07_MALABANANvRP

7/28/2019 07_MALABANANvRP

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EN BANCHEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, G.R. No. 179987

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,CARPIO,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA,CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,

LEONARDO DE CASTRO,BRION,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERALTA, andRespondent. BERSAMIN,JJ.

Promulgated:

April 29, 2009x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

D E C I S I O N

TINGA,J.:

One main reason why the informal sector has not become formalis that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not

titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it has many consequences.

xxx

The question is: How is it that so many governments, fromSuharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title thesepeople and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that noneof the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informaltitles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving property ownership toeach other which are not the same means developed by the Spanish legalsystem. The informals have their own papers, their own forms ofagreements, and their own systems of registration, all of which are veryclearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal businesstransactions.

If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru,and you walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going tobark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only

one who does not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a"common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal

legal system does not know how to recognize.

- Hernando De Soto[1]

This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of p

and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkabl

the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity

applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and

of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the re

provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the g

The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of in

settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Y

current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenom

Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord wi
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Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our public land law, though our

social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.

I.

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration

covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre ,[2]situated

in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan

claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3]and that he and his

predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful

possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-

Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the

State.[4]Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness,

Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally

belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.

Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being

Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and

divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the

administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino.

After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them inadministering the properties, including Lot9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle,

Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.[5]

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Ar

Velazco. He further manifested that he also [knew] the property and I affirm the tr

the testimony given by Mr. Velazco.[6]The Republic of the Philippines likewise

present any evidence to controvert the application.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certificatio

11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources O

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated t

subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land pe

Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved a

under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.[7]

On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabandispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application forregistration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/orP.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the landsdescribed in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area ofSeventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) SquareMeters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of therecord of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name ofMARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and withresidence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the correspondingdecree of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.
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The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan

had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the

public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the

property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of

imperfect title.

On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8]reversing the

RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under

Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the

classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be

excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted

that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared

alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to

that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This

interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree

was based on the Courts ruling inRepublic v. Herbieto.[9]

Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;[10]hence, it

was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this

Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11]which was handed down just four months

prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion inHerbieto cited by the Court of

Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had

directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place sin

requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun.N

petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in q

is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prio

declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the

of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Regis

Decree.

The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12]and on 11 November 20

case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for th

arguments, to wit:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the publicdomain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the landbe classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is itsufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of theapplicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant hasbeen in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land

under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property RegistrationDecree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable bedeemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription

in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in charactereither because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be
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registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree inrelation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject landin their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the PropertyRegistration Decree or both?[13]

Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.

With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court

inNaguitis the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory

pronouncement inHerbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum,since the

land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the

notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that inRepublic v.

Bibonia,[14]promulgated in June of 2007, the Court appliedNaguitand adopted the same

observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently

absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land

should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart

fromHerbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings inBuenaventura v.

Republic,[15]Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic[16]andRepublic v. Imperial Credit

Corporation,[17]as well as the earlier case ofDirector of Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]

With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive

and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30

years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of

Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be

registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so lon

the time of the application, the property had already been converted into private p

through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from ou

ruling inRepublic v. T.A.N. Properties.[19]

The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are

extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acqu

prescription of properties of the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section

speaks of private lands. It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that pre

Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year poss

period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land A

not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submit

assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposa

Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular

circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.

II.

First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For

understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.
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A.

Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its

enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The

President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into

alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.[20] Alienable and disposable lands of the

public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b)

residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational,

charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and

quasi-public uses.[21]

May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and

disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges

that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of

imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial legalization. [22]Section 48(b) of the

Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably

grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or

an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is

located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate oftitle therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notoriouspossession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the publicdomain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applicationfor confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all theconditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to acertificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 wh

law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced b

No. 1073.First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disp

lands of the public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the sc

the lands that may be registered.[23]This is not actually the case. Under Section 9

Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public d

alienable or open to disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the

domain are a larger class than only agricultural lands.

Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possessi

thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application to poss

since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Court inNaguitexplained:

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the periodof possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to

agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided thatthe bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30)

years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
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amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning dateat June 12, 1945. xxx

It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the

same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various

laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is

Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The

provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply.The following persons may filein the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of titleto land, whether personally or through their duly authorizedrepresentatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through theirpredecessors-in-interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and

occupation of alienable and disposable lands of thepublic domain under a bona fide claim of ownershipsince June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion

of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly

refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous,

exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the

public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That

circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is

case.

The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14

Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:

Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizensof the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming toown any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not beenperfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of theprovince where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and theissuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,to wit:

xxx

Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an

application for registration of title to land, whether personally or throughtheir duly authorized representatives:

xxx

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the na

the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration D

which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing th

itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amen

P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the rig

Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possess

occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fid


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of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his title by

applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance

of the corresponding certificate of title.

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the

Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be

disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both

provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the

substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12

June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the

substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the

corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect

or incomplete title.

There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the

Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek

registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several times, most recently

by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:

Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section arehereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within whichto avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall

apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12)hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated bythe President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply

also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this

Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from actingunder this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.[24]

Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted

Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.

B.

Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amend

Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position

one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the

domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interes

possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienab

disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June

Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after

1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration De

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implicati

discussed inNaguit.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable anddisposable character of the land should have already been establishedsince June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning ofSection 14(1). SinceJune 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies itsantecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership. Generallyspeaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words orphrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantlyor remotely located.[25]Ad proximum antecedentsfiat relation nisiimpediatur sentencia.
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Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result ifwe adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rulewould be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domainwhich were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 wouldnot be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length ofunchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation rendersparagraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes thegovernment from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify publicagricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of thesituation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945,

the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

Accordingly, the Court inNaguitexplained:

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that itmerely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable anddisposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If theState, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper torelease the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that thegovernment is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the needto preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse

possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already beenclassified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there isalready an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusiveprerogative over the property.

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was

adopted inNaguit. The contrary pronouncement inHerbieto, as pointed out in Naguit,

absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would

only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if

the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious

possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.

Moreover, theNaguitinterpretation allows more possessors under

fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than

would be feasible underHerbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially cons

our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Pr

Registration Decree.

Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory pa

fromHerbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is v

initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of

hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturnHerbieto, as it suffices that the C

acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section

is indeed obiter.

It may be noted that in the subsequent case ofBuenaventura,[26]the

citingHerbieto, again stated that [a]ny period of possession prior to the date wh

[s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and

be excluded from the computation of the period of possession That statement,

context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as

inBuenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The application therei

ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners there

not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precludi

application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether peti

therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1)

position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide cl

ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.
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Thus, neitherHerbieto nor its principal discipular rulingBuenaventura has any

precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio ofNaguitis

embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had

been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945.

The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the

case. Any doubt as to which betweenNaguitorHerbieto provides the final word of the

Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor ofNaguit.

We noted inNaguitthat it should be distinguished fromBracewell v. Court of

Appeals[27]since in the latter, the application for registration had been filedbefore the land

was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronouncesBracewellas the

better rule between the two. Yet two years afterBracewell, itsponente, the esteemedJustice

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling inRepublic v. Ceniza,[28]which involved a

claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared

alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza citedBracewell, quoted extensively from it,

and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza should have

failed. Not so.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration isalienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the

government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; anadministrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands

investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.

In this case, private respondents presented a certification datedNovember 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the CommunityEnvironment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the

lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic)Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 datedDecember 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show the real characterof the land subject of private respondents application. Further, thecertification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence ofcontradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also wasthe observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:

[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Landsand Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the

ground that the property still forms part of the publicdomain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question

are forestal land....

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that merepossession of public land for the period required by law would entitle its

occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favorof private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of thePublic Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burdenof proving the alienability of the land subject of their application.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondentswere able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious

possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we arebound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there areexceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them.[29]

Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member

authoredBracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain

declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June

The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nea

(6) years after the land had been declared alienable or disposable, while inBracew

application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared alienab
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disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguitto contradistinguish it

fromBracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.

III.

We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2).

The provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may filein the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title

to land, whether personally or through their duly authorizedrepresentatives:

xxx(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private

lands by prescription under the provisions of existinglaws.

The Court inNaguitoffered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2),

which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum,but we nonetheless

refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and theamendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of

alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commencedonly after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of theProperty Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application

of those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescriptionunder the provisions of existing laws.

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under theCivil Code.[[30]] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that propertiesclassified as alienable public land may be converted into private property byreason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)years.[[31]] With such conversion, such property may now fall within thecontemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptibleto registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription.

Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a datelater than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous

and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land byvirtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Naguitdid not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case

petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and wh

evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948.

this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.

A.

The obiterin Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the p

basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is

1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:

All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible ofprescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its

subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object ofprescription.
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It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial

in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the

public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and

mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral

lands.

There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of

real property through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary

prescription of ten (10) years,[32]or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30)

years.[33]Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith ,[34] as well as

just title.[35]

When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that

persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the

provisions of existing laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the

registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the

acquisition by prescription of private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the

State. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does

encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a

private person has acquired through prescription.

The Naguit obiterhad adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that

properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by

reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[36

we ascertain the source of the thirty-year period, additional complexities rela

Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge. Forthere are in fa

distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.

The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended S

48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of al

public lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.

The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupyinglands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or aninterest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land islocated for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate oftitle therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

x x x x x x x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possessionand occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years

immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation

of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall beconclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to aGovernment grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under theprovisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]

This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which

the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applicati
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(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, andare intended for some public service or for the development of thenational wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the characterstated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property

belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the

commerce of man.[39]Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and

disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by

prescription.

Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President

or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the

public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, underthe Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all,

by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the

commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are

susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial

property of the State may be acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public

dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of

the patrimonial property of the State. It is this provision that controls how public

dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by

prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property which belong

State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or

development of the national wealth are public dominion property. For as long

property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or dispos

remains property of the public dominion if when it is intended for some public serv

for the development of the national wealth.

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the

dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development

national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. W

such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or dispo

remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and

incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disp

lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public ser

for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescr

can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enact

Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is

authorized by law.

It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Pr

Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability e

lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide posor occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord w

Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the


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although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the

Government.

Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to

apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The

remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can

very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and

pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial

confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual

example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of

Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly known as the

BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and

portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air

Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the

President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority

(BCDA)[40]which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.[41]The

President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in

part.[42]Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof

are alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations

governing sales of government properties.[43]

From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military land

become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial,

BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these lands are to be sold in o

raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases at Clarkand Subic .[4

purpose can be tied to either public service or the development of national w

under Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of the public do

under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is

their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such

become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.

C.

Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared a

in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer inten

public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of pos

prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in co

the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.

The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the pe

possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted

purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion p

before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to th

Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly with
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framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the

time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet

the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.

Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section

14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis

of possession,while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis

of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of

the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under

Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil

Code.

In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section

48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period

available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article

1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of

possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of

extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act

as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without

regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property

Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.

It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not

apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it

ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other s

such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adh

the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. S

14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that pro

with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).

IV.

One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing h

land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under th

Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be ac

by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which

that [a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescrip

and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in characte

not be the object of prescription.

There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be ac

under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under A

1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article 11

completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code th

a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acqu

prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same tim


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are indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title. The ascertainment of good faith

involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil

Code,[45]provisions that more or less speak for themselves.

On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under

Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription when the adverse claimant

came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the

acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not

transmit any right. Dr. Tolentino explains:

Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission ofownership, and which would have actually transferred ownership if thegrantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured byprescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession,and dacion in payment.[46]

The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the

applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major

premise for the argument is that the State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit

ownership to the possessor before the completion of the required period of

possession.[47]It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor referred to

in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person invoking ordinary

acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or

any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights.

Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extrao

prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of public dominio

as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But af

property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in fa

the possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events ensue:

patrimonial property is ipso jureconverted into private land; and (2) the per

possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership

property by operation of the Civil Code.

It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner

converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property

the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of property is not a m

acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership.[48]

Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Pr

Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did no

accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil

What the system accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought ab

the completion of a period of possession ordained under the Public Land Act (eit

years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945following P.D. No. 1073).

The Land Registration Act[49]was noticeably silent on the requisites for ali

public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, tho

arguably did not preclude such registration.[50]Still, the gap was lamentable, cons
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that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of

persons who have completed the prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally

closed with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2)

thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have acquired

ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is,

the Civil Code as of now.

V.

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section

48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or

through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and

notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public

domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have

acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of

their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945

and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable

during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial

confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable,

subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.[51]

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Publi

Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, co

that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring owners

patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial prope

only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an e

government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retai

public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil

And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period f

acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the governmen

person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under th

Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Pr


(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial p

may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acqu

prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property t

possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title.

extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse pos


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of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just

title, ripens into ownership.

B.

We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan

has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land

Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his

predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or

earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own

evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus,

they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property


Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While

the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent

evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the

national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the

subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its

status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is

insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

VI.

A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal do

established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of t

ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the count

be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, a

Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we

levied the law without comment.

The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or no

phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common

the so-called Third World countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disc

between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been un

bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of

public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have


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proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or

alienation of said properties.[52]Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the

most viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of

alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this

decision, has considerable limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively

held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have

tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been

regarded for generation by their families and their communities as common law

owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet

such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered

such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth

a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such

lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes

insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards

for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the

requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.

Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not

only of that individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of security is

deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring

welcome closure to the long pestering problem.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of A

dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 areAFFIRMED

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[1]Hernando de Soto Interview by Reason Magazine dated 30 November

at http://www.reason.com/news/show/32213.html (Last visited, 21 April 2009).

[2]More particularly described and delineated in Plan CSD-04-017123. Records, p. 16

[3]But see note 5.

[4]Id.

[5]The trial court decision identified Eduardo Velazco as the vendor of the pr

notwithstanding the original allegation in the application that Malabanan purchased the sam

Virgilio Velazco. See note 3. In his subsequent pleadings, including those before this

Malabanan or his heirs stated that the property was purchased from Eduardo Velazco, a

Virgilio. On this point, the appellate court made this observation:

More importantly, Malabanan failed to prove his ownership over Lot 9864-A.

application for land registration, Malabanan alleged that he purchased the subject lot from V

Velazco. During the trial of the case, however, Malabanan testified that he purchased the sub

from Eduardo Velazco, which was corroborated by his witness, Aristedes Velazco, a son of V

Velazco, who stated that Eduardo was a brother of his grandfather. As aptly observed

Republic, no copy of the deed of sale covering Lot 9864-A, executed either by Virgilio or E

Velazco, in favor of Malabanan was marked and offered in evidence. In the appealed Deciscourt a quomentioned of a deed of sale executed in 1995 by Eduardo Velazco in favor of Mal

which was allegedly marked as Exhibit I. It appears, however, that what was provi

marked as Exhibit I was a photocopy of the deed of sale executed by Virgilio Velazco in f
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Leila Benitez and Benjamin Reyes. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the

court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The offer is necessary

because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon

the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Thus, Malabanan has not proved that Virgilio or

Eduardo Velazco was his predecessor-in-interest.Rollo, pp. 39-40.

[6]Rollo, p. 74.

[7]Id. at 38. Emphasis supplied.

[8]Penned by Associate Justice Marina Buzon of the Court of Appeals Fifth Division, and

concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo Sundiam and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa.[9]

G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183.

[10]See rollo, p. 11.

[11]G.R. No. 144507, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442.

[12]Through a Resolution dated 5 December 2007. See rollo, p. 141.

[13]Id. at 186-187.

[14]G.R. No. 157466, 21 June 2007, 525 SCRA 268.

[15]G.R. No. 166865, 2 March 2007, 459 SCRA 271.

[16]G.R. No. 147359, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA 92.

[17]G.R. No. 173088, 25 June 2008, 555 SCRA 314.

[18]G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 178 SCRA 708.

[19]G.R. No. 154953, 16 June 2008.

[20]Section 6, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.



[23]OSG Memorandum, p. 13.

[24]Section 47, Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 9176.

[25]R. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3

rded., 1995) at 182.

[26]See note 3.

[27]380 Phil. 156 (2000).

[28]Also known asRepublic v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 697 (2002).

[29]Id. at 710-712.

[30]

See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1113.[31]

See e.g., Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCR

611;Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576

Commander, Intelligence and Security Group v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275 (2002).

[32]See Article 1134, CIVIL CODE.

[33]See Article 1137, CIVIL CODE.

[34]See Article 1117 in relation to Article 1128, Civil Code. See also Articles 526, 52

& 529, Civil Code on the conditions of good faith required.

[35]See Article 1117, in relation to Article 1129, Civil Code.

[36]CitingDirector of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCR

611;Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576

Commander, Intelligence and Security Group v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275 (2002).

[37]Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, immediately before its amendment by Rep. A

No. 1942, reads as follows:

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been i

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the

domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the Gove

since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war o

majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essent

Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Cha

[38]Again, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 194superseded by P.D. No. 1073, which imposed the 12 June 1945 reckoning point, and whi

then incorporated in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.


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[39]See Vllarico v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 136438, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 110.

[40]Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec.7.

[41]Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 4(a).

[42]Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 7.

[43]Id.

[44]Section 2, Rep. Act No. 7227.

[45]See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1128.

[46]A. TOLENTINO, IV CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (1991 ed.) at 26; citing 2

Castan 175.

[47]Memorandum of the OSG, p. 21.

[48]SeeAngeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. 44 (1938).

[49]Act No. 496.

[50]See Section 19, Land Registration Act, which allowed application for registration of title

by person or persons claiming, singly or collec tively, to own the legal estate in fee simple.

[51]See note 24.

[52]See Section 118, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.

Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands

acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation

from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of

issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted

prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the l and may be mortgaged

or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.

No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-

five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture

and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.

Documents

07_MALABANANvRP