that men are only fellow-voyagers with other creatures in the odyssey of evolu-tion. This new knowledge should have given us by this time a sense of kinshipwith fellow-creatures; a wish to live and let live; a sense of wonder over themagnitude and duration of the biotic enterprise.”’9 Like other variants of deepecology, then, the land ethic rejects anthropocentrism in favor of egocentrism,and individualism in favor of holistic concern for the community.

As a communitarian philosophy, the land ethic has been accused of author-itarian tendencies, of being a kind of “environmental fascism.” Presumably,the obligation to the land denigrates individual rights and places humanconcerns second to preserving natural habitat. In addition, the land ethic seemsto posit the moral sentiments we have (or could have), rather than those we

‘GIbid., p. 80.171bid., p. 81,18LeOpOld,Sand County Almanac, pp.203-4.

Wbid., p. 109.


ought to have. In other words, it derives ought from is. The land ethic alsofaces the general criticism directed against all deep ecology: it seems todemand that we abandon cherished institutions, values, and cultural practices,without taking sufficient account of what we would lose.

In response to the charge of “ecofascism,” Callicott posits nested obliga-tions, with those closer to home having more force than those further removed.In other words, the land ethic adds to without displacing other moral theories,including those defending human liberty. Moral duties to family, humancommunity, and country often override duties to the land, and our libertiescontinue to matter, although now in some tension with the land ethic’s require-ments. Callicott’s analysis of the “is/ought dichotomy” is complex, but, inshort, he suggests a regulative role for reason in determining what we ought tovalue. Morality rests ultimately on sentiments given to us by evolutionaryprocesses, but reason informs us of the proper objects of our moral sentiments.Hence, given widespread ecological education, the public will develop a“consensus of feeling” in favor of protecting the biotic community. Finally, theland ethic differs from other variants of deep ecology in embracing science andelements of Western philosophy. The land ethic draws inspiration fromecology, evolutionary theory, astronomy, and, as Callicott notes, its intellectualheritage in early liberal thought.20

Nonetheless, the land ethic does demand major moral and institutionalchange. World politics would be significantly different if it were to shape inter-national relations. Yet no less is sufficient to meet the environmental challenge,especially to halt the rapid conversion of natural habitat to human use and thedisturbing loss of biodiversity.

THE LANDETHICANDJUSTWAR

What would just war theory look like if it granted moral standing to the

biotic community?Just war theory distinguishes two ethical dimensions to armed conflict: jus

ad bellunz and jus in belle. The “legalist paradigm” says that response toaggression is the primary just cause for resort to war.21 In addition to respond-ing to attack, states may undertake preemptive strikes (which are in essenceresponses to impending aggression), intervention to prevent genocide, inter-vention to counter another party’s intervention in a domestic dispute, and assis-tance to genuine secessionist movements. The underlying principle forcondemning aggression and allowing certain exceptions to strict noninterven-tion is a society’s right to self-determination. Invasions violate self-determina-

20Callicott, In Defense of rhe Lund MIic, p. 82.21Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 2nd edition (New York: Basic Books, 1992).


tion, forcing the citizenry to risk life and property to defend its national auton-omy. Interventions are justified when they reinforce a society’s right to mean-ingful self -determinate on.

In addition, just war theory says that the decision to fight should emanatefrom legitimate authority, receive multilateral authorization, have right inten-tion, and enjoy a reasonable chance of success, and it should occur only afterall reasonable means for changing the offending state’s behavior have beenexhausted.22 The war’s toll must be proportionate to the end sought. As to howwar should be fought, the most important principles are noncombatant immu-nity and proportionality.

The questions these principles raise regarding the environment are: Whatcounts as aggression against the ecological community? What responses arecalled for to combat “ecoaggression”? And how does the ecosystem’s moral

standing affect battlefield ethics?Just war theory’s missing dimension is concern for the ecological commu-

nity that society inhabits. Extending moral standing to the biotic communitychanges the calculus for both jus ad bellum and jus in belle. Heedless envi-ronmental degradation might call for action to defend the biotic community,and wars that might be just if human interests were the only factor might notbe if damage to the ecology were taken into account.

Beginning with @sad bellum, recall that the land ethic seeks to protect theintegrity of evolutionary processes. The ecosystem’s integrity means itscapacity to evolve toward greater complexity and diversity through naturalselection. To disrupt or destroy this process violates the land ethic’s centralprinciple: it undermines the land’s stability, beauty, and integrity.

Accordingly, the massive species loss now under way due to developmentand deforestation represents a significant moral failure. Indeed, in just warterms, it represents a kind of aggression against the ecological community, inthe same way that disrupting self-determined social evolution is aggressionagainst a human community. Presumably, because the ecological communitycannot recognize or combat such aggression, humans can and must respond toecoaggression. If this is so, then governments may legitimately attempt toprevent degradation of the global commons, not only because their own inter-ests are damaged but because the global ecosystem has value in its own right.

Moreover, in some cases, ecointerventions can be just, even when theecoaggression occurs only within national borders. Massive deforestation, forinstance, appears to be an instance of ecocide similar to assaults on humanrights that “shock the conscience of mankind.” If so, this could justify outside

22Richard J. Regan, JUS[ War: Principles and Cases (Washington, D.C.: Catholic university press

of America, 1996); J. Bryan Hehir, “Intervention: From Theories to Cases,” Ethics and InternationalAffairs 9 (1995), pp. 1–13.


intervention to protect the biotic community’s integrity. In other words, theland ethic would call for intervention to prevent ecological damage that shocksthe conscience and belies any notion of evolutionary integrity. Just what kindof intervention would depend on the costs and benefits of a planned action.

Proportionality requires that the evils of the planned action be propor-tionate to the injustice to be prevented or remedied. To respond toecoaggression, such calculations would have to include the ecological damagea war caused, as well as lost human life and health. Because war is so envi-ronmental y destructive, the proportionality requirement for jus ad bellumwould rule out most military actions to end aggression against the bioticcommunity. Adding lost human life and the political costs of violating sover-eignty would tip the scales even further against such actions. The upshot wouldbe justification for nonviolent intervention or the use of force (such as a navalblockade) that coerces without unduly harming people or their environment. Inshort, reading just war theory in light of the land ethic implies circumstancesunder which predominantly nonviolent intervention to protect a bioticcommunity would be just, but it would rarely, if ever, sanction an armedresponse to ecoaggression.

What of war fought for traditional reasons of state? A war that might beproportional in regard to human life and injury might not be if darnage to thebiotic community were included. Further, striving to minimize ecologicaldamage might reduce the probability of success. If so, taking account ofecological damage could mean that an otherwise just war ought not to befought because it would be less likely to succeed. Thus taking the land ethicseriously has profound implications for military action both in defense of thebiotic community and for traditional justifications in interstate war.

Regarding jus in belle, the most important principle is that combatantsare to refrain from killing noncombatants. Similarly, a principle of ecodis-crimination would mandate that the biotic community not be a target orserve as a means to get at human targets. Although combat between soldiersalmost inevitably entails damage to nonhuman creatures and to the landitself, targeting the environment as a battlefield tactic would violate thediscrimination principle. For example, defoliating large land areas tocombat guerrilla troops, as the United States did in Vietnam, would violateecologically informed just war rules. By the same token, Iraq’s intentionallycausing oil fires and oil spills in its retreat from Kuwait violated the prin-ciple of ecodiscrimination,

Further, applying discrimination to the biotic community implies that

soldiers must take risks to avoid damaging the environment. No doubt, tellinga soldier to put his life more at risk to save a rare plant species or a particularly


unusual swampland seems outrageous, but if the biotic community has moralstanding, then taking risks for its sake is required, just as is taking risks to avoidcivilian deaths. The doctrine of military necessity cannot be invoked lightly tojustify environmental damages or to eliminate risks. Eradicating a rareecosystem to win a battle would be no more justified than terrorism or thebombing of cities to achieve political ends. Currently, ecological considerationsbarely register in battlefield operations, but the land ethic implies that they must.

With regard to battlefield proportionality, the issue is how much collateraldamage to noncombatants due to attacks on military targets is morally accept-able. Proportionality informed by the land ethic requires taking into accountunintended environmental damage resulting from an otherwise morally accept-able military action, just as unintended civilian casualties must be considered.Regan notes: “Critics of the Gulf War (1991) maintained that the month-longAllied air strikes before ground forces crossed into Iraq inflicted morallydisproportional civilian casualties, destruction of utilities, and ecological

damage to the region and its inhabitants.”23 Further, nuclear deterrence threat-ened unprecedented ecological damage, strengthening the moral case againstthe threat of nuclear retaliation.

Just as excessive civilian casualties can render an otherwise just warunjust, a war that to be fought successfully entails excessive environmentaldamage becomes unjust, Jus in hello and jus ad bellum converge when the

environmental costs are too great. At that point, the war is a war on a bioticcommunity, and so cannot be fought.

Judging a given military action’s proportionality is difficult. Crossing themoral line by allowing some damage to the environment to achieve a militaryend places one on the slippery slope to permitting everything. Still, as Reganconcludes, “Although morally responsible belligerents cannot reach absolutely

(that is, theoretically) certain judgments about hypothetical outcomes, they canand should strive to reach morally (that is, practically) certain judgments aboutsuch outcomes and act accordingly.”z4

This implies that ecological education should extend to the militaryschools. Military practice depends in part upon soldiers’ beliefs and values; toaccord moral standing to the biotic community requires a certain degree ofecological literacy. Just as teaching human rights has become a normal part ofa military education, so should teaching ecological science and environmentalethics. In that event, military planners would be trained to consider strategy,

battlefield tactics, and weapons systems that minimize damage to the land.Further, military training, pollution from military operations, and the diversion

23@7~~, Just War, p. 97, emphasis added.

241bid.,p. 98.


of scarce resources to military purposes all need to be judged in light of theireffects on the biotic community.

THE LANDETHICANDGLOBALECONOMICLIBERALISM

One of the long-standing debates in international environmental policy is howto balance economic development, especially in the poor countries, againstenvironmental concerns. Human-centered environmental ethics tips the scalestoward economic growth, In some versions environmental protection isassigned a fairly arbitrary monetary value to make comparisons with foregoneconsumption and profits, and in these calculations the ecosystem frequentlyloses. The land ethic, while certainly not demanding that humans return to thehunter-gatherer mode of production, does give more consideration to theecosystem’s moral worth. Hence it raises critical concerns about the methods

and goals of “development.” As Leopold notes, “One basic weakness in aconservation system based wholly on economic motives is that most membersof the land community have no economic value. . . . Yet these creatures aremembers of the biotic community, and if (as I believe) its stability depends onits integrity, they are entitled to continuance.”25

The current trend in the world economy is, of course, toward more liberal-ization, more consumerism, and more emphasis on economic growth. Thesetendencies threaten to hasten the destruction of regional ecosystems and tohinder efforts to control global environmental problems such as climatechange. The land ethic calls on us to reconsider the rush to globalconsumerism. If the price is species extinction and the loss of irreplaceableecosystems, then we will have failed in our duties to the ecological commu-nity, even if First World living standards are made available to everyone.

In practical terms, incorporating the land ethic into policy making wouldmean reversing current trends toward complete liberalization of rulesgoverning trade, investment, and financial flows. For example, the WorldTrade Organization (WTO) should allow national and local governments to

pass and enforce laws meant to protect the ecological community. instead,behind closed doors, “in every case brought to date, the WTO has ruled in

favor of corporate interests, striking down national and sub-national legislationprotecting the environment and public health at every tum.”zb Similarly, citi-zens and governments should resist the attempt of translational corporations(TNCS) to hijack environmental protection to the corporate cause. Workingthrough the Business Council on Sustainable Development and other organi-zations, TNCS ensured that Agenda 21, the main document emerging from the

zsLeoPld, Sand County Almanac, P. 210.

Zf.simon Ret~lack, “The JVT()’S Record SO Far-Corporations: 3; Humanity and the Environment: O,”

Ecologist 27 (July/August 1997), pp. 136-37.


1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, servedtheir interests. “The TNC’S greatest achievement of course was firmly to estab-lish the principle that industrial development or economic growth, now

referred to as ‘sustainable development,’ was the only acceptable solution toglobal environmental problems, and that to maximize the pace of this process,international trade had to take precedence over all other considerations. ”27Theland ethic rejects the corporate definition of sustainable development. In itsstead, sustainable development would be understood as meeting human needswhile respecting the land’s beauty, stability, and integrity.

Likewise, the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, the North AmericanFree Trade Agreement, and other important documents of liberalizationpromote market values to the detriment of environmental protection. Theseemblems of globalization and neoliberalism take little account of the ecolog-ical community’s intrinsic moral worth. Thus recent market triumphalism ismisplaced; the land ethic implies that policy makers should write future inter-national economic agreements and reform existing agreements with a deepecological perspective in mind.

No doubt, such a radical reorientation of global economic policy is not inthe offing. Nonetheless, “it is not unreasonable to suppose that the humancommunity should assume some obligation and make some sacrifice for thebeleaguered and abused biotic community.”28 We can at least reevaluatecurrent practices with somewhat greater regard for the land’s moral standing.Without discarding the global market, we can ensure that developmentpolicy, trade rules, and economic norms in general include a higher degree ofenvironmental concern.

Rather than relying on the market, which has been largely responsible forcreating the environmental crisis, the global economy would have to be man-aged to prevent environmental destruction. More regulation of economic trans-actions would be needed to protect the environment from the natural tendencyof market forces to externalize environmental costs. Development policies andforeign assistance would have to focus on environmental protection, meaningthat the causes of environmental damage (poverty, underdevelopment,inequitable distribution of global wealth, human acquisitiveness, oppression ofwomen) would have to be addressed with political, economic, technological,and educational resources.

The land ethic would also demand that, at a minimum, governments andglobal financial institutions incorporate environmental protection into intema-

zTMatthias Finger and James Kilcoyne, “Why Translational Corporations Are Organizing to ‘Save theGlobal Environment,’” .Ecologisf 27 (July/August 1997), p. 139.

28J, Baird Ca]llcott, ‘<me Setich for ~ Envlronment~ Ethic, ” in Mafter~ ~~ L@ and Death, 3rd

edition, edited by Tom Regan (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 368.


tional regulatory policies. As home to most of the world’s TNCS, the UnitedStates could insist that American multinational corporations operating abroaduse practices that are not harmful to the environment, preferably leading byexample in demanding higher environmental standards at home and influ-encing other nations to follow suit. Governments would, under land ethicguidelines, require corporations to direct more of their overseas investments toprograms that benefit the environment. In addition, restrictions on trade thatwere geared toward environmental protection would become commonplace.Countries and corporations producing products that harm the ecologicalcommunity would not be allowed to benefit from free trade.

The land ethic would mandate that rich nations provide developing nationswith more assistance in achieving decent living standards without having toretrace the First World’s environmentally damaging development path.Unfortunately, recent trends in official development assistance from North toSouth do not provide grounds for optimism in this regard. Since the 1992 EarthSummit, a larger proportion of development funds has been devoted to envi-ronmental programs. Yet overall funding for development assistance is fallingin the United States and other industrialized countries. This trend will have tobe stopped, and indeed reversed, if robust goals for environmental protectionare to be achieved. Significantly, while official development assistance isfalling, private investment is burgeoning. But most of that investment is in afew developing countries. Governed by appropriate environmental guidelines,more private investment will have to be directed toward the poorest countriesand the poorest people of the world. Insufficient development assistance canleave the people and institutions of poor countries that are joining the globalmarket with few resources to survive and prosper without damaging theirnatural surroundings.

The land ethic would also require much stronger population control poli-cies so that greater numbers do not overwhelm development. The developednations should provide much more assistance to population and family plan-ning programs in developing countries. Population policies should attend tothe primary causes of overpopulation in the developing world: poverty andunderdevelopment. Because poverty causes overpopulation, the most effectivepopulation control policies would endeavor to meet basic human needs in addi-tion to supporting family planning education and (even) birth control.

Equally important, developed nations must address their very highconsumption rates and their disproportionate impact on the natural environ-ment. Each American, for instance, on average consumes 30 to 100 times asmuch energy, and produces a similar ratio of waste, as a counterpart in theworld’s poorest countries. Although most developed nations are experiencingslow population growth, their disproportionate per capita environmental


effects remain. To meet the land ethic’s demands developed nations mustreduce excessive consumption, which leads to deforestation, desertification,and conflict over resources.

THE LANDETHICANDINTERNATIONALENVIRONMENTALLAW

International law embodies the international community’s normative aspira-tions. What resources does international law provide for a global land ethic?

From the perspective of the land ethic, international environmental law ispartly on track and partly off track: it is off track because protection of ecosys-

tems is seldom the primary goal of international law; it is on track because thisis slowly changing. Still, even where international law is on track, the timingis such that humans will do much more harm to the environment before legalnorms come close to fulfilling the goals of the land ethic.

International environmental law is best perceived as the collection of inter-

state agreements on obligations and rights associated with the naturalenvironment. It is most significantly embodied in the burgeoning number ofinternational environmental treaties and, to a lesser extent, international envi-ronmental declarations (for example, the Stockholm and Rio Declarations),agreed principles, juridical decisions, and commonly accepted practices.zg

International law is premised on the principles of national autonomy,

sovereignty, and noninterference with states’ domestic affairs. These notionsare based on “a normative structure in which each nation is thought to have a

strong right to do whatever h likes to people, property, and natural resourceswithin its own jurisdiction. ”~”But this system of “shared rights” is inherentlyunable to promote the land ethic. As Robert E. Goodin reminds us, “Unless wecan either show that our rights have somehow been transgressed or elsepersuade others to exercise their rights in line with our preferences, a regimeof shared rights effectively blocks us from interfering in the actions of others—however environmental y destructive they may be.”31 International law’straditional emphasis on the rights of nation-states and their relationships withone another does not view the natural environment as a holder of moralstanding. Much as individual persons were, and more often than not still are,neglected by international law, the natural environment was generally not partof international law’s purview, and when it was, the interests of states werebehind its inclusion.

zgLynt~n K. Caldwell, [international Environmental Policy (Durham, NC.: Duke University press,

1990), p. 118.soR~bert E. Goodln, “International Ethics and the Environmental Crisis,” Ethics and International

Affairs 4 (1990), pp. 91-105, at p. 93.311bid.. pp. 95–96.


Yet international environmental agreements have moved toward giving theland separate legal status, albeit also emphasizing that the welfare of humansand interests of nation-states must be priorities. The precedent-setting 1935Trail Smelter decision implicitly outlawed transborder pollution. The arbitra-tion tribunal in the Trail Smelter case decided that “no State has the right to useor permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumesin or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein,”32 Theimplications of Trail Smelter and other international legal precedents havebeen broadened over time to prohibit countries from harming their ownecology when doing so might harm the natural environments of other states.This was largely an environmental codification of a notion regarded as funda-mental to common law: sic utere tuo alienunz non loedas (use your ownproperty so as not to harm the property of another) .33To a great extent, thedecision reflects the notion that one state has no right to harm another state’s“property,” which is far from a complete acceptance of the land ethic. But TrailSmelter and other early decisions at least opened the door to placing environ-

mental concerns on the international legal agenda.Increasingly, diplomats agree that it borders on the “unlawful” to indis-

criminately cut forests that act as repositories for diverse species that mightone day benefit all of humankind (and, incidentally, have inherent moral valuefor many people) and also act as sinks for carbon dioxide, the most significant“greenhouse” gas contributing to climate change and its myriad adverse conse-quences. This goes a step beyond traditional international law (“shared rights”)to a system of shared duties, analogous to what Goodin has called the modelof “tending our own garden” in accordance with universal standards .34

At least in the context of the 1992 United Nations Conference onEnvironment and Development and international environmental instrumentsconceived before and since, the general message of international environ-mental law is that the welfare of the environment and the welfare of human

communities (including nations and states) are inextricably linked— althoughin practice economic development is usually the first priority in all but a tiny

handful of the most enlightened postindustrial societies—and it is wrong toharm the natural environment when doing so will harm persons or valuedecosystems in other states. The general message of the land ethic is that it iswrong to harm the natural environment, period: “The Land Ethic directs us totake the welfare of nature, the diversity, stability, and integrity of the bioticcommunity, to be the standard of the moral quality of our actions.”ss

B2American Journal of International Law 33 (1939), p.1965.33Jan Schneider, “State Responsibility for Environmental Protection and Preservation,” in

International Luw, edited by Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Saul H. Mendlovitz (Boulder,

Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), p. 603.W300din, “International Ethics and the Environmental Crisis,” p. 98.BSCallicott, “The Search for an Environmental Ethic,” p. 365.


Eventuallywe might see protecting the land for its own sake as part of ourinterests. In that case, following the land ethic would achieve the long-termobjectives of promoting human welfare and protecting the environment. Bymaking the land ethic a substantial basis of international environmental lawand diplomacy, actors would, by default if not by design, promote humanwelfare and further the ethical objectives of Callicott, Leopold, and other advo-cates of similar philosophies.

We require a system of international laws based on “shared responsibili-

ties” oriented toward achieving the land ethic’s objectives. “In the context ofinternational environmental policy,” according to Goodin, “a regime of sharedresponsibilities would imply, first of all, that it is morally permissible for envi-ronmentally conscientious nations to bring pressure, at least in certain ways,upon nations that fail to discharge their environmental responsibilities. ”36 Itfollows that it would be appropriate—indeed required in the context of the landethic—that international development assistance programs come with condi-tions requiring recipients to protect the environment.

This still begs the question of motivations, Why should we imagine that

anything like the land ethic will ever affect international relations? Becausemotivations change, as is apparent when we look at the development of socialwelfare programs beginning in the last century. Modem welfare states evolvedfrom governments’ efforts to placate constituencies in order to achieve self-interested political objectives. Eventually the notion of social welfare becameinstitutionalized: it is now wrong for governments with the resources to help

poor people to ignore them. Welfare programs were not the result of goodmotivations, although good motivations (on the part of most citizens if not

most legislators) are part of the reason they remain largely intact. Similarly, weought not to worry that international law has yet to embrace environmentalprotection, even though it is inherently right. Eventually the underlying moti-vations of international law—the interests and rights of states—may give wayto new international legal norms that value the land per se.

To see that this dynamic can work in the context of international environ-mental law, one can look at the evolution and development of the international

regime for protection of great whale species. Whales went through variousstages of “rights,” starting with a “free resource” stage before World War I.Subsequent developments included a regulation-conservation stage duringWorld War II; a conservation-protection stage (“characterized by an admixture

of conservationist and protectionist sentiments”) into the mid- 1970s; a protec-tion stage that lasted into the early 1980s; the preservation stage, which is

3’Woodin, “International Ethics and the Environmental Crisis,” pp. 100-101


ongoing; and finally, an emerging “entitlement” stage characterized by themoratorium on killing the great whale species.s’

For most people and for most nations, killing great whales is no longermorally acceptable; not because human interests (say, in whale-watching) areharmed but because whales have intrinsic worth. The international regime

originally designed to manage them as a hunted resource has evolved into onegeared much more toward protecting species that ought not be killed becausedoing so is morally unacceptable. Indeed, Japanese and Norwegian resumptionof commercial whaling has generated intense international protest. Otherspecies have enjoyed similar changes in translational sentiments, and the newmoral attitudes have been codified in international instruments. Of course,such sentiments reflect concern for individual animals with, we suppose, extra-ordinary intelligence or some other special attribute. Nonetheless, the caseshows the extension of international law beyond human beings and mightrepresent one step in extending moral concern to include the land.

We see embryonic precedents for new international environmental lawbased on land ethic principles. Policymakers are more aware than ever of theinterdependent nature of environmental protection and national vitality.Globalization is eroding national borders and state sovereignty, and ecologicalunderstanding is growing among people worldwide. Thus, the notion of an

interdependentwhole is emerging in many areas of social life. The practice ofinternational relations has started to move in the direction of the land ethic,

albeit barely. Thus the ingredients are in place for a gradual, long-term move-ment toward international legal norms based on the land ethic’s principles.Still, further movement in that direction will require conscious, persistenteffort to overcome formidable economic, political, and cultural obstacles. TheUnited States and other influential nations must orient foreign policy towardthe land ethic’s central principle: to ensure the stability, beauty, and integrityof the land.

CONCLUSION

In sum, what does the land ethic imply for world affairs? Relations betweenstates would have to be based more on the carrying capacity of the earth and

less on centuries-old traditions of sovereignty and nonintervention, Thetendency of states to act in ways that promote their short-term interests at theexpense of the environment would have to be moderated and redirected towardthe land ethic’s central principle. To do so would require consensus among

BJAnthony D’Amato andSudhir K.Chopra,“Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life,” AmericanJournal of International Law 85 (1991), excerpted in International Luw Anthology, edited by D’Amato(Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Company, 1994), pp. 285-301.


countries or management by an international organization like the UnitedNations. Perhaps an environmentally enlightened hegemon willing to promotecompliance with universal ecological standards could induce change in inter-

national environmental norms. Cefiainly, the remoteness of such changes doesnot bode well for realization of the land ethic in international affairs. But this

should not deter governments and diplomats from taking the land ethic intoconsideration when devising policy. Callicott’s admonition that the humancommunity should assume some obligation and make some sacrifice for thebiotic community is a moderate standard to meet.

International political realities are such that the land ethic is unlikely to

have more than marginal effects on diplomacy in the foreseeable future, butthat is only to say that international politics as currently practiced is morallyunacceptable. Knowing that our duty is to increase respect for the integrity,

beauty, and stability of the biotic community implies an obligation to act.Scholars can draw attention to this moral problem, citizens can demand

change, and policy makers can seek change in practice. The obstacles are great,but when considering the ecological crisis, bear in mind the words of Kant:“Moral evil has by nature the inherent quality of being self-destructive andself-contradictory in its aims . . . so that it makes way for the moral principleof goodness, even if such progress is s1ow.”JS Disrupting evolutionary

processes and exploiting the land were not considered evils 50 or 100 yearsago, but we now see how self-destructive and self-contradictory such actionsare. Perhaps, then, we do have reason to expect moral progress toward a globalland ethic.

sXImmanuel Kant, “perpetual peace, “ in Kant: Political Writings, 2nd edition, edited by Hans Reiss,translated by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 124.

Documents

The Land Ethic: A New Philosophy for International Relations