U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

A Thesis Presented to

the Academic Faculty

BY

SENG Ou

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree in Master of Arts in International Relations

Major in Diplomacy

The Faculty of Social Science and International Relations

PAÑÑ S STRA UNIVERSITY OF CAMBODIA September 2005

ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War and disintegration of the former Soviet Union brought

about the prospect that international peace and security would be ensured by

the United Nations under the leadership of the United States, the single

remaining superpower. Enjoying the status of the largest economy and the

dominant military power, Washington has presumably assumed the

responsibility to arrange the New World Order. Since the first Gulf War, US

involvement in international affairs helps revitalize the UN’s role in ensuring

international peace and security.

However, the responsibility to arrange a New World Order (international peace

and security) or make it consistent with a common value (democracy) is beyond

the sole ability of any international institution or any state, respectively. US

foreign policy did implement the ideal goals only at the very beginning of the

post Cold War era. The United States later adopted a more realistic policy,

abandoning it efforts to support the UN mission and mostly seeking to serve US

interests. Therfore, in order to survive and profit from the post Cold War state

system, foreign policy of any nation should adapt to pragmatic idealism, seeking

to pursue the promotion of its ideal value (democracy) in selective

circumstances.

Examining a number of influential factors and the constraints in the formulation

and implementation of US foreign policies toward China and Iraq during the

Clinton Administration and the Bush Jr. Administration, the study reveals that

Idealism and American exceptionalism influence the formulation of US foreign

policy at the beginning of each new new administration. However, realism often

overides idealism in the implementation process. In their first term, US

Presidents often start with idealistic goals in their foreign policies but later

implement them with realistic policies.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Successful completion of this report is owed to kind contributions, support, and

encouragement from many people. I would like to extend my gratitude,

especially, to Dr. Trond Gilberg (Dean and Professor, Faculty of Social

Sciences and International Relations) for guiding me through the process of

writing my thesis and tirelessly reviewing my report. Dr. Gilberg is admired for

his detailed knowledge in the International Relations field and his strict

requirement for compliance in research principles. Without his advice, this study

would be of lesser value. Moreover, I also would like to express my

thankfulness to the examination committee for providing constructive critiques

on the thesis. All the comments, provided by Dr. SIN Meng Srun, chairperson,

and other distinguished committee members, Dr. Trond GILBERG; Dr.

Raymond LEOS; and Dr. Christina CROOSE, are quite useful in making this

report more clear and concise.

My beloved mother and my family as a whole also deserve my thankfulness and

admiration for their support. They highly value my education and bear many

responsibilities that enable me to pay extra efforts in this study. My friends and

colleagues are also equally important; they encourage and support me in their

possible ways to make this study possible. Last, but not least, I also would like

to extend credit to the scholars, authors, and reporters whose works and reports

are quoted in this thesis.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page ABSTACT ____________________________________________________

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ________________________________________ iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS _________________________________________ iv

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ____________________________________ 1

1. Rationale ________________________________________________ 1

2. Literature Review __________________________________________ 5

3. Research Problem _________________________________________ 12

CHAPTER II: THE INFLUENTIAL FACTORS AND CONSTRAINTS _______ 15

1. The Influential Factors — Domestic Scene ______________________ 15

2. Constraints by External Actors ________________________________ 22

CHAPTER III: POST COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY _____________________ 26

1. The Clinton Administration ___________________________________ 30

1.1. Clinton's China Policy __________________________________ 33

1.2. Clinton's Iraq Policy ____________________________________ 43

2. The Bush Administration _____________________________________ 51

2.1. Bush's China Policy ____________________________________ 54

2.2. Bush's Iraq Policy _____________________________________ 66

CHAPTER IV: HYPOTHESES ANALYSES _____________________________ 77

v

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION _____________________________________ 92

1. The Major Influential Factors and Decision Making ________________ 92

2. American Values and the New World Order _____________________ 97

3. Recommendations for Further Study ___________________________100

SUMMARY IN KHMER _________________________________________ 104

REFERRENCE ________________________________________________119

APPENDIX ___________________________________________________124

Appendix A: US Presidents and their Doctrines during the Cold War ____ 125

US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold-War Era Introduction

~ 1 ~

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

1. RATIONALE

The end of the Cold War has brought to the study of international relations a

new paradigm for analysis. The United States became the only superpower

remaining in the post cold war era. The collapse of the Soviet Union, and

subsequently the Warsaw Pact, made the United States the only superpower

that has military predominance in the world as well as in NATO—the world’s

largest military organization. In the early 1990s, the United States assumed the

responsibility for re-arrangement of the New World Order. Under the UN

umbrella, the United States mobilized international support to wipe out Iraqi

forces in Kuwait and restored the sovereignty of that tiny state in the Middle

East. From the lesson of the First Gulf War, US foreign policy during the Bush

Administration brought about the hope that the Collective Security Principle of

the United Nations can be enforced to counter the act of aggression by any

country against UN member-states.

US military dominance and economic power help the United States play the

leading role in the United Nations and produce political clout for Washington.

Since the United Nations and other important international institutions,

especially the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are dominated

by the United States, any decision made from Washington could have major

effects in the world. US Secretary of State, Colin L. Powell, commented this


~ 2 ~

way: “There is no country on earth that is not touched by America and there is

no country in the world that does not touch America in some way.”1 With these

facts, the study of US foreign policy is significant for scholars seeking to analyze

the complex web of international relations as well as for policy makers and

diplomats trying to devise result-oriented foreign policy and diplomacy.

Foreign policy of any state is determined by 'national interests.' Like human

beings, states are motivated to react according to the hierarchy of needs.

According to Abraham Maslow (in Arens and Boveé, 1994), human beings have

three levels of needs;2 first priority is given to physiological and safety needs. In

order to survive, people need food and a secure place. States, for survival, must

also give first priority to national security. According to Morgenthau (in Roskin

and Berry, 1999), “a nation’s vital national interest is to secure its territory; this

cannot be negotiated away. Other items may be secondary interests.”3 The

secondary priority for human beings is to fulfill social needs and esteem;

consistently a state also needs to be recognized by the community of states and

establish relations with others. This will allow those states to accumulate wealth

through international trade and help its citizens enjoy a high standard of living.

When other needs are fulfilled, human beings seek to actualize the dreams that

are the values or ideals for their lives. For this cause, people may be driven to

pay extra cost for membership in a golf club or own a luxury car. These people

often assert their values or ideals through their sponsorships in community

1 See "Why does diplomacy matter" US State Department’s website, December 12, 2003 <http://future.state.gov/future/why/index.html> 2 See William F. Arens and Courtland L. Boveé, Contemporary Advertising, fifth edition, Richard D. Irwin Inc., Illinois: USA 1994, pp. 124-125 3 Michael G. Roskin and Nicholas O. Berry, IR: The New World of International Relations (Fourth Edition), Prentice Hall New Jersey: USA, 1999 p. 35


~ 3 ~

services programs or their appearance in grand events. States that manage to

secure their territorial integrity and national security, and accumulate enough

wealth, will also seek to actualize the nation’s dreams and try to dominate the

region or the world and re-arrange the world or regional order to be consistent

with their values and principles. The former Soviet Union dreamed to enforce a

world revolution and export communism to the rest of the world. The above

argument helps explain the pattern of goal setting by US foreign policy makers

in the post cold war era. It was perceived that, at the end of the cold war and

the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States could assure its national

security and continue enjoying the status as the world’s largest economy. The

remaining single superpower was released from the perceived threat of

ideological rivalry from the former Soviet Union that brought about the policy of

containment since the presidency of Harry S. Truman. When the containment

doctrine came to an end, new goals could take form. President George Bush Sr.

proclaimed the “New World Order” of which the United States was seen to be

the guarantor. President Bill Clinton brought with his presidency the “expansion

or promotion of democracy” as a foreign policy goal.

However, according to Henry Kissinger, the United States often started with

idealistic goals after major wars but turned to be more realistic afterward4 The

post-Cold-War foreign policy goals of the United States look predominantly

idealistic since the presidency of George Bush Sr. These goals are made

consistent with American values and principles, but they might not be

implemented successfully in the real world. It tends to be too expensive to

4 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster, New York: USA 1994; pp. 17-28


~ 4 ~

implement such goals. Promotion of democracy is an idealistic goal; it is

motivated by internationalism and is consistent with the values and principles

that the Americans have been pursuing. To export democracy to a number of

countries, ruled by dictators and communists, also means that the existing

regimes are to be undermined; this goal is not far different from the attempt of

the former Soviet Union that intended to produce the 'world revolution' in the

early 20th century, which at the end brought the world's leading communist

state into bankruptcy. The Clinton administration ideally attempted to promote

democracy in Somalia but after the attempt failed, the administration returned to

a realistic goal and left that troubled country. Clinton's successor, President

George W. Bush, brings back the pre-emptive strike doctrine in the wake of

terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The predominantly idealistic foreign

policy goals pursued by the Clinton administration were downplayed by the

administration of Bush Jr.; this brings the United States back to more realistic

foreign policy goals. In the war in Iraq, the Bush Jr. administration seeks to

serve U.S. interests more than those of its allies and has become unilateral in

foreign policy choices. September 11 event brought under-siege mentality to

American leaders and the public. The feeling means that the United Sates

needs to be proactive in preventing futher attack in their homeland through war

against terrorists and pre-emptive strike.

The cases above provide contrasting views on U.S. foreign policy in the post-

Cold War era. One view believes that the United States will pursue idealistic

foreign policy goals in the post Cold War era because the country now enjoys

the greatest economic and military power. Another view explained that the


~ 5 ~

United States, in the post-Cold War era, would sometimes return to realistic

foreign policy goals. The voluminous literature on US foreign policy suggests

that the categories "realistic" and "idealistic" are too simple to serve as research

models for a systematic study of actual foreign policy making in any period of

US history. The study shall now turn to a summary of that literature and an

examination of the guidance that the scholarly works examined can provide.

Subsequently a comparative study will be undertaken focusing on the

administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush and major foreign policies

produced by these two administrations.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Sections below are the theories of international relations and their implications

for foreign policy making. These concepts are the highlighted after the study

reviewed a number of scholarly works and relevant literatures. The following is

the summary of the concepts based on the ideas and works done by many

people.

Idealism and Realism: Two contrasting theories, realism and idealism, have

been applied in foreign policy studies. Realism theory, on the one hand,

believes that states operate in an anarchic international system and therefore

must adapt their foreign policies to three main principles: Statism, Survival, and

Self-help. Based on the principles, a national leader is responsible for protecting

its people and therefore has legitimacy to enforce jurisdiction within the territory

under his sovereignty (Statism). A sovereign state must do anything to ensure

its national security and existence in the international system (Survival).


~ 6 ~

National security can be realized only through self-help because there is no

higher authority to prevent and counter the use of force in the international

system (self-help).5 Idealism (idealpolitik), on the other hand, believes that

foreign policy should be based on the international rule of law. For idealists,

states can survive (or assure national security) by sharing common values and

principles.6 Scholars offer different approaches for states to ensure national

security. According to Immanuel Kant, "the rule of law would result in perpetual

peace."7 If the community of states can agree on certain principles (international

law), they could form alliances to counter common security threats and

therefore war could be avoided. Magaret Mead believes that war could be

prevented because "warfare is only an invention—not a biological necessity."8

Mead proposed that if we change the drives that produce war in a new

direction, states can avoid war and therefore national security can be assured.

Idealists who applied these principles in US foreign policy are Woodrow Wilson

and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The former suggested the collective security

principle after World War I and the latter reaffirmed it at the end of World War II.

Though idealists and realists adopt different approaches in international

relations, they have the same goals; they are pursuing national interests. If a

harmony of interest such as collective security and peace exists, states can

cooperate. According to E. H. Carr, every nation has an identical interest in

5 Timothy Dune, “Realism” in John Baylis and Steve Smith, Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford University Press, New York: USA, 1999, p.114 6 See Imanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace" in Richard K. Betts, (ed.), Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Cause of War and Peace, Second Edition, Longman: New York: USA 2002, pp. 103-109; and Stanley Kober, "Idealpolitik" in Betts (ed.), 2002, pp. 297-307 7 Imanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace" in Betts (ed.), 2002, pp. 297-307 8 Magaret Mead, "Warfare Is Only An Invention—Not A Biological Necessity" in Betts, (ed.), 2002, p. 165


~ 7 ~

peace and any nation, which desires to disturb the peace, is both irrational and

immoral.9 Therefore, idealists believe that peace-loving nations would not go to

war if a harmony of interest exists. Throughout history, idealism succeeded only

in very few circumstances because states could hardly agree on certain

principles. Though sometimes they did, it was because individual states

intended to maximize their own interests, and member states tend to maximize

their own interests at the expense of others. Stanley Kober and Halford

Mackinder noted that Wilson's democratic idealism may be noble but it failed to

deal with the world of realities.10 Carr also notes that the harmony of interest is

not natural; it is based on consensual agreement between states and if any one

state (with considerable power like post-World-War-I Germany) disagrees, the

harmony of interests would collapse.11 A community of states often failed to

maintain harmony of interests because there are many goals and objectives for

their own foreign policies. Since states often have conflicts of interests, it is

essential for the study to further examine states' foreign policy goals.

Foreign Policy Goals, National Interests, and Foreign Policy Behavior:

According to Ducan et al, foreign policy objectives tend to be hierarchical in

nature and shaped by a number of forces. By 'hierarchical’, they mean that

foreign policy covers a range of issues that can be classified in a hierarchical

ranking as follows:

9 E.H. Carr, "Realism and Idealism" in Betts, (ed.), 2002; pp. 51-67 10 See Stanley Kober, "Idealpolitik" in Betts, (ed.), 2002; pp. 297-309 11 E.H. Carr, "Realism and Idealism" in Betts, (ed.), 2002; pp. 51-67


~ 8 ~

1. Core or vital objectives: foreign policy goals first seek to achieve vital

interests, which are territorial security, economic strength, and political

independence.

2. Middle-range objectives: As a way of ensuring that their vital interests

remain primary, states pursue the mid-range objectives that may enhance

their prestige and viability in the international system by engaging in foreign

aid programs and cultural exchanges; by sponsoring trade shows and major

conferences of heads of state; by exploring outer space or by exchanging

diplomatic delegations or similar activities.

3. Long-range objectives: These objectives refer to the promotion abroad of

a country's belief system and overarching basic values. This can be seen

clearly in the post-Cold War foreign policy of the United States that seeks to

promote democracy and a free market economy. A similar case in history is

the former Soviet Union that sought to promote Marxism-Leninism, with its

unique brand of economic determinism, permanent class conflict, and basic

antagonism between communism and capitalism.12

Foreign policy behavior is motivated by 'national interest', which can be

translated into hierarchies of needs. To Realism theorists, such as Hans

Morgenthau, national interest is the only thing that makes sense in international

relations; once you understand a country’s national interest, you can roughly

predict its foreign policy moves. National interests influence foreign policy, and

vice versa; in order to satisfy their needs, states would pursue foreign policy

12 See W. Raymond Ducan; Barbara Jancar-Webster, and Bob Switky; World Politics in the 21st

Century; Longman, New York: USA 2002; pp. 159-181


~ 9 ~

according the following hierarchies or priorities: (1) national security (2)

economic and social needs and (3) national values and ideals. Evans and

Newnham reviewed Morgenthau's hypothesis on national interests and agreed

that states will pursue foreign policies that satisfy the first and second priorities,

which are 'national security' and 'economic and social needs.' However, they

questioned whether states' foreign policy must fulfill the third need (promoting

national values and ideals) after the first and the second priorities are achieved.

For Morgenthau, states must survive by dependence on force and strength

(military might) of their own; therefore the state must have sustainable

economic resources, food and material necessary to support the armed

forces.13 The principles or moral values play a dominant part in formulating

policy. Ducan et al, like Morgenthau, believes that "if a national leader has a

principle or value, the foreign policy would most likely be consistent with the

principles and values."14 Therefore, states will pursue idealistic goals that are

consistent with national values and ideals as expressed in the long-range

objectives.

Foreign Policy Decision Making Process: According to Goldstein, a common

starting point for studying the decision making process is the 'rational model.'

Decision makers calculate the costs and benefits for each possible course of

action and then choose the one with lowest cost by (1) classifying goals in the

situation, (2) ordering them by the importance (in case of conflict between

different goals), (3) listing alternatives available to achieve the goals, (4)

13 Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations,Penguin Books, London: UK, 1998, p. 345 14 Ducan et al., 2002, pp. 159-181


~ 10 ~

investigating the consequence (probable and possible outcomes) of those

alternatives, and finally (5) choosing courses of action that will produce the best

outcome (in terms of reaching one's goals.) Goldstein noted that foreign policy

decisions are dependent on the characteristic of decision makers; some

decision makers—such as Saddam Hussein who decided to invade Kuwait—

are relatively 'accepting of risk' whereas others are 'averse to risk.' When

potential benefits are great, decision makers will be willing to take risks.

However, the rational model often complicates the decision making process

when there are uncertainties about the 'costs and benefits' of various actions

that would be carried out or when decision makers have to handle multiple

goals simultaneously.

An alternative to the rational model of decision making, Goldstein noted, is the

organizational process model where foreign policy decision makers rely for

most decisions on standardized responses or 'standard operating procedures.'

Every day the US State Department receives more than a thousand cables with

reports or inquiries from its embassies around the world and sends out

thousands of cables to those embassies with instructions or responses,

Goldstein added. The organization process model is less labor intensive than

the rational model, but most decisions are made by lower level decision makers

and may not reflect the policy adopted by top leaders. Goldstein also noted that

foreign policy decisions sometimes result from bargaining processes of various

government agencies with somewhat divergent interests in the outcomes. In

1992 the Japanese Agriculture Ministry wanted to protect the welfare of


~ 11 ~

Japanese farmers and opposed the Foreign Ministry that wanted smooth

relations with the US and proposed import of rice from the United States.

A number of irrational elements also influence foreign policy decision making;

these elements can be best understood from a psychological analysis of

individual and group decision-making processes. Goldstein believes that

individuals (the national leaders) are the only true actors in international

relations; every international event is the result, intended or unintended, of

decisions made by individuals. Individual decision makers not only have

differing values and beliefs, but also unique personalities—their personal

experiences, intellectual capabilities and personal styles of making decisions.

The psychoanalytic approach holds that personalities reflect subconscious

influences of childhood experiences; some scholars believe that U.S. President

Woodrow Wilson's desire for power resulted from a feeling of insecurity due to

an abusive father, and that insecurity led to his greatest failure, that the

Congress would not ratify the Versailles Treaty.15 Similarly, Condoleezza Rice,

who is an expert in USSR studies, brought to the Bush Administration the

preemptive strike doctrine. Finally, time constraints can also influence the

foreign policy decision making process. Goldstein noted that, in crisis decisions,

policy makers operate under tremendous time constraints; the normal checks

on unwise decisions may not operate and the decisions that do not fit decision

makers' expectations are more likely to be discarded simply because they have

no time to consider it.16

15 Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations, Brief Edition, Longman New York: USA 2002 pp. 98-99 16 Goldstein 2002, p. 103


~ 12 ~

3. RESEARCH PROBLEM

At the beginning the study assumed that the United States, enjoying the

greatest economic and military power in the post Cold War era, would pursue

idealistic foreign policies. The assumption is based the hierarchies of needs of

states that would shape the setting of foreign policy goals. However, the

literature survey revealed that some other factors may also influence the post

Cold War foreign policy of the United States. The literature suggests that many

different factors are at work in the making of foreign policy, and many models of

decision making are therefore possible in the systematic analysis of this

process. This study will therefore examine two case studies on foreign policies

during the administration of Bill Clinton and the administration of George W.

Bush; and ask the following questions:

1. What were the main factors that produced the foreign policies during each

administration?

2. Why did policy makers act in the manner described in each case?

The case studies deal with US relations with China and Iraq. The study will

examine the attempts by Washington to promote democracy in each country.

Both the administration of Bill Clinton and the administration of George Bush Jr.

seem to have similar policies toward China. However, their policies in Iraq are

obviously different. From the Clinton administration to the Bush administration,

Washington secures more and more partnership with China. In Iraq, the Clinton

administration only sought to contain the Saddam regime from engaging in

aggression against its neighbours and demanded that Iraq comply with the UN

Security Council resolutions. The Bush administration, on the contrary, toppled


~ 13 ~

the Saddam regime and said that promotion of democracy in Iraq was a major

foreign policy goal.

Hypotheses: The study will also examine the factors that produced change in

Iraq policy and the factors that maintain the China policy of the two

administrations. After briefly reviewing the history of U.S. foreign policy (see

chapter II) the study found major factors that influenced U.S. foreign policy in

the past and believes that they were influential factors in determining policies

toward China and in Iraq during the administrations of Bill Clinton and George

Bush Jr. The study believes that these factors may determine the outcomes of

the policies toward China and Iraq during the two administrations and will

therefore examine the possible involvement of each factor in the policy

outcomes by testing a set of hypotheses as the follows:

1. Since the United States is enjoying the greatest economic and military

power, the foreign policies of the administration of Bill Clinton and the

administration of George W. Bush are to promote American ideals

(democracy and human rights.)

2. When foreign policies are carried out by the two administrations, the

rational model will be applied; decision makers calculate the costs and

benefits of each possible course of action.

3. The Congress, public opinion, and interest groups determine the

outcomes of the foreign policies of the two administrations.

4. Foreign policy outcomes of the two administrations are the reflections of

different views of the individual presidents.


~ 14 ~

5. The international environment is the factor that produces the policy

outcomes in the two administrations.

Time Frame and Wording: The study intends to examine US policy toward

China and Iraq during the Clinton aministration and the Bush administration.

However, since the administration of President George W. Bush is mandated

until 2009 and this report is finalized in August 2005, the study did not cover the

perios after August 2005.

Two US presidents share the same family name: Geroge (H.W.) Bush (1989–

1993) and George W. Bush (2001–2009). The study refers to the former using

Bush Sr. (the father) and the latter Bush Jr. (the son). However, the current US

president, George W. Bush is also sometimes referred to as Bush only. In case

of confusion in the report, readers may verify the event described with the

respective mandate of each president.

In order to test the above hypotheses we will examine a brief history of U.S.

foreign policy, before the administration of Bill Clinton, and the international

relations of the post-Cold War world in the next chapter. The chapters to follow

will review the foreign policies of the administration of Bill Clinton and the

administration of George W. Bush and highlight their policies toward China and

Iraq, then conduct an analysis of the hypotheses set forth above. The last

chapter will present the conclusion and recommendations for further studies.

US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold-War Era The Influential Factors and Constraints

~ 15 ~

Chapter II

THE INFLUENTIAL FACTORS AND CONSTRAINTS

In order to elaborate on the interactions between the outcome of U.S. foreign

policy and each influential factor and constraint, this chapter is classified into

two parts. The first part will deal with the factors that reflect U.S. domestic

politics and issues before the end of the Cold War. The second part elaborates

on the constraints produced by the actions of external actors on U.S. foreign

policy after the Cold War. The following table summarizes these factors.

THE INFLUENTIAL FACTORS AND CONSTRAINTS ON US FOREIGN POLICY

The Influential Factors(Domestic Scene)

Constraints By External Actors

Ideology: Realism and Idealism The Presidency (President’s view) The Congress and public opinion The National Security Council Interest Groups Others: time constraint, personal experience…

The New Environment of International Relations Interactions with the External Actors (foreign policy of major powers after the cold war)

1. THE INFLUENTIAL FACTORS — DOMESTIC SCENE

On the domestic scene, US foreign policy is influenced by the ideology, the

president’s personal view and the decision making process of his

administration, the National Security Council and its members, the Congress

and public opinion, and interest groups.


~ 16 ~

Ideology: Realism and Idealism are two contrasting principles in US foreign

policy. The former is more pragmatic and the latter is more ideological. The

leading theorist of realism (realistic or opportunistic foreign policy making

principle) in the United States was undeniably Hans Morgenthau and the

practitioner of realism in US foreign policy was President Richard Nixon. His

Secretary of State, and also former National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger,

is both a theorist and a practitioner of realism. Kissinger and Nixon chose to act

in accordance with the balance of power principle in foreign policy. Fred Kaplan

added that the Nixon-Kissinger approach tended to ignore, or shortchange,

small nations as well as small enemies within big nations; this included

repressed ethnic groups, minority parties or any actor that might not involve vital

interest for the U.S. The cold calculations that inspired Kissinger's triumphs—

détente with the Soviet Union, opening relations with China, "shuttle diplomacy"

in the Middle East—also produced the secret bombing of Cambodia, covert

support of a military coup in Chile and Indonesia's invasion of East Timor."17

Application of idealism in U.S. foreign policy was pioneered by President

Woodrow Wilson. At the end of World War I, he intended to rearrange the world

order with the 14-point recommendations that led to the establishment of the

League of Nations for maintenance of international peace and security. Wilson’s

idealistic attempt was to make the world safe for democracy. Wilsonian idealism

served as the guideline for Franklin D. Roosevelt who founded the United

Nations to ensure collective security. Wilson's idealistic policy became impotent

when the Congress of the United States did not ratify American participation in

17 Fred Kaplan, “Would Kissinger's Foreign Policy Make a Difference in Iraq?," The Cambodia Daily: Wednesday, August 18, 2004; p. 15


~ 17 ~

the League. The conflict between the United States and the former Soviet Union

interrupted the idealistic initiative of Franklin D. Roosevelt on collective security

through the establishment of the United Nations.

The Presidency: The president's view often has direct impact on foreign policy

making. According to Stephen E. Ambrose, the president’s most important

asset in asserting control of foreign policy is stated in section 2, Article II of the

Constitution of the United States: The president of the United States of America

shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. Section

2, Article II, gives the President the power to make treaties. Almost every

president of the United States had his own doctrine in foreign policy. Ambrose

noted that President Harry S. Truman committed American foreign policy to the

reconstruction of Europe and building of democracy in Germany and Japan.

Although without much success, almost all the presidents of the United States

since 1952 have made attempts to create their own doctrine as a model.18 In

1961 Kennedy stated “… we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any

hardship, support any friend, and oppose any foe to assure the survival and the

success of liberty."19 Kennedy’s commitments to contain the spread of

communism in Southeast Asia were inherited by many of his successors.

The Congress and public opinion: According to Ambrose, the Constitution

also gives the Congress power to shape foreign policy; according to Section 8,

Article I: the Congress shall have the power to … declare war… raise and

18 Stephen E. Ambrose, “The Presidency and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs Press, Council on Foreign Relations Inc., New York: USA: Winter 1991/92; pp. 120-125 19 Ambrose, “The Presidency and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs Press: Winter 1991/92, pp. 120-125; see also “Freedom and Foreign Policy,” US State Department’s website, November 07, 2003 <http://usembassy.state.gov/posts/ja4/wwwhfree.html>


~ 18 ~

support armies … and maintain a navy." Section 2 Article II gives the President

the power to make treaties, 'but only provided two-third of senators present

concur.'20 Public opinion could be one of the influential factors in the formulation

of US foreign policy because the senators are elected by the people and may

have to listen to public opinion. However, public opinion is sometimes used as a

tool to support the vision of the president. Morgenthau’s ninth rule on foreign

policy (in Roskin and Berry, 1999)21 states that: “The government is the leader

of public opinion, not its slave. Leaders of democracies must, of course, pay

attention to public opinion; but they must also inform and educate it.” Following

the attacks on US destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964, US sentiment

strongly supported American military action against North Vietnam. President

Johnson capitalized on the event and used American public opinion to get

approval from the Congress to commit combat troops in South Vietnam. “Within

three years, however, mounting U.S. losses and growing uncertainty about US

war objectives led many US citizens to question the wisdom of the war and

subsequently had the United States decide to leave Vietnam.”22

Successful implementation of American foreign policy, to some extent, depends

on budget constraints. Congress’s power to control the budget therefore limits

the power of the president to control the implementation of foreign policy.

Section 9, Article I states: “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in

20 Ambrose, “The Presidency and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs Press: Winter 1991/92, pp. 120-125 21 Michael G. Roskin & Nicholas O. Berry, IR: The New World of International Relations (Fifth Edition), Prentice Hall New Jersey: USA, 1999 p. 282; (ORIGINAL SOURCE: Hans J. Morgenthau & Kenneth W. Thomson, Politics Among Nations: Struggle for Power and Peace,6th edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) 22 Ambrose, “The Presidency and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs Press: Winter 1991/92, pp. 120-125


~ 19 ~

appropriation made by law.” According to Ambrose, on the eve of Pearl Harbor,

Congress was in charge of foreign policy, as it had been since the Congress

rejected the Versailles Treaty in 1919. However, President Roosevelt had a

clear policy to get the United States involved in the war as a major participant

on the side of Britain and the Soviet Union and to block Japanese expansion in

Asia but the Congress would not appropriate the monies necessary to raise

and maintain armed force capable of carrying it out, or declare war on the Axis

powers. After Pearl Harbor, war came anyway. Roosevelt took command and

controlled foreign policy as commander in chief almost without reference to the

Congress. When national security threats are concerned, the Congress most

likely gives power to the President to control foreign policy; and when the

President decides to go to war, the Congress most likely will appropriate monies

to protect American lives. Ambrose noted that with the threat posed by the

Soviet Union and the legacy of Pearl Harbor’s surprise attack, Congress

became content even eager to leave foreign policy to the President.23

The National Security Council: Under the National Security Act of July 26,

1947, the National Security Council (NSC) was created to coordinate US foreign

policy and defense policy, and attempts to reconcile diplomatic and military

commitments and requirements.24 The NSC is the President's principal forum

for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior

national security advisors and cabinet officials. The National Security Advisor

23 Ambrose, “The Presidency and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs Press: Winter 1991/92, pp. 120-125 24 Ivo H. Daalder and I.M. Destler (November 2000) “A New NSC for a New Administration” The Bookings Institution’s website, November 7, 2003 <http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb68.htm>; and “National Security Ccouncil,” The White House’s website, November 7, 2003 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031008-4.html>


~ 20 ~

assists the president in national security matters and coordinates the above

functions. Sometimes he or she is an ideological leader in the formation of

foreign policy. The Secretary of State may insert his or her control over foreign

policy through the implementation of policy and gathering feedback. However,

the overlapping functions of the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of

State produce challenging issues in formulating US foreign policy. In the

Truman Presidency, the State Department dominated the NSC because the

Secretary of State George Marshall was the opinion leader in the Marshall Plan

that he initiated, and the NSC was just created. However, in the Nixon

Presidency, Henry Kissinger’s close relations with the President helped

increase the power and influence of the National Security Advisor in the

formulation of US foreign policy. The close relationship between the President

and the National Security Adviser was the basis for their ability to carry out

American foreign affairs leadership around the world.25 Kissinger notes that "in

the final analysis the influence of a Presidential Assistant derives almost

exclusively from the confidence of the President, not from administrative

arrangements."26

In order to clearly define the roles of the NSC and the State department, it

should noted that NSC most likey dominates the formulation of US foreign

policy whereas the State Department dominates its implementation process.

However, since the NSC also coordinates defense policy agenda, the outcomes

25 Ivo H. Daalder and I.M. Destler (November 2000), “A New NSC for a New Administration” The Bookings Institution’s website, November 7, 2003 <http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/ pb68.htm>; and “National Security Ccouncil,” The White House’s website, November 7, 2003 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031008-4.html> 26 “History of the National Security Council,” 1947-1997, The White House, November 7, 2003 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>


~ 21 ~

of US foreign policy in a country are sometimes under the influence of secret

arrangements by the NSC and the Department of Defense. The bombing of

Cambodia was secretly coordinated by the National Security Council apparatus

under Kissinger.27 After serving as National Security Advisor, Henry A.

Kissinger, Colin L. Powell, and Condoleezza Rice later become US Secretary of

States. As did Kissigner, Condoleezza Rice who has close relation with the

President seems to be having great deal of influence on US foreign policy

regardless of whether she is the National Security Advisor or the Secretary of

State.

Interest Groups: Goldstein noted that, in all states, societal pressure

influences foreign policy, although these are aggregated and made effective

through different channels in different societies. Ethnic groups within one state

often become interest groups that are concerned about the interest of another

country from which their ancestors emigrated or had ethnic ties with the people

there. Cuban Americans organize to influence U.S. policy toward Cuba, as do

Jewish Americans on Israel. Goldstein added that whether or not a foreign

country has a large constituency of ethnic nationals within another country, it

can set about lobbying that country's government, as do other interest groups.

Israel and Taiwan have a strong lobbying presence in the U.S. Congress. Many

less visible states have hired U.S. public relations firms to represent their

interests in Washington. In late 2004 Cambodia also did the same thing in

lobbying the U.S. government to extend the quota of garments imported from

27 See Goldstein 2002, pp. 97-98; see also "The Embassy" in William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia, The Hogarth Press, London: UK, 1993; pp. 80-89


~ 22 ~

Cambodia, which was due to expire by 2005. Owners of big businesses in the

United States, as in other capitalist countries, also influence foreign policy. The

head of General Motors (GM) once said "what's good for GM is good for the

country and vice versa."28 This argument was clearly evident by Reagan's

trickle down economics (Reaganomics, as named to honor the former President

Ronald Reagan) that increased defense spending during the eighties. On

national security, Reaganomics dragged the former Soviet Union into a too

costly arms race that drove the leading communist state to give up the

confrontation with the U.S. On the economic interests, the increased defense

spending generated growth for big businesses in the US and stimulated

booming growth for the US economy.

2. CONSTRAINTS BY EXTERNAL ACTORS

Other factors that influence U.S. foreign policy making are related to the

international state system it operates in and its interactions with external actors.

Both of them are factors that are not under US control.

The New Environment of International Relations: According Samuel P.

Huntington, the new environment after the Cold War brings about trends toward

both integration and fragmentation.29 Some people concluded that a unipolar

world has emerged, with that one pole being the United States, the single

remaining superpower in the post Cold War era. It was also believed that the

United States is now the focus of global affairs because the remaining single

superpower has far and away the world's largest national economy and is the

28 Goldstein 2002. pp. 107-108 29 See Ducan et al., 2002, p. 164


~ 23 ~

only country that could project large quantities of military power anywhere in the

world. However, some people rejected the unipolar world as the most likely new

model of the international system.

Daniel S. Papp notes that the United States might not be able to maintain its

military might given that some quarters in the U.S. doubted the values of

continued large scale military spending. Similarly, military might may not remain

the most meaningful measure of national power in the twenty-first century;

economic strength may be more important. Therefore a second model of the

new system was based on the assumption that the end of the Cold War had

relegated military capability to a less important place in international affairs and

had elevated economic strength to pre-eminence.

Since the Cold War era and the bipolar power system ceased to exit, military

strength is no longer the primary measure of power and economic strength,

which is always a major component of an international actor's ability to develop

and maintain military strength, may be more important. Therefore, they

concluded that the new system would be based on three regional economic

blocks: in America centered on the United States, in Europe centered on the

European Union, and in East Asia centered on Japan.30 Still other observers

believed that the next international system would be a diffuse world order, with

the United States, the European Union, Russia, Japan, and China all continuing

to play major roles, but with other states and other types of international actors

30 Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations (third edition), Macmillan Publishing Company, USA: 1991; pp. 507-514.


~ 24 ~

also, on occasion, rising to prominence in a case-by-case or issue-by-issue

basis.

Interactions with the External Actors: The collapse of the Soviet Union and

the increasing wave of global terrorism both constrain U.S. foreign policy

making. Daniel S. Papp noted that, after end of the Cold War, foreign policy

making has entered a new era.31 The major powers in the post Cold War world

order, to differing degrees, have shifted their foreign policies according to the

new environment of the international system. Their goals are often in conflict

with those of the United States.

The major powers—Russia, China, France, Germany, the UK, and Japan—

sometimes support the United States to achieve it goals but sometimes also

oppose U.S. actions. Japan and Britain still maintain their strong support of the

United States in almost every international crisis.

However, France and Germany jointly opposed U.S. dominance in Europe and

U.S. actions in the second Iraq War. This consequence is caused by the

absence of security threat from the former Soviet Union that diminishes the

importance of NATO alliance and its dependence on US military might.

Driven by the national interests, Russia and China sometimes appear to be

friendly with Washington but sometimes do not. There were persistent setbacks

on the promotion of democracy in both countries.

31 Ducan et al. 2002; p. 164


~ 25 ~

The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 produced an under-siege mentality

in the United States and significantly changed U.S. foreign policy from

promotion of democracy to a pre-emptive strike doctrine. All of these factors

have influence on US foreign policy making, as the following case studies will

show.

US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold-War Era Post Cold War Foreign Policy

~ 26 ~

Chapter III

POST COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY

The principle of U.S. foreign policy of each administration was often recorded as

the doctrine of the President. It is noticeable that during the Cold War, the

doctrines of each president are just variations on the containment policy, the

Truman doctrine. The overall goals of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War

did not change much; all were about 'stop communism.' (See appendix A) The

post Cold War foreign policies of the United States can be classified into three

doctrines that belong to the last three presidents. The administration of George

Bush (Sr.) was mainly to arrange the 'New World Order' after the collapse of the

former Soviet Union. The Clinton Doctrine was mainly just a variation of the

Bush Doctrine which is to 'enlarge democracy,' particularly to help Russia and

the Former Soviet republics to adopt a free market economy and a democratic

political system. The current President George W. Bush, after September 11,

adopted the doctrine of pre-emptive strike that the United States will fight a

proactive war against terrorists.

THE POST COLD WAR U.S. PRESIDENTS AND THEIR DOCTRINES President Years Doctrines Bush Sr. 1989 – 1993 New World Order

Clinton 1993 – 2001 Enlarging Democracy and Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty with Russia and Ukraine.*

Bush Jr. 2001- 2009 War against Terrorists and Pre-emptive Strike

* Derived from Kenneth T. Walsh, “The Clinton doctrines,” U.S. News & World Report; 1/11/93, Vol. 114 Issue 1, p16 <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx? direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db =afh&an=9301070091>


~ 27 ~

As the remaining single superpower after the end of the Cold War, the United

States could feel at ease and have a greater freedom of action in international

affairs to arrange the 'New World Order' that clearly became the principle for US

foreign policy during the presidency of George Bush (Sr.). In classically

Wilsonian terms, President Bush Sr. proclaimed his hope for the new world

order this way: “We have a vision of a new partnership of nations that

transcends the Cold War. A partnership based on consultation, cooperation and

collective action, especially through international and regional organizations. A

partnership united by the principle and the rule of law and supported by an

equitable sharing of both cost and commitment. A partnership, whose goals are

to increase democracy, increase prosperity, increase peace and reduce

arms.”32

In 1990 the United States, through the UN, led the coalition forces of the world's

major countries, almost without opposition (the former Soviet Union began to

disintegrate and acquiesced U.S. move) to counter the aggression by Iraq and

end Iraq’s occupation in Kuwait. Goldstein noted that U.S leaders had hoped

that the Gulf War would set valuable precedents for the future punishment of

aggression, reaffirmation of sovereignty and territorial integrity (for UN member

states, especially Kuwait and even Iraq) re-emphasis of the utility of the UN

Security Council, and willingness of the United States to lead the post Cold War

order, which President Bush named the New World Order.33 However, it was

32 “The U.N: World Parliament of Peace,” President George Bush Address to the U.N. General Assembly, New York on October 1, 1990, in Dispatch (US Department of States), Volume 1, No. 6, October 8, 1990, p. 152 (see Kissinger, 1994, pp. 804-805) 33 Goldstein, 2002, p. 38


~ 28 ~

claimed that the US hegemony in the post cold war era is in the decline. Former

economic advisor to President John F. Kennedy, Professor Paul A. Samuelson

and his co-author, Professor William D. Nordhaus argued the same way,

quoting Yale historian Paul Kennedy as saying that: "the only answer to the

question … of whether the United States can preserve its existing [military and

political] position is “no”—for it has not been given any one society to remain

permanently ahead of all the others, because that would imply a freezing of the

different patterns of growth rate, technological advance, and military

development which has existed since time immemorial”34 Henry Kissinger also

believes that the US hegemony is in decline and noted that “the United States of

America at the dawn of the 21st century faced great opportunities as well as

great danger... when one of the giants (the Soviet Union) finally tired and

abandoned the contest the other giant also saved his money and went home.”35

Kissinger added that by the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth

century, Wilsonianism seemed triumphant; the communist ideological and the

Soviet geopolitical challenges had been overcome simultaneously;36 but added

that the United States no longer wishes to play the superpower.37

Many trends signal the decline of U.S. hegemony. First of all, the absence of the

former Soviet Union diminishes the Trans-Atlantic security alliance (NATO) in

the perceptions of Western European leaders. The US leadership in NATO

34 See Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Micro-economics (15th edition), McGraw-Hill, New York: USA, 1995 pp. 455-456 35 See Alberto R. Coll, “American Power and Responsibility in a New Century” in Joel H. Rosenthal (ed.), Ethics & International Affairs, The Annual Journal of the Carnegie Council (New York) Vol. 14, 2000, p. 3 36 Kissinger, 1994, pp. 804-805 37 Kissinger, 1994, pp. 804-805


~ 29 ~

seemed to be diminishing since before the conflict over the Second Gulf War in

Iraq. The birth of the European Union and existence of the EMU (European

Monetary Union) also limit U.S. economic and monetary powers in Europe.

Third, the emergence of global terrorist networks and the widespread anti-

American sentiments are crucial challenge to U.S. interests abroad. Fourth,

China is emerging as a great power with a booming economy, now challenging

US dominance at the regional level. The last one that can be pointed out is the

national debt of the United States that now registers approximately 60 percent

of national income. The famous Harvard historian Paul Kennedy noted that “the

rise and fall of a superpower is interdependent with its economic power."38

Thus, high national debt could also limit U.S. power.

The U.S. leaders that saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to

implement the idealistic policy of promoting or exporting democracy to the rest

of the world seemed to be reluctant or unable to carry out this policy in many

countries, particularly in Iraq and China. Since Washington changed its policy

from containment of Saddam's Regime to the enforcement of regime change in

Iraq but did not significantly change the policy toward China, this study

established a number of hypotheses (in the research problem) to analyze the

factors and the constraints that produce U.S. policy outcomes on China and Iraq

during the administrations of President Bill Clinton and President George W.

Bush. The study shall now examine the foreign policies of the two

administrations in order to elaborate on the influential factors and the

constraints on the outcome of some policies, in selected areas.

38 Nordhaus and Samuelson, 1995 pp. 413-414


~ 30 ~

1. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

In world affairs, Clinton worked closely with the United Nations and dispatched

peacekeeping forces to war-torn Somalia and Bosnia. He became a global

proponent for an expanded NATO, more open international trade, and a

worldwide campaign against drug trafficking.39 In his inaugural address, Clinton

promised to use American power whenever "the will and conscience of the

international community is defied."40 Some scholars conclude that the Clinton

years mark the triumph of internationalism. However, since 1993, Washington

actually withdrew from internationalism in area after area; Somalia and Bosnia

are two cases in the Clinton years.

The Gulf War victory in 1991 brought pride and prestige for the United States

because it re-assured the UN collective security principle by restoring the

sovereignty of a UN member state (Kuwait) against Iraq's aggression.

Washington since then enjoyed international admiration for American

involvement in international affairs and arrangement of the proclaimed New

World Order. According to David C. Hendricson, Clinton favored

internationalism and he not only signed on to the idea of the 'new World Order,'

but added other items that, taken together, amounted to an ambitious agenda.

Hendricson noted that Bush's internationalism was centered on revival of the

collective security idea: the notion that the United Nations (with the United

States at the lead) would guarantee the territorial integrity and political

39 "Biography of William J. Clinton" The White House’s website, July 14, 2004 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/bc42.html> 40 Lowell Dittmer, “Chinese Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: A Realist Approach,”Review of Politics; Summer 2001, Vol. 63 Issue 3 p. 421 <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx? direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db=afh&an=5120324>


~ 31 ~

independence of all members of the international community.41 Clinton’s

national security advisor Anthony Lake stated that “the ‘enlargement’ of

democracy should replace containment as the top U.S. foreign policy priority.”42

By adding the enlargement of democracy, Clinton’s foreign policy agenda

became even more ambitious. Stephen M. Walt noted that even faced with a

partisan, isolationist Republican Congress and a disinterested American public,

Clinton managed to engage Russia and China in international affairs, fight

nuclear proliferation, liberalize world trade, and save lives in Haiti, Bosnia, and

Kosovo.43

However, Hendricson explained that disillusionment with extravagant

internationalism can easily foster disillusionment with a more moderate variety;

when Woodrow Wilson articulated a similar version of internationalism and

proposed that the only alternative was a return to isolationism he prepared the

ground for the very reaction he most feared. Not only did the Senate reject the

League of Nations and the promise of collective security it entailed, but public

opinion also turned away from the commitment to the security of European

allies, which represented the sensible middle ground of policy and was favored

by moderate republicans. Hendrickson noted that Clinton's foreign policy, which

has been avowedly neo-Wilsonian, courted a similar reaction. Therefore the

danger for Clinton was that his tactical retreat would turn into a rout, that the

41 David C. Hendricson, "Recovery of Internationalism," Foreign Affairs Press: Volume 73, Number 5; September/October 1994; Council on Foreign Relations Inc., New York: USA; pp. 26-43 42 Dittmer, Chinese Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: A Realist Approach, 2001 43 See Stephen M. Walt, “Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs Press:March/April 2000 <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20000301faessay28/stephen-m-walt/two-cheers-for-clinton-s-foreign-policy.html>


~ 32 ~

bases for a more moderate internationalism would evaporate along with (and in

reaction to) disillusionment with its repeated failure to achieve its neo-Wilsonian

goals. It should also be noted that Clinton's extravagant internationalist

approach did not go in line with his fiscal policy. Though his foreign policy

agenda was burdened with idealistic goals and an internationalist approach, in

order to avoid a budget deficit and to correct domestic economic issues, Clinton

cut the defense budget and downsized the armed forces. Patrick Clawson noted

that while trade is important, security remains the more important purpose of

foreign policy, but Clinton came to office showing little interest in it. Clinton

wanted to 'focus like a laser' on the domestic economy. Moreover, in 1993 he

brushed aside a reporter's question about Bosnia by saying, 'what I got elected

to do was to let America look at our own problems.'44 Joshua Muravchik noted

that Clinton's best performance has been in overseeing the completion and

adoption of NAFTA and GATT (North American Free Trade Agreement and

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.)45 Because Clinton promoted free

trade the US then achieved high economic growth and a budget surplus.

We now can generalize that the Clinton administration began with idealistic

goals and an internationalist approach; but the administration subsequently

adopted a realistic approach in international affairs. Clinton sometimes worked

closely with the UN, as in the case of Somalia; but sometimes he did not. Walter

R. Mead noted that Clinton acted without U.N. approval in the war against

44 See Joshua Muravchik, “Carrying a Small Stick,” National Review; Vol. 48 Issue 16: 9/2/1996 p. 57 <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db=afh&an= 9608228010> 45 Joshua Muravchik, Carrying a Small Stick, 1996


~ 33 ~

Yugoslavia.46 As stated in the research problem, the study is to find out “why,

from the Clinton administrations to the Bush administration, Washington did not

change its policy toward China, but its Iraq policy has significantly changed from

containment to regime change.” In order to answer above question, we shall

now examine Clinton's policy in both countries.

1.1. Clinton's China Policy

According to David M. Lampton, US-China relations can be classified into three

categories: economic, human rights and security concerns. Walter R. Mead

noted that the major policy makers (presidential candidates) in the two major

parties generally stand within the post war consensus on American foreign

policy, with Republicans perhaps slightly inclined to make security the most

important goal, followed by economic liberalization followed by democracy and

human rights. Democrats tend, as a very rough rule of thumb, to give the

promotion of democracy and human rights a slightly higher priority than

Republicans do, and are more likely to favor so-called 'humanitarian

interventions.'47 In line with the Democrats, Clinton in the beginning placed

priority on the ideal of promoting democracy and human rights in China.

Lampton noted that Washington's policy toward the People's Republic of China

(PRC) exhibited three principal features: first, to define and articulate the key

strategic interests that bind the two nations together (while remaining mindful of

frictions where they exist); second, to weave the fabric of economic

46 See Walter Russell Mead, “Central Foreign Policy Principles” The Council on Foreign Relations’s website, December 14, 2003 <http://www.foreignpolicy2000.org/library/issuebriefs/IBcfpp.html> 47 Mead, Central Foreign Policy Principles, 2000


~ 34 ~

interdependence that binds the two countries together (thereby making conflict

progressively more expensive for both peoples); and finally, to cultivate

bureaucratic and cultural ties that promote stability between the nations and

progressive change within China (by fostering mutual understanding and the

economic and social changes underpinning humane governance with creation

of a middle class being central. Going back to the Nixon-Mao era, Sino-

American relations were concentrated on the common purpose of eliminating

the Soviet enemy.48 In this period, security issues for the United States and

China overrode the human rights and economic issues, but the dissolution of

the Warsaw Pact and the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union eroded the security

rationale for productive U.S.-China relations. Lampton noted that some of the

glue holding the relationship together had been weakening since before the

collapse of the former Soviet Union, in part because of President Reagan's

initial pro-Taiwan proclivities. In response to Soviet overtures to improve

relations with Beijing, China adopted an "independent foreign policy" to reduce

dependence on Washington in 1982. In the United States, Americans became

increasingly aware of human rights abuses in the PRC (culminating in the 1989

Tiananmen Square violence) as well as China's transfers of weapons of mass

destruction-related technology to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and other

countries in the 1980s. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square violence, the security

48 David M. Lampton, “The Stealth Normalization of U.S.-China Relations,” National Interest;Issue 73: Fall 2003, p37 <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType= cookie,ip,url,uid&db=afh&an =10989506>; and Jin Canrong, “The US Global Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era and Its Implications for China–United States Relations: a Chinese perspective,” Journal of Contemporary China; May 2001, Vol. 10 Issue 27, p309 <http://search. epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db=afh&an=4439556>


~ 35 ~

rationale for Sino-American relations seemed to diminish and human rights

issues were seen as a comparatively more important concern for Washington.

Lampton noted that the White House could not durably define its hierarchy of

priorities in relations with Beijing. Unable to figure out what Americans really

wanted, and believing that the United States could never be satisfied anyway,

Chinese leaders gave Washington precious little. Since the Bush (Sr.)

administration, the United States seemed to place strong concern on human

rights violence in China. After the outbreak of 1989 Tiananmen Square violence,

Bush announced sanctions against the Chinese government, including

suspension of military sales and agreed on (30th November 1989) to a bill

passed by Congress to permit all Chinese citizens in the US on student visas to

remain in the United States until June 1990.49 The Clinton administration

inherited not only the human rights concerns from the Bush administration, but

also a number of goals in Sino-American relations after the Cold War that the

Bush Sr. had not yet set priority for. It was not clear whether the United States

should first promote democracy and human rights in China or promote US

economic interests, or the United States should continue to work with China on

security issues and leave other areas as secondary goals.

On the one hand, the United States wanted to promote democracy through

improvement of human rights and to articulate a policy that would respond to

the growing needs to boost U.S.-China economic interests. In a May 1993

report to Congress on the China issue Clinton confirmed that his administration

49 “US-China Relations 1979-2002,” US State Department’s website, November 9, 2004 <http://usinfo.org/usachina_e.htm>


~ 36 ~

“had made human rights a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy.”50 On the other

hand the United States needed to cooperate with China in many security issues

such as North Korea's nuclear program that threatened two important U.S. allies

(South Korea and Japan.) On the human rights issues, the Clinton

administration hoped that by providing economic incentives with the renewal of

Most Favorable Nation (MFN) status China would gradually improve its policy in

this area. Despite some improvement claimed by Clinton, there were many

major human rights abuses in China during this period, chief of which are the

following:

Tiananmen Square prisoners were not being released, as well as thousands

of longer-term prisoners, who remained in the Chinese gulag.

Forced abortion and religious repression were getting worse.

Torture was being used to extract confessions or to impose discipline.

In May 1993, Clinton drew a clear line with China about human rights, saying

that MFN would be renewed for one year only, and at the end of that time, if

China had not made demonstrable progress in seven specified areas, MFN

would not be renewed again. According to Lowell Dittmer, Clinton stipulated

seven criteria, giving two (pertaining to freedom of emigration and prison labor

exports to the United States) highest priority.51 The conditions were imposed by

executive order, allowing the administration to preempt Congress and reassert

its leadership on the issue and providing for flexibility in interpretation. Clinton

declared that "I am signing an executive order... [extending] most-favored nation

50 Dittmer, Chinese Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: A Realist Approach, 2001 51 In his article, Dittmer did not state in detail about the seven criteria. Human Rights Watch’s report <www.hrw.org> on China also did not specify the seven criteria.


~ 37 ~

status for China for 12 months," adding that "Whether I extend MFN status next

year, however, will depend upon whether China makes significant progress in

improving its human rights record ... I intend to put the full weight of the

executive behind this order."52 But when the year was up, Clinton announced

that China had failed in five of seven areas but said that he would renew MFN

anyway because he had decided that trade should not be linked to human

rights.53 A China analyst, Jonathan Fryer, noted in March 1999 that despite

major human rights abuses reported to be in place, the Clinton administration

quietly lifted most sanctions imposed against China in the wake of the 1989

crushing of the pro-democracy movement in and around Beijing's Tiananmen

Square. According to Frayer, arriving in Beijing only three days after the US

Senate voted by 99-0 to endorse a scathing resolution condemning China's

human rights record, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, echoing former

President Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement" with China, said that

talking with the Chinese is a better approach than shunning them. Furthermore,

the U.S. government signaled China that differences of opinion over human

rights would not necessarily hinder China's efforts to join the World Trade

Organization.54 Albright also said that Washington continued to have sharp

differences with Beijing but they believed that the best way to narrow U.S.-

China differences and to make progress where their interests coincided was

through regular contact and dialogue.55

52 Dittmer, Chinese Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: A Realist Approach, 2001 53 Muravchik, Carrying a Small Stick, 1996 54 Jonathan Fryer, (March 1, 1999) “How serious is Albright?,” BBC News’s website, November 9, 2004 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/288180.stm> 55 Fryer, How serious is Albright, 1999


~ 38 ~

On security issues and economic policy, the United States and China had many

common interests and became quite interdependent. The economic and

security interests are clearly the rationale for the Clinton administration to regard

China as a 'strategic partner.' The United States needed China's participation to

contain North Korea's nuclear ambition. China also had security interests

concerning the communist regime in North Korea. There are at least two

reasons for China to cooperate with the United States in the North Korean

nuclear crisis. On the one hand China sees communist North Korea as the

geostrategic isolant against the US’s influence on China's border. On the other

hand, China would feel a threat if North Korea could successfully develop

nuclear weapons; Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan might also be aroused

to possess their own nuclear arsenals. Without doubt, the three, especially

Japan, have enough resources and know-how to do so.

China would feel insecure, if Japan could also own a nuclear arsenal.

Therefore, the only good solution for China is to calm down North Korea's

nuclear ambition. Another rationale for China cooperating with the United States

was regarding Taiwan's independence move. China does need the United

States to maintain its recognition of the One China policy and maintain that

there would not be another Chinese state on the other side of the Taiwan Strait.

The Clinton administration maintained its support for Taiwan's defense but did

not support any independence move. According to Bruce Cumings, Clinton

stated in his policy over the China-Taiwan conflict that both parties should


~ 39 ~

resolve the conflict by peaceful means.56 During the Clinton years, Taiwan was

the source of continuing tension and several mini-crises between Washington

and Beijing; but the worst occurred in the spring of 1996, when China launched

missiles down near the Taiwan coast and Clinton moved two carrier task forces

into Taiwan's waters. That crisis caused Clinton to change his early policy of

denying any intent to defend Taiwan to the calculated and effective ambiguity of

not saying whether the United States would or would not defend the island.

In the Nixon administration, the United States downsized US-Taiwan relations

with the security rationale that the United States and China had the former

Soviet Union as a common enemy. In the Clinton administration the United

States and China had common interests in terms of economic and regional

security arrangements. While Taiwan is an important stake for the United States

to maintain its influence on China, Washington also needs Beijing’s cooperation

in regional security maintenance. If the United States would explicitly commit to

defend Taiwan, China would not cooperate in the North Korean nuclear crisis.

However, if Washington would not defend and let China annex the island, US

influence on China would diminish. Therefore, by leaving the ambiguity on the

issue of Taiwan defense, the United States can maintain its influence on China.

On the other hand, Beijing may not cooperate with the US in dealing with North

Korea’s nuclear crisis, if Washington would explicitly commit to defending

Taiwan or supporting Taiwan’s independence move. Jin Canrong noted that the

U.S. should continue its One China policy but insist on a peaceful reunification

56 Bruce Cumings, “Stay the course on Asia,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 57 Issue 1; Jan/Feb 2001, p. 29 <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType= cookie,ip,url,uid&db=afh&an =4009780>


~ 40 ~

as the two systems converging over time. Until then, it should supply Taiwan

with adequate military means to remain a de facto independent country. In

return, it should require Taiwan not to declare de jure independence, which

would trigger a war with China, involving the U.S.57

On the economic side the United States and China also had common interests

that produced partnership. China’s export-led growth depends, to a

considerable extent, on access to U.S. markets. Beijing also needed

Washington to endorse China's WTO membership. The Clinton administration

hoped that helping China become a prosperous country would also implant

democratic values in the world's largest remaining communist country. The

United States also sees China as an important trade partner, and U.S.

consumers could hardly deny that China is the main source of supply of

cheaper goods that is a leverage on the welfare of US citizens. On the other

hand, US corporations also saw an opportunity for growth with investments and

exports to China. Lowell Dittmer noted that in 1991, when the MFN issue first

emerged, America's China trade was relatively limited (China had a $15 billion

trade deficit with the United States), but China purchased U.S. $8 billion in U.S.

exports in 1992, an increase of 19 percent over the previous year, making

China the fastest growing U.S. export market in the world (and supporting some

200,000 American jobs). China's exports into the lucrative U.S. market grew

even more rapidly (then consisting in large part of goods produced by foreign-

invested factories), reaching $33 billion in 1993, $38 billion in 1994, and $45.5

57 Jin Canrong, “Lessons from the US-china Standoff,” Business Week Issue 3729; 04/23/2001, p. 130 <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db= afh&an=4326535>


~ 41 ~

billion by 1995 (contributing to a growing Chinese trade surplus).58 By the end of

the Clinton administration, in 1999, US export to China reached 13 billions,

increased by two folds compared to 1991(see the table “U.S. Trade with China

1985-2004” on next page.)

Bruce Cumings noted that during the Clinton years China moved from post-

Tiananmen pariah to membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and

from the reign of Li Peng and Deng Xiaoping—both deeply identified with the

Tiananmen crackdown—to the stolid but stable leadership of President Jiang

Zemin and the dynamic, often brilliant, economic mastery of Prime Minister Zhu

Rongji.59

U.S. TRADE WITH CHINA 1985-2004

Years U.S. Exports U.S. Imports Balance2004 34,721.00 196,699.00 -161,978.002003 28,367.90 152,436.10 -124,068.202002 22,127.70 125,192.60 -103,064.902001 19,182.30 102,278.40 -83,096.102000 16,185.20 100,018.20 -83,833.001999 13,111.10 81,788.20 -68,677.101998 14,241.20 71,168.60 -56,927.401997 12,862.20 62,557.70 -49,695.501996 11,992.60 51,512.80 -39,520.201995 11,753.70 45,543.20 -33,789.501994 9,281.70 38,786.80 -29,505.101993 8,762.90 31,539.90 -22,777.001992 7,418.50 25,727.50 -18,309.001991 6,278.20 18,969.20 -12,691.001990 4,806.40 15,237.40 -10,431.001989 5,755.40 11,989.70 -6,234.301988 5,021.60 8,510.90 -3,489.301987 3,497.30 6,293.60 -2,796.301986 3,106.30 4,771.00 -1,664.701985 3,855.70 3,861.70 -6

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce (See also http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2005 &m =March&x=20050302104631ebyessedo0.9311182&t=livefeeds/wf-latest.html)

58 Dittmer, Chinese Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: A Realist Approach, 2001 59 Cumings, Stay the course on Asia, 2001


~ 42 ~

Cumings added that China's continuing evolution owes much to an energetic

U.S. foreign economic policy that was the hallmark of the Clinton years and the

only "doctrine" that Bill Clinton can be associated with. His trade representatives

worked tirelessly to get China into the WTO, just as his economic advisers

depended on China to keep its currency stable during the aftermath of the 1997

Asian financial crisis. The justification for this strategy was always that

economic glasnost60 would clear a path toward political openness. In addition,

even if that has not yet happened, today there is a vast difference from 1992 in

the freedoms enjoyed by Chinese citizens. Clinton's policies both brought about,

and were supported by, an enormous business lobby anxious to continue

opening the China market.

By summary, Clinton's China policy was idealistic at the beginning with the

attempt to promote American values of democracy and human rights. However,

in practice the economic and security rationale overrode the human rights and

democratic values and made the Clinton administration adopt a more realistic

China policy. Washington realized that the United States needs to cooperate

with China on economic and security issues and toned down the human rights

conditions. On 20 November 1996, Clinton stated that “the United States has no

interest in containing China. That is a negative strategy. What the United States

wants is to sustain an engagement with China…in a way that will increase the

chances that there will be more liberty and more prosperity and more genuine

cooperation in the future. So I intend to spend a lot of time, a lot of energy, a lot

60 Glasnost means ‘Openness’ in the reform strategy under the leadership of the former USSR President, Mikhail Gorbachev.


~ 43 ~

of effort on that, but not with a view of containing the Chinese but with a view of

making them a genuine partner with ourselves and others as we move

forward.”61 Clinton's constructive engagement approach did yield some

improvement in human rights issues and produced many fruitful relations

between Washington and Beijing. Clinton's economic incentive (MFN status)

helped China improved its status from a pariah state to a responsible global

player with WTO membership. Stanley Kober and Halford Mackinder praised

Wilson's democratic idealism as noble; but they criticized that it failed to deal

with the world of realities.62 Similarly, Henry Kissinger noted that the United

States often starts off with intensely idealistic goals and then tone them down.

Clinton’s idealistic views on China regarding human rights could not be

translated into action at the expense of security and economic interests.

1.2. Clinton's Iraq Policy

The troubled relations between the United States and Iraq began when Saddam

Hussein and his Baath Party came to power. The pro-Soviet Baath party, which

adopted a socialist regime in Iraq since the 1960s, nationalized the oil

companies, thus cutting the oil supply to the United States and the West (in

1972). In 1979 Iranian nationalist students overran the U.S. consulate and took

US diplomats in Teheran hostage. Against the backdrop of the Teheran hostage

crisis, Saddam Hussein became Iraq's President. After the Teheran hostage

crisis US-Iraq relations turned to be more cordial. The relations between the two

61 “The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Howard In Canberra November 20, 1996” CSUF Pollak Library (California State University, Fullerton), January 10, 2005 <http://www.library.fullerton.edu><http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db=afh&an=9701206145> 62 See Stanley Kober, "Idealpolitik" in Richard K. Betts, (ed.), 2002, pp. 297-309


~ 44 ~

countries improved because they both had Iran as the common enemy. The

United States saw Iraq as an alternative to Iran (the US major oil supplier before

1979) for continuation of the oil supply to the West. During the 1980s Donald

Rumsfeld, then President Ronald Reagan's Special Envoy to the Middle East,

also tried to court Saddam's regime to secure oil supplies from Iraq.63

After the war with Iran ended in 1988, Iraq had a huge amount of international

debt owed to arms suppliers (the former Soviet Union, France, Germany,

Poland and China.) Kuwait was the biggest creditor among the neighboring

countries that provided financial support to Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war. In 1990

Saddam Hussein attempted to annex Kuwait with a hope that Iraq could use

Kuwait's oil revenues to repay international debts. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait

threatened the continuation of the oil supply from the Middle East to the West

(including Japan). This was one of the factors that provoked Washington to

intervene. The United States, in the Bush (Sr.) administration, led a coalition

force to sweep away Iraqi forces from Kuwait (Operation Desert Storm). Japan

and Germany provided the biggest financial resources in the operation. US-Iraq

relations became completely hostile after that. In retaliation for Operation Desert

Storm Iraq tried to kill former President Bush when he visited Kuwait in 1993.

The Clinton administration classified Iraq in a group of rogue states whose

behavior is not consistent with international norms, attempting to acquire

weapons of mass destruction, sponsoring terrorism, drug trafficking, and the

like.64

63 Jim Vallete et al, Crude Vision: An investigative Report, Institute of Policy Study (IPS) March 2003, p.2 64 “The Clinton Administration's Public Case Against Saddam Hussein,” New American Century project’s website, December 13, 2004 <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraq20040623.htm>


~ 45 ~

According to Robin Wright, since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, both

the Bush and Clinton administrations have based most U.S. intelligence

operations on the belief that Saddam Hussein ultimately could be replaced by

people with a major presence inside Iraq—either dissidents or, more likely,

disillusioned officials close to the Iraqi leader. However, after the 1996 debacle

in northern Iraq, when Hussein's military intervention closed down the CIA-

backed opposition headquarters, Senate Republicans have increasingly

questioned and refused to fund new internal operations. Key senators instead

wanted greater U.S. support for opposition groups whose leaders were largely

outside the country, including— ironically—the very group that was forced out of

northern Iraq and was then headquartered in London.65 However, Patrick

Clawson, an Iraq expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, noted

that during the Clinton administration, the US's Iraq policy had been to contain

Saddam’s regime by doing everything possible to keep U.N. inspectors and

international economic sanctions in place. Clawson noted that the sanctions

must be having some effect, because Saddam complained about them so

much. Indeed, they materially weakened Saddam's grip on power. They sharply

limited Saddam's imports of conventional weapons (Iraq could not make many

weapons parts on its own). In addition, they impeded the flow of needed

commodities for Saddam's cronies. Clawson added that, ultimately, neither

inspections nor sanctions got to the core of the problem, which was the nature

of the Saddam regime whose attempt was to develop nuclear weapons and

65 Robin Wright, “U.S. Dispute Holds Up Covert Iraq Operation,” Los Angeles Times, Jan 5, 1999. p. 1 <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?RQT=309&VInst=PROD&VName= PQD&VType=PQD&Fmt=3&did=000000038027028&clientId=17846>


~ 46 ~

other weapons of mass destruction. Instead of containing the Saddam’s regime,

the Clinton policy actually left room for Saddam to stay in power and continued

developing weapons of mass destruction.66 Clawson explained that Saddam

seemed to win everywhere there was a confrontation.67 According to Robert

Jaeger, after Operation Desert Storm, Bush Sr. sought to force Saddam

Hussein to comply with UN resolutions and to remove him from power and

Clinton also had the same goals, but he did not face down Hussein directly.

Saddam Hussein tested US resolve repeatedly.68 Until Clinton left the White

House, the Iraq’s dictator still managed to stay in power. Similarly Luke Boggs

noted that Clinton did not cow Saddam; instead Saddam was emboldened.

When Iraq tried to kill former President Bush in 1993 Clinton lit up a couple

dozen cruise missiles. He offered similarly limp responses when Iraq

periodically violated the no-fly zones. When Saddam expelled UN weapons

inspectors in 1997, Clinton briefly bombed Baghdad, changing nothing.69

The Clinton administration seemed not to give priority on Iraq issues and did not

seem willing to enforce regime change in Iraq. Clinton's foreign policy agenda

set in the very beginning of his first term settled on two specific priorities: (1)

help Russian President Boris Yeltsin to buttress democratic institutions and

improve his economy, and, more broadly, (2) stop the proliferation of nuclear

66 Patrick Clawson, “Show of Farce,” New Republic, Vol. 219 Issue 23; 12/07/98, p10 <http:// search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db=afh&an=13218000> 67 Lawrence F. Kaplan, “Rollback,” New Republic, Vol. 223 Issue 18; 10/30/2000, p28 <http:// search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db=afh&an=3691675> 68 Kenneth T. Walsh, “The Clinton doctrines,” U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 114 Issue 1; 1/11/93, p16 <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db =afh&an=9301070091> 69 Luke Boggs, “Bill Clinton and the 'Axis of Evil',” Human Events, Vol. 58 Issue 9; 3/4/2002, p12 <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db=afh&an=6315675>


~ 47 ~

weapons. Clinton concluded that both goals were particularly vital to America's

security.70 Clinton's foreign policy agenda did not focus on Iraq, but was

committed with idealistic goals in many other countries such as Somalia and

Bosnia. Andrew J. Bacevich noted that throughout eight years during which

Democrats controlled the White House, few things raised greater ire among

Republicans than the ineffectiveness with which Bill Clinton employed U.S.

military power. Attracting particular ridicule was Clinton's penchant for pinprick

air attacks portrayed as demonstrations of toughness and resolve. The impact

on Saddam and his regime was demonstrably nil. The effort to contain Saddam

Hussein displayed this tactic at its worst. As a symbol of allied vigilance,

American (and British) pilots flying nearly daily combat patrols over the so-

called no-fly zone launched dozens of attacks against Iraqi military installations,

in effect waging an open-ended war of attrition. Saddam's response was to

mount ever bolder acts of defiance. Luke Boggs noted that determined to

sustain the fiction that Saddam remains securely in his "box", but unwilling to

risk a showdown, Bill Clinton relied on a limited use of air power to camouflage

the deteriorating situation in the Gulf.71

Until 1998 the Clinton administration recognized that the containment policy

could not stop Iraq's nuclear ambitions and other WMD programs. The

Congress enacted the 'Iraq Liberation Act' and, according to a public argument

by Clinton's National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, the Clinton administration

70 Walsh, The Clinton doctrines, 1993 71 Andrew J. Bacevich, “Different Drummers, Same Drum,” National Interest; Issue 64, Summer 2001, p. 67 <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db =afh&an=4600271>


~ 48 ~

was "pivoting" to a policy of "regime change." The President signed the Iraq

Liberation Act, in November 1998, which pledged financial and military

assistance to the Iraqi opposition. Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk

characterized the new policy as 'containment plus regime change.'72 Joshua

Muravchik noted that during the Clinton administration, it was widely believed

that United States would not agree to the lifting of UN sanctions on Iraq until

Saddam were gone.73 At his press conference on 15 November 1998, Clinton

stated that the only solution was to install a new regime in Baghdad that would

have democratic legitimacy and respect for human rights. Lawrence F. Kaplan

noted that the question of the day became how to hasten the arrival of the new

government. Clawson noted that none of the available options was ideal.

Providing military support for the main opposition group (the Iraqi National

Congress) was seen as s a high-risk gamble, but it could deliver a high payoff:

ending the Saddam problem, solving the Gulf security conundrum, and relieving

Israel's fear of attack from the east. The option of supporting opposition-led

military operations therefore deserved more serious attention from the

administration than it had gotten, Clawson added.74 The lesson from Somalia

would be a rationale for the Clinton administration not to use ground troops for a

combat operation in Iraq in case they would want to remove Saddam Hussein

from power. David W. Ziegler noted that, in order to reverse the reaction of

American public opinion and with the fear from the lesson of the Vietnam War,

the Clinton administration lowered the commitment and withdrew US troops

72 Kaplan, Rollback, 2000 73 Muravchik, Carrying a Small Stick, 1996 74 Clawson, Show of Farce, 1998


~ 49 ~

from Somalia.75 Ziegler's note implies that after the operation in Somalia, the

Clinton administration was reluctant to deploy US combat troops on the ground

in other UN operations.

According to Robin Wright, in a letter signed by Senate Foreign Relations

Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (Republican from North Carolina) and two

other senators, in 1999, the Republicans accused the State Department and

Pentagon of refusing to implement the new Iraq Liberation Act. The letter

stated: "neither the Office of the Secretary of Defense nor the Joint Staff have

even begun work on plans for drawdown, equipping or training the opposition,"

claiming that "the commitment to support the political opposition to Saddam

Hussein had not trickled down through the administration."76 Wright noted that

both the [Clinton] administration and the intelligence community believed that

the congressionally mandated program was an empty gesture and waste of tax

dollars. Because the opposition did not have a front line within Iraq or along any

of Iraq's six borders, U.S. officials contended there was no viable site for

deployment of the military equipment. According to Robin Wright, a senior U.S.

official asked ruefully "where are we supposed to deliver the military

equipment—Bayswater?" referring to the London suburb where key Iraqi

opposition officials lived. In addition, one U.S. official stated that the [Clinton]

administration believed that the plan advanced by the Iraqi National Congress

to create a southern enclave that would attract defectors from Hussein's military

was "dreaming."77

75 David W. Ziegler, War, Peace and International Politics: Eight Edition, Addision Weslesy, New York: USA 2000, pp. 287-288 76 Wright, U.S. Dispute Holds Up Covert Iraq Operation, 1999 77 Wright, U.S. Dispute Holds Up Covert Iraq Operation, 1999


~ 50 ~

By summary, the Clinton administration's foreign policy agenda on Iraq was

limited to containing Saddam’s regime. The administration was unwilling and

could not remove Saddam from power because of many reasons. On the one

hand, Clinton criticized in the election campaign that the former President

George Bush placed too much emphasis on international affairs and [almost]

ignored domestic problems. Therefore, even though he followed Bush's

internationalism approach in other areas of foreign policy, Clinton seemed not

committed to carry on his predecessor’s attempt to overthrow Saddam's regime.

Instead of focusing on Iraq, the Clinton administration committed too many

idealistic (internationalism) foreign affairs agendas in other countries (Somalia,

Bosnia, and Haiti) thereby losing the focus on regime change in Iraq. Clinton set

first priority for a Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with Russia and the

Ukraine. The Clinton administration allocated the majority of the foreign policy

budget to the NPT agenda with Russia and Ukraine. Consequently, there was

only a limited amount of the budget—that was already reduced78—to be

allocated to the less focused agenda such as Iraq. This could impose a

constraint on the implementation of his Iraq policy.

Another factor that limited the outcome of the US policy in Iraq was Clinton's

approach in international affairs that he would not act or react without

endorsement by UN Security Council resolutions. Patric Clawson noted that,

according to the CIA, even if disclosure and inspection had worked, Iraq would

retain the expertise and the facilities allowing it to produce biochemical

weapons "in a matter of weeks," and nuclear weapons would take only a couple

78 In order to improve federal budget deficit, Clinton reduced spending, especially defense spending.


~ 51 ~

of years. This means that, if Saddam would ignore UNSCOM and would invade

Kuwait the next day, he could have biochemical weapons in less time than it

would take the United States to build up its forces for Operation Desert Storm.79

It seemed that even if he would be convinced that the Saddam regime was

developing weapons of mass destruction Clinton would still rely on the UN

inspections and sanctions to contain Iraq's regime. William Wallace noted that

Clinton agreed with the administration of George W. Bush that existing U.N.

resolutions on Iraq "would not do the job," in October 2002. However, Clinton

still suggested that U.N. weapons inspectors should be given one last crack at

uncovering any Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, noting that “it is important to

remember that Britain and the United States made real progress with the

international allies through the United Nations with the inspection program in the

1990s.”80 The last factor that limited the outcome of Clinton's policy in Iraq is

that there were limited choices available with the Iraqi National Congress to

overthrow Saddam Hussein and it was too late for Clinton to start promoting

regime change in late 1998.

2. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

In Campaign 2000, when presidential candidate George W. Bush looked out at

the world, he described himself as a "clear-eyed realist" whose approach is

"idealism, without illusions." He saw America's enemies falling into four

categories: "terrorists and crime syndicates, drug cartels and unbalanced

79 Clawson, Show of Farce, 1998 80 William Wallace, “Clinton Critical of Bush Policies,” Los Angeles Times; Oct 3, 2002 p. A.5 <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?RQT=309&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD&Fmt=3&did=000000204080271&clientId=17846>


~ 52 ~

dictators." He promised in the election campaign to proceed with caution before

getting America involved beyond its borders. In his premier foreign policy

speech at the Reagan Presidential Library, in November, Bush called

isolationism "an approach that abandons our allies and our ideals" and that

would produce "a stagnant America and a savage world. While looking to U.N.

agencies to address key challenges, Bush emphasized unilaterally asserting

American interests. He would engage with the United Nations and related

institutions only if major reforms were carried out and if America's share of the

budget was lowered. And he has pledged never to put American troops under

U.N. command."81 In an interview with ABC-TV's 'This Week' program, Bush

said: "The United States is going to have to work with organizations like the

United Nations to encourage them to stop genocide;" but he clearly clarified that

the president must set clear parameters as to where [American] troops ought to

be used and when they ought to be used."82 “The foreign policy of President

George W. Bush is revolutionary,” said Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay.83

His father's idea of a “New World Order” and his Democrat predecessor’s ideas

on “promotion of democracy” were replaced with unilateralism. Daalder and

Lindsay added that Bush has signaled on a number of issues that the United

States was prepared to go it alone, even if it put noses out of joint in other

countries - friend or foe.

81 Robin Wright, "Bush - Gore see global issues in different terms," Los Angeles Times,September 13, 2000 <http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/09/13/latimes.global/index.html> 82 Wright, Bush - Gore see global issues in different terms, 2000 83 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “America Unbound-The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy” The Brookings Institution’s website, November 7, 2003 <http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/afp/foreignpolicy.htm> <https://www.brookings.edu/press/books/chapter_1/americaunbound.pdf>


~ 53 ~

For Sino-American relations, China is a competitor, not a strategic partner for

the United States. Bush was highly critical of China for investing its growing

wealth in advanced weaponry and characterized its government as an "enemy"

of religious freedom. He criticized former President Bill Clinton's decision to

treat China as a ‘strategic partner,’ saying that a Bush administration would

consider Beijing as a 'strategic competitor'.84 He redefined how America

engages the world, shedding the constraints that friends, allies, and

international institutions imposed on its freedom of action. Bush has insisted

that an America unbound is a more secure America.85 This principle was also

included in the National Security Strategy in 2002. Richard Lister noted that “the

Chinese, Russians, even the Europeans, have all reacted sharply to what

appears to be a more prominent "unilateralism" in Washington.”86 Daalder and

Lindsay noted that since taking office the Bush administration has withdrawn

U.S. support from an array of agreements governing global warming, biological

weapons, and creation of an international criminal court. It has also worked to

water down a proposed pact limiting the sale of small-arms around the world.

Many analysts said that “Bush policies are isolating America.”87

President Bush and his advisor were saying that the UN is an irrelevant actor in

international conflicts and should only focus on humanitarian efforts that have

84 Richard Lister, “Analysis: Bush's foreign policy” BBC News Saturday, 7 April, 2001, 01:29 GMT 02:29 UK <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1265039.stm>; see also Wright,“Bush - Gore see global issues in different terms,” Los Angeles Times, September 13, 2000 <http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/09/13/latimes.global/index.html> 85 Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound-The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, 200386 Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound-The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, 2003 87 James Lindsay and Gregory Michaelidis, “Bush's Flair for Unilateralism Not Boosting International Ties,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, (August 3, 2001) in The Brookings Institution’s website, November 7, 2003 <http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/op-ed/lindsay/20010803.htm>


~ 54 ~

been proven to be done best by the UN.88 After September 11, the Bush

Doctrine combined unilateralism with pre-emptive strike, stating that the United

States will search and destroy the terrorists anywhere around the world. Bush’s

unilateralist stance produced resistance from allies and a negative image for

American engagement in international affairs and spoiled U.S. relations with

European allies, especially France and Germany. In response to the strained

relations with these two countries (as well as the EU) Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumsfeld suggested a switch to the 'New Europe' alliance with Bulgaria

and Poland to replace the 'Old Europe' of France and Germany.89 Washington

would have more freedom of action with the New Europe. According to Kevin

Anderson, with EU enlargement to 25 countries (on May 1, 2004) the new

member states are viewed as more pro-American. Most of these countries are

part of Rumsfeld's New Europe. Washington therefore continues to be the

biggest player in NATO because these countries see the Trans-Atlantic military

alliance as the main counterbalance to Russia in the region, which continues to

be these countries' main foreign policy concern.90

2.1. Bush’s China Policy

Presidential candidate George W. Bush said in 1999 that he would regard

China as a strategic competitor. However, like his predecessor Bill Clinton,

Bush came to office and implemented a more cooperative China policy. He

88 Shashi Tharoor, “Why America Still Needs the United Nations,” Foreign Affairs,September/October 2003 in foreignaffairs.org, August 17, 2005 <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82505/shashi-tharoor/why-america-still-needs-the-united-nations.html?mode=print> 89 Fred Kaplan, "Would Kissinger's Foreign Policy Make a Difference in Iraq?" The Cambodia Daily: Wednesday, August 18, 2004; p. 15 90 Kevin Anderson, "EU enlargement: Good for US?" BBC News Monday, 3 May, 2004, 08:53GMT 09:53UK <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3679181.stm>


~ 55 ~

managed to obtain a more secure strategic partnership with China than what

the Clinton administration did. The Clinton administration on 6 November 1999

announced a US-China agreement on terms for China's WTO Accession and on

11 December 2001, China formally joined the World Trade Organization

(WTO)91 after George W. Bush became US President.

According to Bruce Cumings, during the campaign Bush's foreign policy

advisers argued that the United States should commit itself to defending

Taiwan. They criticized Clinton's policies toward North Korea; and the

Republican party spent a great deal of effort in Congress vilifying China, running

investigations into allegations of Chinese influence-buying in the 1996 election

campaign, and examining the alleged theft of U.S. nuclear secrets at Los

Alamos.92 Jay Nordlinger similarly noted that, on the critical issue of China,

Condoleezza Rice—then prospective candidate for National Security Advisor or

Secretary of State—said that she would "strongly raise human-rights issues

every time with the Chinese leadership," and Rice was convinced that the

Chinese Communists "are living on borrowed time."93 However, the

administration of President George W. Bush translated the views above into

actions only for the first several months after Bush came to power. In the first

few weeks of the administration, Bush's team had found the relationship with

China less awkward than expected. The visit by China's chief foreign-policy

man, Qian Qichen, had concentrated on the differences over missiles, Taiwan

91 “US-China Relations 1979-2002” US State Department’s website, November 9, 2004<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina> 92 Cumings, Stay the course on Asia, 2001 93 Jay Nordlinger, “Star-in-Waiting,” National Review, Vol. 51 Issue 16: 08/30/99, p. 35 <http:// search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db=afh&an=2215465>


~ 56 ~

and human rights.94 Condoleezza Rice, as the national security adviser, was

pragmatic on the administration’s China policy. While supporting Bush’s tough

stance, she also favored strengthening the hand of the "liberalizers" in Beijing-

those who suppose (erroneously, according to Rice) that economic liberalization

can proceed without a political loosening. She said "I don't care if they believe

that. Economic liberalization is ultimately going to lead to political liberalization-

that's an iron law" while recognizing that "you have to be careful not to cause a

backlash against democratizing forces."95

Tension in US-China relations were fueled by the collision of a U.S. Navy EP-3

reconnaissance plane with a Chinese F8 fighter over the South China Sea on 1

April 2001. China arrested the US crewmembers on the EP-3 when the plane

made an emergency landing on Hainan Island. Johanna McGeary et al noted

that in talks with China's Vice Premier, Qian Qichen, (a week before the

collision of EP-3 reconnaissance plane) Bush bluntly said Washington would

sell whatever arms it chose to Taiwan, whether Beijing liked it or not. In addition,

Bush and his advisers seemed downright eager to prove there was a new

sheriff in town, ready to take a more hawkish, assertive posture on foreign

policy.96 After China released the four American EP-3 crewmembers (on 12

April 2001), President Bush (on 24 October 2001) authorized the sale of

defense articles and services to Taiwan, including diesel-powered submarines,

94 "Crashing To Earth," Economist, Vol. 359 Issue 8216: 04/07/2001, p29 <http://search. epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db=afh&an=4304330> 95 Nordlinger, Star-in-Waiting, 1999 96 Johanna McGeary, Jay Branegan, James Carney, and Tim McGirk, “Dubya Talks The Talk,” Time, Vol. 157 Issue 13; 02 April 2001, p. 24 <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct =true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db=afh&an=4241769>


~ 57 ~

anti-submarine aircraft, and destroyers.97 McGeary et al added that Beijing had

been adopting soft-line tactics toward Washington and seemed shocked to

discover that the Bush administration was tougher than the previous one.

Bush has plenty of advisers who see China as the looming enemy, a military

rival bent on asserting its dominance over the Pacific. He was sounding a hard

note on human rights and has resolved to go ahead with a Pacific missile shield

that Beijing opposes. However, at the same time Bush was being tugged hard in

the opposite direction by trade-minded business interests that want to preserve

engagement and cooperation.98 Bush sought to reassure Qian that "I am going

to look you in the eye and tell you that we can have good relations with China.

Nothing we do is a threat to you, and I want you to tell that to your leadership."

Bush said he was conveying an approach that would be "firm" but "respectful."

China adamantly opposed letting Taiwan buy four guided-missile destroyers

equipped with Aegis radar that can sound an alarm the millisecond a Chinese

M-9 missile is fired from the mainland, 100 miles away. Beijing fears the new

systems would give the island a military edge, whereas Taiwan says the Aegis

would merely even the score against the 300 mainland missiles aimed at it.

Beijing was also worried that the radar could eventually allow Taiwan to link up

with Washington's regional defense shield. "Of all the arms the U.S. could sell,

Aegis is the worst," said China's chief arms negotiator, Sha Zukang. Zukang

also added that "we hate this idea."99

97 “US-China Relations 1979-2002,” US State Department’s website, November 9, 2004 <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina> 98 McGeary et al., Dubya Talks The Talk, 2001 99 McGeary et al., Dubya Talks The Talk, 2001


~ 58 ~

On the issue of EP-3 reconnaissance plane collision, Bush gave a public

warning that China must return the aircraft and its crew, or risk undermining

hopes for a "fruitful and productive relationship between our two countries."

However, the Bush administration silenced senior voices on Capitol Hill who

wanted to confront China more vigorously, such as Jesse Helms, the chairman

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and managed to speak with one

voice. Helms sent a bill to the Senate floor opposing China's bid for the 2008

Olympics. More important, Congress had to vote on money for any new military

equipment the administration proposed to sell to Taiwan, such as the Aegis anti-

missile system. It also had to vote on renewing the bill that opened the way for

China's entry into the World Trade Organisation, unless China's entry was

completed by June 2001. On Wednesday, 28 March 2001, congressmen

proposed legislation to revoke China's trade benefits in the US market.100

China's President Jiang Zemin demanded that the United States issue a full

apology for the EP-3 collision. Bush agreed to let Colin Powell send a letter to

Ziang expressing regret about the missing Chinese pilot.101 Fareed Zakaria

noted that amid the nationwide celebration for the returning crew and the happy

consensus that America prevailed in the Hainan crisis, a few voices on the right

have been asking, "Did we (Bush administration) really win?" Conservative

commentators William Kristol and Robert Kagan said no: "They [the Chinese]

have won and we [the United States] have lost." Some within the Bush

administration have been leaking a similar line but they were in a minority. Most

100 "Crashing To Earth," Economist; Vol. 359 Issue 8216: 04/07/2001, p29 101 Crashing To Earth, 2001


~ 59 ~

conservatives were surprisingly supportive of the administration's

concessions.102

The Bush administration's policy toward China was transformed after the

September 11 terrorist attack. According to John Gittings, the Chinese

congratulated themselves on their speedy support for the Bush administration's

"war on terror," noting Professor Jia Qingguo, an expert on the United States at

Beijing University as saying that "it brought about an improvement in relations

that would have been "inconceivable prior to September 11." Gittings added

that, off the record, Chinese officials put it more bluntly: "Before September 11,

we were being cast as the enemy. But then Bush found a real one instead."

Beijing raised no serious objection to the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001,

though it had criticised the West's intervention in Kosovo two years previously.

Instead, China claimed that Muslim separatists in its north-western Xinjiang

region had been trained by the Taliban. It thus gained a free hand from

Washington for its own repressive policies against dissidents. China also

avoided direct criticism of America's invasion of Iraq.

In exchange for US support in China’s WTO accession, Chinese leaders had to

acquiesce in U.S. military action in Iraq. John Gittings noted that, in the Chinese

capital, where millions once marched to condemn US imperialism, the

authorities let a small group of foreigners walk around a park and demonstrated

102 Zakaria, Fareed, “Tough Guys Can Say 'I'm Sorry,” Newsweek, Vol. 137 Issue 17: 04/23/ 2001, p25 <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db =afh&an=4331436>


~ 60 ~

against the war for 20 minutes; no Chinese citizens were allowed to take part.103

According to Gittings, just days before September 11, Deputy Secretary of

Defense Paul Wolfowitz, one of the leading hawks in the Bush administration,

gave warning that the US should not be "complacent" about the possible threat

from China.104 Gittings added that one of Wolfowitz's earliest decisions as

deputy secretary of defense was to cancel an order of Chinese-made berets for

the US army. It looks like, before September 11, Washington was starting to

remove economic incentives from China. However, in order to get China's

acquiescence and cooperation on the war against terrorists, the United States

must keep the incentives. Taiwan has many supporters in neoconservative

ranks and in the US Defense Department and George W Bush himself has said

that he will do ‘what it takes’ to defend Taiwan but, after September 11, the

Bush administration has been reassuring Beijing that it does not support

Taiwanese independence moves. However, a huge arms package that Bush

offered to Taiwan three years ago was then going through, even though it was

opposed by Taiwanese peace movements, who fear it will trigger an arms race

with Beijing. Another post September 11 incentive for China was the U.S.

support for Chinese membership in the WTO in December 2001.

The Bush administration gave first priority to the security issue over the

economic and human rights issues. Like the Clinton administration, the Bush

administration also needs China's cooperation in North Korea's nuclear crisis.

Washington would have had harsh reactions to human right abuse such as the

103 John Gittings, “Half a superpower,” New Statesman, Vol. 134 Issue 4720: 1/1/2005, p16 <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,uid&db=afh&an=15423773>104 Gittings, Half a superpower, 2005


~ 61 ~

repression against Muslim separatists in China’s northwestern Xinjiang region, if

it occurred before September 11. The United States remained silent on this

issue after that time. In the press conference with former Chinese President

Jiang Zemin on 25 October 2002, President George W. Bush stated, "The

United States seeks and is building a relationship with China that is candid,

constructive and cooperative. We will continue building this relationship through

contacts at many levels in months to come, including a new dialogue on

security issues."105 He also added that a strong relationship between our

nations (the United States and China) will help to build a more peaceful

world.106 The above statement was made with the confirmation that China

supported Iraq's strict compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions. Bush

also urged China's President Jiang Zemin to support a new Security Council

resolution demanding that Iraq fully disarm itself of weapons of mass

destruction and added that US and China are also allies in fighting the war

against terrorists. The two presidents announced that the two countries agreed

that peace and stability in Northeast Asia must be maintained and both sides

would continue to work towards a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula and

a peaceful resolution of this issue.

However, Washington sometimes tends to be more aggressive on the idealistic

goals on human rights and Taiwan Defense. In March 2004, a year after the

Iraq war, a US State Department report accused China of "backsliding on key

105 “President Bush, Chinese President Jiang Zemin Discuss Iraq, N. Korea,” The White House’s website, November 9, 2004 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/print/20021025.html> 106 “President Bush, Chinese President Jiang Zemin Discuss Iraq, N. Korea,” The White House’s website, November 9, 2004 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/print/20021025.html>


~ 62 ~

human right issues" and pointed out that China was using the umbrella title "war

on terrorism" to conduct purges of those seeking independence through

peaceful means in China's Muslim region, Xinjiang.107 On Taiwan issues,

though Bush warned Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian of unilateral

independence moves, the Bush administration in the second term seemed to be

more aggressive on Taiwan defense. In February 2005, US Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld hosted

Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura and Minister for

Defense and Director General of the Defense Agency Yoshinori Ohno in

Washington for the Security Consultative Committee meeting. The two sides

issued a joint statement that for the first time included "the peaceful resolution of

issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue" and called for China's

military transparency among US-Japan common strategic objectives, along with

a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. 108

Outlining the State Department's strategic goals for the region at a foreign

affairs budget oversight hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on

March 2, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs

Evan Revere said the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs has placed

maintenance of regional stability at the top of its list of strategic goals …

complemented by US commitment to enhancing regional prosperity and

107 Benjamin Robertson, “China, US face-off on human rights” aljazeera.net, March 14, 2005<http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/50245433-9B01-43DC-BA45-E74184DD7C93.htm> 108 Jing-dong Yuan, “China seethes at US-Japan meddling” Aisa Times Online, March 16, 2005 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GB24Ad01.html>


~ 63 ~

liberty.109 Reve added that, in Northeast Asia, the State Department focused on

resolving security issues of the Korean peninsula, integrating China into global

and regional institutions, and maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan

Strait.

Beijing complained that there were also many improvements in human rights

issues over the past 12 months in 2004 and condemned the United States (and

Japan) for interference in China’s internal affairs for listing a peaceful Taiwan

Strait as a common objective. The US moves on human rights issues and

Taiwan defense provoked aggressive reactions in Beijing. On Monday 14 March

2005, China’s National People Congress passed an anti-secession law that

could authorize military attack to prevent Taiwan from seeking independence.

Though Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jia Pao said that the law was intended to

ensure peace, not promote war, he noted that China would not be afraid of

confronting foreign powers over Taiwan.110 The United States reacted carefully

to the new law. White House press secretary Scott McClellan said that

Washington views the adoption of the anti-secession law as unfortunate, adding

that it does not serve the purpose of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

McClellan noted that the Bush administration believes the new law runs counter

to recent progress in cross-Strait relations.

In a recent trip to East Asia as US Secretary of States, Condoleezza Rice met

Chinese leaders and talked with them about bringing North Korea back to six

109 “U.S. Goals for East Asia Emphasize Regional Prosperity, Liberty,” US State Department’s website, March 16, 2005 <http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y =2005&m=March&x= 20050302173002ASesuarK0.1506616&t=livefeeds/wf-latest.html> 110 Jim Yardley, “Secession law aims at peace, China says,” International Herald Trubine’s website, March 15, 2005 <http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/03/14/news/beijing.html>


~ 64 ~

party international arms talks. Before the trip, Rice noted, “we have said to both

parties (China and Taiwan) this is not helpful to have unilateral steps that raise

tension.” She added that China was a partner in diplomatic efforts to end

nuclear weapons development in North Korea even as other aspects of US-

China relations remain troublesome.111 It looks like Washington places higher

priority on North Korea’s nuclear crisis. The US still waits and sees as long as

the status quo of the strait remains unchanged.

By summary, Bush's China policy initially focused on idealistic attempts to

promote democracy in China and defend Taiwan. However, the Bush

administration gradually realized that the United and China are quite

interdependent in terms of security and economic cooperation. In practice,

Washington has lowered the weight on the Taiwan defense issue and human

rights concerns in favor of security and economic interests. Subsequently the

Bush administration regards China as an ally, not a competitor. However, after

securing China’s acquiesce in US military actions to enforce regime change in

Iraq, the Bush administration in the second term tends to revive an idealistic

goal on human right issues and Taiwan defense but the North Korean nuclear

crisis is still a constraint that prevents Washington from pressing China hard on

human rights and Taiwan’s defense.

On the economic side, the United States and China are even more

interdependent. Economic incentives may not be an appropriate tool to put

pressure on China. According to a recent article (March 2005) of the US State

111 “N. Korea, Taiwan top Rice agenda,” CNN.com Tuesday, March 15, 2005 Posted: 0013 GMT <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/US/03/14/rice.asia.ap/index.html>


~ 65 ~

Department, some members of the House of Representatives have submitted

legislation for repealing permanent normal trade relations (MFN status), which

the US extended to China as part of the WTO accession agreement. However,

a U.S. trade official says that such proposed legislative remedies, which he

characterized as restricting U.S. consumer choice, seemed to him "a very

curious policy choice" when one U.S. foreign policy aim is to encourage

economic freedom for Chinese consumers. The trade official also noted, "If you

think about China being our fifth largest export market and growing rapidly, I'm

not sure you want to kill that."112

On the final leg of her six nation Asian tour, Condoleezza Rice met China’s top

leaders in Beijing on Sunday 20 March 2005, with North Korea topping her

agenda. She urged the Chinese leadership to help restart stalled nuclear talk

with Pyongyang. Though Rice raised concerns on the “anti-secession law,” she

re-assured U.S. support for the ‘One China’ policy and urged China and Taiwan

to undertake peaceful means on cross-straits conflicts.113 Rice said during the

1999 presidential race that she would raise human rights issues every time she

meets Chinese leaders. However, this issue was not raised in the Sunday talk.

Though she stepped up her criticism after complaints that the U.S. was going

too easy on Beijing’s human rights records, Washington indicated that US would

not seek to censure China this year at the United Nations in this area.114

112 “Swiftly Expanding U.S.-China Economic Relations Stir Debate,” US State Department’s website, March 15, 2005 <http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Mar/03-588739.html> 113 “Rice presses China on North Korea” CNN.com, March 21, 2005 <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/03/20/rice.china/index.html> 114 Mark Margner, “Rice put pressure on N. Korea,” Los Angeles Times, March 22, 2005 <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-rice21mar21,0,6204355.story?coll=la-home-world>


~ 66 ~

2.2 Bush’s Iraq Policy

The obvious difference between the administrations of Bill Clinton and George

W. Bush can be found in the Iraq policy. The goals of the Clinton administration

were limited to the condition that Saddam’s regime comply with the UN Security

Council resolutions and cooperate in the weapons inspections. The Bush

administration inherited the unfinished job of 'regime change' in Iraq from the

Clinton administration. During the election campaign in 2000, presidential

candidate George W. Bush criticized former President Clinton for being too soft

on Iraq’s regime. Before September 11, in order to speed up the process of

regime change and replace the Saddam regime with a free democratic

government in Iraq, the Bush administration was considering retooling its Iraq

policy with two options. One option was to revise the military assistance to the

Iraqi National Congress; and another was the possibility that the United States

would use force to overthrow Saddam directly.115

The September 11 attacks transformed Bush's presidency. Both Democrats and

Republicans praised Bush for his handling of the events. He made a well-

received speech to Congress, notable for this blunt line: "Whether we bring our

enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done." In 2002,

Bush delivered his famous "axis of evil" speech, in which he labeled Iraq, Iran

and North Korea as threats to the United States and the world.116 The news

agencies and television networks compared the event on September 11 to

115 Neil Mackay, “Bush planned Iraq 'regime change' before becoming President” Sunday Herald, February 2, 2005 <http://www.sundayherald.com/print27735> 116 “US Election 2004 - Candidate George Bush” CNN.com, August 30, 2005 <http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/special/president/candidates/bush.new.html>


~ 67 ~

Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The September 11 event placed America’s

national security in danger; and both the Bush administration and public opinion

in the United States adopted an under-siege mentality. When American national

security was threatened, public opinion in the United States is aroused to have

Americans ready for war. The idealistic foreign policies of the last two

presidents were toned down when the Americans felt the threat and needed to

survive. The Preemptive Strike Doctrine, which associates with Bush’s

proclaimed clear-eyed-realist view, dominates US foreign policy after

September 11.

The United States launched the war against terrorists, in which US troops shall

search and destroy terrorist networks all over the world to prevent a third Pearl

Harbor (September 11 being the second Pearl Harbor). The Bush doctrine

ousted two brutal regimes, the first in Afghanistan with obvious connection with

Al Qaeda; and the second in Iraq with accusation that Saddam’s regime

attempted to acquire and possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The

accusation also noted that the regime used them against its own people and as

well as in the 1991 Gulf War.117 Though France and Germany initially produced

diplomatic setbacks in the UN Security Council, the Bush administration

managed to get these two countries and other European allies in NATO to

participate in the war against terrorists in Afghanistan. Bush’s attempt to enforce

regime change in Iraq, by the use of force, again experienced a tough setback

117 “U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council,” The White House’s website, November 7, 2003 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/ 20030205-1.html>; and “The Clinton Administration's Public Case Against Saddam Hussein,”New American Century’s project website, December 13, 2004 <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraq-20040623.htm>


~ 68 ~

from France and Germany. Russia also backed up the opposition in the U.N.

Security Council. With initiative from the British government, the UN Security

Council adopted Resolutions 1441, acknowledging that ‘Iraq breached the

council’s previous resolutions and the use of force may be applied against the

Iraq’s regime.’ The resolution was ambiguous; one side thought that the U.N.

Security Council needed to endorse U.S. military action in Iraq. This was the

voice from France, Germany, China, and Russia.118 Japan also silently

accepted this view.119 The French Foreign Minister, Dominic De Villepin,

believed the Resolution would commit America to securing specific UN approval

before going to war. The German Ambassador to UN, Gunter Pleuger, was

ambiguous on the use of force, while his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov,

insisted that any ‘ultimatum’ or language that could mean the use of force must

be negotiated out of the text.120 The U.S. asserted that the U.N. Security

Council already acknowledged that Iraq failed to comply with the previous

resolutions and… was subject to military action. Colin Powell said that “we

made it absolutely clear when we were negotiating 1441 that we believe there

was sufficient authority (for use of force) in that resolution.”121 With the report

from the CIA and the British Intelligence Agency, that Iraq possessed weapons

of mass destruction (WMD), the Bush administration, with its pre-emptive

doctrine, managed to convince Congress to agree to an official declaration of

118 Philip Gordon and Michael O’Hanlon, “Should the War on Terrorism Target Iraq?,” Policy Brief No. 93, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC: USA, January 2002 119 "Basic Strategies for Japan's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy: November 28, 2002," The Official website of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet <http://www.kantei.go.jp> 120 See “The Jigsaw in Piece,” BBC On Air Magazine No. 94, British Broadcasting Corporation, London, UK: March 2004; pp. 12-14 121 The Jigsaw in Piece, 2004


~ 69 ~

war against the Saddam regime; and so did Tony Blair's Labour Government

with the British House of Commons. Bush officially declared the second Iraq

war on 17 March 2003 giving Saddam Hussein and sons 48 hours to step down

to avoid the war.122 Some analysts noted that the Iraq war broke out because

most of the Bush administration officials were hawkish and they were veterans

of the first Gulf War ten years earlier.123 Though Secretary of State Colin Powell

was praised as the only moderate voice in the administration, Powell's Doctrine

was that the United States would use force when vital interests are concerned.

Without doubt, Iraq's oil resources overlapped with the objective of safeguarding

Israel as well as taking military control of the Gulf region were seen by the Bush

administration as vital for US interests.124

The crisis that developed after Operation Iraqi Freedom was completed is that

the United States and Britain could not find firm evidence that Iraq possessed

any WMD. The United States launched the attacks on Iraq based on the

ambiguity of the resolution without support from major allies in NATO, except

Britain. Subsequently Japan offered financial support with deployment of some

units of Self Defense Forces. The promotion of democracy was a secondary

goal of US actions in post-Taliban Afghanistan and post-Saddam Iraq. The

Bush administration first priority was to enforce regime change in both

countries. However, US-led coalition forces could not maintain order and full

control of these countries, after the fall of the two regimes. In the months prior to

122 “Timeline: Iraq,” BBC News’ website, March 13, 2005 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/737483.stm> 123 “Timeline: Iraq,” BBC News’ website, March 13, 2005 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/737483.stm> 124 See Neil Mackay, “Bush Planned Iraq 'Regime Change' Before Becoming President,”Sunday Herald, February 2, 2005 <http://www.sundayherald.com/print27735>


~ 70 ~

the war, the Administration stressed that regime change through U.S.-led

military action would yield benefits beyond disarmament and reduction of

support for terrorism; benefits such as liberation of the Iraqi people from an

oppressive regime and promotion of stability and democracy throughout the

Middle East. However, the coalition forces now are still fighting against an

insurgency that threatens security and stability throughout the country. Though

the United States declared the handover of sovereignty to the interim

government in Iraq on 28 June 2004, the situation in Iraq remains unstable.

When President Bush declared that combat operations in Iraq were over on 1

May 2003, the death toll on the US side was less than 150. The figure

exceeded one thousand during the U.S. presidential election in November

2004. Violence and anti-American bombing keep haunting US-led coalition

forces in Baghdad and many other parts of Iraq.125 With increased tension in

Iraq, the United States seeks UN support in rebuilding the country and

promotion of democracy. Before Operation Iraqi Freedom kicked off, Bush

promised an Iraq free of oppression and the goals of the United States are to

create a free and friendly government capable of upholding democracy and

counter terrorists in the post-Saddam Iraq. According to Adam Brookes, By

March 2005, the number of American military personnel who have been killed in

Iraq has passed 1,500.126 The casualties are now ten times more than the figure

reported at the completion of combat operation in May 2003. Brookes noted that

in the cold calculation of military operations, the American casualty levels are

sustainable. They pose no serious threat to the viability of operations in Iraq.

125 Adam Brookes, “US comes to grips with 1,500 dead,” BBC News Friday, 4 March, 2005, 00:02 GMT <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4316955.stm> 126 Adam Brookes, US comes to grips with 1,500 dead, 2005


~ 71 ~

However, a survey shows that public confidence in the war has eroded over the

last year. According to Gallup, one year ago 23% of Americans believed that

the war in Iraq was a mistake. Now that figure is 47%. Gallup also says that

nearly half of all Americans (48%) believe that neither side is winning in Iraq.

Brookes added that recent testimony in Congress strongly suggests the

generals and politicians are most concerned about the expense of the war and

the strains on armed forces equipment and deployments.127 On 26 June 2005,

CNBC Asia reported that 1,725 Americans died and 13,000 were wounded in

the Iraq war. Bush again experienced the pressure from the Congress and the

public opinion with the record low job approval for his presidency (41%, almost

as low as Richard Nixon did.)128 Congress and public opinion now want Bush to

set a specific date for withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, as they are skeptical of

the wisdom and the possibility of winning the war. Furthermore, they now

believe that the war against terrorists does not make Americans safer.129

Though both Republicans and Democrats praised Bush for handling the

situation in the post-September 11 period, Bush's Iraq policy became a serious

crisis that analysts portrayed as the object of division in American society. The

Bush team and its supporters claimed that US military action in Iraq helped

pave the way for promotion of democracy and brought about the end of a brutal

regime in the country; that will further stabilize security in the region. After

Operation Iraqi Freedom was accomplished, countries neighboring Iraq

declared that they are no longer involved in or sponsoring terrorism in the Israel-

127 Adam Brookes, US comes to grips with 1,500 dead, 2005 128 CNN News broadcast: June 26, 2005 (International Edition) 129 CNN News broadcast: June 26, 2005 (International Edition)


~ 72 ~

Palestinian conflict. These countries fear that the US may also attack them for a

connection with terrorism. This also paved the way for the Israel-Palestine

peace process to re-start. Other groups criticized the war in Iraq as not

justifiable with the loss of American lives and huge spending in the ongoing

operation.

More seriously, the Bush administration was alleged to being motivated by the

attempt to control Iraqi oil resources because Administration officials from the

Vice President to the national security advisors were involved with some oil

companies. Vice President Dick Cheney was a CEO of Halliburton. National

Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice served on the Board of Director at Chevron

Texaco. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was President Reagan's

special envoy for the Middle East. He was trying and failed to convince Saddam

Hussein’s regime to endorse a pipeline project (to be implemented by Mitchell

Company, if succesful), in order to secure oil supply from Iraq to the West in the

1980s. President George W. Bush was also accused of having a personal feud

with Saddam Hussein that attempted to kill his father, former President George

H. W. Bush, in 1993. He may also have felt that Saddam was a threat to his

own family. International analysts and European allies allegedly said that the

United States re-arranged the regional order because they want to control an oil

resource that is now getting depleted. Some of these allegations and analyses

can be justified. Speaking before the US Senate's Foreign Relations

Committee, on 18 January 2005, Condoleezza Rice implied that there were

many other motivations behind the war in Iraq as she pointed out the

relationship between Iraq and the Palestinian terrorists and the prospect of


~ 73 ~

implanting American values in the country.130 US Defense Secretary Donald

Rumsfeld noted that the United States has got too much invested, too much

committed, and too many lives at stake (in Iraq.) Rumsfeld added that it is the

security forces in Iraq that are going to defeat (that) insurgency.131

By summary, the initial goal of Bush's Iraq policy was to enforce regime change

in Iraq. Because the fall of Saddam's regime could pave the way for the United

States to arrange a new order in the Middle East, the Bush administration

intended to implement the policy by all means. September 11 is an event that

offered a perfect opportunity for Bush to justify his military action, first in

Afghanistan and second in Iraq. Though Bush declared his idealistic goals of

promoting democracy and bringing freedom to the Iraqis, the United States

used a security rationale to launch the attack against Iraq. The second Iraq war

re-arranges the Middle East status quo. It made Washington pay a great price.

The reputation of US involvement in international affairs eroded and the major

allies in international institutions such as the UN and NATO withdrew their

support for US actions. The United States went to war in Iraq without the

endorsement by the UN Security Council but later sought assistance from

traditional allies and the UN in rebuilding post-Saddam Iraq.132

Bush declared that the United States would bring democracy and freedom to

Iraq. But amid the growing violence and increased burdens (financial resources

130 “Rice spars with Democrats in hearing,” CNN.com, January 20, 2005 <http://www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/01/18/rice.confirmation/index.html> 131 Brian Knowlton, “U.S. warns Iraq on New Government,” International Herald Tribune’s website, March 21, 2005 <http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/03/20/news/policy.htm>; see also Jack Mosely, “Iraq Turning Out to be New Vietnam” Times Record, March 18, 2005 <http://www.swtimes.com/archive/2005/March/16/opinion/moseley.html > 132 “The Jigsaw in Piece” BBC On Air Magazine No. 94, BBC, London,UK: March 2004 pp.12-14


~ 74 ~

and the casualties) in fighting insurgents after the fall of the Saddam regime the

United States is now under pressure (both at home and from abroad) to

withdraw combat troops from Iraq.133 Though the hope of promoting democracy

and delivering freedom to the Iraqi people is still in doubt, the Bush

administration is now planning to hand over the responsibility to stabilize the

war-torn country to the Iraqi government.134

We have now reviewed Clinton and Bush’s policies regarding China and Iraq.

They are also summarized in the tables at end of this chapter. As noted in the

research problem, the study needs to identify the main factors that produce

policy in the two administrations. The study shall now determine the sources of

these policies and test a set of hypotheses to confirm which assumptions are

true and which are not.

133 “GOP lawmakers urge shift in Iraq plans” MSNBC’s website, August 17, 2005 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8197439/> 134 Brian Knowlton, “U.S. warns Iraq on New Government,” International Herald Tribune’s website, March 21, 2005 <http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/03/20/news/policy.htm> see aslso “White House rejects Iraq pullout timetable” Associated Press in MSNBC’s website, August 17, 2005 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8240852/>

US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold-War Era Hypotheses Analyses

~ 75 ~

US POLICY TOWARD CHINA

The Clinton Administration (1993 – 2001)

The Bush Administration (2001-2002)

Idealistic at the beginning; attempt to promote American values of democracy and human rights.

In practice, the economic and security rationale overrode the human rights and democratic values.

The Clinton administration adopt a more realistic China policy. Washington realized that the United States needs to cooperate with China on economic and security issues and toned down the human rights conditions. Clinton: China, US strategic partner.

Economic incentive would improve human rights issues, but not the ultimate tool. US consumer hardly deny cheap Chinese goods. Clinton’s economic advisors also saw China one of the markets that the US could export to and generate growth at home.

Bush described himself as “clear-eyed realist” whose approach is “idealism, without illusions.” He criticized Clinton for being too soft on China and he would regard China a strategic competitorinstead.

After September 11, Bush regards China as an ally. Washington endorsed China’s WTO membership, urged China to cooperate in the war against terrorists and North Korea’s nuclear crisis. Bush also obtained Beijing’s acquiescence on US military action in Iraq.

Sino-American economic relations become more and more interdependent. Economic incentive could not be a tool to pressure China to improve human rights records.


~ 76 ~

US POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

The Clinton Administration (1993 – 2001)

The Bush Administration (2001-2002)

Troubled relations after the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

Clinton also had a goal to overthrow Saddam’s regime, but criticized Bush Sr. for too much focus on Iraq. His priority was on enlarging democracy and Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty with Russia and Ukraine.

Clinton sought to reduce federal budget deficit: shrinking foreign policy budget. He chose only to contain Saddam regime; but recognized in 1998 that his policy could not stop Iraq’s nuclear ambition and other WMD program.

Congress enacted Iraqi Liberation Act seeking to replace Saddam with a friendly democratic government. Washington sponsored opposition group, the Iraqi National Congress (headquarter in London.)

The Clinton administration was not committed to the Congress-mandated policy.

Bush planned Iraq 'regime change' before becoming President. September 11 brought under-siege mentality to American leaders and the public.

War against terrorist and pre-emptive strike doctrine dominate US foreign policy. Bush named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as Axis of Evils and the threats to the United States and the world.

Washington accused Saddam regime of development and possession of WMD and used them in the past. UNSC Resolution 1441 demanded Iraq to fully disarm and subject to military action.

US Congress approved the declaration of war. US led coalition force overthrown Saddam regime in 2003. The Bush administration officials were accused of attempting to control Iraqi oil resources. Most of them involved in the Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

Bush promised to deliver freedom and democracy to the Iraqi people. However, US force could not maintain security and order in the post-Saddam Iraq.

The combat operation and the counter insurgency operation result in loss of nearly 2000 American lives. The Bush administration is under pressure, from Congress and the public opinion, to withdraw from troops from Iraq.


~ 77 ~

Chapter IV

HYPOTHESES ANALYSES

In order to draw a comprehensive conclusion, we shall now summarize the

relationships between the influential factors and foreign policy outcomes and

examine how the constraints contribute to the actual output of U.S. foreign

policies. The summary of findings is now used to test the five hypotheses (listed

in the introduction) and explain which factors do determine US policy in China

and Iraq and then explain why decision makers acted in such ways.

1. Under the Clinton administration and the Bush administration, the United

States attempts to promote the ideal values of democracy and human

rights in China and Iraq (hypothesis 1), and in each case, the policy is

made consistent with the different views of the individual president

(hypothesis 4): Though the above analysis explains that US global dominance

gradually diminishes in terms of economics and politics, the remaining single

superpower still enjoys the status of the largest economy in the world. The

United States has the largest defense spending and the most powerful military

capability. The US defense budget and military might are still bigger and

stronger than those of the rest of the world combined. Therefore, from the

Clinton administration to the Bush administration, the United States assumed

responsibility to re-arrange the post Cold War world order and tried to promote

the ideal values of democracy and human rights. Both Clinton and Bush


~ 78 ~

expressed strong support for the ideal policy during the election campaign.

However, the two presidents attempted to implement them just at the very

beginning of their first terms. They had to tone down their voices with the reality

that security and economic interests must be ensured first.

In the case of China, in particular, both Clinton and Bush criticized their

predecessors for being too soft on Beijing and said that they would press China

hard on human rights issues. In actual practice, each president became more

cooperative with China than their predecessors did because Washington needs

Beijing to cooperate in economic and security matters. Bill Clinton, at the

beginning, tended to give first priority to the promotion of democracy and human

rights over security and economic interests. George W. Bush proclaimed

himself a ‘clear-eyed realist’ whose approach is "idealism.”135 With a realist

view, Bush tended to give first priority to security matters, but he also intended

to promote the ideal value of democracy and human rights. As noted earlier,

Bush and his foreign policy advisors, especially Condoleezza Rice, criticized

Clinton for being too soft on China and said they would regard China as a

competitor and would raise human right issues every time they meet the

China’s leaders. However, from the Clinton administration to the Bush

administration, Washington’s priority in China policy has been first on security

matters, economic interest the second, and last on human rights issues. The

United States has tried to secure Beijing’s cooperation on security matters

(North Korea’s nuclear issues) before anything else. Both of the administrations

have been maintaining economic incentives and promoting trade with China,

135 See more detailed explanation in Bush’s Foreign Policy (Chapter III)


~ 79 ~

thereby hoping that Beijing will gradually improve its human rights record and

will lean toward democracy. Washington does not cut economic incentives or

stop trading with China though Beijing habitually fails to comply with human

rights requirements. Both Bush and Clinton gradually came to regard China as

a ‘strategic partner’ instead.

In the case of Iraq, the president’s views did have an impact on policy

outcomes. Clinton, who criticized his predecessor George Bush Sr. for too

much focus on foreign affairs and ignoring domestic issues, did not promote

regime change in Iraq. Saddam’s regime attempted to kill former President

George Bush Sr. in Kuwait in 1993. The Iraqi regime also failed to comply with

the UN Security Council Resolutions on weapons inspections. Clinton also

acknowledged that Saddam’s regime possessed biological weapons and was

threatening the US.136 These events offered many chances for Washington to

take measures that might topple Saddam.

However, Clinton limited his policy to containing Iraq from acts of aggression.

Bush Jr., who criticized Clinton for being too soft on the Iraqi regime, enforced

regime change in Iraq. Like the case of China, promotion of democracy

remained a secondary goal for both Clinton and Bush. Clinton’s doctrine was

about promotion of democracy in the rest of the world; but the Clinton

administration only sought to contain Saddam Hussein. There seemed to be no

agenda on human rights and promotion of democracy in Clinton’s Iraq policy.

On the one hand, Clinton might not offer incentives for Saddam’s brutal regime

136 “The Clinton Administration's Public Case Against Saddam Hussein,” New American Century project’s website, December 13, 2004 <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraq-20040623.htm>


~ 80 ~

to promote democracy. On the other hand, hostility between Saddam and the

United States was not favorable for democracy and human rights. When

security concerns and containment policy dominated the agenda, human rights

matters had lower priority.

Though Bush spoke of promotion of democracy and delivery of freedom to the

Iraqis, they were secondary goals in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Bush’s rationale

for the war in Iraq mainly dealt with security matters—the linkage between

Saddam’s regime and Al Qaeda terrorists and the fact that Saddam’s regime

was acquiring weapons of mass destruction. We now have two findings:

Hypothesis 1 is not verified because security and economic interests

supersede idealism in both cases.137 The study rejects this hypothesis

with the evidence that human rights and democracy are not always the

primary goals (Iraq case) and each president tends to give up these ideal

goals in favor of security and economic interests (China case).

Hypothesis 4 is not always true.138 The president's view sometimes does

not have an impact on foreign policy outcomes, especially when it is in

conflict with security rationales and economic interests (China case).

However, the president’s view will have an impact on the foreign policy

outcome, if it goes in line with security rationales and economic interests

(Iraq case). Clinton’s view on Iraq was that the United States needed to

solve domestic economic problems and focusing too much on Iraq was

137 See Introduction (Hypothesis 1 = Since the United States is enjoying the greatest economic and military power, the foreign policies of the administration of Bill Clinton and the administration of George W. Bush are to promote American ideals (democracy.) 138 See Introduction (Hypothesis 4 = Foreign policy outcomes of the two administrations are the reflections of different views of the individual presidents.)


~ 81 ~

not a good idea. He then chose only to contain Saddam’s regime. On the

contrary, Bush saw Iraq as a threat and the fall of the Saddam regime

would pave the way for the United States to control the Middle East. He

was preparing to topple Saddam’s regime since before taking office, and

finally implemented this in the second Iraq war.

2. The rational model determines priorities for the two administrations to

carry out their foreign policies (Hypothesis 2). To simplify, we need to test

whether or not the decision by each administration is based on the costs and

benefits analysis of the possible outcome of each course of action. As explained

earlier, both Bush and Clinton toned down their idealistic views in their China

policy for many reasons. Clinton, whose domestic economic policy was to

reduce budget deficits, sought to promote trade relations with China and other

countries, thereby guaranteeing economic growth at home. As noted earlier,

most officials in the Clinton administration were keen on improving human rights

in China but Washington toned down the volume on this issue for two reasons.

The North Korean nuclear weapons program was threatening US allies—Japan

and South Korea—and its interests in the region. Furthermore, Sino-American

relations have been increasingly interdependent in terms of economics. These

two areas are more important than human rights issues.

Bush’s domestic economic policy generates economic growth through tax cuts

and increased spending by the federal government (Keynesians economics),

therefore at the beginning the Bush administration downplayed economic

relations with China. Bush threatened to cut economic incentives for Beijing and


~ 82 ~

block China’s WTO membership. However, since the war against terrorists and

North Korea’s nuclear issues are more crucial, Washington again regards China

as a strategic partner. Bush keeps the economic incentives and endorses

China’s WTO membership. The population size of China and its status as a

great power in the region and as a permanent member of the UN Security

Council are also rationales for both administrations to seek cooperation and a

secure partnership with Beijing.

There are also many rationales for policies toward Iraq. Clinton, who feared

tense public opinion after Somalia and Bosnia, did not want dangerous

deployment of US combat troops to overthrow the Saddam regime. Clinton cut

defense spending to reduce federal budget deficits, therefore did not want

expensive military operations to enforce regime change. In this circumstance, a

containment policy was the best option. The Bush administration seems to be

more willing to take risk than the Clinton administration did in the Iraq policy. In

line with security rationales (the terrorists and WMD), the second Iraq war helps

Washington gain greater control in the Middle East (especially its control over

oil resources) which are a vital US interest.139 On the other hand, the Bush

administration also foresaw an opportunity to promote democracy after the fall

of Saddam’s regime. The Iraq war also increased defense spending and

therefore produced more economic activities that stimulated growth in the US.

The aftermath of the second Iraq war (the fall of a brutal regime in Iraq) also

broke up the deadlock in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, rekindling the

139 The Middle East was seen as vital to the US interests since the administration of Gerald Ford. Many analysts also noted that the Bush Jr. administration believes that the fall of Saddam’s regime would pave the way for Washington to control the oil-rich region.


~ 83 ~

democratic movement in Lebanon and produced positive changes toward

democracy in the rest of the region.

Bureaucratic decision-making processes may dominate the making of Iraq

policy in the Bush administration. Many of the senior officials of the Bush

administration used to serve in the administration of George Bush Sr. and were

involved in launching Operation Desert Storm in the first Iraq war. Most of them

allegedly have involvements in Iraq’s oil resources. These people may have

been biased in the decision to go to war in Iraq. Their voices together

dominated other moderate voices such as Secretary of State Colin Powell.

However, his doctrine was that the United States would use force when U.S.

vital interests were concerned. Since the administration of Gerald Ford, the

United States made it clear that the Middle East is vital to American interests.

Therefore, the Secretary of State also shared the same view with other

administration officials. Though most of the Bush administration’s officials have

a bureaucratic interest in seeing the second Iraq war proceed, security

rationales and other vital national interests have more impact in producing the

war. Bureaucratic decision-making processes may be one of the many

contributing factors that caused the outbreak of the second Iraq war, but the

security rationale is most influential factor in Bush’s Iraq policy.

We can now accept hypothesis 2 and claim that both of the administrations use

the rational-actor model to carry out their policies in China and Iraq.140 An

analysis by the BBC News website indicates that the view in the Bush

140 See Introduction (Hypothesis 2 = When foreign policies are carried out by the two administrations, the rational model will be applied; decision makers calculate the costs and benefits for each possible course of action.)


~ 84 ~

administration is that ‘action has to be taken before a country acquires nuclear

capability.’ According to this analysis, North Korea is believed to have nuclear

bombs, but Iraq did not. Therefore, it is too late with the former and action must

be taken against the latter. It added that another rationale for choosing action

against Iraq over North Korea is that Pyongyang is already an isolated regime

with huge domestic problems. Moreover, two of America’s regional allies –

South Korea and Japan – have an active policy of engagement to try to win

North Korea round to a more compliant line.141 On the other hand, while the

benefit in Iraq is more attractive to the US than in North Korea, the cost incurred

in the former would also be much less than the one that would incur in the latter,

if the US would invade the country. If the United States has to use force to

overthrow Pyongyang, it would most likely face a fierce reaction from China,

possibly similar to the Korean War. Washington managed to have China

acquiesce in regime change in Iraq. But Beijing will not tolerate the fall of the

communist regime on the Korean peninsula. The US did not fear a possible

China’s reaction in Iraq because Beijing was not willing and could not afford to

send large-scale troops to counter US’s military action in Iraq.

3. Interest Groups, Congress, and Public Opinion may have major impacts

on the outcomes of US foreign policy during the Clinton and Bush

Administrations (Hypothesis 3): In the China case, the Congress often

questioned the policies proposed by both presidents. However, the policy set

out by the president was not rejected by the Congress, though sometimes there

141 See “Q&A: North Korea's nuclear threat,” BBC News’ website, March 21, 2005 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2340405.stm>


~ 85 ~

is disagreement between the White House and the Capitol Hill over economic

incentives for Beijing and improvement in human right records in China. For the

Iraq case, the Clinton administration did not commit to implementing regime

change in Iraq though the Congress enacted the Iraqi Liberation Act seeking

regime change in the country. In the Bush administration, the policy that

promoted regime change in Iraq is proposed by the administration officials. The

Congress has the role to appropriate the monies and approve declarations of

war. From both the Iraq and China cases, the Congress, as a law making body,

may have an impact on the formulation of US foreign policy, but the body could

not influence the outcome of the policy at the implementation stages, if the

President does not commit to implementing the policy. However, the Congress’

powers to appropriate monies may limit the president’s ability to implement the

policy.

It seems that public opinion in the US has an indirect impact on the policies of

both administrations toward China. Some interest groups in the United States

influenced China policies of both administrations. Washington has repeatedly

lowered the weights on human rights issues, maintaining economic incentives

and trade relations with the country to create opportunities for US businesses.

As noted earlier, Clinton was driven by an enormous business lobby anxious to

continue opening the China market even that meant downplaying human right

goals.142 This policy is also in line with his economic policy, which largely

depended on export to generate growth at home. The Bush administration also

follows similar patterns in its China policy. According to a US trade

142 See Clinton’s China policy (Chapter III)


~ 86 ~

representative,143 China is the fifth largest export market of the United States

and it is growing rapidly, therefore Washington should maintain economic

incentives for Beijing in favor of US businesses.

For the Iraq case, Clinton's decision not to go to war in Iraq was largely a

reflection of his personal view and his domestic economic policy. Criticizing

former President George Bush Sr. for too much focus on Iraq, Clinton intended

to reduce budget deficits and cut defense spending. This, in turn, limited the

possibility that he would overthrow Saddam’s regime. Furthermore, after the

Somalia crisis in 1993, Clinton believed that public opinion would oppose

deployment of US troops that would result in the loss of American lives. This

implied that the Congress did not have significant influence on the outcome of

US foreign policy in the Iraq case.

Interest groups may assert their influence on foreign policy outcome through

lawmakers. Given that some interest groups wanted a regime change in Iraq

and lobbied law makers, the Congress enacted the Iraqi Liberation Act seeking

regime change in the country.144 The law did not motivate the Clinton

administration to overthrow Saddam’s regime.145 The influence of interest

groups might not significantly affect the actual outcome of Clinton's Iraq policy

and it could not supersede the influence of the president’s view on the policy

that is sensitive to national security, involving deployment of US troops and

143 See “Swiftly Expanding U.S.-China Economic Relations Stir Debate,” US State Department’s website, March 16, 2003 <http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Mar/03-588739.html> 144 This is just an illustration of the effect of interest groups’ influence on US foreign policy. As not in chapter III (Clinton’s Iraq policy) the Iraqi Liberation Act was the initiative of the Republican Senators that sought to pursue the unfinished job of the former Republican president George Bush Sr. in overthrowing Saddam Hussein. 145 See Clinton’s Iraq policy (Chapter III). The congress actually enacted the Iraqi Liberation Act.


~ 87 ~

resulting in casualties.146 As noted earlier, many reasons and allegations

indicate that some interest groups in the United States influence the outcome of

Bush's Iraq policy. The involvement of the Bush administration’s officials with oil

businesses is the strongest evidence.

Since interest groups did not always influence the Clinton and and Bush’s policy

toward Chiana and Iraq we shall now examine the effect of public opinion.

There is no firm evidence that major foreign policy outcomes (especially toward

China and Iraq) are made consistent with public opinion during the Clinton

administration and the Bush administration. Public opinion alone could not

produce the war in Iraq. The Bush administration capitalized on public opinion

to get Congress’s approval to go to war in Iraq. After September 11, the

American public supported the war against terrorism (in general terms).

However, there were demonstrations against the second Iraq war. Public

opinion strongly supported the war against terrorists in Afghanistan because

there was an obvious connection between Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime.

After the US launched the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and overthrew

the pro-Al Qaeda regime there, public opinion in the US seems no longer eager

to wage another war in retaliations for September 11. Therefore, American

public did not unanimously support the war in Iraq.

146 It may be the case that some interest group shaped the actual out come of Clinton’s Iraq policy. However, it is difficult to show evidence for above statement and a more in-depth study should be conducted before confirming the statement. The study needs more time and resources as well as access to some confidential documents. This is not doable in this study.


~ 88 ~

Because hypothesis 3 is very complicated, the study will verify its propositions

regarding public opinion, the Congress, and the interest groups separately.147

Because public opinion in the United States is sometimes manipulated by

political leaders to legitimize the president’s policy, US foreign policy may

not be made consistent with general views of the public. Moreover, public

opinion is not always unanimous; it is often made up of different views.

Therefore US foreign policy is made consistent with public opinion only in

certain circumstances.

The Congress may influence the formulation of US foreign policy but may

not directly influence the implementation process and therefore the policy

outcome is subject to the commitment of the president. However,

Congress’s power to appropriate the monies may affect the president’s

ability to implement a particular policy.

Because the White House controls the implementation process, though

Congress controls the budget, the lawmakers have a limited chance to

influence the actual outcome of US foreign policy. As noted by Stephen E.

Ambrose, Congress became content even eager to leave foreign policy

to the President, in the event of war and security threat.148 In pactice, if the

Congress enacts an idealistic policy, it may not be doable. For this sense,

the President may not take risk in implementing the Congress’s policy.

Interest groups have lesser influence on US foreign policy than the

Congress does. They may produce policy outcomes that may not be

147 See Introduction (Hypothesis 3 = The Congress, public opinion, and interest groups determine the outcomes of the foreign policies of the two administrations.) 148 Ambrose, The Presidency and Foreign Policy, 1991/92


~ 89 ~

sensitive to the national interest. If not conflicting with the President’s policy,

such outcomes may include economic incentive and sanction or, sponsoring

guerilla warfare or cultural activities in other countries. Interest groups may

not override the President’s view on major policy sensitive to national

security such as going to war with other countries. Going to war with other

countries involves deployment of US troops and results in loss of American

and therefore it is a sensitive policy. Though Bush’s policy is allegedly

influenced by interest groups involving oil businesses, national security and

the under-siege mentality after September 11 play a more significant role.

On the other hand, interest groups may not persistently affect the actual

policy outcome in a particular country. While they influenced the outcome of

Clinton's China policy and Bush’s Iraq policy, there is no firm evidence that

interest groups have a significant impact on Clinton’s Iraq policy and Bush’s

China policy.

4. The post Cold War environment of the international state system has an

impact on the foreign policy outcomes of the Clinton administration and

Bush Administration (Hypothesis 5): By nature, individual countries react to

change in the international state system. In the China case, the environment of

the international state system did partly shape US foreign policy outcomes, in

terms of security and economics. Driven by the need to maintain regional order

and security and to ensure economic interests, the Clinton administration

reversed its goals on human rights issues in China. After September 11, Bush

also had to reverse his tough stance against Beijing because the United States


~ 90 ~

needs China’s cooperation in the war against terrorism and North Korea’s

nuclear issues.

In the Iraq case, the Clinton administration did not enforce regime change and

relied on the U.N. inspection team to contain Iraq's aggression because Clinton

placed priority on nuclear proliferation and implanting democratic institutions in

the former Soviet republics. On the other hand, Clinton might fear that

deployment of US ground troops in Iraq would experience the same lesson as

in Somalia. The Bush administration turned out to be more aggressive against

Saddam's regime because the emergence of terrorist networks as non-state

actors and the September 11 attack brought about an under-siege mentality in

the United States. The Bush administration replaced 'containment’ with a

‘preemptive strike’ doctrine that led the United States to go to war in Iraq to

topple Saddam’s regime.

The Bush administration sees vital interests in post-Saddam Iraq and in the

Middle East. Therefore, the United States, in alliance with Britain and other

countries, went to war in Iraq without fearing military intervention from any

country or any international institution. The US and Britain led the coalition force

to go to war in Iraq and changed the regional order to serve their own interests

at the expense of Russia, China, and France, at least indirectly. But these major

powers and Germany (as rational state actors and mature democracies) did not

use force to oppose the US military action because it was not threatening their

national security and there was no chance of winning a confrontation. We,

therefore, accept hypothesis 5 with the conclusion that the post Cold War

environment of the international state system has a major impact on the foreign


~ 91 ~

policy outcomes in China and Iraq during the Clinton administration and the

current Bush administration.149

The above analyses explained the relationships between the influential factors

and constraints, and the outcomes of US policies in China and Iraq during the

Clinton administration and the Bush administration. Based on the acceptance

and rejection of each hypothesis, the study will draw conclusions on the main

factors that produced the foreign policies during each administration and the

reasons that policy makers acted in the manner described in each case. This

report will also try to offer recommendations on further study on US foreign

policy in the post Cold War era and the actions by other states in the last

chapter to come.

149 See Introduction (Hypothesis 5 = The international environment is the factor that produces the policy outcomes in the two administrations)

US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold-War Era Conclusion

~ 92 ~

Chapter V

CONCLUSION

1. THE INFLUENTIAL FACTORS AND DECISION MAKING:

Foreign policy is a complicated business where many factors are at work. In this

sense, this study intends to explain, “Which factor are the most important in

each case.” The findings in the hypothesis analyses above suggest that though

the president’s views may have a strong impact in the formulation of US foreign

policy, “national interest” is often the most important factor that determines the

actual policy outcomes. A rational decision-making model is often at work.

Since the Congress and public opinion are mechanisms that define national

interest, when an idealistic policy is pursued by the president, the Congress and

public opinion will then automatically review the policy goal and evaluate the

actual cost and benefit. If it is not vital to national interest, they may pressure

the president to give up the idealistic goal. Clinton’s policy on human rights in

China and promotion of democracy in Somalia reflects this.

The post Cold War foreign policy of the United States adapts to pragmatic

idealism. At the beginning of each new administration, the goal setting tends to

be aggressive and idealistic. However, because national interest is the major

factor that shapes US foreign policy, when translated into action, the rational

model often overrides the president’s view and more realistic goals will be

adopted. In order to convince the voters that he would be a better choice, a new

presidential candidate often differentiates himself from the incumbent president


~ 93 ~

by offering more idealistic promises. Therefore, the new administration often

brings in a new set of idealistic foreign policy goals.

However, when the cost of implementing a policy that is made consistent with

the president’s view is getting too expensive (especially when resulting in the

loss of American lives) or when the benefit is not attractive enough to

outbalance the cost, the United States will most likely not commit to

implementing the idealistic promise of the president (China policies of both of

the administrations.) When the cost may be not so expensive and may not

damage a vital national interest, US foreign policy may be made consistent with

the president’s view (Clinton’s Iraq policy). On the other hand, when the cost

may be very high but the benefits outbalance the cost, or are vital to national

interest, US foreign policy will most likely be made consistent with the

president’s view (Bush’s Iraq policy). In both the Iraq and China cases, if it does

not serve the vital national interest (mainly security and economics), the

president’s view may not be translated into action or may not be implemented

successfully.

Since economic factors influence foreign policy outcomes, the president’s view

on domestic economic policy may also have a major effect on the outcomes of

US foreign policy.150 If the president believes that the federal government

should increase public spending to generate economic growth (Keynesian

150 One view adopted by Bush, based on Keynesian economics as well as Reagan’s trickle-down economics, believes that federal government should increase public spending or cut tax to increase economic activities and thereby generates economic growth. The other view, based on international trade, believes that increased export will also increase economic activities and generate economic growth. Therefore the federal government could reduce budget deficit by cut federal budget, especially defense spending.


~ 94 ~

economics) and allocates huge budgets to defense spending, it is a signal that

foreign policy of the administration would turn to be more aggressive (Bush’s

Iraq policy). On the contrary, if the president believes that domestic economic

problems should be corrected through reducing federal budget deficits, the US

foreign policy would be less aggressive (Clinton’s Iraq policy). Because of the

uniqueness of the US economy (the biggest and most stable), Washington can

borrow a huge amount of money from abroad to fill the budget deficit. It is

unique because most countries in the world could not do it this way. Therefore,

as long as its unique economy still exists, the United States will still seek to

implement idealistic and aggressive policies toward other countries.

Congress and public opinion may also have an impact on the outcomes of US

foreign policy. However, the two factors have indirect influence on the

implementation of foreign policy. The most powerful influence the Congress

could have in shaping foreign policy is when it appropriates money. Though

senators may suggest a foreign policy goal, the power to implement it rests in

the executive branch (the President, the Secretary of State and related

organs.)151 Public opinion may reverse the President’s view on the war and

drove Lyndon B. Johnson to give up the election race for a new term;152 and his

successor, Richard M. Nixon, withdrew US troops from South Vietnam.

However, though Clinton withdrew US troops from Somalia with the fear that

tense public opinion would lead to a crisis like Vietnam, there is no obvious

evidence of public opinion’s influence on his Iraq policy. Though there were

151 See Clinton’s Iraq policy. Senators accused that the States Department and other administration’s officials did not trickle down the policy of regime change in Iraq. 152 Kissinger, 1994, p. 672


~ 95 ~

demonstrations against the second Iraq War, Bush managed to manipulate the

situation and reversed public opinion with his security rationale and the prospect

of promoting American values after the war. On the other hand, according to

Michael G. Roskin and Nicolas O. Berry, public opinion is volatile; it can support

a cause one year and abandon it the next year.153 Roskin and Berry noted that

the success of the quick Gulf War shot up the popularity of Bush Sr. to record

levels, but within a year opinion turned negative as a result of an economic

recession.

The post Cold War environment of the international state system is also a major

factor that influences the outcome of US foreign policy. The collapse of the

former Soviet Union and its communist ideology marks the triumph of American

democratic values. With the absence of the former Soviet Union, Washington

presumably has great freedom of action and an opportunity to arrange the New

World Order and attempts to export democracy to the rest of the world.

However, the United States embraces not only great opportunities but also

great challenges. In the last decade of the 20th century, although the US is the

remaining single superpower that has the largest economy and the most

powerful military capability in the world, Washington has been facing many

challenges in enhancing democracy. On the one hand, introducing democracy

into one country means that existing values and principles in the country will be

undermined. In a talk at Harvard Business School in December 2003, China’s

Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said that "all efforts of the China’s leaders will be

aimed at building China into a prosperous democratic, modern civilized

153 Roskin and Berry, 1999, p. 63


~ 96 ~

country.” But Wen noted that it is too soon for China to adapt democracy,

adding that conditions are not right yet for direct election of senior officials.154

In post-Saddam Iraq, the existing Islamic values and principles are also

challenging democratic values. Furthermore, aside from the financial burden,

US military operation in Iraq results in the loss of American lives. While the

death toll continues to rise, some American leaders and the public feel that the

cost of the war in Iraq outbalances the benefits of promoting democracy. For US

policies toward China, the North Korean nuclear crisis and the war against

terrorists are also major constraints that reverse the US attempt to promote

democracy. The counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq that is becoming more and

more costly is also weakening the US commitment to promoting this political

system in the country.

As the US is the remaining signle superpower, the policy decided on by

Washington has a major impact on the rest of the world. US policy toward China

helps maintain stability in the East Asia region. Bush’s Iraq policy produced a

destructive war in the country and resulted in the loss of lives on both sides.

However, the war that toppled the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein has

brought about many positive changes in the Middle East. Timothy Garton Ash

noted that the Iraq war was not right but there are many positive consequences

in the region after the war.155 Ash pointed out the Lebanese demonstrators for

154 “Wen: Too Soon for China Democracy” CNN.com, December 13, 2003 <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/12/10/china.wen.rights.ap> 155 See Timothy Ash, “The September 11 Attack Subject to the Law of Ironic Consequence,”The Cambodia Daily, Volume 31, Issue 22; Friday March 4, 2005; p 15. (Ash is professor of European Studies at Oxford University and author most recently of “Free World: America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West.” He contributed this column to the Los Angeles Times.)


~ 97 ~

independence, the serious beginnings of a Palestinian State (and the Middle

East peace process), the election in Iraq, and democratic reform in Egypt and

Saudi Arabia as positive consequences of the war in Iraq.156

2. AMERICAN VALUES AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER:

American idealism has been influencing the international state system since the

presidency of Woodrow Wilson. Though the United States failed to participate in

the League of Nations, Wilson’s fourteen points have been a guideline for the

World Order. Franklin D. Roosevelt re-invigorated Wilsonian idealism with the

establishment of the United Nations and Harry S. Truman followed up with the

Marshall Plan to uphold democracies in Western Europe. Every US President

followed the tradition of asserting American values against the rivaled

communist ideology. As explained in the literature review, idealism succeeds

only in certain circumstances; and, in most circumstances, realism overrides it.

Therefore, we conclude that US foreign policy in the post-cold war era will seek

to pursue the promotion of democracy in selective circumstances. Washington

will not go to war with other countries just for democracy, in the absence of a

security rationale or other vital interests.

The next US President, as did Clinton and Bush Jr., will most likely pursue

idealistic goals at the beginning of his (her) first term. However, the

administration will be more realistic and President tends to avoid aggressive or

idealistic policies toward other countries when the election for the second term

is approaching. Though he (she) could win in the second term, the President

156 Timothy Ash, The September 11 Attack Subject to the Law of Ironic Consequence, 2005


~ 98 ~

would be busy correcting problem of their policy in the first term. Moreover, with

problem pending from the first term, the President may not have a chance of

winning the Congress’s approval for a war against other country; and public

opinion would not support such idea. Therefore, if national security is not

threatened, the President will be more cautious in formulating foreign policy;

and most likely he (she) will not implement aggressive or idealistic policies

toward other countries (as he or she did in the first term). Capitalizing on the

collapse of the former Soviet Union, the United States intensifies the attempt to

shape the world with American values and idealism. Henry Kissinger noted that,

having marched to the drumbeat of exceptionalism, the American people would

find their ultimate inspiration in historic ideals, not in geopolitical analysis.157

America’s exceptionalism, according to Kissinger, is the belief in the universal

applicability of American values.158 In this sense, at the beginning of a new

administration, the United States will be aggressive in promoting American

values abroad and may neglect some interests. Kissinger added that “whether

fighting the world war or local conflicts, American leaders always claimed to be

struggling in the name of principle, not interest.”159 As noted earlier, Clinton

placed many idealistic items on his foreign policy agenda in the first term and

corrected the mistakes through withdrawal from area after area in the second

term. He limited his Iraq policy to a realistic goal. Similarly, Bush Jr. was very

aggressive in the war against terrorism in the first term. However, in preparation

for the second term’s election, the Bush administration diverted the focuses to

improving domestic economic welfare and correcting the problems in Iraq. In

157 Kissinger, 1994, p. 767 158 Kissinger, 1994, p. 668 159 Kissinger, 1994, p. 810


~ 99 ~

the second term of the Bush administration, Washington is now trying to avoid

aggressive policies against North Korea and Iran, the remaining parts of the

axis of evil.160

It is important to note that the president’s view and public opinion together could

produce aggressive policies that promote American ideals in the early years in

the first term of each president. Promising an aggressive foreign policy, which is

consistent with American exceptionalism, could help a presidential candidate

win the election. However, because in the implementation process American

exceptionalism161 is balanced against geopolitical or cost and benefit analysis,

each president will most likely adopt a less aggressive foreign policy later in his

or her terms in office, especially when the election (for the second term) is

approaching. In support of the above statement, a quantitative study by

Stephen G Walker, Mark Schafer and Michael D Young indicated that both

Bush Sr. and Clinton showed a lower tendency to use foreign policy

instruments162 later in their offices.163 The study investigated the behavior of US

foreign policies in four countries during the presidencies of Bush Sr. (Panama

and the Persian Gulf) and Clinton (Haiti and Bosnia).

By summary, the study now draws a general conclusion that: While idealism

influences the formulation of the US foreign policy, realism often supersedes it

160 Peter Baker and Dafna Linzer, “U.S. policy against ‘axis of evil’ foundering,” MSNBC’s website, 17 August 2005 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8976111/> 161 American exceptionalism, defined by Kissinger, is the belief in universal applicability of American values. 162 Bush Sr. and Clinton’s foreign policy instruments are their aggressive and idealistic goals in the four countries above during each administration, respectively. 163 Stephen G Walker, Mark Schafer and Michael D Young, “Presidential Operational Codes and Foreign Policy conflicts in the post Cold-War World,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution,Beverly Hill, October 1999 <http://proxyme.fullerton.edu:2057/pqdweb?index=15&did=0000000 44397318&SrchMode=1&sid=2&fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName>


~ 100 ~

in the implementation stage. The president’s view and public opinion, driven by

American exceptionalism, will make US foreign policy ‘aggressive and

idealistic.’ The uniqueness of the US economy and military dominance enables

Washington to implement such idealistic policies, but there are important

constraints. As noted, if Washington keeps pursuing too idealistic a foreign

policy, US global dominance would fade away. Therefore, at some point in the

future, the United States will stop implementing idealistic policy, especially when

its national security is not threatened and its military and economic dominance

ceases to exist.164

The findings in this study provide insight into the formulation and implemtation

of US foreign policy, but due to the scope and complication of such policies, the

study chooses not to offer recommendation in specific cases. However, some

issues for further study are suggested.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

3.1 The Irrational Element As an Influential Factor in US Foreign Policy

Noted in the literature review, a number of irrational elements also influence

foreign policy decision making; these elements can be best understood from a

164 As Kissinger noted, America’s ability to employ power to shape the world has actually decreased after the end of the Cold War. (Kissinger, Diplomacy, 1994, p. 809) In line with Kissinger’s note, China is now a rising great power and the US dominance is in decline. Furthermore, in co-incidence with the US national debt that accounts to over 50% of its annual national income, Alan Greenspan in 2004 noted that high debt economy will not last. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6867-2004May6.html> This trend will limit Washington’s ability to implement aggressive and idealistic goals in international affairs in the future; and if the United States keeps pursuing aggressive and idealistic goals, its global dominance would fade away. (According World Development Indicator data-querry <http://www.worldbank.org/data/dataquery.html> US Gross National Income in 2003 equal to USD 11,012,600,000,000 and, according to US Treasury Department’s website <http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/opd/opdpdodt.htm> total US public debt in 2003 amounted to USD 6,783,231,062,743.62.


~ 101 ~

psychological analysis of individual and group decision-making processes.

Goldstein believes that individuals (the national leaders) are the only true actors

in international relations; every international event is the result, intended or

unintended, of decisions made by individuals. Individual decision makers not

only have differing values and beliefs, but also unique personalities—their

personal experiences, intellectual capabilities and personal styles of making

decisions. The psychoanalytic approach holds that personalities reflect

subconscious influences of childhood experiences. In this sense, the study

suggests that there are differences in personalities and decision making styles

between Bill Clinton (Lawyer) and George W. Bush (Harvard Business

Graduate.) Such difference may have an effect on the outcome of US foreign

policy. Further study should examine the relationship between these irrational

elements and the actual outcome of US foreign policy during the presidencies of

Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.

3.2 Peace and Promotion of Democracy

US president Bill Clinton noted, “Democracies do not fight each other.”

Therefore, promoting democracy and a free market economy have been the

major goals of US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. It was

suggested that when a community of states becomes mature democracies

peace, would ensue because these states will become rational actors that tend

to avoid war. However, there are many obstacles in promoting democracy

because in order for a country to adopt such a system, the existing values need

to be replaced; and the existing regime may also be replaced. In this sense, the

attempt to promote democracy may also produce war (Iraq.) On the other hand,


~ 102 ~

some countries, keeping their existing regimes in place and adopting only a free

market economy, manage to maintain good relations with the United States and

reap great benefits from Washington’s attempt to promote democracy (China).

Based on these facts, further study should also explore how state actors react

in the post Cold War environment165 to achieve the optimum result and maintain

international peace and security.

3.3 Post September 11 US Foreign Policy

The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 brought about

major changes in US foreign policy. Driven by an under-siege mentality among

American leaders and the public, the Bush administration adopted the Pre-

emptive Strike Doctrine in which the United States searches and destroys

terrorists around the globe. The September 11 event also presents an

opportunity for the United States to promote regime change and install a pro-

democracy government in some countries that still are ruled by non-democratic

government.

However, Bush’s war against terrorists not only threatens the non-democratic

regimes, but also intensifies rivalry between American values (or Western

values a whole) and Islamic values. The international terrorists claim that the

Arab World is fighting a holy war (Jihad) against the United States and allies.

Terrorist attacks in major cities of western countries have been intensified.

Evident by two terrorist attacks in London within two weeks in July 2005, it

165 Post Cold War environment: An international state system after the Cold War that only one superpower lefts and now attempts to promote its own value in the rest of the world.


~ 103 ~

seemed that the United States (representing the West) and the terrorists

(representing Arab World) are driven by an under-siege mentality to continue

fighting prolonged wars. While terrorist attacks pop up in major cities in the

western countries the United States has pledged to search and destroy them

every where, crossing national borders. Therefore, further studies should

answer the following question:

Will September 11 serve as a watershed event that changes the parameters

of US foreign policy making for a long time to come?

Does the United States lead western countries to fight a global war against

terrorists or are they fighting an ideological war against Islamic values of the

Arab World?

The above recommendations may produce significant contributions to the study

of international relations. While the first recommendation may provide more in-

depth understanding in the formulation of US foreign policy, the second one

could contribute to international peace and security, and the third focuses on

the influence of elite and mass public perceptions of threats and the exposure of

a siege mentality in the United States. However, researchers may need to

define a new conceptual framework for the studies of these additional

questions. To make sure that the study is doable, researchers should select

only a number of countries and study a specific topic from the suggested list

above.

US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold-War Era Summary in Khmer

~ 104 ~

SUMMARY IN KHMER


~ 105 ~

neya)aykarbreTsrbs;shrdæGaemrik

enAsm½yeRkaysRgÁamRtCak;

(1). buBVehtuénkarRsavRCav³ karrlMrlayénGtItshPaBsUevot )annaMmknUvsNaþb;Fañb;fI°elIBiPBelak(New World Order) eRkayBIkarputrlt;eTAénsRgÁamRtCak;. shrdæ

GaemrikkøayCamhaGMNackMBUl(Superpower) EtmYyKt;EdlenAsl;kñúgBiPBelak

ehIymankMlaMgesdækic© nigeyaFa xøaMgelIseKkñúgsklelak. CamYyKñaenH

RbFanaFibtI George Bush (1989-1993) )anGHGagBIsNaþb;Fñab;fI°elIBiPBelak enA sm½yeRkaysRgÁamRtCak; EdlmanshrdæGaemrikbMeBjtYnaTICaGñkFanakarBar.

edayehtuplxagelI neya)aykarbreTsrbs;shrdæGaemrik Gacmanplb:HBal;

eTAelIRKb;RbeTsTaMgGs;enAelIBiPBelak. BMenalxagelI KWRsbeTAnwg GtItrdæmRnþI

karbreTsénshrdæGaemrik Colin L. Powell Edl)anEføgfa³ K°anRbeTsNamYynAelIBiPBelak EdlminTTYlrg\T§iBlBIshrdæGaemrikeT ehIyk¾K°anRbeTsNamYy Edlminman\T§iBl eTAelIshrdæGaemrikvij tamry³viFINamYyTal;EtesaH enaHeLIy.

ehtuenHkarsikSaRsavRCavBIneya)aykarbreTsrbs;shrdæGaemrik KWmansar³

sMxan;sMrab;bBaØaCn EdleFvikaviPaKeTAelIcMNgTak;TgRbTak;RklaKñad¾saMjúaM kñúg

TMnak;TMngGnþrCati nasm½yeRkaysRgÁamRtCak;. CamYyKñaenH vak¾mansar³sMxan;

pgEdr sMrab;karcgRkg nUvneya)aykarbreTs b¤neya)aykarTUtmYy EdlsMedA

sMerc[)aneCaKC½y.

(2). eKalKMnitsMxan;²³ edIm,IsRmYlkñúgkarBiPakSa eTAelIRbFanbTenAkñúgniekçbbTenH

CacaM)ac; eyIgRtUvkMnt;nUvGtßn½yéneKalKMnitsMxan;BIr KWRTwsIþtfniym (Realism) nig

RTwsIþ]tþmKtiniym (Idealism). RTwsIþtfniym nig neya)aykarbreTsEbbtfniym


~ 106 ~

mankaryl;eXIjfa RbB½n§Tak;TgCaGnþrCatirvagrdæ b¤RbeTsTaMgLay manPaBGna

Fib,etyü dUcenH rdæb¤RbeTsCati nimYy² RtUvEtsVHEsVgrkSakarBarplRbeyaCn_

rbs;RbeTsCatixøÜnCamunsin ehIyEtgmanninñakarmineGIeBI eTAelIplRbeyaCn_rbs;

RbeTsepSgeTot. Gñkneya)ayEbbtfniym EtgeyageTAelIeKalkarN_smPaBén

GMNac (Balance of Power) kñúgkarFanarkSasnþiPaBGnþrCati. cMENkRTwsIþ]tþmKti

niym b¤neya)aykarbreTsEbb]tþmKtiniym yl;eXIjfardæb¤RbeTsCati

TaMgLayGacshkarKña edIm,IedaHRsaybBaða nigEklMGrnUvsNþab;Fñab;BiPBelak

EdlmanRsab; tamry³sßab½nd¾smRsbmYy¬GgÁkarshRbCaCati¦ nig tamry³

eKalkarN_CarYmmYy¬c,ab;GnþrCati¦. neya)aykarbreTsrbs;shrdæGaemrik

manlkçN³]tþmKtiniym enAeBlvamaneKaledANamYy EdlmanninñakarbMeBj

esckIþRtUvkar rbs;RbeTsmYyRkum b¤shKmn_GnþrCati. karxitxMBRgIk b¤bNþúH[

mankarTTYlyk nUvsil,_tMélEbbGaemrikaMg (American Value)dUcCa liT§iRbCaFib,

etyüCaedIm KWCaeKaledAmYyEdlmanlkçN³]tþmKtiniym enAkñúgneya)ay

karbreTsrbs;shrdæGaemrik. karxitxMCMruj[sMerc)aneKaledA EdlmanlkçN³

]tþmKtiniym RtUvbg;karcMNayd¾éfø ehIymanktþaCaeRcInCa]bsKÁ.

(3). bBaðaRtUvsikSa³ edayBinitüeTAelI neya)ayrbs;shrdæGaemrik cMeBaHRbeTscin nig

RbeTsGIura:k; kñúgcenøaHsm½ykal énrdækarrbs;RbFanaFibtI Bill Clinton (1993-2001)

nigRbFanaFibtI George W. Bush (2001-2009) karsikSaenHBüayambkRsaysMnYrBIr

dUcxageRkamenH³

etImanktþaCacMbgGIVxøH EdlCH\T§iBleTAelIneya)aykarbreTs rbs;shrdæ

Gaemrik enAkñúgcenøaHeBlénrdækarrbs;RbFanaFibtITaMgBIr?

ehtuGIV)anCa GñkeFVIeKalneya)ayTaMgenaH sMEdgecjnUvGkb,kiriya dUcEdl)an

erobrab;enAkñúgkrNI nimYy²?


~ 107 ~

¬edaysarniekçbbTenHRtUv)ansresrcb;Rtwm enAExsIha qñaM2005 dUcenHlT§pl

énkarsikSaRsavRCavenH min)aneyageTAelIRBitþikarN_EdlekIteLIg enAeRkay

ExsIha qñaM2005 enaHeT.

(4). sm °tíkm°³ edIm,IbkRsay nUvsMNYrxagelI karsikSaenH)anbegáItsm °tíkm° cMnYnR)aMdUc xageRkam³

1- edayshrdæGaemrikmanzan³CaRbeTs EdlmankMlaMgeyaFa nigesdækic©

xMøagCageKbMputenAelIsklelak neya)aykarbreTs énrdækarrbs;RbFa

naFibtI Clinton nigRbFanaFibtI Bush KWmaneKaledApSBVpSay ]tþmKti

EbbGaemrikkaMg(American Ideals) eTAxageRkAshrdæGaemrik. ¬]tþmKti

EbbGaemrikkaMg KWsMedAelIlT§iRbCaFibetyü nigkareKarBsiT§mnusS¦

2- viFIsaRsþehtuplniym(Rational-Actor Model) RtUv)aneKykmkeRbIR)as;

enAeBlEdlneya)aykarbreTsRtUv)aneKdak;[Gnuvtþn_Cak;Esþg. GñkeFIV

esckIþsMerccitþ RtUveFvikaKNnaeTAelIéføRtUvcMNay nigplEdlGac

TTYl)anBIskm°PaBnimYy² EdlGacekIteLIg. 3- RBwT§sPa saFarNmti nig RkumGñktMNagplRbeyaCn_ (Congress,

Public Opinion and Interest Groups) CaktþakMnt;eTAelIlT§plCak;Esþg

énneya)aykarbreTs kñúgcenøaHsm½ykal énrdækarrbs;RbFanaFibtI

TaMgBIr.

4- plsMercénneya)aykarbreTs rbs;rdækarrbs;RbFanaFibtITaMgBIr KWRtUv

)anqøúHbBa©aMgtamry³ TsSn³erog²xøÜn rbs;RbFanaFibtITaMgBIr.

5- briyakasénRbB½n§rdæCaGnþrCati (International Environment) KWCaktþaEdl

begáIt[manlT§plCak;Esþgénneya)aykarbreTs kñúgcenøaHsm½ykalénrdæ

karrbs;RbFanaFibtITaMgBIr.


~ 108 ~

(5). ktþaCH\T§iBlnigktþararaMg³ tamry³karBinitü eTAelIRbvtþiénneya)aykarbreTs

rbs;shrdæGaemrik nasm½ymunrdækarrbs;RbFanaFibtI Clinton nigRbFanaFibtI Bush

eyIgBinitüeXIjktþaCH\T§iBl nig ktþararaMgmYycMnYn. ktþaCH\T§iBlrYmman³

menaKmn_viC¢a¬RTwsIþtfniym nigRTwsIþ]tþmKtiniym¦

tYnaTICaRbFanaFibtI¬RTwsIþtfniym nigRTwsIþ]tþmKtiniym¦

RBwT§sPa nigsaFarNmti

RkumRbwkSasnþisuxCati

ktþaepSgeTot³ kgVHeBlevla… nig bTBiesaFn_pÞal;xøÜn.

cMEnkktþararaMgvij KWbriyakasf° IénTMnak;TMngGnþrCati nigkarR)aRs½yTak;TgCamYy tYGgÁxageRkA¬eBalKWTak;TgeTAnwgneya)aykarbreTs enAsm½yeRkaysRgÁamRtCak;

rbs;RbeTsmhaGMNacepSgeTot¦.

(6). neya)aykarbreTs nasm½yeRkaysRgÁamRtCak;³ esÞÍrRKb;RbFanaFibtIénshrdæGaemrik

EtgmaneKalkarN_ edayELk² kñúgneya)aykarbreTsrbs;xøÜn. GñksarB’tman

EtgehAeKalkarN_TaMgenHfa CaliT§irbs;RbFanaFibtInimYy². taragxag eRkamenH

bgðajBIliT§irbs;RbFanaFibtITaMgbIrUb nasm½yeRkaysRgÁamRtCak;³

RbFanaFibtI qñaMkan;GMNac liT§i

Bush Sr. 1989 – 1993 sNaþb;Fañb;fI °elIBiPBelakNew World Order

Clinton 1993 – 2001 BRgIkliT§uiRbCaFibetyü nigcuHsiiT§isBaØaminrIk

sayGavuFnuyekøEGr CamYyRbeTsrusSI

nigG‘uyERkn.

Bush Jr. 2001- 2009 sRgÁamRbqaMgePrv³km° nigliT§ivaysáat;Camun


~ 109 ~

(7). eKalneya)ayrbs;RbFanaFibtI Clinton cMeBaHRbeTscin³ CadMbUg Clinton )ankMnt;yknUv

eKaledAEbb]tþmKtiniym edayBüayamBRgIkliTi§RbCaFibetyü nigkareKarBsiT§

mnusSenAkñúgRbeTscin. b:uEnþkúñgkarGnuvtþn_Cak;Esþg ehtuplEpñkesdækic© nigEpñksnþi

suxmanGaTiPaB BIelIkareKarBsiT§mnusS nigsil,_tMélénliT§iRbCaFibetyü. Cabnþ

bnÞab; rdækarrbs;RbFanaFibtI Clinton )aneRCIserIsyk eKalneya)aycMeBaH

RbeTscin edaymanlkçN³tfniymkan;EteRcInCamun. Rkugva:suIgetan)anyl;eXIj

fa shrdæGaemrikRtUvkarkic©shRbtþibtþikar CamYyRbeTscin enAkñúgbBaðaesdækic©

nigbBaðasnþisux ehIy)anbn§Úrbnßyl½kçxNÐ EpñksiT§imnusS. bnÞab;mk RbFanaFibtI

Clinton )ancat;Tuk RbeTscinfaCaédKUrCayuT§saRsþ. karelIkTwkcitþEpñkesdækic©

¬zan³CaRbeTsEdlTTYl)ankarGnueRKaHbMput-MFN¦ GacCYyEklMGbBaðasiT§imnusS

kñúgRbeTscin b:uEnþvaminEmnCa]bkrN_ EdlmanRbsiT§PaBTaMgRsug kñúgkareKobsgát;

Rkugeb:kaMg[EklMGr kareKarBsiT§imnusSenaHeT. eRkABIBlrdæGaemrikEdlmankarBi)ak

kñúgkarminTTYl ykTMnijd¾mantMélefak EdlnaMcUlBIRbeTscin RkumTIRbwkSaesdækic©

rbs;RbFanaFibtI Clinton k¾)anemIleXIjpgEdr faRbeTscinCaTIpSarmYy Edlshrdæ

GaemrikGacnaMTMnijecjeTAlk; edIm,IbegáIt[mankMenInesdækic©kñúgRsuk ¬shrdæ

Gaemrik¦vij.

(8). eKalneya)ayrbs;RbFanaFibtI Clinton cMeBaHRbeTsGIura:k;³ TMnak;TMngCamYyRbeTsGIura:k;

cab;epIþmmanbBaða bnÞab;BIsRgÁamQUgsmuRTelIkTImYynaqñaM 1991 EdlshrdæGaemrik

)andwknaMkgkMlaMgeyaFacMruHsasn_ beNþjkgT½BVGuIra:k;EdlQøanBanRbeTsKUEvt

[x©at;x©ayecjBIrdæGFibetyümYyenH. RbFanaFibtI Clinton maneKaledAcg;TMlak;

rbbdwknaM rbs; Saddam Hussein dUcGtItRbFanaFibtI Bush Sr. Edr. b:uEnþKat;)an

riHKn; GtItRbFanaFibtI Bush Sr. fa)anykcitþTukdak;eTAelIRbeTsGuIra:k;eRcIneBk ehIy

GaTiPaBrbs; RbFanaFibtI Clinton KWsMedAeTAelIkarBRgIkliT§RbCaFibetyü nig

sn§isBaØaminrIksayGavuFnuyekøEGr CamYyRbeTsrusSI nig G‘uyERkn. RbFanaFibtI


~ 110 ~

Clinton )ansVHEsVg kat;bnßy»nPaBénfvikarbs;rdæaPi)alshB½n§ ehIy)an

bNþal[mankarkat;bnßyfvika sMrab;cMNayeTAelIneya)aykarbreTs nigEpñk

epSg²eTotpgEdr. CalT§pl RbFanaFibtI Clinton )aneRCIserIsykeKalneya)ay

EdlRtwmEtmaneKaledAraMgxÞb;rbbdwknaMrbs; Saddam Hussein b:ueNÑaH. b:uEnþenA

qñaM1998 RbFanaFibtI Clinton )anTTYlsÁal;fa eKalneya)ayrbs;Kat;minGacbBaÄb;

mhicätarbs; Saddam Hussein kñúgkarksagGavuFnuyekøEGr nigGavuFsMrab;karsMlab;

rgÁal (Weapon of Mass Destruction—WMD) epSgeTot)aneT. bnÞab;mkeTIbRBwT§sPa

shrdæGaemrik)anGnumti c,ab;sIþBIkarrMedaHRbCaCnGIurak; (Iraqi Liberation Act) eday

sVHEsVgpøas;bþÚrrbbdwknaMrbs; Saddam Hussein ehIycg;dak;CMnYs edayrdæaPi)al

RbCaFibetyümYy EdlmanTMnak;TMngCamitþCamYyshrdæGaemrik. Rkugva:sIugetan)an

]btßmÖKaMRTdl;RkumRbqaMgmYycMnYn dUcCaRkumsmaCCatiGIura:k;(Iraqi National Congress)

EdlmanTIbBa¢arkarenATIRkugLúgd_¬RbeTsGg;eKøs¦. bu:Enþrdækarrbs;RbFanaFibtI

Clinton min)anmankarykcitþTukdak; nigkarebþCJacitþkñúgkarGnuvtþn_nUveKalneya)ay

Edldak;ecjmkedayRBwT§sPaenaHeT.

(9). eKalneya)ayrbs;RbFanaFibtI Bush cMeBaHRbeTscin³ Bush )anerobrab; GMBIxøÜnÉgfa

CaGñkneya)ayEbbtfniym EdlmanTsSn³vis½yc,as;las; (Clear-eyed realist)

nig maneKaledAEbb]tþmKtiniymedayK°anTsSn³RsBicRsBil (Idealism, without

illusion). Kat;)anriHKn;GtItRbFanaFibtI Clinton famanPaBTn;RCayeBk eTAelIbBaða

RbeTscin RBm)anEføgfaKat;nwgcat;TukRbeTscin CaédKURbECgCayuT§saRsþ. b:uEnþ

eRkayRBwtþikarN_ 11-kBaØa RbFanaFibtI Bush )ancat;TukRkugeb:kaMgCasm<½n§mitþmYy

eTAvij. Rkugva:sIugetan )anKaMRTsmaCikPaBrbs;RbeTscin enAkñúgGgÁkarBaNiC¢km°BiPBelak nig )anTTUc[Rkugeb:kaMgshkarkñúgsRgÁamRbqaMgePrvkm° nigvibtþiGavuF nuyekøEG‘rrbs;RbeTskUer:xageCIg. TMnak;TMngesdækic©rvag cin nigGaemrik manPaB

BwgEp¥kKñaeTAvijeTAmkkan;EtxøaMgeLIg². dUcenH karelIkTwkcitþEpñkesdækic©(MFN) Gac


~ 111 ~

Qb;mannaTICa]bkrN_ sMrab;Kabsgát;Rkugeb:kaMg [EklMGrkareKarBsiT§imnusS

eTotehIy.

(10). eKalneya)ayrbs;RbFanaFibtIBush cMeBaHRbeTsGIura:k;³ Bush )anerobcMKMeragkarpøas;bþÚr

rbbenAkñúgRbeTsGIura:k; taMgBImunKat;)ankøayCaRbFanaFibtImkemøH. RBwtþikarN_

11-kBaØa )anbNþal[ s°artIEdlhak;bIdUcCasßiteRkamkarvayRbharmYy eRCot cUleTAkñúgGarm°N_rbs;saFarNCn nigemdwknaMenAshrdæGaemrik. ehtuenHsRgÁam RbqaMgePrvkm° nigkarvaysáat;Camun )ankøayCaliT§imYy EdleKyl;faGacraraMgkar vayRbharsarCaf° IeTot. liT§ienHman\T§iBlxøaMgeTAelIneya)aykarbreTs rbs; RbFanaFibtI Bush. CadMbUg shrdæGaemrik)anpþÜlrMlMrbbtalIbg; enARbeTs

GahVkanIsßan EdlmanTMnak;TMngCak;EsþgCamYybNþajePvrkm°Gal;ékda(Al Qaeda).

RbFanaFibtI Bush )anehARbeTsGIura:k; GIur:g; nigkUer:xageCIg faCa sm<½n§PaBbisac

(Axis of Evils) nigCaeRKaHKMramkMEhg dl;shrdæGaemrik nig BiPBelakTaMgmUl.

bnÞab;mkeTot Rkugva:sIugetan)anecaTRbkan;rbbdwknaMrbs; Saddam Hussein

BIkarb:unb:g GPivDÆn_ nigmanrkSaTuk GavuFsMrab;sMlab;rgÁal (WMD) RBmTaMg

Føab;)aneRbIR)as;GavuFTaMgenH BIGtItkaleTotpg. esckþIsMercrbs;RkumRbwkSasnþisux

GgÁkarshRbCaCatielx 1441 (UNSC Resolution 1441) )anTTYlsÁal;fa RbeTs

GIura:k;)anel ° IsnwgesckþIsMerc elIkmun² ehIy)antMrUv[Rkug)adatrMlaysBVavuFTaMgRsug RBmTaMgdak;RbeTsGIura:k;[sißtenAeRkamcMnat;karEpñkeyaFa eTotpg.

RBwT§sPashrdæGaemrik)anGnumti eTAelIkarRbkassRgÁamTl;nwgRbeTsGIura:k;. kgT½BV

cMruHCatisasn_ EdldwknaMedayshrdæGaemrik )anpþÜlrMlMrbbdwknaMrbs; Saddam

Hussein enAedImqñaM 2003. buEnþmRnþIkñúgrdækarrbs;RbFanaFibtI Bush RtUv)anecaT

Rbkan; BIkarb:unb:gkan;kab;FnFaneRbgrbs;RbeTsGIura:k;. mRnþIPaKeRcInrbs;rdækarenH

k¾Føab;)ancUlrYmcMEnk enAkñúg RbtþibtþikarBüúHsmuRTxSac; (Operation Desert Storm)

kñúgqñaM 1991 pgEdr.


~ 112 ~

(11). karviPaKsm°tikm°³ edayBinitüeTAelIneya)ay rbs;rdækarrbs; RbFanaFibtITaMgBIr

cMeBaHRbeTscinnigRbeTsGIura:k; karsikSaenHGHGagcMeBaHsm °tikm°TaMgR)aMdUcxageRkam³minGacbkRsayfa sm °tikm°-1 RtwmRtUvTaMRsug)aneT eRBaHplRbeyaCn_ Ep° ñkesdækic© nigEpñksnþisux EtgEtmanGaTiPaBBIelI eKaledAEbb]tþmKtiniym

enAkñúgkrNIénRbeTsTaMgBIr. karsikSa)anRcanecal sm°tikm°enH edaysMGag elIPsþútag EdlliT§iRbCaFibetyü nigkareKarBsiT§imnusS minEmnCaeKaledAcMbg

Canic©kalenaHeT¬krNIRbeTsGIura:k;¦ ehIyRbFanaFibtInimYy² Etgmanninña

karlHbg;ecal nUveKaledAEbb]tþmKtiniym edIm,ICafñÚrnwgplRbeyaCn_ Ep° ñkesdækic© nigEpñksnþisux¬krNIRbeTscin¦.

TTYlyk sm °tikm °-2 edaykarsikSarkeXIjfa rdækarrbs;RbFanaFibtI TaMgBIr eRbIR)as;viFIsaRsþehtuplniym (Rational-Actor Model) kñúgkarGnuvtþn_eKal

neya)ayrbs;xøÜnenAkñúgRbeTscin nigRbeTsGIura:k;. PaBBwgEp¥kKña eTAvijeTAmk

rvagRbeTscinnigshrdæGaemrik kan;EtrIkFMeLIgCalMdab;. RbFanaFibtI Clinton

)anBRgIkTMnak;TMngBaNiC¢km°CamYyRbeTscin edIm,IFana[mankMenInesdækic© rbs; shrdæGaemrik. RbFanaFibtI Bush RtUvkarCacaM)ac; nUvkic©shRbtibtþikarCamYy

Rkugeb:kaMg enAkñúgsRgÁamRbqaMgePrvkm° nigbBaðaGavuFnuyekøEGr rbs;RbeTskUer: xageCIg. Rkugeb:kaMg)aneFVICabiTEPñkmçag cMeBaHsRgÁamGuIr:ak;. ehIyrdækarrbs;

RbFanaFibtITaMgBIr )anbn§ÚrbnßykarTamTar[mankarEklMGEpñksiT§imnusS enAkñúg

RbeTscin. ebIeRbobeFobkrNIRbeTsGIura:k; eyIgeXIjfavamanlkçN³hYseBl

sMrab;cMnat;karEpñkeyaFa cMeBaHRkugBúügya:g eRBaHRbeTskUer:xageCIg RtUv)aneK

eCOfaGacmanGavuFnuyekøEG‘r enAkñúgédrYcCaeRscehIy. müa:gvijeTot cMnat;kar

EpñkeyaFaGacRtUvbg;éføcMnayGs;eRcIneBk cMeBaHplRbeyaCn_Epñkesdækic© Edl

GacTTYl)anBIRbeTs]bTIVbenH eRBaHvaminmanPaBTak;Taj dUcenARbeTsGIura:k;

EdlsMbUreTAedayFnFaneRbgenaHeT. shrdæGaemrik GacRtUvbg;éføcMNay enA

kñúgRbeTskUer:xageCIg Gs;eRcInCagenAkñúgRbeTsGIura:k; eRBaHRbeTscinGacnwgmin


~ 113 ~

Gt;F°t;cMeBaHkarpþÜlrMlMrbbRkugBüúgya:g)aneT. Rbtikm °d¾xaøMgrbs;Rkugeb:kaMg kñúg sm½ysRgÁam]bTIVbkUer:naTsvtSTI50 KWCakMnt;sMKal;mYy.

¬sm°tikm°-3 manPaBsaMjúaMeRcIn dUcenHeyIgeFvikabkRsayedayELkKña CabIcMnuc KW ktþa RBwT§sPa saFarNmti nigRkumGñktMNagplRbeyaCn_¦

RBwT§sPaGacman\T§iBleTAelIkar cgRkgeKalneya)aykarbreTs b:uEnþminman

\T§iBledaypÞal; eTAelIdMeNIrkarGnuvtþn_Cak;EsþgeT. lT§plCak;Esþgénneya

)aykarbreTs KWrMBwgeTAelIkarykcitþTukdak;nigkarebþCJacitþ rbs;RbFanaFibtI.

bu:Enþ GMNacrbs;RBwT§sPakñúgkarGnumtifvika Gacmanplb:HBal; eTAdl;lT§PaB

rbs;RbFanaFibtI kñúgkarGnuvtþn_[)ansMercnUveKalneya)ayNamYy. edaysar

estvimanCaGñkRtYtRtaeTAelIdMeNIrénkarGnuvtþn_Cak;Esþg eTaHbICaRBwT§sPaRKb;RKg

fvika k¾smaCikGgÁnitibBaØtþienH¬RBwT§smaCik¦ man»kasd¾tictYcbu:eNÑaH kñúgkar

man\T§iBl eTAelIlT§plCak;Esþg énneya)aykarbreTsrbs;shrdæGaemrik.

CaBiess enAeBlmansRgÁamnigbBaðaTak;TgnwgsnþisuxCati RBwT§sPaEtgEtyl;

RBm¬ehIyEfmTaMgmansmancitþKaMRT¦ [RbFanaFibtI eFVICaGñkcat;Ecgneya)ay

karbreTs.

edaysarsaFarNmtþi enAshrdæGaemrik CYnkalRtUvGñkdwknaMneya)ayekgyk

CaRbeyaCn_ ehIyeFVI[vakøayCaCMnYydl;eKalneya)ay rbs;RbFanaFibtI enaH

neya)aykarbreTsrbs;shrdæGaemrik GacnwgminRtUv)aneFVI[RsbtamTsSn³TUeTA

rbs;saFarCn eLIy. dUcenH neya)aykarbreTsrbs;shrdæGaemrik GacRtUv

)aneKeFVI[RsbtamsaFarNmti Etkñúg»kasmYycMnYntUcb:ueNÑaH.

RkumGñktMNagplRbeyaCn_ man\T§iBlkan;EtexSayCagRBwT§sPaeTAeTot kñúgkar

kMnt;eTAelIlT§plCak;Esþg énneya)aykarbreTsrbs;shrdæGaemrik. BYkeKGac

man\T§iBl eTAelIlT§pléneKalneya)ay EdlminsUvb:HBal;xøaMgeTAdl;snþisux

Cati. RkumGñktMNagplRbeyaCn_minGacCMnH

elITsSn³yl;eXIjrbs;RbFanaFibtI cMeBaHeKalneya)aysMxan;²


~ 114 ~

Edlmanplb:HBal;xøaMgeTAdl;snþisuxCatidUcCa

kareFVIsRgÁamCamYyRbeTsNamYy CaedIm.

¬sm°tikm°-4 nig sm°tikm °-5¦sm°tikm °-4 minRtwmRtUvCanic©eT. TsSn³pÞal;xøÜnrbs;RbFanaFibtI CYnkalK °an\T§iBl eTAelIlT§plCak;Esþgénneya)aykarbreTs rbs;shrdæGaemrik enaHeT

CaBiessenAeBlEdlvaminRsbtam ehtuplxagsnþisux nigplRbeyaCn_esdækic©

¬krNIRbeTscin¦. b:uEnþTsSn³pÞal;xøÜnrbs;RbFanaFibtI nwgman\T§iBleTAelI

lT§plCak;Esþgénneya)aykarbreTs rbs;shrdæGaemrik RbsinebIvaRsbtam

ehtuplxagsnþisux nigplRbeyaCn_esdækic©¬krNIRbeTsGIra:k;¦. TsSn³rbs;

RbFanaFibtI Clinton cMeBaHRbeTsGIura:k;KWfa CacMbgshrdæGaemrikRtUvedaHRsay

bBaðaesdækic©kñúgRsuk ehIykarRbmUlpþúMkarykcitþTukdak;eTAelIRbeTsGIura:k;xøaMgeBk

minEmnCaCMerIsmYyd¾RbesIreT. pÞúyeTAvijRbFanaFibtI Bushyl;eXIjfabBaða

RbeTsGIura:k;CaeRKaHKMramkMEhgmYy ehIykardYlrlMrbbdwknaMrbs; Saddam

Hussein KWGacCYyRtYsRtaypøÚv [shrdæGaemrikRtYtRtatMbn;mCÄwmbUBa’TaMgmUl.

tMbn;mCÄwmbUBa’RtUv)ankMnt;faCaplRbeyaCn_sMxan;CayuT§saRsþ (Vital Interests)

rbs;shrdæGaemrik taMgBIsm½yrdækarrbs;RbFanaFibtI Gerald Ford (1974-1977)

mkemøH.

TTYlykTaMgRsug cMeBaHsm °tikm°-5. briyakasénTMnak;TMngGnþrCati nasm½y eRkays®gÁamRtCak; man\T§iBlCacMbgeTAelIlT§plCak;Esþg énneya)aykarbr

eTsrbs;shrdæGaemrik enAkñúgRbeTscinnigRbeTsGIra:k; kñúgcenøaHsm½ykalén

rdækarrbs;RbFanaFibtITaMgBIr. edaymankarujRcan BIPaBcaM)ac;kñúgkarEfrrkSar

sNþab;Fñab;nigsnþisuxkñúgtMbn; RBmTaMgPaBcaM)ac;kñúgkarFanarkSaplRbeyaCn_Epñk

esdækic© rdækarrbs;RbFanaFibtI Clinton )anERbRklas;ecjBIeKaledA EpñksiT§i

mnusSenAkñúgRbeTscin. eRkayRBitiþkarN_ 11-kBaØa RbFanaFibtI Bush k¾)an

ERbRklas;ecjBIeKalCMhrtwgrwgrbs;Kat; cMeBaHRkugeb:kaMgpgEdr eRBaHshrdæ

GaemrikRtUvkar kic©shRbtibtþikarCamYyRbeTscin enAkñúgsRgÁamRbqaMgePrvkm°


~ 115 ~

nigbBaðaGavuFnuyekøEG‘r rbs;RbeTskUer:xageCIg. edaysarmanPaBCaRbeTsEdl

manPaBcas;TMuxagliT§RbCaFibetyü¬elIkElgEtRbeTscinnigrusSI¦ nig CatYGgÁCa

RbeTsEdlRbkan;ykehtuplniym (Rational State Actors) RbeTsmhaGMNac

(Major Powers) kñúgBiPBelak dUcCaRbeTscin rusSI )araMg nigGaløWm:g; min)an

eRCIserIsykkareRbIR)as;kMlaMg RbqaMgtTl;nwgskm°PaBeyaFa rbs;shrdæ GaemrikenA kñúgRbeTsGIura:k;eT. ehtuplmYyKWfa vamin)anKMramkMEhgcMeBaH

sniþsuxCatirbs; RbeTsTaMgenHeT. Caehtuplmüa:geTot eTaHCaRbeTsTaMgenH

rYmKñaTaMgGs; k¾K°an»kasGacTTYl)anC½yCMnH kñúgkarRbQmmuxedayeRbIkMlaMgtTl;CamYyshrdæGaemrik enaHEdr.

¬esckþIsnñidæan¦

(12). ktþaCH\T§iBl nigkarsMerccitþ³

plRbeyaCn_Cati EtgEtCaktþasMxan;bMput EdlkMnt;lT§plCak;Esþg énneya)ay

karbreTsrbs;shrdæGaemrik. viFIsaRsþehtuplniym (Rational-Actor Model)

EtgEtRtUv)aneKykmkGnuvtþn_.

TsSn³pÞal;rbs;RbFanaFibtI eTAelIneya)ayesdækic©kñúgRsuk Gacmanplb:HBal;

CacMbg cMeBaHneya)aykarbreTsrbs;shrdæGaemrik. shrdæGaemrikGacman

lkçN³skm°RbyuT§xøaMgCagFm°ta(More Aggressive) enAeBlEdlneya)ayesdækic©

Ebb ReaganomicsRtUv)aneKGnumtiyk. edayeyagtamRTwsþI Keynesian

Economics edIm,ICYy[esdækic©egIbecjBIPaBdundab (Recession) rdæaPi)alRtUvbegáIn

karcMNay eTAelIvis½ysaFarN³ enaHvanwgbegáIt[manskm°PaBesdækic© eLigvij. rdækarrbs;RbFanaFibtI Reagan (1981-89) )anbegáInkarcMnayEpñk

eyaFa edIm,IRbkYtRbECgEpñksBVavuFCamYyGtItshPaBsUevot b:uEnþesdækic©rbs;

shrdæGaemrik k¾)anTTYlkarrIklUtlas;x<s; edaysarkarcMnayEpñkeyaFa

enHEdr. karbEnßmkarcMnayEpñkeyaFa eTAkñúg Keynesian Economics

RtUv)anehAfa Reaganomics EdleKTukCakarelIkkitþiysdl;GtItRbFanaFibtI


~ 116 ~

Ronald Reagan. pÞúyeTAvij RbsinebIrdæaPi)aleRCIserIsykneya)ayesdækic©

EdlsMedABRgIkTMnak;TMngBaNiC¢km° eKGaceFVI[mankMenInesdækic© eTaHCaman karkat;bnßynUvkarcMnaysaFarN³ edIm,IEksMrYl»nPaBfvikarbs;rdæaPi)al

shB½n§(Federal Budget Deficit) k¾eday. b:uEnþCalT§pl KWmankarcMNay

EpñkeyaFaticCagmun EdlCaehtunaM[neya)aykarbreTs rbs;shrdæGaemrik

manPaBskm°RbyuT§ticCagFmñta (Less Aggressive).

RBwT§sPanigsaFarNmti k¾Gacman\T§iBl eTAelIneya)aykarbreTsrbs;

shrdæGaemrikpgEdr. b:uEnþktþaTaMgBIrenHman\T§iBledayRbeyal eTAelI

dMeNIrkarGnuvtþn_Cak;Esþg.

enAkñúgbriyakasénTMnak;TMngGnþrCati nasm½yeRkays®gÁamRtCak; shrdæ

GaemrikTTYl)an»kasd¾manGMenaypl kñúgkarerobcMeLIgvijnUvsNþab;Fñab;

elIBiPBelak. buEnþRkugva:sIugetan )anCYbRbTHnUv]b,sKÁCaeRcIn dUcCa³

-karExVgKMnitKñarvagsm<½n§mitþ cMeBaHbBaðplRbeyaCn_Cati erog²xøÜn.

-karb:HTgÁicEpñkGarüFm’¬liT§RbCaFibetyü Tl;nwgliT§ikum° úynIsþ nigsil,_tMél énsasnaGIusøam¦

(13). sil,_tMélEbbGaemrikaMg nig sNaþb;Fñab;fí °rbs;BiPBelak RTwsþI]tþmKtiniymmaneRbobelIseK Etkñúgkal³eTs³mYycMnYnb:ueNÑaH. ehIykñúg

kal³eTs³PaKeRcIn RTwsþItfniymmaneRbobBIelIvij. dUcenHneya)aykarbreTs

rbs;shrdæGaemrik nwgbnþkarBRgIkliT§RbCaFibetyü Etkñúgkal³eTs³CaCMerIs

mYycMnYnEtb:ueNÑaH. Rkugva:sIugetannwgmineFVIsRgÁamCamYyRbeTsd¾éTeTot kñúgeKal

bMngBRgIkliT§iRbCaFibetyüEtmüa:gKt; edayK°anehtuplEpñksnþisux b¤pl RbeyaCn_ Edlmansar³sMxan;CayuT§saRsþ (Vital Interests) enaHeT.

TsSn³rbs;RbFanaFibtI rYmCamYysaFarNmtþi GacbegáIt[manneya)aykar

breTsmYy EdlmalkçN³skm°RbyuT§ kñúgkarpSBVpSayBItMél]tþmKtiEbb GaemrikaMg enAkñúgdMnak;kalcab;epþIm Pøam²énrdækarf° I rbs;RbFanaFitI nimYy².


~ 117 ~

(14). esckIþsnñidæanTUeTA³ enAeBlEdlRTwsþI]tþmKtiniyb man\T§iBleTAelIkarcgRkg

neya)aykarbreTsrbs;shrdæGaemrik PaKeRcIn RTwsIþtfniymEtgEtcUleTACMnYsvij

enAeBlEdleKalneya)ayenaH RtUv)aneKdak;[Gnuvtþn_Cak;Esþg. TsSn³rbs;

RbFanaFibtI rYmpSMCamYynigsaFarNmti eBlEdlRtUv)anCMruj edayCMenOeTAelI

PaBRbesIrdac;eKénsil,_tMélEbbGaemrikaMg (American Exceptionalism) nwgeFVI[

neya)aykarbreTsrbs;shrdæGaemrik manPaBskm°RbyuT§nigmanlkçN³]tþmKtiniym (Aggressive and Idealistic). American Exceptionalism

KWCaCMenOEdleKyl;fa sil,_tMélEbbGaemrikaMg¬liT§iRbCaFibetyü¦ KWGacRtUv)an

ykeTAGnuvtþ)anenAkñúgRbeTsTaMgGs;kñúgBiPBelak ehIynwgnaMmknUvvibulPaB dUcenA

shrdæGaemrikEdr. lkçN³BiessEbøkeKénesdækic© nigPaBxøaMgelIseKEpñkeyaFa

rbs;shrdæGaemrik GacCYyRkugva:sIugetanGnuvtþn_ nUveKalneya)ayTaMgenH[

)ansMerc bu:Enþvak¾enAmanktþararaMg sMxan;²mYycMnYneTot. eTaHCadUcenHkIþ RbsinebI

shrdæGaemrikenAEtbnþCMrujnUveKalneya)ayEdlman lkçN³]tþmKtiniymxøaMgeBk

enaHPaBxøaMgelIseKelIBiPBelak rbs;shrdæGaemrik GacnwgRtUvrlb;rlayeTAvij.

(15). Gnusasn_sMrab;karRsavRCavbnþ³ edayneya)aykarbreTsshrdæGaemrik manPaB

saMjúaMehIykarsikSaenHmanlkçN³TUlMTUlayeBk dUcenHvaminGacpþl;Gnusasn_

eTAelIneya)aykarbreTssMrab;RbeTsNamYy [Cak;lak;)aneT. b:uEnþkarsikSa

enH)andak;ecjnUvGnusasn_ sMrab;karRsavRCavbnþmYycMnYndUcxageRkam³

KYrBinitüemIleTAelITMnak;TMng rvagktþaEdlminTak;TgCamYyktþaGehtuplniym

(Irrational Factors) eTAnwglT§plCak;Esþg énneya)aykarbreTsrbs;shrdæ

Gaemrik enAkñúgsm½ykalénrdækarrbs;RbFanaFibtI Bill Clinton nigRbFanaFibtI

George W. Bush. ktþaTaMgenaHrYmmankarviPaKeTAelIEpñkcitþsaRsþ…nig

bTBiesaFn_pÞal;xøÜn rbs;RbFanaFibtI nimYy².


~ 118 ~

KYrBinitüemIlfa etItYGgÁCardæb¤RbeTs nimYy² manRbRBwtþkm°ya:gNa edIm,IsMerc )anlT§pld¾RbesIrbMput¬kñúgneya)aykarbreTs¦ nig edIm,IefrkSasnþiPaB nig

snþisuxGnþrCati kñúgsm½yeRkaysRgÁamRtCak;.

etIRBwtþikarN_ 11-kBaØa nwgkøayeTACaRBitþkarN_EdlmantYnaTICarbt;pøÚvmYy

Edlpøas;bþÚrktþakMnt;TaMgLay(Parameters) EdlbegIátnUvneya)aykarbreTs

rbs;shrdæGaemrik enAkúñgGnaKtd¾Evgq¶ayxagmuxeTot b¤eT?

etIshrdæGaemrikdwknaMRbeTselakxaglic RbyuT§kñúgRbqaMgePvrkm°enATUTaMgBiPBelak b¤mYyk¾RbeTsTaMgenHkMBugRbyuT§enAkñúgsRgÁammenaKmn_viC¢CamYy

EdlRbqaMgnwgsil,_tMélénsasnaGuIsøam rbs;BiPBGara:b;?

REFERENCE

~ 119 ~

REFERENCE

REFERENCE

~ 120 ~

Print Publication

1. Arens, William F; Boveé, Courtland L. Contemporary Advertising, fifth edition, Richard D. Irwin Inc, Illinois, USA: 1994

2. Baylis, John; Smith, Steve (ed.) Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford University Press New York, USA: 1999

3. BBC On Air Magazine No. 94, British Broadcasting Corporation London, UK: March 2004

4. Betts, Richard K. (ed.) Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Cause of War and Peace, Second Edition, Longman: New York, USA: 2002

5. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 57 Issue 1, USA: Jan/Feb2001

6. Business Week; Issue 3729, USA: April 23, 2001

7. Buszynski, Leszek. Russian foreign policy after the cold war, Praeger Publishers, Westport USA: 1996

8. Cooper, Robert. The Postmodern State and the World Order, Foreign Policy Centre (Demos) London, UK: 2002

9. Ducan, Raymond W.; Webster, Barbara Jancar; Switky, Bob. World Politics in the 21st Century; Longman, New York, USA: 2002

10. Economist; Vol. 359 Issue 8216: April 07, 2001

11. Evans, Graham; Newnham, Jeffrey. The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, Penguin Books, London, UK: 1998

12. Faust, John R.; Comberg, Judith F. China in the World Politics, Boulder, London, UK: 1996

13. Foreign Affairs Press: Vol. 70, No. 5, Council on Foreign Relations Inc., New York: USA: Winter 1991/1992

14. Foreign Affairs Press: Volume 73, Number 5; Council on Foreign Relations Inc., New York: USA: September/October 1994

15. Foreign Affairs Press: March/April 2000

16. Goldstein, Judith; Keohane, Robert O. Ideas & Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, & Political Change, Cornell University Press London, UK: 199X

17. Goldstein, Joshua S. International Relations, Brief Edition: Longman New York, USA: 2002

18. Harris, Stuart; Klinworth, Gary. China as a Great Power, (1st Ed) Longman Melbourne, Australia: 1995

19. Human Events, Vol. 58 Issue 9; USA: March 4, 2002

REFERENCE

~ 121 ~

20. Joel H. Rosenthal (ed.), Ethics & International Affairs, The Annual Journal of the Carnegie Council (New York) Vol. 14, 2000

21. Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10 Issue 27: May 2001

22. Karpov, Mikhail (ed.), Russia & China in post-Cold War World Politics: Course Reader for Winter Session, Central European University: 2001/2002

23. Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster, New York: USA: 1994

24. Levine, Herbert M (ed.). World Politics Debated, McGraw-Hill: New York, USA: 1992

25. Los Angeles Times, USA: January 5, 1999

26. Los Angeles Times, USA: October 3, 2002

27. Los Angeles Times, USA: September 13, 2000

28. McConnell, Campbell R; Brue, Stanley L., Economics: Principle, Problems and Policies, Fourteenth edition, Irwin/McGraw-Hill, Boston, USA: 1999

29. National Interest; Issue 64, USA: Summer 2001

30. National Interest; Issue 73, USA: Fall 2003

31. National Review; Vol. 48 Issue 16, USA: September 2, 1996

32. National Review; Vol. 51 Issue 16, USA: August 30, 1999

33. New Republic; Vol. 219 Issue 23, USA: December 07, 1998

34. New Republic; Vol. 223 Issue 18, USA: October 30, 2000

35. New Statesman; Vol. 134 Issue 4720; January 1, 2005

36. Newsweek, Vol. 137 Issue 17; USA: April 23, 2001

37. Nogee L. Robert, Donaldson H. Robert, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing System, Enduring Interest, Armonk, 1998

38. Papp, Daniel S; Contemporary International Relations (3rd edition), Macmillan Publishing Company, USA: 1991

39. Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 64, Issue 4, Chicago, USA: Winter 2000

40. Review of Politics; Vol. 63 Issue 3, USA: Summer 2001

41. Roskin, Michael G; Berry, Nicholas O. IR: The New World of International Relations (Fourth Edition), Prentice Hall New Jersey, USA: 1999

42. Roy, S. L. “Diplomacy”, Sterling Publisher, New Delhi, India: 1984

43. Russia & China in post-Cold War World Politics, Course Reader of the Central European University (CEU) by Mikhail Karpov, Winter Session 2001/2002

44. Samuelson, Paul A; Nordhaus, William D. Macro-economics: (15th edition),McGraw-Hill New York USA: 1995

45. Samuelson, Paul A. Nordhaus, William D. Micro-economics (15th edition), McGraw-Hill, New York, USA: 1995

REFERENCE

~ 122 ~

46. Shawcross, William. Sideshow: Kissinger Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia,The Hogarth Press, London: UK, 1993

47. The Cambodia Daily, Wednesday, August 18, 2004

48. The Cambodia Daily, Volume 31, Issue 22; Friday March 4, 2005

49. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Beverly Hill, October 1999

50. The New York Times, May 7, 2004

51. The Philadelphia Inquirer, USA: August 3, 2001

52. Time Magazine; Vol. 157 Issue 13; USA: April 02, 2001

53. U.S. News & World Report; Vol. 114 Issue 1; USA: January 11, 1993

54. Vallete, Jim et al, Crude Vision: An investigative Report, Institute of Policy Study (IPS) March 2003

55. Ziegler; David W. War, Peace and International Politics: Eight Edition, Addision Weslesy, New York, USA: 2000

Websites

56. American Diplomacy http://www.americandiplomacy.org

57. Asia Times http://www.atimes.com

58. Brookings Institution http://www.brookings.edu

59. BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk

60. CSUF Pollak Library http://library.fullerton.edu/ (California State University, Fullerton)

61. Clinton Foreign Policy Failure Page: http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/8514

62. Embassy of France in the US http://www.info-france-usa.org

63. Foreign Policy Magazine http://www.foreignpolicy.com

64. Human Rights report http://www www.hrw.org

65. International Herald Tribunes http://www.iht.com

66. London School of Economics http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/Default.htm and Political Science (LSE) (Department of International Relations)

67. Los Angeles Times http://www.latimes.com

68. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr (France)

REFERENCE

~ 123 ~

69. New American Century http://www.newamericancentury.org

70. New Perspectives Quarterly http://www.digitalnpq.org/

71. New York Times http://www.nytimes.com

72. Online NewsHours http://www.pbs.org/newshour

73. PBS.org http://www.pbs.org

74. President of Russia http://president.kremlin.ru/eng/

75. ProQuest http://proquest.com

76. Questia Media America, Inc. http://www.questia.com/Index.jsp

77. Sunday Herald http://www.sundayherald.com

78. Times Record http://www.swtimes.com

79. The World Bank http://www.worldbank.org

80. The World Fact Book (CIA’s) http://www.cia.gov/

81. The official website of http://www.kantei.go.jp/ the Prime Minister of Japan

82. UN Peacekeeping Operations http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/ Department

83. US White House http://www.whitehouse.gov

84. US State Department http://www.state.gov http://usinfo.org

85. Z Magazine Online http://www.zmag.org

86. Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com

~ 124 ~

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

~ 125 ~

US PRESIDENTS AND THEIR DOCTRINES DURING THE COLD WAR

President Years Doctrines Truman 1945-53 Contain the expansion of communism, presumably

everywhere. Eisenhower 1953-61 Prevent communist or other radical take over in

the Middle East. Kennedy 1961-63 Be able to respond flexibly to communist

expansion, especially to guerilla warfare. Johnson 1963-69 Follow through on the Kennedy Doctrine by

committing U.S. combat troops in Vietnam. Nixon 1969-74 Supply weapons but not troops to countries

fighting off communists’ attacks. (Strategic retreat from Vietnam: Peace with Honor)

Ford 1974-77 Continue the Nixon Doctrine. Carter 1977-81 Make clear to the Soviets that Persian Gulf is a

vital US interests. Reagan 1981-89 Sponsor anti-Communist guerillas who are trying

to overthrow pro-soviet regimes.

SOURCES: Derived from Michael Roskin and Nicholas O. Berry, IR: The New World of International Relations, Fourth Edition, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey: USA 1999, p. 65

Documents

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA