1. PREFACE 1.01. Post-Colonial States of Southern Africa in the New Millennium Almost half a

1. PREFACE

1.01. Post-Colonial States of Southern Africa in the New Millennium

Almost half a century after their liberation from colonial domination, Southern

African states experience an ongoing process of political crisis of legitimacy

combined with weak economic performance and uneven development, and suffer

from a deep and persistent malaise characterised by the whole range of socio-

economic problems. Large segments of the society are affected by unemployment in

formal sector of economy and by acute poverty, and the states fail to deliver basic

services. The public administration is inefficient, the states are unable to effectuate

control over the society despite repressive measures, there is no rule of law and the

basic human rights are frequently abused1.

Since the beginning of the new millennium, the medial and academic attention

to Southern Africa’s politics and development increased, particularly in last two or

three years. The year 2005 has been frequently called as the Year of Africa,

following the Live 8 gathering, Make Poverty History campaign and G8 summit in

July 2005, the developed world leaders such as Tony Blair and Gordon Brown’s

various high profiles initiatives on aid and debt, World Trade Organisation

developmental round in Dauha and visible non-governmental assistance present

everywhere2.

Various attempts have been made in order to define the most adequate theory

of African development and underdevelopment, and to prescribe the most efficient

strategy of development. In the framework of the African continent, it is the

Southern African conjuncture which is shaping the whole discourse and which

serves as a test case for formulated theories. The main focus in the developmental

debate has been on the institution of state. Scholars agree on that the Southern

African states reveal significant failures, but they differ in opinion of whether

internal or external forces constrain the efficient governance in the region and they

propose different solutions to the twin crises in which the Southern African states

1 Azarya, V. (1988) Reordering State-Society Relations: Incorporation and Disengagement. Introduction to

Rothchild, D nad Chazan, N The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa (available on

www.ukzn.ac.za/politics : Howard College, online resources, politics 2B, Southern Africa). 2 Brown, W. (2007) Debating the Year of Africa. Review of African Political Economy. pp 11-27

Lebeda, P (2005) Ohlédnutí za rokem 2005 v rozvojové problematice. Mezinárodní Politika (prosinec).

currently are. They observe that the Southern African states are currently unable to

embark on sustainable development, but they disagree on how and by whom the

state and governance should be made more efficient in order to work to the

satisfaction of basic needs of the population in the region. Many elaborate

explanations of the regional malaise have been published and the chances of

misunderstanding the topic are excellent.

1.02. Outlining the Thesis

For the purposes of this paper, the state will be defined as a political entity dealing

with a set of crises to which it is confronted all through its existence3. An efficient

leadership must solve the crisis of identity: establish the sense of common

nationhood, the crisis of legitimacy: convince the citizens of the state and the

international society about the legitimacy of its structures and policies, the crisis of

penetration: penetrate the society geographically and socially by organs of

administration, facilities and infrastructure, the crisis of participation: integrate the

society into the functioning of the state and civil society, and the crisis of distribution:

ensure the proper redistribution of wealth and resources among its citizens4. Using

this definition, the Southern African states classify as failing most of the challenges

outlined above and consequently as examples of inefficient or bad governance.

Using some of the theoretical material available on post-colonial states in Africa,

this paper is seeking to explore the causes of the underdevelopment which are

common to Southern African post-colonial states, and compare the proposed

solutions across the theoretical spectre. In my paper, I seek to illustrate the idea that

not only the governance itself but essentially the views on governance are culture-

specific, the common sense among Southern African political, academic and civil

society elites being predominantly left-wing in their search for the main causes of the

regional malaise. From this point of view it will be interesting to compare how

different articles of different magazines such as the Review of African Political

Economy, the Journal of African Studies, the Historical Materialism, the International

Affairs, the Global Dialogue etc. which comment on issues of Southern African

governance, reflect different theoretical background of their authors. Academic

3 Hague, R & Harrop, M (2004) Comparative Government and Politics. Palgrave Macmilan, Basingstoke. 4 Hague, R & Harrop, M (2004) Comparative Government and Politics. Palgrave Macmilan, Basingstoke.

resources published in Southern African region are usually very critical towards

outside forces such as international economic regimes which are seen as significantly

constraining the regional development, while journals published elsewhere, in Europe

or US, emphasize proper explanations of how the global economy works before

accusing the imperialist system of pressuring the region down. In my paper, I will

evaluate different views on why the Southern African state fails to perform its basic

functions.

1.03. Specifying the Region

The concept of “Southern Africa” encompasses different countries according to

whether one seeks for geographical, socio-cultural, or eco-political definitions. In

academic debate, the Southern African countries are usually the countries regrouped

in SADC Treaty: these are - on the map coming from the geographical South - South

Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi,

Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), Mauritius and

Seychelles5. The space allowed for this paper is not broad enough to pay necessary

attention to all fourteen case-studies. Consequently, the examples illustrating the

outlined points will be drawn from case studies of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique,

Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, which were selected as the most

representatives to the points explained in the paper. However, this paper is primarily

seeking for generalisations, and the conclusions formulated in the paper are valid,

with local-specific variations, for the region as a whole.

5 McGowan P.J. and Ahwireng-Obeng F. (1998) Partner or Hegemon? South Africa in Africa. Parts 1 and 2.

Journal of Contemporary African studies, Volume 16 Nos. 1 and 2, January and July 1998.

2. UNDERSTANDING REGIONAL CONTEXT

The countries of Southern Africa, with which we deal in this paper, have the

colonial past. South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Namibia have been

under British rule, Angola and Mozambique under Portuguese rule6. Current attempts

to create peace, democracy and development have been conditioned by the

inheritance of the past, but it is a question to what extent the colonial past represents

an insurmountable obstacle for development. The relationship of past to present is a

complex one, and both past and present have been an arena of contest, on political

and intellectual scene. Some of the scholars participating in the discussion of the

contemporary politics in Southern Africa are convinced about that the legacies of the

past can be surmounted by the effective governance, and often use the examples of

the newly industrialised countries to illustrate the idea. They argue that it is not

possible to explain all the symptoms of the malaise of the (Southern) African

countries by colonialism. Others argue that contemporary structure of the governance

contains the legacies of the past, and that what worked in other countries would not

work in the (Southern) African context, because of unfavourable economic and

political settings and historical divisions of power which exist in the region. Before

we go into this discussion, a critical understanding of the events which came out of

the independence period is necessary.

2.01. Early Post-Independence as the Democratization Honeymoon

The early post-independence period was characterised by a honeymoon

democratization efforts by the new governments. At the time of decolonisation, in the

1960s, Almond’s structural functionalist theory was on the rise and there was a

widespread consensus about the universal applicability of the modern state

institutions7. The common sense was that the states perform comparable functions

6 Namibia was shortly German, in 1884-1915 as Deutsch- Südwestafrika. Then it passed under British control

and after 1948, when South Africa got independence, it passed under its mandate as de facto South African

colony.

Melber, H (2003) From Controlled Change to Changed Control: the Case of Namibia. Journal of

Contemporary African Studies 21/2 pp 266-284. 7 Randall, V (2005) Analytical Approaches to the Study of Politics in the Developing World

(in) Burnell, P & Randall, V: Politics in Developing World, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

across cultural contexts. For the developing countries, the path of development was

through imitating the development of the Western world8.

The honeymoon period was present in different countries of the region in different

forms and periods, in Namibia for example, the independence came in 1990 only and

the honeymoon democratization was supervised by UN because of the involvement of

the country into Angolan civil war9. In former Portugal colonies Angola and

Mozambique, the independence was accompanied by the intense bloodshed and long-

term civil war, and the honeymoon period of democratization was thus absent until

the end of the millennium, too10.

Classical examples of a honeymoon democratization period are the Zambian and

Zimbabwean post-independence period. Zambian independence in 1964, for example,

was a negotiated transfer, accompanied by promises of good governance and respect

towards democratic principles and human rights11. Similarly, Zimbabwean

independence in 1980 was accompanied by guarantees of political and economic

rights for all the citizens. The leaders of the resistance movement agreed on basic

principles of democratic governance prior to elections in 1980. They agreed to

comply with the pre-independence arrangements, to abide by the cease-fire

agreement, to campaign peacefully and without intimidation, to renounce the use of

force for political ends, to accept the outcome of the elections and instruct any forces

under their authority to do the same12. When ZANU-PF won the elections, Robert

Mugabe - the new Zimbabwean president - was celebrated as a new type of African

leader: an educated, experienced, respectful and trustworthy politician. Even though

70% of arable lands were in the full control of only 4 000 descendants of white

settlers in 1980, it was agreed that the land reform will follow a priori agreed

principles and that the land owned for more than 10 years will not be expropriated.

The land reform was supposed to progress according to “willing buyer, willing seller”

principle in which case both the British and American governments offered to buy

8 Randall, V (2005) Analytical Approaches to the Study of Politics in the Developing World

(in) Burnell, P & Randall, V: Politics in Developing World, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 9 Birmingham, D (1993) Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique (available on

www.ukzn.ac.za/politics : Howard College, online resources, politics 2B, Southern Africa). 10 Birmingham, D (1993) Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique (available on

www.ukzn.ac.za/politics : Howard College, online resources, politics 2B, Southern Africa). 11 Barlett, D (2001) Human Rights, Democracy and Donors: The First MMD Government in Zambia.

Review on African Political Economy. 12 Ojukwu, H (2007) Zimbabwe: Who Is to Blame? Uhuru Spirit: A Frontline Africa Publication. May-June

2007 (available also on www.frontline.org)

land from willing white settlers. According to the Independence Constitution, it was

guaranteed that the minorities, included the white citizens, will get representation in

parliament for another 7 years from the year of independence, and that the party

government will supervise the functioning of multiparty democracy. 20% of the seats

in parliament were reserved for whites. The army was supposed to be reintegrated

into the society. Mugabe leadership was inheriting the settlers state with important

parts of economy owned by foreign capital, and was convincing the white settlers to

stay in Zimbabwe with the famous motto: “Let’s do it together!”13

2.02. Modernization Rejected

The democratization, introduced in early post-independence period, was not

successful in any of the countries. The political structures in Africa being so divergent

from the Weberian model of rational-legal leadership of Western state, the Almond’s

theory of the universality of the state functions was submitted to intense criticism, in

the region but also in broader international debate. The concept of democratization

was rejected as Western concept inadequate to African context, and replaced by

policies of robust Africanization run by radical one-party governments such as MPLA

in Angola, Frelimo in Mozambique, SWAPO in Namibia, UNIP in Zambia, and

ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe. The authoritarian style of governance and the state-led

grand socio-economic projects of development were declared as more suitable for

African context14.

For example, Zambia became a one-party state in 1972, and the party-government

UNIP adopted radical zambianisation and nationalisation of Zambian copper mines.

The state became a major employer. In 1978 for example, the state controlled about

80% of the economy and about 75% of all the wage workers. The private sector was

almost eradicated; all the business was done by the members of the ruling party15. In

Mozambique, Frelimo acquired the power in 1974 without elections or any kind of

transition pact after dissolution of the weak Portuguese rule, under the motto: Don’t

13 Bush, R & Szeftel, M (2002) Sovereignty, Democracy & Zimbabwe’s Tragedy. Review on African Political

Economy. 14 Zack-Williams, AB. (2001) No Democracy, No Development: Reflections on Democracy and

Development in Africa. Review of African Political Economy. No 88 volume 28. p 216 15 Barlett, D (2001) Human Rights, Democracy and Donors: The First MMD Government in Zambia.

Review on African Political Economy.

panic, we are in charge!”16 Frelimo leadership introduced massive large scale

nationalisation in Marxist-Leninist style under the title the “People’s Power”.

Frelimo, as Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, imposed the ideology on people, and

aspired to reorganise the society and economy through central planning, state

intervention and ever-present comradeship17.

2.03. Towards the Twin-Crises of Post-Colonial Governance

However, one or two decades later, the results of the great mission of post-colonial

governments have been deplorable for the majority of people in the region. The top-

down grand projects of development have failed to incorporate the mass of

unemployed into formal exchange economy, and the governments soon lacked

sufficient financial basis to ensure the sustainable development.

For example, during 1980s in Mozambique, the society and economy collapsed

due to inefficient rural strategy which was a disaster. The nationalisation of land, state

farming and hi-tech mechanisation was introduced without proper know-how and

without respect towards what the ordinary people were able to manage. White settlers

left the country with their capital and skills. Very soon, the machines and tractors in

the state farms were broken, agriculture supplies collapsing, the irrigation systems

insufficient for extensive state farming. Serious destabilization has been accompanied

by intensification of civil war with opposition guerrilla forces Renamo, in the second

half of 1980s. State lost control over the economy, large segments of the society

passed into the black market sector, avoiding cash exchanges. The currency

devaluated, in the shops there were no commodities and the population suffered from

food shortages. The state authority lost the influence over the citizens, including the

inhabitants of the rural areas, and the Catholic Church remained the only force

capable of any organisation of the society18.

At the same time, Zambia faced a similar crisis. In 1970s, the prices of copper fell

down on the world market. This seriously damaged the Zambian economy, which is

from the large part based on the exports of copper. The state continued borrowing

money from various state and non-state donors, but found itself heavily indebted

16 Grest, J (1995) Out of the Ashes. Indicator Vol 12 No 2. University of KwaZulu-Natal. 17 Grest, J (1995) Out of the Ashes. Indicator Vol 12 No 2. University of KwaZulu-Natal. 18 Grest, J (1995) Out of the Ashes. Indicator Vol 12 No 2. University of KwaZulu-Natal.

without any chance to repay the loans back, at the beginning of 1980s. Half of the

population passed into the informal sector of economy, rate of unemployment reached

40%; only 10% worked in the formal sector. The capacity of state was undermined by

widespread corruption, money laundering affected 32% of the economy19.

In Zimbabwe, the crisis was not evident before the very end of the 20 century. The

crisis in Zimbabwe is difficult to evaluate because many of the commentaries

available on contemporary Zimbabwe’s politics are biased. According to the

discourse of the international community, the suffering is widespread because of the

irresponsible and coercive policies of Mugabe’s government. South African press, for

example, often report that the unemployment in the formal sector is higher than 80%,

there is an enormous inflation, the money is practically useless, and there are food

shortages due to failed harvests as consequence of forced land seizures20. 5 million of

people need food relieves to prevent the starvation. The country has drawn into

widespread crisis accompanied by lack of democracy, lack of the rule of law, absence

of the civil society and of the respect towards human rights. Courts are purged of

independent judges, media is controlled by the ZANU-PF, independent press is being

crushed, and the opposition is violently repressed. There is a mass migration from

Zimbabwe, for example about 2,3 million of Zimbabweans, from 13 million in total,

are currently to be found in neighbouring South Africa21.

On the other hand, the followers of the discourse of ZANU-PF - and they are

many in the region - argue that some kind of pain is inevitable in order to finish the

liberation from the trap of international regimes. The unfinished business of the

liberation struggle has some additional economic costs in the short-term but will bring

widespread social welfare in the long-term. They argue that the reports of the press

which is available in the West or in South Africa are biased and that the only thing

which undermines the efficiency of the ZANU-PF governance are the sanctions

imposed on Zimbabwe by the Western world22.

To put it right, on one hand there is definitely no freedom of expression in

19 Barlett, D (2001) Human Rights, Democracy and Donors: The First MMD Government in Zambia.

Review on African Political Economy. 20 Sachikonye, LM (2002) Whither Zimbabwe? Crisis & Democratisation. Review on African Political

Economy no 91 volume 29. 21 Ojukwu, H (2007) Zimbabwe: Who Is to Blame? Uhuru Spirit: A Frontline Africa Publication. May-June

2007 (available also on www.frontline.org) 22 Ojukwu, H (2007) Zimbabwe: Who Is to Blame? Uhuru Spirit: A Frontline Africa Publication. May-June

2007 (available also on www.frontline.org)

Zimbabwe and the penetration of the society by secret police is high. Both paper

money and coins are useless and key sections of the formal sector of economy such as

banking, services, and cell phone networks are not working. Commodities which are

used for daily consumption by the majority of Zimbabweans, such as flour, icing

sugar, cooking oil and rice, are hardly to be found in shops, because of the sanctions

imposed on Zimbabwe by Western importers. On the other hand, the people are not

hungry, as they can get necessary groceries in some of the shopping centres, on the

black market, or bring them from the neighbouring countries, particularly South

Africa. The people make their own bread and use their own fruit and vegetables,

which is permanently present in the gardens, thanks to Zimbabwean climate which

remains warm for the whole year. Unlike in for example South Africa, there are very

few homeless or hungry people in the streets, there is no crime, the transport system

is working better than in South Africa, and general atmosphere is very peaceful. The

headlines such as “No more toilet paper in Zimbabwe!” or “Trees Cut for Firewood in

Zimbabwe”! which are frequently to be found in South African newspapers, are

exaggerated23.

The evaluation of the crisis in Zimbabwe remains controversial though, and we

will come back to it later in the paper, as the crisis is currently of high regional and

international importance. For this part of the paper, we can conclude that about

twenty years from their independence, the Southern African post-colonial states were

facing the twin crises: firstly, the economic crisis characterised by collapsing

infrastructure, deteriorating standards of living, and increasing socio-economic

uncertainty, and secondly, political crisis of the legitimacy of the one-party

governments characterised by popular protests and intensified political violence in

Mozambique and Angola24. In other words, the Southern African states failed to deal

with the crises of identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation and distribution in

key sectors of the economy and society.

23 Examples of such articles available for example on http://zimbabwe-everyday.blogspot.com/2007/10/from-

news-zim-runs-out-of-toilet-paper.html or http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/Zimbabwe/0,,2-11-

1662_2208020,00.html 24 Zack-Williams, AB. (2001) No Democracy, No Development: Reflections on Democracy and

Development in Africa. Review of African Political Economy. No 88 volume 28. p 219

3. STATE AND GOVERNANCE IN THEORIES

3.01. Neo-Patrimonialist States

As the twin crises of the Southern African post-colonial states intensified in 1980s,

various state failure theories appeared to explain the causes of the malaise25. One of

the most influential was the theory of neo-patrimonialism. According to this theory,

the African post-colonial states fail because of the nature of their leadership. The

African nationalism never articulated or accepted a constrained conception of

political power. The liberation movements became party governments, but did not

manage to transform themselves from hierarchical, authoritarian, militaristic, violent,

repressive, vertical and undemocratic movements into real governments. Whether the

UNIP state apparatus in Zambia, the Frelimo government in Mozambique, the

ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, the MPLA administration in Angola, they all became

repressive and authoritarian after a short honeymoon democratization period. They

carried in themselves the very same essential elements against which they protested,

and the legacies of colonial systems reproduced themselves through these one-party

governments26.

The leadership in African countries remained traditional and patrimonial, with

some aspects of modern legal-rational leadership27. The formal structure of the state

is bureaucratic rather than tribal, but the state officials are dependent on their clients

by personal ties rather than autonomous. Written law and formal procedures of

recruitment of state officials exist, but the law enforcement and the promotion

procedures are patrimonialized and corrupted. African rulers are basically unable to

be independent of their communities, and the public administration works on the

basis of clientelism, tribalism and corruption. The distinction between public and

private and between political and economic is not respected. Powerful means

25 Hyden, G. (1996) Rethinking Theories of the State: an Africanist Perspective. Africa Insight Vol 26, 26

no 1 (available on www.ukzn.ac.za/politics : Howard College, online resources, politics 2B, Southern Africa). 26 Freeman, L (2005) South Africa’s Zimbabwe Policy: Unravelling the Contradictions. Journal of

Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 23 No. 2 pp 147-172, p168. 27 Médard, JF (1982), Patrimonialism, Neo-Patrimonialism and Post-Colonial State in Subsaharian Africa

(in) Clapham, C. (ed.), Private Patronage and Public Power. Political Clientelism in the Modern State. New

York: St. Martin's Press.

wealthy and wealthy means powerful28.

In other words, in neo-patrimonial systems of Southern Africa, the state has not

been institutionalised; it has not been structurally differentiated from the society29.

That is due to imperfect bureaucratization of African societies under colonial rule.

The bureaucratization of African societies under colonial rule was run at the lowest

possible costs for the colonial powers; the penetration of the societies by the Western

legal rational model was incomplete, and Western autonomous state was not

pervasive enough. Consequently, the African cultural traditions of personalized

nature of prestige, status and power are now coming out30.

According to the theoreticians of neopatrimonialism, neopatrimonialism is the key

obstacle for progress in Southern African post-colonial states. The key conditions for

development in post-colonial states in Southern Africa are: firstly, the emancipation

of existing political structures from the society, secondly, the establishment of

independent bureaucracy, in which the professional competence will matter more

than the clientelist relationships, and thirdly, the emergence of citizenship identity,

binding individuals directly to the state, above and beyond the ties of kinship

community or faction31.

These conditions are, however, unlikely to occur any time soon, as the neo-

patrimonial systems work on a basis that is highly advantageous and efficient for their

elites. For these elites, the state is the most useful when it is the least institutionalised,

that is what Chabal and Daloz call political instrumentalization of disorder32. The

leaders of the Southern African post-colonial states enjoy the disorder of the twin-

crises. It allows them to plunder public resources in order to enrich themselves, to

28 Médard, JF (1982), Patrimonialism, Neo-Patrimonialism and Post-Colonial State in Subsaharian Africa

(in) Clapham, C. (ed.), Private Patronage and Public Power. Political Clientelism in the Modern State. New

York: St. Martin's Press. 29 Chabal, P and Daloz JP (1999), Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Introduction: The Question

of Analysis, and Chapter 1 W(h)ither the State? (available on www.ukzn.ac.za/politics : Howard College, online

resources, politics 2B, Southern Africa). 30 Chabal, P and Daloz JP (1999), Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Introduction: The Question






resources, politics 2B, Southern Africa).

remain in power for the prolonged presidential periods, and thus avoid the

responsibility for the abuse of human rights of which they are guilty33.

For example, Angolan president Dos Santos effectively instrumentalized the chaos

brought by long-running war with UNITA movement, in order to accumulate wealth

coming from the oil industry. His government is the oligarchy of vast corruption,

which has special interest in the maintenance of the permanent crisis management34.

The presidency of Mozambican and Namibian leaders Chissano and Nujoma can be

described in similar terms35. The most extreme case is the pre-eminence of Robert

Mugabe in the presidential office in Zimbabwe, since 1980. Mugabe has been in

power for 27 years now, catching up with Kenneath Kaunda’s 27-years long UNIP

rule in Zambia in 1964-199136.

3.02. Weak States

Furthermore, the Southern-African post-colonial states face the twin crises

because they are weak37. According to Jackson, the weak states such as Angola or

Mozambique, but also Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe work on the basis of their

own logics. This logic, in Chabal and Daloz’ term the political instrumentalization of

disorder, is in its extreme form aimed at the maintenance of permanent crisis and of

war economies. This strategy is profitable, but highly risky, as the breakdown and the

eruption of conflict is likely in the weak states, as direct result of particular form of

politics of the weak states38.

The weak states essentially lack an effective government; the system of law

enforcement is underdeveloped, and the state institutions are unprofessionalized and

unreliable. The governments operate in the context of disorder, corruption and

33 Szeftel, M. (2000) Between Governance and Underdevelopment: Accumulation and Africa’s

‘Catastrophic Corruption‘. Review on African Political Economy. Volume 27, No 84. 34 Szeftel, M. (2000) Between Governance and Underdevelopment: Accumulation and Africa’s

‘Catastrophic Corruption‘. Review on African Political Economy. Volume 27, No 84. 35 Szeftel, M. (2000) Between Governance and Underdevelopment: Accumulation and Africa’s

‘Catastrophic Corruption‘. Review on African Political Economy. Volume 27, No 84. 36 Good, K (2003) Democracy and the Control of Elites (available on

www.ukzn.ac.za/politics : Howard College, online resources, politics 2B, Southern Africa). 37 Nettl, JP (1968) The State as a Conceptual Variable. World Politics. 38 Jackson, R (2002) Violent Internal Conflict and the African State: Towards a Framework of Analysis,

Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Vol 20, No 1, pp 29-52.

administrative lethargy39. The weak states are fragile towards internal and external

shocks, and permeable and manipulable by external forces such as international

capitalists, entrepreneurs, eventually regional warlords etc. They are characterised by

a blurred line between economic malaise, organised crime, war and large scale human

rights violations. The governments of the weak states tend to loose the legitimacy in

political struggles and civil wars. According to these characteristics, the most

spectacular examples of weak states in the region are Mozambique and Angola. There

the state weakness was product of the messy style of Portuguese colonial rule, and

resulted not only in deep socio-economic malaise, but in ceasefire-wartime cycles and

the fragile systems of temporary semi-state collapse, in Angola in 1974-2002 and

Mozambique in 1976-199240.

According to Jackson, the weak states lack the empirical basis: they rarely have a

monopoly of force over their territory and population and they rarely exercise

efficient organization and jurisdiction over the population in the given territory41. The

rival units such as UNITA in Angola or Renamo in Mozambique have or have had

control over parts of the territory and population by their own means of force. In

addition, the Southern African states are economically dependent on semi-

peripherical South Africa and the core international economy. In Jackson’s theory,

the African weak states persist only as juridical states on the basis of international

recognition42.

3.03. Spoils Politics Systems

Alternatively, Allen has described the current Southern African post-colonial

states as spoils politics systems43. These are characterised by massive corruption,

concentration of wealth around tinny elites, its political supporters and external

bodies like trans-national corporations, the withdrawal by state from services and

39Jackson, R and Rosberg, C (1982) Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in

the Statehood. World Politics. 40 Jackson, R (2002) Violent Internal Conflict and the African State: Towards a Framework of Analysis,

Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Vol 20, No 1, pp 29-52. 41 Jackson, R and Rosberg, C (1982) Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in

the Statehood. World Politics. 42 Jackson, R and Rosberg, C (1982) Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in

the Statehood. World Politics. 43 Allen, C (1999), Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse in Africa. Review on African Political

Economy. Volume 26, No 81.

functions such as health, roads, education, economic management, law, order and

justice etc., the withdrawal from state by citizens, for example from tax payment and

obedience to law and central authority, by the organisation of chaos and disorder,

monopolisation of power, and at the same time the erosion of control over use of

force44.

The prolonged spoils systems may work for even twenty years or more, but are

likely to result in the state collapse characterised by disappearance of state functions

and offices in even very basic activities such as central security or banking, the

abusive behaviour of the remaining institutions, usually the police and the army, and

by the contraction or fragmentation of the central authority. The state collapse is

accompanied by the collapse of formal economy and social institutions. Prolonged

spoils are best visible on Mozambique and Angola in their wartime again, when the

violence became an endemic feature of the politics45.

3.04. An Eye on Contemporary Neo-liberal Strategy

Since the state failures and spoils politics intensified in 1980s, the Southern

African post-colonial states have abandoned the attempts to transform the productive

structures of Southern Africa in their own style, and they have adopted the Western

neo-liberal approach to development, which focuses on gradual trade liberalisation,

establishment of market-oriented economies, limited role of the regional

organisations and states in promoting development and on the dominant role of

private sector46. The question of universality of the Euro-Atlantic model of the state,

or of the meaningful application of its parts in the regional context has thus regained

its prominence in the regional political and economic debate.

This tendency reflects the changes on international scene: the end of the Cold War,

the collapse of communism and the victory of liberalism represented by the concept

of new world order and the proceeding globalisation. Since 1980s, the neo-liberal

approach has been driven through the structural adjustment programmes, supervised

44 Allen, C (1999), Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse in Africa. Review on African Political

Economy. Volume 26, No 81. 45 Allen, C (1999), Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse in Africa. Review on African Political

Economy. Volume 26, No 81. 46 Pallotti, A (2004) SADC: A Development Community without a Development Policy? Review of African

Political Economy Vol 31. No. 101 pp 513-531

by International Monetary Fund and foreign donors providing financial assistance to

the region. Throughout 1990s and the beginning of new millennium, the SADC

integration and development policy has consequently fallen into line with the

approach of international financial institutions47. Southern African governments are

now adopting less confrontational attitudes towards demands for political and

economic liberalisation, through programmes such as GEAR in South Africa or

NEPAD in the whole region48.

Neoliberal model of governance in Southern African regions has been intensively

debated across political/economic, public/private, regional/international spectre

among leaders, politicians, developmental scholars and economists. Their views

differ according to their occupation, to where they come from and whose interests

they defend. Some agree with the current settings of the international relations,

describing the World Trade Organisation system as a unique regime, for which there

is no alternative on global scale, and from which all sides can profit49. Such scholars

argue that the development in the framework of the World Trade Organisation is

possible, as the examples of newly industrialised countries have shown50. The

contours of this neoliberal consensus were famously identified by Tony Blair in 2001:

“On our side, provide more aid ...write off debts, help with good governance...access

to our markets...on the African side, true democracy, no more excuses for

dictatorship, abuses of human rights, no tolerance of bad governance, proper

commercial, financial and legal systems”51. Blair’s conception is basically promoting

revisited ideas of the modernization school, saying that the development of the region

is possible, in case the governments will manage to co-opt the principles of modern

governance into their administrations52.

According to neo-liberals, it is not the liberal model itself which is crippling

towards the development of the regions, but the way the states in the region approach

the neoliberal systems53. They say that the global economy is a fact with which all

47 Pallotti, A (2004) SADC: A Development Community without a Development Policy? Review of African

Political Economy Vol 31. No. 101 pp 513-531 48 Brown, W. (2007) Debating the Year of Africa. Review of African Political Economy. pp 11-27 49 Vondrušková, B (2007) Světový obchod v minulosti a dnes. Mezinárodní politika (leden) 50 Foltýn, J (2007) Co sděluje tzv. nová geografie světového obchodu. Mezinárodní Politika (leden) 51 Brown, W. (2007) Debating the Year of Africa. Review of African Political Economy. pp 11-27 52 Brown, W. (2007) Debating the Year of Africa. Review of African Political Economy. pp 11-27 53 Gedlu, M (2006) Dobré vládnutí: nástroj účinného rozvoje, nebo kamufláž neoliberální strategie

závislosti? Mezinárodní politika (prosinec).

economies must deal, nobody can remain independent. The success of each particular

state depends on the way it approaches the international economic regime. They are

critical towards policies of Mugabe in Zimbabwe for example, as it reduces the credit

of the whole region and the attractiveness of the region for foreign investors. The

isolation form the international economic regime is neither possible nor desirable, as

it forces the states to rely on insufficient unsaturated and uncompetitive regional

markets54. There is no alternative for how to ensure economic growth other than the

integration into global economy and flexible reaction to the needs of global market55.

Neoliberalists advice the Southern African countries should revisit the role of state

in individual sections of the economy and society. The Southern African state has

been both strong and weak, but unfortunately in combinations that do not ensure

sustainable development. In Zimbabwe, the state there has been strong in penetration

of the society by secret police and coercive policies of ZANU-PF, but has been weak

in ensuring proper infrastructure, formation of social capital and civil society, proper

public administration and stability of the legal systems, which are necessary

conditions of an economic growth. The good governance, for neo-liberals, is a

necessary precondition of an economic growth56.

3.05. What is Neoliberalism?

The scholars regrouped around the Historical Materialism magazine have

approached the issue in an interesting way recently. They observed that the

neoliberalism serves as a touchstone by which almost everything – from the failings

of NEPAD, the Commission for Africa, Mbeki, and EU to the rise of populism and

authoritarianism and the absence of modern statehood in Africa - can be labelled.

Neoliberalism seems to encompass everything from modest changes to trade regimes

to a dismissal of the very possibility of capitalist development of Africa in the

54 World Bank (2007) Global Monitoring Report: Millennium Development Goals (pp 49-51 section

“Monitoring the Investment Climate”) available on

http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/04/11/000112742_2007041

1162802/Rendered/PDF/394730GMR02007.pdf 55 World Bank (2007) Global Monitoring Report: Millennium Development Goals (pp 51-55 section

“Monitoring Governance Trends”) available on

http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/04/11/000112742_2007041

1162802/Rendered/PDF/394730GMR02007.pdf 56 Fárek, J (2006) Brettonwoodské instituce v globalizovaném světovém hospodářství. Mezinárodní politika

(říjen)

foreseeable future. Consequently, there is a need for clarification and definition of

what is neoliberalism and how far we can label current regional and international

policies as neoliberal57.

In liberal theory, the markets have a positive influence over international relations.

They ensure that all sides profit from the exchange, as all sides specialise on exports

of what they can do the best, and they purchase the rest on the market58. The invisible

hand of the market is able to polish all misbalances in the international relations and

open the way for harmonious cooperation among countries. The neoliberal theory

similarly perceives the markets as positively contributing to peaceful and cooperative

international relations. The new element in the theory is the perception of the need for

the state regulation of the domestic environments in order to make them flexible and

sensitive towards the needs of global market, and of the global market through

international regimes59. The international regimes are supposed to regulate the

markets and the terms of trade in order to accommodate the comparative advantage of

the individual countries to ensure global welfare60. In the neoliberal paradigm, the

international institutions and regimes are product of long-term bargaining and

negotiations among countries and they represent a complex consensus which

facilitates international cooperation. Neo-liberals stress absolute gains from

international cooperation and they are concerned to maximise the total level of gain

for all parties61.

In the articles published in Historical Materialism, different scholars attempted to

answer whether the current international regimes of World Trade Organisation and

International Monetary Fund can be described as neoliberal or not. For example,

Idahosa and Shenton have concluded that current system is not neoliberal but

hypocritical. The neoliberal model is currently disturbed by protectionism of

developed economies, despite their liberalising rhetoric, and by corruption and

political authoritarianism on the African side62. The regional cooperation of SADC

57 Brown, W. (2007) Debating the Year of Africa. Review of African Political Economy. pp 11-27 58 Krpec, O (2007) WTO a liberální režim mezinárodního obchodu: liberální pohled. Mezinárodní politika

(leden). 59 Smith, S (1995) New Approaches to International Theory (in) Booth, K & Smith, S: International

relations Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity. 60 Smith, S (1995) New Approaches to International Theory (in) Booth, K & Smith, S: International

relations Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity. 61 Smith, S (1995) New Approaches to International Theory (in) Booth, K & Smith, S: International

relations Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity. 62 Idahosa, P.L.E. & Shenton, B. (2004) The Africanist’s New Clothes. Historical Materialism 12 (4) : 67-113.

countries cannot be described as neoliberal neither, as South Africa is employing

various protectionist measures in fragile sectors of the economy and is liberal only

when it is advantageous for Southern African businesses63.

To put it right, scholars publishing in Historical Materialism often write in neo-

marxist paradigm. They usually see the main bloc to modern state formation as

coming from outside, not inside. They say that the African states need space for

development, such as South-East Asia had, which they do not have because they are

incorporated into global neoliberal architecture in a specifically African way. They

emphasize critical understanding of historical legacies of Africa’s past and of the way

it is currently incorporated into world economy. It is a question how far the neoliberal

policies in the region represent the insurmountable barrier to the modern state

formation. Either way round, their approach is understandable if the local context is

taken into account, because the fact that people should die of hunger in the country of

significant surplus such as South Africa is intellectually absurd and morally repulsive

especially if the hunger is visible on every step64.

3.06. The Neoliberal Approach in Question

The evaluations of the international regimes thus vary, but in Southern African

context, the academic debate has been predominantly left-wing. It has been argued

that the neoliberal strategy has been defined by narrow group of people such as

western business executives, politicians, media correspondents, academic experts, top

and middle level management in foreign and domestic companies, senior business

leaders etc., in general by a privileged elite who drives the globalisation process,

lends money, conducts business and diplomatic activities, and profits from the

imperialist nature of the world system65.

It has been argued that in the context of uneven development in South African

post-colonial states, the neoliberal policies will not deliver any sustainable

development or improvement for the marginalised. On the contrary, it promotes the

polarisation of the relations among SADC members, and the situation in which

63 Clayton, P (1998) Is Regional Economic Integration a Good Idea? Indicator Vol. 15 No 2 64 Brown, W. (2007) Debating the Year of Africa. Review of African Political Economy. pp 11-27. 65 Szeftel, M. (2000), Between Governance and Underdevelopment: Accumulation and Africa’s

‘Catastrophic Corruption‘. Review on African Political Economy. Volume 27, No 84.

economically stronger members (South Africa) grow at the expense of others. It

reproduces the trajectories of trade and investment drawn by history, particularly the

dependency of the SADC members on South Africa and the international economy.

The market will not built necessary institutional capabilities for industrial

development, but rather lock the regions into structures of colonial period66.

Actually, the concept of the free trade serves as the mask for the promotion of the

interests of South African business elites. The liberalisation only proceeds when it is

advantageous for these elites. For example, the Zimbabwe textile industries were

seriously damaged by protectionist measures of South African government in the late

1990s. South African investment in Southern Africa is concentrated around small

number of large corporations in metal mining and minerals (77%), smaller share of

investment goes to banking, telecommunications, media, tourist related and financial

services, supermarkets and brewing. Mineral energy large-scale complexes such as

the ’Mozal Aluminium Smelter’ in Mozambique dominate South African interests,

there is no focus on local long-term development and local job creation67.

The liberalisation of trade in a region of strongly uneven development has brought

the isolation of the members in their competition for the best access to the largest and

the most diversified South African market. The regional development has become an

attempt for rapid transition of selected countries (South Africa) to the rich club. South

Africa acts as a selfish hegemon and as a sink for capital funds of the region. It works

as a semi-periphery, profiting from the transmission of the capital from the

peripheries (the rest of SADC) towards the core (world’s most powerful

economies)68. The consequence is the reproduction of the legacies of the past and of

unequal development in the region69.

3.07. State-Led Development as an Alternative?

On one hand, the rejection of the state in 1980s and the adoption of the market

66 Pallotti, A (2004) SADC: A Development Community without a Development Policy? Review of African

Political Economy Vol 31. No. 101 pp 513-531 67 Pallotti, A (2004) SADC: A Development Community without a Development Policy? Review of African


68 Wallerstein, I (2004) World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University

Press. 69 Pallotti, A (2004) SADC: A Development Community without a Development Policy? Review of African


approach towards development was understandable, in the light of the serious power

abuse by the one-party governments in the first decades of independence and the

internal and external pressures towards change. State was variously described as

vampire, repressive, authoritarian, inefficient, parasitic, patrimonial and rent-seeking

institution, and destatization was seen as a good plan which will liberate the free

entrepreunial potential of the civil society from the omnipresent and omnipotent

hostile state70.

However, in the framework of the criticism of contemporary neoliberal strategies

of development, many scholars have re-emphasized the crucial and positive role of

state in promoting development recently. The strengthening of state capacities, rather

than the neoliberal destatization, is seen as the solution for problems of Southern

African post-colonial states. In the context of regional underdevelopment, legacy of

colonialism, the nature of post-colonial mode of production, accumulation and

political mobilisation and the inherent fragility of post-colonial systems, the

neoliberal strategies do not ensure the general development71. In the struggle to

rebuild the nation-states, construct identities, build new platforms for inclusion of the

marginalized and for popular participation in politics, the state remains a critical

factor and actor, according to various contemporary scholars72.

For the advocates of an active role of states in the region, the state must be

sovereign to be able to promote the development. The question of the sovereignty of

African states is particularly hot, especially in the Southern African context, in the

light of the events concerning Zimbabwean land reform. The crisis in Zimbabwe

stands far beyond the country’s importance. The academic debate about the nature

and the extent of the violence that accompanied the land seizures and the character of

the land seizures themselves is very controversial. For many in the region, Mugabe

managed to challenge the imperatives of neoliberal architecture, in forms that do not

repeat regional historical failures. Mugabe has a lot of support among African leaders,

intellectuals, academic elites and grassroots opinion leaders outside Zimbabwe. Many

see him as a hero fighting the white oppressors. Black suffering accompanying his

70 Zack-Williams, AB. (2001) No Democracy, No Development: reflections on Democracy and Development

in Africa. Review of African Political Economy. No 88 volume 28. p 218 71 Hyden, G. (1996), Rethinking Theories of the State: an Africanist Perspective. Africa Insight Vol 26, 26

no 1 (available on www.ukzn.ac.za/politics : Howard College, online resources, politics 2B, Southern Africa). 72 Szeftel, M. (2000), Between Governance and Underdevelopment: Accumulation and Africa’s

‘Catastrophic Corruption‘. Review on African Political Economy. Volume 27, No 84.

policies is seen as inevitable in the final phase of anti-colonial struggle. Human rights

discourse is a Western one, a white one, and serves rich countries to control

international politics worldwide73. Many in the region interpret the land crisis as a

part of the process of primitive accumulation, and hence a prelude to a more equal

capitalist growth in Zimbabwe. These describe the land reform as democratization of

land and economy and as a defence of Zimbabwean sovereignty from global

capitalism74.

Evaluating the arguments of Mugabe’s supporters, the argument that the critics of

the land seizures were co-opted by global imperialism and that every country has

sovereignty and rights over the land within its borders is not defensible, in the light of

authoritarian policies of ZANU-PF. As David Moore put it, no democratic Marxists

could support ZANU-PF and its authoritarian policies, whether or not they resulted in

some kind of land revolution75. It is a question what the Southern African leaders

want and what would be the real solution for the twin crises, if isolation from the

international economy or greater incorporation into it. The neo-liberals say that no

state is sovereign in contemporary world economy, and that the incorporation into the

system is the only solution for the states to embark on the development76. In case the

state manages to catch up with the rhythm of the market, the neoliberal model does

not mean the irresponsible governance of the oligarchy and of the business elites, but

rather a positive stimulation of the industrial policies and the terms of trade77. The

key problem of the Southern African countries is not the lack of sovereignty, but the

unfortunate attitude of the governing elites towards challenges offered by the

international system. Unless the Southern African states change their economic

strategies towards more flexible forms, the development will not be stimulated. What

is needed is a set of strategic decisions concerning an efficient investment in

development of export sectors, the attraction of foreign investors, the establishment of

the trade relations with the major markets, and then the

73 Freeman, L (2005) South Africa’s Zimbabwe Policy: Unravelling the Contradictions. Journal of

Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 23 No. 2 pp 147-172 74 Brown, W. (2007) Debating the Year of Africa. Review of African Political Economy. pp 11-27. 75 Moore, D (2004) Marxism and Marxists Intellectuals in Schizophrenic Zimbabwe: How Many Rights for

Zimbabwean Left? A Comment. Historical Materialism 12 (4): 405-425. 76 Krpec, O (2007) WTO a liberální režim mezinárodního obchodu: liberální pohled. Mezinárodní

politika (leden). 77 International Monetary Fund (2007) World Economic Outlook: Globalization and Inequality. (Chapter 4

“Globalization and Inequality”) available on http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/pdf/c4.pdf

progressing liberalization78. In the neoliberal view, the state must be a flexible

operational actor which is able to drive its society through interdependent and

dynamic environment of global market. Before the states will be able to fulfil this

role, there is no chance for them to get out of the crises79. For neo-liberals, the

question of the sovereignty of the Southern African state is thus irrelevant.

Zimbabwe’s crisis illustrates how the cultural context is shaping the views on state

and governance. The views on governance are never isolated from the context of their

formulation. They are shaped by the particular historical and socio-cultural context in

which their formulation takes place. Some may argue that the neoliberal model does

not seem to be particularly harmful to the well-being of Botswana for example, which

managed to identify the export sectors of the economy (extraction and processing of

diamonds), attract the investors and successfully integrate the trans-national

corporations into national economy80. Botswana represents an exceptional study-case

in the region. Botswana governance has been compatible with the principles of good

governance, there have been regular and open elections, and the public administration

and civil society are working better than in other countries in the region81. The

poverty in Botswana is limited. The people may live in traditional villages, some of

them do not have access to electricity or water, but the people are not hungry as in

South Africa for example.

3.08. Focus on Civil Society

Some of the scholars focus more on the social and cultural factors in defining the

causes of the underdevelopment and suggestions for development. They argue that

the current malaise can only be eradicated from within the post-colonial states, by

forces coming from the society, or more precisely, from the civil society. They

observe that in Southern Africa, the tradition of civil society and active citizenship is

absent, and on the other hand, the legacy of authoritarianism is pervasive82.

78 International Monetary Fund (2007) World Economic Outlook: Globalization and Inequality. (Chapter 4

“Globalization and Inequality”) available on http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/pdf/c4.pdf 79 Krpec, O (2006) Linie sporu v rámci světové obchodní organizace. Mezinárodní vztahy (únor 2006). 80 Good, K (2003) Democracy and the Control of Elites (available on

www.ukzn.ac.za/politics : Howard College, online resources, politics 2B, Southern Africa). 81 Good, K (2003) Democracy and the Control of Elites (available on

www.ukzn.ac.za/politics : Howard College, online resources, politics 2B, Southern Africa). 82 NeoCosmos, M (2003), Neo-Liberalism Versus State Nationalism: Beyond State Thinking in Southern

Africa. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 21, No 2, pp 341-358. p 343.

For example, NeoCosmos argues that both neoliberal western strategies and

radical nationalist strategies such as Mugabe’s policies in contemporary Zimbabwe

are based on the very same nature of the state. The post-colonial state has historically

developed from the colonial apparatus; it is essentially strong, powerful and

repressive. In addition, the civil society is absent in all post-colonial states of the

Southern African region, there is no public sphere to interfere with the state in the

regular reproduction of power, and the state fashions the society according its own

logics. This nature of the state and the absence of institutionalised organisation of

groups in the society, the civil society and the public sphere, is at the heart of the

malaise of today states. The absence of popular participation based on stable civil

society is the key obstacle for proper development83.

3.09. South Africa’s Civil Society

Mahmood Mamdani goes to the roots of the problem by examining constrains to

the formation of proper civil society. According to Mamdani, the main barrier against

development of democracy in Southern Africa is the existence of a bifurcated state, or

bifurcated society84. The bifurcated state was established in the period of colonial

domination, it was reproduced after the Southern African countries got the

independence and it persists recently. In South Africa for example, the legacy of

bifurcated state was established by the colonial power of Great Britain. The history of

colonial domination has been recapitulated by many, but the critical understanding of

Southern Africa’s past is necessary for the meaningful cognition of differences

between individual countries in the region.

The strategy was to keep the natives uneducated and underdeveloped as a source

of cheap labour. The white civil society and the black native society were divided in

the framework of a dual, bifurcated state. The official justification was to protect the

African culture and African indigenous development against European influences, but

it was more because of the need to protect the white civil society against challenges

83 NeoCosmos, M (2003), Neo-Liberalism Versus State Nationalism: Beyond State Thinking in Southern

Africa. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 21, No 2, pp 341-358. p 343. 84 Mamdani, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Colonialism, Princeton

University Press, New York.

from the natives in the political and economic realm85. The civil society was subject

of modern European law and European type of administration. The native society, on

the other hand, was subject of customary law and customary administration. In the

period of late 19 century and first half of the 20 century, the native population of

South Africa was pushed from the urban areas to the countryside, organized in

artificially established tribes and submitted to artificially appointed Native

Authorities86.

The division lines, in both geographical and social terms, between the modern and

the customary, were strictly supervised by the colonial power, and it rooted deeply in

the society. Modern society in the town lived separately from the native society in the

countryside and in the ghettos and townships at the legs of big towns. The rule over

the native society was indirect, realised through the institution of Native Authorities.

The indirect rule was a form of decentralised despotism87.

The representatives of Native Authorities, the chiefs, were carefully chosen

according to their personal features: the more despotic the better, serving as efficient

instrument of coercion and control. They were black tyrants, defining the customary

law according to their own will, plundering the peasants society of the allocated tribe.

While the modern civil society defended the rights of individual citizens, the

customary law allowed forced labour, forced cultivation, forced sales, forced

removals and corporal punishment88.

South Africa got independence after strong anti-colonial protests in 1948.

However, the South African government formed by the Afrikaner National Party

reincorporated the division lines of the bifurcated state into the apartheid state89.

Apartheid regime reproduced the legal dualism and strengthened the divisions

between the native rural and modern urban. Urban areas were subject to centralised

direct administration of the government, while the rural areas were subject to Native

85 Mamdani, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Colonialism, Princeton

University Press, New York. 86 Mamdani, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Colonialism, Princeton



University Press, New York. 89 Extract from Marks, S and Trapido, S (1987) Introduction: The Politics of Race, Class and

Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa. London. pp 10-22 and pp 36-62

Authorities. The inhabitants of the countryside were further squeezed by Native

Authorities, strictly closed inside the boundaries of their artificially established tribes

or in ghettos in the neighbourhood of the big cities, as migrant labour used in the

industries90.

In 1970s, the explosion of migrant workers protests took place in South African

cities, which spread the revolt into the countryside. According to Mamdani, that was

the historical moment bringing the potential for formation of a civil society. The

resistance movements contained a unique democratic potential. They claimed for the

rights and equality for all and they included both urban and rural segments of the

society. In other words, they blurred the division lines of the bifurcated state, opening

the space for formation of unified civil society. In the leadership of the resistance

movements, the rural realm was represented by migrant labourers which came to

town from the countryside, and the urban realm was represented by black and white

students and intellectuals and by the inhabitants of the shanties and townships91.

However, the connection of the rural and urban through the resistance against

apartheid regime was but temporary. It soon became clear that migrant workers as

representatives of the rural and the community residents as representatives of the

urban have different claims. The controversies developed inside different social

groups also. The migrant workers were allocated in single-sex hostels close to the

industrial and mining centres. The migrant workers with families were for

abolishment of the hostel system, as they would prefer to stay in the townships with

their families. Single migrants, illegal workers and squatters wanted to stay in the

hostels, as the hostels provided the only shelter they could get anywhere92.

The unified resistance thus split in 1980s and 1990s. Unions and organisations

representing the resistance were incorporated into political game, and the democratic

potential of the movements was reduced. The division between the rural and urban

persisted. Neither African National Congress (ANC) which in coalition with the

South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade

Unions (COSATU) won the first post-apartheid elections in 1994, nor Inkatha

90 Mamdani, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Colonialism, Princeton



University Press, New York.

Freedom Party (IFP) which was particularly influential in KwaZulu Natal province of

South Africa exploited the democratic potential of the early resistance period93.

Consequently, the civil society exists but in urban areas among political, economic

and academic elites, a situation which is common to other countries of the region, too.

3.10. Elite Democracy

Contemporary South Africa under the administration of President Thabo Mbeki

has been frequently described as an elite democracy. One of the sharpest critics of

Mbeki’s policies, Patrick Bond, has argued that Mbeki’s leadership was adopting

systematically authoritarian defence of capital and oppression of those which are

opposing neoliberalism94. Bond talks about the “Zanufication” of the ANC in the

sense that the ANC is increasingly intolerant towards criticism from the South

African civil society, and about “Mbekism” in the sense that the power execution is

becoming increasingly presidential and the lines between state and party are blurred95.

Bond argues that Mbeki talks left and walks right, and that ANC is not an ally in the

fight for social justice no matter its occasional anti-imperialist rhetoric96.

Barchiesi, in the same volume of Historical Materialism, argues that ANC rule has

reasserted the country into global circuits of capital. According to Barchiesi, ANC is

dissolving the opposition by that the rhetoric is leftist but the style of the

implementation of policies favours the upper and middle classes and marginalizes the

poor97. Desai, too, described Mbeki’s contemporary policies such as GEAR (Growth,

Employment and Redistribution) Programme, which is being implemented since

1996, as liberalising agendas legitimating the enrichment of new black bourgeoisie98.

Good is also critical towards the conduct of black empowerment strategies in

contemporary South Africa. Despite original charterist enthusiasm and promises of

93 Extract from Good, K. (2002) The Liberal Model and Africa. Elites Against Democracy.

Palgrave. Hampshire. 94 Bond, P (2004) Talk Left, Walk Right: Rhetoric and Reality in the New South Africa. Global Dialogue 6

(3-4): 127-140. 95 Bond, P (2004) Talk Left, Walk Right: Rhetoric and Reality in the New South Africa. Global Dialogue 6

(3-4): 127-140. 96 Bond, P (2004) Talk Left, Walk Right: Rhetoric and Reality in the New South Africa. Global Dialogue 6

(3-4): 127-140. 97 Barchiesi, F (2004) Class, Social Movements and the Transformation of South African Left in the Crisis

of National Liberation Historical Materialism 12 (4): 327-353

98 Desai, A (2004) Magic, Realism and the State in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Historical Materialism 12

(4): 383-403

the major change in relations of production and of the redistribution of resources

towards the needy, the black empowerment strategies are characterised by

maladministration, malpractice, and tend to be contra-productive. In 1955 Freedom

Charter, ANC promised the state-led reorganisation of economy in order to deliver

land, jobs and welfare services for all. However, the reality is that the needy remain

isolated and marginalised, while the black empowerment strategies push up few

individuals which were more able or more lucky (at the right place at the right time,

knowing right people) to exploit the moment of transitional turmoil and the chances

which were opening. Instead of helping the majority, from which 40% (8 million of

inhabitants) are jobless, the ANC government officials pact with the business elite

and enjoys the comfortable luxurious life without any concerns for the poor99.

Good is giving concrete examples of state officials’ greed and selfishness. For

example, former president Mandela owns one house in Cape Town, one in

Johannesburg, one in his home village, and one in Maputo. His former wife

Madikizela-Mandela spends about R107 000 per month, from which large share goes

on clothing, cosmetics and entertainment. President Mbeki own exclusive houses in

Pretoria and Cape Town. Corruption is widespread because of the greed. The greed is

the common code of political behaviour for the contemporary elite. In the context of

greed and frequent appointments of people to positions they know nothing about (just

because they are relatives or clients), the black empowerment works in a biased way.

Bypassing the vast majority of people, it assists but the interests of tinny prominent

black individuals who were clever and cheeky enough to combine public policies and

economic strategies in order to enrich themselves and their families. People like Joe

Modise (the Defence Minister), Shamin Chippy Shaik (head of Defence Department

Arms Procurement Committee), Thoko Didiza (Land Affairs Minister), the directors

of NAIL (New Africa Investment Limited) Ramaphosa, Montlana, Moseneke, and

Sandler, or Mzi Khumalo (boss of JCI gold producer) are among the most obvious

examples100

.

Mbeki presents the growth of black capitalists as the successful prove of

deracialization of the society. The fact that the 20% of population receives 72% of the


Palgrave. Hampshire. 100 Extract from Good, K. (2002) The Liberal Model and Africa. Elites Against Democracy.

Palgrave. Hampshire.

total income and that the empowerment of the large black majority is not happening,

is largely overlooked. The black empowerment strategy is mal-administered; the

money is frequently wasted or lost somewhere, the numbers of projects fail to use the

money which they have been allocated. Money circulates in the society, but this is in

the context of general turmoil from which but the rich and quick opportunists can

profit. The poor are the biggest losers, and their future is uncertain, as the ANC

government seems to enjoy the current situation101

.

3.11. Professionals Wanted

Various useful studies have been published on professionalism in public

administration. In theory, the professionals in public administration allow for

consistent, transparent and efficient decision-making which serves the benefits of the

society as a whole, not individuals or particular interest groups. In reality, the

professionals are never fully independent, as they are also human. In African context,

nevertheless, the professionalism is completely absent, as a result of weaknesses in

education system, infrastructure for professional training and the absence of general

trust in, and demand for professionalism102

.

The colonial states have excluded the African natives from the process of

professionalization, by denying them access to higher education and managerial

positions. The transition towards independence and the Africanization policies

brought the amateurs into the positions in public administration, which lack the

professional sense for organized objective hard working. In Gran’s theory, the

professionals are the specialised experts with advanced knowledge in their field and

the owners of titles and diplomas, based on long-term systematic education and

training. They serve as an important bridge between politics and society, transmitting

the values from one direction to another in order to objectively serve the general

welfare. Gran sees the absence of professional ethics and professional culture is the

main cause of the persistent malaise of post-colonial states in Southern Africa103

.


Palgrave. Hampshire. 102 Gran, T. (2001) Professionalism in African Settings (in) Professionalism and Good Governance in Africa.

Admin Africa Project. 103 Gran, T. (2001) Professionalism in African Settings (in) Professionalism and Good Governance in Africa.

Admin Africa Project

3.12. Mal-Management of Incorporation/Disengagement

Azarya’s approach also focuses on the society rather than on the state104

.

According to Azarya, the main cause of the malaise of South African post-colonial

states is the poor management of incorporation and disengagement tendencies of their

societies. For example, the massive demand for incorporation in urban areas is not

managed properly, the cities are overcrowded, serious unemployment occurs, and

extreme inequalities emerge among the rural and urban areas and among individuals

themselves105

.

The governmental responses to disengagement of the citizens are even less

fortunate. The disengagement symptoms include the tendency of citizens to withdraw

from the state, the turn towards the informal or black market, subsistence economy,

alternative basis of identification such as village, family, ethnicity or religion, the

scepticism about the state legitimacy and efficiency, and the emigration. The most

obvious example of the mal-management of disengagement tendencies in the region

is contemporary Zimbabwe. There, the governmental attempts to prevent

disengagement by means of propaganda and coercion are not efficient and somehow

contra-productive. Above all, the popular participation is not encouraged to voice

suggestions for improvement. The constructive reactions towards the incorporation

and disengagement challenges are thus avoided, and the progress of Zimbabwe, as

well as other post-colonial states of Southern Africa stagnates106

.

104 Azarya, V. (1988) Reordering State-Society Relations: Incorporation and Disengagement. Introduction to


www.ukzn.ac.za/politics : Howard College, online resources, politics 2B, Southern Africa). 105 Azarya, V. (1988) Reordering State-Society Relations: Incorporation and Disengagement. Introduction to


www.ukzn.ac.za/politics : Howard College, online resources, politics 2B, Southern Africa). 106 Azarya, V. (1988) Reordering State-Society Relations: Incorporation and Disengagement. Introduction to


www.ukzn.ac.za/politics : Howard College, online resources, politics 2B, Southern Africa).

4. CONCLUSIONS

4.01. Southern Africa in Permanent Transition towards Democracy

To conclude, I have examined how the institution of state works in particular

regional context of Southern Africa. The focus has been on case-studies of Angola,

Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, which were

selected as the most representatives to the points explained in the paper. I have

observed, on the basis of various indicators, that the Southern African states reveal

significant failures concerning the economic and social well-being of their citizens.

Various agencies and individuals have presented the causes of the malaise of post-

colonial states in Southern Africa in different light, and prescribed different strategies

of development. Some see the state as the key progenitor of the sustainable

development and focus on state assistance to the development. Others oppose the

state interventions as limiting the entrepreunial potential of local societies and

prescribe neoliberal policies in order to introduce international capital accumulation

and stable economic growth. Moreover, some others prefer the bottom-up solutions

taking source from the new born civil society and focus on the empowerment of local

public sphere, process of professionalization and middle class formation.

The relationship between the regional malaise, the institution of the state and the

neo-liberal model of international economy is a complex one. What I perceive as the

main misunderstanding among the critics of neoliberalism, is the idea that the

neoliberal model represents the stateless governance of business elites which is

constraining the sustainable development. The neoliberal model is only harmful to the

development of a country if the leadership is not able to deal with it in an efficient

and flexible way. It is a problem of governance rather than the neoliberalism as such.

What causes the bad governance is another question, for which different scholars

have different answers. Some accuse the local leaders of being captured in the

patrimonial traditions and dictatorial tendencies, others criticise the imperialist nature

of the world system and the globalisation to keep the regional elites in power.

Most probably, the malaise of the Southern African states is sustained by the

combination of the outlined factors, in the form of the legacies and institutions

inherited from colonial past and reproduced through the transition towards

independence. There are many blocs and obstacles for the democratization and

development in the region, as the status quo seem to please both international

capitalist elites and the political leadership of the states in question. Consequently and

unfortunately for the majority of their populations, the South African post-colonial

states appear to be in permanent transition towards democracy and development, at

the beginning of the new millennium as at the end of the last one.

Documents

1. PREFACE 1.01. Post-Colonial States of Southern Africa in the New Millennium Almost half a