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MH-6: Toward Total War- 1863

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The Civil War (1863) - Toward Total War:Strategic Overview

• By 1863: Both sides move toward Total War:– Both field huge Armies of volunteers & conscripts;– Both mobilize their economies & entire populations;

• Gradually above $$$ & population seen as legit targets

• North: destroys South’s agro, factories, rail, mills;– Anything viewed as potential support for war

• NTL – One single Battle cannot end the war– No “Napoleon Austerlitz” is possible– Nothing in Europe approached US Civil War to date

• Not even Frederick the Great’s or Napoleon’s Battles

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Strategic Overview-2• 1863: Both sides passed Europe in Total War scale:

– Total resources of North vs. Total resources of South– In long run then – who was most likely to win & why?

• Caveat: Total War requires total commitment – For North: political will to stay the course:

• Also dependent on perceived progress toward that goal

• (It still does!)

• At 1863’s start - Rebel victory seemed still possible– South’s battle wins: (Fredericksburg, Holly Springs):– Battle victories encouraged South & depressed North

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Strategic Overview-3• But by July 1863 to end of war-

– A turning point finally emerged – Decisive victories in 1 major battle & 2 key campaigns:

• 1. Gettysburg

• 2. Vicksburg

• 3. Chattanooga

• Tactical victories would have major strategic impact– (for now at start of 1863 – still in the future)– NTL both sides sought to win the decisive battle:– Both pursue the elusive dream of Napoleon’s Austerlitz

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Battle Map Overview- 1863:

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Austerlitz Chimera*

• Term’s meaning & historical background:– *Greek mythology (fire breathing lion headed sheep)

• Modern term: *unattainable dream or illusive myth

• Napoleon’s tactical battle victory – Battle of Austerlitz-1805 with decisive strategic result

– Tactical victory destroys 3rd Coalition (strategic)

– Illusive dream of generals throughout Military History

• Factors against decisive Civil War battlefield victory:– Weapons Technology that favored defense

– Terrain limiting effective employment of cavalry

– Leadership make-up shaped amateur tactics & strategy

– Main reason: very rare opportunities & huge size of Armies

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Chancellorsville - Phase I

• Hooker vs. Lee (& Jackson)– Cmdrs’ Strength & weakness:

– Hooker: good organizer & planner- restored Union morale

• But also ambitious & overconfident - until chaos of battle…

– Lee (& Jackson): no change

• Force dispositions (Map):– Hooker: 120K

– Lee: 60K

Force Dispositions

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Chancellorsville - Phase I Strategy & Tactics

• Hooker’s Objectives & Tactical Concept:– BG Meig advocates tactical concept:

• Conduct bold, rapid turn of Rebel Left Flank:

• Tactical aim: crush Lee between 2 halves

• Anvil & hammer battle strategy

– Hooker embraced Meig’s tactical concept• Believes it has potential strategic impact

• Operational & Strategic Objectives: – Destroy Lee’s Army – Force South’s surrender in the East

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Chancellorsville - Phase ITactical Battle Plan

• Plans & preparation (Battle Map Plan):– Hooker takes ½ of Force &

turns Lee’s LF– Sedgwick crosses

Rappahannock to fix Lee’s front:

• Attack Lee’s center & take Fredericksburg

• Hooker then sends Union cavalry to raid Lee’s LOC to Richmond– (That would turn out to be

a big mistake)

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Chancellorsville - Phase ITactical Deployment

• Hooker’s Deployment:– 1st stage: Sedgwick crosses

Rappahannock – Tactical Aim: fix Lee’s attention at

Fredericksburg

• Rebel scouts report move to Lee – Hooker moves 25 miles NW to

Kelley’s Ford – Stuart reports Hooker’s move over

Rapidan

• Union cavalry conduct lackluster raid-Lee’s LOC

– Hooker remains ignorant of Lee’s movements- why?

– Calvary off conducting?__________

• Hooker halts advance & forms defensive line in Wilderness

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Chancellorsville - Phase IExecution & Tactical Results

• Tactical opportunity unfolds:– JEB Stuart reports Union’s RF as: “?__________”

– Lee decides to seize opportunity presented

• Tactical Results:– Hooker surrenders tactical initiative to Lee– Lee plans with Jackson to exploit it

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Chancellorsville - Phase IIStrategy & Tactics

• Lee’s Strategic, Operational, & Tactical Objectives:– Tactical: Hit Hooker’s RF & roll up Union line;– Operational: Destroy Army of the Potomac;– Strategic: Open Washington to potential future attack;– Political: Push Union toward negotiated settlement;

• Just the reverse of Hooker’s Objectives

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Chancellorsville - Phase IIBattle Execution Plan

• Plans & preparation:– Jackson (w/28K) marches

across Union front undetected

– Lee (w/14K) demonstrates to fix Union center:

• Convince Hooker of Lee’s intent: frontal assault

• Reinforce Hooker’s desire to surprise Lee

– Early (w/10K) to hold heights of Fredericksburg

• (Against half of Union’s Army of Potomac)

Chancellorsville - Phase II Battle Execution

• Jackson is late but totally surprises Union RF under Howard’s command– Roll up and through Union RF

– Jackson & Lee continue to press Union as darkness falls

• Jackson conducts eve Recon & is hit by NC ?_______ fire:– Mistook, along with A.P. Hill,

for Union cavalry & is ambushed & wounded seriously

– Stuart takes Jackson’s corps- but unclear of Jackson’s plan

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Chancellorsville - Phase II Battle Execution-2• Meanwhile, Sedgwick rolls over Early

– Poses serious threat to Lee’s rear

• Lee counterattacks & forces Sedgwick to retreat– Hooker remains inert (“2000 yard stare”)

• Hooker then goes immediately on defensive:– Surrenders Hazel Grove high ground to Lee’s arty

• Commands Chancellorsville & surrounding area

– Hooker is wounded (shell shocked) & decides to withdraw• Over strong objections of his corps commanders

• Lee intent on Hooker’s destruction– Unable to prevent Hooker’s escape

– Demonstrates risks he is willing to take• Frontal assaults against fortified position- Again!

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Chancellorsville - Phase IITactical, Operational, & Strategic Results

• Lee held Battlefield – (tactical victory), but:– Glory very costly – 13K casualties (20%)– Union casualties: 17K (out of 120K):

• Higher casualties less a problem for Union – why?

– Attrition rate ?______________________________

• Lee failed to destroy Hooker’s Army – (His Operational Aim)– Strategic situation in Virginia remains unchanged– Austerlitz Chimera remains just that: an illusive dream

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Vicksburg Campaign

• Background & Overview (Map):– Overland campaign (Nov-Dec 1862) failed

• Holly Springs (Van Dorn cut Grant’s LOC)• Several dozen miles of RR LOC torn up by Bedford Forrest• Chickasaw Bluffs (Sherman roughly repulsed)

• Commanders’ strengths & weaknesses– Grant: Gritty, determined, good solid leader– Pemberton: mediocre, naïve, & indecisive

• Force dispositions:– Union: 44K => 70K (later reinforcements by Hallack)– Confederate: 31K

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Vicksburg Campaign II – Strategy & Tactics

• Union Strategic, Operational, & Tactical Objectives:– Sever South’s East-West communication;– Open Mississippi to Union control & commerce;– Capture & eliminate Vicksburg command

• Plans & preparation:– Various schemes tried & thwarted (Jan-Apr ’63);– Grant later called them: “make-work” efforts #2-5

(Map)*

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Vicksburg Campaign II• Grant conducted various failed

schemes (Jan-Apr 1863):– 1. Overland campaign

• Nov-Dec 1862 – Grant’s LOC cut by Van Dorn

at Holly Springs– Sherman repulsed at Chickasaw

Bluffs… then Grant tries:

– 2. Lake Providence– 3. Canal Bypass– 4. Steele’s Bayou expedition– 5. Yazoo Pass expedition

• 6. Grant finally embarks on serious offensive- April-May, 1863

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Vicksburg Campaign II- Final Deployment

• Operational & tactical Deployment:– As Grant marches

overland on West bank of Mississippi

– Porter steams through Vicksburg’s defense on midnight run

– Then ferries Grant’s forces across lower part of Mississippi to east side of river

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Vicksburg- Final Campaign Engagements & Battle Execution

• Grant stages out of Bruinsburg 30 April 1863– Cuts off Port Hudson to south

• Grant marches on Jackson (to hit rail & supplies);– Reaches Jackson, MS w/3

corps after 2 small battles:

• Attacks Jackson and forces Johnston’s Army North:– Burns Jackson munitions

factory, then turns west

• Defeats Pemberton units on march to Vicksburg:– Series of engagements prior

to reaching outskirts– Champion Hill & Big Black

River are the 2 biggest

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Vicksburg Campaign II- Siege & Capture• First elements of Grant’s

army move into position on 18 May 1863– 19 May: Conducts initial

attacks on Vicksburg defenses

– Strongly repulsed twice

• Begins siege & waits for Pemberton’s surrender– In the meantime he gathers

reinforcements (to 70K) & re-supplies transported by Navy

– After 47 Days, Pemberton surrenders on 4 July 1863

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Vicksburg Campaign II- results

• Tactical, Operational, & Strategic Results:– Tactical Union victory with major Strategic impact– Grant captures: 31K troops,172 guns, 60K rifles– South can not afford to replace this operational loss

• Strategic impact:– South’s operational loss impacts overall troop levels– Grant reopens Mississippi for Union commerce– Severed Arkansas, Texas, LA from Confederacy

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Gettysburg Campaign- prelude• Background & Overview

– Eastern Theater situation:• Crisis facing South• Vicksburg still under siege• Various strategies considered• Lee persuades all to invade North

• Meade vs. Lee:– Both solid professionals– Lee will have serious

lapse in judgment during campaign• Force dispositions

– Hooker (replaced by Meade): 115K– Lee: 76K

• Rebel Deployment:– From Chancellorsville to southern

Pennsylvania (Map):• Via west side of Shenandoah

– Lee assumed Hooker would shadow

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Gettysburg Campaign- Strategy & Tactics• Strategic, Operational, & Tactical Objectives:

– South: force Hooker to follow & relieve pressure on Richmond

• Tactical victory in North would:– Threaten key Northern cities– Press North for peace settlement– Gain diplomatic recognition from Britain

– North: react to and engage Lee’s forces• Destroy Lee’s army and protect Washington & Baltimore

• Plans & preparation:– Originally Lee agreed to Longstreet’s strategy:

• Strategic Offensive & Tactical Defense (or so he thought)

– Reality of the situation drove the tactics: • Meeting engagement for both sides & unplanned for

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Gettysburg Campaign- Invasion of North• By early June Lee deploys north

– Sends 3 corps North to PA (Map)– Spreads out over southern PA– Stuart goes off on his own

• Surprised by Calvary at Brandy Station• Attempts replay of his famous ride

• Lee remains ignorant of Hooker’s close proximity- why?– He asks:“Where is General Stuart?

• Lee learns of Hooker’s proximity from Longstreet’s “scout” (spy) Harrison- what does Lee do?– Orders his widely separated Army to

concentrate at Gettysburg• Meanwhile Lincoln replaces

Hooker with Meade

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Gettysburg- Execution: 1 July 1863• A “meeting” engagement

– Accidental contact soon escalates into major engagement

• Union’s BG Buford’s Calvary holds ground until Reynolds’ 1st Corps arrives just in time

– Enter 2 heavy corps to overwhelm Union line by late pm 1 July

• Union corps forced to retreat through streets of Gettysburg to Cemetery Ridge

• Lee makes two fateful decisions: – 1. Fight general engagement &– 2. Fail to insist that LTG Ewell

take Cemetery Ridge

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Gettysburg- Execution: 2 July 1863• Day 2: Rebel assault begins at

1630 on Union left– Longstreet’s 1st corps with 2

divisions attack en echelon on Union far left as ordered

• Battle is extremely intense to the south at Little Round Top– Col Chamberlain’s 20th Maine

barely holds Union’s far left• Then flanks the Rebel RF which

culminates in a bayonet charge

• On Union right Ewell is:– Ordered to conduct

demonstration – Late but almost breaks Union RF– Seized Union arty batteries

• Lee convinced victory near & plans to try it again tomorrow

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Gettysburg- Execution: 3 July 1863• Day 3: Lee now determined to prevail

at all costs– Plans a repeat of Day 2

(attack both of Meade’s flanks)

• But Union arty hit Culp’s Hill first – So Lee decides on a frontal assault on

Meade’s center right (Hancock’s II)

– Longstreet is ordered to command the assault of 3 mixed divisions

• Pickett’s Charge– Pickett, Pettigrew, & 13K men

march almost a mile on line to their objective of a small copse of trees

– Union II corps wait there entrenched with rifled muskets & arty cannister

– Unmitigated disaster soon follows

Aftermath• Lee reforms his line

& waits for Meade to counter-attack

• After a day Lee withdraws his forces under cover of heavy rains– His escape made

possible in part to Meade’s caution in following at a distance (Calvary)

– Unlike the Battle, Lee’s retreat well planned & executed 30

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Gettysburg- Results

• Tactical, Operational, & Strategic Results:– Major defeat for Lee- who almost lost his entire Army

• 20K veteran casualties not replaceable • 15 generals & numerous regimental & field commanders lost

– To include: Hood & Barksdale & ALL of Pickett's Brigade Cmdrs

– Union tactical victory with great strategic impact• Costly victory (MG Reynolds KIA, Hancock & Sickles WIA)

– Strategic: South ejected from North, never to return

• Major post-battle questions:– Was major opportunity to destroy Lee’s army missed?– Would Lee’s destruction have ended war?

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Chattanooga Campaign- Prelude

• Commanders’ strengths & weaknesses:– Bragg: Good tactician but seemly unable to follow

through • Also not in full command of subordinates

• (Who all like confidence in their Commander)

– Rosecrans: cautious & plodding• Tends toward overconfidence when committed

• Uneven in temperament in a crisis

• Force dispositions:– Bragg : 66K => reinforced: splits into two wings

– Rosecrans: 56K

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Chattanooga CampaignDeployment Overview

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Chattanooga Campaign-Battle of Chickamauga

• Rosecrans is convinced Bragg is retreating– Aggressively pursues– Splits forces into columns

& deploys over Georgia’s mountainous terrain

• Bragg seizes opportunity & attacks 1 Union corps– Feds wage good defense– Rosecrans plugs holes– Then fateful error=>

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“Rock of Chickamauga”• Major tactical defeat for Union

– Entire right wing of Rosecrans’ line crumbles in disarray– Rosecrans flees the field all the way back to Chattanooga

• MG Thomas rallies Left Wing of Union forces and holds on Snodgrass Hill (“Rock of Chickamauga”)– Then makes orderly withdrawal back to Chattanooga lines

• Bragg begins siege of Chattanooga– Pinches off Union supply LOC– Rosecran’s army being starved into crisis– But Bragg is roundly criticized for not exploiting his victory

• Lincoln turns to Grant-assigned command of all of West– Visits Chattanooga, takes charge, restores “cracker line”– Relieves Rosecrans & replaces with him with Thomas– Reinforces Grant with two corps from Meade

• Deploy 1200 miles by rail

• Grant organizes forces to break out of Bragg’s siege– Relies on his faithful subordinate Sherman

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Chattanooga Campaign-Force Disposition prior to Grant’s Breakout

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Battle of Missionary Ridge

• Grant’s arrival imbue new spirit in Union forces at Chattanooga– By late Fall ready to attack– 24-25 Nov conduct series of

assaults aimed at break out

• MG Thomas ordered to attack center & hold at bottom of Missionary Ridge– But his troops still smarting

over defeat at Chickamauga

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Battle of Missionary Ridge

• Thomas’ limited attack turns into full frontal assault at Bragg’s center– Union troops fight

their way up ridge– Bragg’s forces flee in

disarray

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Battle of Missionary Ridge- results• Reason for successful Union attack:

– Poor Rebel disposition on ridge• Situated on top of geographic crest

vice military crest (?)*

• Rebel line of fire blocked (how?) while Union troops used terrain

– Rocky terrain and crevices provided ?__________

– Too few Rebels placed at foot of ridge to stop assault• Forced defenders at top to hold fire as friendly troops retreated

• Also Bragg failed to pursue Rosecrans after Chickamauga – Mismanaged siege of Chattanooga & allowed Grant to restore

situation to Union’s favor

• Union tactical victory with strategic impact– Grant secured permanent Union hold on gateway to South

– South’s heartland now open to Union attack

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Assessment• By 1863 - South’s Battle Losses totaled 66K veterans• South tactical losses translated into key strategic defeat

– Losses the South can not replace!– Loss of motivated, combat hardened veterans– Manpower stretched beyond South’s capacity

• NorthNorth: Time was on the Union’s side– Plenty of reserves available - to include willing African Americans– Economic & industrial power finally fully mobilized– Generals get better: Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Hancock, Reynolds, Buford

• South’s defeat at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, & Chattanooga:– Marked major strategic turning point of the war– Generated crisis of confidence throughout South (historical debate):

• Most say eventual defeat as inevitable• Nobody wanted to be the last to die for lost cause• Result: desertions escalated

• It would soon get much worse as Grant took overall Command– Sherman’s march of Total War to the Sea

Back-up Slides

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Two American Societies at War • Define Total War

– Simply stated: everything is considered a target!

• North’s Grand Strategy by mid-1863?– South’s war economy targeted– Population demoralization- civilian property hit

• Mobilization & various approaches to achieving:– Conscription & its mixed success– Political costs high-

• South: “Rich man’s war and poor man’s fight”

• Results: Draft evasion, riots, unfair burden

• Future Lessons Learned (L/L) for WWI

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War Economy mobilization • South: less effective:

– Highly centralized economic control:• Government runs almost everything (Very inefficient)

– Tax revenue only 5% of that required (1/2 of 1% tax)– Barrow & print $$$ => 9000% inflation & high debt

• North: more effective:– Decentralized economic control:– Private enterprise runs most everything (some corrupt)– Government manages & encourage BZ’s cooperation;– Tax revenue provides 21% of that required– SECTREAS Chase effective manager of North’s $$;– Lincoln promoted Bz cooperation w/Gov. (or else- rail)

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Western Theater

• Meanwhile – other operations initially conducted in the West had little significant strategic impact on the war

• Grant’s first overland campaign to capture Vicksburg had to be abandoned when his LOCs are attacked by Van Dorn at Holly Springs & Bedford Forrest to the NE– Leaving Sherman unsupported & ultimately repulsed at

Chickasaw Bluffs

• Bragg’s raids into Kentucky & Tennessee end with limited tactical success & little strategic relevance – Culminating in little more than a tactical draw against

Rosecrans at the Battle of Stones River (Murfreesboro)

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Grant’s Overland Campaign to Vicksburg

• Long LOC (via rail) vulnerable to cavalry raids– Van Dorn’s attack at Holly

Springs– Bedford Forrest to NE

• Grant forced to abandon campaign when LOC cut off– Subsists off land => key

Lessons Learned (LL)

• Sherman left unsupported at Chickasaw Bluffs:– Soundly repulsed by

Vicksburg’s defenders– It’s back to “drawing board”

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Battle of Stones River (Murfreesboro) • Execution: 31 Dec 1862

– Bragg anticipates Rosecrans – Attacks Union’s right flank at

dawn exploiting tactical surprise – Surprised Union troops on right

collapsed into closed “jackknife” like defensive stance

• 2 Jan 1863: Bragg then attacks Union left across Stones River – Union holds & its arty decimates

Rebel attack– Bragg forced to withdraw 30

miles SE to Tullahoma

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Assessment: Stalemate & Contributing Factors

• Geography:– Virginia: numerous rivers & creeks (spring rains)

• Difficult to maneuver & deploy forces rapidly (time)

– Western Theater: greater distances:• Stretch out Lines of Communication & supply;

• Overland LOCs (rr) especially vulnerable to attack:

• Grant’s Overland Campaign to Vicksburg– Example: Van Dorn at Holly Springs & Bedford Forrest to NE

• Different fighting capacities & trade-offs:– North: Mpw, Logistic/supply, $$$ & industrial power– South: Well led & motivated troops, aggressive tactics

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Assessment –Toward Total War• Contrasting perspectives:

– Federal view: South’s determined resistance surprising

– McClellan’s theory: small Southern elite were main culprits

– Grant: Surprise assault at Shiloh proved otherwise:• Especially after Union victories at Forts Henry & Donelson

• Peninsula Campaign convinced the rest of North – long war

– Total War now appeared unavoidable

• Grand Strategy required major revision for Total War:– Southern society must now be changed by force;

– North must overthrow South’s entire way of life;

• Total War requires new & harsher tactics:– Seize & destroy property, crops, & all material support;

– Destroy industry & towns & RR, & treat civilians as enemy