G.R. No. 47800.  December 2, 1940

MAXIMO CALALANG, petitioner, vs. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., respondents.Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.

The case of Calalang vs Williams is known for the elegant exposition of the definition of social justice.  In this case, Justice Laurel defined social justice as “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy” but humanization of laws and equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

As I browse through the entire case, I found out that there is more to this case than the definition of social justice.  In fact, another important issue raised here is whether there was a valid delegation of power by the National Assembly to the Director of Public Works.  Let us begin with the facts of the case.

FACTS:

In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets  to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads, the Director of Public Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission, prohibiting the passing of animal drawn vehicles in certain streets in Manila.  Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUES: 

Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power?

RULING:

There is no undue deleagation of legislative power.  Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works.  The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.”

The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.

To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. 

It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

RUBI VS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

FACTS: 

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on thisreservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

ISSUE: 

Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

HELD: 

The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. 

“Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. 

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. 

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

US vs. ANG TANG HO (February 17, 1922)Ponente: Johns, J.

FACTS:

1919: Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2686 penalized the monopoly and hoarding of, as well as speculation in, palay, rice and corn under extraordinary circumstances regulated the distribution and sale thereof authorized the Governor-General to issue necessary rules and regulations pursuant therefor (see p. 3-4 with regard to pertinent sections being assailed)

August 1, 1919: Gov-Gen issued proclamation fixing price at which rice should be sold (EO #53)

August 8: complaint was filed against defendant Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price – he was subsequently tried, found guilty, and sentenced to 5 months’ imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500.

Present case is an appeal, with petitioner alleging that the lower court erred in: Finding EO #53 to of any force and effect Finding him guilty of the offense charged Imposing the sentence

ISSUE:

WON Act No. 2868 delegates legislative power to the Governor-General (such delegation being violative of the Constitution) YES, therefore, it is unconstitutional and void; lower court’s decision was reversed and petitioner was discharged

RATIO:

In the analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, insofar as it authorizes the Gov-Gen to fix the price at which rice should be sold, it can be gathered that legislative power to enact law, which is constitutionally granted to the Legislature, is lodged in the Executive.

The promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures was left to the discretion of the Gov-Gen. The Legislature did not specify or define what conditions or for what reasons the Gov-Gen shall issue the proclamation – the Act states that it can be issued “for any cause”. The Legislature did not specify or define what is an “extraordinary rise” in the price of rice (wow, nag-rhyme), the causes of which shall supposedly be prevented by such proclamation. The Act did not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. In the absence of the proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. It follows that if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Gov-Gen issued the proclamation. No act of the Legislature made it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was not a crime. It is the violation of the proclamation, not of Act 2868, which constitutes the crime.

The power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Gov-Gen or anyone else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law; it can only pass a law that does nothing more than to authorize the Gov-Gen to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect.

Ponente states several US cases. ie. State v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co: “The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring an authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.”

HELD:

Act No. 2868, insofar as it undertakes to authorize the Gov-Gen in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 

FACTS:  

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders. 

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable. 

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.  The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.  Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat.  It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.  That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity. 

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process.  It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.  The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) 

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.  Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. 

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;

2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation. 

HELD: 

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.  This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication. 

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.  A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. 

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. 

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. 

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity.  The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. 

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. 

J. Cruz: 

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.  Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.  The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

Tanada v. Tuvera [ GR L-63915, 29 December 1986]

Resolution En Banc, Cruz (p) : 8 concurring.

FACTS: 

On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges.

Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. February Revolution took place, which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).

The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

1. Publication imperative

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided,” in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.

2. Scope of laws requiring publication

The term “laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to “fill in the details” of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.Publication requirements does not apply to (1) interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e. regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public; (2) Letters of Instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties; and (3) instructions of Ministry heads on case studies, assignments of personnel, etc. Municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

3. Publication must be full

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., “with Secretary Tuvera”), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement.

4. Medium of Publication

It should be published in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere. Even if newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly, this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law.

5. Publication essential for due process

Omission of publication would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Publication is required, even if their enactment is “otherwise provided” or effective immediately.

6. Right to information

Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes “the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,” and this certainly applies to, among others, the legislative enactments of the government.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10202            March 29, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS Ex Rel. THE MUNICIPALITY OF CARDONA, plaintiff, vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN, ET AL., defendants.

Modesto Reyes and Eliseo Ymzon for plaintiff.Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus and Roberto Moreno for defendants.

MORELAND, J.:

This is an action by the municipality of Cardona to prohibit perpetually the municipality of Binangonan from exercising municipal authority over the barrios of Tatala, Balatik, Nambug, Tutulo, Mahabang Parang, Nagsulo, and Bonot.

The complaint alleges that the municipality of Binangonan is now exercising governmental authority over the barrios named, to the exclusion of the municipality of Cardona; that such authority is exercised by the municipality of Binangonan by reason of Executive Order No. 66, series of 1914, issued by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands on the 1st day of July, 1914, which reads as follows:

Pursuant to the provisions of section one of Act Numbered seventeen hundred and forty-eight, the boundary line between the municipalities of Binangonan and Cardona, in the Province of Rizal, is hereby defined and fixed as follows, viz:

On the mainland, beginning on the north at the intersection of the Morong River and the existing Binangonan boundary, thence in a southerly and westerly direction to Mapulanglupa (otherwise called Santol), where a partially destroyed monument now exists; thence in a direct southeasterly line to the summit of Mountain Tutulo; and thence to the Laguna de Bay; thus embracing within the limits of the municipality of Binangonan the barrios or sitios of Tatala, Balatik, Nambug, Tutulo, Mahabang Parang, Nagsulo, Sampad, and Bonot.

On the Island of Talim, that portion of the island embraced within points known as Kaymaralina and Virgen-Bato, on the eastern coast and extending to the summits of the range of hills geographically dividing the land, is hereby confirmed as being embraced within the jurisdiction of the municipality of Cardona; and the remainder of the island, including the small off-lying islands of Bunga, Olahipan, and Malake, as being embrace within the jurisdiction of the municipality of Binangonan.

Action will at once be taken to survey the boundary line herein fixed and to establish monuments demarcating same.

The plaintiff further alleges that the executive order referred to and above quoted and the Act under which it was issued are "unconstitutional" in that said Act confers on the Governor-General legislative authority; and that the Governor-General in promulgating said order usurped legislative functions. Plaintiff also claims that the order is void because it does not contain a statement that the change in the division line between the said municipalities was required by the public good; and that it does not appear in said order itself that there was a present urgency requiring the promulgation of such an order.

The defendant municipality demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The question before us is that presented by the demurrer.

We do not think that plaintiff's objections are well founded. No reason has been given why the Act is unconstitutional and no argument or citation of authorities has been presented on that subject. Every Act of the legislature is presumed to be constituted until the contrary is clearly shown; and no showing of unconstitutionality having been made in this case, the objection to the order of the Governor-General based on that ground must be overruled. The other two objections are frivolous. Although it be admitted, for the sake of argument, that the Governor-General ought not to make such an order unless the public good requires it, that fact need not be stated in the order. The same may be said with regard to its urgency. The Governor-General

having full authority to promulgate such an order this court will assume, if it should act on the matter at all, that there was public necessity therefor and that the matter was of such urgency as properly to evoke action by the Chief Executive.

The demurrer to the complaint is sustained and unless an amendment thereof is made within five days from the service of a copy of this order eliminating the objections stated in this decision, the action will be dismissed on the merits. So ordered.

Torres, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-4043             May 26, 1952

CENON S. CERVANTES, petitioner, vs.THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

Cenon Cervantes in his own behalf.Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for respondent.

REYES, J.:

This is a petition to review a decision of the Auditor General denying petitioner's claim for quarters allowance as manager of the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation, otherwise known as the NAFCO.

It appears that petitioner was in 1949 the manager of the NAFCO with a salary of P15,000 a year. By a resolution of the Board of Directors of this corporation approved on January 19 of that year, he was granted quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month effective the first of that month. Submitted the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises Council for approval, the said resolution was on August 3, 1949, disapproved by the said Committee on strenght of the recommendation of the NAFCO auditor, concurred in by the Auditor General, (1) that quarters allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general manager thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000 a year, and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did not warrant the granting of such allowance.

On March 16, 1949, the petitioner asked the Control Committee to reconsider its action and approve his claim for allowance for January to June 15, 1949, amounting to P1,650. The claim was again referred by the Control Committee to the auditor General for comment. The latter, in turn referred it to the NAFCO auditor, who reaffirmed his previous recommendation and emphasized that the fact that the corporation's finances had not improved. In view of this, the auditor General also reiterated his previous opinion against the granting of the petitioner's claim and so informed both the Control Committee and the petitioner. But as the petitioner insisted on his claim the Auditor General Informed him on June 19, 1950, of his refusal to modify his decision. Hence this petition for review.

The NAFCO was created by the Commonwealth Act No. 332, approved on June 18, 1939, with a capital stock of P20,000,000, 51 per cent of which was to be able to be subscribed by the National Government and the remainder to be offered to provincial, municipal, and the city governments and to the general public. The management the corporation was vested in a board of directors of not more than 5 members appointed by the president of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. But the corporation was made subject to the provisions of the corporation law in so far as they were compatible with the provisions of its charter and the purposes of which it was created and was to enjoy the general powers mentioned in the corporation law in addition to those granted in its charter. The members of the board were to receive each a per diem of not to exceed P30 for each day of meeting actually attended, except the chairman of the board, who was to be at the same time the general manager of the corporation and to receive a salary not to exceed P15,000 per annum.

On October 4, 1946, Republic Act No. 51 was approved authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other things, to effect such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation Pursuant to this authority, the President on October 4, 1947, promulgated Executive Order No. 93 creating the Government Enterprises Council to be composed of the President of the Philippines as chairman, the Secretary of Commerce and Industry as vice-chairman, the chairman of the board of directors and managing heads of all such corporations as ex-officio members, and such additional members as the President might appoint from time to time with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The council was to advise the President in the excercise of his power of supervision and control over these corporations and to formulate and adopt such policy and measures as might be necessary to coordinate their functions and activities. The Executive Order also provided that the council was to have a Control Committee

composed of the Secretary of Commerce and Industry as chairman, a member to be designated by the President from among the members of the council as vice-chairman and the secretary as ex-officio member, and with the power, among others —

(1) To supervise, for and under the direction of the President, all the corporations owned or controlled by the Government for the purpose of insuring efficiency and economy in their operations;

(2) To pass upon the program of activities and the yearly budget of expenditures approved by the respective Boards of Directors of the said corporations; and

(3) To carry out the policies and measures formulated by the Government Enterprises Council with the approval of the President. (Sec. 3, Executive Order No. 93.)

With its controlling stock owned by the Government and the power of appointing its directors vested in the President of the Philippines, there can be no question that the NAFCO is Government controlled corporation subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 51 and the executive order (No. 93) promulgated in accordance therewith. Consequently, it was also subject to the powers of the Control Committee created in said executive order, among which is the power of supervision for the purpose of insuring efficiency and economy in the operations of the corporation and also the power to pass upon the program of activities and the yearly budget of expenditures approved by the board of directors. It can hardly be questioned that under these powers the Control Committee had the right to pass upon, and consequently to approve or disapprove, the resolution of the NAFCO board of directors granting quarters allowance to the petitioners as such allowance necessarily constitute an item of expenditure in the corporation's budget. That the Control Committee had good grounds for disapproving the resolution is also clear, for, as pointed out by the Auditor General and the NAFCO auditor, the granting of the allowance amounted to an illegal increase of petitioner's salary beyond the limit fixed in the corporate charter and was furthermore not justified by the precarious financial condition of the corporation.

It is argued, however, that Executive Order No. 93 is null and void, not only because it is based on a law that is unconstitutional as an illegal delegation of legislature power to executive, but also because it was promulgated beyond the period of one year limited in said law.

The second ground ignores the rule that in the computation of the time for doing an act, the first day is excluded and the last day included (Section 13 Rev. Ad. Code.) As the act was approved on October 4, 1946, and the President was given a period of one year within which to promulgate his executive order and that the order was in fact promulgated on October 4, 1947, it is obvious that under the above rule the said executive order was promulgated within the period given.

As to the first ground, the rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is established by the statute" there is no undue delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.

It is also contended that the quarters allowance is not compensation and so the granting of it to the petitioner by the NAFCO board of directors does not contravene the provisions of the NAFCO charter that the salary of the chairman of said board who is also to be general manager shall not exceed P15,000 per anum. But regardless of whether quarters allowance should be considered as compensation or not, the resolution of the board of the directors authorizing payment thereof to the petitioner cannot be given effect since it was disapproved by the Control Committee in the exercise of powers granted to it by Executive Order No. 93. And in any event, petitioner's contention that quarters allowance is not compensation, a proposition on which American authorities appear divided, cannot be insisted on behalf of officers and employees working for the Government of the Philippines and its Instrumentalities, including, naturally, government-controlled corporations. This is so because Executive Order No. 332 of 1941, which prohibits the payment of additional compensation to those working for the Government and its Instrumentalities, including government-controlled corporations, was in 1945 amended by Executive Order No. 77 by expressly exempting from the prohibition the payment of quarters allowance "in favor of local government officials and employees entitled to this under existing law." The amendment is a clear indication that quarters allowance was meant to be included in the term "additional compensation", for otherwise the amendment would not have expressly

excepted it from the prohibition. This being so, we hold that, for the purpose of the executive order just mentioned, quarters allowance is considered additional compensation and, therefore, prohibited.

In view of the foregoing, the petition for review is dismissed, with costs.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

In People v. Maceren (79 SCRA 450, 458 and 460), this Court ruled that:

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971,42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue v. Villamor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 665, 676; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).

xxx xxx xxx

... The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).

In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091)

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 140128            June 6, 2001

ARNOLD P. MOLLANEDA, petitioner, vs.LEONIDA C. UMACOB, respondent.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the (a) Decision1 dated May 14, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48902 affirming in toto Resolution No. 973277 of the Civil Service Commission; and (b) Resolution2 dated August 26, 1999 of the said court denying the motion for reconsideration of its Decision.

The case stemmed from the affidavit-complaint for sexual harassment filed by Leonida Umacob (respondent) against Arnold Mollaneda (petitioner) with the Civil Service Commission - Regional Office XI, Davao City (CSC-RO XI) in September 1994 alleging:

"That sometime on September 7, 1994 at around 7:30 o'clock more or less, in the morning, while inside the office of Mr. Rolando P. Suase, Admin Officer 2 of Davao City Schools, located at the Division Office Building, along Palma Gil St., Davao City, to follow-up my request for transfer from my present assignment to either Buhangin District or Bangoy District, Davao City, Mr. Rolando P. Suase was not around and it was school Division Superintendent, Mr. Arnold P. Mollaneda who was seated at his (Rolando's) table, as at the time, the office of Mr. Arnold Mollaneda just adjacent was being cleaned by a janitor.

That immediately I approached him and seated opposite to him and handed to him my letter of recommendation from DECS Regional Director, Region XI, Dr. Ramon Y. Alba, recommending my possible transfer and after reading the same advised her to return next week as there is no available item and that he will think about it. However, I insisted that he will give me a note to fix the time and date of our next meeting and or appointment at his office. At this instance, he handed me a piece of paper with his prepared signature and requested me to write my name on it, after which, he took it back from me and assured me to grant my request and at the same time, he made some notations on the same piece of paper below my name, indicating my possible transfer to Buhangin or Bangoy District of which I thanked him for the accomodation. At this point, he stood up, bringing along with him the paper so that I also stood up. However, before I could get outside the office, he then handed to me the said piece of paper and advised me to give it to a certain May Pescadero, personnel clerk, for the making/cutting of the order of transfer. All of a sudden he hugged and embraced me, then he kissed my nose and lip in a torrid manner. That I tried to resist but he forcibly held my neck so that he was able to kiss me in an easy way. That - not contented, he then mashed my left breast. He did the malicious act for several times, afterwhich he warned me not to tell anybody what he did to me inside the office.

That as a result of the very unfortunate incident, I was so shocked, that I was not able to speak or talk or confess to my husband what our School Superintendent did to me. Likewise, I also informed one Venus Mariano, also DECS employee, who advised me to stay and remain calm. However, I decided to report the matter to San Pedro Patrol Station."3 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent furnished the Department of Education, Culture and Sports - Regional Office XI, Davao City (DECS-RO XI) a copy of her affidavit-complaint. Thus, on September 30, 1994, Regional Director Susana Cabahug issued an order4 directing the formation of a committee to conduct an investigation of respondent's complaint against petitioner.

On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed with the CSC-RO XI his answer to the affidavit-complaint denying the allegations therein and alleging that there are "material contradictions," in respondent's version of the incident, thus:

"1) On the date of the alleged happening of the incident, she was with her husband who was just outside the Office of Mr. Mollaneda according to witness Security Guard Raul Moncada, but she did not report the incident to her husband, nor did she register any complaint on that date September 7, 1994;

She reported the alleged acts of lasciviousness complained of to the police only the following day, September 8, 1994, at about 3:45 P.M. as shown by the extract of the entry of the police blotter attached to her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT in this case.

2) In her report to the police as shown by the said police blotter, she said that "While at the office of Mr. Arnold Mollaneda, Division Superintendent DECS XI, she was requested by the latter to transfer in the office of Mr. Rolando Suase as the janitor/security guard was cleaning the room of the respondent."

And her version as published in The Mindanao Daily Mirror in the issue of September 10, 1994 (see ANNEX C of the complaint of Mollaneda to the City Prosecution Office). "Omacob said Mollaneda in a written note told her to transfer to the room of a certain Rolando Suase since the janitor will clean his room. But before she could move to the other room Mollaneda allegedly hugged, kissed and mashed her breast and told her not to tell it to anybody."

3) In her instant Affidavit-Complaint, she again says "while inside the Office of Mr. Rolando P. Suase x x x to follow-up my request for transfer x x x Mr. Suase was not around and it was Schools Division Superintendent, Mr. Arnold P. Mollaneda who was seated at his (Rolando) table, as at that time, the Office of Mr. Arnold P. Mollaneda just adjacent was being cleaned by a janitor x x x." It was inside the office of Mr. Suase that she was given a note on her request for transfer by Mr. Mollaneda to be given to May Pescadero when "At this point, he stood up bringing along with him the paper so that I also stood-up, however, before I could get outside the office, he then handed to me the said piece of paper and advised me to give it to a certain May Pescadero, personnel clerk for the making/cutting of the order of transfer and at the same time all of a sudden, he hug and embraced me, then he kissed my nose and lips in a torrid manner. That I tried to resist but he forcibly held my neck so that he was able to kiss me in an easy way. That not contented, he then mashed my left breast, which he did the malicious act for several times, afterwhich he warned me not to tell anybody what he did to me inside the office."5

In the present petition, petitioner alleged his own version of the incident,6 thus:

"Petitioner, in his sworn statement, stated that on September 7, 1994, he had interviewed or conferred with about three (3) persons already who were applying for new teaching positions or for transfers when Respondent came to HIS OFFICE. When it was her turn to be interviewed, petitioner told her that she could not be transferred immediately because the Division only had very few vacant items and the same were already given to earlier applicants. Nevertheless, she was told to wait while he searched for a new vacant item.

Petitioner gave the Respondent a note for her to give to the Acting Personnel Officer Mildred "May" Pescadero so that Respondent may be included in the list of teachers applying for transfer. Upon reading the note, however, the Respondent angrily told him why could she not be immediately accommodated when she had the written recommendation of Dir. Ramon Alba. She told Petitioner that asking her to wait was unfair because there were other applicants from Marilog district who were transferred and one of them who was slated to be transferred was Mrs. Daylinda Bacoy.

Petitioner explained to the Respondent that Mrs. Bacoy suffered an injury when she fell off the horse she was riding on when she went to her school in Kiopao Elementary School. Petitioner scolded the Respondent for her insubordinate attitude toward him. She was counting so much on the recommendation of Dir. Ramon Alba who was Petitioner's superior, and could not believe that no positive action was made by Petitioner on the basis of said recommendation. In going OUT OF THE OFFICE OF PETITIONER, she was heard to have murmured that Petitioner would regret his act of discrimination.

There was no act of sexual harassment that occurred during the relatively brief conversation between the herein parties. The witnesses, whose affidavits were attached to the Affidavit of Mr. Mollaneda, all swore to the fact that they saw what transpired between Petitioner and the Respondent and that there was no act of sexual harassment that occurred. Moreover, they swore to the fact that the interview took place inside Mr. Mollaneda's office as the both parties were seen through a glass panel separating Petitioner's office and the anteroom."

Meanwhile, pending resolution by the CSC-RO XI of respondent's complaint, the DECS investigating committee recommended to the DECS Regional Director "the dropping of the case" for lack of merit.7

On June 5, 1995, the CSC-RO XI issued a resolution charging petitioner with grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The said office found there was a prima facie case against him8 and eventually elevated to the Civil Service Commission (Commission) the records of the case.

Thereafter, the Commission designated Atty. Anacleto Buena to hear and receive the evidence in the case. A formal hearing was conducted in Davao City. Both parties were assisted by counsel.

On July 7, 1997, the Commission issued Resolution No. 973277 finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He was meted the penalty of dismissal from the government service with all its accessory penalties.9 Forthwith, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in Resolution No. 981761.10

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review alleging: "first, that the Commission erred in finding him guilty x x x notwithstanding the fact that he was denied his right to due process; and second, that the Commission erred in giving weight to the hearsay testimonies of the witnesses for respondent."11

On May 14, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision12 affirming in toto Resolution No. 973277 of the Commission. The appellate court held:

"It is a time-honored rule that the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts, tribunals, or administrative bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers. Unlike appellate courts, they can weigh such testimony in clear observance of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial or hearing. Thus, absent any showing that they have overlooked facts of substance and value that if considered might affect the result, their findings must be given weight and respect.

In the present case, nothing significant has been shown to convince this Court that the Commission acted with bias or ignored something of substance that could have, in any degree, warranted an exoneration of petitioner from the charges hurled against him.

It bears mentioning that respondent victim is a public school teacher. If she is not motivated by the truth, she would not have subjected herself to the rigors of a hearing before the Commission and airing in public matters that affect her honor. It is hard to conceive that respondent would reveal and admit the shameful and humiliating experience she had undergone if it were not true. In any case, the fact that petitioner could not proffer any explanation as to why respondent and the prosecution witnesses would falsely testify against him logically proves that no improper motive impelled them to accuse the former of such serious offense as sexual harassment.

x x x           x x x           x x x

Petitioner, in the present case, may not successfully plead violation of his right to due process as he, in fact, participated at the pre-trial, agreed to matters therein taken up, attended the hearing, and lengthily cross-examined the prosecution witnesses.

Anent petitioner's contention that the decision of the Commission was in conflict with newspaper reports of a decision dismissing the case against him for insufficiency of evidence, suffice it to state that what the movant considers as a decision is merely a newspaper report. Newspaper accounts and clippings are hearsay and have no evidentiary value. (People vs. Aguel, 97 SCRA 795)."13

Rebuffed in his bid for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision, petitioner filed the instant petition, and as grounds therefor alleges:

"I

THE RELIANCE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ON THE THEORY THAT FINDINGS OF QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES ARE GIVEN CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT, IS MISPLACED IN VIEW OF THE PERTINENT FACTS OF THE CASE.

II

A SIMILAR ADMINISTRATIVE CASE WAS INSTITUTED IN AND INVESTIGATED BY THE D.E.C.S. AND A RESOLUTION WAS RENDERED DISMISSING THE CASE AGAINST PETITIONER.

III

THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PETITIONER WERE ALL EYE-WITNESSES TO THE ACTUAL INCIDENT, WHICH CAST DOUBT ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE RESPONDENT'S TESTIMONY."14

Petitioner contends that the oft-cited rule - the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the x x x administrative bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers - finds no application in the present case. According to petitioner, the failure of the CSC Commissioners to "personally observe the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses" and their reliance solely on Atty. Buena's recommendation and notes should have discouraged the Court of Appeals from giving weight to the findings of the Commission. Petitioner also argues that respondent engaged in forum shopping by filing her affidavit-complaint with the DECS-RO XI and CSC-RO XI; and that the Court of Appeals should have considered in his favor the DECS-RO XI's resolution dismissing the administrative case against him. Finally, petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erroneously gave credence to the "hearsay" testimonies of Melencio Umacob, respondent's husband, and Venus Mariano, secretary of the Assistant Division Superintendent of the Davao City Schools. These witnesses testified that respondent narrated to them the events concerning the sexual harassment committed against her by petitioner.

For her part, respondent reiterates the ruling of the Court of Appeals that in reviewing administrative cases, the appellate court is traditionally sanctioned to subscribe to the findings of the lower court or administrative body or agency since it is in a better position to determine the credibility of witnesses. As to the alleged "act of forum-shopping," petitioner claims that in pursuing redress of her grievances, she sought refuge both in the court and in the Commission for she believed they are the proper fora for her criminal and administrative complaints. And lastly, respondent counters that the Commission did not err in giving more credence to the testimonies of her witnesses, stressing that petitioner's witnesses are biased, they being his subordinates.

During the pendency of this case in this Court, petitioner submitted the decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 5, Davao City, acquitting him of the crime of acts of lasciviousness which arose from the same incident involved in the present administrative case.

The petition is bereft of merit.

In assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner is actually urging us not to give credence to the factual findings of the Commission on the ground that the Commissioners did not personally hear the case.

The fact that the Commission assigned Atty. Buena to hear and receive evidence does not render its factual findings unworthy of credence. In laying down the precedent that the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by trial courts or administrative bodies rather than by appellate courts, this Court merely recognizes that the trial court or the administrative body as a trier of facts is in a better position to assess the demeanor of the witnesses and the credibility of their testimonies as they were within its proximal view during the hearing or investigation. At any rate, it cannot be gainsaid that the term "administrative body or agency" includes the subordinate officials upon whose hand the body or agency delegates a portion of its authority. Included therein are the hearing officers through whose eyes and ears the administrative body or agency observes the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses and listens to their testimonies.15

It must be emphasized that the appointment of competent officers to hear and receive evidence is commonly resorted to by administrative bodies or agencies in the interest of an orderly and efficient disposition of administrative cases. This Court, in American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents,16 ruled:

"Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made."

The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that to "give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.

In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of Patents. Apart from the circumstance that the point involved is procedural and not jurisdictional, petitioners have not shown in what manner they have been prejudiced by the proceedings."

Under our jurisprudence, an administrative agency may employ other persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to receive evidence, conduct hearing and make reports on the basis of which the agency shall render its decision. Such a procedure is a practical necessity. Corollarily, in a catena of cases, this Court laid down the cardinal requirements of due process in administrative proceedings, one of which is that "the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate."17 Thus, it is logical to say that this mandate was rendered precisely to ensure that in cases where the hearing or reception of evidence is assigned to a subordinate, the body or agency shall not merely rely on his recommendation but instead shall personally weigh and assess the evidence which the said subordinate has gathered. In the case at bar, it is evident that the Commission itself evaluated in detail the evidence of both parties as reported by Atty. Buena. In fact, in laying down its conclusion, it made constant reference to the testimonies of the parties and of their witnesses and to the documentary evidence presented.

It must be addressed that, the Commission's act of delegating the authority to hear and receive evidence to Atty. Buena is not without legal basis. Section 47, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987) provides that the Commission may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct an investigation on the complaint filed by a private citizen against a government official or employee. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.

Going further, petitioner complains that he was not furnished a copy of Atty. Buena's notes and recommendation. The Court cannot empathize with him. In Ruiz v. Drilon,18 we unequivocally held that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendation of any investigating committee created to inquire into the charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against him during the hearing.19 Besides, Atty. Buena's findings and recommendation are internal communications between him and the Commission and, therefore, confidential. In Pefianco v. Moral,20 this Court held:

"Respondent's (Moral) counsel is reminded that the Report of the DECS Investigating Committee is not an integral part of the Decision itself x x x [t]he report is an internal communication between the Investigating Committee and the DECS Secretary, and therefore, confidential until the latter had already read and used the same in making his own determination of the facts and applicable law of the case, to be expressed in the Decision he may make.

The Report remains an internal and confidential matter to be used as part - although not controlling - of the basis for the decision. Only when the party adversely affected by the decision has filed and perfected an appeal to the Civil Service Commission may all the records of the case, including the aforesaid Report be forwarded to the CSC. In the latter appellate tribunal, the respondent's counsel may be allowed to read and/or be given a copy of the Report to enable the appellant to file an intelligent and exhaustive appellant's Brief Memorandum."

Petitioner's second argument requires no lengthy discussion. First, he did not raise the issue of forum-shopping before the Commission.21 It bears emphasis that respondent merely furnished the DECS-RO XI a copy of her affidavit-complaint. And second, we surveyed the records and there is nothing therein which supports petitioner's claim that the DECS-RO XI dismissed respondent's affidavit-complaint. The resolution22 of the DECS mainly recommended to the Regional Director of the DECS-RO XI the dropping of the case. A recommendatory resolution does not have the effect of actually disposing of a case. Its function is merely to advise the disciplining authority of what action should be taken or what penalty should be imposed. It is not controlling and the disciplining authority may or may not conform with the recommended action.

On petitioner's assertion that the testimony of respondent's witnesses are hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence, we are constrained to hold a different view. A reading of the testimonies of Umacob and Mariano shows that they were not presented to prove the truth of respondent's accusations against petitioner, but only to establish the fact that respondent narrated to them what transpired between her and petitioner. While it is true that the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made.23 Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.24

Significantly, respondent herself and her witnesses were present during the hearing of the case. Hence, petitioner was given the opportunity to cross-examine them. The real basis for the exclusion of hearsay evidence lies in the fact that a hearsay testimony is not subject to the tests which can ordinarily be applied for the ascertainment of the truth of testimony, since the declarant is not present and available for cross-examination.25

Lastly, petitioner cannot find solace in the dismissal of the criminal case against him. Long-ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case against an accused who is a respondent in an administrative case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence does not foreclose the administrative proceeding against him or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. In dismissing the case, the court is simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction because of the presumption of innocence which the Constitution guarantees an accused.26However, in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.27 Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.28 After a more incisive scrutiny of the records, we are convinced that petitioner's culpability has been proven by substantial evidence. Respondent's testimony was found by the Commission to be "natural, straightforward, spontaneous and convincing."29 Unlike petitioner's testimony, that of respondent is replete with details consistent with human nature. Clearly, the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 5, Davao City cannot bind this Court in the disposition of the instant administrative case.30

In sum, we find no reason to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. While it is unfotunate that petitioner will lose his job because of a moment's indiscretion, this Court shall not flinch in imposing upon him the severe penalty of dismissal. As Schools Division Superintendent, petitioner is bound by a high standard of work ethics. By succumbing to his moral perversity, he failed to live up to such standard. Indeed, he provided a justifiable ground for his dismissal from the service.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Justice Artemio Tuquero and concurred in by Justices Eubolo Verzola and Candido Rivera, Rollo, pp. 22-31.

2 Annex "C" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 44-45.

3 Annex "D" of the Petiton, Rollo, p. 46.

4 Annex "H" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 68.

5 Annex "G" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 49-50.

6 Rollo, pp. 4-5.

7 Annex "M" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 74-75.

8 Resolution dated June 5, 1995, Annex "N" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 76-80.

9 Rollo, pp. 82-88.

10 Rollo, pp. 102-108.

11 Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 28.

12 Rollo, pp. 23-31.

13 Rollo, pp. 29-31.

14 Petition, Rollo, p. 10.

15 "The necessary rule (the one who decides must hear) does not preclude practicable administrative procedure in obtaining the aid of assistants in the department. Assistants may prosecute inquiries. Evidence may be taken by an examiner. Evidence thus taken may be sifted and analyzed by competent subordinates. Arguments may be oral or written. The requirements are not technical. But there must be a hearing in a substantial sense. And to give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence, the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them." (Morgan vs. United States of America, 298 US 468-482 [OCT 1935], 80 L. ed 1288-1296)

16 67 SCRA 287 (1975); Skyworld Condominium Owners Association, Inc. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 211 SCRA 565 (1992); National Union of Printing Workers vs. Asia Printing, et al., 99 Phil 589 (1956); Cebu Transit Co. vs. Jereza, 58 Phil 760 (1933).

17 Lupo v. Administrative Action Board, 190 SCRA 69 (1990).

18 209 SCRA 695 (1992).

19 Pefianco v. Moral, 322 SCRA 439 (2000).

20 Ibid.

21 Gardose v. Tarroza, 290 SCRA 186 (1998).

22 Rollo, pp. 74-75.

23 People v. Cusi, Jr., 14 SCRA 944 (1965).

24 Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 607 (1997).

25 Francisco, Evidence, 1996 Ed., 246; 20 Am Jur. 400-401.

26 Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1 (1993).

27 Vedaña v. Valencia 295 SCRA 1 (1998) Cortes v. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423 (1998); Lorena v. Encomienda 302 SCRA 632 (1999); Lachica v. Flordeliza, 254 SCRA 278 (1996); Manila Central Line Corp. v. Manila Central Line Free Workers Union-National Federation of Labor, 290 SCRA 690 (1998).

28 Heirs of E.B. Roxas, Inc. v. Tolentino 167 SCRA 334 (1988).

29 Resolution No. 973277, Rollo, p. 85

30 Moreno v. Bragat 293 SCRA 581 (1998); Office of the Court Administrator v. Matas 247 SCRA 9 (1995); Agpalo, The Law of Public Officers, First Ed. 1998, p. 367.

An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450 [1977]).