UTILITARIANISM AND MALTHUS’ VIRTUE ETHICS.

RESPECTABLE, VIRTUOUS, AND HAPPY

Sergio Cremaschi

Routledge, Abingdon, Oxford,

Aug 2014,

pages: 240

price: E. 109,79, US DOLL. 145,00

ISBN: 041573536X

ISBN-13: 9780415735360

Preface

1. Introduction: Malthus the Utilitarian vs. Malthus the Christian moral thinker

The die-hard image of Malthus the ogre has not completely disappeared yet. And yet, Malthus

showed no less concern than Adam Smith for the labouring poor’s lot. Without a reconstruction of

the intellectual framework within which Malthus’s pro-Poor evaluative judgments were

formulated however, the exercise of listing such judgments would not help too much in

understanding who Malthus really was and why could he be tragically misunderstood. We need to

know what moral philosophy, what view of natural science, and what view of the “moral and

political science” Malthus endorsed. Such a systematic reconstruction is what is offered here.

In a nutshell, Malthus’s understanding of his own population theory and political economy was

that of sub-disciplines of moral and political philosophy. Empirical enquiries required in order to

be able to pronounce justified value judgments on such matters as the Poor Laws. But Malthus’s

population theory and political economy were no value-free science and his policy advice – far

from being ‘utilitarian’ – resulted from his overall system of ideas and was explicitly based on a set

of familiar moral assumptions. It is mistaken to claim that Malthus’s explanation of disharmony by

reference to Divine Wisdom is extraneous to analysis and without influence on the theory of

policy. It is true instead that consequentialist voluntarist – or theological consequentialist –

considerations of a sort were appealed to within the context of his moral epistemology in order to

provide a justification for received moral rules, but such considerations were meant to justify a

rather traditional normative ethics, quite far from the Benthamite ‘new morality’.

2. Eighteenth-century Anglican ethics

ETHICS IN THE CONTEXT OF CAMBRIDGE EDUCATION

A NON-CALVINIST ETHICAL TRADITION

CAMBRIDGE MORAL PHILOSOPHY AT MALTHUS’S TIME

Hey

Watson

Paley

Watts

NON-OFFICIAL SOURCES

Tucker

Hume

The chapter gives an overview of eighteenth-century Anglican ethics, noticing how the Cambridge

tradition gave special weight to natural theology as opposed to positive or revealed theology – and

how two Cambridge fellows, John Gay and Thomas Brown, elaborated on Cumberland’s (and

Malebranche’s, as well as Leibniz’s) strategy for finding a third way between intellectualist view

and voluntarist view of the laws of nature. The result of their elaboration was a kind of a rational-

choice account of the origins of natural laws, where a law-giver God chooses among a number of

possible sets of laws on the basis of a maximizing criterion, and God’s maximandum is happiness

for his creatures. The chapter notices also how such a solution aimed at solving at once the

problem of evil and that of the foundation of moral obligation by proving how God’s choice was

justified as far as it was the one minimising the amount of suffering in the world.

The chapter adds some details on the teaching of moral theology to which Malthus was exposed

at Cambridge in the 1780s before ordination as a deacon of the Church of England in 1788.

3. Malthus’s metaethics

MORAL ONTOLOGY

Happiness

Laws of nature

MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY

Religion, morality, and the veil of ignorance

Conscience

The Golden Rule

The test of Utility

The function of general rules

MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

Mind, inertia, and the need for stimuli

Passions and self-love

Moral sentiments

The chapter reconstructs what is to be found in the two ethical chapters of the second Essay and

in other writings on ethical subjects and, in more detail, on the nature and status of morality. It

argues that Malthus’s ethics is not dependent on Paley’s, but is derived from Cumberland, Butler,

Gay, Brown and, more than dependent on Paley, reaches independently rather similar, albeit not

identical, conclusions.

The chapter reconstructs firstly the new place theodicy takes in the 1803 Essays. Its claims are that

theodicy is still the main theoretical issue, that ethics, which showed up marginally in 1798,

receives pride of place in 1803. In fact, ethics in 1803 provides the means of solving the main

difficulty that had been raised by Bewick Bridge, a fellow of Petershouse at Cambridge and then

Malthus’s colleague at the East India College. The thesis that gives the 1803 Essay its unity – it is

argued – is precisely the existence of a moral order in the world, and its proof lies in alleged

possibility of avoiding, at least in principle, those evils as are carried by the principle of population

though an alliance of prudence and chastity.

The new solution to the problem of theodicy is that, once it has been proved that the passions

could be dominated and that a world where passions are under control would be a comparatively

happy place, the world we live in has been proved to be, at least in principle, not an evil place, and

its Creator has been proved (or more modestly, may be believed) to be omniscient, benevolent,

and (perhaps also) omnipotent. A society where moral restraint prevailed would reduce abject

poverty to very few cases, would make the middling ranks more numerous (a lottery with fewer

blanks), would reduce dependence, and thus preserve traditional liberties of the English

Constitution, and finally would give the working poor a chance of living “respectable, virtuous, and

happy”.

Then the chapter examines Malthus’s moral ontology, which makes room for a definition of

(moral) good in terms of happiness, and for a definition of the moral order of the universe in terms

of general rules yielding the maximum amount of net happiness, for a view of natural laws in

terms of ‘instructions’ to creatures as to the way to their own happiness confirmed by physical

sanctions. The mentioned quasi-Leibnitian general solution to the problem of evil is an implication

of the moral ontology illustrated.

The chapter reconstructs then Malthus’s moral psychology, based on a view of mind as “activity”,

as contrasted with matter that is assumed to be marked by inertia, and assuming that constant

stimuli are required in order to prompt activity and constantly raise human beings to higher

degrees of reason and virtue.

The chapter finally reconstructs, taking advantage also of materials to be found in the recently

published Sermons (Malthus 1997-2004: II), also Malthus’s moral epistemology. In this field a

number of peculiar claims, until recently ignored, may be met:

(i) the Golden Rule, an idea taken from Butler and not easily compatible with utilitarianism, as a

key-element of morality, useful as a practical criterion and related to the Whig ideal of human

beings’ equality (at least in principle);

(ii) the function of general rules; firstly, they are necessary to any kind of “moral government”

(since two actions of the same kind need be treated in the same way); secondly, they are required

in order to define virtue and vice starting with consequentialist considerations but without making

virtue and vice extensionally variable; vice is defined as that class of actions, the general tendency

of which is to produce misery, and since “the gratification of all our passions in its immediate effect

is happiness, not misery; and in individual instances even the remote consequences (at least in this

life) come under the same denomination… These individual actions therefore cannot come under

the head of misery. But they are still evidently vicious, because an action is so denominated, the

general tendency of which is to produce misery, whatever may be its individual effects” (Malthus

1803, I: 19).

(iii) the function of the test of Utility as a way of discovering the will of God, and accordingly the

laws of nature, which he has imposed on this Creation, in their positive contents; thus our

principal duties turn out to be (a) strict attention to the consequences carried by the satisfaction

of our passions, (b) regulation of our conduct conformably to such consequences.

It is worth stressing that the test of utility is a test for detecting whether a maxim is a law of

nature, not a standard for establishing what is right and wrong or, in other words, that it is a clue

for detecting the will of God (who has established in his full right – being omnipotent – but not

arbitrarily – being benevolent and omniscient – what is right and what is wrong).

An important addendum to Malthus’s moral epistemology is provided by his considerations on

religion, morality, and the “veil of ignorance”, a traditional idea that shows up also in Adam Smith,

that is the idea that man’s inability to foresee the eternal consequences of his own right or evil

behaviour was established by the Creator in so far as it is required in order to leave room enough

for human freedom and the attainment of genuine virtue.

4. Malthus’s early normative ethics: a morality of freedom

MALTHUS’S 1798 POLITICS

MALTHUS’S FIRST THEODICY

THE PLACE FOR MORALITY IN A DISMAL WORLD

MALTHUS’S FIRST THEODICY UNDER FIRE

The chapter examines a few scattered comments in the first Essay out which reconstructs young

Malthus’s views on the foundations of ethics from, proving his adhesion to a current version of

voluntarist-consequentialist ethics. Then it reconstructs more copious treatment of political issues,

whence a clear stance emerges in favour of traditional Whig concerns, such as political freedom,

personal independence and dignity. Finally it gives a fresh look at the theological argument in the

two well-known final chapters, locating the rather unorthodox theodicy developed there in the

context of a tradition where consequentialism, voluntarism, and quasi-Leibnitian theodicy used to

go hand-in-hand.

5. Malthus’s intermediate normative ethics: a morality of prudence

PALEYITE THEODICY AND THE PLACE OF MORALITY

Paley’s Theodicy

Malthus’s second theodicy

NATURAL VIRTUES

Benevolence

Chastity

ARTIFICIAL VIRTUES

Respect for rights

Love of equality

Love of liberty

PRUDENCE

Malthus’s normative ethics focuses on two main ‘natural’ (that is, such as would arise previous to

any human institution) virtues, that is, benevolence and chastity. In a social, but pre-political, state

such as that of men living without government and law, there would be at least a few, albeit

rather loosely defined duties, those of helping one’s neighbour and of forming a stable attachment

to a person of the other sex. To men living in such a state, these would be taught to be laws of

nature by experience, since they might easily notice the nefarious consequences of acting

according to opposite lines. There is a second group of virtues: artificial virtues, which begin to

exist as soon as the transition to the political state is accomplished; to such kind of virtues love for

equality and love for liberty belong. Also rights appear in the political state, and thus are not

innate, at least in a sense, that is, they have no existence before institutions such as marriage and

property have been established, but they come to existence as soon as a proper political state has

come into being. Yet, Malthus declares that no society can exist without acknowledgment of

inalienable rights, and this is a Whig feature in his system of ideas that is incompatible with

Bentham’s philosophy. A special place is granted to a fifth virtue, Prudence, which emerges in both

the pre-political and the political state and governs both individual quest for happiness and

collective quest for the public good. This special virtue also provides an invisible link between the

private and the public domains, in that it contributes in combining self-love with general happiness

through the unintended results mechanism, or – in Malthus’s words – “the happiness of the whole

is to be the result of the happiness of individuals, and to begin first with them. No cooperation is

required” (Malthus 1803, II: 115)

6. Malthus’s mature normative ethics: a morality of humanity

HUMANITY

THE MALTHUSIAN CONTROVERSY QUA APPLIED THEOLOGY

Critics from the right and critics from the left

Evangelicals: Gisborne

Evangelicals: Sumner

Evangelicals: Chalmers

MALTHUS’S THIRD THEODICY AND HIS RESTYLED ETHICS

Malthus’s1806 ethics

Malthus’s 1817 ethics

The chapter describes one aspect of the Malthusian controversy that developed between 1804

and 1830, namely reactions by Evangelical authors such as Gisborne, Sumner, and Chalmers. The

controversy, never analysed in depth, and until now never analysed from the point of view of the

history of moral doctrines, has a number of interesting aspects. One is a subdivision of conflicting

parties into a multiform spectrum; another is a holistic, and sometimes opportunistic, use of

arguments and reasons in order to favour one overall view, such as the Tory-humanitarian, the

populist-evangelical, the middle-class Whig and, later on, the middle-class Reformer and Radical

view; the third is that the ‘closure’ of the controversy is marked by three facts: (a) a step-by-step

revision of Malthus’s theory in following editions of the Essay, undertaken as a means of

incorporating his opponents’ reasons into his own argument carrying the following aware or

unaware implications: firstly, a shift towards a more explicitly theological view marked by

adoption of a more markedly voluntarist view of natural laws, which contradicts Hollander’s claims

of Malthus’s evolution towards a more secular kind of utilitarianism, (b) design of more detailed

‘Institutional’ approach to a reform of Poor Laws that would have possibly provided an alternative

to the disastrous experiment in social engineering that was in fact carried out after Malthus’s

death; (c) elaboration by Sumner and Chalmers of a theological system incorporating the principle

of population and making it compatible with both Anglican or Presbyterian orthodoxy and pro-

Poor policies and adoption by Malthus himself of such developments.

The friendly controversy with his Evangelical fellow-travellers yields several important changes in

the 1806, 1817, and 1826 editions of the second Essay in the formulation of Malthusian ethics, in

the adoption of moral improvement not happiness as the variable to be maximised in theodicy, in

the adoption of generalized education as the main weapon in the war on poverty.

7. Malthus’s applied ethics

WAR ON POVERTY AS MORAL REFORM

Inequality as evil

More swings than ratios

Policies of self-reliance

FROM SEXUAL MORALITY TO PROCREATION ETHICS

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

REFORM

CATHOLIC EMANCIPATION AND THE IRISH ISSUE

WAR AS EVIL

ABOLITION OF THE SLAVE TRADE

The chapter reconstructs Malthus’s treatment of a few issues in ‘applied ethics’. The most

renowned one is sexual morality, where he points at chastity as an overarching virtue, describes

the joys of “virtuous love” as the prize for such virtue, defines marital fidelity as a specification of

chastity in the given social conditions, and the duty of marrying only at a time when one is ready

to carry the burden of six children as a moral duty imposed by prudence and enjoined by a “law of

nature” which we can detect through observation of the order of creation. Besides he points at

disadvantages of early marriage mainly for women, and finally rejects birth control within

marriage with such reasons as its supposed effect of encouraging ‘indolence’.

Another set of issues discussed in this chapter are those of political theory, or better public

morality. Malthus’s peculiar kind of Whiggism is reconstructed as a kind of moral discourse, or of

anti-Machiavellian politics, centred on rights, equality on principle, and individual self-reliance.

The third issue reconstructed is that of poverty. The reconstruction shows how, through

subsequent approximations and under pressure of critics, Malthus yields finally a kind of

Institutional approach to policies concerning poverty, making room for generalized basic

education, free markets for labour and (from a certain date on) for corn, colonies, and allowing for

a subsidiary role for private beneficence. The goal to be aimed at by such a mix of policies is

bringing about “circumstances which tend to elevate the character of the lower classes of society,

which make them approach the nearest to beings who ‘look before and after’, and who

consequently cannot acquiesce patiently in the thought of depriving themselves and their children

of the means of being respectable, virtuous and happy” (Malthus 1820, I: 251).

8. General conclusions: strengthening the theological foundations

Malthus’s criteria for policy appraisal were not (in any meaningful sense of the word) Utilitarian

ones. His normative ethics and his politics were sharply different from Bentham’s. Yet, this is

consistent with the central role played by the “test of utility” in Malthus’s system of ideas. This

test is for Bentham the key to normative ethics (give me an action or policy and I will measure how

far is it right) while it is for Malthus the key to moral epistemology (give me a maxim and I will tell

you whether it is a law of nature) and this different role accounts for their quite different

normative ethics. To sum up, Utility is just one element in Malthus’s ethics, going with laws of

nature and rights, and ironically, far from being a Benthamite insertion, is the most markedly

theological element in Malthus’s system of ideas.

Hollander’s reading is one more example of confusion between an alleged pattern of historical

development and the course of one individual existence. That is, even if Weltgeschichte were

actually moving from dogma to utility (which I do not believe to be the case) this does not imply

that Th. Robert Malthus followed its course obediently. The novelty in Malthus’s final view was

instead the possibility of a harmonious design of human society even in a ‘worldly’ perspective.