12/9/2011_Effective actors_for_international_peace

Effective International Actors?Japan Self-Defense Force Overseas Dispatch

Operations

Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

Structure of PresentationEffective International Actors?:

JSDF Overseas Dispatch Operations (ODO)

1 Questions and Parameters 2 Extant Research 3 Definition of Terms 4 Methodology and Operational

Analysis 5 Immediate Findings: OA & ODO 6 Broader Findings: ODO and Japan


Quiz!Know your ODO!!!

1 When/where was the first Japanese post-war ODO?

2 When/where was the first JSDF ODO?

3 Does Japan do Peacekeeping?

4 Why does Japan send JSDF ODO?


1 Questions and Parameters

What operations? How and why selected? What did the JSDF actually do? How did they perform? How did performance affect the JSDF? How JSDF culture/configuration affected

performance? Were the JSDF effective international

actors?


2 Extant Research

Limited applicability

Contextual understandingLimited coverage or applicability; unpublished

General

Politics of Defence

Constitutional Issues

US-Japan Alliance

Japan-Asia Relations

‘Normal’ Japan

Historical controversies

Party Politics

Specific

Journalism: event specific

‘PKO’ studies: operations

‘PKO’ studies: concepts

Participant studies

JSDF operational studies

Official histories


3 Definition of Terms

‘PKO’

Japan does not ‘do’ ‘PKO’Japan developed a ‘PSO’ variantMost operations were not PKO/PSO/PKFJapan distinguished between ‘PKO’ & ‘PKF’



Complex, confusing, but clear for JSDF

Clear, simple, but potentially a legal problem for the JSDF

An Agenda for Peace Boutros Boutros Ghali 1992/95

Main Findings:1 There are five forms of

Peace Operation:PMO, PKO, PSO, PEO, PBO

3 There is no simple progression from one to the other.

The Brahimi Report(Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations)

2000Main Findings:1 Identified only 3 forms of

Peace Operation: PMO, PKO, PBO

3 Need to develop lessons learned capabilities and doctrine


An Agenda for Peace Strata of UN Peace Operations

Peacemaking (PMO)- settlement or suspension of conflict

Peacekeeping (PKO)- policing/observing of settlement/ ceasefire

Peace Support (PSO)- support of peace by aiding civil society

Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO)- use of military power for settlement/ceasefire, or for compliance with UNSC Chapter VII resolution

Peace Building (PBO)-post-conflict reinforcement of civil society



Overseas Dispatch Operations (ODO)Japanese: International Peace Cooperation

Activities (IPCA: 国際平和協力活動 )Neutral, covering UN/non-UN operations,

unilateral and multilateralThe IPCA term (and IPC Law) was

developed from the ODA policies of the 1980s

Overseen by IPCH, with JSDF and Police in the IPCC


Japanese ODO Policy Actors

MoFA

MOD/JSDF

Cabinet Office/IPCH

NPA/Police


Legal and Constitutional Limits on JSDF ODO

Article 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace

based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.


戦争の放棄第９条　日本国民は、正義と秩序を基

調とする国際平和を誠実に希求し、国権の発動たる戦争と、武力による威嚇又は武力の行使は、国際紛争を解決する手段としては、永久にこれを放棄する。

２　前項の目的を達するため、陸海空軍その他の戦力は、これを保持しない。国の交戦権は、これを認めない。


Fear of Clouds and Codes

There is an implicit ‘code’ The code is based upon perceptions of

interpretations of a translated document The code is not codified The code hangs above, like a ‘cloud’ The code/cloud affects laws, policies,

and operational decisions The code/cloud is imaginary, and very

real, and exerts a tremendous influence


4 Methodology and Operational Analysis

Methodology1 Triangulation:

JSDF UN Ops

JSDF non-UN Ops

Non-Japanese Actors

2 Analytical Framework:

Mission Context

Preparation and Logistics

JSDF Performance

Overall Mission Contribution

Operational Analysis

JSDF Performance Indicators

1 Effectiveness

2 Efficiency

3 Quality

(O'Brien, R.J., Police as peacekeepers: an evaluation of the performance of Australian police peacekeeping on Cyprus 1964 – 1998, PhD thesis (Adelaide: University of South Australia, 2001).


4 Limits of Methodology and Operational Analysis

No systematic JSDF/JDA/MOD analysis Lack of documentation Uncritical, non-specific documentation Small security community Interview-based Limited media resources


4 Limits of Methodology and OAODO of the 1990s

UN command, PSO, ‘nation building’ and ‘classical’ ops

Varied, strongly liberal IPCO character

UN ODO

UNTAC Cambodia

1992-1993

ONUMOZ Mozambique 1992-1995

UNDOF Golan Heights 1996-present

Non-UN ODO Allied Support

○ Persian Gulf 1991

Humanitarian Assistance

人道支援○ Rwanda/Zaire 1994,

West Timor 1999

Disaster Relief　緊急援助○ Honduras 1998, Turkey 1999


21st Century JSDF ODO

Pattern of the 1990s Appearing to be ‘new’ but mainly 1990s patterns

UN ODO UNMISET East Timor

2002~2004 (680)

UNMIN Nepal (6) 2007~2011

MINUSTAH Haiti (350) 2010~present

UNMISS South Sudan (c.500) 2012~

Non-UN ODO Anti-Terrorism

OEF-MIO Allied Support

Iraq, Gulf of Aden/Djibouti Refugee Relief

Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iraq/Jordan

Disaster Relief Iran, Thailand/Indonesia,

Russia, Pakistan


5 Immediate Findings: Operational Analysis and ODO

Common Issues Slow deployment and logistical limits



Common Issues Slow deployment and logistical limits

Legal and political obstacles○ IPCL as ‘umbrella legislation’

JDA-MOD/JSDF management and culture○ GSDF ‘rotation’, poor ‘jointery’, culture

Poor local intelligence○ Mixed Agency, reliance upon US

Defence investment legacies and policies○ Industrial war priorities in post-modern age


Slow deployment and logistical limits

IPCL limit of 2000 personnel Each mission requires separate

legislation (with exceptions) Rapid deployment disabled by use of ad

hoc units assembled from personnel within a Regional Army

“Alice in Wonderland” approach to unit security (ROE/equipment etc.) pre-1998


Preparation for ODO: Investment ComparisonJapan and UK Air Transport Capability 2006

Japan

Tactical 137

Theatre 16

Strategic 2 (VIP)

Tankers (4)

UK

Tactical 20

Theatre 47

Strategic 17

Tankers 12

Also differences in quality of air-lift capabilities


Preparation for ODO: Investment ComparisonCanada and Australia Air Transport Capability

2006

Canada

Tactical 10

Theatre 25

Strategic 5

(plus contracts)

Tankers 7

Australia

Tactical 13

Theatre 20

Strategic 4

Tankers 2


Preparation for ODO: Investment ComparisonJapan & UK Strategic Sealift & Support Capability

2006

Japan

3 Vessels (Oosumi class)

= 26,700 tons

Also, auxiliary support vessels,

4 AOE 72,550 tons

UK

15 Vessels (6 classes)

= 291,600 tons

12 varied vessels

353,600 tons


Logistical Limitation ExamplesMozambique and Honduras

Mozambique

Antonov charter airlift and schedule airline flights

C-130s: five days No MSDF support,

merchant charter

Honduras

ASDF required half C-130 force to sustain 80-man GSDF medical team

C-130: four days Only one vehicle

and light equipment



Common Issues Slow deployment and logistical limits Poor risk assessment and management

in first generation ODO



Common Issues Slow deployment and logistical limits Poor risk assessment and management

Highly risk averse: form and functionPoor risk-reduction managementImplicit reliance upon collective securityExplicit rejection of collective securityJDA-MOD/JSDF conflict with MoFA


Watanabe Takashi :The PKO in Cambodia-Lessons Learned: 101

What is basic common sense for the militaries of nations taking part in PKOs is not recognized by Japan...

Japanese PKO personnel were only able to defend themselves and other unit members …Moreover, the use of weapons …was left to the judgment of the individual, and appeared to be outside the standards of conduct for troops.



Common Issues Slow deployment and logistical limits Poor risk assessment and management Inadequate preparations and follow-up



Common Issues Slow deployment and logistical limits Poor risk assessment and management Inadequate preparations and follow-up

Training flaws: climate, vaccination, multinational ops, languages, security, ODO-specific issues

Poor intelligence and briefingsFew de-briefs, few lessons learned


5 Immediate Findings: Operational Analysis:

Negative Dissatisfaction with MoFA briefings Little ‘Learning from Others’ No PKO Training Centre (~2007) No ‘Lessons Learned’ Centre (~2008) Little ‘Recycling’ of personnel Poor De-briefing Poor Rotation System for PKO Dispatch No extraction force (~2007 ?)



Positive JSDF Innovations

Collective Security by Stealth (UNTAC, ONUMOZ, Rwanda/ Zaire, UNDOF)

Defrosting ‘frozen activities’ (UNMISET) 2001

HQ presence and close cooperation with non-US partners (ONUMOZ, Iraq)

Local intelligence gathering as CIMIC (UNTAC, Iraq)


5 Immediate Findings: Security Issues and JSDF

ODO Risk Averse

Law, Policy, Missions, Deployments Risk Negligent

Poor camp/unit security, ridiculous limits Risk Accepting

Patrolling by another name Collective Security

De facto collective security (UNTAC, ONUMOZ, UNDOF, Zaire, Honduras)



Positive Technically capable

Water purificationEngineeringMedical assistanceLogistical supportCIMIC (Civilian-Military Cooperation)

Professional


Medical Work of JSDF

Medical MissionsHeavy Zaire/RwandaLight Honduras

Non-Medical MissionsHuman Security Human Care

UNTAC Max. 17 medical personnel- up to 600 patients/day, c.7000 cases in total.- normal workload = 20~40 cases/day


5 JSDF Refugee Relief Unit (RRU) Zaire/Rwanda Sept-

Dec 1994 Division Personnel

• In-patients Out-patients Medical 70 70 2100

Clinical 23 Surgical 18 Hygiene 9 Prevention 16 HQ 4 Combined Daily Average 30

Security 50 Including serious surgery and Water 43 intensive care Administration 68 HQ 29


5 Honduras JDR ODO17th Nov-10th Dec 1998

Division Personnel • In-patients Out-patients • 0 4031 • Daily Average 288

Medical 23 Prevention 15 Support 42

○ Innovation of Tele-medicine (with JSDF Central Hospital and the GSDF School of Field Medicine)


6 Broader Findings: ODO and JapanEffects of ODO upon the JSDF

JSDF self-confidenceGSDF survey December 1974 ~ January 1975, 15,220 personnel

below rank of Lt. Col.

“Do you feel that the work of the SDF is meaningful”:

40.3% Not very much; 45.4% Yes, I do; 6.5% Yes, very much so; 7.8% No.

Equivalent surveys in 1995, 1997, and 2000 revealed positive answers above 75% level. Due both to domestic and overseas operations.

Defense of Japan, 1976, p.118; Defense of Japan 1995~2000, JDA, Tokyo.


6 Broader Findings: ODO and JapanODO Costs

Japan defence budget 2006 $43.7 Billion

Japanese spending (gross), above the MoFA UN PKO contribution:

UNTAC: \11.8 Billion = $102.6 Million (@\115/$1)

ONUMOZ: \2.2 Billion = $19 Million (@\115/$1)

=0.006~0.16% of Japanese defence budgets (1992-95)


6 Broader Findings: ODO and Japan

ODO-Inspired Investments and Innovations GSDF: CRF Central Readiness Force

Force Trainer, Force Provider, Force Consumer ~2007 GSDF: Peacekeeping Training Center ~2008 GSDF: LAV and Type-96 APC ASDF: Freighter-tanker KC-767 (x4) ~2009 MSDF: Oosumi-class (x3) ~1998 Jointery

First Joint ODO 2005 (SEA Tsunami JDR) Allied Cooperation through ODO (Functionalism)

UK, Australia, France, RoK, Netherlands etc.


6 Broader Findings: ODO and JapanPersonnel and Support Issues

JDA 2007 23,262 staff for 259,590 JSDF

UK MoD 2009 87,000 staff for 187,210 military

Japan MOD has c. three times the ratio of military to civilians as Australia

MoFA is also much smaller than the British or French foreign ministries

Japan has very limited and fragmented intelligence capabilities.


6 Broader Findings: ODO and Japan

Effective Actors, Effective Policy?

Generally effective JSDF ODO Confused and contradictory policies,

laws, and rules Constitutional fear (‘code and cloud’) What is gained by such limited ODO? What is the point? ODO as a strategic device? The enigma of leadership


Conclusions

JSDF ODO: Low Cost – Medium Return Introduced new security ‘horizons’ ODO as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for new norms? JSDF as Effective International Actors JSDF stretched by missions Capability gaps: logistics, ‘jointery’, training

etc. As yet, no militarization of policy As yet, strategy as speculation

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12/9/2011_Effective actors_for_international_peace