Gulf of Tonkin Incident

Learning Intention

We will be able to describe how the Gulf of Tonkin incident resulted in the

tensions in Vietnam escalate into full-scale war.

Gulf of Tonkin

The Incident

Took place in August 1964

The US was directing two ongoing naval operations in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Gulf of Tonkin is located north of the 17th parallel off the coast

of Vietnam

Operation One Involved South Vietnamese commandos, trained by the CIA, who

would launch hit-and-run strikes on North Vietnamese coastal sites using very fast patrol boats

The Incident

Operation Two US warships equipped with sensitive electronic gear, to cruise within

8 miles (13km) of the North Vietnamese coast. This was to trigger the operation of North Vietnamese installations

so they could take measurements of their locations and frequencies.

On August 1, 1964, the US destroyer Maddox was engaged in such a mission.

The day before, several South Vietnamese patrol boats had raided North Vietnamese coastal positions in the same area.

The Incident

On the morning of August 2, the Maddox was attacked by several North Vietnamese patrol boats. Several torpedoes missed their target, but machine gun fire hit

the U.S. warship. There were no casualties The Maddox begun firing as soon as the patrol boats approached,

sinking one patrol boat and damaging two others. Planes from the nearby U.S. aircraft carrier Ticonderoga assisted

by strafing the enemy boats.

The Incident

President Johnson after learning about the incident sent a stern warning to North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi.

He also informed Nikita Khrushchev that he did not wish to widen the war but that he would not tolerate attacks by the North Vietnamese on U.S. warships in international waters.

No acts of reprisal were ordered at the time

The Incident

To reinforce American determination, the Maddox, joined by a second destroyer, the C. Turner Joy, were ordered back into the same area the next day.

During that evening (3 Aug 1964), radar and sonar readings taken by the crews of the destroyers were under attack.

However, no enemy boats were actually seen and no hostile gunfire was heard.

Nevertheless, both destroyers fired for several hours at the unseen attackers

Heavy rain that evening contributed to the confusion.

The Incident

When President Johnson was informed of the situation, he decided to order retaliation, and to ask Congress immediately for a resolution of support.

Several days later, analysis of the incident raised doubts that the two destroyers had actually come under attack.

President Johnson himself remarked to an aide, “Hell, those dumb stupid sailors were just shooting at flying fish.”

The Incident

Two days later, President Johnson informed the American public of these attacks, speaking with measured outrage and promising an

immediate, though limited response

“This new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, brings home to all of us the importance of the struggle for peace and security in south-east Asia. Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Vietnam has now been joined by open aggression

on the high seas against the United States of America. The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the government of South Vietnam will be redoubled by this outrage. Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading

conflict. We still seek no wider war…It is a solemn responsibility to have to order even limited military action by forces whose overall strength is as vast and as awesome as

[ours], but it is my considered conviction that firmness in the right is indispensable today for peace”

The Resolution

As the 1964 presidential elections approached, President Johnson saw the need for a congressional resolution that would endorse the growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Such a resolution would strengthen President Johnson’s credibility abroad and give him increased flexibility.

Also President Johnson was worried about Barry Goldwater, the Republican nominee for president, who had taken a tough stance in dealing with communism.

Johnson hoped that lining up solid majorities of both Republicans and Democrats in Congress behind his Vietnam policies would take the sting out of Goldwater’s criticisms.

Congress back Johnson

On August 10th, a week after the attack on the USS Maddox, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (officially titled Asia

Resolution 88-408)“Naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the

Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have

thereby credited a serious threat to international peace…These attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North

Vietnam has been waging against its neighbours…The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to

repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. The United States is therefore prepared, as the President determines, to take

all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty requesting assistance in defence of its

freedom.

Congress backs Johnson

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had both legal and political implications.

Under the US Constitution, the president is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and can deploy them as he sees fit.

However, the president does not have the power to declare war on another nation-state; this power is exclusively reserved or Congress.

The wording of the resolution had a clear purpose. It authorised Johnson to use military force in south-east Asia, with congressional backing, but it side-stepped a formal declaration of war.

In the strictest legal terms, the unfolding conflict in Vietnam was deemed to be a “police action.”

Congress backs Johnson

“The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave Johnson a temporary respite from unpleasant choices in Vietnam…Having stood up to communist

aggression, Johnson now sounded a moderate note. In speeches during the campaign, he emphasise giving Vietnam limited help: He

would “not permit the independent nations of the East to be swallowed up by Communist conquest” – but it would not mean

sending ‘American boys 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.’”

Robert Dallek, historian

Election First, War Later

Despite the broad support for the resolution, Johnson took no decisive action until after the presidential election of November 1964.

After his inauguration in January 1965, Johnson’s attentions returned to military strategy in Vietnam.

By early March, American troops were being landed at Da Nang. They were initially tasked in a defensive role, posted to protect

from Viet Cong attack. The rules of engagement described their role as occupying and

defending ‘critical terrain features’, and not engaging in ‘day to day activities against the Viet Cong.’

Election First, War Later

However, military commanders were unsatisfied with this approach. They believed that the only effective strategy was to go on the offensive and eliminate Viet Cong troops and bases.

Overtime these rules of engagement were loosened, allowing US troops to move outside their defined areas, to seek out the enemy.

Troop numbers gradually increased. There were an estimated 17,000 US ground troops in Vietnam in March 1965; by the end of the year this had blown out to more than 180,000.