КОРРУПЦИЯ И МАСШТАБ ТЕНЕВОЙ ЭКОНОМИКИ

45© Е. Н. Невзорова, 2013

* Ðàáîòà âûïîëíåíà ïðè ôèíàíñîâîé ïîääåðæêå ïðîåêòà ÔÁ-60 «Ðàçðàáîòêà ìåòîäîëîãè÷åñêèõ ïîäõîäîâ ê îöåíêå ýôôåêòèâíîñòè ìåð íàëîãîâîãî è òàìîæåííîãî ðåãóëèðîâàíèÿ» (íîìåð ðåãèñòðàöèè â ÔÃÍÓ ÖÈÒèÑ 01201256015).

Å. Í. ÍÅÂÇÎÐÎÂÀкандидат экономических наук, доцент,

Байкальский государственный университет экономики и права

ÊÎÐÐÓÏÖÈß È ÌÀÑØÒÀÁ ÒÅÍÅÂÎÉ ÝÊÎÍÎÌÈÊÈ*

Â ñòàòüå ïðåäñòàâëåí êðàòêèé îáçîð èññëåäîâàíèé î ïðèðîäå íåôîðìàëüíîé ýêîíîìèêè. Îáñóæäàåòñÿ ñîîòíîøåíèå ïîíÿòèé «íåôîðìàëüíàÿ ýêîíîìèêà», «ïîäïîëüíàÿ ýêîíîìèêà», «òåíåâàÿ ýêîíîìèêà». Ôîðìóëèðóþòñÿ ðàçëè÷èÿ ñóùåñòâóþùèõ ïîäõîäîâ ê èçó÷åíèþ ðîëè ôåíîìåíà êîððóïöèè â ôóíêöèîíèðîâàíèè ïîäïîëüíîé ýêîíîìèêè. Îáîñíîâûâàåòñÿ öåëåñî-îáðàçíîñòü èçó÷åíèÿ âëèÿíèÿ êîððóïöèè íà ýêîíîìèêó ñ ó÷åòîì ïîëîæåíèé òåîðèè ïðàâ ñîá-ñòâåííîñòè. Îòìå÷àåòñÿ íåîäíîçíà÷íîñòü âûâîäîâ íåêîòîðûõ ñîâðåìåííûõ èññëåäîâàòåëåé î âëèÿíèè êîððóïöèè íà ýêîíîìèêó. Îáîçíà÷àþòñÿ óñëîâèÿ, ïðè êîòîðûõ êîððóïöèÿ ñïîñîáíà áëàãîïðèÿòñòâîâàòü ýêîíîìè÷åñêîìó ðîñòó. Íà îñíîâàíèè ìàêðîýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ ïîêàçàòåëåé è äàííûõ ìåæäóíàðîäíûõ ðåéòèíãîâ èíñòèòóöèîíàëüíîé ñðåäû, ñ ïðèìåíåíèåì ïîäõîäà êëàñ-òåðíîãî àíàëèçà âûÿâëÿþòñÿ è àíàëèçèðóþòñÿ âçàèìîñâÿçè ìåæäó îöåíêîé ðàçìåðà òåíåâîãî ñåêòîðà ýêîíîìèêè, ýêîíîìè÷åñêèì áëàãîñîñòîÿíèåì íàñåëåíèÿ, íàëîãîâûì áðåìåíåì, èí-äåêñîì âîñïðèÿòèÿ êîððóïöèè è íàáîðîì èíñòèòóöèîíàëüíûõ èíäèêàòîðîâ âåäåíèÿ áèçíåñà. Íà îñíîâå ðåçóëüòàòîâ ïðîâåäåííîãî àíàëèçà ôîðìóëèðóþòñÿ âûâîäû î ïðèîðèòåòíûõ íàïðàâëå-íèÿõ ðåôîðìèðîâàíèÿ èíñòèòóöèîíàëüíîé ñðåäû âåäåíèÿ áèçíåñà, ñòèìóëèðóþùèõ ðàçâèòèå íàöèîíàëüíîé ýêîíîìèêè.

Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: èíñòèòóöèîíàëüíàÿ ñðåäà; òåíåâàÿ ýêîíîìèêà; êîððóïöèÿ; èíñòèòóò ïðàâ ñîáñòâåííîñòè; íàëîãîîáëîæåíèå.

E. N. NEVZOROVAPhD in Economics, Associate Professor,

Baikal State University of Economics and Law

CORRUPTION AND THE SCALES OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY

The paper presents a brief overview of the conducted studies on nature of the informal economy. The author gives consideration to correlation between the definitions the «informal economy», «underground economy», «shadow economy». Differences in approaches to studying the role of the corruption phenomenon in the underground economy are formulated. The author, considering basic propositions of the property rights theory, justifies advisability of studying the negative impact on the economy brought by corruption and stresses the fact that contemporary studies on corruption impact on economic growth contain rather ambiguous conclusions. In this regard, the conditions when corruption can encourage the economic growth are designated. Leaning on macroeconomic data and international ratings of institutional environment along with using the cluster analyses approach, the correlation between the sizes of the shadow economies, state of economic welfare, tax burdens, corruption perception indexes and sets of institutional indicators for doing business typical for different countries is identified and scrutinized. Based on the results of the conducted research, the author denotes perspective directions of institutional business environment reformation that can encourage national economic development.

Keywords: institutional environment; shadow economy; corruption; property rights institution; taxation.

ÓÄÊ 330.341.2(075)ÁÁÊ 65.012.2

Èññëåäîâàíèÿ î âëèÿíèè èíñòèòóöèîíàëü-íûõ ôàêòîðîâ íà èòîãîâûå ïîêàçàòåëè ýêîíî-ìè÷åñêîé äåÿòåëüíîñòè çàíèìàþò çàìåòíîå ìåñòî â ñîâðåìåííûõ ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ ðàáî-òàõ. Â îòäåëüíûõ ñëó÷àÿõ èññëåäîâàòåëè äå-ëàþò àêöåíò íà âëèÿíèè íà ïîêàçàòåëè ýêîíî-

ìè÷åñêîãî ðîñòà, â äðóãèõ — íà ïîêàçàòåëè ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî ðàçâèòèÿ. Èçâåñòíî, ÷òî ýêî-íîìè÷åñêîå ðàçâèòèå ÿâëÿåòñÿ íîðìàòèâíîé êîíöåïöèåé, ò. å. ýòî ïîíÿòèå ïðèìåíÿåòñÿ â êîíòåêñòå ÷åëîâå÷åñêîãî ÷óâñòâà ìîðàëè. Íàèáîëåå òî÷íûé ìåòîä èçìåðåíèÿ ðàçâè-

Å. Í. ÍÅÂÇÎÐÎÂÀ

46Известия ИГЭА. 2013. № 6 (92)

ÝÊÎÍÎÌÈ×ÅÑÊÀß ÒÅÎÐÈß

òèÿ — èíäåêñ ðàçâèòèÿ ÷åëîâå÷åñêîãî ïîòåí-öèàëà. Ýêîíîìè÷åñêèé ðîñò — áîëåå óçêîå ïîíÿòèå, ÷åì ýêîíîìè÷åñêîå ðàçâèòèå. Ýòî óâåëè÷åíèå ðåàëüíîãî óðîâíÿ íàöèîíàëüíîãî ïðîèçâîäñòâà ñòðàíû, êîòîðîå ìîæåò áûòü âûçâàíî ïîâûøåíèåì êà÷åñòâà ðåñóðñîâ, óâåëè÷åíèåì êîëè÷åñòâà ðåñóðñîâ, óëó÷øå-íèåì òåõíîëîãèè èëè óâåëè÷åíèåì ñòîèìîñòè òîâàðîâ è óñëóã, ïðîèçâîäèìûõ â êàæäîì ñåêòîðå ýêîíîìèêè. Ýêîíîìè÷åñêèé ðîñò ìîæåò èçìåðÿòüñÿ óâåëè÷åíèåì ñòðàíû ÂÂÏ. Òàêèì îáðàçîì, ïðè îöåíêå ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî ðîñòà íå ó÷èòûâàåòñÿ ðàçìåð íåôîðìàëüíîé ýêîíîìèêè. Âñëåäñòâèå ýòîãî èçìåðåíèå ïî-êàçàòåëåé ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî ðàçâèòèÿ ÿâëÿåòñÿ áîëåå àêòóàëüíûì äëÿ îöåíêè ïðîãðåññà è êà÷åñòâà æèçíè â ðàçâèâàþùèõñÿ ñòðàíàõ; à ïîêàçàòåëè ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî ðîñòà ÿâëÿþòñÿ áîëåå ïðèåìëåìûìè ìåòðèêàìè äëÿ îöåíêè ïðîãðåññà â ðàçâèòûõ ñòðàíàõ. Íî ïîñëåäíèå øèðîêî èñïîëüçóþòñÿ âî âñåõ ñòðàíàõ, ïîòî-ìó ÷òî ðîñò ÿâëÿåòñÿ íåîáõîäèìûì óñëîâèåì äëÿ ðàçâèòèÿ1.

Ìåæäóíàðîäíàÿ îðãàíèçàöèÿ òðóäà äàåò ñëåäóþùåå îïðåäåëåíèå íåôîðìàëüíîìó ñåêòîðó ýêîíîìèêè: «Íåôîðìàëüíûé ñåêòîð â öåëîì ìîæåò áûòü îõàðàêòåðèçîâàí êàê ñîâîêóïíîñòü åäèíèö, çàíèìàþùèõñÿ ïðîèç-âîäñòâîì òîâàðîâ èëè óñëóã ñ îñíîâíîé öåëüþ îáåñïå÷åíèÿ çàíÿòîñòè è äîõîäîâ äëÿ ñîîò-âåòñòâóþùèõ ëèö»2. Äàííûé èñòî÷íèê óêàçû-âàåò, ÷òî áèçíåñ-åäèíèöû âíóòðè íåôîðìàëü-íîãî ñåêòîðà îáû÷íî èìåþò íèçêèé óðîâåíü îðãàíèçàöèè äåÿòåëüíîñòè, îñóùåñòâëÿåìîé â íåáîëüøîì ìàñøòàáå. Òàêæå îòìå÷àåòñÿ, ÷òî òðóäîâûå îòíîøåíèÿ â äàííîì ñåêòîðå ÷àñòî îñíîâûâàþòñÿ íå íà äîãîâîðíûõ îòíî-øåíèÿõ ñ îôèöèàëüíûìè ãàðàíòèÿìè, à íà íå-ðåãóëÿðíîé çàíÿòîñòè, ðîäñòâåííûõ, ëè÷íûõ èëè îáùåñòâåííûõ îòíîøåíèÿõ.

Ê íàñòîÿùåìó ìîìåíòó ìîæíî îáîçíà-÷èòü ÷åòûðå äîìèíèðóþùèõ øêîëû ìûñëè â ðàìêàõ ìíîæåñòâà ïîäõîäîâ ê àíàëèçó íå-ôîðìàëüíîé ýêîíîìèêè [4; 12]:

– äóàëèñòè÷åñêàÿ øêîëà, ïîçèöèîíèðóþ-ùàÿ íåôîðìàëüíûé ñåêòîð ýêîíîìèêè êàê ñåêòîð, ñîñòîÿùèé èç õîçÿéñòâóþùèõ ñóáúåê-òîâ, çàíÿòûõ â «ìàðãèíàëüíîé äåÿòåëüíîñòè»

(îòëè÷àþùåéñÿ îò ôîðìàëüíîãî ñåêòîðà è íå ñâÿçàííîé ñ íèì), îáåñïå÷èâàþùåé äîõîä äëÿ áåäíûõ è ñîöèàëüíóþ çàùèòó â ïåðèîäû êðèçèñîâ (ILO 19723; V. Tokman [20]);

– ñòðóêòóðàëèñòñêàÿ øêîëà, ðàññìàòðèâà-þùàÿ íåôîðìàëüíóþ ýêîíîìèêó êàê ñôåðó äåÿòåëüíîñòè «ïîä÷èíåííûõ» áèçíåñ-åäèíèö (ìèêðî-ïðåäïðèÿòèé è îòäåëüíûõ ðàáîòíè-êîâ), êîòîðûå ñâîåé äåÿòåëüíîñòüþ ñïîñîá-ñòâóþò ñíèæåíèþ «çàòðàò âõîäà» è òðóäîâûõ èçäåðæåê êðóïíûõ ôèðì, òåì ñàìûì, ïîâû-øàÿ èõ êîíêóðåíòîñïîñîáíîñòü (M. Castells è A Portes [3]);

– ëåãàëèñòñêàÿ øêîëà, îáîçíà÷àþùàÿ íå-ôîðìàëüíûé ñåêòîð êàê ñîñòîÿùèé èç «îòâàæ-íûõ» ìèêðî-ïðåäïðèíèìàòåëåé, ðåøèâøèõ ðà-áîòàòü íåîôèöèàëüíî, ÷òîáû èçáåæàòü çàòðàò, âðåìåíè è óñèëèé íà îôèöèàëüíóþ ðåãèñòðà-öèþ, è íóæäàþùèõñÿ â ïðàâàõ ñîáñòâåííîñòè äëÿ êîíâåðòàöèè ñâîèõ àêòèâîâ â þðèäè÷åñêè ïðèçíàííûå àêòèâû (H. de Soto [7]);

– âîëþíòàðèñòñêàÿ øêîëà, ôîêóñèðóþ-ùàÿ âíèìàíèå íà íåôîðìàëüíûõ ïðåäïðè-íèìàòåëÿõ, êîòîðûå ñîçíàòåëüíî ñòðåìÿòñÿ èçáåæàòü îáÿçàòåëüíûõ ïðåäïèñàíèé è íàëî-ãîîáëîæåíèÿ, íî â îòëè÷èå îò ëåãàëèñòñêîé øêîëû íå âîçëàãàþò âèíó íà ãðîìîçäêèå ïðîöåäóðû ðåãèñòðàöèè (W. Maloney [18]).

Îáîáùàÿ ýòîò ïåðå÷åíü, ìîæíî çàìå-òèòü, ÷òî ïðè èçó÷åíèè íåôîðìàëüíîé ýêî-íîìèêè èññëåäîâàòåëè ñîñðåäîòî÷èâàþòñÿ íà èçó÷åíèè ðàçëè÷íûõ ñåãìåíòîâ íåôîðìàëü-íîé ýêîíîìèêè è êîíöåíòðèðóþò âíèìàíèå íà ðàçëè÷íûõ àñïåêòàõ íåñîâåðøåíñòâà ãîñó-äàðñòâåííîãî ðåãóëèðîâàíèÿ.

Ñ òî÷êè çðåíèÿ ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî àíàëèçà ïðàâà, â îáùåì ñìûñëå ó íàðóøèòåëÿ íîðì ñóùåñòâóþò ýêîíîìè÷åñêèå ìîòèâû. Íàïðè-ìåð, G. Becker [2] ïðèäåðæèâàåòñÿ ìûñëè, ÷òî ðåøåíèå î ñîâåðøåíèè èëè íå ñîâåð-øåíèè ïðåñòóïëåíèÿ ìîæåò ÿâëÿòüñÿ àêòîì ðàöèîíàëüíîãî âûáîðà. Ôàêòîðû, âëèÿþùèå íà èíäèâèäóàëüíîå ðåøåíèå ó÷àñòâîâàòü â ïðåñòóïíîé äåÿòåëüíîñòè, âêëþ÷àþò â ñåáÿ: 1) îæèäàåìûé äîõîä îò ïðåñòóïíîé äå-ÿòåëüíîñòè ïî ñðàâíåíèþ ñ äîõîäàìè îò ëå-ãàëüíîé ðàáîòû; 2) âåðîÿòíîñòü (ðèñê) áûòü ïîéìàííûì è îñóæäåííûì; 3) ñòåïåíü íà-êàçàíèÿ; 4) âîçìîæíîñòè ëåãàëüíîé äåÿòåëü-

1 URL : http://www.diffen.com/difference/Economic_Development_vs_Economic_Growth.

2 Resolution concerning statistics of employment in the informal sector, adopted by the Fifteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (January 1993).

3 Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya. Geneva : International Labour Organization, 1972.

47Известия ИГЭА. 2013. № 6 (92)


íîñòè [21]. Â äàííîé ìîäåëè ïðåñòóïíèêè òàê æå, êàê è ëþáûå äðóãèå ëþäè ðàöèîíàëüíî ìàêñèìèçèðóþò ïîëåçíîñòü. Ïîñêîëüêó îá-ùèé ðåçóëüòàò ïðåñòóïíîãî äåÿíèÿ ÿâëÿåòñÿ íåîïðåäåëåííûì, Áåêêåð èñïîëüçóåò ïðåä-ïîëîæåíèÿ, ÷òî ëþäè äåéñòâóþò, êàê åñëè áû îíè áû ìàêñèìèçèðîâàëè îæèäàåìóþ ïîëåçíîñòü, à òàêæå, ÷òî ïîëåçíîñòü åñòü ïîëîæèòåëüíàÿ ôóíêöèÿ äîõîäà. Èíäèâèä áóäåò ñîâåðøàòü ïðåñòóïëåíèå, åñëè åãî îæèäàåìàÿ ïîëåçíîñòü áóäåò ïîëîæèòåëü-íà, è îí íå áóäåò åãî ñîâåðøàòü, åñëè îíà îòðèöàòåëüíà.

Â ðàçâèòèå ýòîé èäåè ïðè èçó÷åíèè ôàêòî-ðîâ, ìîòèâèðóþùèõ ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ àêòîðîâ ê ïåðåõîäó â íåîôèöèàëüíûé ñåêòîð ýêîíî-ìèêè, H de Soto âûäåëÿåò òàê íàçûâàåìóþ «öåíó ïîä÷èíåíèÿ çàêîíó» è «öåíó âíåëå-ãàëüíîñòè» [6].

«Öåíà ïîä÷èíåíèÿ çàêîíó» âêëþ÷àåò â ñåáÿ:

– èçäåðæêè äîñòóïà ê çàêîíó — èçäåðæêè íà âûïîëíåíèå òðåáîâàíèé çàêîíîäàòåëüñòâà, íåîáõîäèìûå äëÿ íà÷àëà áèçíåñà;

– èçäåðæêè ïðîäîëæåíèÿ äåÿòåëüíîñòè â ðàìêàõ çàêîíà — èçäåðæêè, ñâÿçàííûå ñ íå-îáõîäèìîñòüþ óïëàòû íàëîãîâ è ñîáëþäåíèÿ èíûõ òðåáîâàíèé çàêîíîäàòåëüñòâà â õîäå îñóùåñòâëåíèÿ õîçÿéñòâåííîé äåÿòåëüíîñòè.

«Öåíà âíåëåãàëüíîñòè» â îáùåì âèäå âêëþ÷àåò â ñåáÿ âñå âèäû èçäåðæåê, ñâÿçàí-íûõ ñ óêëîíåíèåì îò ïðàâèë îôèöèàëüíîãî ðåãóëèðîâàíèÿ.

Êàê «öåíà ïîä÷èíåíèÿ çàêîíó», òàê è «öåíà âíåëåãàëüíîñòè» âêëþ÷àåò íå òîëüêî ïðÿìûå äåíåæíûå çàòðàòû, íî è çàòðàòû âðåìåíè íà âûïîëíåíèå òåõ èëè èíûõ äåé-ñòâèé, è ïîñëåäíÿÿ ñîñòàâëÿþùàÿ çà÷àñòóþ áûâàåò çíà÷èòåëüíà.

Íà ñåãîäíÿøíèé äåíü íàèáîëåå ìàñøòàá-íûì èññëåäîâàíèåì, èçó÷àþùèì «öåíó ïîä-÷èíåíèÿ çàêîíó», ÿâëÿåòñÿ ïðîåêò Âñåìèðíî-ãî áàíêà «Âåäåíèå áèçíåñà» (Doing Business), ñîäåðæàùèé äàííûå, ïîçâîëÿþùèå îöåíèòü çàêîíîäàòåëüñòâî, ñâÿçàííîå ñ ðåãóëèðîâàíè-åì áèçíåñà, è åãî ïðèìåíåíèå â 189 ñòðàíàõ ìèðà. Ýòîò ïðîåêò áàçèðóåòñÿ íà èññëåäî-âàíèÿõ ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ ìîòèâîâ îñóùåñòâëå-íèÿ äåÿòåëüíîñòè â íåôîðìàëüíîì ñåêòîðå ýêîíîìèêè, â òåðìèíàõ ñîîòíîøåíèÿ çàòðàò è âûãîä [8].

Äàííûå î «öåíå âíåëåãàëüíîñòè» íå ÿâ-ëÿþòñÿ ëåãêîäîñòóïíûìè äëÿ èññëåäîâàòåëÿ.

Îäíàêî êîñâåííûìè ïîêàçàòåëÿìè, ñâèäå-òåëüñòâóþùèìè î ìàñøòàáå âíåëåãàëüíîé ýêîíîìè÷åñêîé äåÿòåëüíîñòè, ïî íàøåìó ìíåíèþ, ìîãóò ñëóæèòü èíäèêàòîðû, èëëþñ-òðèðóþùèå âîñïðèÿòèå ìàñøòàáà êîððóïöè-îííûõ ïðàêòèê.

Òðàäèöèîííî êîððóïöèÿ îïðåäåëÿåòñÿ êàê «çëîóïîòðåáëåíèå ñëóæåáíûì ïîëîæåíèåì â öåëÿõ ëè÷íîé âûãîäû» (the abuse of public office for private gain)1 [19]. Ïðè ýòîì âèäû êîððóïöèîííîé äåÿòåëüíîñòè âåñüìà ðàç-íîîáðàçíû, ê íèì îòíîñÿò âçÿòî÷íè÷åñòâî, õèùåíèå, ìîøåííè÷åñòâî, âûìîãàòåëüñòâî, çëîóïîòðåáëåíèå âëàñòüþ, êîíôëèêò èíòåðå-ñîâ, ôàâîðèòèçì è äð. [17].

Íåîáõîäèìî çàìåòèòü, ÷òî ïðè èçó÷åíèè êîððóïöèîííûõ ïðàêòèê è äåÿòåëüíîñòè â ðàìêàõ íåôîðìàëüíîé ýêîíîìèêè èõ âçà-èìîîòíîøåíèÿ çà÷àñòóþ ïîçèöèîíèðóþòñÿ ðàçëè÷íûì îáðàçîì. Â ÷àñòíîñòè, ñîãëàñíî øèðîêî öèòèðóåìîé òàêñîíîìèè, êîòîðóþ ïðåäëîæèë E. L. Feige, ñôåðû íåëåãàëüíîé, íåäåêëàðèðóåìîé, íåðåãèñòðèðóåìîé è íå-ôîðìàëüíîé ýêîíîìèêè ñîñòàâëÿþò ñåêòîð «ïîäïîëüíîé ýêîíîìèêè»2 [10]. Êîððóïöèîí-íàÿ äåÿòåëüíîñòü ïðè ýòîì ðàññìàòðèâàåòñÿ êàê ñîñòàâëÿþùàÿ íåëåãàëüíîé ýêîíîìèêè [11], ãäå íàáëþäàåòñÿ íåïðàâîìåðíîå ïðè-ñâîåíèå îòäåëüíûõ ïðàâîìî÷èé ïóáëè÷íîãî ñîáñòâåííèêà (íàïðèìåð, òàêèõ êàê ïðàâî ðàñïîðÿæåíèÿ è ïðàâî íà äîõîä).

Â òî æå âðåìÿ êîððóïöèÿ òàêæå èññëåäó-åòñÿ êàê ôàêòîð êà÷åñòâà èíñòèòóöèîíàëüíîé ñðåäû, íàðÿäó ñ èíäèêàòîðîì «Ïðàâà ñîáñ-òâåííîñòè» (îöåíèâàþùèì óðîâåíü çàùèòû ïðàâ ñîáñòâåííîñòè) [16]. Ïðè òàêîì ïîä-õîäå, èñïîëüçóÿ òèïîëîãèþ íåôîðìàëüíûõ èíñòèòóòîâ, ïðåäëîæåííóþ G. Helmke è S. Levitsky [13], êîòîðàÿ áàçèðóåòñÿ íà äâóõ èçìåðåíèÿõ: 1) ýôôåêòèâíîñòü ñîîòâåòñòâó-þùèõ ôîðìàëüíûõ èíñòèòóòîâ è 2) ñòåïåíü ñîâìåñòèìîñòè ìåæäó öåëÿìè àêòîðîâ, êîð-ðóïöèþ ìîæíî îõàðàêòåðèçîâàòü êàê êîíêó-ðèðóþùèé èíñòèòóò.

Ñðàâíèòåëüíûå èññëåäîâàíèÿ èíñòèòóöèî-íàëüíîé ñðåäû ñîâðåìåííîé ýêîíîìèêè èçó-

1 World Bank. Helping Countries Combat Corruption. The Role of the World Bank (Poverty Reduction and Economic Management); The World Bank, September 1997; http://www.adb.org/themes/governance/anticorruption.

2 Òåðìèí «underground economy» ïåðåâåäåí êàê «ïîäïîëüíàÿ ýêîíîìèêà». — Å. Í.

48Известия ИГЭА. 2013. № 6 (92)


÷àþòñÿ ñ ïîìîùüþ ìíîæåñòâà ðåéòèíãîâûõ èññëåäîâàíèé. Ïðè îïðåäåëåíèè ìåæäóíà-ðîäíûõ ðåéòèíãîâ èíñòèòóöèîíàëüíîé ñðåäû øèðîêî èñïîëüçóþòñÿ èíäèêàòîðû êîððóïöèè è çà÷àñòóþ ýòî ñîïðÿæåíî ñ îöåíêîé êà÷åñò-âà èíñòèòóòà ñîáñòâåííîñòè (òàáë. 1).

Òàêàÿ ñâÿçü îáóñëîâëåíà ñóùíîñòüþ ñàìî-ãî ôåíîìåíà êîððóïöèè. Òî åñòü, ïî íàøå-ìó ìíåíèþ, ýòî ñâÿçàíî ñ òåì, ÷òî, íàðÿäó ñ òðàäèöèîííûì îïðåäåëåíèåì êîððóïöèè, èçâåñòíû ôîðìóëèðîâêè, áàçèðóþùèåñÿ íà èñïîëüçîâàíèè êàòåãîðèè «ïðèñâîåíèå», ò. å. îäíîãî èç ïðàâîìî÷èé ñîáñòâåííèêà. Ðàçâåð-íóòîå, «ïîëíîå» îïðåäåëåíèå ïðàâà ñîáñòâåí-íîñòè ê íàñòîÿùåìó ìîìåíòó ïðåäëîæåíî A. M. Honore [14]. Îíî âêëþ÷àåò 11 ýëåìåí-òîâ: ïðàâî âëàäåíèÿ, ïðàâî ïîëüçîâàíèÿ, ïðà-âî óïðàâëåíèÿ, ïðàâî íà äîõîä, ïðàâî íà êà-ïèòàëüíóþ ñòîèìîñòü, ïðàâî íà áåçîïàñíîñòü, âîçìîæíîñòü ïåðåäà÷è, îòñóòñòâèå ñðîêà, çàïðåùåíèå âðåäíîãî èñïîëüçîâàíèÿ, îòâåò-ñòâåííîñòü ê èñïîëíåíèþ è ïðàâî íà îñòàòî÷-íóþ ñòîèìîñòü. Òðàêòîâêà ïîíÿòèÿ êîððóïöèè ñ èñïîëüçîâàíèåì êàòåãîðèè «ñîáñòâåííîñòü» ðàçâèòà â ñëåäóþùåì îïðåäåëåíèè: «Òåðìèí «êîððóïöèÿ» â öåëîì îïðåäåëÿåò ñäåëêó, ïîñðåäñòâîì êîòîðîé èíäèâèä, ñâÿçàííûé ïðèíöèïàë-àãåíòñêèì êîíòðàêòîì, èñïîëüçó-åò åãî äèñêðåöèîííûå ïîëíîìî÷èÿ, ÷òîáû ïðîäàòü òðåòüåìó ëèöó ïðàâà ñîáñòâåííîñòè, êîòîðûå íå ïðèíàäëåæàò åìó» [5].

Ïî íàøåìó ìíåíèþ, âåñüìà ïðèìå÷à-òåëüíûì èññëåäîâàíèåì ïðîáëåìû âçàèìî-äåéñòâèÿ èíñòèòóòà ïðàâà ñîáñòâåííîñòè è ðàñïðîñòðàíåííîñòè êîððóïöèîííûõ ïðàêòèê ÿâëÿåòñÿ èññëåäîâàíèå D. A. Houston [15], äîêàçûâàþùåãî, ÷òî íå âî âñåõ ñëó÷àÿõ êîððóïöèÿ èìååò îäíîçíà÷íî íåãàòèâíûå ïîñëåäñòâèÿ äëÿ ýêîíîìèêè ñòðàíû, ÷òî

ýêîíîìè÷åñêèå ýôôåêòû êîððóïöèè ñïî-ñîáíû íå òîëüêî îãðàíè÷èâàòü ðîñò, íî è ñïîñîáñòâîâàòü åìó. Â ÷àñòíîñòè, â ñòðàíàõ ñî ñëàáîé çàùèòîé ïðàâà ñîáñòâåííîñòè êîð-ðóïöèÿ íà îáùåíàöèîíàëüíîì óðîâíå ìîæåò ñïîñîáñòâîâàòü ðàñøèðåíèþ ýêîíîìè÷åñêîé äåÿòåëüíîñòè. È òîëüêî â òåõ ñòðàíàõ, ãäå ñîáñòâåííîñòü çàùèùàåòñÿ ýôôåêòèâíî, ýêîíîìè÷åñêèé ýôôåêò êîððóïöèè èìååò îãðàíè÷èòåëüíîå äåéñòâèå.

Èçâåñòíû ðàçëè÷íûå òèïîëîãèè âèäîâ äåÿòåëüíîñòè âíóòðè ñåêòîðà äåÿòåëüíîñòè, îñóùåñòâëÿþùèåñÿ âíå ðàìîê çàêîíà èëè íå ïðåäóñìàòðèâàþùèå çàêîíîäàòåëüíîå ðåãóëèðîâàíèå. Â ðàìêàõ äàííîé ðàáîòû ìû ñëåäóåì òàêñîíîìèè Ñ. Þ. Áàðñóêîâîé [1], êîòîðàÿ èñïîëüçóåò â êà÷åñòâå îáùåãî ïî-íÿòèÿ òåðìèí «íåôîðìàëüíàÿ ýêîíîìèêà» è âûäåëÿåò ÷åòûðå ñåãìåíòà âíóòðè ýòîé äåÿòåëüíîñòè:

– Ýêîíîìèêà «âîïðåêè çàêîíó»:1) êðèìèíàëüíàÿ — ïðîèçâîäñòâî íåïðè-

åìëåìûõ âèäîâ ïðîäóêöèè íåïðèåìëåìûìè ñðåäñòâàìè, ýòîò ñåãìåíò íåôîðìàëüíîé ýêîíîìèêè ïûòàþòñÿ óïðàçäíèòü;

2) òåíåâàÿ — ïðîèçâîäñòâî ïðèåìëåìûõ âèäîâ ïðîäóêöèè íåïðèåìëåìûìè ñðåäñòâà-ìè, ýòîò ñåãìåíò ïûòàþòñÿ ëåãàëèçîâàòü.

– Ýêîíîìèêà «çà ïðåäåëàìè çàêîíà», ò. å. äåÿòåëüíîñòü, íå ïðåäïîëàãàþùàÿ çà-êîíîäàòåëüíîå ðåãóëèðîâàíèå:

3) ýêîíîìèêà äàðà — ýêîíîìèêà ìåæñå-ìåéíûõ îáìåíîâ íà íåðûíî÷íîé îñíîâå;

4) äîìàøíÿÿ ýêîíîìèêà — íåîïëà÷èâà-åìàÿ äåÿòåëüíîñòü ïî ñîçäàíèþ ïðîäóêòîâ èëè îêàçàíèþ óñëóã, ïðåäíàçíà÷åííûõ äëÿ ÷ëåíîâ äîìîõîçÿéñòâà.

Íàñòîÿùàÿ ðàáîòà ôîêóñèðóåòñÿ íà èçó-÷åíèè ñåêòîðà «òåíåâîé ýêîíîìèêè», êàê

Òàáëèöà 1Èíäåêñû ïðàâ ñîáñòâåííîñòè è êîððóïöèè

Îðãàíèçàöèÿ Èíäåêñ Èíäåêñ ïðàâ ñîáñòâåííîñòè Èíäåêñ êîððóïöèèWorld Bank Worldwide Governance

IndicatorsÂåðõîâåíñòâî çàêîíà (ñîáëþäåíèå ïðàâ ñîáñòâåííîñòè ó÷èòûâàåòñÿ ïðè îïðåäåëåíèè êîìïîíåíòà)

Áîðüáà ñ êîððóï-öèåé

World Bank Country Policy and Institu-tional Assessment (CPIA)

Çàùèòà ïðàâ ñîáñòâåííîñòè Äîâåðèå ê ïðàâè-òåëüñòâó, êîððóïöèÿ

World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index Ïðàâà ñîáñòâåííîñòè Ýòèêà è êîððóïöèÿHeritage Foundation & Wall Street Journal

Index of Economic Freedom Ïðàâà ñîáñòâåííîñòè Ñâîáîäà îò êîððóï-öèè

Bertelsmann Stiftung Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)

Ïðàâà ñîáñòâåííîñòè Àíòèêîððóïöèîííàÿ ïîëèòèêà

IPRI International Property Rights Index

Ìåæäóíàðîäíûé èíäåêñ ïðàâ ñîáñòâåííîñòè (èòîãîâûé èíäåêñ)

Áîðüáà ñ êîððóï-öèåé

49Известия ИГЭА. 2013. № 6 (92)


îí îïðåäåëåí â èñòî÷íèêå «The costs of tax abuse»: «Ïî îïðåäåëåíèþ, èñïîëüçóåìîìó çäåñü, ýêîíîìè÷åñêàÿ àêòèâíîñòü â òåíåâîé ýêîíîìèêå ñòðàíû — óêëîíåíèå îò íàëî-ãîâ»1. Èìåííî ýòîò ñåãìåíò íåôîðìàëüíîé ýêîíîìèêè ÿâëÿåòñÿ îáëàñòüþ ãåíåðèðîâàíèÿ äîïîëíèòåëüíûõ ðåñóðñîâ ÷àñòè îáùåñòâà, è èìåííî â îòíîøåíèè ýòîãî ñåãìåíòà æåëà-òåëüíû ïîïûòêè ëåãàëèçàöèè. Ìû çàäàåìñÿ öåëüþ âûÿâèòü õàðàêòåð âçàèìîñâÿçè ïîêà-çàòåëåé óðîâíÿ áëàãîñîñòîÿíèÿ íàñåëåíèÿ, ìàñøòàáà òåíåâîé ýêîíîìèêè è èíñòèòóöèî-íàëüíîé ñðåäû âåäåíèÿ áèçíåñà. Ïîñëåäíèé äîëæåí âêëþ÷àòü â ñåáÿ êàê ïîêàçàòåëü ñëîæ-íîñòè îôèöèàëüíîãî ðåãóëèðîâàíèÿ âåäåíèÿ áèçíåñà, òàê è èíäèêàòîð, èëëþñòðèðóþùèé âîñïðèÿòèå âëèÿíèÿ êîððóïöèîííûõ ïðàêòèê. Êðîìå ýòîãî, îáçîð èññëåäîâàíèé ïî âîï-ðîñàì ïðèíÿòèÿ ðåøåíèé î âåäåíèè áèçíåñà äàåò âîçìîæíîñòü ïðåäïîëîæèòü, ÷òî öå-ëåñîîáðàçåí àíàëèç òàêîãî ïîêàçàòåëÿ, êàê íàëîãîâîå áðåìÿ. Äëÿ ïðîâåäåíèÿ àíàëèçà áûëè èñïîëüçîâàíû ñëåäóþùèå äàííûå:

– ÂÂÏ íà äóøó íàñåëåíèÿ, äîë. ÑØÀ íà îñíîâå ïàðèòåòà ïîêóïàòåëüíîé ñïîñîáíîñòè2;

– îöåíêà ðàçìåðà òåíåâîé ýêîíîìèêè, % îò ÂÂÏ3;

– íàëîãîâîå áðåìÿ, %4;– èíäåêñ âîñïðèÿòèÿ êîððóïöèè, 20125;– èíäèêàòîðû ïðîåêòà Doing business6.Â âûáîðêå ïðèñóòñòâóþò äàííûå

133 ñòðàí, äëÿ êîòîðûõ äîñòóïíû âñå óêà-çàííûå ïîêàçàòåëè.

Â öåëÿõ ñîêðàùåíèÿ ïåðâîíà÷àëüíîé âûáîðêè áûë ïðîâåäåí êëàñòåðíûé àíàëèç äàííûõ â ðàçðåçå íàöèîíàëüíûõ ýêîíîìèê. Ñ ïîìîùüþ ïðîãðàììû SPSS ïåðâîíà÷àëü-íàÿ ñîâîêóïíîñòü áûëà ðàçáèòà íà 10 ãðóïï, òàê êàê èìåííî òàêàÿ ãðóïïèðîâêà îáúåêòîâ íåðåäêî ïðèìåíÿåòñÿ â ñîöèàëüíî-ýêîíîìè-÷åñêèõ èññëåäîâàíèÿõ. Â òàáë. 2 ïðèâåäåíû

1 The costs of tax abuse: A briefing paper on the cost of tax evasion worldwide. The Tax Justice Network. November 2011. URL : http://www.tackletaxhavens.com/Cost_of_Tax_Abuse_TJN%20Research_23rd_Nov_2011.pdf.

Òàáëèöà 2Ñðåäíèå çíà÷åíèÿ ïîêàçàòåëåé â ïðåäåëàõ êàæäîãî êëàñòåðà

Çíà÷åíèÿ ïîêàçàòåëåé Íîìåð êëàñòåðà Äàííûå ÐÔ10 4 1 3 5 7 6 9 8 2

ÂÂÏ íà äóøó íàñåëåíèÿ, äîë. 1 644 7 400 16 460 29 197 43 821 48 980 59 979 80 390 95 301 115 037 13 089Ðàçìåð òåíåâîé ýêîíîìèêè, % îò ÂÂÏ

39,76 35,30 29,03 25,38 15,56 14,66 17,45 8,5 18,75 9,7 43,8

Íàëîãîâîå áðåìÿ, % 16,72 20,07 27,65 27,88 29,29 36,86 31,75 29,00 23,00 36,00 34CPI 2012 31 38 54 50 76 78 77 86 76 80 28Èòîãîâîå ìåñòî â ðåéòèíãå Doing Business 2012 — Ïðî-ñòîòà âåäåíèÿ áèçíåñà

130 88 60 64 19 21 34 29 28 60 92

Ó÷ðåæäåíèå ïðåäïðèÿòèÿ 109 96 79 81 56 41 64 104 82 103 88Îôîðìëåíèå ðàçðåøåíèé íà ñòðîèòåëüñòâî

118 97 91 94 39 85 44 58 26 37 178

Ïîäêëþ÷åíèå ê ñèñòåìàì ýíåðãîñíàáæåíèÿ

131 110 68 76 22 67 30 8 22 66 117

Ðåãèñòðàöèÿ ïðàâ ñîáñòâåí-íîñòè

109 84 67 90 58 61 44 16 26 124 17

Ïðèâëå÷åíèå êðåäèòîâ 96 76 63 78 35 37 51 28 102 170 109Çàùèòà èíâåñòîðîâ 105 76 80 66 51 45 54 170 75 128 115Óïëàòà íàëîãîâ 130 99 76 78 48 40 27 16 10 15 56Âíåøíåòîðãîâàÿ äåÿòåëü-íîñòü

128 102 66 51 21 22 43 35 46 41 157

Îáåñïå÷åíèå èñïîëíåíèÿ äîãîâîðîâ

117 86 70 84 31 27 48 20 48 1 10

Ðåøåíèå ïðîáëåì íåñîñòîÿ-òåëüíîñòè

128 90 65 63 26 9 36 47 19 53 55

2 URL : http://api.worldbank.org/datafiles/NY. GDP.PCAP.PP.CD_Indicator_MetaData_en_EXCEL.xls.

3 The costs of tax abuse: A briefing paper on the cost of tax evasion worldwide. The Tax Justice Network. November 2011.

4 Òàì æå.5 URL : http://files.transparency.org/content/

download/533/2213/file/2012_CPI_DataPackage.zip.6 URL : http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/

GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Simulators/DoingBusiness/DB13-Simulator.xls.

50Известия ИГЭА. 2013. № 6 (92)


äàííûå î ñðåäíèõ çíà÷åíèÿõ ïîêàçàòåëåé âíóòðè êàæäîé ãðóïïû, êëàñòåðû óïîðÿäî÷å-íû ïî âîçðàñòàíèþ ïîêàçàòåëÿ ÂÂÏ íà äóøó íàñåëåíèÿ. Òàêæå äëÿ ñðàâíåíèÿ ïðèâåäåíû äàííûå ÐÔ.

Ñîñòàâ ñòðàí ïî êëàñòåðàì ïðåäñòàâëåí â òàáë. 3.

Õàðàêòåðèñòèêè êëàñòåðîâ ñòðàí ïðåä-ñòàâëåíû íà ðèñ.

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

010 4 1 3 5 7 6 9 8 2

Доля «скрытой» экономики в ВВП, %Налоговое бремя, %Значение индекса CPI 2012Место в рейтинге Doing Business 2012Количество стран в кластере

Номер кластера стран

Õàðàêòåðèñòèêè êëàñòåðîâ ñòðàí

Ìîæíî çàìåòèòü, ÷òî ñîâîêóïíîå íà-ëîãîâîå áðåìÿ â ÐÔ íàìíîãî ïðåâûøàåò ïîêàçàòåëü, ðàññ÷èòàííûé â ñðåäíåì äëÿ ñîîòâåòñòâóþùåé ãðóïïû ñòðàí (ò. å. íàëî-ãîâîå áðåìÿ â Ðîññèè îöåíèâàåòñÿ ïðèìåðíî íà óðîâíå ñòðàí ñ âûñîêèì óðîâíåì áëà-ãîñîñòîÿíèÿ). Îäíàêî ïðè ýòîì ìàñøòàáû òåíåâîé ýêîíîìèêè â ÐÔ îöåíèâàþòñÿ âûøå, CPI — íèæå, à ìåñòî â ðåéòèíãå «Âåäåíèå áèçíåñà» — íèæå (÷òî õàðàêòåðíî â öåëîì äëÿ ñòðàí, äîñòèãøèõ óðîâíÿ áëàãîñîñòîÿíèÿ íèæå Ðîññèè.)

Íåîáõîäèìî îòìåòèòü âîçìîæíóþ íå-îäíîçíà÷íîñòü ïðè÷èííî-ñëåäñòâåííîé ñâÿçè ìåæäó ïðèâåäåííûìè ïîêàçàòåëÿìè. Ê íàñòî-ÿùåìó ìîìåíòó ðàçðàáîòàíû óáåäèòåëüíûå ïðèêëàäíûå èññëåäîâàíèÿ, äîêàçûâàþùèå, ÷òî ìåæäó ïîêàçàòåëÿìè áëàãîñîñòîÿíèÿ è èíñòèòóöèîíàëüíûìè èíäèêàòîðàìè ìîæåò ïðîñëåæèâàòüñÿ êàê ïðÿìàÿ, òàê è îáðàòíàÿ ñâÿçü. Òàê, íàïðèìåð, S. Engerman è K. Sokoloff óòâåðæäàþò, ÷òî «èíñòèòóòû èìåþò âàæíîå çíà÷åíèå äëÿ îáúÿñíåíèÿ ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî ðàçâèòèÿ, íî èíñòèòóòû â îïðåäåëåííîé ñòå-ïåíè ÿâëÿþòñÿ ýíäîãåííûìè ê èçìåíÿþùèìñÿ îáñòîÿòåëüñòâàì» [9]. Ïî èòîãàì íàñòîÿùåãî èññëåäîâàíèÿ ìû íå ìîæåì óòâåðæäàòü, ÷òî èíñòèòóòû ÿâëÿþòñÿ îïðåäåëÿþùèì ôàêòî-ðîì äëÿ ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî ðîñòà è ðàçâèòèÿ. Îäíàêî ðåçóëüòàòû íàøåãî ìåæñòðàíîâîãî

Òàáëèöà 3Ðàñïðåäåëåíèå ñòðàí ïî êëàñòåðàì

Íîìåð êëàñòåðà

Êîëè÷åñòâî ñòðàí

Ñòðàíû êëàñòåðà

10 58 Àëáàíèÿ, Àðìåíèÿ, Áàíãëàäåø, Áåíèí, Áîëèâèÿ, Áóðêèíà-Ôàñî, Áóðóíäè, Áóòàí, Âüåò-íàì, Ãàèòè, Ãàìáèÿ, Ãàíà, Ãâèíåÿ, Ãâèíåÿ-Áèññàó, Ãîíäóðàñ, Ãðóçèÿ, Åãèïåò, Çàìáèÿ, Èíäèÿ, Èíäîíåçèÿ, Èðàí, Éåìåí, Êàáî-Âåðäå, Êàìáîäæà, Êàìåðóí, Êåíèÿ, Êèðãèçèÿ, Êîìîðñêèå îñòðîâà, Êîíãî (Äåìîêðàòè÷åñêàÿ ðåñïóáëèêà), Êîíãî (Ðåñïóáëèêà), Êîò-ä’Èâóàð, Ëàîñ, Ëåñîòî, Ëèáåðèÿ, Ìàäàãàñêàð, Ìàëàâè, Ìàëè, Ìàðîêêî, Ìîíãîëèÿ, Íåïàë, Íèêàðàãóà, Ïàêèñòàí, Ïàïóà — Íîâàÿ Ãâèíåÿ, Ïàðàãâàé, Ñàëüâàäîð, Ñåíåãàë, Ñîëîìîíîâû Îñòðîâà, Ñüåððà-Ëåîíå, Òàäæèêèñòàí, Òàíçàíèÿ, Òóíèñ, Óãàíäà, Óêðàèíà, Ôèëèïïèíû, Öåíòðàëüíîàôðèêàíñêàÿ Ðåñïóáëèêà, ×àä, Øðè-Ëàíêà, Ýôèîïèÿ

4 28 Àçåðáàéäæàí, Àëæèð, Àíãîëà, Àðãåíòèíà, Áåëàðóñü, Áîëãàðèÿ, Áîñíèÿ, Áîòñâàíà, Âåíåñóýëà, Ãàáîí, Äîìèíèêà, Èîðäàíèÿ, Êàçàõñòàí, Êèòàé, Êîëóìáèÿ, Êîñòà-Ðèêà, Ëèâàí, Ìàêåäîíèÿ, Ìàëàéçèÿ, Ìåêñèêà, Íàìèáèÿ, Ïåðó, Ðóìûíèÿ, Òàèëàíä, Òóðöèÿ, Ýêâàäîð, ÞÀÐ, ßìàéêà

1 17 Áàãàìñêèå îñòðîâà, Áðàçèëèÿ, ×èëè, Õîðâàòèÿ, ×åøñêàÿ ðåñïóáëèêà, Ýñòîíèÿ, Âåíãðèÿ, Ëàòâèÿ, Ëèòâà, Ìàëüòà, Ïîëüøà, Ïîðòóãàëèÿ, Ðîññèÿ, Ñàóäîâñêàÿ Àðàâèÿ, Ñëîâàêèÿ, Òðèíèäàä è Òîáàãî, Óðóãâàé

3 8 Ãðåöèÿ, Èçðàèëü, Èñïàíèÿ, Èòàëèÿ, Êèïð, Îìàí, Ñëîâåíèÿ, Ýêâàòîðèàëüíàÿ Ãâèíåÿ5 7 Âåëèêîáðèòàíèÿ, Ãåðìàíèÿ, Èñëàíäèÿ, ÎÀÝ, Ñèíãàïóð, Ôðàíöèÿ, ßïîíèÿ7 7 Àâñòðèÿ, Áåëüãèÿ, Èðëàíäèÿ, Êàíàäà, Íèäåðëàíäû, ÑØÀ, Ôèíëÿíäèÿ6 4 Àâñòðàëèÿ, Äàíèÿ, Êóâåéò, Øâåöèÿ9 1 Øâåéöàðèÿ8 2 Êàòàð, Íîðâåãèÿ2 1 Ëþêñåìáóðã

51Известия ИГЭА. 2013. № 6 (92)


èññëåäîâàíèÿ ïîêàçûâàþò, ÷òî íèçêèé óðî-âåíü òåíåâîé ýêîíîìèêè èìååò òåíäåíöèþ áûòü âçàèìîñâÿçàííûì ñ âûñîêèì óðîâíåì áëàãîñîñòîÿíèÿ ñòðàíû, âûñîêèì óðîâíåì íàëîãîâîãî áðåìåíè, âûñîêèì çíà÷åíèåì CPI è îòíîñèòåëüíîé ïðîñòîòîé óñëîâèé äëÿ âåäåíèÿ áèçíåñà.

Ðàññìàòðèâàÿ ïîëîæåíèÿ ýêîíîìè÷åñêîé òåîðèè î ïðåäîñòàâëåíèè îáùåñòâåííûõ áëàã, à èìåííî, ïðåäïîëàãàÿ, ÷òî ðåñóðñû â âèäå íàëîãîâ è èíûõ îáÿçàòåëüíûõ ïëàòåæåé

èçûìàþòñÿ ó õîçÿéñòâóþùèõ ñóáúåêòîâ äëÿ ïðåäîñòàâëåíèÿ ìèíèìàëüíî íåîáõîäèìîãî îáúåìà îáùåñòâåííîãî áëàãà, ìû ïðèõîäèì ê ñëåäóþùåìó âûâîäó: óñèëèÿ, íàïðàâëåííûå íà âûâåäåíèå ýêîíîìè÷åñêîé äåÿòåëüíîñòè èç òåíåâîãî ñåêòîðà («ñíèæåíèå àäìèíèñòðà-òèâíûõ áàðüåðîâ»), ìîãóò ðàññìàòðèâàòüñÿ ïðè ôîðìèðîâàíèè ýêîíîìè÷åñêîé ïîëèòèêè êàê ñâîåîáðàçíàÿ àëüòåðíàòèâà óâåëè÷åíèþ ðàçìåðà ðàçëè÷íûõ âèäîâ àäìèíèñòðàòèâíûõ èçúÿòèé.

Ñïèñîê èñïîëüçîâàííîé ëèòåðàòóðû1. Áàðñóêîâà Ñ. Þ. Íåôîðìàëüíàÿ ýêîíîìèêà. Êóðñ ëåêöèé : ó÷åá. ïîñîáèå / Ñ. Þ. Áàðñóêîâà. — Ì. :

Èçä-âî Ãîñ. óí-òà. — Âûñø. øê. ýêîíîìèêè, 2009. — 354 ñ.2. Becker G. S. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach / G. S. Becker // The Journal of Political

Economy. — 1968. — Vol. 76 (2). — P. 169–217.3. Castells M. World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and Effects of the Informal Economy / M. Castells,

A. Portes // The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Advanced Developed Countries / eds A. Portes, M. Castells, L. A. Benton. — Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.

4. Chen M. The Informal Economy: Definitions, Theories and Policies / M. Chen // WIEGO Working Paper. — 2012. — ¹ 1.

5. Colombatto E. Discretionary Power, Rent-Seeking and Corruption / E. Colombatto // ICER Working Papers. — 2001. — ¹ 24.

6. De Soto H. The Other Path. The Invisible Revolution in the Third World / H. De Soto. N. Y., 1989.7. De Soto H. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else / H. De

Soto. N. Y. : Basic Books, 2000.8. Djankov S. Going Informal: Benefits and Costs / S. Djankov, I. Lieberman, J. Mukherjee, T. Nenova. Draft :

The World Bank, 2002.9. Engerman S. Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economies /

S. Engerman, K. Sokoloff // NBER Working Paper. — 2002. ¹ 9529.10. Feige E. L. Defining and Estimating Underground and Informal Economies: The New Institutional Economics

Approach / E. L. Feige // World Development. — 1990. — Vol. 18 (7). — P. 989–1002.11. Feige E. L. Underground Activity and Institutional Change: Productive, Protective, and Predatory Behavior

in Transition Economies / E. L. Feige // Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies / eds Nelson, Tilley, Walker. — National Academy Press, Washington D.C., 1997. — P. 19–34.

12. Globalization and informal jobs in developing countries / eds. M. Bacchetta, E. Ernst, J. Bustamente. — Geneva : International Labour Organization, 2009.

13. Helmke G. Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda / G. Helmke, S. Levitsky. South Bend, IN: Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University, 2003.

14. Honore A. M. Ownership / A. M. Honore // Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence / ed. A.G. Guest. — Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1961. — P. 112–124.

15. Houston D. A. Can Corruption Ever Improve an Economy? / D. A. Houston // Cato Journal. — 2007. — Vol. 27, ¹ 3.

16. Johnson S. Corruption, Public Finances, and the Unofficial Economy / S. Johnson, D. Kaufmann, P. Zoido-Lobaton // World Bank Working Paper. — 1999. — ¹ 2169.

17. Langseth P. Integrated versus Quantitative Methods: Lessons Learned / P. Langseth. Vienna, 2000. 39 p.18. Maloney W. F. Informality Revisited / W. F. Maloney // World Development. — 2004. — ¹ 32 (7). —

P. 1159–1178.19. Pope J. TI Source Book: Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System / J. Pope. —

Berlin : Transparency International, 2000.20. Tokman V. E. An Exploration into the Nature of the Informal-Formal Sector Relationship / V. E. Tokman //

World Development. — 1978. — ¹ 6 (9). — P. 1065–1075.21. Witte A. D. Crime causation: economic theories / A. D. Witte, R. Witt. — University of Surrey, Department

of Economics, 2000.

References1. Barsukova S. Yu. Neformalnaya ekonomika [Informal Economy]. Moscow, Higher School of Economics Publ.,

2009. 354 p.2. Becker G. S. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. The Journal of Political Economy, 1968,

vol. 76 (2), pp. 169–217.

52Известия ИГЭА. 2013. № 6 (92)


3. Castells M., Portes A. World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and Effects of the Informal Economy. In Portes A., Castells M., Benton L. A. (eds) The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Advanced Developed Countries. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.

4. Chen M. The Informal Economy: Definitions, Theories and Policies. WIEGO Working Paper, 2012, no. 1.5. Colombatto E. Discretionary Power, Rent-Seeking and Corruption. ICER Working Papers, 2001, no. 24.6. De Soto H. The Other Path. The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. N. Y., 1989.7. De Soto H. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. N. Y.,

Basic Books, 2000.8. Djankov S., Lieberman I., Mukherjee J., Nenova T. Going Informal: Benefits and Costs. Draft, The World

Bank, 2002.9. Engerman S., Sokoloff K. Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World

Economies. NBER Working Paper, 2002, no. 9529.10. Feige E. L. Defining and Estimating Underground and Informal Economies: The New Institutional Economics

Approach. World Development, 1990, vol. 18 (7), pp. 989–1002.11. Feige E. L. Underground Activity and Institutional Change: Productive, Protective, and Predatory Behavior

in Transition Economies. In Nelson, Tilley, Walker (eds) Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies. National Academy Press, Washington D.C., 1997, pp. 19–34.

12. Bacchetta M., Ernst E., Bustamente J. (eds.) Globalization and informal jobs in developing countries. Geneva, International Labour Organization, 2009.

13. Helmke G., Levitsky S. Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda. South Bend, IN: Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University, 2003.

14. Honore A. M. Ownership. In A. G. Guest (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. 112–124.

15. Houston D. A. Can Corruption Ever Improve an Economy? Cato Journal, 2007, vol. 27, no. 3.16. Johnson S., Kaufmann D., Zoido-Lobaton P. Corruption, Public Finances, and the Unofficial Economy. World

Bank Working Paper, 1999, no. 2169.17. Langseth P. Integrated versus Quantitative Methods: Lessons Learned. Vienna, 2000. 39 p.18. Maloney W. F. Informality Revisited. World Development, 2004, no. 32(7), pp. 1159–1178.19. Pope J. TI Source Book: Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System. Berlin,

Transparency International, 2000.20. Tokman V. E. An Exploration into the Nature of the Informal-Formal Sector Relationship. World Development,

1978, no. 6 (9), pp. 1065–1075.21. Witte A. D., Witt R. Crime causation: economic theories. University of Surrey, Department of Economics,

2000.

Èíôîðìàöèÿ îá àâòîðåÍåâçîðîâà Åêàòåðèíà Íèêîëàåâíà — êàíäèäàò ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ íàóê, äîöåíò, êàôåäðà ýêîíîìèêè è ãîñó-

äàðñòâåííîãî óïðàâëåíèÿ, Áàéêàëüñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé óíèâåðñèòåò ýêîíîìèêè è ïðàâà, 664003, ã. Èðêóòñê, óë. Ëåíèíà, 11, e-mail: [email protected].

AuthorNevzorova Ekaterina Nikolaevna — PhD in Economics, Associate Professor, Department of Economics and

Public Administration, Baikal State University of Economics and Law, 11 Lenin St., 664003, Irkutsk, Russia, e-mail: [email protected].