Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

www.elsevier.com/locate/polsoc

Policy and Society 30 (2011) 301–310

The patrimonial value of water: How to approach water

management while avoiding an exclusively market perspective

Iratxe Calvo-Mendieta a,*, Olivier Petit b, Franck-Dominique Vivien c

a TVES-ULCO, University of the Littoral-Cote d’Opale, Dunkerque, Franceb CLERSE-CNRS, University of Artois, Arras, France

c OMI, University of Reims Champagne Ardenne, Reims, France

Abstract

This article proposes an economic alternative to the traditional approach to calculating non-market values of the environment

and natural resources, which we refer to here as ‘‘patrimonial’’. We will first examine the traditional economic approach and its

tendency to apply market categories to the economic valuation of non-market goods and services associated with the environment

and natural resources. We will then move on to examine the way in which the question is perceived within the context of patrimonial

economics by focusing on another form of economic rationality, based on the notion of a shared legacy or patrimony. Lastly, we will

illustrate the tension between market values and patrimonial values in the field of water management and untreated water

distribution infrastructure by analysing the recent evolution of Associations syndicales autorisees (‘‘Authorized Union Associa-

tions’’, or ASAs) in France and their approaches to pricing.

# 2011 Policy and Society Associates (APSS). Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

According to the European Union Water Framework Directive: ‘‘Water is not a commercial product like any other

but, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such’’ (EU 2000, p. 1). Interestingly, the phrase

calls attention to the fact that water has, simultaneously, both a market and a non-market value. Although the text was

published only recently, it illustrates the way in which Europeans have traditionally envisaged water resources. The

aim of this article is to examine from an economic point of view, both theoretically and empirically, some of the terms

of this debate. The objective is to highlight the need to reconceptualize non-market aspects of the economy, which,

paradoxically, have, up until now, largely been thought of in terms of market categories. Water management provides a

good illustration of the need for this change in analytical perspective in that, generally, the values accorded to the

resource, its uses, and the way in which it is conserved, are far from the market ideal. One of the contributions of

patrimonial economics, which will be used here as a theoretical framework, is precisely to show that market and non-

market dimensions co-exist and can be viewed as two interdependent aspects in tension with each other, an

understanding of which is useful in an analysis of concrete situations. In order to illustrate our hypothesis, we will refer

to the French example of the Associations syndicales autorisees (ASA), which manage irrigation and other water

distribution networks, notably for agricultural use in France. We will see, in particular, that the value attributed to water

* Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: i.calvo@univ-littoral.fr (I. Calvo-Mendieta), olivier.petit@univ-artois.fr (O. Petit), fd.vivien@univ-reims.fr (F.-D. Vivien).

1449-4035/$ – see front matter # 2011 Policy and Society Associates (APSS). Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.polsoc.2011.10.006

I. Calvo-Mendieta et al. / Policy and Society 30 (2011) 301–310302

and its use within the framework of the ASAs, has a patrimonial aspect as well as a market aspect. The patrimonial

aspect1 insists on the collective character of water and infrastructure management, placing it within the long-term

perspective of the reproduction of human societies and of the resources on which they depend, a fact which

distinguishes it from the logic of the market.

2. The traditional economic approach used to ‘‘attach a price’’ to nature: an exercise in redefining non-

market aspects in terms of the market?

The question of the economic valuation of the environment and natural resources, both in terms of damage

inflicted on them or profits potentially generated from them, has been of central importance for at least fifty years.

Mainstream economists organize their reasoning according to two steps: (a) they theorize the way a rational

individual – i.e., homo oeconomicus – operationalizes his/her choices. According to his/her preferences (i.e., tastes),

this individual arbitrates amongst the choices by comparing the value of the goods and services. This value is derived

from their marginal utility (i.e., the utility given by the consumption of the latest unit of the given good or service). (b)

An optimal choice will be the one that brings the maximum of utility for a certain amount of money spent – the second

step of neoclassical economic reasoning, which rests on the revealed preferences process and individual values. The

aim is to translate the previously established exchange ratios (i.e., marginal utility ratios) into socially acceptable

prices through a means of exchange (generally money). In order to achieve this, neoclassical economists generally

find their inspiration in market procedures because they see the market as the institution which, through the

expression of competitive prices – resulting from confrontation of supply and demand – coordinates individuals’

optimal choices.

We will first examine how economists envisage the various values associated with the environment and natural

resources, then examine methods of monetary valuation used to attempt to ‘‘give a price’’ to nature.

2.1. The various degrees of economic value associated with nature

Historically speaking, the need to reveal the value of nature emerged relatively late. Indeed, for a very long time,

natural resources were regarded as inexhaustible, free and available to all. The erosion of biological diversity, a

recognition of the fact that human activity had damaged ecosystems, and, in general, the growing awareness of

environmental problems at all levels, encouraged the development of various concepts that could be used to integrate

into the market what had, up until then, been considered as being extraneous to it. Notions used to construct a reference

framework were extremely evocative; for example, in profit and loss analyses of the exploitation of natural resources,

the ‘‘wealth’’ of ecosystems and biological diversity has been foregrounded as the source of ‘‘services’’ to human

populations. Attaching a price to nature involves in the first instance an analysis of the various groups of values, which

in turn enables rational individuals to make their tradeoffs. To apply the typology elaborated by Vivien (2005), each of

these values corresponds to a correlative question:

A value for what? The homo oeconomicus distinguishes between ‘‘use values’’ and ‘‘non-use values’’. The former

correspond to the benefits derived by the individual from nature, be they direct (hunting, fishing, etc.) or indirect (the

use of climatic regulations, for example); the latter are linked to ethical or moral values attached to nature by the

individual, independently of any use to which it can be put. Some economists refer to these as forms of ‘‘existence

value’’.

The second question which is asked to the homo oeconomicus touches on the issue of the dynamic character of his/

her relationship with the environment: in other words, a value for when? Use values, while generally attached to a

current use, can also refer to potential future uses. This situation brings to the fore the notion of ‘‘option value’’, which,

amongst other things, refers to the idea of protecting nature now with a view to exploiting it in the future. But, taking

into account the limitations of our knowledge about the uses to which nature will be put in the future (for example,

1 The English translation of the term ‘‘patrimoine’’ is difficult since the candidates for this translation (patrimony, heritage, legacy) can hardly

cover the whole significance of this term, used here as a concept. We have chosen to use the terms of ‘patrimony’ and ‘patrimonialization’, following

Henry Ollagnon’s definition which conceptually defines ‘‘patrimoine’’ as ‘‘an ensemble of material and immaterial elements focused on a

community which works on maintaining and developing its identity and autonomy by adapting in time and space to an evolving situation (Ollagnon,

2000, p. 339).

I. Calvo-Mendieta et al. / Policy and Society 30 (2011) 301–310 303

which plant, which has no specific use today, will serve as a vaccine tomorrow?), the term ‘‘quasi-option value’’ is

applied.

Lastly, questions can be asked about the identity of end users: a value for whom? The rational individual generally

considers values for himself/herself. But he/she may also consent to pay to enable his/her contemporaries to benefit

from a certain quality or quantity of the environment. This refers to as ‘‘altruistic value’’. Similarly, if the environment

is likely to have a value for future generations, it will be called a ‘‘legacy value’’.

The ‘‘total economic value’’ of nature thus consists of all these different values, which are not always mutually

exclusive. Furthermore, it is often difficult, when carrying out this kind of macro-analysis, to deconstruct that which is

delivered, with the help of currently applied economic methods, into individual price categories.

2.2. Economic valuation methods applied to natural resources and the environment, or how to reduce non-market

aspects to the market

Since the 1950s, a good deal of research has been carried out with a view to developing a method capable of

‘‘revealing’’ the preferences of economic agents for natural resources. Theoretically, for a given good, the price

resulting from a comparison between supply and demand reflects its value. The same type of reasoning can be applied

to water. Ward and Michelsen (2002: 425) assert that: ‘‘Water has economic value only when its supply is scarce

relative to its demand. Whenever water is available in unlimited supply, it is free in the economic sense. Scarce water

takes on economic value because many users compete for its use. In a market system, economic values of water,

defined by its price, serve as a guide to allocate water among alternative uses, potentially directing water and its

complementary resources into uses in which they yield the greatest total economic return’’.

Economists were, for many decades, incapable of developing a price for goods that was not subject to transactions.

However, in applying the notion of ‘‘quasi markets’’, hypothetical situations can be imagined in which agents express

their willingness to pay, or receive, compensation as a means of protecting nature or accepting what it produces. As we

will see, all of these methods, which attempt indirectly to attach a price to nature, are subject to numerous distortions.

They are all implicitly based on the ‘‘commensurability’’ of nature with manufactured goods, which is, ultimately,

tantamount to postulating the possibility of substituting/compensating natural and other goods or assets which are part

of the utility function of economic agents or that constitute their forms of capital.

A certain number of methods for indirectly evaluating the environment have been developed since the end of the

Second World War. The travel costs method is used, notably, to assess the economic value of remarkable natural sites

(Clawson & Knetsch, 1966). Meanwhile, the hedonic price method (Rosen, 1974) is often used as a basis for assessing

damage caused to the environment or, alternatively, evaluating amenities generated by it.

Because these two methods are only applied to specific cases, their scope is limited. Moreover, they are only used to

evaluate use values. The scope of the contingent valuation method (direct method of evaluation), perhaps the one most

frequently used today, is much greater. It is based on the idea of individuals agreeing to pay for an improvement in their

situation, or, symmetrically, agreeing to receive compensation if their situation deteriorates. Faced with a hypothetical

modification of their environment, subjects are requested to fill in individual questionnaires asking them to attribute a

value to that change, and translate this value in monetary terms. The average figure for respondents’ monetary

valuations is taken as the average of the price to pay (or compensation to be received). Furthermore, an econometric

analysis of the data makes it possible to select explanatory variables which can be used to assess the validity of the

study. The results are then aggregated by multiplying the average sum which respondents hypothetically agree to pay

(or receive) by the total population of the sample. The success of the method is largely based on its apparent simplicity.

Nevertheless, contingent valuation is affected by a number of biases which need to be addressed by the authors of the

questionnaire. Naturally, results generated by an open question (‘‘how much would you agree to pay to ensure that the

quality of your tap water remains high?’’) will be different from those generated by a question based on a value scale

(i.e., ‘‘would you agree to pay $1, $10 or $20 to ensure that the quality of your tap water remains high?’’). The choice

of value scale also influences responses (alternatives of $1000, $10,000 and $20,000 could be presented). Furthermore,

to the degree that individuals are faced with a hypothetical situation, it is by no means certain that they would display

the same attitudes in real life as they did in the questionnaire. Lastly, amongst the drawbacks listed by Mitchell and

Carson (1989), the fact should be emphasized that it is difficult to assess the degree to which respondents understand

the question posed. In effect, there is no guarantee that they will all interpret the same words in the same way.

I. Calvo-Mendieta et al. / Policy and Society 30 (2011) 301–310304

3. The need to think in market and non-market terms simultaneously: the contribution of patrimonial

economics

Since the late 1960s, economists, reflecting a need to take into account the non-market aspects of human activity,

have recognized the importance of environmental issues and have integrated them into the analytical framework of

their standard models. Theorists working in this current of thought have used the concept of ‘‘externalities,’’ both

positive and negative. If, as its name suggests, the category designates a value outside the market, it nevertheless

‘‘internalizes’’ that value into the price system. While such prices are not obligatorily market-based (although they can

be used to calculate ‘‘pigovian’’ taxes), the fact that they can be expressed in monetary terms means that they have

value-equivalence with the market sphere. This is a short step away from reducing non-market aspects to categories

applied to the market. This is exactly what advocates of patrimonial economics, whose intention is to demonstrate the

existence of different rationalities within the economic field, refuse to do. Even if the concept of patrimony can be

regarded as a close cousin of common property, the large literature which has emerged since the end of the 1970s on

common property and common pool resources has, most of the time, different roots. For instance, patrimony and

common property cannot be regarded as synonymous or equivalent concepts, since a community can be considered as

the holder of a common patrimony, without the necessity to become the co-owner of property rights. Moreover, all the

works developed by the Bloomington school (Aligica & Boettke, 2009), and more specifically by Elinor Ostrom

(1990), have a fundamentally individualistic approach. They regard collective action processes as the expression of

individual behaviors. In contrast, the methodological framework mobilized by patrimonial economics is much more

holistic.

3.1. The standard analytical perspective: a single rationality at work in the economic field

In spite of the shortcomings mentioned above, the monetary valuation of natural assets is a relatively effective way

of revealing the value of nature. Prior to the 1970s, most assessments simply ignored the variable. As Bontems and

Rotillon (2003) observed, cost–benefit analysis, which from an economic point of view remains the most popular

approach to evaluation, can be thought of in two ways. First, when economic benefits outweigh social costs, the

approach can be used ‘‘technocratically’’ to convince local people impacted by a particular project (a household water

incineration plant, an airport, a railway line, etc.) of that project’s legitimacy by bringing to bear arguments concerning

environmental and social factors. But a perhaps subtler way of using monetary valuations would be to apply it

‘‘democratically’’: by giving citizens and associations the opportunity not only to consult such evaluations but also to

take part in the assessment process itself in order to ensure that their ‘‘preferences’’ are taken into account (Sagoff,

1998). In this framework, society is viewed as a collection of rational individuals all of whom express themselves, in

their own names, according to a procedure defining what they are willing to pay (or receive). Their expression finds

form in their right to vote. This explains the use of the Pareto criterion, a universally accepted criterion if ever there was

one, to classify the various ways of distributing goods allocated within society and to determine which situations are

preferable to others, with the best of them being described as ‘‘optimal.’’ Another approach, that can be described as

‘‘dualist’’ – to be found, for example, in the work of Sen (1982) – analytically separates the behavior of homo

oeconomicus – the consumer intent on maximizing his/her wellbeing – from homo politicus, the citizen equipped with

judgment and a capacity to take on board certain ethical ideas. In this case, two different orders, two types of

rationality confront each other.

Beyond such differences, advocates of the two approaches share the opinion that, in the economic field, the

rationality of the individual is fully, if not exclusively, expressed within the framework of market relations. This is

demonstrated by the fact that, from the perspective of neo-classical analysis, the non-market sphere is a negatively

defined category, a notion sketched out in function of what it is not. This can only be understood in relation to the

market, the ideal of the dominant approach to economic analysis, when it is characterized as presenting a

perfectly level playing field. The analytical category of the non-market sphere applied to (amongst other things)

various environmental issues bears witness to the fact that in the field of economics, that which is external to the

market is generally understood in terms of the market. In this epistemological perspective, which can be defined

as ‘‘auto-referential logic’’ (Godard, 1984), economists faced with the non-market sphere will fall back on the

market by using concepts such as externality and natural capital and applying traditional methods of economic

valuation.

I. Calvo-Mendieta et al. / Policy and Society 30 (2011) 301–310 305

3.2. The contribution of patrimonial economics: a different kind of economic rationality

Reflecting the institutionalist stream of thought, we take a radically different analytical approach which seeks to

describe non-market relations in a positive fashion, relative to the economic concept of patrimony. The notion of

patrimony was introduced in France in the field of the environment in the 1970s during a debate on the role of

economic valuation in water management. The concept really emerged in a survey directed by Ollagnon (1979), the

objective of which was to define the frameworks and modalities required to efficiently manage the Alsace Plain water

table, during which researchers carried out an economic valuation of water as a resource. The researchers found that,

far from easing conflicts between actors as standard economic theory suggests, attempts to express social relations

with the environment using monetary valuations exacerbated conflict between stakeholders. It can thus be posited that

the problem with water – as with the environment in general – is not that it is monetarily undervalued, as postulated in

standard economics, but that there are no institutions capable of managing the resource on a patrimonial basis.

Ollagnon (1979), then, sees patrimony as a set of material and immaterial elements attached to a community, and the

maintaining and developing the autonomy and identity of this community through adapting in time and space to an

evolving situation.

The idea suggested by Godard (1990), who has worked on the notion of patrimony within the institutionalist

framework of convention theory (Favereau and Lazega, 2002), is that the environment suffers from a ‘‘deficit in

legitimacy,’’ torn as it is between the different visions and social orders in which it is inscribed. In other words, the act

of attaching a price to a non-market environmental object is not neutral; in fact, it has the effect of inscribing that object

into a specific framework of legitimacy, into a ‘‘market order’’ opposed to other equally legitimate visions and social

orders. In fact, as Polanyi (1944) pointed out, a number of economic rationalities are at work in human societies, a fact

reflected by the various ways in which scarce resources are allocated. The hypothesis that we would like to advance

here is that patrimonial relations exist alongside market relations. Economic agents must not be conceptualized as

mere examples of homo oeconomicus, selfish agents and ‘‘rational fools’’, to take Sen’s expression (Sen, 1982). It is

important to consider them as members of different human communities: families, nations, social groups, and even

humanity at large. The concept of patrimony – which can be used at different scales, from family patrimony to

common heritage of mankind – translates this sense of belonging and attachment of individuals to various

communities, embedded in time and territories.

These patrimonial relations are economic relations, including relations of production, exchange and distribution,

the objective of which is to ensure the survival of human groups in space and time. They concern patrimonial objects

and goods that are recognized for their importance in terms of the reproduction, both physical and in terms of identity,

of these groups. The exchange and distribution of goods within patrimonial communities is based on establishing

patrimonial values which, as in the case of (neoclassical) utility-value, correspond to the definition of classes of

subjective equivalence used by individuals in order to guarantee relationships of solidarity characterizing the

community.

A second step of the reasoning consists in translating these patrimonial values into monetary terms. Thus, for

example, Barthelemy (2005) has shown that, in Europe, contemporary agriculturalists form patrimonial communities

that are defined according to certain legally recognized criteria of belonging focusing on relationships between

different generations of farmers. In order to do this, the agriculturalists share patrimonial goods – notably production

rights – according to rules of solidarity that are defined nationally, and by referring to values which vary according to

the status of the individuals with whom exchanges are made (for example, in a family transaction, the price of land will

be lower than it would be in other kinds of transaction).

Another of our hypotheses, also inspired by the work of Polanyi, is that, in modern societies, economic relations are

structured by a dialectic between market relations and patrimonial relations. On the one hand, individuals act within a

framework of market relations as producers or individual consumers in order to maximize their wellbeing. On the

other, they act within a framework of patrimonial relations with a view to reproducing those relations. This dialectic

finds a concrete expression in institutionalized compromises: negotiated rules which vary in time and space,

guaranteeing the articulation of the market and patrimonial aspects of goods and people within the sectors under

consideration. Thus, still referring to examples provided by Barthelemy, the status of milk quotas (considered as

patrimonial goods), which, in Europe, takes the form of a compromise between individual and collective management,

varies from country to country: very close to the market management model in the United Kingdom, but distributed

free of charge in France to certain sections of the population.

I. Calvo-Mendieta et al. / Policy and Society 30 (2011) 301–310306

4. The management and pricing of water at the interface of the market and non-market spheres: the case

of Associations syndicales autorisees (‘‘Authorized Union Associations’’) in France

Attempts have been made in a number of studies to apply the analytical framework of patrimonial economics to

water, notably, in those studies focused on the evolution of water policy in France since 1960’s (Calvo-Mendieta, Petit,

& Vivien, 2010a, 2010b; Petit & Romagny, 2009). This section features an analysis of the case of the Associations

syndicales autorisees, or ‘‘Authorized Union Associations’’ (ASAs). These associations are particularly interesting

with regard to patrimonial economics in that, in both their underlying concept and their manner of functioning, they are

characterized by the co-existence not only of individual and collective aspects, but also of market and patrimonial

logics. Indeed, an analysis of the evolution of ASA pricing policies renders this dialectical tension increasingly

apparent.

Box 1 The French structure of water management.

Water management in France is based on three principles: the river basin as the operational scale of

management, a decentralized organization and the polluter/user pays principle.

French water policy is defined and coordinated at the national level, but implemented in a decentralized way.

The 1964 Water Law defined the water basin as the pertinent scale of water management. In each of the 6

French river basins (in Metropolitan France), the decision-making authority is vested in a Water Board that

brings together water users, representatives of public administrations, and representatives of regional and

local authorities. Water management plans (defining priorities, objectives and actions) are multiannual in

scope and are designed at two scales: the basin scale (by the Water Boards) and the sub-basin scale (by Local

Water Boards).

Private property of water is the exception in France (as in most European countries), but even in this case

water use is strongly constrained by regulatory authorities. Under the control of Water Boards, Water

Agencies are the cornerstone of the water French system: they levy charges from water users and contribute

to funding of public works to limit water pollution. Thus, financial specific resources are mutualized at the

basin scale.

4.1. A patrimonial community of landowners managing a common good

The need to carry out costly work on water distribution infrastructure (construction, improvements and

maintenance of irrigation networks) has prompted agriculturalists around the world to pool their resources.

Communitarian irrigation organizations have existed in various European countries (Spain, France, the Netherlands,

Portugal) for hundreds of years. Such organizations are responsible, amongst other things, for maintaining irrigation

canals and the equipment associated with them. These traditional institutions take a variety of different forms –

assemblies, communities, or, on the other side of the fence, consumer associations – with some organized along more

formal lines than others. In France, Associations syndicales autorisees (ASA), defined by the law of 1865, are

associations set up by land owners and authorized by the State. Their legal status was introduced with a view to

meeting the need to finance the renovation of irrigation infrastructure (sometimes dating back to the Middle Ages) and

share maintenance costs.2 The general assembly of landowners (which elects its own decision-making officials – union

official and director) draws up statutes and votes on the geographical area for which the ASA is responsible, and which

is subject to public enquiry. The ASA is then officially recognized by the Prefect (i.e., the representative of the State) as

a public establishment. There are approximately 1860 ASAs in France (almost 1000 manage old canals conveying

water by gravity; the others manage canals equipped with pumping stations), covering 20% of the country’s irrigated

land (Garin & Loubier, 2002). The public authorities regard these organizations as instruments of regional

development, a fact reflected in the principles described in the legal texts by which they are governed (Garin &

Loubier, 2002):

2 It should nevertheless be pointed out that, from the outset, infrastructure was not exclusively used to distribute untreated water for irrigation

purposes and that the ASAs can also take responsibility for drainage, sanitation and, more widely, the distribution of untreated water for a variety of

different uses (Garin, Montginoul, & Ruf, 2003).

I. Calvo-Mendieta et al. / Policy and Society 30 (2011) 301–310 307

- e

(l

ligibility for public funding for investments.

- d

efense of long-term collective investments (membership of an ASA is dependent on owning land).

- s

eparation of roles between director (authorizing officer) and accountant (collector).

- b

alancing the budget, monitoring on the part of the public authorities.

- a

utonomy in terms of defining operating rules.

This last principle explains the characteristics of most interest to us here, characteristics which will enable us to

argue that ASAs form a patrimonial community managing a common good (water, water distribution infrastructure)

on a decentralized basis. At the same time, the dialectic between the individual and the collective identified in the

preceding section is well established in that, while ASAs manage shared resources, their members form a community

of private owners. Although they are recognized by the public authorities, ASAs have a high degree of autonomy in

terms of the operational approaches they choose to apply: relations between members, rules governing how water

should be distributed, pricing, rules concerning monitoring procedures and sanctions, etc. Individual ASAs draw up

their own operational rules, taking into account the various social, economic, hydrographic and cultural contexts in

which they function. Insofar as pricing is concerned, the vast majority of ASAs apply a flat rate (based on surface area),

independently of water and land use, since most management costs are not dependent on the number of water towers in

the territory for which they are responsible.3 However, this organizational approach is being called into question by

evolutions in water use to which ASAs are trying to adapt.

4.2. New values, new uses: market and non-market aspects of the multi-functionality of irrigation systems

For around 30 years, irrigation systems have been affected by thoroughgoing transformations in the agricultural

industry in France (Ghiotti & Riviere-Honegger, 2011; Ladki et al., 2011) and the ASAs are faced with socio-

economic difficulties which threaten their very existence.

Canal networks, which have contributed so much to economic development, particularly in the south of France,

have been affected by economic, social and political change: shrinkage in the agricultural sector (and the fall of

employment in that sector, which accounted for 20.6% of French jobs in 1962 but only 4.3% in 1999)4; growing

urbanization and peri-urbanization (urban households built on what was formerly agricultural land); a decrease in

public subsidies for irrigation; uncertainty caused by the globalization of markets and European agricultural policy;

and the new regulatory constraints described in the European Water Framework Directive. The irrigation of

agricultural land is not the only use of water contributing to regional development; ‘‘environmental’’ uses (protecting

ecosystems; supporting low flow levels, etc.), and recreational (leisure parks, fishing, rambling) and urban uses are also

playing an increasingly important role, reflecting the evolution of society and its values.

For the ASAs, these new uses pose new problems and create new areas of responsibility (the security of goods and

people; contributing to countryside amenities; safeguarding water supplies, etc.) which generate additional costs

which the ASAs are not able to cover on their own. This situation calls into question the operational conditions and

continued existence of ASAs. Indeed, these organizations are now attempting to adapt to the new environment by

reappraising their management and organizational approaches (relations between members, shared values,

distribution of responsibilities, etc.).

Faced with these evolutions, some ASAs, after re-examining approaches to coordinating the activities of various

actors, are considering the possibility of modifying their pricing policies in order to take into account new water uses

and maintain their networks when they are not being used. In the final analysis, this transition reflects the multi-

functionality of irrigation systems which, according to Ladki (2010: 26), can be described as ‘‘the ensemble of

purposes (or functions) that the actors in a given territory agree to allocate now (or which they may want to develop in

the long-term) to the water network and to water infrastructure and approaches to irrigation in the plot constituting the

irrigated system.’’ Within the framework of the ASAs, the multi-functionality of irrigation systems is characterized by

two aspects: market and non-market. The market aspect corresponds to untreated water services offered by ASAs,

3 Note that financial contributions are made by owners or tenants of land situated within the territory for which the ASA is responsible

andowners whose land is situated within this territory are obliged to become members of the ASA).4 INSEE (2007).

I. Calvo-Mendieta et al. / Policy and Society 30 (2011) 301–310308

which can cover different types of use, for which consumers pay. The non-market aspect corresponds to external

effects (either positive or negative) generated by irrigation systems (contribution to minimal acceptable flow levels,

rain drainage, forest fires, etc.). We will examine these two aspects by means of an analysis of the pricing structures

implemented by most ASAs and the modifications applied to those structures with a view to including a patrimonial

dimension within their overall approach.

4.3. A pricing system influenced by market and patrimonial aspects: two examples

First, it is useful to recall that although ASAs are not involved in any form of commercial activity (they do not sell

anything) they are responsible for sharing costs amongst their members (according to criteria independently defined by

each ASA)5 in order to balance their books.6 In this regard, the primary function of charges levied by the ASAs on their

members is to recover costs, which, in fine, reflects a market-based approach. In effect, ASAs base their pricing

systems on costs (production and maintenance costs). The influence of patrimonial aspects on pricing can be illustrated

by means of two examples: the first concerns ASAs managing canals conveying water by means of gravity; the second

concerns ASAs which run canals equipped with pumping stations.

In the first case, ASAs generally levy a charge per hectare. Individual ASAs calculate total annual charges and

divide them by the area covered, thus arriving at price to be paid by landowners per hectare. It should be noted, in this

context, that rather than fixing prices, ASAs apply pre-defined methods of calculation. Thus, if there is an explosion at

a canal which causes damage requiring extensive repair work, a ‘‘charge for services rendered’’ can be levied.

However, depending on the uses to which water is put, a distinction is sometimes applied between agriculturalists and

individuals not associated with the agricultural sector, these last paying much more expensive charges.7

A certain number of ASAs which run gravity-based canals are reappraising their pricing policies in order to address

the following issues:

- M

p

w

w

m

(a

odernizing infrastructure (notably, intakes).

- R

eplacing open-air canals with underground canals (to avoid water loss through evaporation).

- C

onversion to the use of pumping stations (to meet ‘‘urban’’ demand).

All these modernization projects, which should (theoretically) generate water savings, are being carried out in order

to meet the requirements of the European Water Framework Directive, in terms of the ensuring the good quantitative

status of water bodies by 2015.8

Generally speaking, environmental services delivered by gravity-based irrigation networks can be used as a key to

reappraising ASA pricing systems by levying charges on water consumers benefiting from those services without

contributing financially to the maintenance of those networks. In effect, it is estimated that gravity-based networks are

not very efficient: 20–25% of water taken from rivers is used for irrigation while the rest either evaporates, filters into

the water table, goes back to the river, or sustains ecosystems.

In the second case, in ASAs running canals using pumping stations, which have focused a little more on pricing

issues, the following approaches can be distinguished:

- F

ixed prices calculated on the basis of fixed units (per hectare or unit of quantity).

- V

ariable charges based on variable units (cubic metre consumed, for example, or the number of hours in which water

is available, or the number of hectares under irrigation).

5 Some ASA managers justify levying much higher charges for non-agricultural consumers by applying a ‘‘solidarity principle’’ which makes it

ossible to keep charges for agriculturalists at an ‘‘acceptable’’ level.6 Conversation of March 15, 2011, with Marc Polge, of ASA Info, a consultancy firm providing information and training services for ASAs (http://

ww.asainfo.net/).7 In the case of the Canal de L’abbe ASA located in the Herault departement, individuals not involved in the agricultural sector pay a watering tax

hich is twice as high as the irrigation tax paid by agriculturalists (Ladki, 2010).8 As an example, it should be pointed out that the Canal de Gignac ASAwas found guilty in 2005 by the water monitoring board for not respecting

inimal levels of flow. This constraint will become more important in the future with the application of the Law on Water and Aquatic Milieus

dopted in France in 2006) which stipulates an increase in these flows beginning in 2014 (Ghiotti & Riviere-Honegger, 2011).

I. Calvo-Mendieta et al. / Policy and Society 30 (2011) 301–310 309

Some ASAs managing canals which convey water by means of gravity, for example in the Lot departement, are

faced with the fact that there are no longer any requirements for water in certain areas (former agricultural plots which

have been built on; land belonging to retired farmers). Current pricing practices involve paying the owners of plots

which do not require water but which are nevertheless located within the territory for which the ASA is responsible,

while not distributing water to the owners of plots located outside that territory. To resolve this problem, Robert

Roussies, Director of the Lot ASA Union, suggests introducing a new charge, based on the plot located within the

ASA’s territory, regardless of water use. This would be in addition to (or subtracted from) the use-based charge (taxe

syndicale). He also suggests that this new charge should be referred to as a ‘‘patrimonial charge,’’ a ‘‘territory charge’’

or a ‘‘non-use charge.’’ Serving as a financial contribution to the maintenance of the network, this ‘‘patrimonial

charge’’ would be paid by those landowners not supplied with water but nevertheless located within the ASA’s

perimeter.9 Amongst other arguments used to defend this change in pricing policy, presented as a ‘‘win-win’’

arrangement, is the need for ‘‘a collective recognition of the fact that irrigation systems are of central importance in

terms of regional development’’ and for ‘‘a process of valorisation’’ (Roussies, 2011: 11). However, this aspect,

defined as ‘‘patrimonial’’, hides a market aspect to the degree that landowners paying this new charge would, in return

for cheaper prices (temporarily) cede their rights to water which other consumers could then use. The objective,

therefore, is not only to take into account the ‘‘non-use’’ of water, but also to find a way of sharing rights over water

which is not being used by applying an approach which cleverly combines the market and patrimonial spheres.

5. Conclusion

Structural modifications to ASAs are currently being applied on two levels. Canals conveying untreated water,

originally destined for irrigation purposes, are increasingly being used to supply ‘‘urban’’ and ‘‘environmental’’ needs

rather than traditional agricultural ones. However, to the degree that agriculturalists retain important decision-making

powers within ASAs, the associations’ governance structures have not reflected these changes.

Nevertheless, the two examples referred to in this article, which illustrate a number of ways in which patrimonial

values associated with water and water infrastructure can be appropriated, call for the implementation of new means of

solidarity over and above the internal functioning of ASAs, which require a more open dialogue between irrigation

communities and other actors in society. As Ladki observes (2010: 311, note 229),

9 Ho

questio

equity

‘‘[. . .] valorising multi-functionality also implies a new way of thinking about how canals can be used. In effect,

it is a question of broadening the identity-based relationship between the circle of agriculturalists and other

actors associated with canals and water distribution (individual members, environmentalists, collectivities,

industrialists, etc.) and creating the basis of a new legitimacy for ASAs, the guardians of this patrimony. That

would require that ‘‘actors respect a shared set of rules [. . .] and, in certain situations, a common system of

representations or values’’ (Gilly & Lung, 2005: 6). Behind this arrangement between actors, a compromise is

being elaborated, a compromise based on reciprocal concessions.’’

Beyond these organizational aspects, the question arises as to how to integrate patrimonial values associated with

water and water infrastructure into current pricing systems. While this question is of central importance in terms of the

current and future evolution of the cases studied in this article, it largely surpasses the field of patrimonial economics.

Indeed, it provides, for the moment, a primarily analytical approach to certain phenomena (including the management of

and pricing systems applied to untreated water) that accentuate the need to analyze non-market aspects positively, from

the perspective of patrimonial economics.

More generally, it can be observed that the market approach cannot entirely explain pricing structures in the water

sector because these structures are the result of institutionalized compromises between market-based economic

efficiency (translated by cost recovery) and equity-based criteria, the definition of which depends on power relations

within collectives. The patrimonial value of water resulting from these processes of arbitrage between the economic,

social and political spheres fully justifies our argument that patrimonial economics should be associated with the old

traditions of political economy, while creating the kind of new analytical perspectives we have attempted to outline here.

wever, this ‘‘patrimonial charge’’ is still at the project stage and so a complete analysis is not yet possible. In fact, several operational

ns remain, particularly concerning the way this charge will be determined (amount, distribution, etc.) and the possible effects in terms of

between users or even water use conflicts.

I. Calvo-Mendieta et al. / Policy and Society 30 (2011) 301–310310

Acknowledgments

While retaining responsibility for their views and any errors that may appear in the text, the authors would like to

take this opportunity to extend their thanks to Joel Gallais, Patrice Garin, Stephane Ghiotti, Marwan Ladki and Marc

Polge for making their work available and/or for their comments concerning a previous version of this article.

References

Aligica, P. D., & Boettke, P. J. (2009). Challenging institutional analysis and development: The bloomington school. London: Routledge.

Barthelemy, D. (2005). L’institution d’un patrimoine professionnel en agriculture. In Barrere, C., Barthelemy, D., Nieddu, M., & Vivien, F. D. Eds.

Reinventer le patrimoine. De la culture a l’economie, une nouvelle pensee du patrimoine? (pp. 197–221). Paris: L’Harmattan.

Bontems, P., & Rotillon, G. (2003). L’economie de l’environnement (2nd edition). Paris: Editions La decouverte, Collection ‘‘Reperes’’.

Calvo-Mendieta, I., Petit, O., & Vivien, F.-D. (2010a). Entre bien marchand et patrimoine commun, l’eau au coeur des debats de l’economie de

l’environnement. In G. Schneier-Madanes (Ed.), L’eau mondialisee: la gouvernance en question (pp. 61–74). Paris: Editions La Decouverte,

collection ‘‘Recherches’’.

Calvo-Mendieta, I., Petit, O., & Vivien, F.-D. (2010b). Le patrimoine commun: une autre maniere d’analyser la gestion collective des ressources

naturelles. Le cas de la gestion de l’eau en France. In Maillefert, M., Petit, M. O., & Rousseau, S. Eds. Ressources, patrimoine, territoires et

developpement durable. Vol. 10 (pp.205–218). Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, collection ‘‘Ecopolis’’.Clawson, M., & Knetsch, J. L. (1966). Economics of outdoor recreation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press/RFF Press.

EU. (2000). Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the community action in the field of

water policy, OJ L 327, 22-12-2000, 1–73.

Favereau, O., & Lazega, E. (Eds.). (2002). Conventions and structures in economic organization: Markets, networks and organizations. Cheltenham:

Edward Elgar Publishing.

Garin, P., & Loubier, S. (2002). Durabilite et fragilite des Associations Syndicales Autorisees (ASA) d’irrigation en France. Comptes-rendus de

l’Academie d’Agriculture de France, 88(3), 61–71.

Garin, P., Montginoul, M., & Ruf, T. (2003). Integration du multi-usage de l’eau dans les perimetres irrigues mediterraneens. Revue H.T.E., 125, 44–49.

Ghiotti, S., & Riviere-Honegger, A. (2011). Le contrat de canal: une contribution a un nouveau mode de gouvernance de la gestion de l’eau agricole a

l’echelle locale? Exemple du canal de Gignac (Herault). Colloque international Usages ecologiques, economiques et sociaux de l’eau agricole

en mediterranee: quels enjeux pour quels services? 12pp.

Gilly, J. -P., & Lung, Y. (2005). Proximites, secteurs et territoires. Cahiers du GRES No. 2005-09, 20pp.

Godard, O. (1984). Autonomie socio-economique et externalisation de l’environnement: la theorie neoclassique mise en perspective. Economie

appliquee, 37(2), 315–345.

Godard, O. (1990). Environnement, modes de coordination et systemes de legitimite: analyse de la categorie de patrimoine naturel. Revue

economique, 41(2), 215–241.

INSEE. (2007). Reperes Synthese pour l’economie du Languedoc-Roussillon, No. 1, January, 8pp.

Ladki, M. (2010). Canaux d’irrigation ou canaux de transport d’eau brute? Arrangements institutionnels et strategies organisationnelles autour de la

multifonctionnalite des systemes irrigues gravitaires, Ph.D. Thesis in Management. AgroParisTech, Paris, 735pp.

Ladki, M., Guerin-Schneider, L., Garin, P., & Baudequin, D. (2011). Des canaux d’irrigation aux canaux de distribution d’eau brute? Regarder le

passe pour comprendre le present et preparer l’avenir. Colloque international Usages ecologiques, economiques et sociaux de l’eau agricole en

mediterranee: quels enjeux pour quels services? (pp. 12–).

Mitchell, R. C., & Carson, R. T. (1989). Using surveys to value public goods: The contingent valuation method. Washington D.C. Resources for the Future.

Ollagnon, H. (1979). Propositions pour une gestion patrimoniale des eaux souterraines: l’experience de la nappe phreatique d’Alsace, Bulletin

interministeriel pour la rationalisation des choix budgetaires, No. 36, Paris, La Documentation francaise, 33–73.

Ollagnon, H. (2000). La gestion en patrimoine commun de la qualite de l’eau dans un bassin. In M. Falque & M. Massenet (Eds.), Les ressources en

eau, Droits de propriete, economie et environnement (pp. 325–345). Paris: Dalloz.

Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons. The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Petit, O., & Romagny, B. (2009). La reconnaissance de l’eau comme patrimoine commun: quels enjeux pour l’analyse economique? Mondes en

developpement, No. 145, 2009/1, 29–54.

Polanyi, K. (1944). The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time. New York: Rinehart & Company.

Rosen, S. (1974). Hedonic prices and implicit markets: Product differentiation in perfect competition. Journal of Political Economy, 82(1), 34–55.

Roussies, R. (2011). Interet a bien recenser le perimetre syndical. Interet de son suivi 11pp.

Sagoff, M. (1998). Aggregation and deliberation in valuing environmental public goods: A look beyond contingent pricing. Ecological Economics,

24, 213–230.

Sen, A. (1982). Rational fools: A critique of the behavioural foundations of economic theory. In A. Sen (Ed.), Choice, welfare and measurement (pp.

84–106). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Vivien, F.-D. (2005). La diversite biologique entre valeurs, evaluations et valorisations economiques. In P. Marty, F.-D. Vivien, J. Lepart, & R.

Larrere (Eds.), Les biodiversites – objets, theories, pratiques (pp. 125–140). Paris: CNRS Editions.

Ward, F. A., & Michelsen, A. (2002). The economic value of water in agriculture: Concepts and policy applications. Water Policy, 4, 423–446.