Who Believes in Religious Evil? An Investigation of Sociological Patterns of Belief in Satan, Hell, and Demons

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WHO BELIEVES IN RELIGIOUS EVIL? AN INVESTIGATION OF SOCIOLOGICAL PATTERNS OF

BELIEF IN SATAN, HELL, AND DEMONS*

JOSEPH BAKERBAYLOR UNIVERSITY

REVIEW OF RELIGIOUS RESEARCH 2008, VOLUME 50(2): PAGES 206-220

Very little research has been conducted on sociological patterns of belief in the exis-tence of religious evil such as Satan, hell, or demons. This study uses data from the2005 Baylor Religion Survey to assess whether sociodemographic factors are asso-ciated with belief in religious evil. Results indicate that as income and education lev-els increase belief in religious evil decreases. However, the effects of social class areconditioned by attendance at religious services, such that frequent attendance at reli-gious services attenuates the influence of social class. In addition to the influence ofclass, results suggest that women and African Americans hold firmer beliefs in con-cepts of religious evil. For African Americans these beliefs are influenced by bothcurrent social location and religious traditions that incorporate a strong presence ofthe supernatural. Theoretically this connection is linked to increased suffering andhardship encountered due to holding a social position with less access to power andresources in a social system, with those in positions of disadvantage often looking forexplanations in the form of religious evil. For women firmer belief in religious evilreflects higher religiosity for females generally.

While an extensive body of literature exists on religious beliefs, only minimalresearch has been conducted on belief in religious evil. Belief in the reality ofSatan, hell, demons, or other conceptions of religious evil constitute an impor-

tant component of the overall fabric of religious belief that can have important associationswith other types of belief, including intolerance of specific groups of people (Wilson andHuff 2001). In addition to being associated with other beliefs, a 2004 Gallup Poll (Winse-man) reported that belief in religious evil was rising. Where 56% of Americans believed inhell in 1997, 70% claimed belief in it in 2004. Similarly 55% believed in the Devil in 1990while 70% claimed belief in 2004. This rise of belief in religious evil may reflect a post-9/11 effect with the United States in a period of war, although there are likely other factorsinfluencing this rise as well. The same 2004 Gallup Poll reported that belief in hell wasstronger among Republicans, frequent church attendees, southerners, and those with a highschool diploma or less. These estimates suggest that belief in conceptions of religious evilis pervasive and has been increasing in recent years.

This study will analyze data from the first wave of the Baylor Religion Survey (2005)in order to provide a quantitative view of the sociodemographic patterns of belief in reli-

gious evil. Specifically, attention will be paid to the relationship between race, class, andgender on such beliefs.

RESEARCH ON BELIEF IN RELIGIOUS EVIL

Previous social scientific studies that assess belief in religious evil often do so in a periph-eral manner by using belief in conceptions of religious evil as a component of broader con-cepts such as fundamentalism (see Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992) or premillennialism(see Wilcox, Linzey, and Jelen 1991). Similarly Norris and Inglehart (2004) incorporatebelief in hell as an aspect of general religiosity. Such studies use belief in religious evil asa way to categorize people along certain theological or religious lines. While there are manystudies that incorporate belief in religious evil as an aspect of general religious beliefs, muchless research has focused on belief in religious evil specifically. However, there are a hand-ful of studies dealing with the topic that provide groundwork for the current inquiry.

Wilson and Huff (2001) conducted research that measured belief in a conception of Satanbeing active in the material world. They found that such measures held internal consisten-cy in their sample, and they outlined an association between belief in an active Satan andintolerance of homosexuals and racial minorities. This provides an important precedent byestablishing that it is possible to “meaningfully measure” belief in religious evil and thatsuch beliefs can influence other social and political attitudes (Wilson and Huff 2001:292).Wilcox et al. (1991) found that belief in an active Satan oriented people to a unique world-view, which was associated with attitudes toward political participation and membership inthe Moral Majority. They theorized that belief in an active Satan led to individuals viewingthemselves as being embroiled in a battle with the forces of evil—an outlook that served toincrease political activism. Similarly, Swatos (1988) found a connection between believingSatan was responsible for pornography and increased likelihood of picketing 7-Eleven storescarrying adult materials. Collectively these studies provide preliminary evidence that beliefin religious evil can be empirically measured and that these beliefs can impact other areasof social life.

SOCIAL LOCATION AND EXPRESSION OF RELIGIOSITY

While there are few studies substantively addressing the topic of religious evil, previousfindings and theoretical perspectives about how social location (i.e. position and status)affects the way people choose to be religious provide insight into belief in religious evil.Those of lower social status and members of marginalized social groups are more likely toselect a religion that has an otherworldly focus rather than a “this worldly” focus (Bain-bridge 1997). This difference in focus is attributed to relative deprivation—the idea that, inan environment of inequality, those who are deprived will compensate with stricter religiouspreferences emphasizing the spiritual world and the afterlife (Bainbridge 1997; Stark andBainbridge 1985)

Concerning class, high socioeconomic status (SES) has been found to be associated withreduced beliefs in the supernatural (Davidson 1977). More recently, Norris and Inglehart(2004) propose a theoretical model positing that existential security, meaning that “survivalis secure enough that it can be taken for granted,” is an underlying mechanism of the rela-tionship between social status and religiosity. They contend that as this security increasesreligiosity decreases. Although their study is generally macro in scope—focusing on the

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Who Believes in Religious Evil?

overall economic development of a nation as evidence of security—they also make a the-oretical link between existential security and religiosity at the individual level.1 It is expect-ed that these differences of belief in the religious supernatural will extend to belief inreligious evil.

A similar line of theorizing from the psychology of religion suggests that traditionallyunderprivileged groups are more likely to use religion as a coping mechanism, and it isracial minorities, those of low social status, and women who are more likely to confrontthe “limited” capacity of humanity and turn to religion for significance (Pargament 1997),with belief in religious evil helping provide an explanation for the occurrence of suffering(Spilka, Hood, Hunsberger, and Gorsuch 2003). Pagels (1995) contends that people deal-ing with misfortune and loss often make attributions of such occurrences to Satan. Althoughattributions of personal life events to Satan are less common than to God, they are mostlikely to occur when an individual has endured an extremely negative life experience (Lupfer,Tolliver, and Jackson 1996). Given that traditionally less powerful groups are more likelyto endure hardship due to social location and more likely to express religiosity throughbelief in the supernatural and otherworldly deities, it is expected that members of thesegroups will be more likely to believe in the existence of religious evil.

In addition to the general theoretical framework of members of disadvantaged groupsbeing expected to hold stronger belief in supernatural evil, there is a specific influenceexpected among African Americans due to the unique cultural aspects of religious tradi-tions within the African American community, where deities and supernatural forces playa more prominent role than in white religious traditions in America (Lincoln and Mamiya1990). In addition, African American religious culture has traditionally had an “other-worldly” focus, serving as a haven from suffering and oppression for African Americansin the U.S. (see Frazier 1963). Theology in these traditions tends to focus on oppressionand the freedom from oppression offered by God (Lincoln 1974). Moreover, suffering andoppression are often seen as the work of the devil (Raboteau 1997), with members of thesetraditions personalizing the supernatural to their situations (Lincoln 1974). As a result ofthe cultural patterns of belief that exist in African American traditions, it is expected thatthere will be stronger belief in religious evil for African Americans, due to both currentsocial location and the cultural history that exists in these religious traditions.

From these foundations the general hypothesis guiding this study is drawn: Those oflower socioeconomic status and members of traditionally less powerful societal groups,such as women and African Americans, will hold firmer belief in the certitude of manifes-tations of religious evil because such beliefs help provide meaning and context for theirexperiences. Although this general hypothesis provides a framework for the analyses thatfollow, this study is also somewhat exploratory in nature due to the lack of previous researchon the topic. Consequently I will also assess whether or not other sociodemographic fac-tors are robust predictors of belief in religious evil. In addition I will test the hypothesisthat church attendance conditions the potential effects of income and education. This willtest the idea that regardless of social class, frequent attendance, as a proxy for participa-tion in organized religion, will lead to strong belief in the existence of religious evil. Inother words, I will assess whether frequent church attendance attenuates the influence ofsocial class, such that frequent attenders maintain firm belief in the certitude religious evilregardless of social class.

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Review of Religious Research

DATA

The data used to assess belief in religious evil are taken from wave 1 of the Baylor Reli-gion Survey (BRS), which was fielded in 2005 by the Gallup Organization. The primaryfocus of the BRS is to collect extensive information on the religious beliefs and attitudesof the American public. Data collection is based on a national random sample of telephonenumbers in the United States using random digit dialing. The collection employed a mixed-mode method, whereby potential respondents are contacted by phone and then mailed aquestionnaire. Potential respondents are asked during the phone phase whether they wouldbe willing to participate in a mailed survey. 7,041 potential respondents were called byGallup. A total of 2,603 questionnaires were mailed out to phone respondents that indicat-ed a willingness to complete the questionnaire. 1,721 were returned for an overall responserate of 24.4% (1721/7041) and a response rate for the mailed survey phase of 66.1%(1721/2603). Gallup weighted the survey for gender, race, region of the country, age, andeducation with a statistical algorithm based on information from the Census Bureau. Thisweight is used in all forthcoming analyses. While the survey design differs from the con-ventional telephone survey design, the demographic results of the BRS compare favorablyto the GSS, indicating low levels of sampling bias (Bader, Mencken, and Froese 2007). Forin-depth information on the data collection process and comparison of the results of theBRS to other national surveys see Bader et al. (2007).

MEASURES

Belief in Religious EvilThe BRS contains a battery of questions addressing religious beliefs that include mul-

tiple questions about conceptions of religious evil. Among the beliefs assessed are Satan,hell, and demons. The question addressing these beliefs is phrased “In your opinion, doeseach of the following exist?” Answer choices are “absolutely not,” “probably not,” “prob-ably,” and “absolutely.” Answers are coded from 1 (absolutely not) to 4 (absolutely) so thathigher scores indicate a stronger level of belief.

Sociodemographic VariablesHousehold income and education level are used as class indicators in the forthcoming

analyses. Income is measured in categories with 1 ≤ $10,000, 2 = $10,001 to $20,000, 3 =$20,001 to $35,000, 4 = $35,001 to $50,000, 5 = $50,001 to $100,000, 6 = $100,001 to$150,000, and 7 > $150,000. Education is measured in attainment categories such that 1 =8th grade or less, 2 = 9th to 12th grade with no diploma, 3 = high school graduate, 4 = somecollege, 5 = trade/technical/vocational training, 6 = college graduate, and 7 = postgraduatework/degree. Demographic variables utilized include race, gender, age, marital status, andregion of the country. Race is classified into three categories of white, African American,and racial other. The racial other category consists mostly of American Indians and AsianAmericans. For multivariate analyses the three race categories are coded as dummy vari-ables with white as the suppressed category. Gender (female=1) and marital status (mar-ried=1) are also dummy variables. Age is a continuous variable ranging from 18 to 93 formultivariate analyses, but is divided into cohorts for bivariate analysis. Region is classifiedinto four dummy variables of South, Midwest, Northeast, and West. In multivariate analy-ses South is the excluded category.

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Religious Measures Variables are included in multivariate analyses to control for the influence of religiosi-

ty and religious tradition. Attendance at religious services, Biblical literalism, and the REL-TRAD classification scheme (Steensland et al. 2000) are included as independent variables.Attendance at religious services is measured in categories from 1 (never) to 9 (several timesa week). Biblical literalism is measured with four ordinal categories of 1 (the Bible is anancient book of history and legends), 2 (the Bible contains some human error), 3 (the Bibleis perfectly true, but it should not be taken literally, word-for-word. We must interpret itsmeaning), and 4 (the Bible means exactly what it says. It should be taken literally, word-for-word, on all subjects). This variable is treated as a continuous measure since higherscores indicate stricter literalism. The RELTRAD classification scheme developed by Steens-land et al. (2000) divides American religious traditions into seven categories of Black Protes-tant, Catholic, Evangelical Protestant, Jewish, Mainline Protestant, religious other, and thereligiously unaffiliated. Each RELTRAD category is coded as a dummy variable, with thereligiously unaffiliated being the excluded category in multivariate models. The same bat-tery of questions used to measure belief in religious evil also asks about belief in the exis-tence of God. The belief in God measure will be used as a control variable in a multivariatemodel assessing whether overall levels of religious belief account for any association foundbetween the variables of interest and belief in religious evil. Answers choices are codedfrom 1 (absolutely not) to 4 (absolutely), with higher score indicating more certitude in theexistence of God.

Analytical StrategyFirst, frequencies are presented for the three measures of belief in Satan, hell, and demons,

giving an indication of the proportion of Americans claiming belief in their existence. Next,bivariate relationships between the independent variables and the measures of religious evilare presented in the form of average scores on the measures of belief in religious evil. Mul-tivariate models are then conducted with belief in various forms of religious evil as thedependent variables. Initially OLS regression models are presented on the three specificbeliefs of Satan, hell, and demons to determine if any associations with sociodemograph-ic variables persist when controlling for religious tradition and religiosity.2 These three beliefmeasures (Satan, hell, and demons) are then combined to create an additive index of beliefin religious evil (Cronbach’s alpha = .927).

This scale constitutes the dependent variable for the final set of analyses where the com-bination of these three beliefs is assessed. An OLS model will also be used to test whetheror not belief in God attenuates the effects of race, class, or gender. If belief in religious evilis simply an inverse of belief in God, then the belief in God measure should significantlyreduce the effects found absent of this measure. For the model that utilizes the belief in Godmeasure (model 3 in Table 4), church attendance and Biblical literalism will be excludedas controls in order to reduce potential problems with multicollinearity (due to includingmultiple inter-related religious measures as independent and dependent variables).3 Further,belief in God is correlated with the scale of belief in evil at 0.20, indicating a strong rela-tionship between these measures. As a result the model that includes belief in God as ameasure will be used primarily to assess whether any findings for race, class, or gender aresimply a result of higher overall religious belief among those groups, rather than focusingon specific substantive findings within the model. Finally, interaction effects are included

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in OLS models to assess the potential conditioning effects of church attendance on theimpact of social class on belief in religious evil.

RESULTS

Table 1 shows that over half of respondents “absolutely” believe in the existence of Satanand hell, while 47.7% “absolutely” believe that demons exist. When the categories of“absolutely” and “probably” are combined over 75% believe in Satan, over 73% believe inhell, and nearly 70% believe in demons. Given the United States’ comparatively high levelof religious belief (see Norris and Inglehart 2004) these figures are not unexpected, but theydo provide quantitative evidence for the prevalence of such beliefs.

Table 2 presents the mean score on the measures of belief in Satan, hell, and demons bydemographic categories and religious tradition. There is not a definitive pattern for ageregarding these beliefs, as they are relatively steady across cohorts. African Americans holdstronger beliefs in religious evil than whites or other races. The means for African Ameri-cans on the belief measures are 3.73 for Satan, 3.67 for hell, and 3.62 for demons. Con-sidering that 4 is the highest value on these measures, African Americans overall have afirm level of belief in the existence of religious evil. Women tend toward stronger belief inreligious evil than do men for all three measures. Region of the country shows that the Southhas the highest mean level of belief, while the West has the lowest. For religious tradition,Black Protestants and Evangelicals have the strongest levels of belief in religious evil, witheach of these groups tending toward conservative Christian theology. Jews and those claim-ing no religion had the lowest levels of belief in religious evil among the religious tradi-tions assessed, with the religiously unaffiliated scoring the lowest. Based on one-wayANOVAs, between category differences for mean scores on all three belief measures arestatistically significant for race, gender, region, and religious tradition.

Figures 1 and 2 graphically display the mean level of belief in religious evil by educa-tion and income level. Figure 1 shows belief by education, where a drop is seen beginningwith the “some college” category. The mean scores on the belief measures for a high schoolgraduate are 3.58 for Satan, 3.54 for hell, and 3.29 for demons. Meanwhile for someonedoing postgraduate work the mean scores are 2.76 for Satan, 2.74 for hell, and 2.66 fordemons. Figure 2 shows a similar decline with the increase of income level. Mean scores

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Table 1

Descriptive Statistics on Belief in Religious Evil

Satan Hell Demons

Absolutely 57.8% 55.6% 47.7%

Probably 17.3% 17.9% 21.9%

Probably Not 15.4% 17.2% 18.9%

Absolutely Not 9.5% 9.2% 11.5%

Mean Score 3.23 3.20 3.06

N 1670 1668 1632

Source: 2005 Baylor Religion Survey

for a respondent below $10,000 per year in household income are 3.44 for Satan, 3.4 forhell, and 3.3 for demons. For someone with an income level over $150,000 the means are2.69 for Satan, 2.69 for hell, and 2.58 for demons. There are statistically significant differ-ences between income and education categories for the mean belief on all three measuresbased on one-way ANOVA tests.

Table 3 displays OLS regression models conducted on the three separate beliefs in reli-gious evil. For each dependent variable only sociodemographic variables are shown for thefirst model and religious controls are added for the second. The models including religious

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Table 2

Means for Demographics and Religious Tradition

on Belief in Religious Evil

Satan Hell Demons

Variable

Agea

18-29 3.11 3.15 3.04

30-39 3.04 3.05 2.91

40-49 3.25 3.24 3.10

50-59 3.17 3.09 3.04

60-69 3.18 3.12 2.91

70 and over 3.19 3.15 2.79

Race*

Black 3.73 3.67 3.62

Other 3.10 2.98 2.98

White 3.16 3.12 2.95

Gender*

Men 3.01 2.94 2.81

Women 3.30 3.28 3.10

Region*

East 3.01 3.00 2.88

Midwest 3.27 3.24 3.06

South 3.40 3.33 3.20

West 2.93 2.89 2.71

Marital Statusb

Married 3.29 3.25 3.08

Not Married 3.17 3.13 3.03

RELTRAD*

Black Protestant 3.78 3.83 3.60

Catholic 3.34 3.30 3.04

Evangelical 3.71 3.68 3.50

Jewish 1.93 2.16 1.93

Mainline 3.15 3.08 2.91

None 1.90 1.83 1.84

Religious Other 2.73 2.78 2.91


* P≤.05 for association between sociodemographic and all three beliefs (One-way ANOVA)a: There is a significant difference between age categories and belief in demons

b: There is a significant difference between marital status categories and belief in Satan and

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Figure 1

Belief in Religious Evil by Education

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

8th Grade or Less Less than HS High School Grad Some College Vocational College Grad Post Grad

Mea

n Sc

ore

Satan Hell Demons

Figure 2

Belief in Religious Evil by Income Level

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

Less than 10k 10-20k 20-35k 35-50k 50-100k 100-150k Over 150k

Mea

n Sc

ore

Satan Hell Demons

controls reveal definitive patterns for social class, race, and age. As social class increases,belief in religious evil decline, with those at higher levels of income and education claim-ing less certitude in the existence of religious evil. Income level has a significant negativeassociation with certainty of belief in Satan (b=-.056, p≤.001), hell (b=-.034, p≤.05), anddemons (b=-.036, p≤.05). Similarly, education level has a significant negative associationwith all three belief measures such that: Satan (b=-.038, p≤.05), hell (b=-.052, p≤.001),demons (b=-.053, p≤.001). For race, African Americans express stronger belief in religiousevil than do whites, net of other factors. This holds true for belief in Satan (b=.481, p≤.001),hell (b=.25, p≤.05), and demons (b=.667, p≤.001). On average females score higher thanmales on belief in the existence of hell (b=.106, p≤.01) and demons (b=.091, p≤.05), but asignificant gender difference at the .05 level was not found for believing in Satan. This find-

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Table 3

OLS Regression of Sociodemographics and Religious Controls

on Belief in Religious Evil

Variable ___Satan___ ____Hell____ __Demons__

Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2

Constant 3.971*** 1.853*** 3.971*** 1.817*** 3.989*** 2.172***

SES

Income -.073*** -.056*** -.072*** -.034* -.070*** -.036*

Education -.112*** -.038* -.164** -.052*** -.095*** -.053***

Demographics

Female .202*** .073 .247*** .106** .203*** .091*

Black .550*** .481*** .518*** .250* .673*** .667***

Other Race -.055 .024 -.125 -.067 .019 -.012

Age -.001 -.004*** -.003 -.006*** -.007*** -.008***

Married .278*** .085* .294 .078 .230*** .035

Region

East -.354*** -.061 -.330*** -.029 -.291*** -.004

Midwest -.078 .029 -.090 .022 -.086 .013

West -.324*** -.002 -.355*** -.026 -.392*** -.133*

Religiosity

Attendance --- .041*** --- .046*** --- .055***

Literalism --- .481*** --- .427*** --- .335***

RELTRAD

Black

Protestant

--- .386** --- .685*** --- .145

Catholic --- .754*** --- .773*** --- .692***

Evangelical --- .793*** --- .794*** --- .657***

Jewish --- -.079 --- .254 --- -.010

Mainline --- .689*** --- .705*** --- .410***

Other --- .583*** --- .630*** --- .692***

Adjusted R2

.125 .536 .123 .544 .119 .410

N 1543 1386 1542 1385 1510 1360

*** P≤.001 ** P≤ .01 * P≤.05 (two-tailed tests)


ing is similar to the previously mentioned Gallup Poll that found little difference betweenmen (69%) and women (70%) concerning belief in the Devil (Winseman 2004). Age, whichonly had an influence on belief in demons when no religious controls were included in themodels, exerts a significant influence on all three beliefs net of religious control variables.When controlling for religious tradition and religiosity it is younger people that are morelikely to claim belief in religious evil.

Although there are differences for all three beliefs between the East and West regionsof the country as compared to the South in model 1, these differences become non-signif-icant once religious controls are added. The only exception was belief in demons, which is

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Table 4

OLS Regression of Sociodemographics and Religious Controls

on Belief in Religious Evil Scale (Including Interaction Effects)

Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Constant 5.384*** 2.215*** 6.123*** 6.797***

SES Income -.100* -.115** -.280*** -.097*

Education -.141*** -.134*** -.145*** -.436***Interaction Effects

Income x Attend --- --- .037** --- Education x Attend --- --- --- .058***

Demographics Female .219* .008 .214* .234* Black 1.222*** .897*** 1.187*** 1.187***

Other Race .147 -.105 .179 .120 Age -.015*** -.012*** -.014*** -.014***

Married .197 .265* .201 .189Region

East -.167 -.205 -.168 -.208 Midwest .008 -.143 .018 -.020

West -.161 -.206 -.153 -.139Religiosity

Attendance .114*** --- -.040 -.152** Literalism 1.234*** --- 1.217*** 1.230***

Belief in God --- 2.211*** --- ---RELTRAD

Blk. Protestant 1.163** .817* 1.268*** 1.039** Catholic 1.880*** .471* 1.885*** 1.777***

Evangelical 2.235*** 1.408*** 2.244*** 2.124*** Jewish -.336 -1.470*** -.257 -.390

Mainline 1.851*** .411* 1.862*** 1.778*** Other 1.521*** -.044 1.542*** 1.440***

Adjusted R2

.571 .597 .574 .580

N 1322 1428 1322 1322

*** P≤.001 ** P≤ .01 * P≤.05 (two-tailed tests)

Source: Baylor Religion Survey 2005

less likely in the West (b=-.133, p≤.05) than in the South. When including religious con-trols, married people average higher scores on the measure of belief in Satan (.085, p≤.05),but are not significantly different from non-married individuals on belief in hell and demons.With only a few exceptions the religious variables exert a positive significant influence onbelief in religious evil for all three dependent variables. One exception is that Jewish respon-dents are not significantly different from people claiming no religion on any of the threemeasures of belief. There is not a significant difference between Black Protestants and reli-gious “nones” for belief in demons, but this is explained by the inclusion of African Amer-ican as a racial category.4

Table 4 shows the results of OLS regressions conducted on the additive index of beliefin religious evil that is created from the three different beliefs analyzed in Table 3. Model1 includes the same variables as the previous OLS models and shows similar results. Income(b=-.100, p≤.05) and education level (b=-.141, p≤.001) have a negative association withoverall belief in religious evil. Women (b=.219, ≤.05) and African Americans (b=1.222,p≤.001) express stronger belief in the existence of religious evil than do men and whites.Age (b=-.015, p≤.001) has a negative association with belief in evil, such that younger peo-ple express stronger belief. The strongest sociodemographic predictors in the model arebeing African American, age, and education with standardized betas of .112, -.084, and -.078 respectively.

Model 2 includes the measure of belief in God as a control to provide information onwhether the effects of race, class, or gender are the result of these groups having higherlevels of belief generally. The effects of income, education, and race remain significantwhen controlling for belief in God. Conversely the effect of gender is completely attenu-

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Figure 3

Effect of Income on Belief in Religious Evil by Church Attendance

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Intercept Less than 10k 10-20k 20-35k 35-50k 50-100k 100-150k 150k Plus

Income Level

Bel

ief

in E

vil S

cale

Never Attend Attend Once a Month Attend Several Times a Week

ated by the belief in God measure. This informs the findings for the variables that remainwhen including this measure, as well as providing insight into the findings regarding gen-der. For women, stronger belief in conceptions of religious evil is related to religious beliefin general, rather than a specific relationship between gender and belief in religious evil.Meanwhile model 2 provides preliminary evidence that the race and class effects are notdue to higher levels of general religious belief among African Americans and people oflower social class.5

Models 3 and 4 assess whether church attendance conditions the effects of income andeducation. Model 3 includes an interaction effect for income level by church attendance.The interaction is significant at the .01 level (b=.037), indicating that income has differingdegrees of influence depending on how often someone attends religious services. For highattendees (those that report attending several times a week) increasing income level has aslight positive influence, such that the slope of the parameter estimate is .053.6 For moder-ate attendees (those that report attending once a month) income level has a negative influ-ence with a slope of -.099. Finally for those claiming to never attend religious servicesincome level has a stronger negative influence with a slope of -.243, or more than twicethat of moderate attendees. These results are displayed graphically in Figure 3.

Model 4 includes an interaction effect for education level by church attendance. Theinteraction term is significant at the .001 level (b=.058), again suggesting that the influenceof social status, measured by education in this case, is conditioned by how often one attendsreligious services. For frequent attendees (several times a week) education has a slight pos-itive influence with a slope of .087. For moderate attendees (once a month) each addition-al increase in education category results in a -.145 change on the belief in evil scale. Finally

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Figure 4

Effect of Education on Belief in Religious Evil by Church Attendance

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Intercept 8th Grade or Less 9-12th grade High school grad some college vocational College grad Post Grad

Education

Bel

ief

in E

vil S

cale

Never Attend Attend Once a Month Attend Several Times a Week

for those who never attend religious services each increase in education level decreases thescore on the belief in religious evil index by .378—again more than twice that of moder-ate attendees. These results are shown graphically in Figure 4.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The analyses presented here outline some distinctive sociological patterns for belief inreligious evil. African Americans tend to have a stronger belief in religious evil than dowhites. Women have a stronger degree of belief than men. Net of religious controls, youngerAmericans hold stronger belief in conceptions of religious evil than older Americans. Final-ly, social class plays an important role in how certain an individual is about the existenceof religious evil, with those of higher social class having weaker confidence about the exis-tence of religious evil. However, these effects are conditioned by church attendance. Forthose exhibiting a high level of participation in organized religion, the influence of socialclass is neutralized. For those not actively participating in organized religion, the influenceof social class is more pronounced.

These results indicate that traditionally power and resource deprived groups—AfricanAmericans and those of lower social class—exhibit strong belief in religious evil. Difficultlife circumstances and suffering often lead individuals to search for meaning. Moreover,suffering forces people to conceive of God as removed or attribute the source of sufferingto some form of evil (Pargament 1997). In the case of African Americans belief in religiousevil has become embedded in the cultural symbols presented in religious traditions overtime. The history of racism and oppression experienced by African Americans in the Unit-ed States has influenced the view of evil within the Black Protestantism. In a sense then itis the confluence of religious symbols of evil becoming part of a racial heritage and reli-gious traditions combined with current social circumstance that explains stronger belief inreligious evil among African Americans, as current social location and historical patternscoincide to influence belief in religious evil.

Regarding gender, firm belief in religious evil for women appears to be a function ofhigher rates of religiosity for women in general. Evidence for this is seen with the reduc-tion in the association between gender and belief in evil when a measure for belief in Godis included in a multivariate model. There is a growing literature and an on-going debateas to why women tend to be more religiously active than men (cf. Roth and Kroll 2007;Stark 2002). Whether this higher level of involvement and belief is due to physiology, social-ization, or other factors is currently unclear. Regardless of the underlying cause of higherreligiosity for females, results here indicate that women hold stronger beliefs in religiousevil than men, although these beliefs are primarily a reflection of general religiosity.

The consistent finding that younger people hold stronger belief in religious evil thanolder Americans is unexpected. When age alone is regressed on the scale of belief in reli-gious evil there is not a significant association between the two measures. Further, the cor-relation between age and the belief in evil scale is .001. This indicates that the effects ofage only emerge net of other factors. Controlling for other factors, especially in the mod-els with religious controls, increased age exerts a negative influence on certitude of belief.Thus it appears that age has a highly contextualized influence; however the analyses con-ducted here are insufficient to determine why this occurs and provide an explanation forthe influence of age on these beliefs. The influence of age on belief in religious evil deservesfurther in-depth treatment to examine the nature of this relationship.

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The opportunities for future inquiry into belief in religious evil are vast. The paucity ofstudy in the area leaves virtually all avenues unexplored. The consequences of belief in reli-gious evil for other types of attitudes and behaviors are one such area. Another is the dif-ference in belief among varying segments of the population. For instance, the differencesin belief based on age, race, gender, and social class could be explored in more detail. Qual-itative investigations could assess how different types of people conceptualize and under-stand evil within a religious framework. This would provide insight into whether traditionallymarginalized groups have different conceptions of, and make more attribution to, religiousevil than more privileged groups. An examination of the potential sources of the recent riseof belief in religious evil indicated by the Gallup poll could further the current understandingof how these beliefs are formed and maintained. There is also an ongoing debate about theconnection between Christian and non-Christian paranormal belief (cf. Bainbridge 2004;Orenstein 2002; Rice 2003), and incorporating belief in religious evil may shed light ontosubstantive issues in this line of research as well. Beyond the concepts of Satan, hell, anddemons, investigating belief in evil generally and how perceptions of evil influence otheraspects of people’s lives is an important component in the sociological study of religionthat currently remains underdeveloped.

NOTES

*Please direct all correspondence to: Joseph Baker, Department of Sociology, Baylor University, One BearPlace #97326, Baylor, Texas 76798-7326.

1See pages 108-10 of Sacred and Secular.2Since the dependent variables have 4 ordinal categories, cumulative logistic regressions were also run. OLS

models are presented instead because the proportional odds assumption was violated by the models, which accord-ing to Agresti (2002) indicates that a proportional odds model is not the optimal analytic technique. However,comparisons of discrete categories of belief (such as a multinomial logistic model) unnecessarily obscured thesubstantive thrust of the investigation, which is to assess degree of belief in religious evil.

3There were no substantial problems with multicollinearity in the any of the models. None of the VIF scoreswere higher than 3.2 in any model.

4When the OLS model is conducted without the race variables the difference between religious “nones” andBlack Protestants is significant and rather large (b=2.172, p≤.001).

5It is again important to note that caution is needed when assessing the substantive interpretations of the find-ings for model 2 in Table 4 because the belief in God measure is so highly correlated with the belief in evil scale.The primary purpose of this model is to assess whether the effects of race, class, or gender are attenuated by high-er levels of general religious belief.

6The slight positive effect of education and income at the highest level of church attendance is more a math-ematical than substantive effect. The effects of social class at the highest levels of attendance are very close tozero, but end up being slightly positive as a result of being the most extreme category in the interacting variable.However, it is not likely that this indicates a strong positive influence of social class—rather this is most likely aneffect close to zero.

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Documents

Who Believes in Religious Evil? An Investigation of Sociological Patterns of Belief in Satan, Hell, and Demons