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1
THAILAND’S EXPERIENCE IN
OIL PRICE DEREGULATIONby
Piyasvasti Amranand
Paper Preparedfor
Roundtable Discussion on Downstream Oil & Gas Restructuring in Indonesia
Borobodur HotelJakarta, 15-16 October 2002
2
MAJOR PLAYERS INVOLVED IN DEREGULATION
MAJOR PLAYERS INVOLVED IN DEREGULATION
GOVERNMENT
NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY OFFICE (NEPO) INTERNAL TRADE DEPARTMENT PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES
STATE OWNED OIL COMPANIES
PETROLEUM AUTHORITY OF THAILAND (PTT), BANGCHAK (BCP)
PRIVATE OIL COMPANIES
SHELL, ESSO, CALTEX, THAIOIL
3
OIL PRICE DETERMINATION BEFORE DEREGULATION
OIL PRICE DETERMINATION BEFORE DEREGULATION
EX-REFINERY & IMPORT PRICES DETERMINED BY GOVERNMENT BASED ON SINGAPORE POSTING AND SPOT PRICES
MARKETING MARGIN DETERMINED BY GOVERNMENT AND RARELY CHANGED
EXCISE AND MUNICIPAL TAXES ON SPECIFIC BASIS (BAHT/LITRE)
RETAIL PRICES DETERMINED BY GOVERNMENT AND RARELY CHANGED
OIL FUND LEVY/SUBSIDY ACTED AS STABILIZER OF RETAIL PRICES
RETAIL PRICE = EX-REFINERY/IMPORT PRICE + OIL FUND
+ TAXES + MARKETING MARGIN
4
OIL MARKET BEFORE DEREGULATIONOIL MARKET BEFORE DEREGULATION
RETAIL TRADE CONTROLLED BY 4 MAJOR OIL COMPANIES (PTT, SHELL, ESSO, CALTEX)
MARKETING MARGIN KEPT CONSTANT FOR MANY YEARS
A FEW INDEPENDENT OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED IN WHOLESALE TRADE
OIL IMPORTS WERE CONTROLLED WITH QUOTA SYSTEM
NO NEW ENTRANTS INTO OIL BUSINESS DUE TO GOVERNMENT POLICY (NO LICENSE ISSUED FOR ARTICLE 6 OIL TRADER)
DOMESTIC REFINING CAPACITY APPROX. 50% OF DEMAND
MANY REMOTE AREAS DID NOT HAVE PETROL STATIONS. CONSUMERS BOUGHT OIL FROM “DRUM PUMPS” WHOSE PRICES WERE NOT CONTROLLED AND WERE 1-3 BAHT/LITRE HIGHER THAN SERVICE STATION PRICES.
5
PREPARATION OF OIL PRICE DEREGULATIONPREPARATION OF OIL PRICE DEREGULATION
INCREASE COMPETITION IN DOMESTIC OIL MARKET
IMPROVE DETERMINATION OF EX-REFINERY & IMPORT PRICES TO MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT WORLD PRICES
IMPROVE TAX AND RETAIL PRICE STRUCTURE OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
INTRODUCTION OF AUTOMATIC FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE FOR ELECTRICTY TARIFF
CREATE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING ABOUT NATURE OF OIL MARKET
CREATE CONFIDENCE THAT OIL COMPANIES WOULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CONSUMERS
6
INCREASE COMPETITION IN DOMESTIC OIL MARKETINCREASE COMPETITION IN DOMESTIC OIL MARKET
REVISE CRITERIA FOR ISSUEING ARTICLE 6 OIL TRADING LICENSE AND ISSUE PERMITS TO ENCOURAGE NEW ENTRANTS
ABOLISH IMPORT CONTROL
INCREASE REFINING CAPACITY BY ALLOWING EXISTING REFINERIES (ESSO, THAIOIL, BCP) TO EXPAND AND GIVING PERMITS FOR 2 NEW REFINERIES (SHELL, CALTEX)
REVISE REGULATIONS FOR ESTABLISHING PETROL STATIONS IN ORDER TO REDUCE COSTS AND TIME FOR OBTAINING PERMITS AND ALLOW CONSTRUCTION OF SMALLER PETROL STATIONS
ALLOW BANGCHAK REFINERY TO SELL OIL TO ALL OIL TRADERS
ALLOW PTT AND BANGCHAK TO COMPETE IN OIL MARKET AND ENCOURAGE BANGCHAK TO SET UP SMALL DIESEL OUTLETS WITH AGRICULTURE COOPERATIVES
7
IMPROVE DETERMINATION OF EX-REFINERY & IMPORT PRICES TO MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT WORLD
PRICES
IMPROVE DETERMINATION OF EX-REFINERY & IMPORT PRICES TO MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT WORLD
PRICES
PREVIOUSLY EX-REFINERY AND IMPORT PRICES WERE SET BASED ON SINGAPORE POSTING WITH UNCLEAR TIME LAG AND FORMULAE WERE CHANGED FROM TIME TO TIME UPON REQUEST BY OIL COMPANIES.
A CLEAR SET OF FORMULAE WAS DEVISED - ESSENTIALLY LINKING IMPORT PRICES TO CIF PRICE OF SINGAPORE SPOT MARKET WITH A TIME LAG OF ONE WEEK.
EX-REFINERY PRICES STILL BASED ON SINGAPORE POSTING BUT WITH CLEARER GUIDELINES.
THIS ALLOWED A MORE REGULAR FLOW OF IMPORTS INTO THAILAND.
8
IMPROVE TAX AND RETAIL PRICE STRUCTURE OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
IMPROVE TAX AND RETAIL PRICE STRUCTURE OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
TAX AND RETAIL PRICE STRUCTURE WERE PREVIOUSLY VERY DISTORTED LEADING TO ADULTERATION OF PRODUCTS, ENGINE MODIFICATION AND SHIFT TO DIESEL VEHICLES.
DURING 1985-91 TAXES AND RETAIL PRICES WERE GRADUALLY ADJUSTED TO REDUCE THE DISTORTION.
BAHT/LITREBAHT/LITRE
19841984 19971997
TAX &TAX & RETAIL TAX &RETAIL TAX & RETAIL RETAIL
OIL FUND OIL FUND PRICE OIL FUND PRICE OIL FUND PRICE PRICE
PREMIUM GASOLINE 2.7898 11.70 3.4449* 9.95*REGULAR GASOLINE 2.4410 10.80 3.4155* 9.50*HIGH SPEED DIESEL 0.7431 6.70 2.9634 8.81LPG (BAHT/Kg) -0.2684 10.74 1.9636 9.72
* PRICES AND TAXES OF UNLEADED GASOLINE** DOMESTIC OILFUND
9
PRICE STRUCTURE OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS (1997)PRICE STRUCTURE OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS (1997)
UNIT : UNIT : BAHT/LITREBAHT/LITRE
UNLEADEDUNLEADED UNLEADEDUNLEADEDHIGH SPEEDHIGH SPEED
PREMIUMPREMIUM REGULARREGULARDIESELDIESEL
EX-REFINERY 5.1358 4.7105 4.9546EXCISE TAX 2.4400 2.4400 2.0700MUNICIPAL TAX 0.2440 0.2440 0.2070OIL FUND 0.0800 0.0800 0.0800ENCON FUND 0.0300 0.0300 0.0300VAT 0.5551 0.5253 0.5139WHOLESALE PRICE 8.4849 8.0298 7.8555MARKETING MARGIN 1.3693 1.3740 0.8920VAT 0.0958 0.0962 0.0625RETAIL PRICE 9.95 9.50 8.81(BKK)
10
IMPLEMENTATION OF OIL PRICE DEREGULATIONIMPLEMENTATION OF OIL PRICE DEREGULATION
USE THE OPPORTUNITY CREATED BY FALL IN -WORLD OIL PRICE AFTER THE END OF IRAQ KU
WAIT WAR
DEREGULATION WAS CARRIED OUT FOR GASOL INE, KEROSENE, DIESEL AND FUEL OIL
“ SEMI DEREGULATION” IMPLEMENTED AT THE END OF MAY 1991
“ FULL DEREGULATION” IMPLEMENTED ON 19 1991AUGUST
11
SEMI DEREGULATIONSEMI DEREGULATION
SERVICE STATIONS TO POST VISIBLE PRICES (EACH LETTER > 15 CM. HIGH)
GOVERNMENT REDUCED WHOLESALE PRICE BY REDUCING OIL FUND LEVY
GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGED OIL TRADERS TO REDUCE RETAIL PRICES
WHEN ACTUAL RETAIL PRICE WAS LOWER THAN MAXIMUM PRICE, GOVERNMENT ABOLISHED MAXIMUM RETAIL PRICE
GOVERNMENT STILL ESTABLISHED EX-REFINERY & IMPORT PRICES ON WEEKLY BASIS
OIL FUND LEVY WAS FIXED AT A CONSTANT LEVEL AND WHOLESALE PRICES WERE ALLOWED TO CHANGE EVERY WEEK IN LINE WITH EX-REFINERY PRICES
OIL COMPANIES CHANGED RETAIL PRICES IN LINE WITH CHANGES IN WHOLESALE PRICES BUT WITH A TIME LAG
OIL COMPANIES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTING PRICES AT THEIR SERVICE STATIONS AND CLOSELY MONITOR THEM
OIL COMPANIES HAD TO INFORM NEPO OF EACH CHANGE IN RETAIL PRICES
PETROL STATIONS HAD TO REPORT PUMP PRICES EVERY MONTH
12
FULL DEREGULATIONFULL DEREGULATION
FULL DEREGULATION OCCURRED ON 19 AUGUST 1991
GOVERNMENT ABOLISHED DETERMINATION OF EX-REFINERY/IMPORT & WHOLESALE PRICES
REFINERIES ANNOUNCED THEIR EX-REFINERY PRICES
PRICES SOLD TO ARTICLE 6 OIL TRADERS PRICES SOLD TO SMALL CUSTOMERS
AN IMPORT LEVY WAS IMPOSED TO PROTECT DOMESTIC REFINERIES. THIS WAS LATER FOLLOWED BY CHANGES IN OIL RESERVE REGULATIONS TO FURTHER INCREASE PROTECTION.
13
MEASURES TO PROTECT DOMESTIC REFINERIES
MEASURES TO PROTECT DOMESTIC REFINERIES
DOMESTIC REFINERIES HAVE TO PAY “SPECIAL BENEFITS” TO THE GOVERNMENT
2% OF GROSS REVENUE FOR ESSO, SHELL, CALTEX 35% OF GROSS PROFIT FOR THAI OIL NONE FOR BANGCHAK BUT BANGCHAK FACED OTHER
DISADVANTAGES
REMOVAL OF “SPECIAL BENEFITS” IS POLITICALLY DIFFICULT SO PROTECTION WAS PROVIDED BY USING IMPORT TAX AND OIL RESERVE REGULATIONS
14
MEASURES TO PROTECT DOMESTIC REFINERY (CONT)
MEASURES TO PROTECT DOMESTIC REFINERY (CONT)
IMPORT TAXES
STANG/LITRESTANG/LITRE
BEFORE BEFORE DEREGULATIONDEREGULATION AFTERAFTER
GASOLINE, DIESEL 1.0 6.5KEROSENE
FUEL OIL 0.1 1.0
OIL RESERVE % OF % OF
VOLUMEVOLUMEBEFORE BEFORE
DEREGULATION AFTER DEREGULATION AFTER
CRUDE OIL HELD 4% 5%BY REFINERIES
LOCALLY REFINED FINISHED 3% 5%PRODUCTS HELD BY OIL TRADERS
IMPORTED FINISHED PRODUCTS 3% 10%HELD BY OIL TRADERS
15
PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM OIL PRICE DEREGULATION
PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM OIL PRICE DEREGULATION
CONSUMER PERCEPTION
MARKETING MARGIN TOO HIGH RETAIL PRICE INELASTIC IN DOWNWARD DIRECTION PRICE COLLUSION BY OIL COMPANIES
COLLUSION BY PETROL STATIONS IN CERTAIN REMOTE AREAS
RETAIL PRICE DOWNWARD MOVEMENT SLOW BUT ADJUST UPWARD QUICKLY
SOME PETROL STATIONS DO NOT POST PUMP PRICES
16
GOVERNMENT CONTROLS IN CURRENT SYSTEM
GOVERNMENT CONTROLS IN CURRENT SYSTEM
IN PRINCIPLE, SHOULD FULLY DEREGULATE BUT IN TRANSITION PERIOD CERTAIN CONTROLS ARE STILL NECESSARY
EXISTING CONTROLS
OIL TRADERS ARE STILL ENCOURAGED TO DETERMINE PRICES AT THEIR SERVICE STATIONS
NEPO STILL ISSUES “TRANSPORT COST ACCOUNT” AS GUIDELINES FOR OIL COMPANIES TO DETERMINE PRICES IN EACH DISTRICT
NEPO AND INTERNAL TRADE DEPARTMENT CLOSELY MONITOR PRICES AND MARKET CONDITION
WARNING ISSUED FROM TIME TO TIME FOR OIL TRADERS TO REDUCE MARKETING MARGIN
17
CHANGES IN OIL MARKET AFTER DEREGULATION
CHANGES IN OIL MARKET AFTER DEREGULATION
INITIALLY MARKETING MARGIN MORE THAN DOUBLED INITIALLY MARKETING MARGIN MORE THAN DOUBLED BUT REFINING MARGIN DECLINED SUBSTANTIALLY. BUT REFINING MARGIN DECLINED SUBSTANTIALLY.
MARKETING + REFINING MARGIN ADJUSTED FOR MARKETING + REFINING MARGIN ADJUSTED FOR CHANGES IN PRODUCT SPECIFICATION HARDLY ROSE.CHANGES IN PRODUCT SPECIFICATION HARDLY ROSE.
NUMBERS OF OIL TRADERS AND SERVICE STATIONS NUMBERS OF OIL TRADERS AND SERVICE STATIONS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED.HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED.
DISTRICTS WITH NO SERVICES STATIONS HAVE DISTRICTS WITH NO SERVICES STATIONS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY DECLINED. REMOTE AREAS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DECLINED. REMOTE AREAS ARE SERVED BY A NEW BREED OF SMALL SCALE SERVICE SERVED BY A NEW BREED OF SMALL SCALE SERVICE STATIONS.STATIONS.
REDUCTION IN COLLUSION IN REMOTE AREAS.REDUCTION IN COLLUSION IN REMOTE AREAS.
REFINING CAPACITY RISES SUBSTANTIALLY AND REFINING CAPACITY RISES SUBSTANTIALLY AND SURPLUS CAPACITY BEGAN TO EMERGE IN 1996SURPLUS CAPACITY BEGAN TO EMERGE IN 1996.
18
CHANGES IN OIL MARKET AFTER DEREGULATION (CONT)
CHANGES IN OIL MARKET AFTER DEREGULATION (CONT)
COMPETITION IN OIL MARKET INTENSIFIES PARTICULARLY AS OIL COMPANIES WERE CARVING UP MARKET SHARE BEFORE SURPLUS DEVELOPS IN 1996.
IMPROVEMENT IN QUALITY OF SERVICE.
GREATLY FACILITATE IMPROVEMENT IN OIL QUALITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.
19
OIL MARKET SINCE 1999OIL MARKET SINCE 1999
INTENSE COMPETITION IN OIL MARKET DUE TO SURPLUS REFINING CAPACITY LARGE NUMBER OF TRADERS AND SERVICE STATIONS CONSUMER SENSITIVITY TO PRICE DIFFERENTIALS
SURPLUS REFINING CAPACITY IN GASOLINE AND DIESEL HAS E - XERTED PRESSURE ON EX REFINERY PRICE TO SHIFT FROM “F
- OB SINGAPORE + TRANSPORT COST” TO “FOB SINGAPORE T RANSPORT COST”
BRAND LOYALTY IS DISAPPEARING RAPIDLY AS CONSUMERS R EGARD OIL SOLD BY ALL TRADERS AS THE SAME COMMODITY.
PRICE BECOMES THE BIGGEST FACTOR INFLUENCING CONSUME R CHOICE FOLLOWED BY SERVICE QUALITY
A 0.10 BAHT/LITRE DIFFERENTIAL COULD LEAD TO CHANGE IN VOLUME BY 10%
LARGE INCREASE IN NUMBER OF SERVICE STATIONS TOGETHE R WITH DECLINE IN DEMAND RESULTING FROM ECONOMIC REC
ESSION HAS CAUSED THROUGHPUT VOLUME PER SERVICE STA TION TO FALL SUBSTANTIALLY
20
OIL MARKET SINCE 1999 (CON’T) OIL MARKET SINCE 1999(CON’T)
CHARACTERISTIC OF OIL MARKET SINCE 1999
INITIAL SHARP DROP IN MARKETING MARGIN IN 1999
FOLLOWED BY STABILIZATION
RAPID DOWNWARD PRICE ADJUSTMENT BUT SLOW UPWARD
ADJUSTMENT
PUMP PRICES ARE THE SAME FOR ALL MAJOR BRANDS
PRICE WAR PREVALENT THROUGH OUT THE COUNTRY,
INITIALLY PRICE WAR WOULD BE STARTED BY MINOR BRANDS
BUT NOW MAJOR BRANDS ALSO START PRICE WARS.
FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN SERVICE QUALITY
IMPLEMENTATION OF DRASTIC COST REDUCTION PROGRAM BY
OIL COMPANIES
UNPROFITABLE SERVICE STATIONS CLOSING DOWN
21
AVERAGE RETAI L PRI CES
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20026
8
10
12
14
16
18
1991 - 2002 (JAN - SEP)
BA
HT
/L
ITR
E
UNLEADED PREMIUM GASOLINE REGULAR GASOLINE HIGH SPEED DIESEL
22
PRI CE OF UNLEADED GASOLI NE(ULG 95)
| 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
DATE:(JAN 1,1990 - OCT 4,2002)
BA
HT
/L
ITR
E
RETAIL(AVG) WHOLESALE(AVG)
8.45
11.05(Iraq - Kuwait War)
Baht Floatation
17.5916.29
23
PRI CE OF HI GH SPEED DI ESEL
1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 20024
6
8
10
12
14
16
DATE: (JAN 1,1990 - NOV 9,1999)
BA
HT
/L
ITR
E
RETAIL(AVG) WHOLESALE(AVG)
6.10
8.40 (Iraq - Kuwait War)Baht Floatation
15.04 14.29
24
MARKETI NG MARGI N OF PETROLEUM PRODUCT
| 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 20020
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
JAN 1991 - SEP 2002
BA
HT
/L
ITR
E
25
GROSS REFI NI NG MARGI N
| 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 20020
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
(JAN 1996 - SEP 2002)
US
D/
BB
L
26
PRICE STRUCTURE OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS(OCTOBER 4,2002)
PRICE STRUCTURE OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS(OCTOBER 4,2002)
UNIT : UNIT : BAHT/LITREBAHT/LITRE
GASOLINEGASOLINE UNLEADEDUNLEADEDHIGH SPEEDHIGH SPEED
95 RON95 RON 91 RON91 RONDIESELDIESEL
EX-REFINERYEX-REFINERY 8.92188.9218 8.39588.3958 9.1509 9.1509
EXCISE TAXEXCISE TAX 3.68503.6850 3.68503.6850 2.3050 2.3050
MUNICIPAL TAXMUNICIPAL TAX 0.36850.3685 0.36850.3685 0.23050.2305
OIL FUNDOIL FUND 0.50000.5000 0.30000.3000 0.50000.5000
ENCON FUNDENCON FUND 0.04000.0400 0.04000.0400 0.04000.0400
VATVAT 0.94610.9461 0.89520.8952 0.85590.8559
WHOLESALE PRICE WHOLESALE PRICE 14.461414.4614 13.6845 13.6845 13.082313.0823
MARKETING MARGINMARKETING MARGIN 1.70901.7090 1.50051.5005 1.12871.1287
VATVAT 0.11960.1196 0.10500.1050 0.07900.0790
RETAIL PRICERETAIL PRICE 16.2916.29 15.29 15.29 14.29 14.29
(BKK)(BKK)
27
NUMBER OF GAS STATI ONS1991 - 2002(Q2)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (Q2)0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
3,475 3,764 4,186
5,765
8,014
10,045
12,208
14,04415,03415,40715,683
16,706
NO
. O
F G
AS
ST
AT
ION
S
MAJOR BRAND MINOR BRAND INDEPENDENT
28
NUMBER OF SERVICE STATIONS
TRADER Q4/1992 Q2/2002 TRADER Q4/1992 Q2/2002
PTT 1,025 1,414 MP - 112
SHELL 915 690 BP 25 -
ESSO 757 682 Q8 23 128
CALTEX 547 514 PT - 243
BCP 41 1,073 TPI - 75
SUSCO 95 131 JET - 137
COSMO - 99 PA - -
MOBIL 50 - INDEPENDENTS - 11,383
TOTAL 3,764 16,706
NUMBER OF SERVICE STATIONSNUMBER OF SERVICE STATIONS
29
DI STRI CT WI TH NO SERVI CE STATI ONS1991 - 2000
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 20000
50
100
150
200 184
160
185
100 94 93
52
3020 18
DI STRI CTS
NOTE : 1993 WAS ROYAL DECREE ANNOUNCING THE ESTABLISHING NEW PROVINCES, RESULTING IN A LARGER NUMBER OF DISTRICTS
30
36%
19%
19%
9%
4%
12%
967
896
711
513
23
375
1,290
991
811
589
659
1,425
1,414
690
682
514
1,073
12,333
1,498
1,040
871
598
1,187
7,014
1. PTT
2. SHELL
3. ESSO
4. CALTEX
5. BCP
6.-29. OTHERS
COMPANYMARKET SHARESMARKET SHARES NUMBER OF GAS STATIONSNUMBER OF GAS STATIONS
1991 1994 1997 2002
(Q2)
30%
15%
13%
9%
8%
25%
36%
15%
16%
9%
6%
18%
34%
22%
23%
11%
3%
8%
2002 (7 MTHS.)
199719941991
TOTAL 100% 100%100%100% 3,475 5,765 16,70612,208
31
REFINING & MARKETTING MARGIN(Before and after Deregulation)
BEFORE 91 - 01 JAN - SEP 02 BEFORE 91 - 01 JAN -SEP 02
1.39
2.26 2.28
1.23
1.791.96
Ref. Margin Mark. Margin Cost for Ql. Cost for Add&Res.
0.77
0.62
0.64
0.23
1.27
0.12
0.24
0.38
1.54
0.12
0.74
0.49
0.57
0.27
0.85
0.10
0.33
0.27
1.26
0.10
HSDHSDULGULG
32
PRICE STRUCTURE COMPARISONBetween Price Control and No Price Control
Cases
CONTROL NO CONTROL CONTROL NO CONTROL0
5
10
15
20
25
16.85 16.2914.73 14.29
UNI T : BAHT/ LI TRE
EX-REFINARY PRICE TAX FUND VAT MARKETTING MARGIN
ULGULG HSDHSD
( OCTOBER 4, 2002 )
33
DEMAND-SUPPLY BALANCE FOR PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN 2001
GASOLINEPREMIUM UNLEADEDREGULAR UNLEADED
KEROSENEJET FUELDIESEL
HIGH SPEED (0.05%S)LOW SPEED (0.05%S)
FUEL OIL
DEMANDDEMAND DOMESTIC DOMESTIC PRODUCTIONPRODUCTION
NET IMPORT NET IMPORT (EXPORT)(EXPORT)
UNIT: M.LITRESUNIT: M.LITRES
6,8573,0013,856
573,717
15,22615,121
1054,564
8,3274,1964,131
5874,237
16,66716.559
1086,466
(1,336)(1,098)
(239)(395)
(484.3)(1,325)
(1,3321)(4)
(1,504)
34
Petroleum Products Demand & Supply Balance
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
TORC ESSO BCP RRC SPRC TPI RPC GSP DEMAND
KBD
35
Q1/95 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/96 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/97 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/98 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/99 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/00 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/01 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/02 Q2 Q3-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
UN
IT :
KB
D
IMPORT
EXPORT
IMPORT & EXPORT OF GASOLINE IMPORT & EXPORT OF GASOLINE 1995- 2002 (Q3)1995- 2002 (Q3)
IMPORT & EXPORT OF GASOLINE IMPORT & EXPORT OF GASOLINE 1995- 2002 (Q3)1995- 2002 (Q3)
36
Q1/95 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/96 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/97 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/98 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/99 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/00 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/01 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/02 Q2 Q3-100
-50
0
50
100
150
UN
IT :
KB
D
IMPORT
EXPORT
IMPORT & EXPORT OF DIESEL IMPORT & EXPORT OF DIESEL 1995-2002 (Q3)1995-2002 (Q3)
IMPORT & EXPORT OF DIESEL IMPORT & EXPORT OF DIESEL 1995-2002 (Q3)1995-2002 (Q3)
37
Q1/95 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/96 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/97 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/98 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/99 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/00 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/01 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1/02 Q2 Q3-600
-300
0
300
600
900
1,200
UN
IT :
KB
D
IMPORT
EXPORT
IMPORT & EXPORT OF FUEL OIL IMPORT & EXPORT OF FUEL OIL 1995-2002(Q3)1995-2002(Q3)
IMPORT & EXPORT OF FUEL OIL IMPORT & EXPORT OF FUEL OIL 1995-2002(Q3)1995-2002(Q3)
38
DEREGULATION OF LPG MARKET & PRICESDEREGULATION OF LPG MARKET & PRICES
LPG IS THE LAST PRODUCT TO BE DEREGULATED DUE TO COMPLEXITY OF CONTROLS AND ILLEGAL BUSINESS PRACTICES RESULTED FROM PRICE CONTROLS
LPG PRICES WERE CONTROLLED IN THE SAME WAY AS OTHER OIL PRODUCTS BUT IN 1986 UNIFORM PRICING SYSTEM WAS INTRODUCED. DISMANTLING THIS SYSTEM TURNED OUT TO BE EXTREMELY COMPLICATED
THE CONTROLS ALSO LED TO NUMEROUS ILLEGAL BUSINESS AND UNSAFE PRACTICES AS WELL AS CREATING UNEQUAL LEVEL PLAYING FIELDS AMONG TRADERS. SINCE 2000 OIL FUND ALSO HAD TO HEAVILY SUBSIDISE LPG PRICES.
39
LPG DEMAND-SUPPLY BALANCE 2001LPG DEMAND-SUPPLY BALANCE 2001
unit : MTON
PRODUCTION 3,183 PTT GSP 1,429 SHELL GSP 110 REFINERIES 1,480 OTHERS 164
DEMAND 2,400 COOKING 1,430 INDUSTRY 335 AUTOMOBILE 254 FEEDSTOCK 381
EXPORT 758
40
MARKET SHARES OF MAJOR LPG TRADERS IN THAILAND (%)
MARKET SHARES OF MAJOR LPG TRADERS IN THAILAND (%)
2001 2002(7 Months)
PTT 46 44Siam Gas 14 15Unique Gas 15 14World Gas 14 15Union Gas 9 9Caltex LPG 2 2Sang Thong 0.1 1
100 100
41
PRICE CONTROLS BEFORE DEREGULATIONPRICE CONTROLS BEFORE DEREGULATION
EX-REFINERY/IMPORT PRICES WERE INITIALLY DETERMINED BY CIF PRICE OF SINGAPORE POSTING AND/OR CONTRACTED PRICE OF SAUDI ARABIA (CP). ONCE THAILAND BECAME A NET EXPORTER OF LPG PRICES WERE BASED (SOMETIMES ) ON EXPORT PARITY
OIL FUND LEVY IS USED TO STABILIZE RETAIL PRICE
“UNIFORM PRICE” INTRODUCED IN 1986: WHOLESALE PRICES AT PTT’S 5 DEPOTS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WERE THE SAME THROUGH SUBSIDY FROM OIL FUND FOR “STORAGE COST” AT DEPOT AND “TRANSPORT COST” FROM SRIRACHA (SITE OF PTT’S MAIN LPG TERMINAL)
PRICES AT OTHER LOCATIONS WERE MARKED UP BY TRANSPORT COST FROM NEAREST MAJOR DISTRIBUTION CENTRES
42
Refineries & Gas Sep. Plants
PTT Up-Country Depots
Retail Prices in Other Provinces
Retail Prices in Depot Provinces
Pay subsidy for world price change
Pay subsidy for transportation cost
(Same wholesale price)
(Same retail prices)
No subsidy for transportation cost
(Different retail prices)
STRUCTURE OF LPG SUBSIDIZATIONSTRUCTURE OF LPG SUBSIDIZATION
43
PRICES CONTROLS BEFORE DEREGULATION (CONT)
PRICES CONTROLS BEFORE DEREGULATION (CONT)
BEFORE 1991 SUBSIDY LEVY WERE DIFFERENT FOR DIFFERENT USES IN ORDER TO HELP LOW INCOME HOUSEHOLDS
SMALL CYLINDER LPG (13-15 kg) LARGE CYLINDER LPG (48-50 kg) AUTOMOTIVE AND INDUSTRIAL USES
THIS LED TO A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF LPG FROM SMALL CYLINDERS
TO LARGE CYLINDERS AND AUTOMOTIVE USES CAUSING FIRE HAZARD
ILLEGAL REQUEST FOR SUBSIDY FROM OIL FUND
44
INITIAL ATTEMPT TO DEREGULATE LPG PRICEINITIAL ATTEMPT TO DEREGULATE LPG PRICE
THE GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTED TO DEREGULATE LPG PRICE ROUGHLY AT THE SAME TIME AS OTHER OIL PRODUCTS BUT DID NOT HAVE TIME TO COMPLETE
TO CREATE COMPETITION IMPORT CONTROL ON LPG WAS LIBERALIZED
DIFFERENCES IN SUBSIDIES FOR DIFFERENT USES WERE ABOLISHED : SAME SUBSIDY /LEVY IRREFFECTIVE OF USE
RETAIL PRICE CONTROL WAS LIFTED IN 1991 FOR AUTOMOTIVE AND INDUSTRIAL LPG
45
PROBLEMS FROM LPG PRICE CONTROLSPROBLEMS FROM LPG PRICE CONTROLS
POLITICALLY DIFFICULT TO ADJUST RETAIL PRICE IN LINE WITH WORLD PRICE LEADING TO INEFFICIENT USE, SUBSTITUTION OF LPG IN GASOLINE ENGINES, HEAVY SUBSIDY FROM OIL FUND AND ILLEGAL EXPORT. HEAVY SUBSIDY FROM OIL FUND WAS PARTLY RESOLVED BY INCREASING LEVY ON GASOLINE AND DIESEL, THEREBY FURTHER CREATING DISTORTION.
MARKETING MARGIN WAS KEPT CONSTANT FOR MANY YEARS FORCING TRADERS TO RESORT TO ILLEGAL PRACTICES OR LEAVE THE MARKET
“UNIFORM PRICING” CREATED UNFAIR ADVANTAGE TO PTT, FURTHER FORCING OTHER TRADERS TO RESORT TO ILLEGAL PRACTICES AND DISCOURAGING NEW INVESTMENT AND NEW ENTRANTS.
46
ILLEGAL BUSINESS PRACTICESILLEGAL BUSINESS PRACTICES
CROSS FILLING AND TRADERS’ REFUSAL TO INSPECT AND REPAIR THEIR OWN CYLINDERS DUE TO CROSS FILLINGS
“WHITE CYLINDER” : CYLINDERS NOT BELONGING TO ARTICLE 7 TRADERS AND NOT SUBJECT TO REGULAR MAINTENANCE
OVERCHARGED CYLINDER DEPOSIT
UNDERWEIGHT FILLING VOLUME
47
STRATEGIES IN LPG PRICE DEREGULATION
STRATEGIES IN LPG PRICE DEREGULATION
PRICE DEREGULATION MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE COMPETITION AND ELIMINATION OF ILLEGAL AND UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FREE AND FAIR COMPETITION AS WELL AS BRING SAFETY LEVELS UP TO STANDARDS
TO ACHIEVE ABOVE GOAL DURING THE PAST 4 YEARS THE GOVERNMENT HAS GRADUALLY
REDUCED UNIFORM PRICING WITH OBJECTIVE OF FINALLY ABOLISHING IT AND CREATE COMPETITION
INCREASED MARKETING MARGIN REDUCED SUBSIDY BY OIL FUND BY ADJUSTING RETAIL
PRICES COMMENCED PROCESS OF PRICE DEREGULATION INTRODUCED MARKET REFORM
48
PHASING OUT OF UNIFORM PRICINGPHASING OUT OF UNIFORM PRICING
INITIALLY GOVERNMENT ABOLISHED SUBSIDY OF ‘STORAGE COST’ FOR LPG TERMINALIMPORT CONTROL ABOLISHEDTHIRD PARTY ACCESS FOR USE OF PTT’S LPG DEPOTALLOW LPG TO BE SOLD AT SERVICE STATIONREDUCE MINIMUM REQUIREMENT FOR BECOMING ARTICLE 7 LPG TRADER (FROM MINIMUM VOLUME OF 100,000 TONS/YEAR TO 50,000 TONS/YEAR)
49
Excise & Municipal Tax
Marketing Margin
Tax & Marketing Margin of LP Gasin Thailand
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20022
2.5
3
3.5
Un
it [
Ba
ht/
KG
]
50
LPG PRI CES
JAN41 MAR MAY JUL SEB NOV JAN42 MAR MAY JUL SEB NOV JAN43 MAR MAY JUL SEB NOV JAN44 MAR MAY JUL SEB NOV JAN45 MAR MAY JUL SEP
0
100
200
300
400
10
12
14
16
18
MONTH : (JAN 1998 - OCT 2002)
PE
TR
OM
IN P
RIC
E :
US
D/
TO
N
RE
TA
IL P
RIC
E :
BA
HT
/K
ILO
KR
AM
PETROMIN PRICE RETAIL PRICE
51
Unit : Baht/kg
LPG PRICE STRUCTURE IN THAILANDLPG PRICE STRUCTURE IN THAILAND
Jan-01 Dec-01 Sep-02
Ex-Refinery Price 14.235 8.8419 10.2909
Taxes (All) 3.0870 3.2767 3.2767
Marketing Margin 2.9566 2.9566 3.0566
Retail Price (Should be) 20.2786 15.0752 16.6242
Subsidy 9.5786 1.4752 3.0242
Actual Retal Price 10.70 13.60 13.60
52
OI L FUND
90 | 91 | 92 | 93 | 94 | 95 | 96 | 97 | 98 | 99 | 00 | 01 | 02-14,000
-12,000
-10,000
-8,000
-6,000
-4,000
-2,000
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
DATE : (SEP 90 - 28 AUG 02)
UN
IT :
M.B
AH
T
7,780
69
-1,958
6,081
-5,702
-12,208
53
• LP Gas prices have been deregulated at retail level
• Retail prices for cooking LPG have been deregulated
since November 2 0 0 1
• Three common cylinder sizes of Cooking LPG are:
- Small (4 kg)
- 15Medium ( kg)
- Large (4 8 kg)
CURRENT STATUS OF LPG PRICE DEREGULATION
CURRENT STATUS OF LPG PRICE DEREGULATION
54
Step 1 : Preparatory Stage
Step 2 : Semi - Deregulation
Step 3 : Market Preparation prior to Full
Deregulation
(Period of Semi-floating Prices)
Step 4 : Full or Complete Deregulation
DEREGULATION OF LPG PRICESDEREGULATION OF LPG PRICES
55
Step 1 : Preparatory Stage
- Create competition in the market
- Inform market participants
and related organizations of government policy
Step 2 : Semi-Deregulation
- Decontrol retail price while still controlling
wholesale price (1 November 2001)
- Filling Plants and LPG Shops must post prices
- Article 7 LPG Trades must announce standard
prices
DEREGULATION OF LPG PRICES (CONT.)
DEREGULATION OF LPG PRICES (CONT.)
56
Step 3 : Market Preparation prior to Full
Deregulation (Period of Semi-floating Prices)
- Try to maintain Oil Fund subsidy at not more than
1 baht/kg
- Change wholesale prices in a line with Petromin contracted
prices. This will result in automatic change in retail prices
- Decrease Oil Fund debt by paying back LPG producers
at rate of 400-500 M. baht/month
- Thailand has been in this stage since November 1, 2001
DEREGULATION OF LPG PRICES (CONT.)
DEREGULATION OF LPG PRICES (CONT.)
57
Step 4 : Full or Complete Deregulation
- Deregulate prices at all levels
- Producers and traders set their own prices
- Try to achieve this stage during the next few years
DEREGULATION OF LPG PRICES (CONT.)
DEREGULATION OF LPG PRICES (CONT.)
58
Improvement of LPG Business Practices and It s
Safety Standards
1Stage • Eliminate cross filling, iiiiiii iiiiiii iiiiiiii
and unfair practices
2 •Stage Remove illegal cylinders from the markii
3 •Stage Enforce stringent regulations on cylindii
iiiiiiiiiii
LPG MARKET REFORMLPG MARKET REFORM
59
Stage 1 : Eliminate cross filling, illegal filling business
and unfair practices - Traders and their filling plants to fill LPG into their own
cylinders only
- Filling plants to act as “filler” only and are not allowed to
buy and sell LPG
- All filling plants are required to register and obtain
official ID numbers
- Filling plants must seal valves of filled cylinders, which carry
their ID numbers
- Underweight filled cylinders could be traced by ID numbers
IMPROVEMENT OF LPG BUSINESS PRACTICES AND ITS SAFETY STANDARDS
IMPROVEMENT OF LPG BUSINESS PRACTICES AND ITS SAFETY STANDARDS
60
Stage 1 : Eliminate cross filling, illegal filling business
and unfair practices (Cont)
- Intensify LPG filling inspection by responsible
authorities
- New cylinder to have information in Thai
- Traders must issue receipt for deposit of cylinders
in order to allow consumers to more easily switch
brands
IMPROVEMENT OF LPG BUSINESS PRACTICES AND ITS SAFETY STANDARDS (CONT.)
IMPROVEMENT OF LPG BUSINESS PRACTICES AND ITS SAFETY STANDARDS (CONT.)
61
Safety Improvement 3.5 M. used cylinders (47%) have been
reconditioned 2 M. new cylinders have been injected into
the market
Every filled cylinder has sealed valve providing higher quality (i.e. no underweight filling, a decrease in illegal cylinders)
Increased market competition has led to fair pricing and better services
BENEFITS TO CONSUMERS (DERIVED FROM STAGE 1)
BENEFITS TO CONSUMERS (DERIVED FROM STAGE 1)
62
Stage 2 : Remove illegal cylinders from the marketTo prohibit filling of uncertified cylinders
To remove “white cylinders” from the market through the white cylinder exchange program
White Cylinders : Cylinders not belonged to Art.7 traders : No regular maintenance : High risk of danger : About 2 Million in market circulation
IMPROVEMENT OF LPG BUSINESS PRACTICES AND ITS SAFETY STANDARDS (CONT.)
IMPROVEMENT OF LPG BUSINESS PRACTICES AND ITS SAFETY STANDARDS (CONT.)
63
Stop new entries
• Prohibit cylinder manufacturers from producing
cylinders unless Art. 7 traders order
Collect circulating white cylinders from the market
• iiii iiiiiii iiii iii iiiiiii iii iii iii5 0 %
iiiiiii ii iii iiiiiiiiiiii cy linders for exchange
STAGE 2 : REMOVE ILLEGAL CYLINDERS FROM THE MARKET (CONT.)
STAGE 2 : REMOVE ILLEGAL CYLINDERS FROM THE MARKET (CONT.)
White Cylinder Exchange Program
64
• i ii iiiiii iiiii ii iiiiiii i iiii iiiiiiiii iiii iiiiii iii and then change for new std. cylinders at traders’ filling plants • Divide the country into 10 zones and introduce the
exchange program zone by zone • - 2002Implementation :JanNov.
- 2: months/zone, with one month lag iiii iii iii iiiiiiii ii iii iiii and t hat i n t he next one • iiiii i iiiiii iiiiiiii ii i iiiii ii iiiii iiiii iiii iii iii ii
iiiii
STAGE 2 : REMOVE ILLEGAL CYLINDERS FROM THE MARKET (CONT.)
STAGE 2 : REMOVE ILLEGAL CYLINDERS FROM THE MARKET (CONT.)
White Cylinder Exchange Program (Cont.)
65
- Strictly enforce mandatory inspection and recondition of the cylinders every five years
- Start this stage in 2003
Stage 3 • Enforce stringent regulations on
cylinder maintenance
IMPROVEMENT OF LPG BUSINESS PRACTICES AND ITS SAFETY STANDARDS (CONT.)
IMPROVEMENT OF LPG BUSINESS PRACTICES AND ITS SAFETY STANDARDS (CONT.)
66
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