Ζήνων και ψυχολογικός μονισμός. fileone of our principal sources, if only because of his rich supply of verbatim quotations from Chrysippus. If we have lost

Ζήνων και ψυχολογικός μονισμός.

TEUN TIELEMAN

Ο Ζήνων χρησιμοποίησε δύο μοντέλα για να εξηγήσει τη θέσητου ανθρώπου στο σύμπαν: πρώτον, την αναλογία μικρόκοσμου /

μακρόκοσμου, η οποία συνεπάγεται την απόδοση των ίδιων εξ΄

ίσου ψυχικών διαδικασιών στο θεϊκό και ανθρώπινό νουo

δεύτερον, το σχήμα - όλο και μέρη-, σχεδιασμένο με σκοπό να

εξηγήσει τη σχέση ανάμεσα στο Θεό και στον άνθρωπο. Συ-

μπλήρωσε επιπλέον αυτό το σχήμα με συγκεκριμένες απόψεις για

την μέθεξη του ανθρώπου με το θεϊκό νου. Το ότι η μέθεξη αυτή

έλαβε τη μορφή μιας σιωπηρής μετάδοσης του νοήματος μέσω του

πνευματικού συνεχούς είναι μια σωστή υπόθεση. Ο Ζήνων τόνισε

την ιδέα ενός νου διεισδυτικού του παντός, ο οποίο μας καθοδηγεί

και στον οποίο θα πρέπει να υπακούμε - μια ιδιαίτερη εκδήλωση

της θεϊκής πρόνοιας.

Ο Ζήνων απέδωσε μεγάλη σημασία στον έλεγχο και στην

προετοιμασία του σώματος μια και το θεωρούσε πηγή ταραχής και

πάθους. Γι΄ αυτό το λόγο, η θεραπεία της ψυχής συνεπάγονταν

και τη θεραπεία του σώματος – μια άμεση συνέπεια της σωματικής

φύσης της ψυχής (δηλαδή του ψυχικού πνεύματος) και των ιδεών

του Ζήνωνα αναφορικά με τη μίξη και την αλλαγή, σε συνδυασμό

με το δόγμα των τεσσάρων φυσικών στοιχείων.

Η εφαρμογή του περιγραφικού χαρακτηρισμού (descriptive

label) "ψυχολογικός μονισμός" στην ψυχολογία του Ζήνωνα δεν

είναι εντελώς αβάσιμη, τουλάχιστον στο βαθμό που υποδηλώνει

ότι δεν υπάρχουν μη-λογικές δυνάμεις ή μέρη, με την έννοια της

Πλατωνικό - Αριστοτελικής προσέγγισης των ψυχικών δυνά-

μεων. Ως τέτοιος, ο χαρακτηρισμός δεν είναι ιδιαίτερα

διαφωτιστικός, όταν καλείται να ανιχνεύσει την αυθεντική φύση

και τα κίνητρα της ψυχολογίας του Ζήνωνα. Αυτό θέτει μια

βασική αντίθεση ανάμεσα στον ατομικό χαρακτήρα εξαρτημένο

από το σώμα, από την μια πλευρά, και το θεϊκό νου, διεισδυτικό

του παντός και καθοδηγητικό προνοητικό της ανθρώπινης ψυχής.

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Zeno And Psychological Monism: Some Observations

On The Textual Evidence

TEUN TIELEMAN

I. Preamble

Galen has been influential in presenting so-called psychologicalmonism as a regrettable departure by Chrysippus from the doctrineof his predecessors Zeno and Cleanthes.1 Today, however, mosthistorians lend more weight to other sources, notably Cicero andPlutarch, who know nothing about the fundamental disagreementwhich Galen parades so noisily.2 Still, there is little reason to baskin self-congratulation on our present scepticism vis-à-vis Galen. Thedocumented evidence still bristles with varied and unresolvedpuzzles. And for all the bias he brings to the debate, Galen remains

1 See On the doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, esp. IV and V. Galen’spresentation of the evidence was largely accepted by Pohlenz (1938), (1948).Galen claims that Chrysippus identified the emotions with wrong value-judgements, whereas Zeno defined the as the physical effects supervening onsuch judgements, which Galen takes to amount to the acceptance ofindependent non-rational factors in the intellect, e..g. PHP 4.3.2, 5.1.4 (SVF1.209). It is often overlooked that Galen, PHP 5.6.40-42, professes ignoranceabout Zeno’s position, saying he has not been able to look it up in one of thelatter’s treatises. On the whole Galen takes it for granted that Cleanthesfollowed in his master’s footsteps, producing (from Posidonius) as his proof-texta versified dialogue between reason and anger, which however is not conclusive,PHP 5.6.35 (SVF 1.570).2 See Cic. Ac. 1.38, Tusc. 3.74; cf. 4.11, 15; Plut. Virt. mor. 441C (SVF 3.459);Zeno’s definitions of the virtues also presuppose the monist model, see Plut.ibid. 441A (SVF 1.201).

one of our principal sources, if only because of his rich supply ofverbatim quotations from Chrysippus. If we have lost our qualmsabout tracing ‘psychological monism’ back to the school’s founder,we should not be too quick to suppose that we understand fully thenature and original motivation of the doctrine commonly denotedby this label.

The purpose of the present article is to reconsider Zeno’sconception of the soul. In so doing I shall not concentrate on themost obvious and most widely studied sources for this area of Stoicthought: Galen’s PHP, Plutarch’s On moral virtue and Cicero’sTusculan Disputations. Instead I shall highlight a few other sourceswhich seem to provide a wider doctrinal context which I believethrows some more light on Zeno’s position. This should also enableus to assess the aptitude of the modern coinage ‘monism’ as a labelfor the Stoic position.

What exactly do we mean by ‘(psychological) monism’ ? Theexpression commonly refers to the Stoic view that the dominatingpart (hêgemonikon) of the soul or intellect (dianoia)3 is wholly andhomogeneously rational. That is to say, it does not contain one ormore irreducibly non-rational faculties.4 This marks off the Stoicposition from that of Plato and Aristotle who (as need hardly berecalled) did operate with such parts or powers, viz, the appetitiveand spirited parts (Plato) or appetition (i.e. orexis, Aristotle). Ourmain sources, Plutarch and Galen (though, strikingly, not Cicero),even if they have no term equivalent to monism, characterize thedisagreement along these lines. They argue that the Stoic modelcannot account for such phenomena as the soul’s affections (pathê,i.e. passions or emotions) and weakness of the will (akrasia). In sodoing these sources judge the Stoics in terms of their own facultyapproach to the soul. It falls to the present-day historian todetermine how far this involves any blind spots as to certainauthentic features of the Stoic position. For example, the ancientfaculty approach operates with such terms as ‘power’ (δÊναµις) and

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3 For the equation see Plut. Virt. mor. 441C (SVF 1.202); Stob. Ecl. II p. 65.2-3(SVF 3.306).4 Cf. Inwood (1985) 28.

‘part’ (µ°ρος, µÒριον) in a sense according with Platonic-cum-Aristotelian essentialism. But the same terms function differently inearly Stoic psychology.5 On the whole our polemical sources are notsensitive to this fact. Furthermore, the faculty approach invites us toview the soul as a self-contained entity, viz. the ensemble of thefaculties called upon to explain mental events. This suits aconception of the soul as the locus of subjectivity as opposed theexternal world.6 The Stoics for their part viewed the world as acontinuous whole. This is common knowledge among students ofStoicism. But I am not quite sure whether we have always beensufficiently sensitive to its implications for Stoic moral psychology.In what follows I shall further develop the idea of the continuum intwo directions: first, the soul’s continuity with its environment, i.e.ultimately the cosmos at large (section II); secondly, the soul’scontinuity with the body (section III). Finally, I shall return to thequestion of Zeno’s so-called monism and attempt to formulate ananswer in the light of evidence discussed in the main body of thisarticle (section IV).

II. Man and the divine world

According to Sextus, M. 9.101-3 (= SVF 1.113a, part) Zenoadapted a Socratic proof that the cosmos is rational: just as we derivethe material elements of which we consist from the cosmos, so too

Zeno And Psychological Monism 189

5 The ‘parts’ distinguished by Zeno were different portions of the psychicpneuma, viz. the regent part plus the rays of pneuma operating the senses,speech and reproduction: see e.g. SVF 1.143. The term δÊναµις originallyindicated ‘power’ in the sense of the tensional strength (τÒνος) of the wholesoul: Plut. Virt. mor. 441C (SVF 1.202; 3.459); Stob. Ecl. II p. 74.1-3 (SVF3.112); cf. Alex. Aphr. De an. Mantissa p. 118.6ff. Br. (SVF 2.823); cf. infra, p.190.6 As such, the faculty approach is more congenial to our own habit ofconceiving of the subjective / objective distinction in terms of a (rather sharp)internal / external distinction. However, there are other cultures that do notoperate with this latter distinction: see Taylor (1988).

we must have acquired our reason from it. Zeno’s version runs asfollows:

Zeno of Citium, taking Xenophon7 as his starting point,argues as follows: "That which projects the seed of therational is itself rational; but the universe projects the seed ofthe rational; therefore the universe is something rational ... "(M9. 101, SVF 1.113, first text).8

Von Arnim has the fragment end here. But the following contextshould be taken into account as well.9 Here Sextus appends anexplanation of the premises of this syllogism: what is meant by"projecting the seed of the rational" and how exactly does this applyto the universe? This more fully argued account, which is clearlyStoic and―I assume―Zenonian, lends coherence and hencepersuasiveness to the above syllogism:10

(102) The persuasiveness of the argument is obvious. Theorigin of motion in every nature and soul is believed to comefrom the regent part (≤γεµονικοË) and all the powers(δυνάµεις) that are sent forth into the parts of the whole (τὰµ°ρη τοË ˜λου) are sent forth from the regent part as froma source, so that every power which exists in the part exists

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7 See Xen. Mem. 1.4.8; cf. Cic. ND 2.18 (not in SVF) and next n. 8 This syllogism is paralleled by the second of the three Zenonian syllogismspresented at Cic. ND 2.22 (SVF 1.113, second text). Cicero’s version adds theworld’s property of being ensouled (which is left merely implied in Sextus’).The first syllogism establishes the conclusion that the world is sentient (SVF1.114) and the third that it is ensouled and wise (SVF 1.112). Clearly the threearguments - an ordered sequence - proceed along the same lines, viz. theprinciple that the cause must possess the property its effect has; see furtherSchofield (1983) 44 ff.9 Cf. DeFilippo and Mitsis (1994) 263 ff.10 It appears that Zeno’s syllogisms were not meant to carry conviction ontheir own but presuppose a justification of the kind offered here. Their functionmay therefore have been to encapsulate a more expansive dialectical argument,making the Stoic tenet to be propagated more memorable or even sensational;see Schofield (1983) esp. 49 ff.

also in the whole because of its being transmitted(διαδÛδοσθαι) from the regent part therein [i.e. in thewhole]. Hence what the part is in point of power, that thewhole must certainly be first.

(103) Consequently, if the universe projects the seed of arational animal, it does not do so, like man, through a frothyemission, but as containing the seeds of rational animals; butit does not contain them in the same way as we might speakof the vine "containing" its grapes (that is, by way ofinclusion) but because the seminal reasons (λÒγοισπερµατικοÛ) are contained in it.11 So that the argument isthis: The universe contains the seminal reasons of rationalanimals; therefore the universe is rational.

What we have here is a microcosm/macrocosm analogy lackingfrom the Socratic original. Furthermore, the cosmic soul isdescribed as a whole comprising parts, viz. the individual humanintellects. Given this relationship, the cosmic regent part orintellect―i.e. God12―is called the ‘origin of motion in every souland nature’; that is to say, it initiates cognitive processes inindividual humans.13 This comes about through transmission(διαδÛδοσθαι), which is a key-concept in the Stoic (and Zenonian)physiology of perception. Thus Galen tells us that

[...] Zeno and Chrysippus and all their company intend thatthe motion (κÛνησιν) aroused in a bodily part from a thingimpinging upon it from without is transmitted(διαδÛδοσθαι) to the command-centre (ἀρχÆν) of the soul


11 Grapes, though ‘contained’ by the vine, differ from it in kind, wheras humansand the cosmos are both rational; cf. DeFilippo and Mitsis (1994) 264.12 For God as the hêgemonikon of the world, see e.g. Cic. ND 1.39,13 For what is basically the same picture cf. M. Aur. xii.2, who states that Godsees all regent parts without their bodily accretions, “for only with its ownthought is it in contact only with what issues from itself and what is drawn offinto these [scil. regent parts].” Cf. also Epict. Diss. 1.14.9.

so that the animal may perceive (α‡σθηται) (PHP 2.5.35,SVF 1.151).

Galen is primarily concerned with auditory perception in view ofZeno’s celebrated argument which established the seat of the regentpart by identifying it with the source of speech―which he believedto be the heart (PHP 2.5.8, SVF 1.148).14 This argumentpresupposes Zeno’s thesis that mental presentations (viz. theφαντασÛαι) are imprinted in the psychic pneuma and stored thereas notions.15 In spoken language these impressions are externalizedthrough the voice, which, being a kind of breath, is considered anextension of the psychic pneuma.16 Impressions, then, are passed onthrough this pneumatic continuum inside and outside ourselves andso also between humans in verbal communication. I shall return tothis function of the pneumatic continuum―viz. as the vehicle ofmeaning―in due course. For the moment I wish to put forward thesuggestion that divine influence on the human intellect at issue heremay have been conceived analogously to verbal communicationbetween humans (with the obvious difference that no phoneticcomponent is added to the semantic one). Indeed, Cleanthes in hiscelebrated Hymn to Zeus speaks of listening to God’s voice (as wellas contemplating his works, SVF 1, p. 122, ll. 20-21). How else can

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14 “The voice comes through the wind-pipe; but if it were coming from thebrain, it would not be coming through the wind-pipe. Now the voice comesfrom the same place as spoken language (λÒγος). But spoken language(λÒγος) comes from thought, so thought is not in the brain...”. (But in theheart: see the versions by Diogenes of Babylon, ibid. 9-13 and Chrysippus, ibid.14-20).15 Euseb. Praep. Ev. 15.20.2 (SVF 1.141, quoted infra, p. 204), Sextus M. 7.227,372 (SVF 2.56); cf. ibid. 230, 236 (SVF 1.58), D.L. 7.46 (SVF 2.53); on the linkbetween mental presentations (φαντασÛαι) and speech see esp. D.L. 7.49 (SVF2.52).16 Aët. Plac. IV 21.4 (SVF 1.150): τÚ δ¢ φωνᾶεν ÍπÚ τοË ΖÆνωνοςεÞρηµ°νον, ˜ κα‹ φωνØν καλοËσιν, ¶στι πνεËµα διατε›νον ἀπÚ τοË≤γεµονικοË µ°χρι φάρρυγγος κα‹ γλ≈ττης κα‹ τ«ν οÞκεÛωνÙργάνων. cf. PHP 3.1.11-15 (SVF 2.885). Zeno elaborated the older idea ofthought as internal discourse and spoken language as externalized thought,which can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle, see Pl. Th. 189e-190a, Soph.263e; Arist. EN H 6.1149b9f, MA 7.701a31ff., De an. G 11.434a16-21; cf.APo. A 10.76b24-25.

this be understood than as listening to an inner voice, a silentconveyance of meaning ?

In addition to the soul’s sensory and communicative powers,Sextus refers to the soul’s reproductive function, presenting ourintellect as the offspring of God’s. Elsewhere Zeno described thehuman semen both as a part (µ°ρος) and detached portion(ἀπÒσπασµα) of the human soul corresponding to two successivestages, viz. before and after ejaculation (SVF 1.128). Here we havethe same distinction: whereas on the microcosmic level the semen isseparated off from the soul of the parents, Sextus stresses that thecosmic soul does not, indeed cannot, squirt its seed but contains itpermanently.17

Cicero, ND 2.57-8 (SVF 1.172) ascribes to Zeno what isessentially the same microcosm/macrocosm analogy as thatemployed by Sextus. Here too we find the idea of universal Naturecontaining everything―which implies the whole/part relationship.18

Moverover, as in Sextus, the divine intellect has its own motions andprocesses analogous to those which other living beings experienceon account of their ‘seeds’ (seminibus), i.e. the spermatic principlesthey receive from the all-pervading divine intellect. Cicero, beingprimarily concerned with Nature’s providential activity, highlightsthe voluntary motions or conations (the Stoic ıρµαÛ) of the divineintellect. But he also lists perception as one of the functions involvedin the microcosm/macrocosm analogy. Zeno, Cicero tells us, definedNature as an artistic fire counselling and foreseeing in all matters ofinterest and importance.19

It is clear that the part/whole schema is crucial for a properappreciation of Zeno’s anthropology. One of the main texts whereit features is the account of Stoic formulations of the highest good orend (τ°λος) presented by Diogenes Laërtius, 7.87-88. Zeno in hisOn the nature of man equated ‘living according to nature’ with


17 Likewise Zeno in the argument recorded by Cic. ND 2.22 (SVF 1.112) invitesus to think of the world as a tree on which we grow as fruits.18 [natura] ipsius mundi, qui omnia conplexu suo coërcet et continet...19 natura ...plane artifex a Zenone dicitur, consultrix et provida utilitatumopportunitatumque omnium.

‘living according to virtue’, since "it is to this [scil. virtue] thatnature leads us". Chrysippus in his turn is said to have explainedliving according to virtue (i.e. Zeno’s point) as "living according toour experience of the things that occur by nature." He said so in hisfirst book of the On ends, from which the subsequent account (untilthe mention of his pupils Diogenes and Archedemus at the end of 88)appears to have been derived, including the quote from Zeno. Inwhat follows we hear more Zenonian echoes, in particular hisdefinition of happiness as a "smooth flow of life" (εÎροια βÛου),20

which is attained when "everything is done according to the harmonyof the daimôn within each individual vis-à-vis the will of the ruler ofthe universe." (Note the pun εÈδαιµονÛα ~ δαÛµων).21 Chrysippusexplained this as the project of bringing our individual nature inaccordance with universal nature which are related as part to whole.Thus we shall have a life "in which we do nothing of what is usuallyforbidden by the common law, which is right reason pervadingeverything, and is identical with Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is."This formulation reflects Zeno’s definitions as well.22

In Diogenes' summary, which seems to go back to Chrysippus’explication of Zeno’s definitions, we find basically the same accountas that presented by Sextus and Cicero, although each of these threesources has its own emphases. The important point for us to note isGod’s sustained guidance of our lives―a direct consequence of thepart/whole relationship. As Epictetus says, God’s providence goesbeyond the fact that we are equal to him with respect to rationality:he has entrusted us to the guidance of a daemon, i.e. God as presentwithin us (Diss. 1.14, 12-14).23 (The whole of Diss. 1.14 bearscomparison with the passages from Sextus, Cicero and Diogenes wehave just been reviewing).24 And the testimony of Epiphanius, if

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20 Cf. the texts assembled as SVF 1.184.21 Similarly Posidonius ap. Gal. PHP 5.6.4 (Fr. 187 E.-K.).22 See also Cic. ND 1.36, SVF 1.162.23 On the daemon within us as equivalent to (right) reason and intellect see esp.M. A. v.27, ii.13.1, ii.17.4, iii.16.3, iii, 6, 2 (where note the reference toSocrates), iii.7.2, iii.12.1, viii.45.1. Cf also Posidonius as cited supra, n. 21.24 It fact, it brings together into one coherent account all the points I havehighlighted in Cicero, Sextus and Diogenes: the part and whole schema, ensuiring

accepted, explicitly attributes the identification of the intellect (orregent part)25 with God to Zeno.26 This idea explains the curious factthat the daemon-intellect does not coincide with the ‘I’ but isdescribed as something else―a point which is also implied byDiogenes’ reference to the daemon within each individual person.

Since Diogenes’ viewpoint is moral, we hear something aboutthe meaning of all this for the practical conduct of our lives. Hespeaks only of prohibitions, where one would expect a reference topositive injunctions also. Unless this feature results from acompression of his source,27 we may compare the equally negativefunction of Socrates’ daimonion, i.e. the inner voice warning himnot to do certain things.28 It is well known that Socrates was the


that souls are connected, or ‘in touch’ (συναφε›ς), with God (6); the attributionof psychic functions to the divine mind, e.g. seeing and perceiving (6, 7, 8, 10);and communication between God and human intellects through transmission(διάδοσις) (9). On God as seeing and touching our regent parts (or intellects)cf. also M. A. xii.2.25 See supra, n. 3.26 Epiphanius, Adv. haeres. III 2.9 (D. G. p. 592,21-29, SVF 1.146), presents anaccount in which Zeno’s views on the soul (and God) alternate with scandalousopinions derived from Zeno’s Republic: ΖÆνων ı ΚιτιεÁς Ù Στωικος ¶φηµØ δε›ν θεο›ς οÞκοδοµε›ν ßερα, ἀλλ´ ¶χειν τÚ θε›ον §ν µÒνƒ τƒ ν“,µᾶλλον δ¢ θεÚν ≤γε›σθαι τÚν νοËν. ¶στι γὰρ ἀθάνατος... [anothershocking statement on burial and sex]... ¶λεγε δ¢ πάντα διÆκειν τÚ θε›ον.Epiphanius cannot count as a blue-chip source. His reliability is rather uneven,but he does not seem to have tampered with the above tenets to suit theChristian bias he brings to his material; no doubt they were sufficientlyobjectionable in themselves. Nor need the ascription to Zeno as such be treatedas suspect: there is a specific connection with one of Zeno’s treatises here. Foran assessment of Epiphanius as a source cf. Diels, D. G. 175 ff. and esp. 177concerning Zeno (“partim recta sunt, partim ita ira studioque mutata utscriptoris consilium pateat”).

It is also worth comparing another doxographic lemma: Aët. IV 5.11 (=Stob.Ecl. phys. I 48.7 [περ‹ νοË], p.317.15-6 W.): ΠυθαγÒρας ᾿ΑναξαγÒραςΠλάτων Χενοκράτης ΚΚλλεεάάννθθηηςς θÊραθεν εÞσκρÛνεσθαι τÚν νοËν. Theinclusion of Cleanthes may reflect the Stoic doctrine of the divine provenanceof the intellect. Differently Tieleman (1991) 124f. The expression externalintellect as such echoes of course Arist. De an. G 5; cf. also GA B 3.736b22-29;EN 10.7-9.27 Chrysippus in his On law included both ordering and prohibiting in hisdefinition of the Common Law: see SVF 3.314.28 Pl. Ap. 40a-c, Phaedr. 242b8-c1, Tht. 151a, Euthphr. 3b, Theag. 128d. Xen.

main philosophical model for the first generations of Stoics, whenZeno himself had not yet assumed this role.29 In regard to theinterpretation the Stoics gave of the Socratic daimonion it is worthcomparing Calcidius, In Timaeum ch. 168, which concludes acoherent early Stoic account on the causes and prevention ofpassion (chs. 165-8).30 In ch. 168 Calcidius’ Stoic source tells us howwe can prevent the soul’s perversion by society and by the body:

... Above all there is need of divine assistance with a view toperceiving the greatest goods which, though proper to thedivine, are nonetheless communicated to humans. The carefor the body too should be in accordance with the powers ofthe soul with a view to enduring the effort of its [i.e. thesoul’s] being exercised. Also good teachers should suffice andthis divine power which each of us has acquired. For Socratesis said to have had, from the time he was a child, a daemon(daemon) as his companion, who taught him the things heshould do, not in the sense that it exhorted him to dosomething but that it warned against things which it was notadvantageous to do. It is also for this reason that such thingsas lie in man’s power, if they are done without prudence, evenif it is useful to do them, bring disaster, which the benevolentdivine power kept off from Socrates.

The account preserved by Calcidius does not refer explicitly toZeno and is offered here by way of illustration. But is there anydirect evidence that Zeno already entertained similar ideas on thecommunion between humans and the divine world ? Passages such asthat from Sextus would certainly lead one to expect something ofthis kind. A few glimpses are indeed afforded by a few texts which

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Mem. I. 1.2,4. On Socrates in connection with the Stoic daemon within us seeM. A. iii, 6,2.29 See Long (1998); cf. also Döring (1979) 6 f.30 Von Arnim printed chs. 165-7 as SVF 3.229, omitting ch. 168 from hiscollection altogether. However, as Waszink (ad 198.20) rightly points out, theaccount of Stoic doctrine extends to ch. 168, p.199, 6 numen.

deal with divination through dreams but which, I believe, are ofwider significance. After all, the Stoic providentially determinedworld leaves no room for arbitrary acts of grace on the part of God;that is to say, ideas on divination too, one supposes, were embeddedin a general and coherent world-view. First I want to take a look ata statement by Zeno which has been preserved by Plutarch, Onprogress in moral virtue ch. 12 (p. 82F = SVF 1.234):31

Consider then also Zeno’s point of view. For he held thateach person perceives his own (moral) progress from dreams,if while asleep he sees himself neither taking pleasure insomething shameful nor countenancing or perpetratinganything terrible or inappropriate, but―just as in thetransparent depth of an unruffled surface of the sea―theimaginative and emotional (τÚ φανταστικÚν κα‹παθητικÒν)[faculty? aspect?] of the soul shines through,having been relaxed under the influence of reason.32

Plutarch presents this view of Zeno in an argument designed toshow that moral progress is a matter of controlling one’s passions―even during sleep when reason’s hold on them relaxes. The model ofthe soul presupposed by Plutarch is the Platonic/Aristotelian dualistone, witness the way he speaks of the imaginative and emotional assomething different from, and potentially opposed to, reason. As itstands, the second half of this testimony cannot be squared withanything to be found in other Stoic texts, while, as we have seen, it


31 Plutarch refers to Zeno more than thirty times, yet does not offer much inthe way of doctrinal content. The present passage stands out in that itreproduces a particular statement of Zeno (though, contrary to Plutarch’s habit,indirectly); see Babut (1969) 220ff., Kidd in the present volume, pp. 00 ff.32 ˜ρα δØ κα‹ τοË ΖØνωνος ıπο›ον §στιν. ±ξÛου γὰρ ἀπÚ τ«νÙνεÛρων ßκαστον αÍτοË συναισθάνεσθαι προκÒπτοντος, εÞ µÆθ´≤δÒµενον αÞσχρ“ τινι •αυτÚν µÆτε τι προσι°µενον ŭ πράττοντατ«ν δειν«ν κα‹ ἀτÒπων ıρᾷ κατὰ τοÁς Ïπνους, ἀλλ´ οÂον §νβυθ“ γαλÆνης ἀκλÊστου καταφανε› διαλάµπει τ∞ς ψυχ∞ς τÚφανταστικÚν κα‹ παθητικÚν διακεχυµ°νον ÍπÚ τοË λÒγου.

suits the thesis defended by Plutarch in the context. Moreover, a fewtestimonies concerned with sleep as a physiological process confirmthat Plutarch has tailored the original text to suit his own aims (andin consequence has written a rather unclear sentence). But what forZeno relaxes during sleep is the perceptive part of the soul, i.e. thoseparts of the psychic pneuma which connect the regent part to thesenses and through them to the outside world.33 As its involvementwith the body and the outside world decreases, the regent part (orintellect) becomes free from the usual disturbances coming fromthese sources. The tranquillity and resulting self-perception arenicely encapsulated in the image of the transparent surface of thecalm sea―apparently an authentic Zenonian feature.

Plutarch presents the same view of sleep―and the same image ofthe unruffled sea―in On the daimonion of Socrates 588C-D. Heresleep interrupts the stream of affections impinging on the intellectand so enables it to resume contact with its divine roots and at ahigher insight:

.... Socrates’ daimonion was no vision but the perception ofa voice or else the mental intuition of language which reachedhim in some strange way. So too in sleep there is no speech,but when one receives the impressions or intuition of certainstatements, one imagines that one hears people speaking.But other people actually have this sort of insight in dreamsbecause the body is at rest and unruffled, while when they areawake, their soul can scarcely hear those who are better [thanthey, i.e. daemons] and being overwhelmed by the tumult ofthe passions and the distraction of their wants, they cannotlisten or pay attention to the message. Socrates however hadan intellect which being pure and free from passion andcommingling with the body only slightly for necessary ends,was so sensitive and delicate as to be influenced at once by

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33 Cic. Div. 2.119, quoted infra, p. 200 D.L. 7.158 (SVF 2.766): τÚν δ¢ ÏπνονγÛνεσθαι §κλυοµ°νου τοË αÞσθητικοË τÒνου περ‹ τÚ ≤γεµονικÒν. Cf.Aët. Plac. V 24.4 (SVF 2.767). On Zeno’s division of the soul into parts, seesupra, n. 5.

what reached him. What reached him, one would conjecture,was not spoken language but the unuttered words of adaemon making voiceless contact by the meaning of theirthought alone.34

The difference between monism and dualism is not at issue in thecontext. Instead, there is a basic opposition between the intellect andthe body, which when it has become like a calm sea enables theintellect to rediscover its divine roots, viz. the daemon. Note thatSocrates was special in that his control over his body was so great asto enable him to have this kind of experience during his wakinghours, whereas the common run has this opportunity only whileasleep. Plutarch, De gen. Socr. 588C-D may present us with Zeno’sposition in a more authentic light than the passage from On moralprogress does (see further the Appendix, p. 213 ff.).

Sleep then provides a special opportunity for undisturbed mentalactivity and in particular self-perception when the intellectconcentrates. But why did Zeno mention perception of one’s moralprogress in particular ? It would appear that the kind of insight atissue here requires a superior viewpoint, viz. that of virtue itself.Only this enables us to recognize what is morally objectionable assuch. But a person who is still on the road towards virtue cannot(normally) take this viewpoint.35 What is needed is a kind of


34 ... τÚ Σωκράτους δαιµÒνιον οÈκ ˆψις ἀλλὰ φων∞ς τινοςα‡σθησις ≥ λÒγου νÒησις ε‡η συνάπτοντος ἀτÒπƒ τιν‹ τρÒπωπρÚς αÈτÒν, Àσπερ κα‹ καθ´ Ïπνον οÈκ ¶στι φωνÆ, λÒγων δ°τινων δÒξας κα‹ νοÆσεις λαµβάνοντες ο‡ονται φθεγγοµ°νωνἀκοÊειν. ᾿Αλλὰ το›ς µ¢ν …ς ἀληθ«ς ¯ναρ ≤ τοιαÊτη σÊνεσιςγÛνεται δι´ ≤συχÛαν κα‹ γαλÆνην τοË σ≈µατος ˜ταν καθεÊδωσιµᾶλλον ἀκουουσιν, Ïπαρ δ¢ µÒλις §πÆκοον ¶χουσι τØν ψυχØντ«ν κρειττÒνων κα‹ πεπνιγµ°νοι γε θορÊβƒ τ«ν παθ«ν κα‹περιαγωγª τ«ν χρει«ν εÞσακοËσαι κα‹ παρασχε›ν τØν διάνοιανοÈ δÊναται το›ς δηλουµ°νοις. Σωκράτει δ¢ ı νοËς καθαρÚς−Ãνκα‹ ἀπαθÆς, τ“ σ≈µατι µικρὰ τ«ν ἀναγκαÛων χάρινκαταµιγνÁς αÍτÒν, εÈαφØς ·ν κα‹ λεπτÚς ÍπÚ τοË προσπεσÒντοςÙξ°ως µεταβαλε›ν: τÚ δ¢ προσπ›πτον οÈ φθÒγγον ἀλλὰ λÒγονἄν τις εÞκασειε δαÛµονος ἄνευ φων∞ς §φαπτÒµενον αÈτ“ τ“δηλουµ°νƒ τοË νοοËντος.35 The same problem is at issue in the polemical objection against the Stoics

detachment from one normal subjective point of view. In an earlyStoic context this requires the assistance from the divine world―notreason assessing one of more non-rational faculties, as Plutarchintimates at On progress in moral virtue 82F.

Still, one would like to be on firmer ground as to Zeno’s view onthese matters. Plutarch in the latter passage explicitly refers to Zenobut suppresses much of the original context, while De gen. Socr.888C-D can be attributed to Zeno only on the basis of a comparisonwith the former passage. But there is some additional evidence.Consider Cicero, On Divination 2.119 (SVF 1.130):

They [scil. the Stoics] hold that our souls are divine and arederived from an external source; the universe is replete witha multitude of harmonious souls; thus, because of its divinenature and its connection with the intellects outside, thehuman soul during sleep discerns what is to come. Zenohowever believes that the soul contracts and as it weresubsides and collapses and that sleep is precisely this.36

Cicero uses the stock polemical ploy of playing off one’sopponents against one another, in this particular case the Stoicsagainst their founding father. His point is that on Zeno’s view sleepslackens the soul’s tension, which determines its power including itscognitive capacity.37 Zeno’s physiology of sleep therefore precludes

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that those progressing towards virtue must have grasped it already, see Plut. Decomm. not. 8, 1061F (SVF 3.542); and if so, they must at the same timeconsider themselves to be in the presence of great evil and so slip into emotion,see Posid. ap. Gal. PHP 4.5.28, 4.6.7, 5.6.28 (=Posid. Frs. 164, 165, 174 E.-K.).The Stoics of course denied that this was inevitable. Part of their answer wasthat the transition to a virtuous state occurs instantaneously and unconsciously,see Plut. Prof. in. virt. 75C (SVF 3.539, second text), Stob. Ecl. II 7, p. 113 W.(SVF 3.540).36 Divinos animos censent esse nostros, eosque esse tractos extrinsecus,animorumque consentientium multitudine conpletum esse mundum; hac igiturmentis et ipsius divinitate et coniunctione cum externis mentibus cerni quaesint futura. contrahi autem animum Zeno et quasi labi putat atque concidere et ipsum esse dormire. 37 See infra, p. 216.

the idea―defended by later Stoics―that sleep makes possible ahigher level of insight due to its connection with external intellects.Elsewhere, however, Cicero tells us that Zeno instigated a keeninterest in divination among the Stoics.38 Plutarch, De prof. in virt.82F reveals at least this much with certainty; Zeno too attachedspecial significance to insights gained during sleep.

In fact, the two views opposed by Cicero belong to one and thesame coherent theory. He (or his source) has distorted Zeno’s viewby referring to the soul tout court, whereas other testimonies statethat only those parts of psychic pneuma which connect the intellectwith the senses slacken.39 This idea, as we have noticed, also appearsto underlie the testimony from Plutarch. Further, while Cicero in thisconnection ascribes the belief in the soul’s divine origin to the otherStoics, we may recall that Sextus, M 9.101-3 explicitly ascribes thesame belief to Zeno (above, p. 190). That in itself does not provethat Zeno accepted the idea of communion with external intellects,i.e. daemons, during sleep, but the passages from Plutarch and Sextuscertainly points in that direction. At any rate we may safely assumethat the Stoics in holding the ideas ascribed to them by Cicero did notdepart from Zeno in any significant sense.

What Cicero’s testimony adds to the picture presented by Sextusis the idea of a universe full of harmonious (i.e. virtuous and wise40)souls with whom our soul may make contact through dreams. Zenotoo is on record as having attributed an afterlife (not immortality) toat least a number of privileged souls.41 Fulfilling a mediating rolebetween men and god, these souls represent the Stoic understandingof what traditionally were called daemons.42 They dispense wisdom


38 Div. 1.6 (SVF 1.173); cf. D.L. 7.149 (SVF 174): these texts also make it clearthat only Panaetius deviated from all his predecessors by doubting the efficacyof divination. 39 See supra, n. 33. Note also that these sources have nothing corresponding toCicero’s labi and concidere terms which strengthen the case for discrepancy hewishes to make.40 animorum... consentientium; cf. the consentaneas actiones of the divineintellect mentioned in the account of Zeno’s doctrine at Cic. ND 2.58 (SVF1.172); cf. supra, p. 193.41 SVF 1.146; cf. 145.42 D.L. 7.156 (SVF 2.774), Cic. Tusc. 1.77 (SVF 2.822); on their identification

(including the capacity to foresee the future) to those people whocontact them.

This special opportunity offered by sleep is illustrated by apassage from Epictetus, Diss. 1.14, an account of divine providencewhich, as we have noticed,43 resembles in its main outlines Sextus, M9.101-3. The following passage however has no parallel in Sextuswhile cohering with the testimonies from Plutarch and Cicero:

He [i.e. God] has stationed by each man’s side as guardian hispersonal daemon and has committed him to his care―andthat a guardian who never sleeps and is not to be deceived [...]In consequence, when you close your doors and makedarkness within, remember never to say that you are alone:for you are not alone―no, God is within and your owndaemon is within. And what need have they of light to seewhat you are doing. And to this God you also must swearallegiance ...

The daemon sees ‘what you are doing’, i.e. one’s moral state.One may recall the moral evaluation highlighted by Plutarch, Onprogress 82F (above, p. 197) That his assessment can be followed byadmonition follows from Epictetus’ call to obey God.

The Stoics built on the foundations laid by the founder of theirschool.44 Still, it remains crucial to distinguish what our sourcesattribute to him explicitly and indisputably and what not. Zenoavailed himself of the part/whole schema to explain the relationshipbetween the human and the divine intellect. He combined this withthe microcosm/macrocosm analogy thus ascribing the same psychicfunctions to God and man alike and making possible theircommunication. Moreover, there are indications that he

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with daemons see Sextus, M 9.71 (SVF 2.1105), D.L. 7.151 (SVF 2.1102), Aët.1.8.2 (SVF 2.1101); cf. Hoven (1971) 44 ff., 58 ff.43 Supra, n. 24.44 On the dominant role of allegiance to authorities in the Hellenistic schoolssee Sedley (1989), esp. 97f. on the Stoics.

implemented this general world-view with more specific ideas aboutthe communion between God and man. At any rate he considered

sleep a privileged state in which certain moral insights might be

obtained. We are on less firm ground as to whether this took the

form of a kind of silent discourse and which role was played by

daemons conceived as external intellects (compare their importance

for such contemporaries as Xenocrates, the Academic scholarch). I

have however not avoided pointing to certain indications to this

effect.

III. The Body

In the testimonies we have been reviewing so far the bodyappears as the potential source of disturbances which divert the soulfrom its divine roots. Obviously this made the body the subject ofmoral reflection. Indeed, the title of Zeno’s tract On the nature ofman, with its Hippocratic ring, attests to his concern with the bodyas well as the soul. How he conceived of their interaction is reportedby Arius Didymus:45


45 ap. Eusebius, PE 15.20-2-3, p. 384.15-24 Mras (= Ar. Did. fr. phys. 39b Diels,SVF 1 Zeno 141, Cleanthes 519). The preceding context presents Zeno’sspermatology (ibid. 15.20.1, SVF 1.128). In what follows (ibid. 4-7, SVF 2.821,809) the world-soul is said to consist of the same substance as the individualsoul and to be maintained in the same way (i.e. through exhalation on thecosmic scale). Further, the rest of the souls (i.e. the individual souls) are said tobe organically attached (προσπεφυκ°ναι) to the world-soul and a distinctionis drawn between souls within living beings and those in the surrounding space.The latter category are further identified as those who persist until theconflagration. Also, it is specified that each soul (i.e. including the cosmic one)is possessed of a regent part marked by life, perception and impulse. AlthoughEusebius (or his source Arius) do not ascribe the ideas in §§ 4-7 to Zeno or anyother individual Stoic, it is noteworthy that they link this account closely to thatof Sextus, discussed supra, p. 190 f. What it adds to the latter, is the place ofthose souls which survive after death. For a fresh survey of the materialascribable to Arius Didymus see now Runia (1996), esp. 380f.

Citing Zeno ’s doctrines on the soul for comparison with the other natural philosophers,46 Cleanthes says that Zeno, likeHeraclitus, calls the soul a sentient exhalation. For wishing tobring out the fact that the souls as they are exhaled alwaysbecome intelligent, he [scil. Heraclitus] likens them to rivers,speaking as follows: "As they step into the same rivers, otherand still other waters flow upon them." And souls too areevaporated from liquids.47 Like Heraclitus, then, Zenodeclares the soul to be an exhalation; but the reason why hecalls it sentient is that its regent part is capable of beingimprinted by the existing and present things through thesense-organs and capable of receiving the imprints: for thesethings are peculiar to the soul.

This is Zeno (and Heraclitus) in Cleanthes in Arius in Eusebius.48

Of immediate concern to us is the fact that Zeno defined the soul as

a ‘sentient exhalation’ or ‘evaporation’ (αÞσθητικØἀναθυµÛασις), i.e. from the bodily fluids, in particular the blood inthe heart.49 What is maintained through this exhalation is the

psychic ‘breath’ (πνεËµα). It is its hot quality50 which causes the

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46 Starting from the definitions (and arguments) of Zeno (in this case that of thesoul) was de rigueur among Stoic authors. Cleanthes was reputed to have been aloyal follower of the master, see e.g. D.L. 7.168. One of his treatises was entitledOn Zeno’s natural philosophy (D.L. 7.174), in which he may have drawncomparisons with forerunners such as preserved by Arius here. Cleanthes tooka particular interest in Heraclitus, devoting a separate tract to him, theInterpretations of Heraclitus (in four books, D.L. 7.174); for a discussion of theevidence see further Long (1975/6) and esp. 151f. on this passage.47 Diels includes this sentence in the Heraclitean fragment. (DK B 12). But itseems to be Cleanthes’ exegesis, presumably inspired by Heraclitus’ view thatthe source of souls is the moist, see B 36. Heraclitus may indeed have called thesoul an exhalation, see Arist. De an. A 2.405a24 (DK A 15, first text); the sameconcept on both the macrocosmic and microcosmic level is also to be found atAët. 4.3.12 (DK A 15, third text), but this cannot count as an independentwitness since we may here be dealing with the interpretatio Stoica. See next n.48 For discussion and further references see Long (1975/6) 151f. Kahn (1979)259f.49 Gal. PHP 2.8.48, SVF 1.140; cf. SVF 1.102, first text, 2.778, 781-3.50 Hence Ruphus of Ephesus, Onom. § 229, p. 166, 10-1 Daremberg-Ruelle:

blood to evaporate and thus to replenish its pneumatic substance.51

These ideas owe more to the physiologies of Zeno’s own day than to

Heraclitus (who is brought in here by Cleanthes).52 The adjective

‘sentient’ in the definition is taken up by the reference to sense-perception as a process of imprinting (τÊπωσις) in the pneumaticsoul―a Zenonian tenet attested by other sources.53 Impressions

directly and physically affect the soul’s strength. In consequence is

needed to respond adequately to them.

The account of the soul as an exhalation preserved by Arius

Didymus suggests that two qualities are predominant―the hot and

the cold, distinctive of the elements fire and air respectively.54 That

Zeno explained mental states in terms of the traditional quartet of

elements, or elementary qualities, is confirmed by Galen, PHP5.2.31-38 (SVF 3.470, part), where Galen polemicizes againstChrysippus’ On the emotions (Περ‹ παθ«ν). In its fourth and lastbook, separately entitled the Therapeutics (ΘηραπευτικÒν)Chrysippus developed an elaborate and well-known analogy betweenbodily and mental illness and so between the missions of medicine

and philosophy respectively.55 In so doing he defined mental

affections, i.e. passions or emotions (παθ∞), as resulting from a lossof balance ―an idea he borrowed from Zeno. Chrysippus is quoted

as saying:

(31) ‘That is indeed why Zeno’s argument proceeds as itshould. Disease of the soul is most similar to an unsettled


θερµασÛαν δ¢ κα‹ πνεËµα ΖÆνων... τÚ αÈτÚ ε‰ναι φησιν (SVF I 127).similarly Varro, LL V.59 (SVF 1.126); cf. 135-138. The description of the soul asfire accords with the hot quality of the pneuma and recalls his account of thecosmic active principle - or God - as an artistic and creative fire, see supra, p.193. It may also be meant to recall Heraclitus, see SVF 1.134; cf. Tieleman(1991) 114f., 120f. with further references.51 Alongside exhalation, respiration is mentioned as a source of nourishmentfor the soul, SVF 1.137, 138.52 On the contemporary scientific background see Tieleman (1996) 83ff.53 D.L. 7.50 (SVF 2.55), Sext. M 7.228ff. (SVF 1.484), 7.236 (SVF 1.58) cf.supra, p. 192.54 SVF 2.310, 442, 786, 841.55 On this analogy and its implications see Kudlien (1968), Tieleman (1999).

state of the body. Disease of the body is said to be the lack ofproportion of the [things] in it, hot and cold, dry and wet.’

(32) And a little further on: ‘Health in the body is a kind ofgood blend and proportion of the [things] specified.’56 Andagain subsequently: ‘For in my view a good condition of thebody resides in the best blend of the [things] mentioned.’

(33) And after that: ‘And these things too are said notinappropriately of the body, because proportion or lack ofproportion in its components, hot, cold, wet and dry is healthor disease; proportion or its reverse in the sinews is strengthor weakness, firmness or softness; and proportion or the lackof it in the limbs is beauty or ugliness.’

Galen selects no less than four passages stating that the body iscomposed of the four elements. He accepts this quartet (which heconsiders originally Hippocratic) and he also grants that emotions,just as the afflictions of the body, result from the loss of someequilibrium. But he criticizes Zeno and Chrysippus for failing tospecify which components are involved in the mentalequilibrium (or its opposite). However, the first snippet of textpresented by Galen (§ 31) clearly indicates that Zeno and in hiswake Chrysippus had simply argued that mental health too resides inthe proper balance between the physical elements; hence thesimilarity mentioned (31).57 Indeed, this is what Galen elsewherepresents as the Stoic position.58 This of course suits the conceptionof the corporeal soul as interacting with―and consisting of the sameelements as―the body. Galen has suppressed the passage in whichthis was directly said because he wishes to drive home his point that

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56 I.e. the hot, cold, dry and wet.57 On the four elements in Zeno’s natural philosophy see also Ar. Did. ap. Stob.Ecl. I 17.3.p. 152.19ff. (= fr. 38 Diels, SVF 1.102, first text), D.L. 7.135, 136, 142(SVF 1.102, second text): natural processes - including those in living beings -involve the constant transition of elements into one another. Thus evaporation- the process whereby the soul is nourished (see supra in text) - is a transitionfrom water into air: Ar. Did. ap. Stob. loc. cit.58 Galen, Quod animi mores temperamenta corporis sequuntur, SM II pp. 45-6Müller (SVF 2.787) based on the same passage from Chrysippus’

mental events are only explicable in terms of Platonic-stylefaculties, one rational, two non-rational. To produce four quotesfrom Chrysippus all of which make the same point about the body ishis devious, if not untypical, way of intimating that this Stoic wassilent―and indeed at a loss―about the soul’s health and disease.59

The physical account of psychic health and its opposite does notpreclude an alternative description in intentionalist terms, viz. interms of judgements and their consistency or lack thereof. In fact,Stoic texts describe the passions in both intentional and physicalistterms, often conjoining them in one and the same definition.60

Galen tends to construe the physical descriptions as pertaining tonon-rational states, especially in Zeno’s case.61 But there is nodiscrepancy between him and Chrysippus. Quite the contrary: theabove passage reveals that Chrysippus accepted Zeno’s analysis. InPHP Galen is engaged in a fierce polemic against the Stoicconception of the soul while defending the Platonic tripartition-cum-trilocation. The burden of his argument is that the Stoics inevitablyrun into difficulties because they refuse to accept Platonic-style non-rational parts. The fact that Zeno and Chrysippus assigned a causalrole to the four elements is awkward from this polemical point ofview since Galen himself applauds the doctrine of the fourelements.62

If the psychic pneuma represents a mixture of the hot and the


Therapeutikon. That this time Galen does not suppress the fact that the Stoicsdiscussed the soul’s state in terms of the four elements, or elementary qualities,is due to context: the passage in QAM is non-polemical: Galen lists as many aspossible philosophers including the Stoics in order to demonstrate the prevalentconsensus on the quartet of elements, a tenet he traces back to Hippocrates. InPHP, by contrast, any Stoic affiliation with Hippocrates would undermine hispolemical purposes. After all, the whole work is devoted to aligningHippocrates with Plato and playing both off against the Stoics.59 That Galen is quite capable of gross distortion even while presentingverbatim quotations from his opponents I have demonstrated on the basis of hishandling of Chysippus’ On the soul in PHP books 2 and 3, see Tieleman(1996).60 E.g. D.L. 7.114, Cic. Tusc. 4.66-7, with Sedley (1993) 329.61 See supra, n. 1.62 See supra, n. 58.

cold,63 their correct ratio will guarantee the stability needed to

respond adequately to the impressions impinging upon it.

Accordingly, Zeno also described the passions in terms of (a surplus

of) the hot and the cold: pleasure and desire are ‘hot’ and cause the

soul’s relaxation and expansion, whereas grief and fear are ‘cold’

and cause its shrinking and contraction.64

It is a moot point whether Zeno associated the proportion

between the hot and the cold with the concept of tension, or

tensional movement, which is prominent in many Stoic texts, though

never explicitly attributed to him in particular.65 His pupil

Cleanthes, at any rate, made much of the idea of tension as

constituting psychic strength, which is the capacity to respond

adequately to events (SVF 1.563; cf. 575). He may have taken his

starting point from Zeno’s picture of a proportion between the

physical elements.

Zeno highlighted the aspect of instability in one of his definitions

of emotion (πάθος):

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63 See supra, n. 54. The assumption that Zeno took the psychic pneuma - bothcosmic and individual - as a prime instantiation of his concept of ‘through-and-through blending’ (κρᾶσις δι´ ˜λων), though likely, has no firm textualsupport΄see SVF 1.145 (a very late testimony, where Zeno’s name may serveas a label for the Stoic school); cf. 1.102 (= Ar. Did. fr. 38), where the concept isapplied to the transition of the elements into one another. The concept ofblending as such predates Chrysippus since it was attacked by Arcesilaus, Plut.De Stoic Rep. 1078B-D; cf. Long-Sedley (1987) vol. 1, 292; Mansfeld (1983).64 Gal. PHP 4.3.2, Cic. Tusc. 4.15. Chrysippus considered it typical of theunbalanced soul to switch from one emotion to its opposite in terms of thehot/cold distinction: SVF 3.418. On the traditional background see Zink (1962),In addition Tieleman (1999).65 The earliest clear reference to the concept links it to Cleanthes’ name: Stob.1.17.3 (SVF 1.497), with Long (1975/6) 148 f. Later texts define the ‘tensionalmotion’ (τονικØ κÛνησις) as simultaneous motion in contrary directions -inwards and outward (SVF 2.451) - or as an alternation of two oppositemovements (SVF 2.450, 458). The predominant properties of the pneuma - hotand the cold - produce an inward and an outward motion simultaneously and sotension (SVF 2.441. 442); cf. Gal. PHP 5.3.8 (SVF 2.841, part), reporting andobjecting to Chrysippus.

He also gave the following definition: "Emotion is a

fluttering (πτοÛα) of the soul", likening the fickleness of theemotional [?state] to the movement of wings.66

In a state of emotion, the soul is thrown off balance and a

random motion ensues, comparable to the undirected fluttering of

birds in panic.

Since our mental and moral disposition is exposed to all sorts of

bodily influences, it can at least to some extent be regulated through

diet and exercise―i.e. the part of ancient medicine called regimen

(διαÛτα). Zeno is on record as having taken a keen interest in it.67

Since, we are told, Zeno was irascible and harsh by temperament,68

he took moderate quantities of wine, whereupon he would mellow

and become a nicer person to be with. "Lupins, too, are bitter but

become sweet when they are soaked", he quipped. Anecdotes like

this, with their mots from the master,69 should not be brushed asideas fanciful, or philosophically trivial. They often preserve a kernel of

doctrinal truth, which, given our pathetically slim evidence, deserves

to be taken seriously.70 Not only does this anecdote reflect a general

interest in regimen on the philosopher’s part; it bears out his

authentic conviction that one’s mental state, or character, can be

explained―and treated―in terms of the four elements and their

proportion. In this particular case a surplus of the hot (anger) and


66 Stob. Ecl. 7.1 (SVF 1.206); SVF 1.206; cf. Chrys. ap. Gal. PHP 5.2.13-14(SVF 3.465).67 An interest in regimen appears from SVF 1.285 (see further in text), 286,287. General medical interest is indicated at SVF 1.131, 132; cf. Chrys. ap. Gal.PHP 5.2.31-33 (SVF 3.471) quoted supra, pp.205 f. On Stoic therapy ascomprising care for the body see further Tieleman (1999).68 This description may be meant to mark him out as a melancholic.Melancholy was considered the mark of genius, see e.g. [Arist.] Probl. XXX.1with Flashar (1966).69 Von Arnim printed these texts in a section headed “Zenonis apophthegmata”.70 Anecdotes like this reflect the idea that the life and tenets of a philosophershould be in harmony. On this motif in the ancient biographical traditions, seeMansfeld (1994) pp.179 ff.

dry (harshness) properties is remedied by the wet and the cold. As

opposed to the Cynics, then, Zeno advocated care for the body as

well as the soul. Among the class of preferred indifferents, the body

occupied a special, though ambivalent, place in view of its

conjunction with the soul and hence direct impact on our moral

disposition.71

But not only do these colourful stories about Zeno’s lifestyle

reflect some of his tenets. Zeno is also on record as having died in

style (SVF 1.288). He is said to have committed suicide by holding

his breath, thus underlining the importance of air and respiration in

Stoic physical thought.72 The reason why he believed his time had

come may also reflect one of the points I have been developing in

the preceding pages. As he left his school, he tripped and fell,

breaking a toe. Striking the ground with his fist, he said, citing a line

from tragedy:73

I am coming, why do you call me ?

At one level, he took his accident as a summons from the―

personified―earth, to which he was about to return.74 But the

anecdote may also illustrate a more fundamental idea: since nothing

happens without the will of the omnipresent Stoic God, Zeno may

be taken to have responded to God’s voice. The apparent futility of

the incident is another point to be noted: its real meaning is

understood only by those who enjoy a superior level of insight into

the divine plan and their individual role therein. This is the

compliment which is here being paid to the great man.

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71 Cf. Kudlien (1974).72 I here follow the version preserved at D.L. 7.28. Lucian, Macrob. 19, saysthat he went home and starved himself to death, which suits the interest inregimen on Zeno’s part we noted in other sources, see supra, n. 67.73 From the Niobe, a (lost) tragedy by Timotheus: TGF p. 51 Nauck.74 On the chthonic origin of the human body according to Zeno see SVF 1.124quoted infra, n. 76.

IV. Epilogue

Our survey of the documented evidence in section II has broughtout the importance of two models used by Zeno to explain man’splace in the universe: first, his microcosm/macrocosm analogyentailing the attribution of the same psychic processes to the divineand human intellect alike; secondly, his whole/ part schema designedto explain the relation between God and man. He may have furtherimplemented this schema with specific views on man’s communionwith the divine intellect. It is a fair assumption that this communiontook the form of a silent form of language, a transmission ofmeaning through the pneumatic continuum, in line with his generaltheory of language and thought. There can be no doubt that Zenostressed the idea of the all-pervading intellect which, if obeyed,guides us as a special manifestation of divine providence. This divineelement in us does not coincide with what we might call the (whole)person; rather it is like one’s better self: not just reason but ‘rightreason’. In consequence the person may comprise two differentviewpoints at once.

Impressions arising from their bodily state often prevent humansfrom paying sufficient attention to right reason. In this context Ihave considered a few testimonies dealing with the special status ofsleep―a privileged condition insofar as many of the distractionstypical of our waking life are absent. The function of dreams (inaddition to other experiences) in divination is well known. Yet theworkings of right reason are not confined to the narrow niche ofdivination but belong to the general order of things―even thoughour awareness of the divine presence requires an advanced stage ofcognitive and moral development.75

In addition we have found a profound concern with the body(section III). Since Zeno considered the body a source of disturbanceand emotion, he assigned great importance to controlling and


75 The idea of consciousness (or the lack thereof) in Stoicism - an intriguingsubject in its own right - requires a special consideration which I cannotundertake here. I hope to return to it in a subsequent study.

conditioning it in such a way that our mental (and moral) well-beingwas best served. Thus the therapy of the soul involved that of thebody―a direct consequence of the corporeal nature of the soul (viz.as psychic pneuma) and of Zeno’s ideas on mixture and change inconnection with the doctrine of the four physical elements.

Where does all this bring us with regard to the question raised atthe outset―the question of psychological monism? The applicationof this descriptive label to Zeno’s psychology is not whollyinapposite insofar as it indicates that there are no non-rationalpowers or parts in the sense of the Platonic-cum-Aristotelian facultyapproach to the soul. However, the expression is not particularlyilluminating when it comes to retracing the original nature andmotivation of Zeno’s psychology. This posits a basic oppositionbetween individual character conditioned by the body on the onehand and the all-pervading divine intellect on the other.76 So, in away, one could also speak of a particular kind of dualism. This modelpermits differentiation and conflict insofar as the individual may ormay not turn its back on right reason. The conflict should beexplained in terms of the whole/part schema rather than anydistinction between psychic faculties. Here Zeno went his ownway―although his doctrine was often later discussed and judgedaccording to the ill-fitting Platonic-Aristotelian paradigm. This laterdebate, focusing as it does on the number of parts or powers to bedistinguished within the soul, has obfuscated the importance of theStoic idea of the continuum and hence the part and wholerelationship.

This is not to suggest that there were no anticipations orinfluences. Zeno will have delineated his position with an eye on theother philosophies of his day. We may point to certain passages from

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76 This basic opposition as characteristic of Zeno’s anthropology is captured byCensorinus, De die natali IV, 10 (SVF 1.124): Zeno Citieus Stoicae sectaeconditor, principium humano generi ex novo mundo constitutum putavit,primosque homines ex solo, adminiculo divini ignis id est dei providentiagenitos. Here too we find juxtaposed the soil and the divine sparkle as standingfor our bodily nature and our intellect respectively. Our intellect is a gift ofprovidence since the divine mind supervises our doings and may help us (noteadminiculo). Cf. Epict. Diss. 1.14; on which see, supra, n. 24.

Plato’s Phaedo which also feature an opposition between divertingbodily factors and an orientation towards the higher realm (notably79A-81E). In addition, there is the influential section on the somaticcauses of passion, Tim. 86B-89D. It would appear that Zenopreferred the more straightforward soul/body distinction in atheological context of these passages to the more detailed attemptsat intra-psychic differentiation found in other Platonic andPeripatetic works.

Appendix: Plut. De gen. Socr. ch. 20

In the course of the above argument I have pointed to the

resemblance between Plutarch’s On progress in moral virtue ch. 12(p. 82F = SVF 1.234) and a passage from his On the daimonion ofSocrates, vz. 588D-E (above, p. 197-99). The latter is part of a moreextensive discussion of the daimonion of Socrates by one of thedialogue’s interlocutors, Simmias (ch. 20, 588B-589F). The dialogueis set among Socrates’ younger associates, who meet in Thebes

shortly after their master’s death. But of course this does not prevent

Plutarch from drawing on more recent theories of divination and

thus inviting his readers to compare the merits of the respective

theories at issue. Indeed, there is much in ch. 20 which recalls

Stoicism―so much so that this fact did not go unnoticed. The first

editor of the fragments of Xenocrates, Richard Heinze, studied

Plutarch’s treatise in view of Xenocrates’ well-known interest indaemons as intermediaries between man and the divine. Reading ch.

20, he was struck by the large number of Stoic elements. This was the

heyday of so-called Panposidonianism and Heinze had littlecompunction in identifying Posidonius as the source of the theory of

divination expounded here.77

This ascription was accepted―and the passage assiduously

studied―by Karl Reinhardt in his Poseidonios.78 But on the whole


77 Heinze (1892) 102 ff.78 Reinhardt (1921) 464 ff., id. (1953) 802 ff., followed by Döring (1979) 6.

the attribution met with little favour.79 As the tendency to sightPosidonius behind authors of the Roman period dwindled, ourpassage disappeared from the stage of Stoic studies altogether.Nothing from ch. 20 has found its way into our collections of Stoic(including Posidonian) fragments. However, I believe that the wholechapter merits reconsideration including the question of theinfluence or influences which might be identified here.

As has been noted earlier, 588D-E―i.e. the passage partlyquoted above, pp. 198 f.―runs closely parallel to Calcidius, InTimaeum ch. 255. Calcidius cannot have drawn on Plutarch. Do bothreflect Middle-Platonist tradition?80 It is true that in this tradition,too, the conjunction of language and thought and the idea of God’ssilent voice are to be found (which still leaves open the question ofthe ultimate provenance of these ideas).81 At any rate, the numberand coherence of Stoic elements here are very striking. There isnothing like it in extant Platonist literature. Consider further thefollowing points:

In 588E the way in which the ‘intellect of the higher power’ (ıτοË κρεÛττονος νοËς, i.e. the daemon82) makes contact with thehuman soul is explained as a form of linguistic communication.Spoken language has two components: speech (i.e. sound) andmeaning. The special form of linguistic transmission occurs withoutsound, whereas both components are involved in ordinary (oral)communication (i.e. among humans). In what follows (588E) thispoint is further explained in purely physical terms: (ordinary) speechis like a blow in the air (a Zenonian definition)83 but the higherpower communicates with us through the gentler means of a touch ofits thought (cf. also 589B). It is also said to lead the gifted84 soul.

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79 Survey in Corlu (1970) 56 ff.80 See Waszink pp. LXXXVII f. (also with reference to the parallel at issuehere).81 See Waszink ad Calc. p. 153.23-5, 178.21 ff. with references.82 This is specified in the parallel at De def. orac. 431C.83 SVF 1.74, D.L. 7.55 (SVF 3. Diog. Bab. 17), D.L. 158 (in an account ofhearing).84 This renders the adjective εÈφυᾶ which in Stoic texts standardly refers tothose making progress, see D.L. 7.106-7 (SVF 3.127, 135). Cleanthes even

The idea of the divine being touching85 and leading our souls is alsofound in the accounts of Sextus and Diogenes I have mentioned(above, pp. 190., 193f.). Its relation to the mechanism of linguisticcommunication rests on the Zenonian doctrine of mentalrepresentations (φαντασÛαι) as imprints in the psychic pneuma.86

This Stoic doctrine clearly underlies 589C-D, whereSimmias/Plutarch takes up again the motif of communicationthrough speechless language, or sheer meaning: the air is said to beimprinted (τυπωθεÛς) with articulate sounds and stamped withmeaning (§νσηµαÛνεται).87

The idea of thought as internal discourse and speech asexternalized thought can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle.88

But what we have here is its distinctively Stoic, theoreticallyembedded version.89 It is noteworthy that the messages of thedaemons pass through all men regardless of whether they are awareof them. What is decisive is whether one’s mental disposition isserene and undisturbed by emotion so as to be capable of payingattention to them.90


wrote a Περ‹ εÈφυÛας, see D.L. 7.175 (SVF 1 Cl. 481). Further Stob. Ecl. II, p.107.14 ff. W. (SVF 3.366); ibid. 93.14ff. (SVF 3.500), D.L. 7.129 (SVF 3.716),Plut. CN 1072F (SVF 3.719).85 On the idea of physical contact (‘touching’) in Stoic epistemology cf.Chrysippus ap. Aet. IV 9.13, ibid. IV 20.2 (SVF 2.81, 387), Chrys. ap. Nemes.Nat. hom. 2, p. 22.3-6 Morani (SVF 2.790), Plut. CN 1072F (SVF 3.719).86 Euseb. Praep. Ev. 15.20.2 (SVF 1 Zeno 141), Sextus M. 7.227, 372 (SVF2.56); cf. ibid. 230, 236 (SVF 1.58), D.L. 7.46 (SVF 2.53); on the link betweenpresentation and speech see esp. D.L. 7.49 (SVF 2.52).87 Cf. Chrys. ap. Gal. PHP 2.5.20 (SVF 2.894): πιθανÚν δ¢ ἄλλως, εÞς ˜§νσηµαÛνεται τὰ λεγÒµενα, κα‹ σηµαÛνεσθαι εκε›θεν κα‹ τὰςφωνὰς ἀπ´ §κεÛνου ...Diog. Bab. ap. Gal. PHP 2.5.12 (SVF 3 Diog. 29):κα‹ ἄλλως δ¢ πιθανÚν ÍπÚ τ«ν §ννοι«ν §νσεσηµασµ°νον τ«ν §ντª διανοÛᾳ κα‹ οÂον §κτετυπωµ°νον §κπ°µπεσθαι τÚν λÒγον...Both these statements occur in versions of Zeno’s speech argumentinferring the seat of regent part from what was considered the source of spokenlanguage, viz. the heart (ibid. 2.5.8, SVF 1.148).88 See supra, n. 16.89 Sext. M 8.275-6 (SVF 2.223, part); see esp. Long (1982) 51f., Long-Sedley(1986), 1, 322.90 This quality is indicated by the term νÆνεµον, ‘without wind’, a term often

In Stoic psychology the use of language, like any act, is a form ofconation or impulse (ıρµÆ). It is this aspect which is introduced inthe subsequent account (588F). The gifted soul responds to thehigher power "as this slackens and tightens its [scil. the soul’s]conations―not forcibly [as is the case] when emotions pull the otherway."91 Here surfaces the basis opposition between rational insightas rooted in the higher realm on the one hand and the emotionsrooted in the body on the other. A key concept here is that of tension(τÒνος): the impulses are transmitted in a tensional continuum, thusinstigating motion. It also underlies the analogy drawn in 589Abetween ordinary human action and the influence exerted bydaemon upon human. Just as impulses and emotions (a subspecies ofimpulses) start from the intellect and operate the body by means oftension, so too the higher powers initiate processes in the humanintellect.92 Indeed, so the argument runs, if our intellects are capableof setting the inert mass of our bodies in motion, how much easier itis for divine intellects to do the same for our intellect. One recalls theidea of God as the source of mental powers (reaching our intellectsthrough a process of transmission) in the Zenonian disquisitionpreserved by Sextus, M. 9.101-3 (see above, p. 190f). The differenceis that we here have the daemons acting as intermediaries―but thisis also attested as Stoic doctrine (see above, pp. 200f). Bothtestimonies, it has to be stressed, presuppose some form ofcontinuity existing between divine and human intellect.

Well before Plutarch’s lifetime several of the concepts I havehighlighted had found their way into common philosophicaldiscourse―witness their very presence here. What counts is not somuch the sheer number of originally Stoic ideas and terms as theirsystematic coherence and their close agreement with distinctive

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found in conjunction with the term γαλÆνη, found at 588D and De prof. in.virt. 82F. Both belong to the same maritime imagery: cf. e.g. Pl. Tht. 153C,Timon of Phlius 64. 91 588F: ≤ δ´ [scil. ψυχØ] §νδÛδωσιν αÈτ“ χαλ«ντι κα‹συντεÛνοντι τὰς ıρµὰς οÈ βιαÛως ÍπÚ παθ«ν ἀντιτεινÒντων...92 589Α... εÞς τÚ νοοËν αß τ«ν παθ«ν κα‹ ıρµ«ν κατατεÛνουσινἀρχαÛ, τοÊτου δ¢ σεισθ°ντος, •λκÒµεναι σπ«σι κα‹ συντεÛνουσι τÚνἄνθρωπον.

Stoic theories on knowledge, action, speech as well ascommunication between man and the divine. These correspondencesand the degree of coherence of the account presented by Plutarchencourage the assumption that this account is essentially Stoic.

________________________

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Documents

Ζήνων και ψυχολογικός μονισμός. fileone of our principal sources, if only because of his rich supply of verbatim quotations from Chrysippus. If we have lost