The Magnanimous Soul: Ethics In Cartesian Philosophy 1

WORKING PAPER Sarah Jacob, 1

Sarah Jacob Graduate Student University of South Florida

The Magnanimous Soul: Ethics In Cartesian Philosophy1

Introduction

If you are seeking moral guidance, it is not usual that you will be directed to read

Descartes. While his Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy were

revolutionary, they are regarded so for their epistemological and metaphysical insights

and methodology, not for their clarity or guidance on how one ought to live. However,

implicit in Cartesian metaphysics is an ethical perspective that is so tightly interwoven, it

is somewhat hidden. That being said, in recent years certain scholars have taken up the

task of trying to discern Cartesian ethics. It is thanks, mostly, to Princess Elizabeth of

Bohemia that we have as detailed and explicit description as we do. It is from her

curiosity and correspondence that inspires Descartes to try and discern the complexities

of his philosophy, such as how the soul interacts with the body and how one can indeed

achieve happiness and contentment no matter what station he or she holds in life, as long

as that life is directed by the rational will and not by the passions. When we connect this

with the very notion of a thinking “I” that can achieve certainty without succumbing to

the prescriptions of such by the Church authorities, Descartes’s philosophy as a whole

1 I would like to acknowledge Roger Ariew and the graduate students who participated in the Descartes Workshop, December 4th, 2015, who generously offered suggestions that helped me add clarity to this paper. I would also like to thank Darrell Arnold, from St. Thomas University, who, through conversations helped me further develop some of the main ideas presented, and who also made invaluable recommendations regarding structure.

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emphasizes an ethic of self-knowledge and self-responsibility.2 While scholars often

highlight the mechanistic result of Descartes’s dualism, the following paper explores a

Cartesian ethic that is derived from the rational will and synthesizes elements of the

Catholic tradition, Stoicism, Epicureanism and Virtue Ethics. The synthesis as a whole

focuses on the necessity of the rational will in the development of altruism and a

magnanimous soul, which is key, according to Descartes, for the most satisfied life.

Ethics and the Method of Doubt

We must admit that while exploring Descartes’ ethics, we are in fact conjuring

them. He provides us with little except a provisional moral code in part 3 of Discourse

on Method, various letters to Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia and Queen Cristina of

Sweden, and The Passions of the Soul, and like a puzzle we must put the pieces together

for him. However, before exploring specific “ethical” excerpts, I would also like to

explore the ethical implication of the journey toward Cogito Ergo Sum – I think,

therefore I am. In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes is not seeking to

establish an ethical theory, and yet his method of doubting everything that the senses

regard as true has ethical presuppositions. What can I know? I can know my mind. The

disciplined mind is the “I” that exists independent of circumstances as an unattached

observer. No matter what happens to my body, the “I” is a free, thinking thing. Indeed, it

is the “I’s” purpose to think and, not only that, to think rationally. Descartes’s moral

perspective is one that calls all to acquire this rational objective perspective thereby

acquiring a distance from the movement of the passions. With this, Descartes claims the

2 Although not studied here, we should also consider the ethical implications of Cartesian dualism, which though often criticized serves to liberate the body from the auspices of the Church, further justifying scientific experimentation and affording the great advances and disturbing exploits that science has since delivered.


right to shake off the shackles of anything the mind finds irrational. It cannot be

overlooked that his method of doubt can be likened to an extreme Platonic doubt of the

world of appearances. “At last I will apply myself earnestly to and unreservedly to this

general demolition of opinions.”3 The fine divided line between knowledge and opinion

is one that Plato first developed. Opinion and superstition, for Plato, were the lower

forms of thought and belonged to the world of slithery appearances that seem real, but

only serve to keep us enslaved and attached to the world of unreliable matter and

circumstances beyond our control. However, for Descartes, to separate opinion from

knowledge requires more than a fine line, but instead a robust (albeit temporary) mistrust

of everything. Descartes’ Meditations, therefore, are not only an exploration into

certainty, but also a reclaiming of what is rightfully his: the free, unfettered, rational

mind; a mind that has the power to direct one’s life so it may be virtuous and happy

without opinions or superstitions that do not serve it. The body as automata may be at the

mercy of limitation, fluctuation and finitude, but the mind that has mastered the passions

is capable of freedom, tranquility and consistency, no matter what. Descartes’ method is

an extreme one. He must doubt everything he “knows.” What can we truly know

without doubt? If we just use the senses, nothing. But the mind exists beyond a shadow

of a doubt.4 It remains intact, even after everything else has been denied, because to

doubt the mind, is to persist in thought. He is, he affirms, a thinking thing.

God in Descartes’s Philosophy

3 Descartes, Rene, Discourse on Method in Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, ed. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Inc., 2000), p. 104. 4 Of course, Descartes’s conclusion “I think, therefore I am” and his proof of God’s existence was criticized by many of his contemporaries. The presentation of it here does not suggest Descartes has successfully defended a proof of the self or God. Nor does it imply that I reject other concepts of consciousness proposed by atheists or Eastern philosophical traditions. My main concern is the ways in which his theory influenced his ethical perspective.

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However, Descartes’s philosophical system remains truncated without his proof

for God’s existence. Undoubtedly, the social and political context offers ample

motivation to prove God’s existence. If he does not, then his work will remain obscure at

best; at worst he will be condemned for heresy. However, the proof of God’s existence is

also a philosophical requirement for without God, Descartes will be destined to solipsism,

void of proof of anything else but himself. However, it is important to note that

Descartes’s proof of God is his idea of God. He notes,

Thus there remains only the idea of God. I must consider whether there is anything in this idea that could not have originated from me. I understand by the name God a certain substance that is infinite, independent, supremely intelligent and supremely powerful, and that created me along with everything else that exists – if anything else exists.5 Cogito Ergo Sum, Descartes’s epiphany of his own existence, is inseparable from

his next epiphany, which follows the same line of argumentation. Albeit paraphrased, it

states “I think God exists, therefore God must exist.” The God and the ‘I’ are a priori

concepts that are entwined. This is a valuable insight while trying to discern Cartesian

ethics, which is conjoined to the idea of a rational creator that is all good. Implicit in his

thought is that the free, unfettered individual “rational” will is at the very least a

reflection of the will of God. Indeed, in a letter to Queen Cristina of Sweden he notes,

“Now free will is the noblest thing we can have, since it makes us in a way equal to God

and seems to exempt us from being his subjects.”6 This provocative quote underlines that

we can determine our own lives. However, one needs to note that for Descartes we

destined to be determined by extrinsic forces if we are not making our decisions aligned

5 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, ed. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Inc., 2000), p. 118. 6 Letter to Cristina, 20 November 1647, AT V 85, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume III, The Correspondence, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1991), p. 326.


with a rational will. Indeed, Cartesian philosophy implies that if we were fully rational

(and omniscient), then our will would be the same as God’s will. Hence, the ethical life,

inspired by the rational will, is a divine life and the only truly happy life. Freedom is

only possible in a life lived through reason and therefore it behooves us to always choose

reason over the enslavement to the passions. Descartes also describes a practical

necessity for God. Because we are not omniscient, the steadfast belief in God provides

peace of mind in the face of the uncertainty of life. In reflections on God in his letters to

Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, Descartes points to the psychological function that a

belief in God serves. He writes,

In order to be always disposed to judge well, only two things seem to me necessary. One is knowledge of the truth; the other is practice in remembering and assenting to this knowledge whenever the occasion demands. But because nobody except God knows everything perfectly, we have to content ourselves with knowing the truths most useful to us.7

God is an integral aspect of Cartesian philosophy and provides psychological comfort

when all else fails. He reminds Elisabeth,

The first and chief of these [truths] is that there is a God on whom all things depend, whose perfections are infinite, whose power is immense and whose decrees are infallible. This teaches us to accept calmly all the things which happen to us as expressly sent by God. Moreover, since the true object of love is perfection, when we lift up our minds to consider him as he is, we find ourselves naturally so inclined to love him that we even rejoice in our afflictions as the thought that they are an expression of his will.8 Although God is arrived at through Descartes’s own idea of perfection, his

meditations cannot prove the holy trinity or any of the details of Church doctrine. If

anything, his meditations can only prove that an infinite rational intelligence must exist.

Nowhere do we find proof of the anthropomorphic passionate God found in the original

7 Letter to Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia, 15 September, 1645, AT IV, 290. 8 Ibid., 292.

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Judaic testament, nor the self-sacrificing son of God from the Christian bible, but instead

a rational, all encompassing “philosopher’s” God that may be more akin to the Stoic idea

of Logos than anything else, even though Descartes does use anthropomorphic

terminology when describing this all perfect presence.

The Spiritual Impetus Behind the Unification of the Sciences

While exploring Cartesian ethics, it is relevant to review the impetus behind

Descartes’ resolve to write a method that “unifies all the sciences” which was arrived at

after experiencing a mystical vision followed by three dreams. The vision was one that

revealed a mathematical universe, a universe that was logical and could be learned with

absolute certainty by the astute mind. In his third dream, Descartes is posed with a

question, “What road of life ought one to follow?”9 Discourse on Method, Meditations on

First Philosophy, and further works are the result of this enigmatic question. It would

also be an oversight when discussing Cartesian ethics not to analyze the literary style of

the Meditation on First Philosophy10 and how it not only seeks to present what can be

known with certainty, but according to Cartesian scholars, Tom Sorrell and Roger Ariew

does so using the form inspired by The Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola, founder

of the Society of Jesus (Jesuits). Consisting of mental exercises, Ignatius defined that

they, “have as their purpose the conquest of self and the regulation of one’s life in such a

way that no decision is made under the influence of any inordinate attachment.”11

9 I would like to acknowledge Roger Ariew, who translated an article written by Adrien Baillet, “Vie de M. Descartes,” in 1687 which offered an account of Descartes’s dream based upon the notes left by Descartes. Ariew noted that Leibniz also saw the original notes where Descartes explains his experience and did not think that it had the theatrical/mystical tone that this explanation gives. Nonetheless, the impetus to unify the sciences is produced by a non-rational experience. 10 I was first introduced to this information in a seminar on “Descartes and his Contemporaries” offered by Roger Ariew in the fall of 2015. 11 See www.ignatianspirituality.com.


Without going too much into his methodology, it is sufficient to note that the spiritual

exercises were to take place over a period of four weeks and consisted of prayer,

contemplation, meditation and “exercises of discernment of spirit,” which emphasized

right thought and action in the world using a virtue ethical approach. Undeniably, St.

Ignatius’s spiritual exercises have a mystical-ethical component that encourages the

practitioner to think and act as God would think and act. By using this format and indeed

calling his work “Meditations” Descartes seems to approach his philosophy as a religious

quest for truth. He wants us to meditate slowly with him, casting aside all our judgments

and preconceived ideas so that we may have our own revelation and come to know the

objective truth ourselves with the aid of his method. The mystical/religious foundations

implied by his dreams, vision and the structure of the Meditations is interesting in light of

discussions surrounding Descartes’s potential Atheism, and indicates that the Divine12 is

a founding factor of his work. This greatly influences his ethics and would imply a deep

desire to live, according to God. Arguably, therefore, the Meditations on First

Philosophy is as much an ethical work as it is a quest for certainty that is bathed in the

nectar of a religious quest.

The Ethical Imperative in Cartesian Philosophy

In support of the view that ethics is fundamental for Descartes, in her article,

“Descartes’ Ethics,” Lisa Shapiro notes that in the preface to the French edition of the

Principles of Philosophy, Descartes reserves an esteemed place for moral conduct.

Descartes uses a metaphor,

12 I use the word Divine and not God, because there are a number of reasons to believe that Descartes departs from a notion of the traditional Judeo-Christian God who “acts” in the world. At the same time, Descartes does defer to God for all things that are impossible to know with certainty and also as a comfort when life does not correspond with desire.

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The whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, which may be reduced to three principle ones, namely medicine, mechanics and morals. By ‘morals’ I understand the highest and the most perfect moral system which presupposes a complete knowledge of the other sciences and is the ultimate level of wisdom.13

It is apparent that “the most perfect moral system” is not merely an afterthought, but one

of the main branches that grows directly out of the physics, which in turn grows directly

out of the metaphysics. Shapiro notes that the implication here is that if we want to know

how to conduct our lives properly and live well, we must first understand ourselves, and

the world in which we live. She notes, “…we require a proper metaphysics to arrive at

scientific knowledge….Ethics and metaphysics and epistemology, on this view, are

tightly knit.”14 In his Descartes and the First Cartesians, Roger Ariew agrees that ethics

held an important place in Cartesian philosophy, but sees this metaphor as confirmation

that Descartes probably intended to develop an entire system. He notes,

The well-known metaphor makes explicit what was already assumed in the code of morals from the Discourse, namely that the code would remain provisional or applicable under some limited conditions until the formation of Cartesian metaphysics and physics – the roots and trunk of the tree of philosophy.15

Like Shapiro, Ariew notes that for Descartes, ethics is not an after thought but also

emphasizes that it is the purpose of all his philosophy. He quotes Descartes, “living

without philosophy is precisely to have one’s eyes closed without ever trying to open

them;…this study is more necessary for the regulation of our manners and for our

conduct in life than is the use of our eyes in the guidance of our steps.”16 And yet,

Descartes’ ethics remain obscure, and he indicates a reluctance to write explicitly on the

13 Lisa Shapiro, “Descartes’s Ethics,” A Companion to Descartes, chapter 26, eds. Janet Broughton and John Carriero, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), p. 447. 14 Ibid. 15 Roger Ariew, Descartes and the First Cartesians, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.152. 16 Ibid.,152.


topic. In his letter to Chanut, Descartes discusses his resistance to writing an ethical

theory. He notes,

It is true that normally I refuse to write down my thoughts concerning morality. I have two reasons for this. One is that there is no other subject in which malicious people can so readily find pretexts for vilifying me; and the other is that I believe only sovereigns, or those authorized by them, have the right to concern themselves with regulating the morals of other people.17

The second part of Descartes’s reason is probably a tactic from hiding his unconventional

perspective from the authorities. With so much control over freedom of thought,

Descartes’s treads a fine line between the Catholic exemplar and condemned heretic. We

see this submission to the authorities in a number of entries including his third Discourse

on Method. Descartes has good reason to want to communicate his allegiance to the

Church authorities and by doing so ensure his scientific method does not threaten them in

anyway, and also that his work is perceived as being authored by one of its faithful,

supportive community members. Instead, Descartes affirms the correct use of the will as

a primary aspect of moral conduct. He notes,

That the will should extend widely is in accordance with its nature, and it is the greatest perfection in man to be able to act by its means, that is, freely, and by so doing we are in a peculiar way masters of our actions and thereby merit praise or blame. For we do not praise automata…since their actions are performed necessarily…when we choose what is true, much more credit is due to us when the choice is made freely, than when it is made of necessity.18

While there doesn’t appear to be anything radical about an ethic that advocates freely

exercising one’s will, it is suggestive of a newly independent, individual responsibility to

think freely. Through a close reading it could be inferred that he is disempowering the

Church authority for matters concerning scientific discovery. He has good reason to hide.

17 Letter to Chanut, 20 November, 1647, AT V, 86. 18 Descartes, “Principles of Philosophy” #37, Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, ed. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Inc, 2000).

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When Galileo exercised his “free will,” he was deemed heretical by the Church and

placed under house arrest. Other’s experienced even worse plights. Perhaps it is no

wonder that Descartes wants to put off writing on the topic of morality.

The Influence of Stoic Philosophy on Cartesian Ethics

Nonetheless, Descartes does not remain silent. In Part 3 of Discourse on Method,

Descartes offers us an outline of his ethical theory, which he tells us he separates into

“three or four maxims.” He begins acknowledging the importance of an ethical code, “in

order to remain irresolute in my actions while reason required me to be so in my

judgments, and in order not to cease to live as happily as possible during this time…”19

His first maxim reconfirms his desire to obey “the laws and customs of [his] country”20,

his second “to be firm and resolute in my actions as [he] could…”21 Here he seems to

adopt the scientific method to the best of his ability. He will follow a course of action,

until it is obvious it is wrong and only then will change course. He will not trust doubtful

opinions. He will not allow his passions to dissuade his rational choices. His third is “to

try and conquer [himself] rather than fortune, and to change [his] desires rather than the

order of the world.”22 This theme of undermining material fortune repeats itself like a

mantra throughout Descartes’s letters to Princess Elisabeth. Here we definitely see a neo-

Stoic attitude towards the world. His last maxim was to dedicate his life to the best

occupation – which he declared is “advancing, as far as [he] could, in the knowledge of

the truth, following the method [he] had prescribed to [himself].”23 Ariew notes that

19 Descartes, Discourse on Method in Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, ed. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Inc., 2000), p. 56. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., 57. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., 58.


during the sixteenth and seventeenth century there was a revival of Stoic philosophy

newly translated into French, and Descartes acknowledges that he is “indebted to the

ancients” for their ideas. In letters to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, Descartes uses Stoic

wisdom to help her. He recommends that she read Seneca’s On the Happy Life.

Descartes notes,

It seems to me, in a perfect contentment of mind and inner satisfaction, which is not commonly possessed by those who are most favoured by fortune, and which is acquired by the wise without fortune’s favour. So vivere beate, to live happily, is just to have a perfectly content and satisfied mind.24

According to this response, happiness is only contingent upon the right attitude and

nothing more. Wealth and fortune, according to this line of thinking can actually be

obstacles for peace of mind. Descartes continues to note that there are two classes of

things that bring us supreme contentment, “those which depend on us, like virtue and

wisdom, and those which do not, like honours, riches and health.”25 He notes that it is

certain that a person of noble birth and good health “can enjoy a more perfect

contentment than another who is poor, unhealthy and deformed, provided the two are

equally wise and virtuous.” However, he also notes “the poorest people, least blest by

nature and fortune, can be entirely content and satisfied just as much as everyone else.”26

For Descartes, the extrinsic goods are inessential, unlike the intrinsic good that is the

rationally determined free will, which can be accessed by all. In this particular letter to

the Princess, he refers to the three rules of morality as put forward in his Discourse on

Method although they are altered slightly, eliminating the first maxim.27 To summarize

24 Letter to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, AT IV, 264. 25 Ibid., 257. 26 Ibid. 27 The first maxim appears to be an obligatory inclusion, “To follow the laws and customs of my country….” While Descartes offers a philosophical justification to do so, it is an inessential provision that

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his advice, he tells her we must employ the mind to determine the best course of action in

every situation in life. In other words, live non-reactively and use the rational intellectual

faculty to make decisions. Secondly, once reason has determined a best course of action,

stick with it resolutely until proven wrong through reason, not through passions or

desires. Descartes makes a side note here that cannot be found in the Discourse, that he

believes virtue is found by sticking resolutely to a decision and always following the

voice of reason and not seductive voice of the passions. The third method has been re-

articulated as detachment from desire. He notes that the person who guides his actions by

reason must understand that any goods he cannot possess are outside his power and

therefore not his to have. In this way, the third rule implies that the virtuous, happy

person will not desire that which he cannot have. If these ideas sound familiar, it is

because they are rich with Stoic overtones, and also, according to Shapiro, a non-

Aristotelian virtue ethic that seeks happiness through nothing other than virtuous living.

Descartes suggests that while it is preferable to be wealthy and healthy, happiness is

attained through the power of the mind and has little to do with circumstance, and

poverty, sickness, wealth and health are all circumstantial. Whatever one’s situation,

controlling one’s desires is vital for happiness. He notes, “We do not desire to have, for

example, more arms or more tongues than we have, and yet we do desire to have more

health or more riches.”28 However, he recommends ridding ourselves of this desire, “by

bearing in mind that since we have always followed the advice of our reason, we have

left undone nothing that was in our power; and that sickness and misfortune are no less

does not seem to be a fundamental aspect of Cartesian morality, even though he does repeat this idea to Princess Elisabeth on a number of occasions. 28 Ibid., 259.


natural to man than prosperity and health.”29 This particular idea of happiness is akin to a

Stoic view that advocates accepting circumstances without resistance in order to maintain

tranquil in any situation.

Descartes: Moving Beyond the Stoics

But, as already suggested, Descartes is not a pure Stoic. In her article “Descartes’

Passions of the Soul” Shapiro notes “Descartes rejects the neo-Stoic ideal of a passionless

sage.” For one, in The Passions of the Soul, Descartes seeks the “proper use of the

passions,”30 whereas the Stoics seek the suppression of them. On the other hand,

Descartes’s does not think that the will can (or should) suppress the passions. For him,

the passions are part of an automated system, operating under the laws of physics. The

will cannot cause the heart to stop, the pupils to dilate or the stomach to stop the process

of digestion. Instead what happens is that various situations affect the body, causing

changes in the internal system. The sunlight (or artificial light) will cause the pupils to

dilate; a lion running towards you will cause your heart to race, and so on. The will can

do nothing about the reactive body and how it responds to various stimuli. Our bodies

are machines. To emphasize this, Descartes notes,

If someone quickly thrusts his hand against our eyes as if to strike us, even though we know him to be our friend, that he only does it in jest, and that he will take great care not to hurt us, we still have trouble preventing ourselves from closing our eyes.31

It is the same with the passions that cause joy, anger and all the like. The passions are

functions, which are affected by external and internal forces. They are not controlled by

29 Ibid. 30 Shapiro, Lisa, “Descartes’s Passions of the Soul,” The Philosophical Compass 2006 (1/3): 268-278. 31 Descartes, Passions of the Soul, in Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, ed. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Inc., 2000), p. 302.

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the will. Instead, Descartes recommends altering stimuli to alter the passions. If you are

angry, then a walk by the beach may change this passion, just as changing one’s thoughts

may have a similar result. Of course, self-control may be needed to avoid acting upon

aggressive passions. But all in all, Descartes believes the passions benefit us – they are

there to protect us. Therefore, Cartesian “Stoicism” is an ameliorated form of neo-

Stoicism. Descartes further clarifies his thoughts on the ancient philosophers in his letter

to the Princess. He notes,

…the pagan philosophers had three main views about the supreme good and the end of our actions: Epicurus, who said it was pleasure; that of Zeno, who insisted that it was virtue; and that of Aristotle who made it consist of all the perfections, as much of the body as of the mind.32

He dismisses both Aristotle and Zeno; the former because he is only interested the

supreme good as it pertains to the most accomplished of men, and the latter because his

virtue is so severe that “only depressed people, or those whose minds are entirely

detached from their bodies, could be counted among his adherents.”33 It is an interesting

critique, especially as Descartes is accused of the same crime. However, Descartes is

more pragmatic than Zeno and perhaps, more importantly, much more interested in

happiness than a Stoic would normally be. In this passage, it is Epicurus who Descartes

finds the most tenable. He notes, “Lastly, when Epicurus considered that happiness

consists in and to what purpose or end our actions tend, he was not wrong to say that it is

pleasure in general – that is to say, contentment of mind.”34 His only issue with Epicurus

is that his goal is pleasure, and while he advocates the pleasures of the mind and not the

pleasures of the body, pleasure, for Epicurus, is an end in itself. However, Descartes

32 Letter to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, AT IV, 275. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid.


offers a metaphor that indicates while he finds happiness to be important and most natural

to pursue, the pursuit of it on its own, may not lead to virtue, which must be the purpose

of our actions. He notes,

Suppose there is a prize for hitting a bull’s eye: you can make people want to hit the bull’s eye by showing them the prize, but they cannot win the prize if they do not see the bull’s eye; conversely, those who see the bull’s eye are not thereby induced to fire at it if they do not know there is a prize to be won.35

In other words, to simply pursue happiness, without knowing in what it consists, may

make you miss the bull’s eye, which Descartes explains is virtue; but to simply target

virtue will not move most to want to pursue it. Happiness and contentment, then, is the

prize that one receives through virtuous living. Shapiro concurs when she notes, “For

Descartes, our supreme good consists in virtue and only virtue, and our achieving this

supreme good cannot but make us truly happy. In our actions, we ought to aim for virtue,

and we are motivated to do so because of the happiness that results.”36 This echoes of

early Socratic and Platonic virtue ethics that prescribes the only way to true happiness is

through virtue. By contrast, Stoic happiness is achieved more through an adaptation of

attitude to circumstance, and a detachment to outcomes. As noted, Shapiro clothes

Descartes’s in virtue ethics, but admits that “Descartes’s virtue ethics is somewhat

peculiar.”37 As an example she notes he believes virtue is attained when we resolutely act

in accordance to what we think will be best, even if it is not. That being said, Descartes

virtue ethics is definitely not based on an Aristotelian model. Shapiro notes,

On the Aristotelian account, virtue requires the world cooperate with our intentions. We fail to achieve virtue fully if our actions do not succeed in their

35 Letter to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, AT IV, 277. 36 Lisa Shapiro, “Descartes’s Ethics,” A Companion to Descartes, Chapter 26, eds. Janet Broughton and John Carriero (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), p. 455. 37 Ibid.

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aim. If we mean well, but do harm, we have morally failed. For Descartes, as we have seen, good intentions are sufficient for virtue.38

Shapiro also notes that similarly, for the Stoics, “virtue is an all-or-nothing affair. One

either lives wholly in agreement with nature, or one is vicious.”39 Hence, Descartes seems

to slither through the cracks of any single ethical theory, while borrowing attributes from

many.

Magnanimity: The Call for Generosity and Altruism

As a final point, it is relevant to point out that Descartes’ concept of living

virtuously is not just for oneself, but for the entire community, and in the same letter to

Elisabeth he recommends a non-Hobbesian altruistic ethic. He notes,

After acknowledging the goodness of God, the immortality of our souls and the immensity of the universe, there is yet another truth that is, in my opinion, most useful to know. That is that though each of us is a person distinct from others, whose interests are accordingly in some way different from those of the rest of the world, we ought still to think that none of us could subsist alone and that each one of us is really one of the many parts of the universe, and more particularly a part of the earth, the state, the society and the family to which we belong by our domicile, our oath of allegiance and our birth. And the interests of the whole, of which each of us is a part, must always be preferred to those of our own particular person.40

He implies that the virtuous person will sacrifice himself for the whole, realizing that the

community of which he is part is more than he alone. The act of courage that heroes

display, if virtuous, is not displayed for the praise, but instead for the sheer desire and

inclination to defend the whole of which the individual is just a small part. Descartes

position is arguably a religious one, “Once someone knows and loves God as he should,

he has a natural impulse to think in this way; for then, abandoning himself altogether to

God’s will, he strips himself of his own interests, and has no other passion than to do 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Letter to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, AT IV, 295.


what he thinks pleasing to God.”41 This altruism seems to stem from what can be

described as the most important virtue for Descartes: the virtue of generosity. Ariew

notes that the proper translation of generosity from the Latin would be “magnanimity,”

implying “a big or large soul.”42 Obviously this entails generosity, but it is perhaps even

more all encompassing. What is it that a big soul implies? Perhaps love, forgiveness,

compassion, fortitude and, of course, generosity. These qualities are all results of the

passions that impress upon the soul making it large and full of goodness. According to

Descartes,

True generosity, [magnanimity] which makes a man esteem himself as highly as he may legitimately esteem himself, consists only in: partly that he (the generous person) knows that there is nothing that truly belongs to him but this free disposition of his volitions, nor any reason why he ought to be praised or blamed except that he uses it well or badly; and partly in that he feels within himself a firm and constant resolution to use it well, that is to say, never to lack the will to undertake and execute all the things which he judges to be the best.43

Shapiro notes that clearly Cartesian generosity needs a little exploration, especially

because generosity (as explained above) for Descartes is both a passion as well as an act

of will. Descartes does emphasize that the generous person is “entirely master of his

passions” and that generosity is “the key to all other virtues.”44 Shapiro notes that for

Descartes, “generosity refers to an understanding that one has a free will and a resolve to

use that will well.”45 This presents us with a paradox, however. The will is free, but the

passions affect the soul, making it blessed (full of love and joy in its extreme) or cursed

(full of hatred in its extreme). It is not just for the benefit of others that we should

41 Ibid. 42 From Cartesian workshop notes on December 4th, 2015 at the University of South Florida. 43 Descartes, Passions of the Soul, 153; AT XI 445-446, quoted by Lisa Shapiro in “Cartesian Generosity,” A Companion to Descartes, eds, Janet Broughton and John Carriero (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell Publishing, 2008) 249. 44 Ibid., 350. 45 Ibid., 449.

18

acquire a generous soul, but for our own self-esteem. Generosity and happiness are

entwined. While the causes of “negative” passions can be redirected through the

imagination (reviewing the situation that caused these passions to rise from a new

perspective or perceiving a different outcome), it seems that certain external forces will

trigger the passions. Therefore, life choices, in so far as they can be made, are something

that the rational will should direct with as much certitude as possible, with the view of

magnanimity in mind.

Conclusion

To conclude, Descartes’ Discourse on Method and Meditations on First

Philosophy combined with his letters to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and Queen

Cristina of Sweden and the Passions of the Soul present us with a philosopher-scientist

who approaches his entire philosophy with an ethic that is deeply entwined within his

metaphysics and epistemology. In his letters, Descartes uses a synchronistic ethic that

combines neo-Stoicism, Epicurean hedonism and a non-Aristotelian virtue ethic.

However, the religious impetus cannot be overlooked. It influenced the inspiration behind

his systems, the structure of the meditations and his ethical views. While, scholars often

emphasize the mechanistic nature of Descartes’s dualism, this reading finds proof of an

ethic that values individual freedom, self-sufficiency, personal responsibility, altruism,

generosity, and promotes virtuous living for a happy life. Whereas the passions are the

results of mechanistic impulses, the free will can be employed to “change one’s thoughts”

and hence, change the mechanistic impulses that can excite the passions mostly

commonly disparaged. Descartes is unapologetically optimistic about the human

condition, highlighting the potential to live magnanimously through the unfettered free


will, and the power we have to redirect the irrational urges of the machine through

rational thinking.

20

Bibliography

Ariew, Roger. Descartes & The First Cartesians. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Descartes, Rene. Discourse on Method. In Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays and

Correspondence. Ed. Roger Ariew. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing

Company Inc., 2000.

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Essays and Correspondence. Ed. Roger Ariew. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing

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Descartes, Rene. “To Princess Elizabeth, 4 August 1645,” AT IV, 264, 265, 267. The

Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Volume III The Correspondence. Trans.

John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch and Anthony Kenny.

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Descartes, Rene. “To Chanut, 20 November, 1647,” AT V, 86-87. The




Shapiro, Lisa, “Descartes’s Ethics,” A Companion to Descartes, Eds. Janet Broughton

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Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

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The Magnanimous Soul: Ethics In Cartesian Philosophy 1