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Indicators based on representative Indicators based on representative surveys of firms, households and surveys of firms, households and
service providersservice providers
Javier Herrera (IRD - DIAL)Javier Herrera (IRD - DIAL)
Mireille Razafindrakoto (IRD - DIAL), and François RoubaudMireille Razafindrakoto (IRD - DIAL), and François Roubaud (IRD - (IRD - DIAL)DIAL)
Seminar on “The Empirics Of Governance“Seminar on “The Empirics Of Governance“
May 1 – 2, 2008, Washington DCMay 1 – 2, 2008, Washington DC
2
PRESENTATION SCHEME
DIALDéveloppement, Institutions et Analyse de Long terme
I. Uses of household surveys
II. Taking into account sources of bias
III. Objective vs subjective corruption indicators
IV. Conclusions & Perspectives
3
I. Uses of household surveys
• Household survey as a « voicing » instrument; public awareness on corruption (particularly in of authoritarian political contexts).
• Complex links with policy
4
Historical perspective
First estimation of the extent of corruption in 1995 in Madagascar (with Household survey)
Headlines in the press: « Outcry against corruption! »
It then became impossible to ignore the problem
5
1995 It then became impossible to ignore the problem
the Ministry of Justice took steps to introduce a system of sanctions. a draft law on the fight against corruption
BUT Draft law rejected by the Government Council in 1999 Importance of context & characteristics of institution (~ authoritarian regime and problem of governance)
2002Institutional change Stress put on transparency 2003 Creation of an independent council (CSLCC) 2004 Independent anti-corruption office (BIANCO)
“ … It is important to bear in mind that, on the basis of the statistical survey conducted in May 1995 by the MADIO project, co-financed by the French Ministry for Cooperation and the European Union: ‘the issue of corruption seems to be a recurring problem which haunts the capital’s inhabitants. 96% of them consider that it is a major problem in Madagascar’. ‘Over 40% of people aged over 18 in the capital had had to pay a corrupt civil servant during the previous year’. Whatever the credibility of this survey and the interpretations that have been drawn from it, there is no doubt that corruption is a social problem in Madagascar … and it is necessary to combat the practice of corruption as energetically as possible” .
MEASURE1995 1998
DEFINITION OF POLICY
QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS
/ Political Regime
Positive Impact
Interactions
6
Headlines in the press in may 2005: « More confidence & less corruption »
after the public conference presenting the first results of the survey on « governance, democracy and fight against poverty »
7
Sources : Razafindrakoto, Roubaud (2002) and 1-2-3 Survey 2002-2004, INSTAT, DIAL, authors calculations.
An improvement of civil servant wages or an active anti-corruption policy
a sharp drop in the incidence of corruption
Civil servant salaries and corruption levels in Madagascar 1995-2004
GOVERNANCE
048
121620242832364044
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004
%
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
Bas
e 10
0=19
95
Level of corruption Civil servants real wages (right scale)
Political crisis
Active anti-corruption policy
8
II. Taking into account sources of bias
• Who answers the question matters (random sample selection within the household)
• But also it matters to know more about who don’t answer (non respondent profile)
• Taking into account the working of corruption (middlemen, social norms, etc.)
• Robustness needs to be assessed• Informal production units needs adapted
survey approach (the 123 surveys)
9
III. Taking into account sources of bias
• The wording and sequence of question matters (but not only when measuring corruption, ie. labor surveys). Pilot surveys are important.
• Non response to governance questions in HH surveys are lower than in standard questions (ie. Income)
• Unobserved heterogeneity (« over optimistic »/ »under optimistic », use panel data -ongoing research)
10
The surveys
Governance and Democracy Modules grafted onto official household survey conducted by National Statistical Institutes
Survey support (stratified multi-stage sample surveys: area/HH) for the Modules (Individuals):
• In AfricaIn Africa: 1-2-3 Survey (LFS, informal sector, consumption and poverty)
- Madagascar 1995-2004, Capital + urban areas (2000, 2001), rural, entreprises surveys (time series)
- West Africa 2001/2003, in 7 WAEMU capital cities (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lomé, Ouagadougou and Niamey)
35 594 persons interviewed
• In Latin AmericaIn Latin America: Standard National Household surveys (ECH, Bolivia; SIE-ENEMDU, Ecuador; ENAHO, Peru). National and regional inference for Peru and Ecuador.
- Peru 2002-, national level (18 000 HH sample in 2002; continuous survey from 2003 to date).
- Ecuador 2004, (20 000 HH)
- Bolivia 2004, national (1 700 HH).
-The survey is taking place in Colombia during the 2nd term of 2005.
More than 50 000 persons interviewed
11
Strong points / Basic principles:
Ownership
Reliability
Sustainability
Conducted by National Statistical
Institute
Integration in the National Statistical
System
Relevance
SystematicPresentation /
Publication of the result wider public
ValidationDemocratic debate
demand
Bottom-up approach Investment in capacity building
Light, flexible toolReconductible time-series
Marginal costHH survey « Voicing »
empowerment, accountability
Supply side Demand sideInteractions
12
Non response
There is (often) more willingness to answer questions on governance and democray than usual economic questions
Non response rate to selected questions
%West Africa Mada
Cotonou
Ouaga-
dougou
Abidjan
Bamako
Niamey
Dakar Lomé Antana-
narivo
Total
Opinion on governement functioning
0 3.6 0.9 1.1 2.7 5.2 3.5 0.1 2.2
Opinion on democracy 0 2.8 0.5 0.9 1.9 3.1 0.3 0.2 1.3
Income level (continuous) 40.2 54.3 40.9 43.3 51.6 56.3 37.2 47.3
Income level (continuous or discrete)
2.3 6.5 3.2 6.5 14.1 9.2 1.6 0.1
Sources : 1-2-3 Surveys, Phase 1, Governance and Democracy module, 2001/2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, authors’ calculations.
13
RobustnessProbabilistic surveys allows a quantitative assessement of indicators’ precision (also relevant for group and intertemporal comparaisons)
rural urban Total
has increased 31,0 39,1 36,6
95% confidence interval [29,0 - 33,0] [37,4 - 40,9] [35,3 - 38,0]
has decreased 8,43 10,47 9,85
95% confidence interval [7,5 - 9,5] [9,5 - 11,6] [9,1 - 10,7]
is the same 49,1 48,8 48,9
95% confidence interval [47,5 - 14,0] [46,9 - 50,6] [47,4 - 50,3]
don't know 11,5 1,6 4,7
95% confidence interval [10,3 - 12,9] [1,3 - 2,1] [4,2 - 5,2]
Total 100 100 100
In your opinion, corruption since last year?
Source: our estimation based on ENAHO july 2003-june 2004, INEI, Peru.
14
Taking into account the working of corruption: middlemen; failed corruption; “accepted” corruption, amounts paid, access to services; links with inefficiency…
Source: ENAHO 2004 HH survey Peru
15
Incidence and cost of corruption (2002/2003 and 2004 in Antananarivo)
En 2002/2003 En 2004
Total Income per capita Total Income per capita
1st quartile 4th quartile 1st quartile 4th quartile
Incidence (all households) 16,3 11,9 20,1 8,4 6,0 10,3
No contact with civil service 40,4 46,8 31,5 29,9 34,2 22,4
Incidence (households victims) 27,4 22,4 29,3 12,0 9,1 13,3
Total annual amount (1 000 Fmg)
Mean (HH victims of corruption) 381 219 682 300 77 484
Median (HH victims) 25 20 50 30 14 50
% of income (HH victims) 3,3 7,8 3,1 1,2 1,8 1,2
Source : Enquête 1-2-3, modules qualitatifs, 2003 et 2004, INSTAT, authors calculations.
Corruption incidence taking into account access to public services Incidence (percentage of households victims) has decreased Total amount paid has decreased in real terms The poor as well as the rich had benefited from this improvement
16
“Don’t know” answer is not random: it concerns mainly the poor, the rural, the less educated, the socially excluded
Importance of democracy
Do you think that having a democratic government is
important?:
Rural %
Urban %
Not poor %
Poor %
Total %
Yes 34.8 55.9 56.3 41.5 49.4 More or less 38.0 30.6 29.7 36.6 32.9 Not much 13.7 8.4 8.7 11.6 10.0 No 4.6 3.4 3.3 4.3 3.7 Does not know 8.9 1.7 2.1 6.0 3.9 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Authors’ own calculations from ENAHO 2002-IV.
17
Corruption incidence for the informal sector production units can be measured
Cotonou Ouagadougou Abidjan Bamako Niamey Dakar Lome Total
%Incidence of Informal Units that had a problem with civil servants last year
4.7 5.0 7.0 3.5 6.2 8.5 6.2 6.2
% that settled the problem:
By paying a fine 75.5 76.7 42.9 38.5 40.4 49.2 44.5 47.3
By giving a “gift” 13.9 5.7 50.2 32.6 24.7 38.1 45.1 41.3
other 10.5 17.6 6.9 28.9 34.9 12.7 10.4 11.4
Source: Alain Brilleau et al. « Le secteur informel : Performances, insertion, perspectives, enquête 1-2-3 phase 2 », STATECO n°99, 2005 p.82.
18
III. Objective vs subjective corruption indicators
• Expert’s surveys vs. HH surveys
• Do they measure the same phenomena? (petty vs. big corruption)
• Minding the gap between : -perceptions and objective
indicators -aspirations and perceived outcomes
19
The mirror survey
To round out the collection of surveys on Governance and Democracy in seven West African capitals and in Madagascar (Antananarivo),
an additional survey to get the opinions of a certain number of Southern and Northern experts (researchers, development practitioners, decision-makers, senior civil servants, politicians, etc.).
The aim --> to compare answers from the population surveyed in each country with the specialists’ point of view.
20
The mirror survey (…)
Two sets of questions:
- what the experts think the respondents answered on average. - their own answer to these same questions (“What is your personal opinion?”)
Questions :
- Specificity of the answers of the population / experts, specialists - Knowledge of Northern or Southern experts on what happens and on people’s thinking in the South
-Relevance and reliability of indicators based only on appreciation of panel of experts
Sample size : 250 experts (30 per country in average)
DIALDéveloppement, Institutions et Analyse de Long terme
21
How far can we trust the experts’ opinion on corruption?
Discrepancies between real extent of corruption and experts’ perception in Francophone Africa
On the level of corruption / To what extent corruption acceptable On the relative positions (rank) of the different countries
Sources: General Household Survey (35,594 persons interviewed; 4500 for each country in average); Expert panel survey or Mirror survey (246 persons surveyed; 30 experts for each country in average). * In Madagascar, results are drawn from the 2003 survey. Authors calculations.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Incidence of corruption
General population * (% of victims of corruption from HHhousehold surveys)
Expert panel (mirror survey)(what they believe could be thepercentage of victims of corruption)
HH Survey
Mirror Survey
Cotono
u
Ouaga
Abidjan
Tana
Bamako
Niamey
Dakar
Lom
é
Avera
ge
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Population who believes that making bribe is acceptable
General population * (% from Household (HH) survey)
Expert panel (what they think could be the % of population whobelieves that making a bribe is acceptable)
Mirror Survey
HH Survey
The need for complementary approaches / indicators
22
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
%
Cotonou Ouaga Abidjan Bamako Niamey Dakar Lomé Tana
The six principles of democracy are:
Fundamental Respected
Perception of the main democratic principles by the population
Are they fundamental? Are they respected in the country?
Measuring the gap between aspirations and effectiveness as regards democratic principles
DEMOCRACY
Sources : Enquêtes 1-2-3, module Démocratie, 2001/2003, Instituts Nationaux de la Statistique, AFRISTAT, DIAL
authors calculations.
23
Measuring the gap between aspirations and effectiveness as regards democratic principles
DEMOCRACY
Lomé
0
50
100
Free,transparent
elections
Politicalfreedom (right
to choose party)
Freedom ofexpression, of
the press
Equality beforethe law
Freedom totravel
Religiousfreedom
FundamentalRespected
Dakar
0
20
40
60
80
100
Free, transparentelections
Political freedom(right to choose party)
Freedom ofexpression, of the
press
Equality before the law
Freedom to travel
Religious freedom
Fundamental
Respected
Antananarivo
0
50
100
Free,transparent
elections
Politicalfreedom (right
to chooseparty)
Freedom ofexpression, of
the press
Equality beforethe law
Freedom totravel
Religiousfreedom
Fundamental
Respected
Cotonou
0
50
100
Free,transparent
elections
Politicalfreedom (right
to chooseparty)
Freedom ofexpression, of
the press
Equality beforethe law
Freedom totravel
Religiousfreedom
FundamentalRespected
Ouagadougou
0
50
100
Free,transparent
elections
Politicalfreedom(right to
choose party)
Freedom ofexpression,of the press
Equalitybefore the
law
Freedom totravel
Religiousfreedom
Fundamental
Respected
Abidjan
0
50
100
Free,transparent
elections
Politicalfreedom (right
to chooseparty)
Freedom ofexpression,of the press
Equalitybefore the
law
Freedom totravel
Religiousfreedom
Fundamental
Respected
Bamako
0
50
100
Free,transparent
elections
Politicalfreedom (right
to chooseparty)
Freedom ofexpression, of
the press
Equalitybefore the law
Freedom totravel
Religiousfreedom
Fundamental
Respected
Niamey
0
50
100
Free,transparent
elections
Politicalfreedom (right
to choose party)
Freedom ofexpression, of
the press
Equality beforethe law
Freedom totravel
Religiousfreedom
Fundamental
Respected
Sources : Enquêtes 1-2-3, module Démocratie, 2001/2003, Instituts Nationaux de la Statistique, AFRISTAT, DIAL
authors calculations.
24
No correlation between Objective measure (incidence of corruption) Subjective perception of the working of civil service
EnsembleBamako
Dakar
Ouaga Abidjan
Tana
Cotonou
Niamey
Lomé
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
Incidence of corruption
% o
f n
egat
ive
op
inio
n o
n t
he
wo
rkin
g o
f th
e ci
vil
serv
ice
Cor=-0,48
The need for complementary approaches / indicators
25
The global lessons• Advantages of household sample surveys Transparency of measurement proceduresRepresentativenessQuantification, Comparability of indicators over time.
• In-depth policy-oriented analyses More appropriate than international indicators and aggregates.
• Both objective (behaviour, actual experiences) and subjective information (perception, satisfaction) Monitoring and relating the two fundamental dimensions of these phenomena.
• Socio-economic disaggregation These two dimensions can be combined with traditional variables related to the socio-economic characteristics of individuals and households (income, occupation, sex, age, ethnic group, etc.). Possibility to disaggregate information between different population categories (gender, poverty, ethnic groups, discriminated people, etc.
• International comparability
26
IV. Conclusions & Perspectives
• Measure different dimensions of governance
• A detailed understanding of different forms of
corruption is necessary to analyse its
determinants and consequences
• Different sources of potential bias should be
considered in designing & analysing surveys
• Both, objective and subjective, governance
indicators need to be collected to better
understand aspiration/outcome gaps and why
corruption may become or not a political issue.
27
END
For more works on Governance, Democracy and Poverty see our web site
http://www.dial.prd.fr
Our article:
“Governance, Democracy and Poverty Reduction: Lessons drawn from household Surveys”, International Statistical Review (2007), vol. 75, issue 1, pp.70-95
is available upon request