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1 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure Chapter 8

1 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure Chapter 8

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Page 1: 1 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure Chapter 8

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An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure

Chapter 8

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Eight Basic FactsEight Basic Facts1.1. Stocks are not the most important Stocks are not the most important

source of external finance.source of external finance.2.2. Issuing marketable debt and equity Issuing marketable debt and equity

securities is not the primary source securities is not the primary source of financing.of financing.

3.3. Financial intermediaries are more Financial intermediaries are more important than direct finance to important than direct finance to raise funds.raise funds.

4.4. Banks are the most important Banks are the most important source of external funds.source of external funds.

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Eight Basic FactsEight Basic Facts

55. Financial system is the most heavily . Financial system is the most heavily regulated sector of the economy.regulated sector of the economy.

66. Only large, well-established . Only large, well-established corporations have access to direct corporations have access to direct finance.finance.

77. Both households and businesses are . Both households and businesses are usually required to put up a usually required to put up a collateral for a loan.collateral for a loan.

88. Debt contracts are typically . Debt contracts are typically extremely complicated legal extremely complicated legal documents.documents.

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External FinanceExternal Finance

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Funds Raised By Issuing StockFunds Raised By Issuing Stock

A very small portion of the funds raised A very small portion of the funds raised by businesses come from issuing stock.by businesses come from issuing stock.

In the U.S., only 2.1% of the external In the U.S., only 2.1% of the external funds came from issuing stock between funds came from issuing stock between 1970 and 1985.1970 and 1985.

Between 1970-96, this ratio is 9.2%.Between 1970-96, this ratio is 9.2%.Other industrialized countries show Other industrialized countries show

similar behavior.similar behavior.

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External Financing Through External Financing Through Bonds and StocksBonds and Stocks

Bonds and stocks combined still make up Bonds and stocks combined still make up a small portion of the external funds for a small portion of the external funds for businesses.businesses.

The relative importance of bonds is The relative importance of bonds is overemphasized because every time a overemphasized because every time a firm issues a bond to keep the debt firm issues a bond to keep the debt constant (debt rollover), it shows as an constant (debt rollover), it shows as an addition to financing.addition to financing.

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Indirect Finance Is The Primary Indirect Finance Is The Primary Source of FundingSource of Funding

Even when the business issues stock or Even when the business issues stock or bond, the primary purchasers are mutual bond, the primary purchasers are mutual funds, insurance companies, or pension funds, insurance companies, or pension funds.funds.

Households buy small portions of newly Households buy small portions of newly issued bonds (5%) or stocks (50%).issued bonds (5%) or stocks (50%).

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Bank Loans Are the Major Bank Loans Are the Major SourceSource

In the US more than half of external In the US more than half of external funds raised by businesses come from funds raised by businesses come from banks.banks.

Bank loans are 4 times higher than Bank loans are 4 times higher than funds raised through stocks.funds raised through stocks.

In other countries, like France or Japan, In other countries, like France or Japan, banks are even more important.banks are even more important.

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Regulation of the Financial MarketsRegulation of the Financial Markets

Throughout the world, financial markets Throughout the world, financial markets are heavily regulated by governments.are heavily regulated by governments.

The soundness of the financial system The soundness of the financial system partly relies on the government control.partly relies on the government control.

Government also provides information on Government also provides information on the system.the system.

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1010http://www.economist.com/node/16485376?story_id=16485376

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Small vs. Large FirmsSmall vs. Large Firms

Small firms almost never raise funds Small firms almost never raise funds through the issuing of stock or bonds.through the issuing of stock or bonds.

Small firms rely on banks.Small firms rely on banks.Only large, well-established firms have Only large, well-established firms have

traditionally raised funds through traditionally raised funds through securities.securities.

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CollateralCollateral

Collateral is the property pledged to the Collateral is the property pledged to the lender in case the borrower defaults.lender in case the borrower defaults.

Collateralized debt (secured debt) is the Collateralized debt (secured debt) is the primary form of lending to households.primary form of lending to households.MortgageMortgageCarCar

Business borrowing is also widely Business borrowing is also widely undertaken by pledging collateral.undertaken by pledging collateral.

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Debt ContractsDebt Contracts

Debt contracts are long, legal Debt contracts are long, legal documents.documents.

Debt contracts have provisions that Debt contracts have provisions that restrict the activities of the borrower.restrict the activities of the borrower.

Debt contracts specify the Debt contracts specify the responsibilities of the borrower.responsibilities of the borrower.

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The Importance of Transaction CostsThe Importance of Transaction Costs

A single mother who earns $1 a day can A single mother who earns $1 a day can improve her income by 15-25% if she could improve her income by 15-25% if she could only get a loan of $43. (John Hatch, FINCA, only get a loan of $43. (John Hatch, FINCA, Sep. 29, 2000).Sep. 29, 2000).

Banks find it very expensive to process and Banks find it very expensive to process and operate such small loans.operate such small loans.

Income (production) remains lower than it Income (production) remains lower than it would be because the financial system is not would be because the financial system is not more efficient.more efficient.

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Transaction CostsTransaction Costs

Financial intermediaries have evolved to Financial intermediaries have evolved to reduce transaction costsreduce transaction costsEconomies of scaleEconomies of scaleExpertiseExpertise

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How FINCA Reduces How FINCA Reduces Transactions CostsTransactions Costs

By establishing a “club” of women, By establishing a “club” of women, FINCA reduces the costs of information FINCA reduces the costs of information collection and guarantees that loans will collection and guarantees that loans will be paid.be paid.

By forming such clubs around the world, By forming such clubs around the world, it gains expertise in the problem areas.it gains expertise in the problem areas.

By specializing on a particular size and By specializing on a particular size and type of loan and a particular clientele, it type of loan and a particular clientele, it enjoys economies of scale.enjoys economies of scale.

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Asymmetric InformationAsymmetric InformationAsymmetric informationAsymmetric information means one of the means one of the

parties in an exchange has much more parties in an exchange has much more information about the good, service than the information about the good, service than the other.other.

Adverse selectionAdverse selection is asymmetric information is asymmetric information before the transaction takes place.before the transaction takes place.

Moral hazardMoral hazard is asymmetric information is asymmetric information after the transaction takes place.after the transaction takes place.

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http://www.nobel.se/economicshttp://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2001/public.html/laureates/2001/public.html

George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz received the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 2001, "for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information".

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http://www.nobel.se/http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/economics/laureates/

2001/public.html2001/public.htmlAgents on one side of the market have much better information than those on the other side.

•Why are interest rates often excessively high on local lending markets in Third World countries?

•Borrowers know more than the lender about their repayment prospects

•Why do people who want to buy a good used car turn to a dealer rather than a private seller?

• The seller knows more than buyers about the quality of his car

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http://www.nobel.se/http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2001/economics/laureates/2001/

public.htmlpublic.htmlWhy does a firm pay dividends even if they are taxed more heavily than capital gains?

The CEO and the board know more than the shareholders about the profitability of the firm

Why is it advantageous for insurance companies to offer clients a menu of contracts where higher deductibles can be exchanged for lower premiums?

Policyholders know more than the insurance company about their accident risk

Why do rich landowners not bear the entire harvest risk in contracts with poor tenants?

Tenants know more than the landowner about their work effort and harvesting conditions.

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Adverse Selection: The Lemons ProblemAdverse Selection: The Lemons Problem

If quality cannot be assessed, the buyer is If quality cannot be assessed, the buyer is willing to pay at most a price that reflects the willing to pay at most a price that reflects the average qualityaverage quality

Sellers of good quality items will not want to sell Sellers of good quality items will not want to sell at the price for average qualityat the price for average quality

The buyer will decide not to buy at all because The buyer will decide not to buy at all because all that is left in the market is poor quality itemsall that is left in the market is poor quality items

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Adverse SelectionAdverse Selection

Adverse selection problem explains Adverse selection problem explains Puzzle #1 and Puzzle #2.Puzzle #1 and Puzzle #2.

Puzzle #1: Stocks are not the most Puzzle #1: Stocks are not the most important source of external finance.important source of external finance.

Puzzle #2: Issuing marketable debt Puzzle #2: Issuing marketable debt and equity securities is not the primary and equity securities is not the primary source of financing.source of financing.

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Adverse SelectionAdverse Selection

You meet someone; you want to go on a date. You You meet someone; you want to go on a date. You don’t know if s/he will be a pain. The date becomes a don’t know if s/he will be a pain. The date becomes a little dance to check each other out without little dance to check each other out without commitments.commitments.

Used car market has different quality cars. You are Used car market has different quality cars. You are willing to pay the average price for quality range. willing to pay the average price for quality range. Those who have better cars refrain from the market. Those who have better cars refrain from the market. Those with lemons are happy to sell. Used car Those with lemons are happy to sell. Used car market has more lemons than random sampling market has more lemons than random sampling would yield. would yield.

http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/akerlof/index.htmlhttp://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/akerlof/index.html

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Adverse SelectionAdverse Selection

If high and low quality stocks are difficult to If high and low quality stocks are difficult to distinguish, potential buyers will be willing to pay distinguish, potential buyers will be willing to pay the average price.the average price.

Owners who know their profit potential is high Owners who know their profit potential is high and their risk is low will not offer their stock.and their risk is low will not offer their stock.

Owners with low profit horizon and high risk will Owners with low profit horizon and high risk will be happy to sell.be happy to sell.

Overabundance of lemons in the stock market Overabundance of lemons in the stock market will discourage lenders to enter the market.will discourage lenders to enter the market.

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Solving Adverse SelectionSolving Adverse Selection The party with the scant information needs to The party with the scant information needs to

be informed.be informed. Private firms might collect and sell the needed Private firms might collect and sell the needed

information.information. Free-rider problem would cut into their earnings and Free-rider problem would cut into their earnings and

sub-optimal information would be generated.sub-optimal information would be generated. Government would regulate the market and Government would regulate the market and

require firms to supply information. This solves require firms to supply information. This solves the public good problem and the political the public good problem and the political problem of having to reveal harmful data.problem of having to reveal harmful data.

Explanation of Puzzle #5: Financial system is Explanation of Puzzle #5: Financial system is the most heavily regulated sector of the the most heavily regulated sector of the economy.economy.

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Solving Adverse SelectionSolving Adverse Selection One way to solve the lemons problem in the used One way to solve the lemons problem in the used

car market has been to utilize an intermediary: car market has been to utilize an intermediary: used car dealer.used car dealer.

Financial intermediaries collect information about Financial intermediaries collect information about firms and loan them the funds provided by their firms and loan them the funds provided by their depositors. Because the loan process is private depositors. Because the loan process is private and loans are not traded, there is no free-rider and loans are not traded, there is no free-rider problem.problem.

This explains puzzles #4 and #5: Banks are the This explains puzzles #4 and #5: Banks are the most important source of external funds. Financial most important source of external funds. Financial system is the most heavily regulated sector of the system is the most heavily regulated sector of the economy.economy.

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Role of BanksRole of Banks The less information available about firms, The less information available about firms,

the more prominent banks will be in the the more prominent banks will be in the financial system.financial system.

LDCs rely on banks much more.LDCs rely on banks much more. Puzzle #4: Banks are the most important Puzzle #4: Banks are the most important

source of external funds.source of external funds. In the US banks have seen a decline in In the US banks have seen a decline in

their control of the financial flows. their control of the financial flows. This explains puzzle # 6: Only large, well-This explains puzzle # 6: Only large, well-

established corporations have access to established corporations have access to direct finance.direct finance.

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Collateral and Net Worth to Solve Collateral and Net Worth to Solve Adverse SelectionAdverse Selection

If a borrower defaults, the lender will get the If a borrower defaults, the lender will get the collateral.collateral. It reduces the risk from lack of knowledge for It reduces the risk from lack of knowledge for

the lender.the lender.A firm with high net worth (assets – A firm with high net worth (assets –

liabilities) will be able to pay the loan even if liabilities) will be able to pay the loan even if the business goes sour.the business goes sour.

This explains puzzle # 7: Both households This explains puzzle # 7: Both households and businesses are usually required to put and businesses are usually required to put up a collateral for a loan.up a collateral for a loan.

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Tools to Help Solve Adverse SelectionTools to Help Solve Adverse Selection

1. Private Production and Sale of Information

Free-rider problem interferes with this solution

2. Government Regulation to Increase Information

Explains Puzzle 5

3. Financial Intermediation: Explains Puzzles 3, 4 and 6

A. Analogy to solution to lemons problem provided by used-car dealers

B. Avoid free-rider problem by making private loans

4. Collateral and Net Worth

Explains Puzzle 7

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Moral Hazard in Equity ContractsMoral Hazard in Equity Contracts

Called the Principal-Agent ProblemCalled the Principal-Agent ProblemPrincipal: less information (stockholder)Principal: less information (stockholder)Agent: more information (manager)Agent: more information (manager)

Separation of ownership and control Separation of ownership and control of the firmof the firmManagers pursue personal benefits and Managers pursue personal benefits and

power rather than the profitability of the firmpower rather than the profitability of the firm

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Moral Hazard of EquityMoral Hazard of Equity Principal-Agent Problem.Principal-Agent Problem.

The owner hires an agent.The owner hires an agent.Agent isn't too keen on profits.Agent isn't too keen on profits.The owner loses.The owner loses.

The question of trust would make savers The question of trust would make savers rely more on debt instruments than rely more on debt instruments than stocks.stocks.

Board of Trustees, Board of Governors, Board of Trustees, Board of Governors, Board of Directors are supposed to Board of Directors are supposed to monitor the activities of the managers.monitor the activities of the managers.

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Solving Moral HazardSolving Moral HazardThe activities of agents need to be The activities of agents need to be

monitored.monitored.Monitoring might be costly.Monitoring might be costly.Monitoring may lead to free-rider Monitoring may lead to free-rider

problem and collapse.problem and collapse.Some owners do the monitoring and others Some owners do the monitoring and others

enjoy the outcome.enjoy the outcome.Less demand for stocks compared to Less demand for stocks compared to

bonds.bonds.

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Solving Moral HazardSolving Moral Hazard Imposing regulation to have standard Imposing regulation to have standard

accounting principles, the government tries accounting principles, the government tries to make monitoring easier.to make monitoring easier.

Venture capital firms are financial Venture capital firms are financial intermediaries that monitor the activities of intermediaries that monitor the activities of the firms by being on the Board of Directors.the firms by being on the Board of Directors.

Owning a stock requires monitoring; owning Owning a stock requires monitoring; owning a bond doesn’t. Debt is more prevalent as a bond doesn’t. Debt is more prevalent as external finance.external finance.

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Moral Hazard for LendersMoral Hazard for LendersThe borrower has to pay fixed amounts The borrower has to pay fixed amounts

and keeps the extra. and keeps the extra. Incentives for the borrower are to Incentives for the borrower are to

undertake risky endeavors.undertake risky endeavors. If the risky investment works, the If the risky investment works, the

borrower will gain a lot.borrower will gain a lot. If the risky investment doesn’t work, the If the risky investment doesn’t work, the

borrower will be unable to pay the borrower will be unable to pay the lender.lender.

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Solving Moral Hazard in ContractsSolving Moral Hazard in Contracts High net worth discourages the borrower from risky High net worth discourages the borrower from risky

investments.investments. Monitoring the borrower’s activities and restricting Monitoring the borrower’s activities and restricting

risky behavior.risky behavior. Loan can only be used in specific activities.Loan can only be used in specific activities. Life insurance may be required.Life insurance may be required. Collateral’s value is protected by insurance.Collateral’s value is protected by insurance. Periodic auditing of the borrower.Periodic auditing of the borrower.

Financial intermediaries Financial intermediaries extend non-tradable loans and reduce the problem of extend non-tradable loans and reduce the problem of

free-rider under marketable debt.free-rider under marketable debt. Reduce the costs of monitoring.Reduce the costs of monitoring.

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Why Do Conflicts of Interest Arise?Why Do Conflicts of Interest Arise?

Underwriting and Research in Investment Underwriting and Research in Investment BankingBanking

Information produced by researching companies is Information produced by researching companies is used to underwrite the securities. The bank is used to underwrite the securities. The bank is attempting to attempting to simultaneously serve two clientsimultaneously serve two client groups whose information needs differ.groups whose information needs differ.

SpinningSpinning occurs when an investment bank occurs when an investment bank allocates hot, but underpriced, IPOs to executives allocates hot, but underpriced, IPOs to executives of other companies in return for their companies’ of other companies in return for their companies’ future businessfuture business

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Why Do Conflicts of Interest Arise?Why Do Conflicts of Interest Arise?

Auditing and Consulting in Accounting FirmsAuditing and Consulting in Accounting Firms

Auditors may be willing to skew their judgments and Auditors may be willing to skew their judgments and opinions to win consulting businessopinions to win consulting business

Auditors may be auditing information systems or tax Auditors may be auditing information systems or tax and financial plans put in place by their nonaudit and financial plans put in place by their nonaudit counterpartscounterparts

Auditors may provide an overly favorable audit to Auditors may provide an overly favorable audit to solicit or retain audit businesssolicit or retain audit business

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Conflicts of Interest: RemediesConflicts of Interest: Remedies Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Accounting Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Accounting

Return and Investor Return and Investor Protection Act)Protection Act) Increased supervisory oversight to monitor and Increased supervisory oversight to monitor and

prevent conflicts of interestprevent conflicts of interest

Established a Public Company Accounting Oversight Established a Public Company Accounting Oversight BoardBoard

Increased the SEC’s budgetIncreased the SEC’s budget

Made it illegal for a registered public accounting firm Made it illegal for a registered public accounting firm to provide any nonaudit service along with an auditto provide any nonaudit service along with an audit

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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Beefed up criminal charges for white-collar Beefed up criminal charges for white-collar crime and obstruction of official investigationscrime and obstruction of official investigations

Required the CEO and CFO to certify Required the CEO and CFO to certify that financial statements and disclosures are that financial statements and disclosures are accurateaccurate

Required members of the audit committee to Required members of the audit committee to be independentbe independent

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Conflicts of Interest: RemediesConflicts of Interest: Remedies

Global Legal Settlement of 2002Global Legal Settlement of 2002 Required investment banks to sever the link Required investment banks to sever the link

between research and securities underwritingbetween research and securities underwriting Banned spinning Banned spinning Imposed $1.4 billion in fines on accused Imposed $1.4 billion in fines on accused

investment banksinvestment banks Required investment banks to make their analysts’ Required investment banks to make their analysts’

recommendations publicrecommendations public Over a 5-year period, investment banks were Over a 5-year period, investment banks were

required to contract with at least 3 independent required to contract with at least 3 independent research firms that would provide research to their research firms that would provide research to their brokerage customersbrokerage customers

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Problems in LDCsProblems in LDCs Property rights are poorly defined and/or poorly Property rights are poorly defined and/or poorly

enforced.enforced. Debtors may have more rights than creditors.Debtors may have more rights than creditors. Courts may take too long to give ownership to Courts may take too long to give ownership to

creditors.creditors. Governments might protect politically powerful Governments might protect politically powerful

borrowers.borrowers. Adverse selection problems become magnified Adverse selection problems become magnified

because under these conditions lenders need because under these conditions lenders need much more reliable information about borrowers.much more reliable information about borrowers.

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Problems in LDCsProblems in LDCs

Moral hazard problems become magnified Moral hazard problems become magnified because lenders cannot enforce restrictive because lenders cannot enforce restrictive covenants.covenants.

As a result, flow of funds from savers to As a result, flow of funds from savers to borrowers is minimal.borrowers is minimal.

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Problems in LDCsProblems in LDCs Governments usually direct credit toward Governments usually direct credit toward

themselves or toward favored sectors.themselves or toward favored sectors. Allocation is determined on political grounds rather Allocation is determined on political grounds rather

than economic efficiency grounds.than economic efficiency grounds. Funds are wasted.Funds are wasted.

Government subsidize interest rates for Government subsidize interest rates for favored sectors.favored sectors.

Nationalized banks channel funds toward Nationalized banks channel funds toward political endeavors.political endeavors.

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Financial CrisisFinancial CrisisA financial crisis happens when there is A financial crisis happens when there is

sharp declines in asset prices and sharp declines in asset prices and widespread bankruptcies.widespread bankruptcies.

Financial crises occur when there is a Financial crises occur when there is a sharp increase in adverse selection and sharp increase in adverse selection and moral hazard.moral hazard.

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Causes of Financial CrisisCauses of Financial Crisis Increases in interest ratesIncreases in interest rates: Riskier investors : Riskier investors

remain in the market while safer ones exit.remain in the market while safer ones exit.

Increases in uncertaintyIncreases in uncertainty: A major failure increases : A major failure increases the uncertainty and inability of the lenders to the uncertainty and inability of the lenders to gauge the creditworthiness of borrowers.gauge the creditworthiness of borrowers.

Balance sheet deteriorationBalance sheet deterioration: Decline in asset : Decline in asset values, rise in liabilities, decline in net worth.values, rise in liabilities, decline in net worth.

Banking sector problemsBanking sector problems: Deterioration of bank : Deterioration of bank balance sheets.balance sheets.

Government deficitsGovernment deficits: Possibility of default: Possibility of default..

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Balance Sheet DeteriorationBalance Sheet Deterioration Stock market crash lowers the net worth of Stock market crash lowers the net worth of

corporations.corporations. Adverse selection increases because the potential Adverse selection increases because the potential

losses to lenders are higher.losses to lenders are higher. Moral hazard increases because borrowers have more Moral hazard increases because borrowers have more

incentives to engage in risky behavior.incentives to engage in risky behavior.

Unanticipated deflation raises liabilities.Unanticipated deflation raises liabilities. Debt is usually long-term, fixed interest rate.Debt is usually long-term, fixed interest rate. Falling prices raise the real value of nominal debt.Falling prices raise the real value of nominal debt. Assets are usually real, so they do not gain value.Assets are usually real, so they do not gain value. Net worth declines.Net worth declines.

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Balance Sheet DeteriorationBalance Sheet Deterioration Exchange rate risk may deteriorate balance Exchange rate risk may deteriorate balance

sheets. sheets. If contracts are denominated in foreign currency, If contracts are denominated in foreign currency,

any unanticipated devaluation or depreciation of any unanticipated devaluation or depreciation of domestic currency increases real value of debt.domestic currency increases real value of debt.

Assets are usually denominated in domestic Assets are usually denominated in domestic currency.currency.

Rise in interest rates may increase interest Rise in interest rates may increase interest payments by debtors.payments by debtors.Cash flow will fall lowering the liquidity of the firm.Cash flow will fall lowering the liquidity of the firm.

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Mexican Financial Crisis of ‘94-95Mexican Financial Crisis of ‘94-95Deregulation of financial markets led to a Deregulation of financial markets led to a

lending boom.lending boom.Unperforming loans increased causing a Unperforming loans increased causing a

decline in net worth of banks.decline in net worth of banks.Weak supervision of regulatorsWeak supervision of regulators Inability to monitor borrowersInability to monitor borrowers

Lending slowed (tight credit market).Lending slowed (tight credit market).

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Tequila Crisis of ‘94-95Tequila Crisis of ‘94-95 Interest rate hikes in the US forced Mexico to raise Interest rate hikes in the US forced Mexico to raise

its interest rates to keep the value of peso.its interest rates to keep the value of peso. Higher interest rates increased adverse selection and Higher interest rates increased adverse selection and

moral hazard.moral hazard.

Assassinations and uprisings increased Assassinations and uprisings increased uncertainty.uncertainty. Stock market crashed reducing net worth.Stock market crashed reducing net worth. Firms had incentives to undertake risky investments Firms had incentives to undertake risky investments

because the value of their collateral fell.because the value of their collateral fell. Adverse selection and moral hazard problems rose.Adverse selection and moral hazard problems rose.

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Tequila Crisis of ‘94-95Tequila Crisis of ‘94-95Expected value of Mexican peso dropped Expected value of Mexican peso dropped

forcing the spot value downward as well.forcing the spot value downward as well.Due to NAFTA, tariffs and quotas were to be Due to NAFTA, tariffs and quotas were to be

removed.removed. Inflation in 1990-95 period had fallen to 15.5% Inflation in 1990-95 period had fallen to 15.5%

from 70.4% during 1980-90 period but it still was from 70.4% during 1980-90 period but it still was significantly higher than the US to which the significantly higher than the US to which the peso was pegged.peso was pegged.

From 1980 to 1995 trade as a percentage of From 1980 to 1995 trade as a percentage of GDP doubled from 24% to 48%.GDP doubled from 24% to 48%.

Source: The World Bank, World Development Report 1997, pp. 219, 235, 245

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U.S. Financial CrisesU.S. Financial Crises

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Third World Financial CrisesThird World Financial Crises