THE NEW ECONOMY, THE END OF THE COLD WAR, AND PRESIDENTIAL EVALUATIONS

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THE NEW ECONOMY, THE END OF THE COLD WAR, AND PRESIDENTIAL EVALUATIONS

Robert K. Goidel Indiana State University

Todd G. Shields University of Arkansas Ronald E. Langley

University of Kentucky

In this paper we examine the question of whether the relationship between presidential evaluations and economic evaluations has been altered in the post-Cold War era. While we fail to find evidence that economic evaluations have become more important as a determinant of presidential approval ratings, we do find evidence that economic evaluations have become more negative andmore volatile in the post-Cold War era. Based on this evidence, wesuggest thatpost-Cold Warpresidents may have a more di f jul t time gainingpublic approval for their management of the economy.

According to most accounts, the 1992 presidential election was a referendum on the state of the national economy (Pomper 1993). Yet, despite a nagging sense of economic uncertainty within the electorate, and national economic conditions that “stayed just bad enough to perpetuate voter concern” (Arterton 1993, 86), most forecasting models predicted a Bush victory (Pomper 1993). Recent research has indicted media coverage as at least partly to blame for this gap between economic perception and economic reality. As Thomas Patterson observed

During the general election, more than 90 percent of references to the economy on network news were negative, as opposed to 75 percent in the immediately preceding period-a remarkable statistic. The networks ’portrayal of the economy got worse as the economy improved. Bush was forced to run not only against a bad economy but against negative coverage of an economy that was in fact getting better (1 993, 1 13. See also Goidel and Langley 1995; Hetherington 1996; Goidel, Shields, and Peffley 1995).

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By November 1994 the national economy appeared to be even healthier. Both the inflation rate and unemployment rate were down, while economic growth which had been recessionary for much of 199 1 and 1992 appeared to have entered a period of sustained growth. Despite what appeared to be good economic news, President Clinton and the Democratic party suffered the worst midterm defeat since 1948. As with the 1992 presidential elections, most forecasting models were considerably off the mark, predicting between a 12-20 seat pickup for the Republican party (Jacobson 1994).

While these two examples provide insufficient evidence that there has been a fundamental change in the relationship between the economy and political evaluations, they are suggestive. Beyond anecdotal evidence relating to the 1992 and 1994 elections, two changes in the economic and political environment suggest that the manner in which economic conditions translate into political evaluations may be different in recent years than in the past. First, the Cold War, which defined and structured US foreign policy from World War I1 until the late 1980s, ended. While the end ofthe Cold War is not itself an economic change, it may have influenced the relative importance of the economy as a determinant of political evaluations. In particular, one might suspect that economic evaluations have become more important as a determinant of presidential approval in the post-Cold War era. In addition, the end of the Cold War may also have increased economic pessimism, particularly as citizens realized that any peace dividend was unlikely to trickle down to their pocketbooks.

Second, the economy itself has undergone a fundamental restructuring, moving from an industrial base to a service and technological base. Pre- sumably, the effects of a restructured economy have been two-fold: (1) economic uncertainty has increased making economic perceptions increasingly volatile; and (2) aggregate economic expectations have decreased, indicating that the public is increasingly pessimistic regarding the economic future. In the past, a low unemployment rate might very well have meant that the majority of Americans did not have to worry about losing their jobs. In recent years, however, a low unemployment rate and increased economic uncertainty have coexisted at least in part because the unemployment rate fails to capture individuals who have lost one job but have found other, less well compensated employment (Tolchin 1996).

In the following analysis we empirically test these propositions by examining: (1) the relationship between presidential approval and economic evaluations; and (2) the relationship between economic evaluations and real economic conditions. While we fail to uncover any evidence that economic evaluations have become more important as a determinant of presidential approval, we do find that, over time, economic evaluations have

New Economy, Cold War & Presidential Evaluations 489

become more negative and more sensitive to change in economic conditions, particularly to changes in the inflation rate. In addition, we find that economic evaluations have become increasingly volatile over time. For post-Cold War presidents, the results suggest that economic policy, like foreign policy, may have become more complicated in the post-Cold War era.

COLD WAR POLITICS AND PRESIDENTIAL EVALUATIONS

Early research on foreign policy attitudes held that the average citizen paid very little attention to foreign affairs. In this respect, foreign policy attitudes appeared to have little impact on voting decisions or on general political evaluations and citizens appeared to have little knowledge or interest in foreign affairs (Almond 1950; Erskine 1963; Converse 1964; Stokes 1966). Revisionist work, however, has contended that citizens are not nearly as inept at making sense of the international world as this initial view suggested (see e.g., Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981; Page and Shapiro 1982; Shapiro and Page 1988; Hunvitz and Peffley 1987; Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989). Notably, this revisionist work did not suggest that citizens are fully informed or fully involved in foreign affairs, but instead argued that citizens employ cognitive heuristics to make sense of the international world. Particularly important in this respect were attitudes toward the Soviet Union or the enemy nation. Short of time to devote to studying foreign policy issues, citizens have, at least in the past, structured their foreign policy beliefs around images ofthe Soviet Union (Hurwitz and Peffley 1990; Peffley and Hurwitz 1992).

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 199 1, attitudes toward the Soviet Union have undoubtedly become less useful as heuristics for organizing foreign policy attitudes (Peffley and Hurwitz 1992). By extension, one would also suspect that foreign policy attitudes-deprived of a key component of their organizational structure- would become less important as determinants of political evaluations. Recent research by Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch (19953, for example, contends that as issues vary in their salience to the public, they also vary in their importance as determinants of presidential approval. Along these lines, one would suspect that changes in the political and economic environment would lead to changes in the relative salience of issues.

To test this hypothesis, we have constructed the following regression model:

490 Southemtern Political Review Vol.25 No.3

Approval = Approval,-, + Economic Expectations + Negative Events + Positive Events + Vietnam + Honeymoon + Postcold + (Postcold x Economic Expectations)

Our dependent variable in the analysis is the average monthly approval rating as reported in Gallup Opinion Reports. Previous research has dem- onstrated that presidential approval ratings are related to the president’s support in Congress (see e.g., Brace and Hinckley 1992; Brody 199 1; Rivers and Rose 1985; Edwards 1980), the number of seats lost in the midterm election (Tufte 1975, 1978; Campbell 1987, 1991, 1993), and the president’s (or his party’s) prospects in future presidential elections (see e.g., Sigelman 1979; Brody and Sigelman 1983; Brody 199 1).

Economic expectations are measured by the Index of Consumer Expec- tations made available by the ICPSR at the University of Michigan. We utilize the Index of Consumer Expectations (ICE) rather than the Index of Consumer Sentiments (ICS) because it provides the longest, most continuous monthly measure of economic expectations available. In this respect, the Index of Consumer Sentiments has been asked on a continuous monthly basis only since 1978, while the Index of Consumer Expectations has been asked on a continuous monthly basis since 1953.’

To control for the impact of political events on presidential approval, we have added separate dummy variables indicating whether a positive or negative event occurred during a given month. Our definitions of political events are derived from MacKuen, Erickson, and Stimson (1992) and from Clarke and Stewart (1994). Unlike more comprehensive analyses of political events on presidential approval (see e.g., Brace and Hinckley 1992), these works have attempted to limit the definition of political events to include only those events which have had a substantial impact on public opinion (MacKuen, Erickson, and Stimson 1992).

Within our model, we have also attempted to control for the impact of the Vietnam War and presidential honeymoons on presidential approval ratings. To capture the effects of the Vietnam War, we have included the total number of military casualties as reported in Ostrom and Simon (1985). To control for the effects of presidential honeymoons, we have included a measure similar to the one reported in Clarke and Stewart (1994). For the first three months of an administration, this honeymoon variable is coded as 2, for the fourth through the sixth month, it is coded as 1 , while all remaining months are coded as 0. Theoretically, the coding suggests that the honeymoon effect should be strongest during the first three months of a president’s administration, but that the effects should linger until about


the sixth month. After the sixth month, the honeymoon should be over and presidential approval ratings should be somewhere near the mean.

Finally, to determine whether the end of the Cold War affected presidential approval ratings, we have included a dummy variable coded 1 for months following the fall ofthe Berlin Wall in 1989, and 0 for months prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall. While pinpointing the end of the Cold War is something of an arbitrary exercise, the fall of the Berlin Wall represented one of the more compelling and clearly defined symbols of the demise of Cold War politics. Statistically, the inclusion of this dummy variable should indicate whether presidential approval ratings were significantly different in the post-Cold War era. To test whether economic expectations become more important as a predictor of presidential approval we have also added an interaction term (Postcold x Consumer Expectations). A positive, significant coefficient associated with this interactive variable would indicate that economic expectations exerted a significantly stronger impact in the period from November 1989-June 1995 than in preceding months. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 1.

The results presented in Table 1 indicate that presidential approval is a function of prior approval, economic expectations, positive and negative political events, the Vietnam War, and presidential honeymoons. There is little evidence in Table 1 that the relative importance of economic expectations has increased in recent years, nor is there any evidence that presidents are rated more negatively (or more positively) in the post-Cold War era. In this respect, neither the post-Cold War dummy variable nor the interaction term exerted a significant influence on presidential approval.

Table 1 OLS Regression Model of Presidential Approval

(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Additive Model Interactive Model Lagged Approval 0.83 (0.02)** 0.83 (0.02)**

Positive Events 6.06 (1.12)** 6.08 (1.13)** Consumer Expectations 0.10 (0.02)** 0.10 (0.02)**

Negative Events -4.89 (1.29)* * -4.82 (1.28)** Vietnam -0.001 (.0007)* -0.002 (.0007)* Honeymoon 1.39 (0.39)** 1.41 (0.39)** Post Cold War -0.02 (0.61) 3.71 (2.65)

Constant 1.13 (1.28) 0.98 (1.29) Adjusted R-Square .87 .87

Post Cold War X Consumer Expectations - -0.05 (0.04)

*p < .05; **p < .01

492 Southeastern Political Review Vol. 25 No. 3

THE COLD WAR, THE NEW ECONOMY, AND ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS

Having found little evidence that the relationship between presidential approval and economic evaluations has been altered in recent years, we now turn our attention to questions concerning economic perception and economic reality. A number of recent works have contended that economic perceptions may no longer reflect economic reality (Hetherington 1996; Patterson 1993; Goidel and Langley 1995). While some of these works have indicted media coverage of the economy as the responsible party (Goidel and Langley 1996; Patterson 1993; Hetherington 1996), other works have contended that the gap between economic perceptions and economic conditions has been created by a restructuring of the economy. Susan Tolchin, for example, has observed that “the real dilemma for Americans is that the numbers no longer mean what they used to mean” (1996, 50). In this respect, Tolchin argues that standard measures of economic health (i.e. unemployment and inflation) may no longer accu- rately reflect public perceptions regarding the status of the national economy.

If this is indeed the case, we should observe some change in the relationship between economic conditions and economic expectations over time. To test this empirically, we have constructed the following regression model:

Economic Expectations = Economic Expectations,, + Inflation + Unemployment + Negative Events + Positive Events + Vietnam + Honeymoon + Postcold

To measure the impact of real economic conditions, we have included variables measuring the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment during a given month. For the purposes of this study, we have defined inflation as the twelve-month percentage change in the consumer price index, while unemployment has been defined as the monthly unemployment rate.2 Our hypothesis is that once one controls for prior economic expectations and real economic conditions, economic expectations should be more negative in the post-Cold War environment. In separate analyses, we also consider whether the relationship between real economic conditions and economic expectations has been altered in recent years. The first analysis (Interactive Model #1) tests whether inflation has become more (or less) important as a predictor of economic expectations. Similarly, the second analysis (Interactive Model #2) tests whether the effect of unemployment has remained consistent across time periods. The results from these analyses are presented in Table 2.


Table 2 OLS Regression Model of the Index of Consumer Expectations

(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Lagged Economic Expectations

Inflation Unemployment Positive Events Negative Events Vietnam Honeymoon Post Cold War Post Cold War X

Inflation Post Cold War X

Unemployment Constant Adjusted R-Square

Additive Model 0.88 (0.02)**

-0.51 (0.09)** 0.21 (0.12) 1.91 (0.81)*

.0008 (.0006) -2.23 (0.94)*

-.03 (0.28) -1.63 (0.48)**

-

1 1 .O (2.39)** .95

Interactive Model (1) Interactive Model (2) 0.88 (0.02)** 0.88 (0.02)**

-0.51 (0.09)** 0.19 (0.12) 2.26 (0.83)**

.0008 (.0006) -2.35 (0.94)*

-.04 (0.28)

-.63 (0.32)* 0.53 (1.18)

-0.49 (0.09)** 0.22 (0.12) 1.75 (0.82)**

.0008 (.0006) -2.05 (0.95)**

-0.02 (0.28) -1.59 (0.48)** -

- 3.63 (2.45)

11.35 (2.39)** 10.53 (2.45)** .95 .95

As can be seen in column 1 of Table 2 (Additive Model), economic expectations are a function of lagged economic expectations, inflation, and the occurrence of both positive and negative events. According to our results, a one-point percentage change in the inflation rate should decrease consumer expectations by about half a percentage point. Somewhat sur- prisingly, the unemployment rate was not a significant predictor of economic expectations. To the extent that economic conditions structure aggregate economic expectations, it would appear that it is inflation rather than unemployment that serves as a basis of these expectations.

While economic expectations are influenced by the real economic conditions, they are also influenced by political events. In this respect, the occurrence of a positive event increases economic expectations by about two percent, while the occurrence of a negative event decreases consumer expectations by about two percent. One event that did not appear to affect consumer expectations, however, was the Vietnam War. In this respect, we find no evidence to suggest that the Vietnam War impacted aggregate economic evaluations. Nor did we find any evidence that citizens are more optimistic regarding the economic future during the presidential honeymoon.

Finally, and most important for our purposes, we do find that consumer expectations were significantly lower in the post-Cold War era. In this respect, the Index of Consumer Expectations has, on average, been about

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1.6 percent lower since November 1989. This increased economic pessimism, we should note, occurs even after controlling for changes in real economic conditions.

If economic expectations have been, on average, more negative in the post-Cold War era column 2 helps to explain why this is so. The results presented in column 2 indicate that aggregate changes in consumer expectations have become more sensitive to changes in the inflation rate in recent years. In the Cold War era, a one percent increase in the inflation rate would be expected to result in a one-half point decrease in the Index of Consumer Expectations. In the post-Cold War Era, on the other hand, a one percent increase in the inflation rate would be expected to result in just over a one-point decrease in the Index of Consumer Expectations. Clearly, the effect of inflation on aggregate economic expectations has increased in the post-Cold War era.

No analogous effect was found with the employment rate (column 3).

VOLATILITY, PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL, AND ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS

One final question involves whether presidential approval ratings (Gronke 1996) and economic evaluations have become more volatile over time and, in particular, in the post-Cold War era. While it is not entirely clear how volatility should be measured at the aggregate level (Gronke 1996), one reasonable indicator of volatility is the absolute value of the monthly change in presidential approval ratings and in the Index of Con- sumer Expectations. If the volatility has increased over time, one would expect that, on average, the monthly change in approval ratings and consumer expectations would be larger in recent years.

To test for this possibility, we have constructed separate regression models predicting the absolute value of the change in approval ratings and consumer expectations respectively. If these aggregate measures of public opinion have, in fact, become more volatile, we would expect to find a significant, positive effect for the post-Cold War dummy variable in each of the equations. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3.

Looking first at the equation predicting the absolute change in presidential approval (column l), we find no evidence that presidential approval ratings have become more volatile over time. In this respect, the month-to- month absolute change in presidential approval ratings in the post-Cold War era is roughly equivalent to the monthly change in approval ratings during the Cold War era.

If we find little evidence that presidential approval ratings have become more volatile in recent years, we do find evidence that the absolute monthly


Table 3 OLS Regression Model of the Absolute Monthly Change in

Presidential Approval and the Index of Consumer Expectations (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Consumer Expectations Inflation Unemployment Positive Events Negative Events Vietnam Honeymoon Post Cold War Constant Adjusted R-Square *p < .os; **p < .01

Presidential Approval -0.04 (O.Ol)**

- 2.45 (0.90)** 2.59 (1.03)* 0.0005 (.0006) 1.15 (0.31)** 0.29 (0.48) 5.74 (1.01)**

.08

Consumer Expectations

0.22 (0.03)** 0.27 (0.07)** 0.69 (0.56) 0.11 (0.64)

0.004 (0.19) 1.65 (0.30)**

.I9

-

-0.0002 (.0006)

-0.42 (0.46)

change in economic expectations has increased in the post-Cold War era. Looking at the equation predicting economic expectations, we find that the average absolute change in the Index of Consumer Expectations was about 1.7% higher in the period fromNovember 1989 to June 1995. It is important that this evidence of increased volatility in economic expectations comes even after controlling for changes in real economic conditions.

At least two competing explanations can be offered for this finding. First, economic expectations are, as the results seem to indicate, increasingly volatile and this increased volatility is not associated with changes in the economy. Based on prior research (Patterson 1993; Goidel and Langley 1995; Hetherington 1996), one tentative hypothesis might be that the volatility in economic expectations reflects changes in the pattern of news coverage devoted to the economy. A second explanation is that traditional economic measures (i.e. inflation and unemployment) are no longer valid indicators of public perceptions regarding the economic future. Regardless ofthe interpretation, it seems clear that the absolute month-to-month change in economic expectations has increased in recent years. Because economic expectations are an important predictor of presidential approval, this increased volatility is likely to have an effect on presidential evaluations.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS In the preceding analysis, we have examined whether the relationship

between presidential approval and economic evaluations has been altered in the post-Cold War era. While we failed to find that economic evaluations have become more important as a predictor of presidential approval, we

496 Southeastern Political Review VoL 25 No. 3

have found that economic evaluations have become more negative and more volatile in the post-Cold War period. The old adage that correlation does not equal causation is appropriate in this context. We would not suggest that the fall of the Berlin Wall or the demise of the Soviet Union caused the public to become more negative and volatile in terms of their economic expectations. The causal link undoubtedly lies elsewhere. The findings, however, remain important for our understanding of the post-Cold War presidency because they suggest that the standards by which the public develops its economic expectations have been altered in recent years. Moreover, because economic evaluations are an integral component of presidential approval ratings, this change in economic evaluations indi- rectly affects presidential evaluations. As a result, post-Cold War presidents may have a more difficult time managing the economy than Cold War presidents. If the end of the Cold War has made foreign policy decision making more complex and complicated, our results suggest that it may coincide with changes in the economy that have made economic policy making more complex as well.

A Final Note on the 1996 Presidential Election If, in the 1992 and 1994 elections, predictions based solely on economic

conditions were considerably off the mark, economic conditions produced more accurate predictions of the 1996 presidential election. Most of the models predicted a reasonably solid Clinton victory ranging from 54.8% to 58.1% of the two-party vote.3 Based on the 1996 election outcome, one might be tempted to conclude that the increased economic pessimism and the increased volatility in economic expectations documented in this analysis have been confined to a fairly limited time period. While it is true that economic expectations became more optimistic in 1996, it is important to keep in mind that the optimism does not appear to be associated with a substantial improvement in economic conditions. Both the inflation and the unemployment rate have remained relatively stable throughout Clin- ton’s first term while economic growth (as measured by the percentage change in GNP) has tended to vary between two and four percent. The key point is that while the economic picture is relatively positive, the economic picture was also relatively positive two years ago when the Democratic party lost 52 seats in the House of Representatives. What has changed over the final two years of Clinton’s first term is not economic conditions, but public perceptions regarding the state of the national economy. As a result, if the 1996 presidential election seems to conform to our understanding of the relationship between economic conditions and political evaluations, it leaves open the question of why aggregate economic expectations became


more optimistic at that particular time. Was it that citizens were responding to a relatively prolonged period of economic good times? That citizens treated the earlier “good” economic news with a healthy dose of skepti- cism? Or was it that deficit reduction efforts by both the Clinton administration and congressional Republicans eased public concerns regarding the long-term consequences of the federal deficit and, consequently, increased economic expectations? Unfortunately, answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this analysis. We would contend, however, that while the outcome of the 1996 elections conformed to predictions based on economic conditions, the timing of the movement from economic uncertainty and pessimism to a more optimistic aggregate view of the economy did not correspond well with traditional, national economic indicators. Despite President Clinton’s successful bid for reelection, it seems that, for post-Cold War presidents, the job of managing the economy has become more difficult than simply controlling inflation and unemployment.

NOTES ‘The Index of Consumer Expectations is made up of the following items:

(1) “Now looking a h e a d 4 0 you think that a year from now you (and your family living there) will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same as now?’’ (2) “Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole-do you think that during the next twelve months we’ll have good times financially, or bad times, or what?” (3) “Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely-that in the country as a whole we’ll have continuous good times during the next five years or so, or that we will have periods of widespread unemployment or depression or what?” The index is scored on a 200-point scale with scores over 100 representing more positive views of the economic future and scores less than 100 representing more negative views.

*In analysis not presented in the text, we used measures of the change in the unemployment rate over the last month and over the last twelve months. Neither variable performed as strongly as the monthly unemployment rate.

3 F ~ r a summary of the presidential forecasting models and their predictions for the 1996 election, see American Politics Quarterly (1996).

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Documents

THE NEW ECONOMY, THE END OF THE COLD WAR, AND PRESIDENTIAL EVALUATIONS