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1. GAVINO CORPUZ vs. Spouses GERONIMO and HILARIA GROSPE

Facts:Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer

(OLT) Program of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Pursuant to Presidential

Decree (PD) No. 27, he was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcelsof agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017 and 012) with a total area of 3.3 hectares situated inSalungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. The lots were formerly owned by a certain

Florentino Chioco and registered under Title No. 126638.

To pay for his wifes hospitalization, petitioner mortgaged the subject land on January20, 1982, in favor of Virginia de Leon. When the contract period expired, he again

mortgaged it to Respondent Hilaria Grospe, wife of Geronimo Grospe, for a period of

four years (December 5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to guarantee a loan of P32,500. The

parties executed a contract denominated as "Kasunduan Sa Pagpapahiram Ng LupangSakahan," which allowed the respondents to use or cultivate the land during the duration

of the mortgage.

Before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Cabanatuan

City (Region III), petitioner instituted against the respondents an action for recovery of

possession. In his Complaint, he alleged that they had entered the disputed land by force

and intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991, and destroyed the palay that he had plantedon the land. Respondents, in their Answer, claimed that the "Kasunduan" between them

and petitioner allowed the former to take over the possession and cultivation of the

property until the latter paid his loan. Instead of paying his loan, petitioner allegedlyexecuted on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights"[7] over the landholding in favor of

respondents in consideration of P54,394. Petitioner denied waiving his rights and interest

over the landholding and alleged that his and his childrens signatures appearing on the

Waiver were forgeries.

Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Ernesto P. Tabara ruled that

petitioner abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Malaya,Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, which had passed Resolution Nos. 16 and 27 recommending

the reallocation of the said lots to the respondent spouses, who were the "most qualified

farmer[s]-beneficiaries." The appellate court also ruled that petitioner had abandoned thelandholding and forfeited his right as a beneficiary. It rejected his contention that all

deeds relinquishing possession of the landholding by a beneficiary were unenforceable.

Issue:Whether or not the petitioner abandoned or voluntarily surrendered his rights as a

beneficiary under PD 27?

Held:Supreme Court DENIED instant petition and the assailed Decision and Resolution was

AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed petitioners appeal. The sale, transfer or conveyance

of land reform rights are, as a rule, void in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarianreform laws. However, in the present case, the voluntary surrender or waiver of these

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rights in favor of the Samahang Nayon is valid because such action is deemed a legally

permissible conveyance in favor of the government. After the surrender or waiver of said

land reform rights, the Department of Agrarian Reform, which took control of theproperty, validly awarded it to private respondents.

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2. FRANCISCO ESTOLAS vs. ADOLFO MABALOT

Facts:Subject agricultural land was awarded to respondent by virtue of PD 27 in

1973 and a CLT was issued in his favor. In need of money for medical

expenses, respondent passed on the property to petitioner for P5,800.00and P200.00 worth of rice. According to respondent, that was a verbalmortgage. According to petitioner, a sale had taken place and a transfer

certificate of title was issued in petitioner's name. Unable to redeem the

property respondent filed a complaint for reconveyance with the DARoffice which found his act of surrendering the land in favor of petitioner as

constituting an abandonment thereof. The DAR Central Office, however,

reversed the assailed order and directed the petitioner to return the land

to respondent. The CA also held that the transfer of the land to petitionerwas void and that there was no abandonment because respondent tried to

redeem the property but petitioner asked for a high purchase rice.

Issue:

Whether or not the transfer of the land to the petitioner was void

Held:Land awarded under PD 27cannot be transferred except to the grantee's heirs by

hereditary succession, or back to the government by other legal means; the law is

clear and leaves no room for interpretation; agrarian laws must be liberallyinterpreted in favor of the grantees; the property was not abandoned as

respondent continues to claim dominion over the land; and that even if

respondent did indeed abandon subject property, any transfer may only be

made in favor of the government.

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3. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

Facts:President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked

PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop,

improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." Then President Marcosissued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in theforeshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and

Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). Thereafter, President Corazon C. Aquino issued

Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land soreclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)

containing a total area of 1,915,894 square meters." Subsequently, the Register of Deeds

of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title, in the name of

PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at thesouthern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. PEA and AMARI

entered into the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) through negotiation without public

bidding. President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres,approved the JVA. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation: (1)

the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the

public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore

PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islandsare thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal. Petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer,

filed a Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary

Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government standsto lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner

prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking

Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of

the people to information on matters of public concern.

Issue:

Whether or not the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer toAMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed is valid

Held:No. The mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does

not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much

less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government

of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposablelands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.

There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its

reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of

lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that landsreclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's charter, however,

expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide,

dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/oroperated by the government." There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to

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sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell

to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from

constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiringalienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial

lands. Moreover, the government is required to sell valuable government property

through public bidding. In the case at bar the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 coverednot only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it alsogranted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a

negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public

bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justificationfor a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned. The grant

of legislative authority to sell public lands does not automatically convert alienable lands

of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public

domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities nottasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial

lands. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to

PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on privatecorporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The 157.84

hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates

of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease

these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands toprivate corporations.

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4. LUZ FARMS vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF DAR

Facts: Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and

poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to

be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13,Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known asComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures

Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated

on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989

Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared

unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction

or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing thesame, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and

poultry raisers.

Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar asthey are made to apply to it:

(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the

definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."

(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural landsdevoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."

(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform theauthority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands

covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section

13 The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:

ARTICLE XIII

x x xAGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM

Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded

on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directlyor collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a

just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and

undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities

and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into accountecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of

just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the

rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for

voluntary land-sharing.x x x" It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the

mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock,

poultry and swine in its coverage. Livestock or poultry raising is not similar tocrop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and

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represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial

livestock and poultry raisers.

Indeed, there are many owners of residential lands all over the country who useavailable space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising purposes,

under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and

other commercial livestock and poultry raisersLands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising ofanimals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or

consideration in productivity in this industry.

On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultryraising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such

enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's

International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words:

"Agriculturethe art or science of cultivating the ground and raising andharvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of

livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.

It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .Livestockdomestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.

Farma plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other

animals."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the said law

includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as theImplementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith is

constitutional?

HELD: The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the

meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the

framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverageof the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.

The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section

166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to croplands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land

The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture."

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which

includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry andswine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the

aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform

program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands

in the coverage of agrarian reform. Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and

32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry

raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending finalredistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from

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three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to

their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and

therefore violative of due process GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of

the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing

Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLAREDnull and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issuedis hereby MADE permanent.