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BYZANTIUM, 1180–1204: ‘THE SAD QUARTER OF A CENTURY’ ?

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NATIONAL HELLENIC RESEARCH FOUNDATIONINSTITUTE OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH

SECTION OF BYZANTINE RESEARCH

INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 22

BYZANTIUM, 1180–1204: ‘THE SAD QUARTER OF A CENTURY’ ?

Edited byA L I C I A S I M P S O N

ATHENS 2015

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Edited by: ALICIA SIMPSON

Word processing-layout: CONSTANTINA SIMONETATOU

Distribution: The National Hellenic Research Foundation48, Vassileos Konstantinou, 116 35 Athensfax: (+30) 210 7273629e-mail: bookstore@eie.gr

© The National Hellenic Research FoundationInstitute of Historical Research48, Vassileos Konstantinou, 116 35 Athens

ISSN 1106-1448ISBN 978-960-9538-37-4

This book forms part of the research project «The Reign of Isaac II Angelos (1185–95): Politics and Society in the Late Twelfth Century», implemented within the framework of the Action «Supporting Postdoctoral Researchers» of the Operational Program «Education and Lifelong Learning» (Action’s Beneficiary: General Secretariat for Research and Technology), and is co-financed by the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Greek State.

CONTENTS

Prologue TAXIARCHIS G. KOLIAS, Director of the Institute of Historical Research 9

Abbreviations 11–12

ALICIA SIMPSON, Perceptions and Interpretations of the Late Twelfth Century in Modern Historiography 13–34

V!"#"$%&"'()*+,, Stronger than It Appears? Byzantium and its European Hinterland after the Death of Manuel I Komnenos 35–48

DIMITRI KOROBEINIKOV, The Byzantine-Seljuk Border in Times of Trouble: Laodikeia in 1174–1204 49–81

TELEMACHOS LOUNGHIS, The Fate of the German-Byzantine Alliance in the Late Twelfth Century 83–95

DEMETRIOS KYRITSES, Political and Constitutional Crisis at the End of the Twelfth Century 97–111

MICHAEL ANGOLD, The Anatomy of a Failed Coup: The Abortive Uprising of John the Fat (31 July 1200) 113–34

ILIAS ANAGNOSTAKIS, ‘From Tempe to Sparta’: Power and Contestation prior to the Latin Conquest of 1204 135–57

KOSTIS SMYRLIS, Sybaris on the Bosphoros: Luxury, Corruption and the Byzantine State under the Angeloi (1185–1203) 159–78

PAGONA PAPADOPOULOU, Coinage and the Economy at the End of the Twelfth Century: !n Assessment 179–94

PAUL MAGDALINO, Money and the !ristocracy (1180–1204) 195–204

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MARIA GEROLYMATOU, Private Investment in Trade in the Final Years of the Twelfth Century 205–20

GERASIMOS MERIANOS, Literary Allusions to Trade and Merchants: The ‘Great Merchant’ in Late Twelfth-Century Byzantium 221–43

KALLIRROE LINARDOU, A Resting Place for ‘the First of the Angels’: The Michaelion at Sosthenion 245–59

NEKTARIOS ZARRAS, A Gem of Artistic Ekphrasis: Nicholas Mesarites’ Description of the Mosaics in the Church of the Holy Apostles at Constantinople 261–82

ABBREVIATIONS

BF Byzantinische ForschungenBMGS Byzantine and Modern Greek StudiesBNJ Byzantinisch–neugriechische JahrbücherBSl ByzantinoslavicaByz ByzantionByzBulg ByzantinobulgaricaBZ Byzantinische ZeitschriftCFHB Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae CSHB Corpus Scriptorum Historiae ByzantinaeDChAE !"#$%&'($)*(+,-.$-/'-0)*(1,2/-&#&3-0)*(( 4$/-,"%/*DÖLGER–WIRTH, Regesten F. DÖLGER, Regesten der Kaiserkunden des Östromischen Reiches, II: Regesten von 1025– 1204, rev. edn. P. WIRTH, Munich 1995 DOP Dumbarton Oaks PapersJÖB Jahrbuch der Österreichischen ByzantinistikLM5 Lexikon des Mittelalters, R. AUTY et al. (eds.), 9 vols., Munich–Stuttgart, 1977–99MGH SRG Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum GermanicarumMGH SS Monumenta Germaniae Historica, ScriptoresMM F. MIKLOSISCH and J. MÜLLER, Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi, 6 vols., Vienna, 1860–90ODB Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, ed. A. KAZHDAN, 3 vols., Oxford–New York 1991PG Patrologiae cursus completus, Series graeca, ed. J.-P. MIGNE, 161 vols., Paris 1857–66PL Patrologiae cursus completus, Series latina, ed. J.-P. MIGNE, 217 vols., Paris 1844–64

!" # $%%&'()$*)+,-

REB Revue des Études ByzantinesTT G. L. F. TAFEL and G. M. THOMAS, Urkunden zur älteren Handels– und Staatgeschichte der Republik Venedig mit besonderen Beziehungen auf Byzanz und die Levante, 3 vols., Vienna 1856–57; repr. Amsterdam 1964VV Vizantiiskii VremmenikZRVI Zbornik Radova Vizantološkog Instituta

MARIA GEROLYMATOU

PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN TRADE IN THE FINAL YEARS OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY

During the last months of 1191 or in the early months of 1192, Genoa sent two plenipotentiaries to Constantinople in order to seek compensation from the Byzantine government for the losses suffered by Genoese subjects in the episode known as the ‘Latin massacre of 1182’, when the future emperor Andronikos I Komnenos (1183–5) launched an attack on the Italian residents of Constantinople. The Constantinopolitan populace joined the troops of Andronikos and forced the Italians to leave the city in haste and to abandon their houses and their movable and immovable properties. Those who did not manage to escape were murdered.1 Ten years later the Genoese sent an embassy to Constantinople to negotiate indemnities. They estimated the material damage and the human losses at 228,000 hyperpyra.2

During the negotiations, the Genoese complained about the kommerkion levied on Genoese ships by the grand logothete Theodore Choumnos3 and by Michael Stryphnos, who at the time held the office of 678($&9(:".$-/,%&;,4 and also by some <'=,>7&- of the emperor, who are

1. NIKETAS CHONIATES, Historia, ed. J.-L. van Dieten, 2 vols., CFHB 11, Berlin–New York, 1975, I, 250–1. For this episode, see now S. NEOCLEOUS, ‘Greeks and Italians in Twelfth-Century Constantinople: Convivencia or Conflict?’, in B. CROSTINI and S. LA PORTA, Negotiating Co-Existence: Communities, Cultures and Convivencia in Byzantine Society, Trier 2013, 229–40.

2. MM III, no. V, 27. 3. On this individual, see J. VERPEAUX, ‘Notes prosopographiques sur la famille

Choumnos’, BSl 20 (1959), 253.4. Later, in 1196 Michael Stryphnos was grand doux of the fleet. Cf. Actes de Lavra, I,

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not identified.5 High-ranking imperial officials seem to have been rapacious during the last decades of the twelfth century, and apart from the case of Michael Stryphnos, whom the sources criticize for his avariciousness, Stephen Hagiochristophorites, probably logothete tou genikou during the reign of Andronikos I, was also notorious for his exactions.6 The distinction made in the Genoese text between the imperial officials and the <'=,>7&- of the emperor becomes more evident in another passage in which the Genoese renounce their claims for every sort of damage caused either by the fisc or by the <'=,>7&- of the emperor. Indeed, the role of the <'=,>7&- of the emperor becomes particularly prominent in the twelfth century.7 These individuals did not usually hold an official position; they were devoted to the interests of their patron (i.e. the emperor) who remunerated their fidelity by assuring them protection, financial support, and probably privileged treatment in matters of taxation. However, there were exceptions. A certain Christopher Kopsenos, magistros, megas chartoularios and anagrapheus of Kos in the early years of the reign of Alexios I Komnenos (1081–1118), signed as ? <'=,>7&*($&9(:/.-#@>*.8

The evidence contained in the Genoese claims strongly suggests that the emperor had his own personal circle of trusted <'=,>7&-, who seem to have had considerable, though unspecified, powers. It is noteworthy

eds. P. LEMERLE, A. GUILLOU and N. SVORONOS, Archives de l’Athos V, Paris 1970, no. 67, 32–3. His notoriety derives from the correspondence of Michael Choniates and from the History of Niketas Choniates.

5. MM III, no. V, 27.6. For Hagiochristophorites, see L. GARLAND, ‘Stephen Hagiochristophorites: Logothete

tou Genikou 1182/3–1185’, Byz 69 (1999), 18–23. For the corruption of high-ranking officials, see the contribution of Kostris Smyrlis to this volume.

7. J.-C. CHEYNET, Pouvoir et contestations à Byzance (963–1210), Paris 1990, 288–90. The term(<'=,>7&- is amply testified in the typikon of the Kosmosoteira Monastery (1152), founded by Isaac Komnenos, a son of Alexios I. Cf. G. K. PAPAZOGLOU (ed.), A;7-0B' C.//0%&; 1#"D%&; E&F'G'&9 $)* F&')* H"&$I0&; $)* E&.F&.>$"%,/* (1151–1152), Komotini 1994, passim. See also N. OIKONOMIDÈS, ‘Liens de vassalité dans un apanage byzantin du XIIe siècle’, in +-$./*0/'() and I. HUTTER (eds.), 5JAKL. Studies in Honour of Cyril Mango Presented to him on April 14 1998, Stuttgart–Leipzig 1998, 257–63 (= Social and Economic Life in Byzantium, ed. E. ZACHARIADOU, Aldershot 2004, XX).

8. M;N/'$-'O P3,/Q/ RS$F&;, II, !GF&.%>' #"-$&;,3T', ed. M. NYSTAZOPOULOU-PELEKIDOU, Athens 1980, no. 54, 24–5.

PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN TRADE "#%

that they, together with high-ranking officials such as the logothete tou dromou and the 678($&9(:".$-/,%&;, had the authority to impose taxation on foreign subjects, in other words to extract money from them. The same distinction between the state and the emperor on the one hand, and the emperor as an individual and his <'=,>7&- on the other, is made in the chrysobull issued by Manuel I Komnenos (1143–80) in favour of Genoa in 1169.9 Genoa, an independent city-state, promised to abstain from forming any alliances against the Byzantine emperor, that is, against the Byzantine state.10 Actually, the Genoese participated in the Lombard League against Frederick I Barbarossa (1152–1190) and Byzantium naturally favoured this.11 Furthermore, the text of Manuel’s chrysobull, indirectly transmitted to us in the chrysobull issued by Isaac II Angelos (1185–95) in 1192, makes a particular note about individual Genoese who might harm the interests of the emperor or his <'=,>7&-. In such cases, the consuls of the city had to take measures as soon as they were notified of any hostile act.12 This is probably an allusion to the ambiguous relationship between Genoese pirates and the city of Genoa.13 If so, the stipulation refers to those Genoese pirates who attacked ships carrying goods belonging to the emperor and his <'=,>7&-, a situation which, as we shall see, was not so unusual given the fact that the Genoese were notorious as pirates during the Middle Ages.14 Whatever the case, it is evident that the <'=,>7&- of the emperor were not confined to the latter’s service but pursued their own interests and activities overseas. The fact that they were close to the sovereign assured them his protection while their imperial connections provided a favourable context for their economic activities.

9. S. A. EPSTEIN, Genoa and the Genoese, 958–1528, Chapel Hill 1996, 84.10. MM III, no. V, 34.. MM III, no. V, 34.11. . R.-J. LILIE, Handel und Politik zwischen dem byzantinischen Reich und den

italienischen Kommunen Venedig, Pisa und Genua in der Epoche der Komnenen und der Angeloi (1081–1204), Amsterdam 1984, 455.

12. MM III, no. V, 34.. MM III, no. V, 34.13. . G. JEHEL, ‘The Struggle for Hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean: An Episode

in the Relations between Venice and Genoa according to the Chronicles of Ogerio Pane (1197–1219)’, Mediterranean Historical Review 11 (1196), 201–2.

14. . K. REYERSON, ‘Identity in the Medieval Mediterranean World of Merchants and Pirates’, Mediterranean Studies 20 (2012), 129–31.

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Despite agreements made with the Byzantine government, frictions with Genoa continued. In November 1192 Isaac II protested strongly against the actions of a Genoese ship, which had attacked the port of Rhodes as well as a convoy of Venetian ships sailing from Alexandria to Constantinople.15 On board travelled the emperor’s diplomatic agents to Saladin (1174–93) and the sultan’s envoys to the emperor;16 Syrian, Byzantine, Genoese, Pisan and certainly Venetian merchants. The aggressors seized the ship’s merchandise, including Saladin’s rich gifts to Isaac II. They later restored the Genoese and Pisan belongings.17 The ship’s patron, Guglielmo Grasso, was known from an earlier attack (1187) on a ship that had also carried presents from Saladin to Isaac, including the Holy Cross.18 Obviously, the exchange of presents was part of the diplomatic rapprochement between the Byzantine emperor and Saladin in view of their common enemy: the western crusaders.19

15. Extensive commentary in . Extensive commentary in A. E. LAIOU, ‘Byzantine Trade with Christians and Muslims and the Crusades’, in A. E. LAIOU and R. P. MOTTAHEDEH (eds.), The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World, Washington DC 2001, 157–9. The author considers the Genoese attack not only in terms of piracy but in terms of diplomacy as well.

16. Gifts normally accompanied the exchange of letters between two rulers. On the . Gifts normally accompanied the exchange of letters between two rulers. On the diplomatic relations between Isaac II and Saladin, see the account given by 1"234$"!5#6'$+1'$%2"##3#, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, trans. D. S. RICHARDS, Crusade Texts in Translation 7, Aldershot 2002, 121–2. For one such letter from Saladin to Isaac II, dated to 1190 and transmitted by the same source, see A. BEIHAMMER, ‘ “Der byzantinische Kaiser hat doch noch nie was zustande gebracht”. Diplomatische Bemerkungen zum Briefverkehr zwischen Kaiser Isaak II. Angelos und Sultan Saladin von Ägypten’, in K. BELKE et al. (eds.), Byzantina Mediterranea. Festschrift für Johannes Koder zum 65. Geburstag, Vienna–Cologne–Weimar 2007, 13–28.

17. MM III, no. VI, 38.. MM III, no. VI, 38.18. . Annali genovesi di Caffaro e de’ suoi continuatori, I, ed. L. BELGRANO, Genoa 1890,

140–1.19. C. M. BRAND, ‘The Byzantines and Saladin, 1185–1192: Opponents of the Third Cru-

sade’, Speculum 37 (1962), 167–81. From the more recent bibliography, see J. HARRIS, Byzan-tium and the Crusades, London–New York 2003, 127–8. On the universalistic ambitions of Isaac II, see P. MAGDALINO, ‘Isaac II, Saladin and Venice’, in J. SHEPARD (ed.), The Expansion of Orthodox Europe, Aldershot 2007, 93–106. For a different approach, see S. NEOCLEOUS, ‘The Byzantines and Saladin: Opponents of the Third Crusade?’, Crusades 9 (2010), 87–106; IDEM, ‘The Byzantines and Saladin: Some Further Arguments’, Al-Masaq 25/2 (2013), 204–21, who disputes an alliance between Isaac II and Saladin against the crusaders.

PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN TRADE "#'

The emperor declared that he was ready to forget about the aggression provided that Genoa paid damages. The loss was estimated, according to the official statement of the victims, at 6,675 hyperpyra for the emperor, 700 hyperpyra for the mystikos, 39,193 hyperpyra for the merchants who were on board, and the staggering sum of 50,000 hyperpyra for the sebastokrator Alexios Angelos, the future emperor Alexios III (1195–1203).20 The total sum amounted to some 96,568 hyperpyra. Isaac emphasized that this sum did not take into account the merchandise not recorded in the list established by the Byzantine authorities since some of the merchants had either perished or had been taken into captivity, and consequently there was no one to estimate the damages they had incurred.21

The same affair is treated in another document of Isaac II to Genoa, which provides additional details that are very useful to our approach. Here we are informed that the Byzantine merchants who had fallen victim to the attack came from Constantinople and were among the most prominent hommes d’affaires of the capital ($O( 7,T$/( $T'( 6'( /U$V( 7,/3F/$";$T'(Q",&F@'&;*).22 This suggests a certain stratification of the mercantile group in the empire’s capital according to wealth. The first indices of this development can be traced to the middle of the eleventh century.23 It was certainly such prominent merchants who, at the end of the twelfth century, purchased honorific titles. Niketas Choniates was quite sceptical and even indignant about the fact that 0&##;:-.$W8—we will come back to this term shortly—simple textile merchants, and even foreigners could be raised to the rank of .":/.$&%.24 It is significant to note that a century after the reform of the system of honorific titles by Alexios I,25 wealth had once again become a criterion for the bestowment of honours. The document addressed by Isaac II to Genoa suggests that at the time wealthy merchants and financiers were influential and consequently could exercise pressure on the emperor to have their demands met.

20. MM III, no. VI, 38–9.. MM III, no. VI, 38–9.21. MM III, no. VI, 39.. MM III, no. VI, 39.""#$%%$&&&$'(#$)&&*$+,##$%%$&&&$'(#$)&&*$+,#%%$&&&$'(#$)&&*$+,# III no. VII, 41.23. See . See M. GEROLYMATOU, 53&,@*, @F7&,&- 0/- "F7I,-& .$& M;NS'$-& (9&*–12&* /-.),

Athens 2008, 237–8 with the relevant notes.24. . CHONIATES, Historia, 483–4.25. . Jus Graeco-Romanum, eds. I. ZEPOS and P. ZEPOS, 8 vols., Athens 1931–62, I, 645.

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The sources of the late twelfth century also make a distinction between the merchant who travelled overseas for his business affairs and the investor who financed commercial enterprises. The document recording the Byzantine claims for the losses suffered in 1192 is explicit on the presence of Byzantine merchants on board.26 According to the text, the Genoese killed all the passengers. However, it seems that this is an exaggeration since a little further in the text it is stated that not all the losses had been recorded, since some of the merchants had perished and therefore no claim could be made on their behalf.27 This means, first, that some of the passengers had indeed escaped and, second, that some of the victims probably had partners residing in Constantinople. It was these partners who presented the claims in their own name as well as in that of the victims. In other words, they were associated in a commenda or a partnership contract.

We will return to such partnership contracts, but for now let us look closely at the well-known case of the investor Kalomodios. His name is otherwise unknown. He was reputed to be an extremely rich man and had launched a great number of overseas enterprises. Choniates describes him as a stingy, miserly person, who was interested in nothing except money.28 Kalomodios himself seems to have been able to provide the capital necessary for his businesses, although it is reasonable to suppose that he also formed partnerships with other investors. According to Choniates, he was essentially a 0&##;:-.$X*, in other words a money changer. Obviously, he had been quite successful in this activity and had reinvested his profits in trade. Indeed, Choniates is explicit on this point, stating that Kalomodios was able to gain gold from gold and silver from silver. In this sense, he was a precursor of the bankers of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.29 Most probably Kalomodios also held the general management of the enterprises he organized. His case is very useful inasmuch as it allows us to follow the

26. MM III, no. VII, 41: MM III, no. VII, 41: III, no. VII, 41: III, no. VII, 41: , no. VII, 41: no. VII, 41: . VII, 41: VII, 41: , 41: Y'=,Z7&;*($)*(:/.-#"%/*(F&; [....](Q@,&'$- [the ship], Y##O(0/8(7,/3F/$";$O*([\>F/%&;*(7&##&]*^

"-#$%%$&&&*$'(#$)&*$./0$III, no. VI, 39: , no. VI, 39: VI, 39: , 39: <'";($T'(F_(`G#>=@'$>'([goods] 6'($a(.GF"-ZF/$-,(b*($T'(62I'$>'(/U$O($T'(Fc'(.Q/3@'$>',($T'(`c(0/$/.2"=@'$>'.

28. On Choniates’ disapproval, see . On Choniates’ disapproval, see A. SIMPSON, Niketas Choniates: A Historiographical Study, Oxford 2013, 277.

29. . D. GOFAS, ‘La banque lieu de rencontre et instrument d’échange à Byzance’, Cahiers du Centre Gustave Glotz 7 (1996), 156.

PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN TRADE "((

123'45(26317('$(5$47689:$6(':;$<=3'>:24*$34$?:4<27@:?$@;$1=:$A((B$(5$1=:$Prefect, to investors—a transformation which was, to a certain degree, the result of the development of the Byzantine economy.

It seems, however, that Kalomodios’ great affluence provoked the envy of his contemporaries.30 Choniates explains that those who surrounded the emperor (&d(7",8($B'(:/.-#@/)—at the time Alexios III—were attracted by ‘the red bronze colour of the coined money’ and decided to take possession of Kalomodios’ property.31 The incident occurred c. 1200. We can safely assume that &d( 7",8( $B'( :/.-#@/ were identical with &d( $&9( :/.-#@>*(<'=,>7&-. Did they act on imperial orders? It seems unlikely, although the emperor must have known their intentions.32 The stipulation in Manuel’s chrysobull to Genoa, namely that the Genoese should refrain from any act against the emperor or his <'=,>7&-, suggests that the latter were active in trade since they were exposed to the risks of piracy. Kalomodios may thus have been a business rival or difficult partner whom the emperor’s <'=,>7&- wished to eliminate. Is it a coincidence that about eight years earlier the then sebastokrator Alexios Angelos had organized, probably through his <'=,>7&-, what seems to have been a commercial voyage to Alexandria?33

At this point something unexpected happened. As soon as the people of the market (Y3&,/e&-) were informed of Kalomodios’ arrest, they gathered in Hagia Sophia and pressed the patriarch John X Kamateros to intervene with the emperor so as to secure Kalomodios’ release. As a result, Kalomodios was set free and, according to Choniates’ statement, his enemies did not manage to take possession of his fortune.34

30. . CHONIATES, Historia, 523: `@`>0" 0/=’f/;$&9 7&##S0-* #/:O* $&e* 2,;.&=X,/-* <,2&;.-' Y'=,Z7>' "g'/- h;GQ"'@.$/$&*.

31. . CHONIATES, Historia, 524: $&9 2,;.%&; [...] $B 7;,>7B' $&i* 7",8 $B' :/.-#@/ "g2"' "j* $,]3G' 6Q"#0;.SF"'&'.

32. It has been argued that Kalomodios had lent money to the emperor himself (cf. . It has been argued that Kalomodios had lent money to the emperor himself (cf. B. JOUDIOU, ‘La fortune et le pouvoir: le modèle byzantin de l’enrichissement’, Studi si Materiale de Istorie Medie 26 [2008], 30). Although this might be true, there is nothing in the text of Choniates that would allow us to make such an inference.

33. As indicated by the sum of 50,000 . As indicated by the sum of 50,000 hyperpyra that Isaac II had requested to be paid to the sebastokrator Alexios for the losses he had incurred in the Genoese pirate attack in 1192.

34. . CHONIATES, Historia, 523–4.

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What is interesting in the case of Kalomodios is, first, the role of those who surrounded the emperor and, second, the solidarity shown by the Y3&,/e&- to the banker. The term Y3&,/e&- designated those who were, in some form or another, active in the Y3&,S, the market. These men identified with Kalomodios and feared that the aggression against him would set a bad precedent whereby others could easily become victims of the arbitrary actions of the imperial milieu. In this context, it is important to note that in the affair of the Genoese pirate attack, the people (`)F&*) had exerted pressure on the emperor (at that time Isaac II) to confiscate the merchandise belonging to the Genoese inhabitants of Constantinople so that the victims of the attack may be compensated. Their insistence, associated with the demand of influential merchants, had pushed the reluctant Isaac II to take measures, admittedly not very effective ones, in order to sooth public indignation.35 Therefore the influential merchants formed a group the emperor had to reckon with. More importantly, the association of interests between Kalomodios and the most important Constantinopolitan merchants on one side, and the ordinary people of the market (money changers, retail merchants, artisans, ship-owners) on the other, suggests that a considerable part of the Constantinopolitan population made a living either: (i) by participating, in some form or another, in enterprises managed by wealthy inhabitants of the capital, perhaps through the investment of lesser sums; or (ii) by buying and selling retail merchandise imported to Constantinople from overseas.

It seems therefore that during the last twenty years of the twelfth century the social and economic role of the merchants and artisans of the capital was reinforced.36 Among these men, money changers (0&##;:-.$/8) held a prominent place. But it was a long process which had led them to this position.37$&'$,,C,D"*$1=:$E:9FGB$4G913'$HI9IJKL249M'$&&$N,,OC–92) is said to have been ridiculed by the Y,3;,&0I7&-( Y3&,/e&- during his sojourn in Constantinople.38 The activities of the twelfth century 0&##;:-.$/8 and

35. MM III, no. VII, 41–2.. MM III, no. VII, 41–2.36. . M. F. HENDY, Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy, c. 300–1450, Cambridge

1985, 590.37. . S. VRYONIS, ‘Byzantine PQRSTUVWXV and the Guilds in the Eleventh Century’, DOP

17 (1963), 287–314. 38. . CHONIATES, Historia, 119–20. On the circumstances of the official visit of the Seljuk

PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN TRADE "()

Y,3;,&0I7&- greatly surpassed those of their tenth century colleagues.39 They were no longer restricted to money changing and to the trade of precious objects, and were now mainly involved in lending money as well as in financing commercial enterprises.

The aggression against Kalomodios was surely emblematic but it was not unique. It seems that incidents with merchants or bankers who fell victim to the rapacity of corrupt officials were numerous at the end of the twelfth and in the first years of the thirteenth century. Choniates relates the story of a certain John Lagos, commander of the prison at the Praetorium. Lagos, in order to satisfy his avidity as well as the demands of those who had helped him acquire his position, robbed peaceful citizens of their movable property with the aid of released prisoners who broke into the victims’ homes. Among his victims was a certain Y3&,/e&* who was abused by the men of Lagos. This act provoked the ?FI$"2'&' (those who shared the same art) of the victim to revolt.40 These cases reveal, on the one hand, the profound corruption of both the civil administration and the imperial milieu, and on the other, the solidarity shown, by those active in the domain of trade and economic transactions, to their colleagues.

To gain a better idea about the expansion of the practice of investing money—directly or indirectly—in trade, we should turn to canon law. Theodore Balsamon, in his commentary on the seventeenth canon of the First Ecumenical Council (325), condemned the churchmen who practiced undercover usury. Since the first century AD lending with interest had been repeatedly forbidden to churchmen.41 But it seems that the practice never stopped. Lending can be considered as a form of investment that had the advantage that it was safer than other investments, for example partnerships.42 Despite the strict prohibition imposed by canon law,

sultan to Manuel I Komnenos, see the classic study of C. CAHEN, La Turquie pré-ottomane, Istanbul–Paris 1988, 37–41.

39. On the . On the trapezitai (money changers) in the tenth century, see Das Eparchenbuch Leons des Weisen, ed. and trans. J. KODER, CFHB 33, Vienna 1991, § 3.

40. . CHONIATES, Historia, 525–6.41. . G. RHALLES and M. POTLES, L]'$/3F/ $T' ="%>' 0/8 d",T' 0/'I'>', 6 vols., Athens

1852–59; repr. 1966, II, 59–60 (forty-fourth canon of the Synod of the Holy Apostles). Cf. RHALLES and POTLES, L]'$/3F/, III, 344–5.

42. . A. E. LAIOU, ‘God and Mammon. Credit, Trade, Profit and the Canonists’, in N.

! MARIA GEROLYMATOU"(*

clerics seem to have been particularly interested in this type of investment. According to Balsamon’s commentary, it was common for clergymen to lend money on the pretence that they were partners in enterprises. Obviously, it was not illegal for clerics to invest in partnerships.43 In this way, clerics complied with the letter but not with the sense of the law. Balsamon’s commentary makes clear that the demand for capital was high and that clerics were potential investors. The fictitious character of these partnerships was revealed by the fact that, according to the contract, the clergyman would participate in the share of profits, but not in the share of damages.

However, it was absolutely against the rules of partnership (0&-'>'%/) that a member was to share only in the profits and not in the damages. In the Ecloga it was established that each member of a partnership would participate both in the profits and in the damages according to his contribution in capital and/or labour.44 The only case in which a partner could be released from his share of losses was if he contributed personal labour equal to the loss or if he travelled alone.45 Obviously, this was not the case with clerics. On the contrary, the liability of only one partner to the risks entailed in a commercial enterprise was a fundamental feature of the loan. The lender was to recuperate his capital as well as the interest arranged in advance whatever the final outcome of the enterprise.46 One can imagine that both lenders and borrowers found a good compromise in these fictitious partnerships. Clergymen avoided the risk of partnership and merchants could eventually borrow money at a lower interest rate than that

OIKONOMIDES (ed.), A& M;NS'$-& 0/$S $&' 12& /-. E/'&'-0I `%0/-&, 0,S$&* 0/- 0&-'>'%/, Athens 1991, 261–300.

43. . RHALLES and POTLES, L]'$/3F/, II 153: `-`I/.- 3O, 7,I* $-'/* Y,3],-/, 0/8 .;FQ>'&9.- $&.X' `" F",%`/ 60 $&9 0@,`&;* /U$&i* #/F:S'"-', $B' `c 0%'`;'&' 67-3-3'Z.0".=/- 7/,O $T' #/F:/'I'$>' /U$S∙ 0/8 $V Y#G="%k ̀ /'"-.$/8 l'$"*, 0&-'>'&8 #@3"=/- .2GF/$%N&'$/-. See also LAIOU, ‘God and Mammon’, 272–3.

44. . Ecloga. Das Gesetzbuch Leons III. und Konstantinos’ V., ed. L. BURGMANN, Forschungen zur byzantinischen Rechtsgeschicchte 10, Frankfurt 1983, § 10.4.

45. . O. MARIDAKI-KARATZA, ‘Legal Aspects of the Financing of Trade’, in A. E. LAIOU (ed.), The Economic History of Byzantium From the Seventh to the Fifteenth Century, 3 vols., Washington DC 2002, III, 1115.

46. . LAIOU, ‘God and Mammon’, 272–3.

PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN TRADE "(+

authorized by civil law, which was fixed at 8.3% for normal loans and 16.6% for maritime loans.47

There is further, indirect evidence that churchmen invested in trade. A prostagma of Manuel I, dating either from 1151 or 1166,48 contains provisions about clerics who exercised the profession of money-changers and were owners of 0/$/##/0$-0O($,/7@N-/.49 The emperor stipulated that clergymen who had acquired 0/$/##/0$-0O($,/7@N-/ by purchase had to hand them over (6'/##/3)'/-($/9$/) to a respectable Byzantine (YD-I#&3/(0/8(m>F/n0O(7,I.>7/).50 The underlying reason for this provision was the fact that, in cases where a crime was committed pertaining to money, the clerics could not be punished corporally.51 It has been argued that Manuel, in agreement with the patriarch Luke Chrysoberges, attempted to force clerics to abstain from engaging in a series of secular occupations such as 0S7G#&-, F;,"o&8 (perfumers), .;'X3&,&- (advocates), 0/$/##S0$/- (money changers), and even doctors, who seem to have been abundant in the twelfth century.52 The imperial prostagma ordered that the eparch had to appoint as $,/7"N%$/* the persons recommended by the clerics without any kind of forfeit tax.53 But it would have been curious if clerics had been forced to hand over the 0/$/##/0$-0O($,/7@N-/, without receiving at least the price they had paid in order to acquire them, especially if we take into account that they had acquired them by purchase (6D(Y3&,/.%/*). Thus it may be that clerics did not have to actually renounce their ownership of such 0/$/##/0$-0O($,/7@N-/ but rather to stop running them personally. Balsamon, commenting on the ninth canon of the Council in Troullo (692),

47. On interest rates, see ibidem. On interest rates, see ibidem, 275–7.48. . DÖLGER–WIRTH, Regesten, no. 1384. 49. On the material side of these . On the material side of these $,/7@N-/, see HENDY, Studies, !"#$%%50. . RHALLES and POTLES, IV, 469; cf. E. PAPAGIANNI, ‘YZ[WU\Z]R\^\_ TVX ̀ ZVaSU\bRc^\_

TSdR[Tc_ e^VdfSghd\[_ WSi jbkV^W[^Si TghUSb’, R,/0$-0S !p 7/'"##G'%&; [q.$&,-0&9 L;'"`,%&;, Thessaloniki 1983, 152–3.

51. It is evident that Balsamon alludes to the crimes associated with the profession . It is evident that Balsamon alludes to the crimes associated with the profession of $,/7"N%$G* or 0/$/##S0$G* as they are described in the Book of the Eparch (cf. Das Eparchenbuch, § 3).

52. PAPAGIANNI, ‘YZ[WU\Z]R\^\_ e^VdfSghd\[_’, 149–50.53. The formulation of the text: . The formulation of the text: 0/8 .Q,/3%.r [the eparch] $,/7"N%$/* Y'$’ /U$T' [the

clerics], 0/$O ̀ >,"S', 0/8 <'"; .;'G="%/* 0/8 ̀ I.">* &d/.`X$-'&* reflects the prohibition placed on the eparch to extract anything from these persons.

! MARIA GEROLYMATOU"($

affirms that although clergymen were forbidden to operate a 0/7G#-0B'(6,3/.$X,-s', they were allowed to own one.54 This must have been the case also with 0/$/##/0$-0O( $,/7@N-/, and in later centuries we know that monasteries were permitted to own these.55 One has to keep in mind that the Byzantines condemned direct involvement in a business that was not considered respectable, but not the profit derived from it. In this sense, clerics could freely invest in such businesses provided they did not get involved in them personally.

In eleventh century jurisprudence, the argyropratai, who bought and resold objects made of precious metals, and financiers could lend at a rate of 11.1% while ordinary individuals could lend at 8.3%.56 It is not certain if the rate of 11.1% was maintained in the twelfth century. It is possible that it was more practical to adopt a rate of 8.3% for all laymen independent of their status, with the exception of those involved in maritime loans.57 According to Balsamon, the interest rate that could be charged by a member of the aristocracy was four nomismata for every litre of gold, in other words 5.5% while merchants and ordinary individuals could charge 8.3%.58 However, it could also be that members of the upper class were concerned by this rate of 8.3%. Apart from churchmen, who, in spite of the prohibition, did not stop lending money at an interest, aristocrats probably also thought that it offered them an opportunity to invest their capital. Although traditionalists were rather reserved about lending since it was risky, members of the social elite were tempted to invest part of their capital to finance merchants.59

54. . RHALLES and POTLES, L]'$/3F/, III, 327. Balsamon does not hesitate to affirm that "j 3O, 0/$O `".7&$"%/' P2"- 0/7G#-0B' 6,3/.$X,-&' 0/8 7,B* f$@,&;* $&9$& 60`%`>.-, 0/-'B' &U0 P.$-.

55. Actes de Lavra, III, ed. P. LEMERLE, A. GUILLOU, N. SVORONOS and D. PAPACHRYSSAN-THOU, Archives de l’Athos X, Paris 1979, no. 123, 105–6.

56. . Peira of Eustathios the Rhomaios in ZEPOS and ZEPOS, JGR IV, §19.1.57. . LAIOU, ‘God and Mammon’, 278–80.58. This was the official rate authorized by the Justinianic Code. In the twelfth . This was the official rate authorized by the Justinianic Code. In the twelfth

century, Balsamon refers to the same rate of 5.5% for senators while he explains that &d 0&-'&#/t$/- 7,/3F/$";$/8 (laymen merchants) and &d #&-7&8 were authorised to charge the uF-"0/$&.$-/%&;* ($I0&;*), explaining that this meant six nomismata for a litre of gold, that is, 8.3% (RHALLES and POTLES, L]'$/3F/, V, 451–2). See the extensive commentary in LAIOU, ‘God and Mammon’, 277–8.

59. . KEKAUMENOS, Strategikon, trans. D. TSOUNGARAKIS, 3rd edn. Athens 1996, 165–7.

PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN TRADE "(%

It seems quite probable that the official interest rate for them, the 5.5%, had been abandoned. In a period of growing demand for capital, nothing prevented them from lending at the usual interest rate or even at a higher rate in cases where there were no other potential financiers. At the same time, one can certainly assume that members of the aristocracy could easily lend through their <'=,>7&-, thus bypassing the legislation.

Apart from lending, there were also other ways for individuals to invest in trade. The classical 2,"&0&-'>'%/, where one partner invested money or merchandise (the 6'=X0G) and the other his labour,60 had never ceased to exist. We know that in 1111 a Venetian merchant paid 125 hyperpyra to a Byzantine silk merchant and that this represented the latter’s share of profits after a voyage overseas.61 The silk merchant must have provided the Venetian with silk clothes which the latter commercialized in foreign markets. On his return, he paid the Byzantine silk merchant his share of profits. The case must not have been unique. Although there is little written evidence, some Byzantines, particularly wholesale merchants, would have profited from the presence of Venetians and other foreigners in the empire; they cooperated with them and gained from the privileges accorded to them.62

At the same time, we can safely assume that small ship-owners and itinerant merchants invested in trade, though certainly less considerable sums. The case of the captain Katzaris, through whom the metropolitan Michael Choniates dispatched oil and soap to his friend, the cleric Esaias, is perhaps suggestive. Choniates, at the time either located at Andros or Kea, promises to profit from the presence of some other ship from Monemvasia (an allusion to the provenance of Katzaris) in order to send clerical vestements to Esaias, since Katzaris’ ship had sailed before these were made ready.63 This piece of information alludes to the active part taken by some provincials, especially those who had easy access to the sea—but did not have the opportunity to cultivate fertile lands—to invest in trade. It seems

60. . GEROLYMATOU, 53&,@*, 246.61. . L. LANFRANCHI (ed.), Famiglia Zusto, Fonti per la storia di Venezia. Archivi privati

1, Venice 1955, no. 6. 62. . D. JACOBY, ‘The Byzantine Outsider in Trade (c. 950–c. 1350)’, in D. SMYTHE (ed.),

Strangers to Themselves: The Byzantine Outsider, Aldershot 2000, 139–40.63. . Michaelis Choniate Epistulae, ed. F. KOLOVOU, CFHB 41, Berlin–New York 2001,

no. 84, 14–19.

! MARIA GEROLYMATOU"(&

probable that some of these groups had been granted exemption from trade taxes and there is evidence that this was the case with the inhabitants of Monemvasia.64 But there may have been other groups of beneficiaries as well.

In his fundamental synthesis on the Byzantine economy, Michael Hendy supported the idea that the Byzantine upper class was little interested in trade. This was for several reasons, the most important of which were the reservations of the state and the fact that the social and economic context did not favour trade. Therefore the so-called aristocracy, meaning those who could accumulate wealth, would have found it more profitable to reinvest their surplus in land rather than in trade.65 Furthermore, the dominant ideal of self-sufficiency would have also discouraged involvement in trade. But the situation was probably not so black-and-white, and it was not only the great monasteries that engaged in trade between their domains (and probably also coastal markets) and Constantinople.66 Wealthy laymen of aristocratic descent did not reject the opportunities available for profit from overseas commercial enterprises. Indeed, it is more reasonable to assume that they preferred to diversify their investments rather than to be restricted to the possession of immovable property. At the same time, the ideal of self-sufficiency has proven rather elusive.67 But lending at interest was not the only available solution. There were other means to fructify their capital.

The aforementioned case of the sebastokrator Alexios Angelos confirms 1=74$344G6817('#$l=:$$>((?4$@:9('>7'>$1($=74$8:24('*$>((?4$m=7<=$34$m:$=3n:$seen had been seized by Genoese pirates in 1192, were valued at 50,000 hyperpyra. This sum is difficult to explain in terms of provisions for his household.68 It would be more reasonable to suppose that the sebastokrator had profited from the convoy dispatched from Egypt in order to make a massive purchase of luxury (?) goods, which he could then liquidate through his <'=,>7&- in Constantinople or elsewhere. His case was probably not unique. A careful study of the sources shows that the idea of profit was not

64. . H. KALLIGAS, ‘Monemvasia, Seventh-Fifteenth Centuries’, in LAIOU (ed.), EHB II, 885. 65. . HENDY, Studies, 566–8.66. . Actes de Lavra, I, no. 67.67. . A. E. LAIOU, ‘Economic Thought and Ideology’, in EADEM (ed.) EHB III, 1128–9. 68. . M. GEROLYMATOU, ‘L’aristocratie et le commerce (IXe-XIIe siècles)’, Symmeikta 15

(2002), 88.

PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN TRADE "('

at all condemned by Byzantine authors.69 The agents of Alexios Angelos as well as those of other members of the aristocracy concluded transactions in the name of their patrons but were certainly free to act on their own account and for their own profit as well. The sum of the 50,000 hyperpyra requested as compensation by Alexios Angelos may therefore depict not only the sebastokrator’s own personal investment but also that of his <'=,>7&-, who profited from the occasion to trade. Their claims for damages were most probably placed under the umbrella of Alexios’ own claims in order to reinforce them. Already in the tenth century the &j0"e&- of the `;'/$&8 were forbidden to acquire precious raw staffs such as silk so that they would not give them to their wealthy patrons. It is evident that the objective of the prohibition was to keep the `;'/$&8 out of artisanal and, indirectly, out of commercial activities.70 The reason did not probably lay in the prejudices against the involvement of the aristocracy in trade. Rather it seems that in a period of scarcity in raw materials the state desired to protect the artisans against competition from the `;'/$&8 in order to maintain a balance in the market. At the end of the twelfth century, it is obvious that there were no such concerns. The economic model had fundamentally changed and members of the social elite were more eager to invest in trade.

Unfortunately, we have few numerical data about individual sums invested in trade. The evidence provided by the document of Isaac II is extremely useful from this point of view, even if it refers to the cumulative value of goods on board. Let us recall that the total damage from the Genoese pirate attack was estimated at 97,000 hyperpyra. From this, the damages of the Constantinopolitan merchants amounted to almost 40,000 hyperpyra. If we arbitrarily assume that the goods belonged to ten persons, then each merchant would have invested something like 4,000 hyperpyra. This, however, may have also represented the total sum of minor investments from many different individuals. Whatever the case, it is clear that the investments made were not negligible. One has to keep in mind that the community of Genoa estimated the total damage suffered by Genoese residents in the empire during the reign of Andronikos I at 228,000 hyperpyra. In 1200–1, a Venetian wholesale merchant bought in Methone,

69. . LAIOU, ‘Economic Thought’, 1130–2.70. . GEROLYMATOU, 53&,@*, 232–3; EADEM, ‘L’aristocratie et le commerce’, 84–6.

! MARIA GEROLYMATOU""#

in the southern Peloponnese, thirty four migliaia of olive oil from Pisan merchants and paid a price of 1,000 gold coins.71 This can perhaps give us an idea of how important investments could prove. It seems, however, that next to those who invested large sums and reserved for themselves control of the enterprise, there were minor investors, such as small ship-owners, retail merchants (7,/3F/$";$/8), and artisans who certainly invested less considerable sums, but whose fate was closely tied to that of their more wealthy and influential partners. At the end of the twelfth and at the beginning of the thirteenth century these men showed solidarity in the pursuit of their interests. They realized they had to be firm in their efforts to resist the arbitrary and corrupt state administration. In other words, a kind of ‘class’ consciousness was about to emerge. It is possible that if things had continued in the same vein there would have emerged dissensions between them. But the Fourth Crusade and the consequent fall of Constantinople put a violent end to this evolution.

71. . R. MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA and A. LOMBARDO, Documenti del commercio veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII, 2 vols., Turin 1940, I, no. 456.