Relationship between terrorism and political systems is multifaceted

Corruption among political and economic elites Oppressive, authoritarian regimes that stifle civil

liberties

Marginalization, favoritism/discrimination, institutionalized exclusion (e.g. Ethno-nationalism, cf. Byman, Lesson 3)

Injustice (real or perceived) Political disagreements (e.g. reconstruction, Roe vs

Wade)

Most often, many of these conditions coincide, creating a cumulative effect of animosity toward those in power

Legitimacy is a key factorTed Robert Gurr (1970): “As legitimacy declines, people rebel”

Corruption among political and economic elites

Weak, failing or failed states (Patrick, Chenoweth, Wahlert) “Political instability” especially in transitioning states

(Chenoweth)

Overthrow of government (e.g., military coup)

Peace agreement (N. Ireland; Israel/Palestinians)

Foreign intervention/occupation

Other political factors?

Lots of discussion about weak states, failing states, failed states, and “ungoverned spaces” Lack of central govt. presence in parts of the

country Various security implications (criminals, terrorists

find safe haven in isolation, freedom of movement)

Are these “ungoverned spaces,” “ungoverned territories,” “lawless areas,” etc. really “ungoverned”? Or . . . something else?

Nobody is providing any services for the common good No order, no security, etc. No infrastructure; difficult terrain, climate Truly a “no man’s land”

Relatively few actual benefits for criminals and terrorists Inhospitable for training camps, operational

headquarters Difficulties in transportation to, from, through Difficulties with communications, moving funds, etc. No intelligence apparatus, commerce, food supply, etc. No infrastructure, no security means having to provide

it yourself . . .

Zones of Competing Governance Region with parallel governance structure Infers “governance” but by forces separate from an

established nation-state Recognizes powerful tribal, clan, ethnic loyalties Informal governance (traditional customs and codes, tribal

structures of loyalty, dispute resolution, etc.) Less emphasis on Westphalian nation-state system

Can be rural or urban; within a state or trans-national DRC, Mindinao (& other islands), regions of Sudan, Yemen,

Colombia, Nigeria, Peru, etc. Southern Lebanon, kacha abadi (slums) of Karachi, etc. AfPak border region, Sahel, TBA, “Kurdish regions,”

Caucasus

What are the critical research questions: Is there an absence of governance in these spaces?or Who is “governing”? What are the local networks of power distribution? How they are governing? What services do they provide in their regions of

influence? Do they provide hospitable environments for criminal,

terrorist networks? Stability or instability? Which “zones” should receive priority of our attention?

What are the critical policy questions: How to engage non-state actors in zones of competing

governance? What are the local political dynamics? Is central govt. seen as legitimate or corrupt, inept, etc.? Will “strengthening the state” exacerbate preference for

alternative governance systems? Are there ways to influence leaders in Pashtun, Taureg, other

regions to achieve our security objectives (without undermining the already fragile legitimacy of the nation-state)?

Under what conditions would tribal leaders see it in their tribe’s best interests to prevent the activities of criminal, terrorist networks?

Policy recommendations from the “ungoverned spaces” perspective typically focus on strengthening a state’s capacity to control that space

Terminology matters: A focus on “ungoverned” implies that only the imposition of the central govt. will make this territory “governed”; state-centric approach is insufficient

In contrast, the “zones of competing governance” perspective suggests the need to identify who is governing that space, and why, and then develop and implement strategies to influence the ways in which that space is governed