133106371 Administrative Law Review Notes

8/10/2019 133106371 Administrative Law Review Notes

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QUASI-LEGISLATIVE OR RULE-MAKING POWER

Quasi-legislative or rule-making power in general

Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations whichresults in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and thedoctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. (Smart Communications v. NationalTelecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003)

Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power tomake rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issuerules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making hasbecome a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity andvariety of public functions. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Sutton, G.R. No. 162070,October 19, 2005)

With [the power of subordinate legislation], administrative bodies may implement thebroad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not havethe opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what areknown as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Departmentof Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law. (EasternShipping Lines v. Philippine Overseas Employment Authority, G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988)

Delegation of legislative powers to administrative agencies

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It

obtains not through express provision but by actual division in the framing of ourConstitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters placedwithin its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. Corollary to the doctrine ofseparation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. "The rule is that what hasbeen delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata nondelegari potest ." The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2)of Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

x x x

The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasingcomplexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the



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legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth ofsociety has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that thelegislature cannot be expected to attend to by itself. Specialization even in legislation hasbecome necessary. On many problems involving day-to-day undertakings, the legislature maynot have the needed competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say,specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who aresupposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them. (Echegaray v. Secretary ofJustice, G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998)

The need for delegation of legislative powers

Treason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inabilityof the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. Thegrowth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems thatthe legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation

has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, thelegislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not tosay, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who aresupposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general areparticularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activitiesand their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and morenecessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out thegeneral provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation." (EasternShipping Lines v. Philippine Overseas Employment Authority, G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988)

Requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to administrativeagencies

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated, or as expressed in aLatin maxim: potestats delegata non delegari potest This doctrine is based on the ethicalprinciple that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed bythe delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter oflegislation and not through the intervening mind of another. Congress however may delegate toanother branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcementor administration of a law for the reasons stated above.

Nevertheless, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation ofpowers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it must set forth therein the policy to beexecuted, carried out or implemented by the delegate- and (b) fix a standard – the limits ofwhich are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the delegate must conform in theperformance of his functions. (Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 125498. February 18, 199)



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Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fillin the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestalla violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself - itmust set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate-and (b) fix a standard - the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable - towhich the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. (Echegaray v. Secretaryof Justice, G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998)

[L]egislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced,notwhat the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of thelegislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to thedelegate.

x x x

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation oflegislative power, viz , the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the firsttest, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature suchthat when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under thesufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out theboundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to thedelegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a poweressentially legislative.

The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated, or as expressed in the

Latin maxim: potestas delegate non delegare potest. x x x This rule however admits ofrecognized exceptions such as the grant of rule-making power to administrative agencies. Theyhave been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementationof a law entrusted to them. x x x

However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that thedelegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth thereinthe policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes astandard —the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable —to which thedelegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one whichdefines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the publicagency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to beeffected. (Dagan v. Philippine Racing Commission, G.R. No. 175220, February 12, 2009)

In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not,it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when itleft the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointeeor delegate of the legislature. In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), thiscourt adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so far as itundertook to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing



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the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. The generalrule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left tobe filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers andadministrative boards.

"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to makethe law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring anauthority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."

x x x

It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after itleaves the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certaincontingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particularcommunity. x x x The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. Thereis nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basisof the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of thegovernment. x x x

"x x x In other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do, determines that, under givencircumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under othercircumstances, different of no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrativeofficial is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply theascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of thelaw by which he is governed." "The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must,of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Actshall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate." The legislature then may

provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determinewhen the specified contingencies has arisen. (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, G.R. No. L- 45685, 16 November 16, 1937)

What cannot be delegated: determination of what offense is punishable

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what actsshould constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of thepenalty provided for in the law itself. (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977)

When are standards sufficient for delegation to be valid?

The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring themodel contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in theexercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which,in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect therights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Publicinterest" in People v. Rosenthal "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR "public



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convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams and "simplicity, economy and efficiency"in Cervantes v. Auditor General , to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "senseand experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission , and"national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States . (Eastern Shipping Lines v. PhilippineOverseas Employment Authority, G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988)

Limitations on quasi-legislative power

The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines, hinges oncompliance with the following requisites:

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;

3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;

4. It must be reasonable. (Dagan v. Philippine Racing Commission, G.R. No. 175220,February 12, 2009)

The administrative body may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent withthe provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering orwhich created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. (Dagan v.Philippine Racing Commission, G.R. No. 175220, February 12, 2009)

The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are theproduct of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that havethe effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by thelegislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to theobjects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, thestandards prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions ofthe enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutoryprovisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by anadministrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. Itmay not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of theConstitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or whichare in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a statuteand an administrative order, the former must prevail. (Smart Communications v. National

Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003)

The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rulesand regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene theprovisions of the Constitution. The rule-making power of an administrative agency may notbe used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it beused to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scopeintended . Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules



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and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope oftheir regulations.

x x x

[I]t is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with theprovisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid,they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between anadministrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. (Department of

Agrarian Reform v. Sutton, G.R. No. 162070, October 19, 2005)

Administrative rules must be reasonable

It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not actarbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules andregulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no

reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they mustbe held to be invalid.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on theexaminees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority todictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensureexaminations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure thefulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make useof their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy theirfreedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. (Lupangco v.Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77372, 29 April 1988, 160 SCRA 484)

A rule or regulation need not be expressly stated or provided in the statuebeing implemented

Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in thestatute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. Alegislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primarylegislation by providing the details thereof. All that is required is that the regulation should begermane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction tobut in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. (Holy Spirit Homeowners

Association v. Secretary Michael Defensor, G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006) Fundamental is the precept in administrative law that the rule-making power delegated

to an administrative agency is limited and defined by the statute conferring the power. For thisreason, valid objections to the exercise of this power lie where it conflicts with the authoritygranted by the legislature.

x x x



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Indeed, when an administrative agency enters into the exercise of the specific power ofimplementing a statute, it is bound by what is provided for in the same legislative enactmentinasmuch as its rule-making power is a delegated legislative power which may not be usedeither to abridge the authority given by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge thepower beyond the scope intended. The power may not be validly extended by implicationbeyond what may be necessary for its just and reasonable execution. In other words, thefunction of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for thepurpose of carrying out the provisions of a law, inasmuch as the power is confined toimplementing the law or putting it into effect. Therefore, such rules and regulations must notbe inconsistent with the provisions of existing laws, particularly the statute being administeredand implemented by the agency concerned, that is to say, the statute to which the issuancerelates. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules andregulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields aresubject to regulation by it.

It must be stressed that the DOH issued the rules and regulations implementing theprovisions of R.A. 7305 pursuant to the authority expressly delegated by Congress. Hence, the

DOH, as the delegate administrative agency, cannot contravene the law from which its rule-making authority has emanated. As the cliché goes, the spring cannot rise higher than itssource. In this regard, Fisher observes:

x x x

Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, theauthority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independentsource of power to make laws. Agency rulemaking must rest onauthority granted directly or indirectly by Congress.

Moreover, although an administrative agency is authorized to exercise its discretion inthe exercise of its power of subordinate legislation, nevertheless, no similar authority exists tovalidate an arbitrary or capricious enactment of rules and regulations. Rules which have theeffect of extending or conflicting with the authority-granting statute do not represent a validexercise of rule-making power but constitute an attempt by the agency to legislate. In such asituation, it is said that the issuance becomes void not only for being ultra vires but also forbeing unreasonable. The law therefore prevails over the administrative issuance. (Entitlementto Hazard Pay, A.M. No. 03-9-02-SC, 27 November 2008)

Rules must be published to be effective

Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Art. 2 of the Civil Code, provides that ―lawsshall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in theOfficial Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwiseprovided.‖

In Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court, expounding on the publication requirement, held:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local applicationand private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which



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shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date isfixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orderspromulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever thesame are validly delegated by the legislature, or, at present, directly conferredby the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be publishedif their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a validdelegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters ofinstructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelinesto be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

(Securities and Exchange Commission v. GMA Network, G.R. No. 164026, 23 December

2008)

We have already emphasized and clarified the requirement of publication in this Court’sResolution in Tañada v. Tuvera :

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local applicationand private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity which shallbegin fifteen (15) days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixedby the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orderspromulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever thesame are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred bythe Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also bepublished if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing lawpursuant also to a valid delegation .

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters ofinstructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelinesto be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Dadole v. Commission on Audit , De Jesus v.Commission on Audit, and Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit .

In Tañada vs. Tuvera , the Court held, as follows:



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"We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application andprivate laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall beginfifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgatedby the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validlydelegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution:

Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforceor implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulatingonly the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published.Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by theadministrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by theirsubordinates in the performance of their duties."

Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared as having no force and effect thefollowing administrative issuances: a) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry ofHealth-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditationof hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; b) Letter of Instruction No. 416 ordering thesuspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to thenational government; c) Memorandum Circulars issued by the POEA regulating the recruitmentof domestic helpers to Hong Kong; d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by thePhilippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from thePeople's Republic of China; and e) Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by theDepartment of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of other allowances andfringe benefits to government officials and employees. In all these cited cases, theadministrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were not

published or filed with the National Administrative Register as required by the AdministrativeCode of 1987.

The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the country. It is not a mere internalmemorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to subordinates. Thus, the ECEC shouldcomply with the requirements of the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. (NationalElectrification Administration v. Gonzaga, G.R. No. 158761, 04 December 2007)

Rules must be filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register

The questioned memorandum circular, furthermore, has not been filed with the Office ofthe National Administrative Register of the University of the Philippines Law Center as requiredin the Administrative Code of 1987.

In Philsa International Placement and Services Corp. v. Secretary of Labor andEmployment , Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 of the Philippine OverseasEmployment Administration, which provided for the schedule of placement and documentationfees for private employment agencies or authority holders, was struck down as it was notpublished or filed with the National Administrative Register. (Securities and ExchangeCommission v. GMA Network, G.R. No. 164026, 23 December 2008)



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The questioned memorandum circular, it should be emphasized, cannot be construed assimply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531. This administrative issuance is an implementation ofthe mandate of R.A. No. 3531 and indubitably regulates and affects the public at large. Itcannot, therefore, be considered a mere internal rule or regulation, nor an interpretation of thelaw, but a rule which must be declared ineffective as it was neither published nor filed with theOffice of the National Administrative Register. (Securities and Exchange Commission v. GMANetwork, G.R. No. 164026, 23 December 2008)

Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 ,reinforced the requirement of publication and outlined the procedure, as follows:

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every Agency shall file with the University ofthe Philippines Law Center three (3) Certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules inforce on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) monthsfrom that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party orpersons.

(2) The Records Officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carryout the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency andshall be open to public inspection.

Sec. 4. Effectivity – In addition to other rule-making requirements provided bylaw not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) daysfrom the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, orspecified in this rule.

Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect – Laws shall take effect after Fifteen (15) daysfollowing the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.

(National Electrification Administration v. Gonzaga, G.R. No. 158761, 04 December2007)

A rule that prescribes a penalty for violation should be published before itbecomes effective

Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of theCentral Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published beforebecoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound byits contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be publishedand the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

x x x



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In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant'sconviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did nothave any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or afterNovember 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it wasnot binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in hispossession thereof. (People v. Que Po Lay, G.R. No. L-6791, 29 March 1954)

Circulars to enforce law vs. Circulars to interpret law: Which must bepublished to be effective?

There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule orregulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to anadministrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" anew law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives astatement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated

in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law,partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanctionprovided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, afterexpressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. Thedetails and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agencyentrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are theproduct of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect oflaw.

A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followedand its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not inagreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit. , 195-197). On the

other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courtsthat finally determine what the law means.

Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of theamendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" containedin Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 x x x.

Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation orunderstanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It didnot add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated andcircularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed. 1 (VictoriasMilling v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. L-16704, March 17, 1962)

The fact that the rule is addressed only to a specific group of persons does notobviate the need for publication to be effective

The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely privateemployment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our rulingin Tañada vs. Tuvera . In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, the



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administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namelyPhilippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, andstill the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not beenforced or implemented.

Our pronouncement in Tañada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rulesand regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing lawpursuant to a valid delegation., The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merelyinternal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiorsconcerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance oftheir duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under anyof these exceptions. (Philsa International Placement and Services Corp. v. Secretary ofLabor and Employment, G.R. No. 103144, 04 April 2001)

Instruction from a superior to a subordinate regarding the performance of thelatter’s duties need not be published

In this regard, the Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Yaokasin vs. Commissionerof Customs is misplaced. In the said case, the validity of certain Customs Memorandum Orderswere upheld despite their lack of publication as they were addressed to a particular class ofpersons, the customs collectors, who were also the subordinates of the Commissioner of theBureau of Customs. As such, the said Memorandum Orders clearly fall under one of theexceptions to the publication requirement, namely those dealing with instructions from anadministrative superior to a subordinate regarding the performance of their duties, acircumstance which does not obtain in the case at bench. (Philsa International Placement andServices Corp. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 103144, 04 April 2001)

In Nacu’s defense, petitioners contend that she (Nacu) was not aware of the existenceof Memorandum Order No. 99-003. They aver that there was no evidence showing thatMemorandum Order No. 99-003 was posted, published, and promulgated; hence, it cannot besaid that the order had already taken effect and was being implemented in the BEZ.

At any rate, no publication is required for such a regulation to take effect. MemorandumOrder No. 99-003 is an internal regulation that clearly falls within theadministrative rules andregulations exempted from the publication requirement, as set forth in the prevailing caseof Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera :



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Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters ofinstructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules on guidelinesto be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

(Nacu v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 187752, 23 November 2010)

Rate-fixing is a legislative or quasi-legislative function

A related factor which precludes consideration of the questioned issuance asinterpretative in nature merely is the fact the SEC’s assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 isexceedingly unreasonable and amounts to an imposition. A filing fee, by legal definition, is thatcharged by a public official to accept a document for processing. The fee should be just, fair,and proportionate to the service for which the fee is being collected, in this case, theexamination and verification of the documents submitted by GMA to warrant an extension of itscorporate term.

Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC byR.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courtsto determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the bounds ofits rate- fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a person’s right toproperty. (Securities and Exchange Commission v. GMA Network, G.R. No. 164026, 23December 2008)

In the exercise of rate-fixing power, the rate imposed must be reasonable

and just

The Committee’s authority to fix the selling price of the lots m ay be likened to the rate-fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the onlystandard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrativeauthority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in theabsence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In thisregard, petitioners do not even claim that the selling price of the lots is unreasonable. (HolySpirit Homeowners Association v. Secretary Michael Defensor, G.R. No. 163980, August 3,2006)

Rate fixing as an exercise of quasi-legislative power vs. as an exercise ofquasi-judcial power

In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, we made a categoricalclassification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and whenit is legislative, thus:



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Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates-when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kindthroughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is not the natureof the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein.What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact-based upon a report submitted bythe General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of itsinvested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contentsthereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusiondrawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact,respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the validexercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.

This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of thePhilippines vs. Cloribel, et al. to wit:

It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrativebody is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (SeeOppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If thenature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of noticeand hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects agroup, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determinedaccording to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a policyto a specific individual) ... It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies andProcedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from statute, the necessity of notice andhearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding andthe circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the greatvariety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and

hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrativebody acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but wherea public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts areparticular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rightsor property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.

The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all theattributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertainsexclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, althoughpatently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on aninitial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit ofan explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted acorresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attendingcontingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteenpercent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a betterposition to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates itcharges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricaciesattendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore,inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in itsrates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public



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considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and thefinancial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questionedorder. (Phiippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818, 18 December1989)

As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of anadministrative agency of its quasi-legislative power does not require notice andhearing

As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an administrativeagency of its quasi-legislative power does not require notice and hearing. In Abella, Jr. v. CivilService Commission, this Court had the occasion to rule that prior notice and hearing are notessential to the validity of rules or regulations issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative powerssince there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established orascertained. (Dagan v. Philippine Racing Commission, G.R. No. 175220, February 12, 2009)

Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint thevalidity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamentalrequirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative bodyexercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions,such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with therequirements of notice and hearing. (Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association, G.R. No.111953 December 12, 1997)

Regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the valdity or constitutionalityof a rule or regulation

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulationissued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, theregular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specificrule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution iswithin the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicialreview or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidentialdecree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trialcourts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts todetermine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicialpower includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rightswhich are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has beena grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branchor instrumentality of the Government. (Smart Communications v. National TelecommunicationsCommission, G.R. No. 151908. August 12, 2003)



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QUASI-JUDICIAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATORY POWER

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power in general

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrativeagency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear anddetermine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide inaccordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering thesame law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a

judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where thepower to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of theexecutive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions,the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existenceof facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for theirofficial action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. (Holy Spirit Homeowners

Association v. Secretary Michael Defensor, G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006)

―Quasi- judicial function‖ is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of publicadministrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain theexistence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their officialaction and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.‖ United Residents of Dominican Hills v.COSLAP, G.R. No. 135945, 07 March 2001

The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear anddetermine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide inaccordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering thesame law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva ,[8]described quasi-judicial power in thefollowing manner, viz :

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand isthe power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons beforeit. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which thelegislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laiddown by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. Theadministrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a

judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrativenature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably

necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrustedto it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrativeofficers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain theexistence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and drawconclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise ofdiscretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, itis elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due processmust be observed in the conduct of the proceedings. [Emphasis ours.]

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The Creation of Task Force Maguindanao was impelled by the allegations of fraud andirregularities attending the conduct of elections in the province ofMaguindanao and the non-transmittal of the canvassing documents for all municipalities of said province.

Task Force Maguindanao’s fact -finding investigation – to probe into the veracity of thealleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to determinewhether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election offensehad possibly been committed – could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial oradministrative function.

The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicialpower in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections inMaguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required theattendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argueand support their respective positions. (Bedol v. Commission on Elections, 03 December 2009,G.R. No. 179830)

Quasi-judicial agencies are not courts

However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeitone that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not consideredcourts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicialtribunals .[25] The doctrine of separation of powers observed in our system of governmentreposes the three (3) great powers into its three (3) branches – the legislative, the executive,and the judiciary – each department being co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its ownsphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment

of one of its own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of theSupreme Court, it is empowered ―to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch orinstrumentality of the Government.‖ (United Residents of Dominican Hills v. COSLAP, G.R. No.135945, 07 March 2001)

Jurisdiction of administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions isdetermined by law

Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, mustexist as a matter of law. It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari , prohibition,

and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferredby the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the power toissue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional orstatutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expresslydesignated.

x x x

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In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrativeagency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extentto which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, onthe provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. The grant of original

jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied. There is no question that the legislativegrant of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in all other quasi-judicial agencies, bodies andtribunals, is in the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, the authority to hear anddetermine a class of cases within the DAR’s competence and field of expertise. In conferringadjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the legislature could not have intended tocreate a regular court of justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers inherent inthe exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited

jurisdiction does not include authority over petitions for certiorari , in the absence of an expressgrant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A.

x x xThat the statutes allowed the DARAB to adopt its own rules of procedure does not

permit it with unbridled discretion to grant itself jurisdiction ordinarily conferred only by the

Constitution or by law. Procedure, as distinguished from jurisdiction, is the means by which thepower or authority of a court to hear and decide a class of cases is put into action. Rules ofprocedure are remedial in nature and not substantive. They cover only rules on pleadings andpractice. (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB0 v.Lubrica, G.R. No.159145, 29 April 2005)

Commission on Human Rights has the power to investigate, but notadjudicate

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions

bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly andcategorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rightsviolations involving civil and political rights . It can exercise that power on its own initiative or oncomplaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as itmay adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with theRules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it maygrant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession ofdocuments or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may alsorequest the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of itsfunctions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required byits findings.

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice,or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in thepopular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve orprobe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or studyclosely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe. . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to



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find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling,deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the lawto the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by stepby patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire intowith care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; alegal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as"(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 AmJ2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection offacts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally(the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass

judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or ruleupon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in acase of controversy . . . ."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. Todetermine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "Topass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicialdetermination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "toinvestigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the mattersinvolved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775. (Carino v. Commission on Human Rights,G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991 204 SCRA 483)

Requirements of Due process in administrative proceedings

In essence, procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law isenforced."

The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of noticeand a real opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar,procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity toseek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. "To be heard" does not mean onlyverbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to beheard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of proceduraldue process.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to includethe following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedingswhich may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally orwith the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend



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one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford aperson charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted forconsideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the partiesaffected. (Casimiro v. Tandog, G.R. No. 146137, 08 June 2005)

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to includethe following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedingswhich may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally orwith the assistance of cou nsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defendone’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford aperson charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted forconsideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the partiesaffected. (Acuzar v. Joroloan, G.R. No. 177878, 07 April 2010)

Due process in administrative proceedings does not require trial-type hearing

Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require atrial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge againsthim and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, thefiling of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer theaccusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence ofdue process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunityto explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or rulingcomplained of.

Petitioner’s plaint that he did not fully appreciate the nature of the charges against himbecause the ATO even without an ostensible complainant against him failed to state orannounce that petitioner was being charged with falsification, is incorrect. The subpoena issuedto him cl early stated that petitioner should appear before the panel investigating his ―allegedfalsification of the AEB examination results.‖ (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166780,27 December 2007)

In the instant case, petitioner was notified of the complaint against him and in fact, hehad submitted his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses. He attended thehearings together with his counsel and even asked for several postponements. Petitionertherefore cannot claim that he had been denied of due process. Due process in an

administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings isaccorded, there is no denial of due process. The requirements are satisfied where the partiesare afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. In otherwords, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrativeagency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidencesubmitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of directtestimony. Here, we note that petitioner had more than enough opportunity to present his side



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and adduce evidence in support of his defense; thus, he cannot claim that his right to dueprocess has been violated. (Acuzar v. Joroloan, G.R. No. 177878, 07 April 2010)

in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence arenot strictly applied

[P]etitioners assail the credibility of Ligan’s statement because it was not made underoath and Ligan was not presented as witness during the hearing. Nacu was allegedly denieddue process when she was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Ligan.

It is settled that, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure andevidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with dueprocess in its strict judicial sense. In a recent case, a party likewise protested against the non-presentation of a witness during trial and the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the said

witness. Addressing the issue, the Court held that the contention was unavailing, stating that -In another case, the Court addressed a similar contention by stating that

the petitioner therein could not argue that she had been deprived of due processmerely because no cross-examination took place. [Citing Casimiro v. Tandog ,459 SCRA 624, 633 (2005)]. Indeed, in administrative proceedings, due processis satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity toexplain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for areconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

The measure of due process to be observed by administrative tribunals allows a certaindegree of latitude as long as fairness is not compromised. It is, therefore, not legallyobjectionable or violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case basedsolely on position papers, affidavits, or documentary evidence submitted by the parties, asaffidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimonies. (Nacu v. Civil ServiceCommission, G.R. No. 187752, 23 November 2010)

It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedureand evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated withdue process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to beheard before the case against him is decided. (Montemayor v. Bundalian, G.R. No. 149335. 01July 2003)

The absence of a complainant also did not affect the regularity of the investigation. Asopposed to a regular trial court, an administrative agency, vested with quasi-judicial functions,may investigate an irregularity on its own initiative. Particularly in the instant case, theoverriding considerations of public safety warranted the investigation of the falsification of thesubject ATO-AEB certification, which allowed petitioner to undergo training despite his lack ofqualifications. (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166780, 27 December 2007)



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Administrative due process does not guarantee right to cross-examination ofwitness

[P]etitioner submits that the PCAGC committed infractions of the cardinal rules ofadministrative due process when it relied on Bundalian’s unverified letter -complaint. He gripesthat his counter-affidavit should have been given more weight as the unverified complaint

constitutes hearsay evidence. Moreover, petitioner insists that in ruling against him, the PCAGCfailed to respect his right to confront and cross-examine the complainant as the latter neverappeared in any of the hearings before the PCAGC nor did he send a representative therein.

We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in administrativeproceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the action orruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before

judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. In the case at bar, thePCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residencecould not be located. Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of dueprocess because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarilysubmitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He wasduly represented by counsel. He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence,attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12 issued bythe President and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His activeparticipation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of proceduraldeficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now beallowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation. (Montemayor v.Bundalian, G.R. No. 149335. 01 July 2003)

Right to counsel is not imperative in administrative proceedings

The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspectin a criminal case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where thepolice investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focuson a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process ofinterrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions areinitiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwisedeprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches onlyupon the start of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2),Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation butnot to those made in an administrative investigation.

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to acriminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrativeinquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and ofthe respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish theperson being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has theoption of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V ofExecutive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Thus, theright to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries



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are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measureagainst erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity ofgovernment service. As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating authority is not partof a criminal prosecution.

In the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any crime in the investigation

conducted by the CSC field office. The investigation was conducted for the purpose ofascertaining the facts and whether there is a prima facie evidence sufficient to form a beliefthat an offense cognizable by the CSC has been committed and that Remolona is probablyguilty thereof and should be administratively charged. Perforce, the admissions made byRemolona during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify his dismissal. (Remolonav. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 137473, 02 August 2001)

However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Billof Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionaryrule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in acriminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to acriminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrativeinquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and ofpetitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty res ts on such body to furnish the personbeing investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrativeinvestigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there arefacts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers andemployees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.

As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the investigation may be used as

evidence to justify her dismissa. (Carbonnel v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 187689, 07September 2010)

Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine acontroversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrativediscretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrativetribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized

training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in anadministrative proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the matter may well bewithin the latter's proper jurisdiction.

The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determiningwhether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency hasdetermined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding beforethe court. (Nestle Phils. v. Uniwide Sales Inc., G.R. No. 174674, 10 October 2010)





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Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: Exceptions in general

Pure questions of law exception

[T]he doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. In Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap , this Court enumeratedthe numerous exceptions to these rules, namely:

(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;

(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;

(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice

the complainant;

(d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical andoppressive;

(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided bythe courts of justice;

(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;

(g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage;

(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;

(i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been renderedmoot;

(j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;

(k) where strong public interest is involved; and

(l) in quo warranto proceedings. In the present case, conditions (c) and (e) are present.

The government project contracted out to respondent was completed almost twodecades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant governmentoffice or agency will definitely prejudice respondent. (Vigilar v. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388,January 18, 2011)

[T]he principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of casesis not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by thepeculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is



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disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, 2) when the issue involved is purely alegal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excessof jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,

(5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whoseacts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7)when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when itwould amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in landcase proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. (Paat v.Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997)

Pure questions of law: Exception to the doctrine of exhaustion ofadministrative remedies

More importantly, the issues in the present case involve the validity and theenforceability of the ―Contract of Agreement‖ entered into by the parties. These are questions

purely of law and clearly beyond the expertise of the Commission on Audit or the DPWH. InLacap , this Court said:

... It does not involve an examination of the probative value of theevidence presented by the parties. There is a question of law when the doubt ordifference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as tothe truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said question at best could beresolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decisionon the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice.Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothingof an administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not

require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involvethe interpretation and application of law. (Emphasis supplied.)

(Vigilar v. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011)

It is true that one of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrativeremedies is when the issues raised are purely legal. However, the Court is not persuaded byrespondent's contention that the special civil action for certiorari it filed with the CA involvedonly purely legal questions and did not raise factual issues. A perusal of the petitionfor certiorari filed by respondent readily shows that factual matters were raised. (Public HearingCommittee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, G.R. No. 170599,22 September 2010)

Exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only when the assailed act wasin the exercise of quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function, not quasi-legislative orrule —making power

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by anadministrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going tocourt. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was



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performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to itsrule-making or quasi-legislative power. In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v.Philippine Coconut Authority , it was held:

The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party mayseek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf ofrespondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued bythe PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative power. However, only judicialreview of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicialfunction is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. (Smart Communications v. NationalTelecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908. August 12, 2003)

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only when the assailed act is in theexercise of quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function

In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrativeagency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized

disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of specialcompetence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine acontroversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunalprior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the questiondemands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricatematters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of theregulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guidea court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after anadministrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arisingin the proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally cognizable in thecourts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issueswhich, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of anadministrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of suchissues to the administrative body for its view. (Smart Communications v. NationalTelecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908. August 12, 2003)

Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine acontroversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrativediscretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrativetribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in anadministrative proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the matter may well bewithin the latter's proper jurisdiction.

The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determiningwhether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency hasdetermined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding beforethe court. (Nestle Phils. v. Uniwide Sales Inc., G.R. No. 174674, 10 October 2010)

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Res judicata applies in administrative proceedings

Literally, res judicata means ―a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or

decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.‖ It lays the rule that an existing final judgmentor decree rendered on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties ortheir privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent

jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.

In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals , we enumerated the elements of res judicata asfollows:

a) The former judgment or order must be final;

b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered aftera consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of thecase;

c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subjectmatter and the parties; and

d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, ofsubject matter and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two (2) actionsare substantially between the same parties.

x x x

This Court has held time and again that a final and executory judgment, no matter howerroneous, cannot be changed even by this Court:

Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality itthereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified inany respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to bean erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether themodification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highestcourt of the land. x x x.

There can be no mistake as to the presence of all the elements of res judicata in thiscase. The parties, although later substituted by their respective successors-in-interest, havebeen the same from the very beginning and in all the proceedings affecting the subjectfishpond area. The concerned agencies and the lower courts have validly ruled on the rights tothe subject fishpond area, the validity of the documents covering it, and even the actionsassociated and related to it. The subject fishpond area is undoubtedly the same subject matterinvolved in O.P. Case No. 4732 and the petition now before us. With regard to the identity ofthe causes of action, this Court, in Mendiola v. Court of Appeal s [ held that:

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The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action but onwhether the same evidence would support and establish the former and thepresent causes of action. The difference of actions in the aforesaid cases is ofno moment. x x x.

The similarity between the two causes of action cannot be impugned. The facts andevidence which supported Catalina’s petition for revival of Hipolito’s fishpo nd sales application inO.P. Case No. 4732 are the same facts and evidence now before us; hence, the difference ofactions in the two cases is of no moment. In O.P. Case No. 4732, the action was to reviveHipolito’s fishpond sales application, which, when granted, gave the respondents the right tothe subject fishpond area, eventually leading to their ownership over the same. The action inCivil Case No. 97-15, the case that was elevated to become this petition, is for the nullificationof the respondents ’ respective titles to the subject fishpond area on the ground that therespondents have no right thereto. If we allow the nullification of these titles on the groundpresented by the petitioners, then we would also be nullifying the decision in O.P. Case No.4732, because it is the decision in that case which gave the respondents the right to the subject

fishpond area.

Notwithstanding the difference in the forms of the two actions, the doctrine of res judicata still applies considering that the parties were litigating over the same subject fishpondarea. More importantly, the same contentions and evidence as advanced by the petitioners inthis case were already used to support their arguments in the previous cause of action.

The petitioners argue that res judicata cannot apply to this case because O.P. Case No.4732 is an administrative case.

While it is true that this Court has declared that the doctrine of res judicata applies onlyto judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers, wehave also limited the latter to proceedings purely administrative in nature. Therefore, when theadministrative proceedings take on an adversary character, the doctrine of res judicata certainlyapplies. As this Court held in Fortich v. Corona [:

The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judiciallydetermined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-

judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boardsacting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general

judicial powers. (Emphasis ours.)

(Derla v. Derla, G.R. No. 157717, 13 April 2011)

Evidence required in administrative proceedings

On the second issue, there is a need to lay down the basic principles in administrativeinvestigations. First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence theallegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It






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means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support aconclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Second,in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings offacts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantialevidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determinethe credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrativeagency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in matterswithin the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion,fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examinethe sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, anddo not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to theadministrative agency concerned. (Montemayor v. Bundalian, G.R. No. 149335. 01 July 2003)

Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings,means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support aconclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable groundto believe that a person is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence

might not be overwhelming or even preponderant . (Nacu v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.187752, 23 November 2010)

Review of administrative adjudication: Findings of facts of administrativeagencies entitled to great respect, and even finality by the courts

The general rule is that where the findings of the administrative body are amplysupported by substantial evidence, such findings are accorded not only respect but also finality,and are binding on this Court. It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflictingevidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for

that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence. Thus, when confronted withconflicting versions of factual matters, it is for the administrative agency concerned in theexercise of discretion to determine which party deserves credence on the basis of the evidencereceived. The rule, therefore, is that courts of justice will not generally interfere with purelyadministrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agenciesunless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretionor when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action mayamount to an excess of jurisdiction. (Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 137473,02 August 2001)

In reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, thefindings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantialevidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determinethe credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrativeagency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Administrative decisions in matters withinthe executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, orerror of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine thesufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and donot authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the



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administrative agency concerned. (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166780, 27December 2007)

Factual findings made by quasi-judicial bodies and administrative agencies whensupported by substantial evidence are accorded great respect and even finality by the appellatecourts. This is because administrative agencies possess specialized knowledge and expertise intheir respective fields. As such, their findings of fact are binding upon this Court unless there isa showing of grave abuse of discretion, or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived atarbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. (Japson v. Civil Service Commission, G.R.No. 189479, April 12, 2011)

Factual findings of the NLRC affirming those of the Labor Arbiter, both bodies beingdeemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdictions, when sufficientlysupported by evidence on record, are accorded respect if not finality, and are consideredbinding on this Court. As long as their decisions are devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness inthe process of their deduction from the evidence proffered by the parties, all that is left is forthe Court to stamp its affirmation and declare its finality. (Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc. v.

Albayda Jr., G.R. No. 172724, August 23, 2010)

Documents

133106371 Administrative Law Review Notes